It’s Not Even a Bubble: Foreclosures on the Rise

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Editor’s Comment: Realtors and Banks want you to think that you need to buy now before the  market takes off and prices spiral upward. I say don’t believe a word of it.

If you are buying to live in a house, you should know that the actual and shadow inventory of foreclosures will keep intense downward pressure on housing prices for many years to come. Some estimates, including mine, are that the housing market might take more than 10 years to recover and that it could be as much as 20 years. This is why so many people are renting rather than buying. Rental values are going up because there is actual demand for renting.

If you are buying for investment, see the above paragraph. You might have a viable investment if you are willing to stay in for the long pull and you are willing to take on the duties and obligations of a landlord.

If you are selling and you are waiting for the market to bottom out, or maybe you see a spike and you think you’ll wait just a little bit longer to get a higher price, forget it. Sellers, as realtors will even tell you, are mostly unrealistic about the sales price of their property. This is because they bought or once saw the price of their property at twice the price as the offers now. The reason is simple — prices went up but values stayed the same or even declined. The difference between prices and values has never been as big a deal as it is now.

Prices can be forced up by actual demand but never as much as we saw from the late 90’s to the peak at 2006. The prices went up because the payments went down or appeared to go down.

Free money was everywhere and nobody was reading the fine print or even questioning why Banks would offer such deals as teaser rates and other nonsensical things to entice people into signing up for mortgages, whose payment would eventually rise above their household income or where the payment was the equivalent of doubling the interest rate because they were going to be sitting with a home that declined to its real value.

The truth is that even if a recovery eventually occurs, it will be 20+ years before we see those prices again. And that will only result from inflation which eventually will pick up steam.

And by all means remember what I have been writing about these last few weeks. The title they are offering you, with a deed signed by a bank, or even a satisfaction of mortgage signed by a bank may not be worth the paper it is written on and the title policy normally excludes that sort of risk from what they  are covering in title insurance. So if you don’t pose the hard questions and negotiate a real title policy that covers all the known risks, you could be the angry owner of a white elephant that cannot be sold later nor refinanced.

From CNBC:

Home prices rose, just barely, in the second quarter of this year annually for the first time since 2007, according to online real estate firm Zillow. That prompted the popular site to call a “bottom” to home prices nationally. The increase was a mere 0.2 percent, but in today’s touch and go housing recovery, that was enough.

Nearly one third of the 167 markets Zillow tracks in this survey saw annual price gains from a year ago.

“After four months with rising home values and increasingly positive forecast data, it seems clear that the country has hit a bottom in home values,” said Zillow Chief Economist Dr. Stan Humphries. “The housing recovery is holding together despite lower-than-expected job growth, indicating that it has some organic strength of its own.”

Zillow’s report, which compares prices of homes sold in the same neighborhood, also showed a stronger 2.1 percent gain quarter to quarter, which is the biggest uptick since 2005. The biggest price gains, however, are in the markets that saw the biggest price drops during the latest housing crash. Phoenix, for example, saw a 12 percent annual price gain on the Zillow index.

That has other analysts claiming that the overall surge in national prices is due to price bubbles in certain markets.

“Strong demand, particularly in areas of California, Arizona and Nevada, are pushing up home prices very quickly in the short-term. And because many of the home purchases in these areas are cash transactions, there appears to be less braking of prices by our current appraisal system than seen in other parts of the country,” noted Thomas Popik, research director for Campbell Surveys and chief analyst for HousingPulse. “The trend raises the distinct possibility of housing price bubbles emerging in some of these hot housing markets.”

The supply of foreclosed properties for sale has been dropping steadily, as lenders try to modify more loans or actively pursue foreclosure alternatives, like short sales (where the home is sold for less than the value of the mortgage). Investors, eager to take advantage of the hot rental market, are having to spread out to more markets in order to find the best deals.

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5/1 jumbo ARM 2.86% 3.14%
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“We were heavily into Phoenix early in the cycle. Those markets are heating up,” said James Breitenstein, CEO of investment firm Landsmith in an interview on CNBC Monday. “We see a shift more to the east, states like North Carolina, Michigan, Florida.”

While home prices on the Zillow index are improving most in formerly distressed markets, like Miami, Orlando and much of California, they are still dropping in other non-distressed markets, like St. Louis (down 4 percent annually) Chicago (down 5.8 percent annually) and Philadelphia (down 3.5 percent annually).

“Those people looking at current results and calling a bottom are being dangerously short-sighted,” said Michael Feder, CEO of Radar Logic, a real estate data and analytics company. “Not only are the immediate signs inconclusive, but the broad dynamics are still quite scary. We think housing is still a short.”

Radar Logic sees price increases as well, but blames that on mild winter weather that temporarily boosted demand. This means there will be payback, or weakness in prices during the latter half of this year. And even without the weather hypothesis, they see further trouble ahead:

“On the supply side, higher prices will entice financial institutions to sell more of their inventories of foreclosed homes and allow households that were previously unable to sell due to negative equity to put their homes on the market. As a result, the supply of homes for sale will increase, placing downward pressure on prices. On the demand side, rising prices could reduce investment buying,” according to the Radar Logic report.

Investors are driving much of the housing market today, anywhere from one third to one quarter of home sales. That makes these supposedly national price gains more precarious than ever, because they are based on a finite supply of distressed homes and that supply is dependent on the nation’s big banks. First time home buyers, who should be 40 percent of the market, are barely making up one third, and millions of potential move-up buyers are trapped in their homes due to negative and near negative equity.

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Homeowner Associations On the Attack, As Predicted Here

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Editor’s Comment:  Thousands of homeowner associations are filing foreclosure actions on banks owning property that are not paying the monthly assessments or special assessments. We’ve written about this before and encouraged the associations to do so.

The irony is very interesting here. The Banks, having never funded a loan and never purchased a loan, managed to foreclose a loan they never had and get title, possession and even eviction if the rightful homeowner failed to leave as ordered by the bogus pretender lender. Now they must pay the taxes, insurance, and maintain the place as it is written in the Declaration of Condominium, or Community restrictions. AND they must pay monthly “Dues” or assessments as well as special assessments.

So that free house the bank got by submitting a credit bid even though they were never the creditor and never had the right to call themselves a creditor, and even though the debt was either unsecured or paid off, now they re suddenly required to pay the piper.

After all, they say they are the homeowner now. So the banks, knowing this would happen have transferred title into “bankruptcy remote vehicles” which are in fact vehicles for avoiding creditors. A transfer in fraud of creditors is intended to be prosecuted by the Association or any other person effected and the association this time is neither intimidated nor unwilling to press their claim. These are the same banks that decimated their neighborhood. The battle is on.

I wonder how this disclosed to Canadian and other investors who think they are getting clear title? This is only one of several reasons why they are getting clouded title — the pendency of assessments.

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Pensions to Be Slashed By Fake Losses on Mortgage Bonds

 

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Editor’s Comment:  

Many of the most conservative, pro-business people who think they escaped the travesty of the mortgage scam and meltdown are in for a big surprise starting this year. Pension funds were the investors. And they lost big. In some cases the fund managers were in bed with the investment bankers who were peddling this crap.

If you read the Wall Street Journal they explain how the already underfunded pension funds (due to accounting tricks that were illegal and then made legal) are now unable to escape the reality admitting the losses being pitched over the fence at them by investment bankers who are rolling in money from bailouts, insurance (that should have paid the pension fund), credit default swaps (that should have paid the pension fund).

Deep in the articles is a description of exactly what is happening in simple math terms. That description applies equally to the intentionally manipulated underwriting standards to assure the loans would fail. If you or I did this, we would be in jail. Instead Jamie Dimon sits on the Board of the New York Fed. what a country. Millions of people are thrown out of their homes, cities and counties go bankrupt, most from mythical losses they don’t understand.

It all comes from what are called yield spreads, premiums and losses from changes in yield. Under normal protocol investors protect themselves by using various hedge products.

But the investment bankers didn’t make the investors the beneficiary of those hedges, they made themselves the beneficiaries instead. Since they were the agents of the investors they should and still can be forced to apply those proceeds, and pay them to the pension funds, which in turn will reduce the amount due under each loan that was funded.

Sources tell me that not only are the pension funds being forced to accept losses on loans they never owned until it was time to foreclose, but that some of the “bets” that went bad are being tacked on as additional fees or losses.

The pension funds are therefore suffering from two huge write-downs — one from the change in accounting rules that allowed them to kick the can down the road (passed 30+ Years ago), and the other from losses that don’t actually exist but were convenient for the banks to assert when they asked for bailouts.

Pension funds become underfunded automatically when the interest and dividends they get paid shrink. In order to bring up income they need to invest more. Neither the companies nor the pensioners are doing that so there is a shortfall. So when interest rates go down, someone must invest more money to earn the interest required to pay to the pensioners. Nobody is making that investment.

Example: If interest rates were 6% when the pension funds made commitments to retiring employees and the amount of money promised those retiring employees just happened to be $60,000, the pension fund would need $1 million invested (over simplifying by taking out amortization of principal). If interest rates fall to 3%, then the $1 million fund is only getting $30,000 per year. In order to raise it back up to $60,000 per year, the fund needs $2 million invested at 3% to stay fully funded. Without additional contribution, there is a $1 million shortfall.

Right now interest rates, manipulated as they are have never been lower which means that pension funds are getting less income than they were getting before, and since nobody is putting in more money to cover the difference the pension fund is underfunded.

When pension funds must declare the losses on mortgage bonds they will be far more underfunded than currently appears and the amount received by each pensioner will be slashed. Say thank you to Wall Street for that.

Curious coincidence: This same analysis applies to the tier 2 yield spread premium grabbed by the investment bank under false pretenses from investors. For purposes of this article you can spell investor as “Pension Fund.”

When the fund manager for the pension fund gave the investment banker $1 million in our example above, he was expecting a 6% return on investment.

But in the most unbridled breach of trust ever recorded in Wall Street history, the investment banker instead invested half the money at twice the rate.

So they only funded $500,000 in “mortgage” loans carrying a nominal interest rate of 12%, even though they had received $1 million and they pocketed the other $500,000 as “trading profits.”Anyone with any investment knowledge understands that this was (1) an immediate loss of $500,000 to the investor (Pension Fund) and (2) a probable loss of the other $500,000 or most of it after the obvious market crash this would cause.

Of course the people accepting those 12% loans were extremely poor credit risks and were literally guaranteed to default.

So Wall Street took the other half of the money they stole from the pension fund, unknown to the pension fund manager, and bet against the mortgages that were underwritten.

Instead of making the pension fund the beneficiary of that protection the investment banker made himself the beneficiary of the insurance, hedge or credit default swap.

And instead of informing the pension fund manager of the loss in a report in which the fund manager could detect what was really happening, the banks announced that the BANKS had suffered trillions of dollars in losses that never happened except in the mythical world of “cash equivalent” derivatives.

So if you are looking for the rest of your pension income you were promised, you can find it on Wall Street.

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Garfield Continuum White Paper Explains Economics of Securitization of Residential Mortgages

SEE The Economics and Incentives of Yield Spread Premiums and Credit Default Swaps

March 23, 2010: Editor’s Note: The YSP/CDS paper is intentionally oversimplified in order to demonstrate the underlying economics of securitization as it was employed in the last decade.

To be clear, there are several things I was required to do in order to simplify the financial structure for presentation that would be understandable. Even so, it takes careful study and putting pencil to paper in order to “get it.”

In any reasonable analysis the securitization scheme was designed to cheat investors and borrowers in their respective positions as creditors and debtors. The method used was deceit, producing (a) an asymmetry of information and (b) a trust relationship wherein the trust was abused by the sellers of the financial instruments being promoted.

So before I get any more comments about it, here are some clarifying comments about my method.

1. The effects of amortization. The future values of the interest paid are overstated in the example and the premiums or commissions are over-stated in real dollars, but correct as they are expressed in percentages.

2. The effects of present values: As stated in the report, the future value of interest paid and the future value of principal received are both over-statements as they would be expressed in dollars today. Accordingly, the premium, commission or profit is correspondingly higher in the example than it would be in real life.

3. The effects of isolating a single loan versus the reality of a pool of loans. The examples used are not meant to convey the impression that any single loan was securitized by itself. Thus the example of the investment and the loan are hypothetical wherein an average jumbo loan is isolated from the pool from one of the lower tranches and an average bond is isolated from a pool of investors, and the isolated the loan is allocated to in part to only one of the many investors who in real life, would actually own it.

The following is the conclusion extracted directly from the white paper:

Based upon the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is apparent that the securitization of mortgages over the last decade has been conducted on false premises, false representations, resulting in intentional and inevitable negative outcomes for the debtors and creditors in virtually every transaction. The clear provisions for damages and other remedies provided under the Truth in Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act are sufficient to make most homeowners whole if they are applied. Since the level 2 yield spread premium (resulting from the difference in money advanced by the creditor (investor) and the money funded for mortgages) also give rise to claim from investors, it will be up to the courts how to apportion the the actual money damages. Examination of most loans that were securitized indicates that they are more than offset by undisclosed profits, kickbacks, fees, premiums, and rebates. The balance of “damages” due under applicable federal lending and securities laws will require judicial intervention to determine apportionment between debtors and creditors.

Securitization and TILA Audits: You Can’t Do One without the Other

Article below submitted From the desk of Brad Keiser:

Editor’s note: This is a perfect example of why ignoring the complexities of securitization leaves all the red meat on the table. The commingling of funds that is cited in the article below is exactly what I have I have been talking about , exactly why the pretender lenders balk at a full accounting, and exactly why a full forensic analysis (like the one Brad will be presenting later this  month) is essential if you are going to battle.

see: Brad Keiser\’s Forensic Analysis Workshop

It is not enough to know about securitization. You must understand what effect it had on the transaction. It sounds counter-intuitive to say that when you know the homeowner has not made a  payment, the obligation might still be considered performing and NOT in default because the payments were made to the creditor.

This does not automatically  mean that you get a free house. But it does mean that the real creditor who has advanced the money, the creditor that the debtor owes money to, is the real party in interest and they might no longer be secured depending upon the nature of the payment and the handling of the accounts — which is why I think that accountants would be ideal candidates for Brad’s workshop.

Securitized loans are not a separate animal from the discrepancies that are revealed in TILA audits. They impact the TILA audit in a way that dwarfs all other factors. Like the fact that the $5,000 yield spread premium paid to the mortgage broker is just a small fraction of the yield spread pocketed by the investment banking crowd behind the curtain.

And what about the very significant impact of those spreads and premiums combined with the impact of a reset on the life of the loan, and the false appraisal? The APR is misstated in virtually every securitized loan not by small amounts or fractions but by multiples of more than 100% of the loan principal in some cases.

Moody’s warns on GMAC mortgage bond servicing
Thu Mar 4, 2010 3:07pm EST
Related News

* Moody’s upgrades GMAC on US Tsy capital infusion
Fri, Feb 5 2010

NEW YORK, March 4 (Reuters) – Moody’s Investors Service on Thursday said it may downgrade portions of 125 residential mortgage bonds based on unusual “cash management arrangements” of GMAC Mortgage LLC, which services loans in the securities.

The rating company said GMAC commingled cash flows from multiple bonds in a single custodial account, Moody’s said in a statement. This allowed GMAC to use cash from loans in one bond for principal and interest payments on another, it said.

By allowing the commingling, it “increases the likelihood that some RMBS deals may not be able to recover the amounts ‘borrowed’ by the servicer to fund advances or another RMBS deal if a servicer bankruptcy were to occur,” Moody’s said.

This could give rise to competing claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, the rater said.

Downgrades based on mortgage servicing, rather than credit, may add to concerns of bond investors who have been long accustomed to harsh rating cuts as delinquencies and foreclosures increase losses.

GMAC Mortgage is a unit of Residential Capital LLC. Residential Capital is owned by GMAC Inc.

For some commentary see this link:
http://market-ticker.denninger.net/

Brad Keiser

(513)289-5353

Yield Spread Premiums Prove Appraisal Fraud: The Key to Understanding The Mortgage Mess

OK I’m upping the ante here with some techno-speak. But I’ll try to make it as simple as possible.

YIELD is the percentage or dollar return on investment. For example,

  1. if you buy a bond for $1,000 and the interest rate is 5%, the yield is 5%.
  2. You are expecting to receive $50 per year in interest, which is your yield, assuming the bond is repaid in full when it is due.
  3. Another example is if you buy the same bond for $900.
  4. The interest rate is still 5% which means it still pays $50 per year in interest. But instead of investing $1,000, you have invested $900 and you are still getting $50 per year in interest.
  5. Your yield has increased because $50 is more than 5% of $900.
  6. In fact, it is a yield of 5.55% (yield base). You compute it by dividing the dollar amount of the interest paid ($50) by the dollar amount of the investment ($900). $50/$900=5.55%.
  7. But you are also getting repaid the full $1,000 when the bond comes due so adding to the money you get in interest is the gain you made on the bond (assuming you hold it to maturity). That difference in our example is $100, which is the difference between $900 and $1,000.
  8. If the bond is a ten year bond, for simplicity sake we will divide the extra $100 you are going to make by 10 years which means you will be getting an extra $10 per year.
  9. If you divide that extra $10 by your investment of $900 you are getting an average annual gain of 1.1%. Adding the base yield of 5.5% to the extra yield on gain of 1.1%, you get a total yield of 6.6%.
  10. The difference between the interest rate on the bond (5%) and the real yield to you as the investor (6.6%) is 1.6%, which could be expressed as a yield spread.

YIELD SPREAD can be expressed in either principal dollar terms or in interest rate. In the above example the dollar value of the yield spread is $100, being the difference between the par value of the bond (the amount that you hope will be repaid in full) and the amount you actually invested.

For decades there has been an illegal trick played between originating lenders using yield spread that resutled in an additional commission or kickback paid to the mortgage broker, commonly referred to as a yield spread premium. This occurs when the broker, with full consent of the “lender” steers the homeowner into a loan product that is more expensive than the one the homeowner would get from another more honest broker and lender.

  1. So for example, if you qualify for a 5% (interest) thirty year fixed loan, but the broker convinces you that a different loan is the only one you can qualify for or that the different loan is “better” than the other one, we shall say in our example that he steers you into a loan for 7%.
  2. The yield spread is 2% which may not sound like much, but it means everything to your loan broker and originating lender.
  3. The kickback to the broker is often several hundred or evens several thousand dollars — which is the very thing consumers were intended to be protected against in TILA (Truth in Lending Act).
  4. By not disclosing the yield spread premium he deprived you of the knowledge that you get get better terms elsewhere and he didn’t bother tell you that instead of working for you he was working for himself.
  5. Sometimes this is discovered right on the HUD statement disguised amongst the myriad of numbers that you didn’t understand when you signed the closing papers. They were required by federal law to disclose this to you and they are required to send you back the money that was paid as the kickback and for a variety of reasons it is grounds to rescind the transaction, making the Deed of Trust or mortgage unenforceable or void.
  6. The kickback is called a yield spread premium in the language of the industry. On this phase of the transaction we’ll call it Yield Spread Premium #1 or YSP1.

Now we get to the securitization part of the “loan.” If you will go back to the beginning of this article you will see that the investor was seeking and expecting $50 per year in interest. Buying the deal for $1,000 gives the investor the 5% YIELD he was seeking.

What Wall Street did was work backwards from the $50, and asked the following stupid and illegal question: What is the least amount of money we could fund in mortgages and still show the $50 in income? Answer: Anything we can get homeowners to sign.

  1. In our simple example, if they get a homeowner to sign a note calling for 10% interest, then all Wall Street needs to come up with is $500. Because 10% of $500 is $50 and $50 is what the investor was expecting.
  2. Wall Street sells the bond for $1,000 and funds $500 leaving themselves with a YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM of 5%+ or a value of $500, which is just as illegal as the kickbacks described above. We will call this YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM #2.
  3. They take $50 out of this $500 YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM and put into a reserve fund so they can pay the interest whether the homeowner pays or not. That is why they don’t want homeowners and investors to get together, because they will discover that the investor was paid the first year out of the reserve and payments from homeowners and then stopped receiving payment even though there was continued revenue.
  4. But Wall Street also had another problem. Since they had siphoned off $450 and probably sent most of it off-shore in an off balance sheet transaction (to a Structured Investment vehicle [SIV]). the time would eventually come when the investor would want his $1,000 repaid in full just like they said it would. That would leave them $450 short and possibly criminally liable for taking $1,000 to fund a $500 mortgage.
  5. So you can see that if the homeowner pays every cent owed, this is bad news to the people on Wall Street. They would be required to give the investor $1,000 when all they received from the homeowner was $500. Therefore they had to make certain that they (a) had a method of covering the difference that would give them “cover” when demand was made for the $1,000 and (b) a method of triggering that coverage.
  6. They also needed to make it as difficult as possible for investors to get together to fire the agent of the partnership (SPV) formed to issue the bonds they bought, which they did in the express terms of the bond indenture. So logistically they needed to keep investors away from investors and to keep investors away from borrowers so that none of them could compare notes.
  7. To cover the money they took from the investor they purchased insurance contracts (credit default swaps is one form). They wrote the terms themselves so that when a certain percentage of the pool failed they could declare it a failure and stop paying the ivnestors anything. The failure of the pool would trigger the insurance contracts.
  8. Under normal circumstances if you buy a car, you can insure it once and if it is wrecked you get the money for it. Imagine if you could buy insurance on it thirty times over at discounted rates. So you smash the car up and instead of receiving $30,000 for the car you receive $900,000. That is what Wall Street did with your mortgage. This was not risk taking much less excessive risk taking. It was fraud.
  9. So IF THE LOAN FAILED or was declared a failure as being part of a pool that went into failure, the insurance paid off.
  10. Hence the only way they could cover themselves for taking $1,000 on a $500 loan was by making absolutely certain the loan would fail.
  11. It wasn’t enough to use predatory loan tactics to trick people into loans that resulted in resets that were higher than their annual income. Wall Street still had the problem of people somehow making the payments anyway or getting bailed out by parents or even the government.
  12. They had to make sure the homeowner didn’t want the loan anymore and the only way to do that was to make certain that the homeowner would end up in a position wherein far more was owed on the loan than the house ever was worth and far more than it would ever be worth in the foreseeable future.
  13. They had to make sure that the federal government didn’t step in and help the homeowners, so they created a scheme wherein the federal government used all its resources to bail out Wall Street which had created the myth of losses on loan defaults for notes and mortgages they never owned. It would then become politically and economically impossible for the government to bail out the homeowners.
  14. This is why principal reduction is off the table. If these loans become performing again, insurance might not be triggered and the investors might demand the full $1,000. With insurance on the $500 loan they stand to collect $15,000. without it, they stand to lose $1000. There is no middle ground.
  15. So they needed a method to get the “market” to rise in values as much as possible to levels they were sure would be unsustainable. That was easy. They blacklisted the appraisers who wanted to practice honestly and paid appraisers, mortgage brokers and “originating lenders” (often owned by Wall Street firms) 3-10 times their normal fees to get these loans closed. They created “lenders” that were not banks or funding the loans that had no assets and then bankrupted them.
  16. With the demand for the AAA rated and insured MBS at an all-time high the demand went out to mortgage brokers not to bring them a certain number of mortgages but to bring in a certain dollar amount of obligations because Wall Street had already sold the bonds “forward” (meaning they didn’t have the underlying loans yet).
  17. With demand for loans exceeding the supply of houses, they successfully created the “market”conditions to inflate the market values on a broad scale thus giving them plausible deniability as to the appraisal fraud on any one particular house.

Whether you call it appraisal fraud or simply an undisclosed yield spread premium, the result is the same. That money is due back to the homeowner and there is a liability to the investors that they don’t know about. Why are the fund managers so timid about pressing the claims? Perhaps because they were not fooled.

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