RESCISSION Revalidated in CA Decision

Posted on July 22, 2016 by Neil Garfield

1sT Appellate District US Bank v Naifeh: “… we conclude that a borrower may rescind the loan transaction under TILA without filing a lawsuit, but when the rescission is challenged in litigation, the court has authority to decide whether the rescission notice is timely and whether the the procedure set forth in the TILA (sic) should be modified in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.”

The jig was up when the Jesinoski decision was rendered — courts cannot re-write the statute, although they can consider minor changes in procedure whose purpose is to comply with the statute, not ignore. it.

HE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see US BANK VS NAIFEH

In a carefully worded opinion at least one appellate court seems to be moving closer to the view I have expressed here on these pages. But they still left some simple propositions unclear.

It remains my opinion that a recorded rescission forces those who would challenge it to file suit to remove the rescission from the title record. In that suit they would need to plead and prove standing — without using the note or mortgage to do it because rescission renders them void at the moment the letter of rescission is mailed..

  1. The decision clearly says that for the rescission to be effective (deriving its authority from 15 USC §1635 and the unanimous SCOTUS decision in Jesinoski v Countrywide), the borrower need NOT file suit. That means it is effective when mailed (NOT FILED) just as the statute says and just as the late Justice Scalia penned in the Jesinoski case.
  2. The decision anticipates a challenge to rescission — which in and of itself is recognition that the rescission IS effective and that something must be done about it.
  3. But the court does not clarify what is meant when it said “when the rescission is challenged in litigation.” Clearly the decision stands for the proposition that the rescission stands as effective unless challenged in litigation. The unanswered question is ‘what form of litigation?’
  4. If we apply ordinary rules of procedure, then the decision dovetails with my opinions, the statute and the US Supreme Court decision. The rescission is effective when mailed. So the “challenge” must be “in litigation.” But whether that means a lawsuit to vacate or a motion challenging the rescission is unclear. A “motion challenging the rescission” is problematic if it does not set forth the standing of the party making the challenge and if it does not set forth the plain facts that the rescission, under law, is already effective but should be vacated, then it is trying to get the court to arrive at the position that the rescission can be ignored even if it is recorded (a condition not addressed in the opinion).
  5. The claimant challenging the rescission must state a cause of action, if the rescission is recorded, that is in essence a quiet title claim that needs to be framed as an original complaint in a lawsuit. So far the banks have been successful in getting trial judges to IGNORE the rescission rather than remove it as an effective instrument, whether recorded or not. This only compounds title problems already present.
  6. The procedural oddity here is that in foreclosure litigation the court might conclude (erroneously in my opinion) that the beneficiary under the deed of trust had standing to substitute trustee, standing to to have the trustee record a notice of default, and standing to record a notice of sale.
  7. BUT once the rescission is effective, there is absolutely no foundation for a claim of standing based upon the void note, the void mortgage and the consequential void assignments, which even if they were not otherwise void, are void now because the assignment is purporting to transfer something that no longer exists.
  8. Standing vanishes if it is dependent upon presumptions applied from the assignment, endorsement and other attributes wherein false statements are made concerning purchase and sale of the note or mortgage. The note and mortgage are void the moment the rescission is mailed. No reliance on the mortgage, note or any transfer of same can constitute standing, since those documents, as a matter of law, no longer exist.
  9. Hence STANDING TO CHALLENGE RESCISSION must logically be dependent upon the ability of the challenger to affirmatively plead that they own the debt or obligation and to prove it at a hearing in which evidence is produced. This is the holy grail of foreclosure defense. We know that 99% of the foreclosers do NOT qualify as owners of the actual debt or obligation. They are traveling on legal presumptions as alleged “holders” etc. under the UCC. If the note and mortgage don’t exist then the status of holder is nonexistent and irrelevant.
  10. This court further leaves us in a gray area when it correctly reads that portion of the statute giving the court authority to consider the options, procedurally, but incorrectly states that one of those options is that a Federal Statute that preempts state law could be “modified in light of the facts and circumstances. This is NOT contained in either the statute or the Jesinoski decision. This court is putting far too much weight on the provision of the statute that allows for a petition to the court at which the court could change some of the procedural steps in complying with rescission, and possibly by implication allowing for a challenge to the rescission in order to vacate the legal effectiveness of the rescission.
  11. ANY DECISION ON “PROCEDURE” THAT NULLIFIES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESCISSION WHEN MAILED IS ERRONEOUS.  Any such decision would effectively be eviscerating the entire statute and the opinion of the US Supreme Court. The simple rule of thumb here (heuristic reasoning) is that the rescission is and always will have been effective when mailed. The parts of the statute that deal with procedure can only be related to a party who claims to be the creditor (owner of the debt or obligation) who intends to comply.
  12. Since tender is expressly excluded in the statute and the Jesinoski decision, the change can not require the borrower to tender money — especially when the statute says that no such demand need be considered by the borrower until there is full compliance with the rescission — return of canceled note, release of encumbrance and payment to the borrower of all money ever paid by the borrower for principal, interest, insurance, taxes, and fees.
  13. Hence the changes are limited perhaps granting additional time, or maybe even to credits against what might be due from the homeowner but even that looks like a stretch. The committee notes and subsequent decisions clearly state that the intent of Congress was to prevent any bank from stonewalling the effectiveness of a rescission, which is what judges have been doing despite the Jesinoski decision and the clear wording of the statute.
  14. And this is how we know that the challenge, if brought, must be within the 20 days available for the creditor, “lender” etc to comply with the rescission. Any other interpretation would mean that the rescission was NOT effective upon mailing and would also mean that the owner of the property cannot get a substitute mortgage to pay off any legitimate claim from a true creditor. Such interpretations, while apparently attractive to bank lawyers and judges, are directly contrary to the express wording of the statute and directly contrary tot he express wording of the Jesinoski decision, decided unanimously by SCOTUS. Hence ANY CHALLENGE outside the 20 days is barred by the statute. Just like any action to enforce the TILA duties against the “lender” must be brought within one year of the mailing and receipt of the rescission.
  15. The failure of either the “lender” to comply or the borrower to enforce simply means that after one year, the rescission is still effective (meaning the note and mortgage are void) the claim for enforcement of the duties of the lender is extinguished, and the financial claim of the lender is extinguished. Hence, the infamous free house — not caused by sneaky borrowers but caused instead of malfeasant banks who continue to use their influence to get judges to re-write the law.
  16. But regardless of how one looks at this decision, the Jesinoski decision or the statute one thing is perfectly clear — vacating the rescission is strictly dependent upon timely filing of a challenge in litigation and a hearing on evidence, because the legal presumptions used in determining standing are no longer available in the absence of the the note or mortgage, which were irretrievably rendered void upon mailing of the rescission.

The banks and servicers have so far been successful in pulling the wool over judges eyes, perhaps because judges have long disliked TILA and especially TILA rescission. The jig was up when the Jesinoski decision was rendered — courts cannot re-write the statute, although they can consider minor changes in procedure whose purpose is to comply with the statute, not ignore. it.

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3rd DCA Florida Decides Statute of Limitations: Deutsch Loses

Posted on December 19, 2014 by Neil Garfield

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see Third DCA – Beauvais Decision

In the Third District Court of Appeal, Florida, the Court decided Deutsch v Beauvais against the alleged “creditor” Deutsch.. Dozens of appellate decisions across the country are reversing a long-standing pattern of rubber stamping trial courts who exceeded their discretion, authority or even jurisdiction. This case affirms the trial court’s decision that the action was barred by the statute of limitations but reverses the trial court’s decision that the mortgage was null and void. How they reached this decision is going to be a matter in dispute and possibly the subject of a Florida Supreme Court decision soon.

The basic thrust of the decision is this: an unenforceable mortgage is not void. This seems counter-intuitive but it is probably correct. The effect is that the unenforceable mortgage remains as an encumbrance or cloud on title such that upon resale or refinance it might require payment to get a satisfaction or release of the mortgage, even though enforcement is barred by the statute of limitations. Other court decisions are struggling with the same issues. The effect on quiet title actions probably is that the declaration of the rights and duties of the parties includes the mortgage in the title chain and does not nullify the mortgage or remove it from the chain of title. Hence an action to nullify the mortgage would be necessary before it could be removed from the chain of title.

Using the logic from this and other cases, a homeowner cannot remove a mortgage from the chain of title by merely asserting that it is unenforceable. The flip side is that a homeowner could easily get the mortgage removed from the chain of title and to get a judgment in which title is declared free and clear of the mortgage encumbrance IF the homeowner proves that the initial transaction was a sham and that the mortgage should not have been signed or released much less recorded.

This is why the logic behind the “unfunded trust” may be crucial to removing the mortgage from the chain of title. If you can prove that there was no loan at the base of the documentary chain, then you are likely to succeed in nullifying the mortgage and then quieting title. Through discovery and deductive reasoning, it is possible to show that there was no loan of money, in FACT, at the base of the chain of documents. As a caveat, I should add that this issue is certainly not entirely resolved. There are competing decisions and views in Florida and across the country.

The basic thrust of this decision is whether the election to accelerate the entire amount due can be abandoned and thus allow future claims on future installments of the alleged loan.  The court cites AM. Bankers, 905 So. 2d 192. The hidden issue is that the association was successful in foreclosing against the homeowner and Deutsch — because there was no effort to withdraw the acceleration of the alleged loan. I think the decision ignores the doctrine of estoppel and prevents the alleged “creditor” from first exercising its “option” to accelerate and then withdrawing it when they lose the case or voluntary dismiss the case.

The court also makes a distinction between a voluntary dismissal and a judgment or involuntary dismissal with prejudice. In the first case, the court decided that the option to reinstate the later installments not barred by the statute of limitations could exist if the dismissal with prejudice, but does not exist where the option is not exercised. This adds wording to the mortgage contract and the applicable statutes. I think it is wrong.

The decision means that a “creditor” who loses or dismisses an action might be able to accelerate and foreclose multiple times until they finally win. It also introduces parole evidence into the recording process and chain of title. I agree that the mortgage is not automatically removed by losing the case. But I don’t agree that the loser can reinstate the action and sue again. It calls for the entire issue of the origination and transfer of the the alleged loan to be re-litigated. I think it conflicts with the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The note, which is the only evidence of the debt, has been rendered unenforceable by the statute of limitations. To say that the mortgage survives as a potentially enforceable instrument on the issue of payment is illogical.

Here are some relevant quotes from the decision:

Where a lender files a foreclosure action upon a borrower’s default, and expressly exercises its contractual right to accelerate all payments, does an involuntary dismissal of that action without prejudice in and of itself negate, invalidate or otherwise “decelerate” the lender’s acceleration of the payments, thereby permitting a new cause of action to be filed based upon a new and subsequent default? [The 3rd DCA answers this question in the negative]

…because the installment nature of the loan payments was never reinstated following the acceleration, there were no “new” payments due and thus there could be no “new” default following the dismissal without prejudice of the initial action.

Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date the acceleration clause is invoked.”).

The supreme court disapproved of the holding in Stadler and approved the Fourth District’s holding in Singleton:

We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District that when a second and separate action for foreclosure is sought for a default that involves a separate period of default from the one alleged in the first action, the case is not necessarily barred by res judicata. [Editor’s Note: I think the court ignored the difference between the intention and effect of a statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata.]

In Singleton, the dismissal with prejudice disposed not only of every issue actually adjudicated, but every justiciable issue as well. Hinchee v. Fisher, 93 So. 2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1957), overruled in part on other grounds, May v. State ex rel. Ervin, 96 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1957). In Hinchee, as in Singleton and Stadler, the trial court dismissed an initial action with prejudice. Hinchee, 93 So. 2d at 353. This operated as an adjudication on the merits and, as a general proposition for purposes of res judicata, “puts at rest and entombs in eternal quiescence every justiciable, as well as every actually adjudicated, issue.” Id. (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1952)). As the Court observed in Hinchee:

A judgment on the merits does not require a determination of the controversy after a trial or hearing on controverted facts. It is sufficient if the record shows that the parties might have had their controversies determined according to their respective rights if they had presented all their evidence and the court applied the law.

Res judicata is not the issue in the instant case because the dismissal of the Initial Action was without prejudice, and therefore the borrower here (unlike the borrower in Singleton) did not “prevail in the foreclosure action by demonstrating that she was not in default” nor was there “an adjudication denying acceleration and foreclosure” such that the parties “are simply placed back in the same contractual relationship with the same continuing obligations.” Id.

the only subsequent cause of action which Deutsche Bank could file under the circumstances was an action on the accelerated debt— it could not thereafter sue upon an alleged “new” default because, without reinstating the installment terms of the repayment of the debt, there were no “new” payments due, [e.s.]

Without a new payment due, there could be no new default, and therefore no new cause of action. Because the Current Action was based upon the very same accelerated debt as the Initial Action, and because that Current Action was filed after the expiration of the five-year statute of limitations, it was barred.5

We acknowledge that Singleton has been applied to permit, as against an

asserted statute of limitations bar, the filing of a subsequent action following

dismissal with prejudice (i.e., an adjudication on the merits) of an earlier action.

See 2010-3 SFR Venture, LLC. v. Garcia, 149 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014);

Star Funding Solutions, LLC. V. Krondes, 101 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); );

U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n. v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) review

granted, Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, Nos. SC14-1265, SC14-1266, SC14-

1305 (Fla. Sept. 11, 2014); PNC Bank, N.A., v. Neal, 147 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 1st DCA

2013). We believe our holding is not necessarily inconsistent with the strict

holdings of these cited cases, as each of them involved a dismissal of the earlier

action with prejudice, representing an adjudication on the merits and, at least

implicitly, a determination that there was no default and therefore no valid or

effectual acceleration. [ I think the court is struggling to justify its decision]

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Donald Duck Loans: Void Note, Void Mortgage and Recovery of all payments made by borrower in REVERSE FORECLOSURE

Posted on December 4, 2014 by Neil Garfield

Click in to tune in at The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

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For further information or assistance please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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Hat Tip to Patrick Giunta, Esq., Senior litigator and manager of litigation for the livinglies team.

see 18th Judicial Circuit BOA v Nash VOID mortgage Void Note Reverse Judgement for Payments made to non-existent entity

When I said that lawyers should be counterclaiming for unlawful collection of payments by the servicer and related parties back in 2008, most people simply thought I was nuts and others were more generously skeptical. Everyone said “show me a case” which of course I could not because this scheme had never been played before and it has taken 7 years for courts to piece it together.

In the case we will discuss tonight briefly as I take more time to answer questions from the audience, we will see how the senior Judge in Seminole County carefully detailed the events and documents and concluded that the foreclosure was a farce — but more than that, the mortgage and note were a farce and declared them void. In addition, the Judge not only entered judgment for the homeowner on the issue of foreclosure but also granted a money judgment FOR THE BORROWER AGAINST BANK OF AMERICA for all payments made to Bank of America as successor or formerly known as Countrywide formerly known, but not registered or incorporated as America’s Wholesale Lender — which did not exist.

The conclusion of the Judge is that if the entity named on the note or mortgage does not exist, then neither does the note or mortgage. And any payments squeezed out of unwary borrowers are due back to the borrower because he might need them some day if someone actually makes a claim that is true. Thus at common law we have the very same remedy that was intended by the Truth in Lending Act under the right of rescission.

Hence the upcoming US Supreme Court decision probably doesn’t matter all that much although they should affirm the express wording of the statute even if they think the homeowner is getting a windfall. That is an erroneous assumption against the borrower — just as erroneous as assuming the loan documents were ever valid.

Sorry to be so immature, but I TOLD YOU SO!!!

Now when bankruptcy lawyers and foreclosure defense lawyers are preparing their pleadings and schedules they best look at whether there is an actual loan from an actual entity at the base of the chain relied upon by the foreclosing party.

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“FREE HOUSE” in NJ Bankruptcy Court

Posted on November 20, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For further information and assistance please call 954-495-9867 and 520-405-1688. We will be covering this decision on the Neil Garfield show tonight.

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Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

see http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2014/11/18/in-re-washington-bankr-court-d-new-jersey-morris-county-homeowner-gets-a-free-house/

also see Senator Elizabeth Warren Ramping Up Attack: When Will “Principal reduction” become a reality?

This case is notable for several reasons:

  1. The Judge expresses outright that it is general judicial bias that homeowner should not prevail in foreclosure litigation.
  2. Nevertheless this Judge trashes the the claim of SPS (Specialized Loan Services) and BONY (Bank of New York) Mellon leaving the homeowner with what the Judge calls a free house.
  3. The Judge concludes that the mortgage was unenforceable and that the note was unenforceable after a careful examination of the statute of limitations under New Jersey law.
  4. The Judge concludes that the mortgage is void, not just unenforceable, thus clearing title.

While we can be pleased with the result, some of the reasoning might not withstand an appeal, if the foreclosers take the risk of filing one.

Here are some interesting excerpts:

“No one gets a free house.” This Court and others have uttered that admonition since the early days of the mortgage crisis, where homeowners have sought relief under a myriad of state and federal consumer protection statutes and the Bankruptcy Code. Yet, with a proper measure of disquiet and chagrin, the Court now must retreat from this position, as Gordon A. Washington (“the Debtor”) has presented a convincing argument for entitlement to such relief. So, with figurative hand holding the nose, the Court, for the reasons set forth below, will grant Debtor’s motion for summary judgment.
The Defendants accelerated the maturity date of the loan to the June 1, 2007 default date, as acknowledged in the Assignment (dkt. 7, Exhibit L).[10] Moreover, neither the Debtor nor the Defendants have taken any measures under the note or mortgage, or under the Fair Foreclosure Act, to de-accelerate the debt, and the Defendants have further failed to file a foreclosure complaint within 6 years of the accelerated maturity date as required by N.J.S.A. § 2A:50-56.1(a). Accordingly, the Defendants are now time-barred from filing a foreclosure complaint and from obtaining a final judgment of foreclosure.

11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. § 506 controls the allowance of secured claims and provides that, if the claim underlying the lien is disallowed, then the lien is void:

(a)(1) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.

(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless [conditions not relevant here exist].
As explained above, by application of N.J.S.A. § 2A:50-56.1(a) and (c), the Defendants are time-barred under New Jersey state law from enforcing either the note or the accelerated mortgage. As a result, Defendants’ proof of claim 7 must be disallowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) as unenforceable against the Debtor or against Debtor’s property under applicable state law. Having determined that Defendants do not have an allowed secured claim, the underlying lien is deemed void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1) and (d).[11]
In light of Defendants’ acceleration of the maturity date of the underlying debt as of June 1, 2007, and because neither Debtor nor Defendants took any action under either the mortgage instruments, or the Fair Foreclosure Act, to de-accelerate the maturity date, Defendants’ right to file a foreclosure complaint expired 6 years after the June 1, 2007 acceleration date under N.J.S.A. § 2A:50-56.1(a). Given that Defendants’ putative secured claim is unenforceable under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1), by applicable New Jersey statute, their mortgage lien is void under 11 U.S.C. § 506(d), and the Debtor retains the property, free of any claim of the Defendants. Debtor is to submit a form of judgment. The Court will proceed to gargle in an effort to remove the lingering bad taste.
11] In as much as the Court finds that the Defendants are time-barred from enforcing the note or the mortgage, it is not necessary to address Debtor’s arguments that Defendants lack standing to enforce the note and mortgage based on alleged defects in the Assignment or the alleged impact of a Settlement Agreement.

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Post Mortum on 2010 “Bad” Decision in Florida

Posted on November 14, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For further information or assistance please call 954-495-9867 or 520 405-1688

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See CitiBank v Delassio 756 F Supp 2d 1361 2010

This case is often cited by servicers and banks to enforce a note and/or mortgage. Lots of people regarded this decision as “bad” because it approved the foreclosure. The natural impulse is to run from this decision and try to cite others that conflict with it. But this decision was correct AND it provides a blueprint for making your defense successful. The Judge correctly analyzed the law and the facts and found that the homeowner had not proven anything or objected to anything that would prevent Citi from proving its prima facie case and had not proven anything or objected to anything that would have supported any of the homeowner’s defenses.

So I thought I would take this case, as I have done before, and examine it for clues on how the same Judge would have decided the case differently. Used properly this might enable the homeowner to cite to this case in support of a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment or to attack the prima facie case of the party initiating foreclosure. There are also plenty of clues as to proving an affirmative defense in which the final result will be that the mortgage is void or unenforceable and perhaps the note as well, leaving the debt, which arises by operation of law and is owed to the party who physically gave the borrower the money.

  1. LACK OF JURISDICTION — VOID MORTGAGE AND VOID NOTE: The first issue is that for reasons unknown, the borrower failed to bring up the fact that the “lender” did not legally exist in Florida and further failed to object to the finding that AHMSI and  American Brokers Conduit were “one in the same [sic]”. In fact, I wonder if the case could not still be overturned on the basis of lack of jurisdiction and perhaps even that the mortgage was void, thus depriving the court of both in rem jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction. Perhaps the homeowner did not authorize investigation into the parties. But had he done so he would have found that American Brokers Conduit (the “lender”) did not exist in law or in fact. Any claim that ABC was the alter ego or Trade Name of AHMSI was not explored in the opinion. And as to AHMSI, what difference does it make if they were supposedly the true lender under Florida law? The note and mortgage were both defective and the disclosures were deficient in failing to identify the actual party, which, as we shall see below, would have changed the view of the case entirely.
  2. POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT: The title of the case involves U.S. Bank “as indenture trustee.” By stating that without explanation the homeowner ought to be able to inquire about the indenture, where it exists, and ask for a copy. That would be the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, which makes all arguments about the irrelevance of the PSA moot. Failure to raise the question of where the trustee derived its powers, where the servicer derived its powers, and where the terms and provisions can be found for the duties of the servicer or trustee essentially waives the issue of securitization (false or not). By raising the issue appropriately the homeowner can then inquire as to whether the trust actually owns the debt or is a holder in due course. The holding by the judge in this case that the Trust was a holder in due course was wrong —but not wrong on the facts and admissions by both sides in this case. Hence the decision was inevitable even though the real facts did not support the conclusion. The accepted facts of the case were contrary to the actual facts.
  3. FDCPA CLAIMS: The homeowner settled with AHMSI regarding fair debt collection practices. This might have been a mistake and might have been the reason that the Judge regarded AHMSI and American Brokers Conduit as the same thing. The settlement probably was worded in a way that prevented the homeowner from raising the authority of ABC to assign anything, much less record a mortgage or transfer a note that it could not have funded because it never existed — at least in Florida. I have several cases where the lender is very concerned about the FDCPA claims and needs a settlement. They obviously know that there is danger in those hills and that should be exploited by borrowers when challenging the debt, note, mortgage or foreclosure.
  4. TILA AND RESPA DISCLOSURES: Amongst the agreed facts, the court found that the borrower closed the loan with ABC, and based upon the only issues raised by the borrower, found that the disclosures were proper, and that any discrepancies worked to the borrower’s advantage and therefore did not constitute a violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) or the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Hence there was no right to rescind either under the 3 day rule or the 3 year rule. Despite the fact that the borrower announced rescission within the 3 years, the court properly found against the borrower. Citi by filing the foreclosure suit, was in substantial compliance with the requirement that it timely file a declaratory action regarding the right to rescind. So if the court had found that there was no closing because ABC did not exist and that the disclosures were inadequate because the borrower raised the issues of disclosing the lender (and avoiding the predatory per se finding by Reg Z), then the same Judge who entered this order probably would have said the rescission right was at least in play and might well have decided, as per the express terms of TILA, that the mortgage was nullified by operation of law by the announcement of rescission. [Note: This issue is currently being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court]
  5. RESCISSION: This in turn leads to the question: if ABC didn’t exist and therefore didn’t actually loan any money then who did? The only thing we can agree on, up to a point ( but that is the subject of another article), is that the borrower did get money and that the receipt of the money is presumed, by operation of law to create a debt in which the borrower is the debtor and the source of funds is the creditor. The failure to disclose a table funded loan or worse, a naked nominee or conduit providing funds from investors who didn’t know how their money was being used, is a material violation of the disclosure requirements in TILA. That is why Reg Z underscores the importance of that disclosure by saying that failure to do so constitutes conduct that is “predatory per se.” And you can prove that by citing to this same case. Hence the rescission would have or at least could have been found to have been complete and the mortgage nullified, thus paving the way for the borrower to get alternative financing,  quiet title or other other remedies.
  6. PREDATORY LOANS: It is unclear what exactly went on at the trial level  with regards to an obviously “trick” loan that fails to disclose its hidden terms in a way that the borrower would any possibility of understanding. The only thing the borrower knew or understood is that he was getting a low interest loan. No reasonable person would sign a loan in which they understood that the interest rate was only good for one month. If you want to win on this point ,though, you need more than the testimony of the borrower. You  need a mortgage broker or other professional that would testify that the loan was unworkable from the start, doomed to failure and was illegally funded from investor funds, and illegally sold to the borrower under false pretenses. THAT is how you prove unclean hands which would prevent enforcement of the mortgage.
  7. UCC: There is an interesting juxtaposition in the “Legal Analysis” of the opinion. The court finds that the Trust was a holder in due course. And this case can be cited for the elements of being a holder in due course. I would encourage foreclosure defense lawyers to do so because you can start out by saying in this case in which the Federal District Court found against the borrower, the elements of the status of holder in due course are summarized. If you go down to the end of the first paragraph in the legal analysis the quote about payment opens the door for your attack against the holder in due course status. Did the Trust prove or show that it PAID for the note and mortgage without knowledge of borrower’s defenses, without knowledge that it was already in default, and in good faith, and did the Trust get delivery (which according to the pleadings, they did not because the note was initially “lost”). Hence the same court that stated that the trust was an HIDC finds that PAYMENT “goes to the heart of the agreement”. If the trust cannot show it paid anything, then two questions arise, to wit: why not? and why did the endorser or assignor of the “loan” transfer or purport to transfer the loan documents to the trust without receiving any payment? If you follow that logic down the line you will corroborate your argument that ABC gave no money to the borrower and that was why ABC never received any money for the transfer of the paper, which now is visible as being entirely worthless, fraudulent and false.
  8. ENDORSEMENT OR ASSIGNMENT IN SECURITIZATION SCHEME: The court correctly states that under the UCC a transferee of negotiable paper can get the right to enforce the paper either by endorsement or assignment. Because the issue was apparently not raised, the court failed to address the issue of whether the enforcement could succeed at trial (as opposed to the pleading stage) if the identity of the creditor is not disclosed. The question at trial or deposition should be, if the witness is from the servicer entity, and assuming the current servicer entity had anything to do with processing payments from the borrower and to the creditor, “who did you pay?” What the court failed to deal with (presumably because the homeowner did not bring it up) is that the party claiming rights (the trustee for the trust) must show that the loan actually went into the trust because it was paid for and properly delivered. If no objection is raised, then the court can correctly presume that those elements are present. If a proper objection is made then the Plaintiff should be required and often is required now to prove the elements of a holder in due course. In cases where my team has been directly involved in litigation the opposing lawyer tried to wriggle out of this problem by declaring that the trust is not a holder in due course and that therefore they had no requirement to prove those elements. They are essentially hoping that the court won’t know the difference between a holder and holder in due course. A mere holder must establish that it has the rights to enforce on behalf of a party who actually owns the debt by identifying that party and identifying the instrument by which the “holder” was given authority to enforce. In the case of a trust that is impossible because by all accounts the trust is the final resting stop of the claims of securitization of loans. So you end up with an empty trust, in which neither the servicer nor the trustee have any legal rights to do anything with the debt created by the borrower when he accepted the money at “closing.” He still owes a debt, and if the opposition would comply with discovery requests we would know the identity of the party to whom he owes the debt. But one thing is for certain, he cannot ALSO owe a second debt created by signature on a note and mortgage made out in favor of a party who loaned him any money. The key to this is emphasizing that a holder must prove the loan in its claimed chain. But the loan will probably be presumed to exist within the chain if the borrower fails to object and raise the issues.
  9. DELIVERY: There is considerable confusion in the case as to the issue of delivery apparently because neither party made an issue about it. The court concludes that Citi got delivery of the loan documents (versus the lost note account that was later abandoned) but fails to show how that delivery constitutes delivery to the trust when the PSA obviously contains strict provisions as to delivery and New York law governing the trust requires any transaction outside the authority stated in the trust to be void.
  10. ECONOMIC WASTE: This decision stands for the proposition that economic waste is a proper affirmative defense, but unless you actually prove it with reliable, credible testimony about facts and documents, merely alleging an affirmative defense and hoping that somehow the opposition will stumble into an admission, is not a very good strategy.

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