U.S. Starts Criminal Probe of Lender Processing Services Inc. Foreclosure-Data Provider

The case follows on the dismissal of numerous foreclosure cases in which judges across the U.S. have found that the materials banks had submitted to support their claims were wrong. Faulty bank paperwork has been an issue in foreclosure proceedings since the housing crisis took hold a few years ago. It is often difficult to pin down who the real owner of a mortgage is, thanks to the complexity of the mortgage market.

the majority of foreclosures go unchallenged, some homeowners have won the right to keep their homes by proving the bank couldn’t show, on paper, that it owned the mortgage.

[LPS a/k/a DOCX] produces documents needed by banks to prove they own the mortgages. LPS’s annual report said that the processes under review have been “terminated,” and that the company has expressed its willingness to cooperate. Ms. Kersch declined to comment further on the probe.

Editor’s Note: The executive branch is finally becoming involved. The foreclosure mills have been producing dubious and/or fraudulent, fabricated, forged documentation for 3 years or more. Some of these foreclosure mills are operating in the same office and owned by the law firms prosecuting foreclosures. Maybe sooner than later these unethical, illegal practices will stop and the people responsible will be prosecuted for criminal violations, civil fines, and administrative grievances in which their licenses will be revoked.

But in the end we still have millions of homes whose title is at least clouded, probably defective and will soon become unmarketable as title companies realize the issues presented by fraudulent foreclosures by entities other than the creditor.

Wall Street Journal

April 3, 2010

U.S. Probes Foreclosure-Data Provider

Lender Processing Services Unit Draws Inquiry Over the Steps That Led to Faulty Bank Paperwork

By AMIR EFRATI and CARRICK MOLLENKAMP

A subsidiary of a company that is a top provider of the documentation used by banks in the foreclosure process is under investigation by federal prosecutors.

The prosecutors are “reviewing the business processes” of the subsidiary of Lender Processing Services Inc., based in Jacksonville, Fla., according to the company’s annual securities filing released in February. People familiar with the matter say the probe is criminal in nature.

Michelle Kersch, an LPS spokeswoman, said the subsidiary being investigated is Docx LLC. Docx processes and sometimes produces documents needed by banks to prove they own the mortgages. LPS’s annual report said that the processes under review have been “terminated,” and that the company has expressed its willingness to cooperate. Ms. Kersch declined to comment further on the probe.

A spokesman for the U.S. attorney’s office for the middle district of Florida, which the annual report says is handling the matter, declined to comment.

The case follows on the dismissal of numerous foreclosure cases in which judges across the U.S. have found that the materials banks had submitted to support their claims were wrong. Faulty bank paperwork has been an issue in foreclosure proceedings since the housing crisis took hold a few years ago. It is often difficult to pin down who the real owner of a mortgage is, thanks to the complexity of the mortgage market.

During the housing boom, mortgages were originated by lenders, quickly sold to Wall Street firms that bundled them into debt pools and then sold to investors as securities. The loans were supposed to change hands but the documents and contracts between borrowers and lenders often weren’t altered to show changes in ownership, judges have ruled.

Related Documents

Documents processed by LPS that said an entity called “Bogus Assignee” owned the mortgage:

That has made it hard for banks, which act on behalf of mortgage-securities investors in most foreclosure cases, to prove they own the loans in some instances.

LPS has said its software is used by banks to track the majority of U.S. residential mortgages from the time they are originated until the debt is satisfied or a borrower defaults. When a borrower defaults and a bank needs to foreclose, LPS helps process paperwork the bank uses in court.

LPS was recently referenced in a bankruptcy case involving Sylvia Nuer, a Bronx, N.Y., homeowner who had filed for protection from creditors in 2008.

Diana Adams, a U.S. government lawyer who monitors bankruptcy courts, argued in a brief filed earlier this year in the Nuer case that an LPS employee signed a document that wrongly said J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. had owned Ms. Nuer’s loan.

Documents related to the loan were “patently false or misleading,” according to Ms. Adams’s court papers. J.P. Morgan Chase, which has withdrawn its request to foreclose, declined to comment.

Linda Tirelli, a lawyer for Ms. Nuer, declined to comment directly on the case.

Ms. Kersch said LPS didn’t actually create the document and that the company’s “sole connection to this case is that our technology and services were utilized by J.P. Morgan Chase and its counsel.”

While the majority of foreclosures go unchallenged, some homeowners have won the right to keep their homes by proving the bank couldn’t show, on paper, that it owned the mortgage.

Some lawyers representing homeowners have claimed that banks routinely file erroneous paperwork showing they have a right to foreclose when they don’t.

Firms that process the paperwork are either “producing so many documents per day that nobody is reviewing anything, even to make sure they have the names right, or you’ve got some massive software problem,” said O. Max Gardner, a consumer-bankruptcy attorney in Shelby N.C., who has defended clients against foreclosure actions.

The wave of foreclosures and housing crisis appears to have helped LPS. According to the annual securities filing, foreclosure-related revenue was $1.1 billion last year compared with $473 million in 2007.

LPS has acknowledged problems in its paperwork. In its annual securities filing, in which it disclosed the federal probe, the company said it had found “an error” in how Docx handled notarization of some documents. Docx also has processed documents used in courts that incorrectly claimed an entity called “Bogus Assignee” was the owner of the loan, according to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Ms. Kersch said the “bogus” phrase was used as a placeholder. “Unfortunately, on a few occasions, the document was inadvertently recorded before the field was updated,” she said.

Write to Amir Efrati at amir.efrati@wsj.com and Carrick Mollenkamp at carrick.mollenkamp@wsj.com

Obama Considers Ban on Foreclosures

the obligation created when the debtor entered the transaction may well be satisfied in whole or in part by the U.S. Taxpayer, insurers, or counterparties in credit default swaps. Wall Street attempts to frame the argument as giving a free house to the unworthy homeowner. The TRUE argument is what to do with all the excess undisclosed profits that paid the obligations of the homeowners many times over.


If the foreclosures were done in the name of entities that never advanced any money toward the funding of the loan, directly or indirectly, then all of the sales are improper, all of them create defective title and all of them will produce a torrent of unmarketable transactions in the coming years as buyers and lenders discover they cannot get title insurance.
Editor’s Note: Obama’s incremental approach is maddening but it seems that he is “getting it” step by step. First reported by Bloomberg news. this article from the NY Times summarizes the progress.
The problem remains that the administration is not addressing the issue of clear title and legal authority. Mr. Frey from Greenwich Financial highlights the point in his lawsuit against Bank of America accusing them of negotiating loans that the servicer does not own. This problem is not going away, and is getting worse with each new foreclosure sale at the steps of courthouses across the country.

If the foreclosures were done in the name of entities that never advanced any money toward the funding of the loan, directly or indirectly, then all of the sales are improper, all of them create defective title and all of them will produce a torrent of unmarketable transactions in the coming years as buyers and lenders discover they cannot get title insurance.
If money is being paid to servicers who lack authority to collect, then the debtor (borrower/homeowner) is in financial double jeopardy when the real creditor makes a claim. What will happen when Greenwich Financial or some other holder of mortgage backed securities makes their claim for repayment of the money they forked over allegedly to fund mortgages? What will happen when Greenwich Financial realizes that only a fraction of the money they paid went to fund mortgages and that the rest went to fees, profits, commissions and kickbacks? And where are the other investors, who incidentally are the only real creditors in this scenario?
An inconvenient and inescapable truth is that the servicers, whose fees rise as the loan becomes troubled and progresses from performing to delinquent, to default, to foreclosure and sale, are still getting paid on non-performing loans. If the loans are non-performing, where is the money coming from? It can only be coming from the payments made under performing loans, which directs our attention to the essential defect in the securitization of residential mortgage loans: the simplest of terms in every note that require the payments be allocated to the interest and principal on the note is being breached regularly and universally. This is the unethical and illegal result of cross collateralization and over-collateralization.
Wall Street blithely assumed they could disregard the terms of the note (use of proceeds) and mortgage when they securitized these “assets.” And there is the nub of the problem. The transaction starts out simple — money advanced by investors to fund mortgage loans to homeowners (debtors). But in order to make virtually ALL the money turn into fees and profits for Wall Street, the participants in the securitization chain ignored basic contract law, property law, lending laws, rules and regulations. The result was a tangle of claims from intermediaries who have no legal nor equitable interest in the revenue stream, principal or interest derived from those loans — all at the expense of the only two real parties to the transaction, to wit: the investor (creditor) and the homeowner (debtor).
A ban on foreclosures pending mandatory modification procedures is an imperfect step, but definitely in the right direction. It’s going to be a big pill to swallow when we finally come to terms with the fact that the parties at mediation or discussing modification only include one side (the debtor). It means coming to accept that all that TARP money went to the brokers instead of the principals. It means unraveling the now secret AIG documents that would show where the money went. It means performing an audit to determine where the money should be allocated.
And all of THAT means the obligation created when the debtor entered the transaction may well be satisfied in whole or in part by the U.S. Taxpayer, insurers, or counterparties in credit default swaps. Wall Street attempts to frame the argument as giving a free house to the unworthy homeowner.

The TRUE argument is what to do with all the excess undisclosed profits that paid the obligations of the homeowners many times over. Federal and State laws generally agree — failure to disclose the real parties and the real fees paid to all the participants in the transaction results in a liability to the homeowner for those undisclosed fees. The real answer is NOT to give more money to the intermediaries who never advanced a dime to fund these loans but rather, how to claw back the money and put the investors and the homeowners back in the position they were in before this huge fraud began.
Existing laws seem to address all of this in both lending and the issuance of securities. It’s payback time. The only question is whether anyone with the power to do so, will enforce the laws as they are already written. As of this writing, complaints to the FTC, OTC, FDIC, FED etc. produce nothing but an acknowledgment of receipt. The power is there. Where is the will?
February 26, 2010

U.S. Weighs Requiring Lenders to Consider Changes Before Foreclosures

The Obama administration, under intense pressure to help millions of people in danger of losing their homes, is considering a ban on foreclosures unless they have first been examined for potential modification, according to a set of draft proposals.

That would raise the stakes from the current practice, which strongly encourages lenders to evaluate defaulting borrowers for a modification but does not make it mandatory.

Meg Reilly, a Treasury Department spokeswoman, said Thursday that the proposed foreclosure ban was “one of the many ideas under consideration in the administration’s ongoing housing stabilization efforts.” The proposal was first reported by Bloomberg News.

Laurie Goodman, a senior managing director at the Amherst Securities Group who has been highly critical of the government’s modification program, said even if the proposal came to pass, it would not be “a major change. We think there is a large public relations element to this.”

The government could use some favorable public relations for its modification program, which has been deemed disappointing.

Begun a year ago, the program was meant to help as many as four million homeowners but has fallen considerably short of those goals. The Treasury Department has said 116,297 loans have been permanently modified and more than 800,000 more are in trial programs.

The Mortgage Bankers Association said its members were already doing what the administration was considering.

“Lenders generally go to foreclosure as a measure of last resort, after all other options, including loan modification, are exhausted,” said John Mechem, the trade group’s vice president for public affairs.

Any enhancements the government made to the modification program would be unlikely to stem many foreclosures, said Howard Glaser, a prominent housing consultant.

The modification program was designed for people who had subprime loans, he said, not for borrowers with high-quality loans who are unemployed. Tweaking the interest rate for an unemployed family does not provide enough help.

The Mortgage Bankers Association announced this week their own plan for reducing foreclosures: Lenders and loan servicers would reduce unemployed borrowers’ payments for up to nine months while they looked for new jobs.

The banking group said the servicers would need special loans from the Treasury to pay for the program. The administration has not commented publicly on the proposal.

“The real strategy in Washington now is to pray for an improving economy so these issues will resolve themselves,” Mr. Glaser said. “At the end of the day, a strong jobs market will prevent the generation of new foreclosures.”

There was some positive news in that regard last week, when the mortgage bankers said the number of borrowers entering default unexpectedly declined in the fourth quarter. But on Thursday, the government reported that home prices sank 1.6 percent in December, a fresh sign that the real estate market is nowhere near healed.

Big Banks Accused of Short Sale Fraud

Wall Street didn’t merely siphon off unearned money, wealth and guarantees from homeowners, bank depositors and taxpayers. They screwed up title on what appears to be more than 60 million transactions — so even refi’s might now have rendered the title to be uninsurable or unmarketable.

Big Banks Accused of Short Sale Fraud

No surprise here. Brad Keiser points out that many of the “intermediaries” or “pretender lenders” are actually owned by these big banks. So the servicers and others turn out to be owned and/or controlled by the big players. No surprise there either. But what is good about this article is that the noose is tightening around those necks that should be in a noose — extracting NEW fees and profits to the detriment of both homeowners and investors and to the detriment of the taxpayer.

The second point is that I don’t want to sound like a broken record but if you don’t get a satisfaction of the note and mortgage from the actual creditor what do you have? NOTHING except perhaps some equitable claim that the company executing the satisfaction was authorized by the creditors. The problem with that is that the creditors (investors, Uncle Sam or subsequent purchasers of mortgage backed securities don’t even KNOW the transaction occurred, much less see the proceeds.

So if your satisfaction of mortgage is invalid (for the same reason that the foreclosure was invalid, which might also include the mortgage or deed of trust being invalid) what is the result? I think the result is that the homeowner still owns the property, OR that the original mortgage is still an encumbrance, OR that the Note is not satisfied OR that the obligation still exists. Or all of those. If any one of those things are true then you have both a cloud on title and a defect in title rendering the title to the property unmarketable.

We’ve written in these pages about how this will end up. The “Toxic Title Problem” is highlighted in neon letters in these transactions. Down the road (and not so far in the future) the title insurers and potential buyers are not going to accept title without exceptions, which means at best that there will be a flood of quiet title suits filed (millions of them) and at worst, a complete standstill in the transfer of title on any house with a securitized note and encumbrance.

Wall Street didn’t merely siphon off unearned money, wealth and guarantees from homeowners, bank depositors and taxpayers. They screwed up title on what appears to be more than 60 million transactions — so even refi’s might now have rendered the title to be uninsurable or unmarketable.

Big Banks Accused of Short Sale Fraud

cnbc

On Friday January 15, 2010, 12:55 pm EST

Just as regulators, lawmakers and all forms of financial oversight boards are talking about new regulations to guard against mortgage fraud and another mortgage meltdown, there appears to be yet a new mortgage fraud out there today, allegedly perpetuated by agents of, yes, the big banks.

I was first alerted to this by Jeremy Brandt, the CEO of several companies that bring short sale agents, investors and sellers together.

His companies include 1800CashOffer, HomeFlux.com and FastHomeOffer.com. Brandt has a huge network of short sale real estate agents, and over the past several months he’s been receiving all kinds of questions and complaints about trouble with second lien holders.

As we all know, during the housing boom, millions of Americans pulled cash out of their homes in the form of home equity loans and lines of credit. They also used “piggy back” loans in order to get even lower interest rates on their primary mortgages. Now, many of the borrowers in trouble, and many who are so far underwater on their loans that they don’t qualify for any refi or modification, are choosing short sales as a way out. (Short sales are when the lender allows the home to be sold for less than the value of the loan). About 12 percent of all home sales by the end of 2009 were short sales, according to the National Association of Realtors.

In order for a short sale with two loans to happen, the second lien holder has to drop the lien.

If they don’t, and there’s no short sale, the home goes to foreclosure and the first lien holder gets the house because second liens are subordinated debt to the primary loan.

In short, the second lien holder gets nothing. In order to get the second lien holder to drop the lien, the first lien holder generally negotiates some partial payment to the second lien holder. The second lien holder doesn’t have to agree, but more and more are doing so.

That’s all legal.

But here’s what’s not legal and what’s apparently happening quite often recently. Since many second lien holders are getting very little, they are now allegedly requesting money on the side from either real estate agents or the buyers in the short sale. When I say “on the side,” I mean in cash, off the HUD settlement statements, so the first lien holder doesn’t see it.

“They are pretty clear and pretty upfront about the fact that if the first lender knows they are getting paid, the first lender will kill the short sale,” says Brandt. “So these second lenders are asking for the payments off the closing documents, off the HUD statement, usually in a cashiers check prior to closing. Once they receive that payment, they will allow the short sale to go through, which according to RESPA laws and the lawyers that we have spoken to on the topic is not legal.”

(RESPA is the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the 2008 law requiring that consumers receive disclosures at various times in the transaction. It outlaws kickbacks that increase the cost of settlement services. RESPA is a HUD consumer protection statute designed to help homebuyers be better shoppers in the home buying process, and is enforced by HUD. Read more about it here.).

I told RESPA specialist Brian Sullivan over at HUD about all this and he replied, “That’s a red flag!”

Clearly illegal.

Brandt told me he’s heard from at least 200 agents that they’ve had these requests made by representatives of Citi Mortgage (NYSE: c), JP Morgan Chase (NYSE: jpm), Bank of America (NYSE: bac) and other large banks.

Most agents wouldn’t go on the record with me, for fear of retribution by the banks with whom they have to work every day. But one agent, Kayte Gentry, of Keller Williams Integrity First Realty, was brave enough to blow the whistle.

“I think it’s wrong, and I think somebody needs to hold them accountable, and every time I lose a house in foreclosure because of this, it hurts my client,” says Gentry matter-of-factly. “Aside from being illegal and a violation of RESPA, it’s immoral and truly it’s just sad for the client that it’s hurting.”

Gentry says she has had the requests made three times and claims she lost one sale because of it.

“The big banks that have recently made this request, specifically payments outside of the closing statement have been Citi Mortgage and JP Morgan Chase.”

JP Morgan Chase simply answered, “No Comment,” when I relayed the charge to their media representative.

Bank of America denied the practice to CNBC in a written statement:

“Bank of America enforces a policy that all disbursements are documented on the settlement statement for short sales. When we are servicing a first mortgage with a second lien held by another investor, if the second lien holder asks for off-HUD payments, we will not approve the transaction (if we have knowledge of it). It is also against Bank of America’s policy to accept off-HUD payments on its second liens.”

Citi ‘s reply was a bit more complicated:

“We work very hard to help distressed homeowners find solutions for their financial challenges. In our attempt to amicably resolve the debt, we will generally negotiate a reduced settlement with the homeowner in order to release a second lien. Unlike some lenders who refuse to reduce the payoffs on second liens, we choose to reduce the payoff amounts in some situations to assist the borrower. We do not provide instructions to settlement agents on how to fill out the settlement statement or any other closing documents, and we certainly do not require settlement agents or any other parties to violate applicable laws.”

“When we confront the lenders and tell them that this request is illegal and a violation of RESPA, they tell us it’s been cleared through legal and they don’t care. Do it anyway,” charges Gentry.

I personally heard a recording of a phone conversation between a short sale real estate agent and a second lien lender, during which the second lien lender clearly asked for cash outside of the settlement and threatened to kill the deal without it.

The real estate agent was rightly concerned and reluctant (the recording was given to me by Brandt who got it from the agent. The agent would provide no information on the lender, for fear of retribution):

AGENT: Well yes, I don’t want to lose my license, go to jail, I mean, I have to sign…

LENDER: You’re not going to lose your license – we have plenty of realtors who do this, who actually understand how this whole process goes – and they realize that OK, if I want to get this done, this will take place.”

I contacted the Treasury Department, HUD, FINCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) and the Federal Trade Commission, and none of their representatives could tell me of any active investigation into this. The folks at HUD said they’d be very interested to see my story.

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