Discovery Changes and Broadens After Hawaii Supreme Court Decision

Posted on October 15, 2018 by Neil Garfield

Based on questions that greeted me when I got to my desk this morning, here are just some of the thoughts that apply — a case review and analysis for each case being necessary to actually draft the right questions and to close any trap doors.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

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Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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NOTE: Procedural questions should be posed to local counsel who knows local discovery rules and court procedure. My answer is based upon general knowledge and not based upon any experience in litigating discovery issues in your state.
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The effect of the new decision in the link above is most probably (a) a broadening of existing discovery requests (b) rehearings on recent decisions denying discovery and (c) an opportunity and a reason to ask the questions you really want to ask.
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The first question is whether the questions you would ask now are already within the scope of the questions you have already asked. If so, generally speaking, there is nothing to do. In this scenario you could send a letter, I think, that clarifies your questions in view of the new Supreme Court ruling. The letter would specifically address certain issues that were raised in questions already asked and tells them the details you expect. This could be done in a supplemental request for discovery citing the new Supreme Court decision. Check with local counsel.
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Second, and this is more likely, your case should be analyzed within the context of the new decision. It seems to me that the decision opens up some broader scope of discovery than had previously been submitted. Your opposition will fight this tooth and nail. Pointing to the Hawaii Supreme Court decision is not going to be enough even if the property is in Hawaii. You need to have a very clear narrative that explains why you are asking for the answers to questions and the production of documents and answers to request for admissions. Without a clear defense narrative your first Motion to Compel them to respond will likely fail. The general rule is that discovery, with certain exceptions, can be any request that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. By “admissible” the meaning is evidence that is relevant and “probative” to the truth of the matter asserted. It isn’t relevant unless it ties into either the case against you or the defense narrative. Lack of clarity can be fatal.
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The opposition is going to claim privilege, privacy, and proprietary information. You should force them to be more specific as to how the identification of the creditor is proprietary, or an invasion of privacy or some privilege. Tactically I would let them paint themselves into a corner, so you need someone who knows how to litigate. Once it is established that they can’t or won’t disclose the matters into which you have inquired, then the question becomes how they will prove authority from the creditor without identification of the creditor from whom all authority flows.
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That could lead to a motion for summary judgment wherein you allege that they have failed and refused to make disclosure as to the most fundamental aspect of pleading a case. Since their authorization to initiate and maintain a foreclosure action must relate back to the authorization of the creditor (owner of the debt) and they now have not or will not identify that party(ies), the presumption of authority must be considered rebutted, thus requiring them to prove their case with facts and not with the benefit of legal presumptions.
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Since they have admitted on record that they cannot prove they are acting on behalf of the creditor, it follows that they cannot prove authority to initiate or maintain a foreclosure action. Hence, the outcome is certain. They will not be able to prove standing although they might have made certain assertions or allegations that might pass for standing such that they can withstand a motion to dismiss or demurrer. The essential assertion of standing is either rebutted or barred from proof. Hence judgment should be entered for the homeowner.
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Some of this might come out in a motion for sanctions which is virtually certain to come from you when they fail to properly respond to your requests for discovery. This is intricate litigation that should be handled by a local attorney.
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Again don’t start a second front in the battle if you have already covered it in your previously submitted requests for discovery. I think you have asked most of the right questions, although now with this decision it becomes more refined.Among the questions I would ask in view of the new decision from the Supreme Court of Hawaii are the following presented only as narrative draft, subject to improvement by local counsel:
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  1. Does the trust exist under the laws of any jurisdiction? If yes, describe the jurisdiction in which the trust is recognized as existing.
  2. Was the trust organized under the laws of any jurisdiction? If yes, when and where?
  3. Does the trust own the subject debt? If yes, please explain why the trust is not claimed as a holder in due course.
  4. Does the trust allow the beneficiaries an interest in the assets of the trust?
  5. Please describe the manner in which the certificate holders are beneficiaries of a trust.
  6. Does the named Trustee of the Trust have any rights or obligations to monitor trust assets?
  7. Does the named Trustee of the Trust engage in any activities in which it is administering the assets of the Trust.
  8. Describe the assets of the Trust.
  9. Please identify the Trustor or Settlor of the Trust.
  10. Please identify the date, place and parties involved in any transaction in which assets were entrusted to the named trustee for the benefit of named or described beneficiaries.
  11. Please identify the date, place and parties involved in any transaction in which assets were purchased by the Trust or in which a Trustor or Settlor purchased assets that were then entrusted to the named trustee of the Trust for the benefit of named or described beneficiaries.
  12. Is the named Trust a fictitious name being used by one or more other entities?
  13. Do the certificates contain provisions in which the holder of the certificate disclaims any right, title or interest to assets of the Trust or any right, title or interest to the subject loan? If yes, please describe the provision, in what document it is located, the date of the document, and where that document currently exists in the care, custody and/or control of the Trust or any party doing business as or on behalf of the named Trust.
  14. Please describe the owner of the debt, to wit: describe the party currently carrying a receivable on its books that includes the subject loan, wherein no other party is ultimately entitled to proceeds of payments, proceeds or recovery on the subject loan.
  15. Is it your contention that residential foreclosure is legally allowed without ownership of the underlying debt from the borrower? If so, describe the elements of a party who would be legally allowed to foreclose on a residential mortgage without ownership of the underlying debt.
  16. Does the Trust have a bank account in the name of the Trust?
  17. Does the Trust have a bank account in the name of the named Trustee as Trustee for the Trust.
  18. If the answer to either of the two preceding question is yes, please describe the account, its location and identify the signatories on said account.
  19. Please describe the retainer agreement between the named Trust and current counsel of record including all the parties thereto, the date(s) of execution and date that the agreement became effective, the names of the signatories, and their authority to execute the instrument.
  20. With respect to loans attributed to or allegedly owned by the Trust please describe the parties who make decisions, along with a description of their authority, with respect to the following relating to the subject loan:
    1. Whether to foreclose
    2. When to foreclose
    3. What documents are needed for foreclosure
    4. Applications for modification
    5. Terms of modification
    6. Terms for settlement of the debt

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

How Do We Know That the Name of the Trustee was Rented?

Posted on June 18, 2018 by Neil Garfield

The practice of paying a fee to a “service provider” to conceal the real nature of a transaction and the real parties in interest has been at the center of all Wall Street schemes that are at variance from conventional loan products.

Virtually all parties who appear in the chain of title or possession in securitization schemes are parties who rent their name to lend credence to the illusion of the loan transaction, loan transfers and foreclosures.

The truth is simply that the debt is never purchased and sold in such circumstances. But paper is created to create the illusion that “the loan” has been purchased and sold. It wasn’t. This illusion is created by simply using the names of the biggest banks in the world.

See Rent-A-Name popular amongst banks

So Payday lenders, the bottom feeders of an already corrupt lending industry, are renting the names of Native American tribes in order to escape rules and laws that apply to lending in general and Payday lenders in particular. They do it because the tribes might be exempt from certain Federal laws and rules. This enables them to charge higher and higher “interest rates” that are in fact gouging American consumers. So the tribal name or jurisdiction is invoked and the lenders pretend that they are not the real parties in interest. More pretender lenders.

This is what happens when we don’t enforce the existing laws and rules in the first place for fear of angering or collapsing the major banks. The prevailing view is that collapsing the TBTF banks — i.e., putting them out of business — is a bad thing no matter how badly they behave.

In the case of REMIC Trusts, big name banks have a tacit and express agreement (which should be pursued in discovery) in which they each will allow their names to be used or rented for a fee. This cross pollination of names, makes it appear that the giant banks are in fact the injured parties in foreclosures. I can say with 100% certainty this is not the case where claims of securitization are involved.

Banks have been quick to point out when faced with judgments for costs, fees or sanctions that they are NOT the foreclosing party and that their name only appears as “Trustee” of a self-proclaimed REMIC Trust. The “party” is the REMIC Trust itself, they say. But when you peek under the hood, the named Trust is just that — only a name. There is no trust and there have been no transactions in which the nonexistent trust’s name has been involved wherein loans have been purchased — or in which anything has been purchased.

Logic dictates and data confirms that the reason for this lack of transactional data is that there were no such transactions. Logic further dictates that the only possible conclusion is that the “investor money” was never entrusted to the falsely named big bank, as trustee and therefore could not have been entrusted to the REMIC Trust. Hence a key element of any valid trust is missing — the active management by a named trustee of assets that were entrusted tot he trustee on behalf of beneficiaries.

So there is no trust and there is court jurisdiction to grant relief in the name of a nonexistent trust. Reading the so-called trust instrument (Pooling and Servicing Agreement) also reveals the absence of trustor/settlor. So not only is the putative trust empty, it also lacks a trustor and trustee. Further inquiry into the PSA and the indenture for the the fake RMBS certificates reveals that the investors are not beneficiaries of a trust because even if the trust existed, the indenture disclaim such an interest in compliance with the buried description in the PSA.

So there is no trust, no trustee, no trustor, and no beneficiary. The investors’ only interest is in the form of a constructive trust, shared with other investors who may or may not be in the same “pool”. The opportunity for commingling money from thousands of investors in multiple pools is just too good for the bank to pass up.

Thus the laws and rules governing the highly complex lending marketplace require only an illusion of compliance instead of the real thing. Court administrators justified their “rocket dockets” by judicial economy and expediency, requiring the courts to hire more judges and personnel. But that is only true if the foreclosure were real. Some courts have required that the original note must be filed with the court upon suit and others require an affidavit describing possession and ownership of the so-called loan documents. Some affidavits must be executed by the lawyers seeking foreclosure on behalf of their clients.

My question is if the trust does not exist except in the minds of certain financiers and there are no trust assets and no active management of them (obviously) then how truthful is it for any lawyer  to execute documents for filing in court on behalf of a client that the lawyer knows or should know does not exist?

 

Filed under: BURDEN OF PROOF, CORRUPTION, discovery, Eviction, foreclosure, Investor, jurisdiction, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: , , , , | 13 Comments »

Starting Action AFTER the Non-Judicial Sale: Get the Information

Posted on April 27, 2010 by Neil Garfield

33-809. Request for copies of notice of sale; mailing by trustee; disclosure of information regarding trustee sale

A. A person desiring a copy of a notice of sale under a trust deed, at any time subsequent to the recording of the trust deed and prior to the recording of a notice of sale pursuant thereto, shall record in the office of the county recorder in any county in which part of the trust property is situated a duly acknowledged request for a copy of any such notice of sale. The request shall set forth the name and address of the person or persons requesting a copy of such notice and shall identify the trust deed by setting forth the county, docket or book and page of the recording data thereof and by stating the names of the original parties to such deed, the date the deed was recorded and the legal description of the entire trust property and shall be in substantially the following form:

Request for Notice

Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of sale under the trust deed recorded in docket or book ___________ at page ________, records of ______________ county, Arizona, _____________________________, _______________________________,

(legal description of trust property)

Executed by ________________________ as trustor, in which ______________ is named as beneficiary and __________________ as trustee, be mailed to _________________ at ___________________.

Dated this _______________ day of _______________, _____.

___________________

Signature

(Acknowledgement)

B. Not later than thirty days after recording the notice of sale, the trustee shall mail by certified or registered mail, with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of sale that reflects the recording date together with any notice required to be given by subsection C of this section, addressed as follows:

1. To each person whose name and address are set forth in a request for notice, which has been recorded prior to the recording of the notice of sale, directed to the address designated in such request.

2. To each person who, at the time of recording of the notice of sale, appears on the records of the county recorder in the county in which any part of the trust property is situated to have an interest in any of the trust property. The copy of the notice sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be addressed to the person whose interest appears of record at the address set forth in the document. If no address for the person is set forth in the document, the copy of the notice may be addressed in care of the person to whom the recorded document evidencing such interest was directed to be mailed at the time of its recording or to any other address of the person known or ascertained by the trustee. If the interest that appears on the records of the county recorder is a deed of trust, a copy of the notice only needs to be mailed to the beneficiary under the deed of trust. If any person having an interest of record or the trustor, or any person who has recorded a request for notice, desires to change the address to which notice shall be mailed, the change shall be accomplished by a request as provided under this section.

3. For single family residential properties only, to the property address, except that the copy mailed pursuant to this paragraph may be mailed by first class mail.

C. The trustee, within five business days after the recordation of a notice of sale, shall mail by certified or registered mail, with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of sale to each of the persons who were parties to the trust deed except the trustee. The copy of the notice mailed to the parties need not show the recording date of the notice. The notice sent pursuant to this subsection shall be addressed to the mailing address specified in the trust deed. In addition, notice to each party shall contain a statement that a breach or nonperformance of the trust deed or the contract or contracts secured by the trust deed, or both, has occurred, and setting forth the nature of such breach or nonperformance and of the beneficiary’s election to sell or cause to be sold the trust property under the trust deed and the additional notice shall be signed by the beneficiary or the beneficiary’s agent. A copy of the additional notice shall also be sent with the notice provided for in subsection B, paragraph 2 of this section to all persons whose interest in the trust property is subordinate in priority to that of the deed of trust along with a written statement that the interest may be subject to being terminated by the trustee’s sale. The written statement may be contained in the statement of breach or nonperformance.

D. No request for a copy of a notice recorded pursuant to this section, nor any statement or allegation in any request, nor any record of request, shall affect the title to the trust property or be deemed notice to any person that a person requesting a copy of notice of sale has or claims any interest in, or claim upon, the trust property.

E. At any time that the trust deed is subject to reinstatement pursuant to section 33-813, but not sooner than thirty days after recordation of the notice of trustee’s sale, the trustee shall upon receipt of a written request, provide, if actually known to the trustee, the following information relating to the trustee’s sale and the trust property:

1. The unpaid principal balance of the note or other obligation which is secured by the deed of trust.

2. The name and address of record of the owner of the trust property as of the date of recordation of the notice of trustee’s sale.

3. A list of the liens and encumbrances upon the trust property as of the date of recordation of the notice of trustee’s sale, excluding those matters set forth in section 33-438, subsection A.

If the trustee elects to charge a fee for providing the information requested, the fee shall not exceed five per cent of the amount the trustee may charge pursuant to section 33-813, subsection B, paragraph 4, except that the trustee shall not charge a fee that is more than one hundred dollars or be required to accept a fee that is less than thirty dollars but may accept a lesser fee at the trustee’s discretion. The trustee, or any other person furnishing information pursuant to this subsection to the trustee, shall not be subject to liability for any error or omission in providing the information requested, except for the wilful and intentional failure to provide information in the trustee’s actual possession.

F. Beginning at 9:00 a.m. and continuing until 5:00 p.m. mountain standard time on the last business day preceding the day of sale and beginning at 9:00 a.m. mountain standard time and continuing until the time of sale on the day of the sale, the trustee shall make available the actual bid or a good faith estimate of the credit bid the beneficiary is entitled to make at the sale. If the actual bid or good faith estimate is not available during the prescribed time period, the trustee shall postpone the sale until the trustee is able to comply with this subsection.

G. In providing information pursuant to subsections E and F of this section, the trustee, without obligation or liability for the accuracy or completeness of the information, may respond to oral requests, respond orally or in writing or provide additional information not required by such subsections. With respect to property that is the subject of a trustee’s sale, the beneficiary of such deed of trust or the holder of any prior lien may, but shall not be required to, provide information concerning such deed of trust or any prior lien that is not required by subsection E or F of this section and may charge a reasonable fee for providing the information. The providing of such information by any beneficiary or holder of a prior lien shall be without obligation or liability for the accuracy or completeness of the information.

Filed under: CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

About those TRUSTS

Posted on April 15, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Submitted by dan, whom I think is 100% right here:

After a closer look at trust law (see Gilbert Law Summeries on Trusts by Edward C. Halbach Jr), the 4 critical elements of a trust are:

1. trust intent.

2. specific trust res or property.

3. properly designated parties.

4. valid and legal trust purpose.

A grantor/trustor must objectively manifest a final, definite, and specific intention that a trust should immediately arise with respect to some particular property.

Grantor/trustor/settlor must express his/her purpose and intent and must own both legal and equitible title of trust res property (the note) prior to transfer or assignment.

A valid trust forms the moment trust property transfers to a trustee.

But banks formed the trust indentures way before they received our notes as trust property. You can’t form a trust with the prospect of receiving property at a future time. In the many mortgage trust indentures found on the SEC website, the “acting” grantor is actually the trust itself called the “issuer” or a second trust created to act as a “strawman grantor.”

The questions arise: how on earth can a dead legal fiction manifest an intent or purpose? And how can a legal fiction transfer trust property to a trustee for the benefit of an class of ascertainable beneficiaries? And the million dollar question: Why can’t we be the grantor and beneficiary of the note (negotiable instrument) bearing OUR signatures? Who could possibly make a superior claim on our own signatures? There is no doubt that we are in the land of trust and equity. I think our remedy will ultimately lie in the land of equity. We keep getting beat up in the land of Debtor/Creditor and UCC. Maybe an education in trust will level the playing field. I think we have been led astray by the misconception that trusts are stricly reserved for asset protection and avoiding probate. Hmmm.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 23 Comments »

Notarized MERS Assignment of DOT as Nominee: Forensic Analysis and Motion Practice

Posted on April 8, 2010 by Neil Garfield

I was looking at an assignment signed by Margaret Dalton, “Vice President”, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) “as nominee” for “Hoecomings” (sic) Financial Network, Inc. with an execution date of March 5, 2010 and a notarization date of the same date, notarized by D. Pakusic in Duval County, Florida, naming United Independent Title as Trustee under the Deed of Trust and purporting to assign the Deed of Trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association.

A forensic analysis report would or should state as follows:

  1. The title chain reveals the property is located in the County of Los Angeles, State of California and contains a purported assignment signed by Margaret Dalton, “Vice President”, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) “as nominee” for “Hoecomings” (sic) Financial Network, Inc. with an execution date of March 5, 2010 and a notarization date of the same date, notarized by D. Pakusic in Duval County, Florida, naming United Independent Title as Trustee under the Deed of Trust and purporting to assign the Deed of Trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association. in public records book ____, at page ____ of the County of _________, in the State of Florida. The document appears on its face to have been prepared by Malcolm-Cisneros, a Law Corporation located at 2112 Business Center Dr., Irvine, California 92612. Given the location of the property in California, the location of the law firm that prepared it in California and the location of of the other parties, the fact that it was “notarized” in Florida raises numerous forensic questions requiring production of additional documentation and facts.
  2. Location Issues: The property is located in the State of California, as are the Trustors under the Deed of Trust (DOT). Margaret Dalton is believed to be located in Irvine, California, possibly employed by or on the premises of the above-referenced Law Corporation. The Notary is located in Duval County, Florida which has no known connection with any of the parties. MERS offices are reported to be located in states other than California and the IT platform is reported to be located in the Midwest. Homecoming Financial Network, Inc. (which undersigned believes was intended by the referenced instruments and title chain) is authorized to do business in the State of California, but upon research does not appear to be a chartered bank, financial institution or lender. HFN is a mortgage originator acting on behalf of unknown sources of funds who may be located anywhere, since they are neither disclosed nor described in the closing documentation nor any document on record. Accordingly there is a question as to the identity of the creditor at the time of the origination of the loan, the identity of the creditor at the current time, and the identity of the creditor at all times between the origination of the loan and the present. There are also questions requiring additional documentation and fats to reveal whether the purported assignment was executed by or on behalf of anyone in Duval County, Florida where the instrument was notarized or in Irvine, California where the instrument may have been executed.
  3. Margaret Dalton’s employment is unknown but it does not appear that she has ever been an employee of MERS, nor that MERS is located where Margaret Dalton apparently signed the document. Previous investigations by the undersigned indicate that MERS is an electronic database privately owned and operated by fewer than 17 employees, which do not include Ms. Dalton. According to information received from MERS, the database platform operated by MERS for its members, has an access procedure consisting of a user ID and password. With such information any person could enter, alter or amend any entry in the MERS database. The procedure also provides access to an automated procedure wherein the user may name a person to serve as “vice-president” or “limited signing officer” for MERS. No record has been produced for this analysis indicating that Ms. Dalton was named as “vice-president” or whether she did so herself, nor whether she was authorized to do so or from whom said authority would be claimed. There is accordingly a question as to whether the document was in fact signed by Ms. Dalton, and if so whether she had authority to sign a document that conveyed an interest in real property.
  4. Given the above information, there is also a question as to whether the notarization was valid or void. Florida law provides that if the Notary knows that the person signing does not possess authority to sign or knows that the person is ignorant of their authority, that the oath administered is invalid and that the instrument is construed to be not notarized, despite the signature and stamp. Recording laws require notarization. Thus there is a question as to whether the document is or would be construed as a recorded instrument despite its obvious appearance in the title record. If it is not construed as a recorded instrument, then the chain of title should be amended to remove this document.
  5. The chain of title, as stated above, reveals a Deed of Trust (DOT) in favor of MERS as nominee. No issues are readily apparent as to the execution of the Deed of Trust. However, the content of the DOT raises factual issues that require further examination and the production of additional documents and information. Since MERS is an IT platform operated for the purposes of its private owners, it is not authorized by Florida Statutes nor California Statutes to serve as the equivalent of a recording record for instruments in the public records. It is a data entry and retrieval system that is private, not public. Since MERS was named as nominee and the MERS documentation available on the internet clearly state that under no circumstances will MERS ever claim an interest in the real property, the DOT, the note, nor will ever be the actual lender, beneficiary or mortgagee in any transaction, the effect of naming MERS raises factual issues since there are questions regarding title raised by the conflict between naming MERS and MERS disclaiming any such interest. There is no record of MERS accepting the position as nominee and if so under what circumstances. Those terms exist in agreements executed between members of MERS and one of the MERS corporations and are unavailable to the undersigned forensic analyst.
  6. The DOT and the above-referenced purported assignment refer to MERS as nominee for HFN, which was neither the creditor nor the lender at the time of the origination of the loan. Thus the DOT appears to name MERS (who disclaims any interest in the loan) on behalf of HFN (who served as a conduit for a table-funded loan transaction, probably as part of the securitization of the subject loan transaction) both of whom served principals that were not disclosed at the time of the origination of the loan nor, to the knowledge of the undersigned, to the present. The effect of misspelling the name of HFN on the purported assignment is unknown, but based upon advice from title agents consulted, it would be ordinarily required in any subsequent transaction, that the document be re-executed with the proper spelling. Whether this affects the legality of the instrument is unknown to the undersigned analyst.
  7. The purported assignment refers only to the DOT, which raises several questions. It is unknown whether an assignment of the note, as evidence of the underlying obligation, was executed at the same time as the purported assignment of the DOT. It is unknown whether all the necessary parties executed instruments required to authorize the assignments, and if so when this was accomplished. If there were no such other assignments then there is a question as to whether the instrument was effective, and if so, whether it intended to provide ownership of the security instrument (DOT) to one party while the ownership of the note remained or was transferred to another party, while at the same time the underlying obligation to yet another party may have existed between the Trustor as debtor and the source of funds for the origination of the loan, as creditor. Additional documentation and facts would be required to make these determinations.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 34 Comments »

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