Subprimes Not Dead for Deutsch, American General New offerings Planned

Editor’s Notes: They are STILL doing it. This report clearly shows that the main players are still packaging sub-prime loans (which most people would define as loans likely to fail). The reason is money. The higher the spread the higher the yield spread premium. These YSP’s are still not reported to borrowers. They are hidden from both investors and borrowers. My opinion is that there is no statute of limitations on a cause of action you don’t know exists — especially if the intent and conduct of the defrauding parties was a pattern to withhold information.

What is interesting is to see how they are addressing investor concerns about toxic assets and what they disclose now versus what they disclosed when the real mess was created. What is scary is that without regulation, the game continues. This is like a sports event where the referees have left the field.

“the underlying borrowers have full documentation, were fully examined by the company and most have made 50 payments or more – factors that have often been missing from poorly performing loan pools.

“Subprime mortgages were once the lifeblood of the securitization business, accounting for more than $1 trillion of deals in the decade leading up to the 2007 credit-market crash

Subprimes Not Dead for American General
Asset Backed Alert, Harrison Scott Publications Inc. (March 26, 2010)

American General is about to start shopping the second in what could be a series of securitizations this year, this time in the form of a deal backed by subprime mortgages. The offering, totaling $800 million, is set to hit the market within the next two weeks via lead underwriter Deutsche Bank. It would be backed by 30-year fixed-rate loans that were mostly written 3-7 years ago through American General’s own branches, with no credits newer than 18 months old.

The transaction is separate from a securitization the Evansville, Ind., unit of AIG is poised to price in the coming days. RBS is leading that $1 billion issue, backed by alternative-A credits written through brokers. The alt-A deal was seen as a rarity when it hit the market just over a month ago, as it was among just a few private-label mortgage securitizations to go into development since the global credit crisis intensified in late 2008. Even then, however, subprime-loan issues were presumed extinct.

Indeed, investors have been treating subprime-mortgage securitizations as toxic for nearly three years. But American General is touting some characteristics that might ease buyers’ concerns. For instance, the underlying borrowers have full documentation, were fully examined by the company and most have made 50 payments or more – factors that have often been missing from poorly performing loan pools.

There will also be substantial credit enhancement for the deal’s triple-A-rated senior class, in the form of three or four subordinate pieces equal to about half the top-rated tranche. Deutsche plans to pitch the top class to large “real-money” investors like insurers or pension plans, while shopping the junior notes more quietly among hedge funds.

After that, American General could try to complete six or seven more deals over the course of the year. Most if not all would be backed by subprime loans, mainly from a $10 billion mortgage portfolio the company holds in what it calls its centralized retail pool. It could also draw on a smaller book of brokered loans.

Deutsche would likely run the books on deals involving the retail portfolio with RBS as a co-lead, as is the case with the upcoming subprime-mortgage issue. The arrangement reverses for brokered-loan deals, with RBS in front and Deutsche as a co-lead. American General is also in talks with whole-loan buyers.

Like other mortgage-bond issues that have gone into development in recent months, American General’s securitizations are being talked about as indicators of how the new-deal market will unfold in the months ahead. Other issuers might see successful offerings as justification to pitch bonds of their own, including Wall Street dealers and hedge funds that bought loans on the cheap.

American General has never been a frequent issuer of mortgage-backed bonds, but sees now as an opportune time to use its loan-origination business to carve out a presence in the market. Subprime mortgages were once the lifeblood of the securitization business, accounting for more than $1 trillion of deals in the decade leading up to the 2007 credit-market crash. Amid rampant defaults, the flow of those deals slowed late that year and then shut off entirely in 2008.

NPR Report: How We Found Our Toxic Asset

NPR Report: How We Found Our Toxic Asset

There’s no store where you can buy toxic assets; you have to know a guy. We know Wit Solberg, a former Wall Street trader.

Solberg left Wall Street to set up his own shop, Mission Peak Capital, in Kansas City, Mo. He and a dozen guys sit at desks with their tools: monitors, potato chips, Snapple, chewing tobacco. Pretty much all day long, Solberg looks at those monitors and evaluates toxic assets.

“The big black Angus cow that everybody wants? We’re not buying that cow because it’s too expensive,” he says. “We want the cow that’s got a wounded leg, but she might produce a few more calves for us — and [she’s] cheap.”

Tracking Our Toxic Asset

Solberg starts searching for a bond we might want to buy. And that searching looks a lot like checking your e-mail. Brokers keep sending him announcements about which toxic assets are for sale today. One says: “Cheaper!” Another says: “Super senior steal!”

Around lunchtime, Solberg finds a bond he likes for us. It’s called an Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, or OOMLT (pronounced om-let). Solberg thinks we should offer to buy the bond for “half a cent” on the dollar. That means that, for every $1,000 of the bond’s original value, we’ll offer $5.

But it turns out the guy who’s selling the bond wants 17 or 18 cents on the dollar — more than 30 times what we bid. Solberg says these kind of huge spreads are pretty common in the toxic asset business. People just radically disagree about what things are worth.

Do You Own Part Of Our Toxic Asset?

We’d like to meet some of our partners in the pages of this gigantic financial transaction. If you bought a home in 2005 in Sarasota, Fla., ZIP code 34232, let us know in the comments below or e-mail us. Or if you’ve owned our toxic asset (CUSIP: 41161PUA9), let us know that, too.

We spend two days with Solberg looking for the right toxic asset. One, full of what appear to be California McMansions, seems promising. Solberg prints out a 604-page prospectus that reads like a historical record of the entire financial crisis. It’s all in there — vaporized companies, people struggling to pay their mortgages, and some horribly complicated logic describing which bond holders get paid, in which order, under which conditions. But that bond falls through, too.

Finally, we find a beautiful, totally toxic asset at what Solberg thinks is a good price: $36,000. Back in the bubble, somebody paid $2.7 million for this thing. We buy a piece from Solberg for $1,000. It’s going to be our encyclopedia of the financial crisis.

What Our Toxic Asset Looks Like

Our toxic asset has 2,000 mortgages, many of them in hard-hit states like California, Arizona and Florida. A lot of the people in our bond are really struggling. Almost half are behind on their mortgage payments, and 15 percent of the homes are already in foreclosure.

At some point those homes will be taken over and sold for a loss. Every time that happens, the bond shrinks. Eventually, our part of the bond will disappear entirely.

Until then, we get a little money every month from people paying off their mortgages. We just got a check for $141. If it goes to Thanksgiving, we could double our money.

By the way, we bought the asset with our own money. Any proceeds will go to charity. If we lose money, we take the loss.

NPR Interview with Author Lewis Reveals Profits in Bad Loans.

Bear in mind now, that underneath this all are subprime mortgage loans and pool of subprime mortgage loans in which only eight percent have to go bad for the whole CDO to be worth zero.

NPR Interveiw with Lewis Author

Submitted by Ron Ryan, Esq. (Tucson) with the following comment:

The story broke on 60 minutes last week and on NPR Tuesday about people getting filthy rich from buying multiple CDS, which was a large cause of the economy almost sending the world into Apocalypse.  While so far they got that part right, they are selling it like there were just some smart people that noticed that the the pools were doomed to “fail,” meaning there would be a moment when the trigger defining failure would surely hit (8% default rate), what they are missing is that this was pre-planned as part of a grand scheme.

Editor’s Note: I agree with Ron. These people were obviously not stupid. They walked away with trillions. The task of homeowners, litigators, forensic analysts, and experts is to explain the counter-intuitive nature of this scheme — to engineer as large a pool of cash or cash equivalents in exchange for zero value; that means by definition creating inherently defective loan products and selling them to unsophisticated homeowners who were not in a position to know the difference.

In economics it is called asymmetric access to information. On the other end, the investors were led to purchase inherently defective bonds thinking they were backed by mortgage loans, which collectively created a low-risk pool.

Only the middle-men knew the truth. So only the middlemen purchased credit default swaps betting against the very loans they created and against the securities they sold. And only the middlemen presented claims that were satisfied by the Federal bailout under the false representation that THEY were holding toxic assets when in fact it was the the homeowners and investors that were holding toxic assets.


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