JP Morgan: 8 people, 18,000 signed affidavits per month

The bottom line is that none of these signors of affidavits have ANY personal knowledge regarding any document, event, or transaction relating to any of the loans they are “processing.” It’s all a lie.

In a 35 hour workweek, 18,000 affidavits per month computes as 74.23 affidavits per JPM signor per hour and 1.23 per minute. Try that. See if you can review a file, verify the accounting, execute the affidavit and get it notarized in one minute. It isn’t possible. It can only be done with a system that incorporates automation, fabrication and forgery.

Editor’s Note: Besides the entertaining writing, there is a message here. And then a hidden message. The deponent is quoted as saying she has personal knowledge of what her fellow workers have as personal knowledge. That means the witness is NOT competent in ANY court of law to give testimony that is allowed to be received as evidence. Here is the kicker: None of these loans were originated by JPM. Most of them were the subject of complex transactions. The bottom line is that none of these signors of affidavits have ANY personal knowledge regarding any document, event, or transaction relating to any of the loans they are “processing.” It’s all a lie.

In these transactions, even though the investors were the owners of the loan, the servicing and other rights were rights were transferred acquired from WAMU et al and then redistributed to still other entities. This was an exercise in obfuscation. By doing this, JPM was able to control the distribution of profits from third party payments on loan pools like insurance contracts, credit defaults swaps and other credit enhancements.

Having that control enabled JPM to avoid allocating such payments to the investors who put up the bad money and thus keep the good money for itself. You see, the Countrywide settlement with the FTC focuses on the pennies while billions of dollars are flying over head.

The simple refusal to allocate third party payments achieves the following:

  • Denial of any hope of repayment to the investors
  • Denial of any proper accounting for all receipts and disbursements that are allocable to each loan account
  • 97% success rate in sustaining Claims of default that are fatally defective being both wrong and undocumented.
  • 97% success rate on Claims for balances that don’t exist
  • 97% success rate in getting a home in which JPM has no investment

(THE DEPONENT’S NAME IS COTRELL NOT CANTREL)

JPM: Cantrel deposiition reveals 18,000 affidavits signed per month

HEY, CHASE! YEAH, YOU… JPMORGAN CHASE! One of Your Customers Asked Me to Give You a Message…

Hi JPMorgan Chase People!

Thanks for taking a moment to read this… I promise to be brief, which is so unlike me… ask anyone.

My friend, Max Gardner, the famous bankruptcy attorney from North Carolina, sent me the excerpt from the deposition of one Beth Ann Cottrell, shown below.  Don’t you just love the way he keeps up on stuff… always thinking of people like me who live to expose people like you?  Apparently, she’s your team’s Operations Manager at Chase Home Finance, and she’s, obviously, quite a gal.

Just to make it interesting… and fun… I’m going to do my best to really paint a picture of the situation, so the reader can feel like he or she is there… in the picture at the time of the actual deposition of Ms. Cottrell… like it’s a John Grisham novel…

FADE IN:

SFX: Sound of creaking door opening, not to slowly… There’s a ceiling fan turning slowly…

It’s Monday morning, May 17th in this year of our Lord, two thousand and ten, and as we enter the courtroom, the plaintiff’s attorney, representing a Florida homeowner, is asking Beth Ann a few questions…  We’re in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida.

Deposition of Beth Ann Cottrell – Operations Manager of Chase Home Finance LLC

Q.  So if you did not review any books or records or electronic records before signing this affidavit of payments default, how is it that you had personal knowledge of all of the matters stated in this sworn document?

A.  Well, it is pretty simple, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge of what is in the affidavit on personal knowledge.  That is how our process works.

Q.  So, when signing an affidavit, you stated you have personal knowledge of the matters contained therein of Chase’s business records yet you never looked at the data bases or anything else that would contain those records; is that correct?

A.  That is correct.  I rely on my staff to do that part.

Q.  And can you tell me in a given week how many of these affidavits you might sing?

A.  Amongst all the management on my team we sign about 18,000 a month.

Q.  And how many folks are on what you call the management?

A.  Let’s see, eight.

And… SCENE.

Isn’t that just irresistibly cute?  The way she sees absolutely nothing wrong with the way she’s answering the questions?  It’s really quite marvelous.  Truth be told, although I hadn’t realized it prior to reading Beth Ann’s deposition transcript, I had never actually seen obtuse before.

In fact, if Beth’s response that follows with in a movie… well, this is the kind of stuff that wins Oscars for screenwriting.  I may never forget it.  She actually said:

“Well, it is pretty simple, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge of what is in the affidavit on personal knowledge.  That is how our process works.”

No you didn’t.

Isn’t she just fabulous?  Does she live in a situation comedy on ABC or something?

ANYWAY… BACK TO WHY I ASKED YOU JPMORGAN CHASE PEOPLE OVER…

Well, I know a homeowner who lives in Scottsdale, Arizona… lovely couple… wouldn’t want to embarrass them by using their real names, so I’ll just refer to them as the Campbell’s.

So, just the other evening Mr. Campbell calls me to say hello, and to tell me that he and his wife decided to strategically default on their mortgage.  Have you heard about this… this strategic default thing that’s become so hip this past year?

It’s when a homeowner who could probably pay the mortgage payment, decides that watching any further incompetence on the part of the government and the banks, along with more home equity, is just more than he or she can bear.  They called you guys at Chase about a hundred times to talk to you about modifying their loan, but you know how you guys are, so nothing went anywhere.

Then one day someone sent Mr. Campbell a link to an article on my blog, and I happened to be going on about the topic of strategic default.  So… funny story… they had been thinking about strategically defaulting anyway and wouldn’t you know it… after reading my column, they decided to go ahead and commence defaulting strategically.

So, after about 30 years as a homeowner, and making plenty of money to handle the mortgage payment, he and his wife stop making their mortgage payment… they toast the decision with champagne.

You see, they owe $865,000 on their home, which was just appraised at $310,000, and interestingly enough, also from reading my column, they came to understand the fact that they hadn’t done anything to cause this situation, nothing at all.  It was the banks that caused this mess, and now they were expecting homeowners like he and his wife, to pick up the tab.  So, they finally said… no, no thank you.

Luckily, she’s not on the loan, so she already went out and bought their new place, right across the street from the old one, as it turns out, and they figure they’ve got at least a year to move, since they plan to do everything possible to delay you guys from foreclosing.  They’re my heroes…

Okay, so here’s the message I promised I’d pass on to as many JPMorgan Chase people as possible… so, Mr. Campbell calls me one evening, and tells me he’s sorry to bother… knows I’m busy… I tell him it’s no problem and ask how he’s been holding up…

He says just fine, and he sounds truly happy… strategic defaulters are always happy, in fact they’re the only happy people that ever call me… everyone else is about to pop cyanide pills, or pop a cap in Jamie Dimon’s ass… one or the other… okay, sorry… I’m getting to my message…

He tells me, “Martin, we just wanted to tell you that we stopped making our payments, and couldn’t be happier.  Like a giant burden has been lifted.”

I said, “Glad to hear it, you sound great!”

And he said, “I just wanted to call you because Chase called me this evening, and I wanted to know if you could pass a message along to them on your blog.”

I said, “Sure thing, what would you like me to tell them?”

He said, “Well, like I was saying, we stopped making our payments as of April…”

“Right…” I said.

“So, Chase called me this evening after dinner.”

“Yes…” I replied.

He went on… “The woman said: Mr. Campbell, we haven’t received your last payment.  So, I said… OH YES YOU HAVE!”

Hey, JPMorgan Chase People… LMAO.  Keep up the great work over there.

Foreclosure Defense: The Defense of PAYMENT

Thus the fund is present for payment and controlled by the combined entities of the entire single transaction. A default by the borrower is actually therefore impossible under the scheme of securitization as it was implemented. 

The fact that the borrower has not made a payment to the mortgage service provider has typically been accepted as prima facie proof that the mortgage is at least technically in default. But what if payment HAS been made by the borrower or by a third party? PAYMENT is an absolute defense and completely removes the ability of anyone to take any action in collection of the debt because the debt is not due.

Consider this latest entry to Garfield’s Glossary:

THIRD PARTY PAYMENT: (Foreclosure Defense: “PAYMENT”)

A basic defense to any foreclosure action or any action on a debt, whether evidenced by a note, security agreement or otherwise is PAYMENT. It is entirely possible and in fact probable that the ultimate party to whom payment was to be made actually received the payment from a third party, or a portion of the payment, or has a claim for the payment from a third party.

This third party obligation, taking the entire transaction as one single transaction arises from the sale, assignment, aggregating, re-assignment, sale, or transfer to an investment banker or entity created by an investment banker and in turn sold to an investor in pieces as an asset backed security (ABS).

Presumably the investor who purchased an asset backed security which was backed in small part by YOUR mortgage and note and the balance backed by (a) other mortgages and notes, and possibly other portfolios of obligations which may or may not have been mortgages and notes, (b) insurance from the rating agency, (c) insurance from an insurer against the risk of default, (d) insurance from the investment banker, (e) insurance from the mortgage broker, (f) insurance from the appraiser of the house, (g) insurance from the “lender”, (h) lender liability for buy back or guarantee of payment and potentially other third party entities who did make payment or who will make payment curing the borrower’s alleged default or nullifying the alleged default altogether.

The transfer of risk allocation sought by securitization, cross indemnity agreements, guarantees, ratings, insurance and “buy-back arrangements, convert the payment allegedly due from borrower as part of a larger option Ponzi scheme.

Using the Countrywide model which can be seen buried deep within their filings with the SEC, one can see that the proceeds of the sale of the ABS can be used to make the payments.

Thus the fund is present for payment and controlled by the combined entities of the entire single transaction. A default by the borrower is actually therefore impossible under the scheme of securitization as it was implemented.

The reality is that the underwriting standards for loaning money were dropped, along with even the escrow account for insurance and taxes in some cases, so that the loan would qualify for for closing at closing, even if it would later NOT qualify knowing the inflated value of the home, and the likelihood of increases in payments beyond the financial capacity of the borrower.

The gap created between what the borrower could actually pay and what the loan terms demanded was made up by the “option” quality referred to above  through insurance and other terms between the multiple players in the chain of title for the mortgage, note, risk of loss and right to payment (all of which was separated out into different entities — none of whom qualified as a lender or as an entity with a right to do business in the state where the property was situated or the state where the loan was originated.) (see LENDER).

 

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