The West Coast Foreclosure Show with Charles Marshall: Table Funded Loans, Consummation and the Courts

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The West Coast Foreclosure Show

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Attorney Charles Marshall and Investigator Bill Paatalo will discuss the issues resulting  from table funding today on the West Coast Foreclosure Show.
Table Funding is a legal theory of liability Charles Marshall is applying in several of his California cases.   The theory has only received limited traction so far. Some judges are starting to accept that many loans were table funded and thus concealed the true lender, while other judges continue to reject the theory in fear that over a decade of table-funded loans would open up the floodgates.
Courts that have considered the argument that when “a borrower’s mortgage loan documents allegedly fails to identify the borrower’s ‘true lender’ that the mortgage loan was never consummated”— and have unanimously rejected it. (Marquez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2017, No. 16-CV-03012-EMC) 2017WL 1019820,  citing Sotanski v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) No. 15-CV-01489-LHK, 2015WL 4760506, at *6; Mohanna v. Bank of Am., N.A. (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016, No. 16-CV-01033-HSG) 2016WL 1729996, Ramos v. U.S. Bank (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012,No. 12-CV-1820-IEG) 2012 WL 4062499, (holding that where “a lender was plainly identified … the loan was consummated regardless of how or by whom the lender was ultimately funded”)).

Table funded loans, according to Reg Z of the Federal Reserve, are predatory loans  per se especially if it was part of a pattern of conduct by the originator.

“Table Funding” now comes in many flavors:

1. The one addressed by TILA and required disclosures of the identity of the lender (giving the consumer choice over who he/she decides to do business with) has some basics to it. You have a real lender with real money making a real loan. But the disclosures say that the originator is the lender and do not disclose thee existence or identity of the real lender. Regulators have often treated a pattern of table funded loans as “predatory per se.” Back in the 60’s the banks were changing things at closing giving the borrower no option but to close with a “lender” who was different from the entity identified as lender in the original documents (application) and disclosures (GFE etc).

2. So the banks set up what they called warehouse lending in which the originator was borrowing money from the real lender and therefore really was the lender.

3. But in the customary purchase and assumption agreement with the “warehouse lender” it is clear that the so-called “warehouse lender” is the real lender, since it asserted ownership of the loan starting before the closing of the new loan.

4. In the era of claims of securitization, most such claims were completely false. But it created a vehicle in which sham conduits could be used to such an extent that it was virtually impossible to identify ANY real lender. This was done to cover-up theft of investor funds who thought they were buying certificates in a viable REMIC Trust that turned out not to exist and whose name was never used in the purchase of loans although it was used in foreclosures — only after the banks swore up and down that the trusts didn’t exist back in 2006-2009.

5. It was those stolen funds that funded “trading profits” from sham transactions including paying fees to originators who would have the borrower execute the note and mortgage in favor of the originator, who in turn transferred the paper to the various sham conduits. The actual debt never changed hands in any transaction because the owner of the debts, whether secured or not, was the investors whose money was illegal used to fund the whole venture.

This can demonstrated by using glasses of water. You have the investors pour some of their water (money) into a glass whose name is the underwriter of a so-called REMIC trust. The investor water is controlled by the underwriter who created a fictional entity (REMIC Trust) to issue bogus certificates that were entirely worthless. The water is owned by the investors. It never goes into the trust. It stays under the control of the underwriters. Just this week there was another multi-billion dollar settlement with investors who sued not for beach of contract (Bad loan underwriting) but for fraud.

So at all times the water is controlled, every drop of it, by the underwriter and the only movement of the water is when it is poured into separate pockets of the underwriter whose name does not appear on any of the so-called loan documents that are based upon a transaction that never happened — a loan of money by and from the originator to the borrower.

The underwriter used SOME of the money from investors to create the illusion of a loan transaction with the originator. So neither the originator nor the warehouse lender has any money in the deal (i.e., water). But endorsements and assignments are fabricated to create the illusion that someone purchased the loan. The only way that could have happened is if someone paid the investors. So the transaction didn’t happen but the paper did happen. All smoke and mirrors.

 

Please refer to page 24 of the attached brief (this was the appellate case Charles Marshall orally argued by phone this morning) for a negative spin on why table funding as a viable legal theory.
Charles Marshall, Esq.
Law Office of Charles T. Marshall
415 Laurel St., #405
San Diego, CA 92101
Investigator Bill Paatalo
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075

The True Lender Issue May Be An Open Door Now

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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In an article published by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, it appears that the evasive true lender argument received new life in an ancillary proceeding before a Federal District Judge in California. By holding that a tribal bank originating loans for a non-bank lender was not a “true lender.” The effects on foreclosure litigation are obvious. Most loans were originated by parties acting not as banks but as sales organizations or mortgage brokers. The money came from an entity created to mask the fact that the funding for the loan came from a dark pool of investor money instead of either a bank lender or a non bank lender. Hence the “table-funded” lender was not a lender any more than the originator.

In this case the finding of the court means that usury laws apply which might be something to look at especially in adjustable rate mortgage loan papers executed in favor of a non-lender who was acting on behalf of a non-lender and certainly nobody in the alleged chain was acting in its capacity as a bank lender unless they actually made the loan. remedies for usury law violations range widely among the states. In some, the remedy is loss of the debt and three times the debt in statutory damages.

The most important part of this decision as I see it is that if a party has no risk or money in the loan, then it is not a lender.

The ultimate effect of this decision might well bring down the foreclosure marketplace. If the originator and the party behind the curtain were not bank lenders, then they might not be lenders at all. Hence transfers from parties who were neither bank lenders nor nonbank lenders might have stumbled into the ultimate argument that the loan contract was never consummated.

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. Or call 202-838-6345

California Court Weighs in on “True Lender” Issue as CFPB Expands its UDAAP Enforcement Authority

Thursday, September 8, 2016

In a significant decision, on August 31, the US District Court for the Central District of California held that a tribal bank originating loans for a non-bank lender was not the “true lender”—making the loans subject to state usury limits.

Background

In December 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) commenced litigation against CashCall (a payday lender in a partnership with a tribal bank) and other defendants, claiming that they had violated the federal law prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (UDAAP) for financial services providers by servicing and collecting on loans that were wholly or partially void or uncollectible under state law.

The CFPB alleged that

  • CashCall (a non-bank payday lender) and not the tribal bank that partnered with CashCall was the “true lender” because only CashCall had money at risk;
  • there was no reasonable basis for the choice of tribal law as the governing law for the loan contract and, therefore, in the absence of an effective contractual choice-of-law provision, the law of the borrower’s state governed the contracts;
  • because the loan contracts charged interest rates in excess of the usury limits in the sixteen states identified by the CFPB, the contracts were wholly or partially void and/or uncollectible under applicable state law in those states;
  • therefore, by collecting on the loan contracts and attempting to collect on the same, CashCall’s actions were deceptive and violated the federal UDAAP statute.

The court granted the CFPB’s motion for partial summary judgment on all four elements of its liability theory.

This case is the latest in a number of cases brought against CashCall that have raised “true lender” questions and have caused uncertainty for marketplace lending and other non-bank lenders that use a bank partnership model for the origination of consumer loans. However, the court’s decision is particularly significant for a number of reasons, most notably the following:

  • The CFPB’s argument that a state law violation can be a predicate for a federal UDAAP violation represents a significant potential expansion of the agency’s authority. As the court noted, state law violations have been used, with some limitations, as predicates for finding deceptive practices violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s prohibitions against misrepresenting the “legal status” (that is, the collectability) of a debt, which often depends on state law, but this appears to be the first significant application of that theory to the general Dodd-Frank Act UDAAP prohibition.
  • In deciding the “true lender” issue, the court essentially adopts the holding in CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, 2014 WL 2404300 (W.Va. May 30, 2014), a West Virginia state law case, holding that the proper test for determining the “true lender” is the “predominant economic interest” of the parties. Varying slightly from Morrisey, the court finds that the “key and most determinative factor” is whether the bank “placed its own money at risk at any time during the transactions, or whether the entire money burden and risk of the loan program was borne by CashCall.” Therefore, although the court uses the term predominant economic interest, the court’s holding could be read to establish that the bank does not have to have more economic interest in the transaction than the non-bank partner. Rather, the bank would be found to be a “true lender” if the bank has any of its own funds at risk for any period of time.
  • The court dismisses without comment the holdings in other federal cases that looked to the contractual relationships between the parties to determine the “true lender,” such as Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (D. Utah 2014).
  • Typically, “true lender” issues are raised by private litigants or state regulatory authorities tasked with enforcing state law. In this case, the CFPB, a federal agency that has no apparent authority to enforce state law, has used state law as a predicate for a federal law violation.
  • According to the court, CashCall relied on the advice of counsel that the tribal bank partnership did not require CashCall to obtain state lending licenses or subject the loans to state laws. However, reliance on counsel did not absolve CashCall—or its CEO and owner—from liability for the UDAAP statute and other violations.

Key Takeaways

The combination of using state law as a predicate for a UDAAP violation and rejection of the advice of counsel defense makes this decision noteworthy. The legal theory implicit in the CFPB’s approach is that, in attempting to collect a debt, a creditor makes an implied representation that that debt is enforceable or, conversely, a material omission that the debt is unenforceable. In rejecting the advice of counsel defense, the CFPB successfully took the position that the objective falsity of this implied representation or omission is “deceptive” in violation of the UDAAP statute regardless of the creditor’s subjective belief that the debt was collectible. Under that combination of theories, a creditor’s failure to “disclose” any violation of state law that the CFPB concludes is “material”—even if the creditor reasonably believes that its practices comply with state law—may give rise to a federal “deception” charge.

One can expect the CFPB to use a similar “bootstrap” approach to relying on other state law violations as a predicate to its UDAAP enforcement authority in future litigation, and reliance on the advice of counsel regarding state law compliance will not afford a consumer financial services provider a safe harbor from accusations of wrongdoing by the CFPB. Given the CFPB’s active and aggressive approach to UDAAP enforcement, consumer financial services providers would be well-advised to evaluate their state law compliance programs and scrutinize very closely bank partnership models. We also believe that other federal agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which have longstanding authority similar to the CFPB’s UDAAP authority, could view this decision as judicial encouragement to exercise their authority in this space as well.

The decision presumably will be appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where CashCall’s prospects for success are unknown at this time.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

LOAN ORIGINATORS ARE NOT LENDERS

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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see Hancock Ins v JPMorgan Chase et al

The question hanging in the air because nobody wants to answer it is that if a party is merely an originator and NOT a lender or creditor, then is there any theory under which a loan contract could be considered consummated? Anyone who has been reading my blog over the years knows I think the answer is no — especially because that practice is called a table funded loan and is considered PREDATORY PER SE according to REG Z under the Truth in Lending Act.

The second question would be whether there is any debt owed to a party on a note and mortgage arising out of a “closing” where there was no loan between the originator and the “borrower?” Again I answer no from simple contract theory. The fact that I give you $5 does not mean you owe my friend Joe $5 unless I transfer the debt.

The banks have managed to confuse courts for 10 years but their “15 minutes” appears to be up. They have reversed it.

Joe gets you to sign a note and mortgage to his benefit and he lends no money. Then Mary asks me for $5 so she can lend it to you. We all hire a closing agent. Mary sends my $5 to the closing agent and the closing agent procures your signature on the note and mortgage that was prepared by Mary.

The note and mortgage are payable to Joe. So now, according to the paperwork, you owe Joe $5. My $5 is given to you by the closing agent, who assumes the $5 came from Joe. So you and I have a debtor-creditor relationship that neither of us knows about. You and Joe have a false relationship of “maker” and “payee” on the note that never should have been released from “closing” had the real facts been revealed by disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act.

That lack of knowledge is at the center of all the controversies in cases where securitization is asserted. They securitized the paper but not the debt.

According to substantive law, you owe either Mary or me — not under the UCC or contract law but under rules of equity. It is a claim that is unsecured. If someone actually buys the note then you are screwed because if they paid for the note in good faith and without knowledge of your defenses, they can enforce it. Mary gets an assignment or fabricates an assignment from Joe and pays him a fee for his “troubles.”

Notice that my $5 is never mentioned in the paperwork with anyone. And my $5 is the only real money in the “game.” If later I figure out where my money went, then I can sue you under equity (unjust enrichment, etc) and win. If someone pays for the paper they can also win. You are left with an action for damages against Joe and maybe Mary. But they are most likely long gone. So you became indebted for $10 even though you only borrowed $5. Add the cost of litigation and interest and your loan probably goes from $5 to $5,000, with little hope of recovery from anyone — unless a judge believes your defenses and insists on proof of the underlying transactions, in which case Joe and Mary will get free room and board from the state (Prison).

Back to the paperwork. Mary’s Uncle creates a company and Mary transfers the loan papers to her uncle’s company. Note that the paperwork has been transferred, not the underlying debt. The paperwork is like a quitclaim deed from someone with no interest in the land. Other than me, nobody has paid any money for the origination or acquisition of the loan. But I have no paperwork protecting my interest even though Mary promised she would get it to me.

I own the debt. But since I don’t know you exist, I never claim any money from you. Instead Mary’s Uncle hires a bank to act like the servicer for the company formed by Mary’s Uncle. The servicer brings suit in the name of the company and they sue you for the $ plus fees, interest and litigation expenses.

If you have guessed that the courts have been rubber stamping a criminal conspiracy, I would agree.

FROM WILLIAM PAATALO

DEFINITION of ‘ThirdParty Mortgage Originator‘ 1. A person or company involved in the process of marketing mortgages and gathering borrower information for a mortgage application. This information is then transferred or sold to the actual mortgage lender.
And here’s Fannie Mae’s Definition:

Fannie Mae classifies mortgages into three different origination types:

  • retail,
  • correspondent, or
  • broker.

Refer to the Glossary for the definition of each origination type.

A third-party origination is any mortgage that is completely or partially originated, processed, underwritten, packaged, funded, or closed by a third-party originator, that is, an entity other than the lender that sells the mortgage to Fannie Mae, such as a mortgage broker or correspondent. Fannie Mae does not consider a mortgage that is originated and/or funded by a lender’s parent, affiliate, or subsidiary to be a third-party origination unless the parent, affiliate, or subsidiary uses the services of a mortgage broker or loan correspondent to perform some or all of the loan origination functions.

​From the Table of Contents of the attached Hancock Ins. v. JPMC, et al.:​

 

THE THIRD PARTY ORIGINATORS OF THE MORTGAGE LOANS UNDERLYING THE CERTIFICATES ABANDONED THEIR UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES AND APPRAISAL STANDARDS …………………………………………………………………………….88
1. BNC…………………………………………………………………………………………….90
2. CIT Group…………………………………………………………………………………….91
3. Countrywide………………………………………………………………………………….93
4. FNBN…………………………………………………………………………………………..95
5. Fremont………………………………………………………………………………………..96
6. GreenPoint……………………………………………………………………………………99
7. Impac Funding…………………………………………………………………………….102
8. IndyMac……………………………………………………………………………………..103
9. MortgageIT…………………………………………………………………………………107
10. New Century……………………………………………………………………………….108
11. People’s Choice…………………………………………………………………………..112
12. PHH……………………………………………………………………………………………113
13. Sebring……………………………………………………………………………………….114
14. Wells Fargo…………………………………………………………………………………114

Reverse Redlining: Targeting the Poor and the Unsophisticated for High Risk Mortgages

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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see

Click to access aclumfy_mortgage_report.pdf

At this point it is clear that the banks actually targeted people of color and other demographics where the likelihood of “default” on a loan was extraordinarily high. The ACLU in its latest report on the mortgage crisis proves this to any remaining doubters. This report also shows that these disadvantaged groups are the least likely to get a modification or other settlement or assistance of the various mortgage issues that we all know now were pandemic throughout the period of 1996-present.

But what they are missing is an answer to the REAL question: Why would anyone target a demographic where “defaults” could be claimed in much higher proportion to the history in the general population? Why did they want the loans to fail, because “failure” of the loan was a basic assumption to anyone who understands the various iterations of highly complex and sophisticated loan products — a number which climbed from 5 in the 1970’s to 450 in 2008. Imagine that 450 different loan options offered to the poor, the people who don’t speak or understand English very well and the people who are poor enough that eventually when payments reset they will not pay and they won’t be able to fight for their house. The tragedy here, let me remind everyone, is that most of these were refinancing of existing home ownership — that’s right, most of the homes were in the family for generations.

The Banks targeted homes where the home values were low. Then they drove the prices up to many items the actual value by filling the bathtub with money and selling “payments” instead of principal or interest rate. They offered teaser payments that the homeowner could afford — but which changed to a monthly payment that was higher (sometimes a multiple) than the entire household income. Somehow the Banks have convinced courts to think that the disclosures were sufficient. They were not. And in my opinion if the courts would scrutinize these so-called loans the way they did before securitization none of the loans would survive any fair interpretation of disclosures required under Federal laws (TILA) and state laws, including common law.

Banks do economic analysis every day employing thousands of analysts. Those analysts knew that the prices were being driven above the value of the property, knew that the endgame was the drop of prices to resume relationship with values, and thus knew — because they rigged the game — that if they bet the mortgages would fail, they would make a lot of money. The trick was to lose somebody else’s money not their own. and that is what they did.

If the ACLU wants to do something that produces actual results, they should analyze the economics of the alleged securitization of these loans. What they will find is a note that cannot be enforced and a mortgage that was void from the start. They will find fraud with aggravating circumstances. the banks needed really “bad” loans in order to accomplish their goals. By using investor funds instead of their own, they could claim ownership of the loans when they reported their assets and liabilities to regulatory authorities; but they would assign the losses to investors, borrowers, insurers, guarantors, FDIC loss sharing, and credit default swap counterparties and take the proceeds for themselves — even though they had no losses.

The ACLU should bring actions on behalf of the demographics hit hardest by this Ponzi scheme. They should state the obvious — that the true source of funds had no idea how their money was being used, the banks that did know were intentionally creating bloated loan documents based upon fraudulent appraisals, and the real creditors were deprived of any protection for their investment while the borrowers were signing documents that recited fraudulent information as to the identity of the lender and the real cost of the loan.

The attack on enforceability of the mortgages is easiest simply because it is now fairly easy to show unclean hands. Where a loan is statutorily defined as “predatory per se” it is hard to argue for the banks that it isn’t subject to “unclean hands per se” and therefore cannot be enforced because it is against public policy.

In a court where rules of equity are applied, there is no enforcement of a deal that was, from the start, violation of Federal and State law, was “predatory per se” (Regulation Z) and was part of a fraudulent scheme. This scheme only works for the banks if the loan is secured by a mortgage on the property. That mortgage is mostly unenforceable and probably void, ab initio. True creditors can prove they lost money on the deal have an opportunity to sue and collect on money due them — (1)  from the borrower up to perhaps the amount that should have been the principal, and (2) from the banks for the rest of the money that was skimmed off the top. The amount skimmed in many cases especially in the disadvantaged demographics, was frequently more than the loan itself.

RESCISSION REVIVED BY 9TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Hat tip to Ken McLeod and to Ron Ryan who argued endlessly that the former ruling was wrong in Arizona. Ron Ryan is a good lawyer and Ken McLeod is a good investigator. Both have years of experience investigating, analyzing and fighting illegal foreclosures.

Courts are catching on and as I have predicted, the ultimate determination of the merits of foreclosure cases are largely going to turn on the application of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Previously this same court held that tender of the money was required to rescind a transaction — the exact opposite of what the Federal statutes and regulations required. Now, correcting its prior error, the court says that a cause of action and defense exists by pleading rescission. Any document indicating the intent to rescind is sufficient.

The purpose of the TILA provision was to put the burden on the lender to prove that they had complied with all aspects of TILA in providing adequate disclosure and otherwise performing those acts required for a valid closing. If the defense is that the loan contract was not completed because of lack of consideration or other violations of TILA or RESPA, then the appropriate action is to send a rescission letter. It then falls on the “lender” to file an action within 20 days to object to the rescission or return all money paid by the borrower and to file a satisfaction of mortgage along with returning the canceled note. And since the allegation of no consideration leaves nothing to be tendered “back”, there is no impediment to going forward with discovery.

This forces “lenders” to essentially file a judicial foreclosure suit and prove they made the loan, they have the right paperwork and made the right disclosures. Table funded loans are going to give them a problem since Reg Z says that any pattern of conduct with table-funded loans is “predatory per se,” it is hard to imagine that this decision won’t stop the “lenders” dead in their tracks.

The requirement of tender assumed that the “lender” had actually made the loan and was the source of funds. Now the Courts are starting to realize that there was a switch at closing with the borrower and very likely a switch at closing with the real lenders — the investors who thought they were buying valuable mortgage bonds. With the borrowers the closing agent took money from an undisclosed party and then had the borrower sign documents in favor of another party. With the investors, the investment bank took money from the investors and instead of funding the trust, used the money and the documents from closing as though it were their own.

Hence the need to fabricate endorsements, assignments etc. If the “securitization” of the loan had taken place there would be a chain of monetary transactions leading up to the ultimate transfer to the trust who would have issued payment for the loan. There would have been no need to fabricate, forge, or robosign documents and certainly no loss of loans due to destruction or misplacement, because the documents would have been forwarded to the named Depository.

The result was that the burden was placed on borrowers with the least access to the real information on the loan and an easy path of defense to the party with the most access to the real facts of the loans and alleged transfers of the loan. TILA was meant to level the playing field. If the borrower invoked rescission without right, then there were consequences. This law was passed to prevent predatory lenders escaping the consequences of illegal actions simply because they had greater resources, sophistication and factual knowledge.

Be careful here. There are several types of rescission — 3 Day, 3 Year and common law. Consult with an attorney who is licensed to practice in the jurisdiction in which your property is located.

For more information call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp.

9th circuit opinion Issued July 16, 2014

Summary: Plaintiffs filed suit against Countrywide and others involved in their residential mortgage, alleging violations of numerous federal statutes. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that plaintiffs can state a claim for rescission under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., without pleading that they have tendered, or that they have the ability to tender, the value of their loan; only at the summary judgment stage may a court order the statutory sequence altered and require tender before rescission – and then only on a case-by-case basis; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ rescission claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that, although the limitations period in the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2614, ordinarily runs from the date of the alleged RESPA violation, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the violation; just as for TILA claims, district courts may evaluate RESPA claims case-by-case; and, therefore, in this case, the court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs’ Section 8 of RESPA claims on limitations grounds and remanded for reconsideration.

Merritt v Countryside 9th circuit 09-17678-2014-07-16

 

Relevance: THE FORECLOSER HAS NO RIGHT TO BE IN COURT WITHOUT THE SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS

 Courts and lawyers are continually ignoring the obvious. By zeroing in on the NOTE, they are ignoring the documents that allow the person in possession of the note to be in court. That results in elimination of critical elements of a prima facie case in which the Defendant borrower lacks the superior knowledge and resources of the Plaintiff and its co-venturers that would show the truth about his loan ownership and balance.

Premise:

Chronologically the document trail starts with the securitization documents. Without the securitization documents there is no privity or nexus between the borrowers and the lenders. Neither one of them signed the deal that the other signed. Without the Assignment and Assumption Agreement, the Prospectus and the Pooling And Servicing Agreement, the trust does not exist, the servicer has no powers, the trustee has no powers, and there is no right of representation or agency between any of those parties as it relates to either the lender investors or the homeowner borrowers.

 

The Assignment and Assumption Agreement between the originator and the aggregator sets forth all the rules and actions preceding, during and after the loan”closing”, including the underwriting by parties other than the originator and the ownership of the loan by parties other than the originator. It is a contract to violate public policy, the Federal Truth in Lending Law prohibiting table funded loans designed to withhold disclosure, and usually state deceptive and predatory lending statutes.

 

The Assignment and Assumption Agreement was an agreement to commit illegal acts that were in fact committed and which strictly governed the conduct of the originator, the closing agent, the document processing, the delivery of documents, the due diligence, the underwriting, the approval by parties other than the originator and the risk of loss on parties other than the originator. The Assignment and Assumption Agreement is essential to the Court’s knowledge of the intent and reality of the closing, intentionally withheld from the borrower at closing. It cannot be anything other than relevant in any action sought to enforce the documents produced at a loan closing that was conducted in strict adherence to the illegal Assignment and Assumption Agreement.

 

The other closing is with the investors who were accepting a proposed transaction to lend money for the origination or acquisition of loans through a trust. Those documents and records (Prospectus, Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Distribution reports, etc) provide for the creation and governance of the trust, the appointment of a trustee and the powers of the trustee, and the appointment and the powers of the Master Servicer and subservicers. Those documents also provide for there requirements of reporting and record keeping, including the physical location and custody of actual loan documents. Without those documents, there is no power or authority for the trustee, the trust, the Master Servicer, the subservicer, the Depository, the Securities Administrator the purchase of insurance, credit default swap trading, funding the origination or acquisition of loans, or collection and enforcement of loan documents. without those documents the Court cannot know what records should be kept and thus what records need to be produced to show the status of the obligation in the books and records of the creditor — regardless of whether the loan was actually securitized or just claimed to be securitized.

 

Procedure and UCC
In Judicial States, the Plaintiff is bringing suit alleging a default by the Defendant on a promissory note and for enforcement of a mortgage. The name of the payee on the note is different from the name of the Plaintiff in the lawsuit. The name of the mortgagee is different from the the name of the Plaintiff. The suit is bought by (a) a trustee on behalf of the holders of securities that make the holders of those securities (Mortgage Bonds) in a NY Trust (b) the “servicer” on behalf of the trust or the holders or (c) a company that alleges it is a holder or a holder with rights to enforce. None of them assert they are holders in due course which means they concede that the Plaintiff did not buy the loan in good faith without knowledge of the borrowers defenses. They assert they are holder in which case they are subject to all of the borrowers defense — which procedurally means the issues concerning the initial loan and any subsequent transfers can be in issue if the preemptive facts are denied and appropriate affirmative defenses and counterclaims are filed. These defenses are waived at trial if an objection is not timely raised.

 

In Non-Judicial States, the name of the “new” beneficiary is different from the name of the payee on the promissory note and the name of the beneficiary on the Deed of Trust. The “new beneficiary” files a “Substitution of Trustee”, the Trustee sends a notice of default, notice of sale and notice of acceleration based upon “representations” from the “new beneficiary.” This process allows a stranger to the transaction to assert its position outside of a court of law that it is the new beneficiary and even allows the new beneficiary to name a company as the “new trustee” in the Notice of Substitution of Trustee. The foreclosure is initiated by the new trustee on the deed of trust on behalf of (a) a trustee on behalf of the holders of securities that make the holders of those securities (Mortgage Bonds) in a NY Trust (b) the “servicer” on behalf of the trust or the holders or (c) a company that alleges it is a holder or a holder with rights to enforce. None of them assert they are holders in due course which means they concede that the Plaintiff did not buy the loan in good faith without knowledge of the borrowers defenses. They assert they are holder in which case they are subject to all of the borrowers defense — which procedurally means the issues concerning the initial loan and any subsequent transfers can be in issue if the preemptive facts are denied and appropriate affirmative defenses and counterclaims are filed. These defenses are waived at trial if an objection is not timely raised. In these cases it is the burden of the borrower to timely file a motion for Temporary Injunction to stop the trustee’s sale of the property.

 

Argument:
By failing to assert with clarity the identity of the creditor on whose behalf they are “holding” the note and mortgage (or deed of trust) and failing to assert the presence of the actual creditor (holder in due course) the parties initiating foreclosure have (a) failed to assert the essential elements to enforce a note and mortgage and (b) have failed to establish a prima facie case in which the burden should shift to the borrowers to defend. The present practice of challenging the defenses first is improper and contrary to the requirements of due process and the rules of civil procedure. If the Plaintiff in Judicial states or beneficiary in non-judicial states is unable to sustain their burden of proof for a prima facie case, then Judgment should be entered for the alleged borrower.

 

Evidence:
Virtually all loans initiated or originated or acquired between 1996 and the present are subject to claims of securitization, which is the first reason why the securitization documents are relevant and must be introduced as evidence along with proof of compliance with those documents because they are almost all governed by New York State law governing common law trusts. Any act not permitted by the trust instrument (Pooling and Servicing Agreement) is void, which means for purposes of the case narrative, the act or event never occurred.

If the Plaintiff or beneficiary is alleging that it is a holder and not alleging it is a holder in due course then there is a 96% probability that the creditor is either a trust or a group of investors who paid money to a broker dealer in an IPO where securities were issued by the trust and the investors money should have been paid to the trust. In all events, the assertion of “holder” status instead of “Holder in Due Course” means by definition that one of two things is true: (1) there is no holder in due course or (2) there is a Holder in Due Course and the party initiating the foreclosure and collection proceedings is asserting authority to represent the holder in due course. In all events, the representation of holder rather than holder in due course is an admission that the party initiating the foreclosure proceeding is there in a representative capacity.

 

THE FORECLOSER HAS NO RIGHT TO BE IN COURT WITHOUT THE SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS:

 

If the proceeding is brought by a named trust, then the existence of the trust, the authority of the trust, the manner in which the trust may acquire assets, and the authority of the servicer, Master servicer, trustee of the trust, depository, securities administrator and others all derive from the trust instrument. If there is a claim of securitization and the provisions of the securitization documents were not followed then in virtually all foreclosure cases the wrong parties are initiating the foreclosures — because the money of the investors went direct to the origination and purchase of loans rather than through the SPV Trust which for tax purposes was designed to be a REMIC pass through trust.

 

If the foreclosing party identifies itself as a servicer and as a holder it is admitting that it is there in a representative capacity. Their prima facie case therefore includes the documents and events in which acquired the right to represent the actual creditor. Those are only the securitization documents.

 

If the foreclosing party identifies itself as a holder but does not mention that it is a servicer, the same rules apply — the right to be there is a representative capacity must derive from some written instrument, which in virtually cases is the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

 

Representations that the loan is a portfolio loan not subject to securitization are generally untrue. In a true portfolio loan the UCC would not apply but the rules governing a holder in due course can be used as guidance for the alleged transaction. The “lender” must show that it actually funded the loan, in good faith (in accordance with the requirements of Federal and State law governing lending) and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. They would be able to show their underwriting committee notes, reports and correspondence, the verification of the loan, the property value, the ability of the borrower to repay and all other national standards for underwriting and appraisals. These are only absent when there is no risk of loss on the alleged loan, because if the borrower doesn’t pay, the money was never destined to be received by the originator anyway.

 

In addition, the Prospectus offering to the investors combined with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement constitute the “indenture” describing the manner in which the investment will be returned to the investors, including interest, insurance proceeds, proceeds of credit default swaps, government and non government guarantees, etc. This specifies the duties and records that must be kept, where they must be kept and how the investors will receive distributions from the servicer. Proof of the balance shown by investors is the only relevant proof of a dealt and the principal balance due, applicable interest due, etc. The provisions of the contract between the creditors and the trust govern the amount and manner of distributions to the creditor. Thus it is only be reference to the creditors’ records that a prima facie case for default and the right to accelerate can be made. The servicer records do not include third party payments but do include servicer advances. If records of servicer advances are not shown in court, and the provision for servicer advances is in the prospectus and/or pooling and servicing agreement, then the Court is unable to know the balance and whether any default occurred as a result of the borrower ceasing to make payments to the servicer.

 

In short, it is the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement that provide the framework for determining whether the creditors got paid as per their expectations pursuant to their contract with the Trust. It is only by reference to these documents that the distribution reports to the investors can be used as partial evidence of the existence of a default or “credit event.” Representations that the borrower did not pay the servicer are not conclusive as to the existence of a default. Only the records of the creditor, who by virtue of its relationships with multiple co-obligors, can establish that payments due were paid to the creditor. Servicer records are relevant as to whether the servicer received payments, but not relevant as to whether the creditor received those payments directly or indirectly. The servicer and creditors’ records establish servicer advance payments, which if made, nullify the creditor default. The creditors’ records establish the amount of principal or interest due after deductions from receipt of third party payments (insurance, credit default swaps, guarantees, loss sharing etc.).

For more information call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

 

 

Foreclosure Defense: Notes on Practice

I went to a hearing a few days ago and discovered to my surprise a Judge, in a remote section of Florida, who was fully conversant in the rules of procedure, due process and the laws of evidence. It would be improper for me to name him as I am currently counsel of record in an active case before him. The first thing that caught my attention was that in a case before me the Judge reserved ruling on an uncontested motion for summary judgment, to give himself time to review the paperwork and make sure that the paperwork was all in order. That is old style court practice.

In the 1970’s through the 1990’s that is what judges did to make sure the lawyer for the Bank had done his job properly — and that was before routine questions relating to who made the loan, whether the loan was properly originated, whether the loan was properly sold, whether the balance due was properly stated and whether there was an actual creditor who was present in court — someone who fulfilled Florida laws on the description of a creditor who could submit on credit bid at the auction.

The Judge also mentioned that he had presided over three bench trials the day before, two of which he had given judgment to the borrower because the Plaintiff had been unable to make its case. This bespeaks an understanding, knowledge, acceptance and execution of the procedural requirement of establishing a prima facie case thus shifting the burden of proof to the Defendant. And contrary to current practice in many courts, this Judge does not view his role as rubber stamping Foreclosures.

This Judge wants to see the things we have been pointing out on this blog: that if you are the Plaintiff you must prove your case according to the rules. First you must have a witness that actually knows something instead of merely reading off of a computer or a computer report. You must establish a proper foundation rather than an illusion by merely giving the appearance of proffering testimony from an incompetent witness with no knowledge of their own whose employment description consists of testifying in court. And your chain of evidence must be complete before you can be recognized as having established a prima facie case.

In the case in which I appeared the Plaintiff had filed a foreclosure against two homeowners, husband and wife, who then pro se fended off the Plaintiff with materials mostly from this blog and from other sources. But they were at the point where being a lawyer counts, knowing the content and timing of objections, filing motions to strike, motions in limine, responding to 11 th hour motions for protective order etc.

In this case their exists a legitimate question over whether the loan was subject to securitization. Originated in 1996 the loan date goes to the beginning of the era of securitization and this one didn’t have MERS, which I argue is evidence per se of securitization because there is no reason for MERS if your intent is not securitization. But 2 days after the alleged closing the loan was transferred to a player in the world of securitization. Thus the first argument is that this was obviously a table funded loan. Hence the question of where the money came from at the alleged closing table.

Adding to the above, the notice letter to the borrowers of default, acceleration and the right to reinstate suggests that the then “holder” was, in their own words “either a Servicer or lender.” So the very first piece of evidence in the file raises the issue of securitization since the party who sent the notice was not the transferee mentioned above two days after the alleged closing.

Thus questions about the origination and transfers of the loan were appropriately asked in discovery. The Judge was on the fence. Could one slip of the pen open up a whole area of discovery even with the table funded loan allegation?

But in the halls of the foreclosure mills, they had decided to file standardized pretrial statements disclosing witnesses and exhibits. So they filed a motion for protective order as to the discovery, refusing to answer the Discovery, and filed a statement that identified the witness they would use at trial 19 days later as “a corporate representative.” That is no disclosure of a witness and is subject to a motion in limine to block the introduction of any witness. The witness disclosure also attached a list of possible witnesses —37 of them, which I argued is worse than no disclosure and the Judge agreed.

Then in their list of exhibits that they will present at trial they refer to powers of attorney, pooling and servicing agreement, investors, servicer’s, sub-servicers, and all the other parties and documents used in creating the illusion of securitization.

I argued that if they filed a pretrial statement referring to all the parts of securitization of a mortgage loan, then the issues surrounding that are properly the subject of inquiry in discovery and that the 11 th hour filing of a sweeping motion for protective order and failure to respond to any discovery was in bad faith entitling us to sanctions and granting our two motions in limine. The judge agreed but removed the problem by setting the trial for February, and setting forth a schedule of deadlines and hearings a few days after the deadlines so both sides could develop their cases. The ruling was in my opinion entirely proper, even if it denied the motions in limine since he was giving both sides more time to develop their cases.

The moment the hearing ended, opposing counsel approached and was asking about settlement. I countered with a demand that his client immediately show us the chain of actual money starting with origination. He said that wouldn’t be a problem because this was definitely not a securitized loan. I told him I actually knew the parties involved and that most probably this was amongst the first group of securitized loans. I also told him that he would most likely fail in getting the proof of payment at closing, and proof of payment in each of the alleged transfers of the loan.

We’ll see what happens next but I would guess that there will be a lot of wrestling over discovery and more motions in limine. But this time I have a Judge who no matter his personal views that are most likely very conservative, will dispassionately call balls and strikes the way a judge is supposed to do it.

Wells Fargo Wrongful Foreclosure Kills Elderly Homeowner?

see http://livinglies.me/2013/04/29/hawaii-federal-district-court-applies-rules-of-evidence-bonymellon-us-bank-jp-morgan-chase-failed-to-prove-sale-of-note/

“The administrator of the estate of Larry Delassus sued Wells Fargo, Wachovia Bank, First American Corp. and others in Superior Court, for wrongful death, elder abuse, breach of contract and other charges.

Delassus died at 62 of heart disease after Wells Fargo mistakenly held him liable for his neighbor’s property taxes, doubled his mortgage payments, declared his loan in default and sold his Hermosa Beach condominium, according to the complaint.”

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our South Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. In Northern Florida and the Panhandle call 850-296-1960. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.

SEE ALSO: http://WWW.LIVINGLIES-STORE.COM

The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Comment and Analysis: There are two reasons why I continue this blog and my return to the practice of law despite my commitment to retirement. The general reason is that I wish to contribute as much as I can to the development of the body of law that can be applied to large-scale economic fraud that threatens the fabric of our society. The specific reason for my involvement is exemplified in this story which results in the unfortunate death of a 62-year-old man. I have not reported it before, but I have been the recipient of several messages from people whose life has been ruined by economic distress and who then proceeded to take their own lives.  In some cases I was successful in intervening. But in most cases I was unable to do anything before they had already committed suicide.

It is my opinion that the current economic problems, and mortgage and foreclosure problems in particular, stem from an attitude that pervades corporate and government circles, to wit: that the individual citizen is irrelevant and that damage to any individual is also irrelevant and unimportant. If you view the 5 million foreclosures that have already been supposedly completed as merely a collection of irrelevant and unimportant citizens and their families then the policies of the banks on Wall Street and the politicians who are unduly influenced by those banks, becomes perfectly logical and acceptable.

I start with the premise that each individual is both relevant and important regardless of their economic status or their political status. In my opinion that is the premise of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution. The wrongful foreclosure by strangers to the transaction is not only illegal and probably unconstitutional, it is fundamentally wrong in that it is founded on the arrogance of the ruling class. Our country is supposed to be a nation of laws not a nation of a ruling class.

If you start with the premise that the Wall Street banks want and need as many foreclosures as possible to complete transactions in which they received the benefit of insurance proceeds and proceeds of head products like credit default swaps, then you can see that these “mistakes”  are in actuality intentional acts intended to drive out legitimate homeowners from their homes. These actions are performed without any concern for the legality of their actions, the total lack of merit of their claims, or the morality and ethics that we should be able to see in economic institutions that have been deemed too big to fail.

The motive behind these foreclosures and the so-called mistakes is really very simple, to wit: the banks have nothing to lose by receiving with the foreclosure but they had everything to lose by not proceeding with the foreclosure. The problem is not a lack of due diligence. The problem is an intentional avoidance of due diligence and the ability to employ the tactic of plausible deniability. Mistakes do happen. But in the past when the bank was notified that the error had occurred they would promptly rectify the situation. Now the banks ignore such notifications because any large-scale trend in settling, modifying or resolving mortgage issues such that the loan becomes classified as “performing” will result in claims by insurers and claims from counterparties in credit default swaps that the payments based upon the failure of the mortgage bonds due to mortgage defaults was fraudulently reported and therefore should be paid back to the insurer or counterparty.

In most cases the amount of money paid through various channels to the Wall Street banks was a vast multiple of the actual underlying loans they claimed were in asset pools. The truth is the asset pools probably never existed, in most cases were never funded, and thus were incapable of making a purchase of a bundle of loans without any resources to do so. These banks claim that they were and are authorized agents of the investors (pension funds) who thought they were buying mortgage bonds issued by the asset pools but in reality were merely making a deposit at the investment bank. The same banks claim that they were not and are not the authorized agents of the investors with respect to the receipt of insurance proceeds and proceeds from hedge product’s life credit default swaps. And they are getting away with it.

They are getting away with it because of the complexity of the money trail and the paper trail. This can be greatly simplified by attorneys representing homeowners immediately demanding proof of payment and proof of loss (the essential elements of proof of ownership) at the origination, assignment, endorsement or other method of acquisition of loans. In both judicial and nonjudicial states it is quite obvious that the party seeking to invoke  foreclosure proceedings avoids the third rail of basic rules and laws of contract, to wit: that the transactions which they allege occurred did not in fact occur and that there was no payment, no loss and no risk of loss to any of the parties that are said to be in the securitization chain. The securitization chain exists only as an illusion created by paperwork.

The parties who handled the money as intermediaries between the lenders and the borrowers do not appear anywhere in the paperwork allegedly supporting the existence of the securitization chain. Instead of naming the investors as the owner and payee on the note and mortgage, these intermediaries diverted the ownership of the note to controlled entities that use their apparent ownership to trade in bonds, derivatives, and hedge products as though the capital of the investment bank was at risk in the origination or acquisition of the loans and as though the capital of the investment bank was at risk in the issuance of what can only be called bogus mortgage bonds.

Toward that end, the Wall Street banks have successfully barred contact and cooperation between the actual lenders and the actual borrowers. These banks have successfully directed the attention of the courts to the fabricated paperwork of the assignments, endorsements and securitization chain. The fact that these documents contain unreliable hearsay statements about transactions that never occurred has escaped the attention and consideration of the judiciary, most lawyers, and in fact most borrowers.

It is this sleight-of-hand that has thrown off policymakers as well as the judiciary and litigants. The fact that money appeared at the time of the alleged loan closing is deemed sufficient to prove that the designated lender on the closing papers was in fact the source of the loan; but they were not the source of the funds for the loan and as the layers of paperwork were added there were no funds at all in the apparent transfer of ownership of the loan that was originated by a strawman with an undisclosed principal, thus qualifying the loan as predatory per se according to the federal truth in lending act.

The fact that the borrower in many cases ceased making payments is deemed sufficient to justify the issuance of a notice of default, a notice of sale and the actual foreclosure of the home and eviction of the homeowner. The question of whether or not any payment was due as escaped the system almost entirely.

Even if the  borrower makes all the payments demanded, the banks will nonetheless seek foreclosure to justify the receipt of insurance and credit default swap proceeds. So they manufacture excuses like failure to pay taxes, failure to pay  insurance premiums, abandonment, failure to maintain or anything else they can think of that will justify the foreclosure and a demand for money that far exceeds  any loss and without giving the borrower an opportunity to avoid foreclosure by either curing the problem for pointing out that there was no problem at all.

As I have pointed out before, the entire mortgage system was turned on its head. If you turn it back to right side up then you will see that the receipt of money by the intermediary banks is an overpayment on both the bond issued to the investor (or the debt owed to the investor) and the promissory note that was executed by the borrower on the false premise that there had been full disclosure of all parties, intermediaries and their compensation as required by the federal truth in lending act, federal reserve regulations and many state laws involving deceptive lending.

Wells Fargo will no doubt defend the action of the estate of the dead man with allegations of a pre-existing condition which would have resulted in his death in all events. The problem they have in this particular case is that the causation of the death is a little easier to prove when the death occurs in the courtroom based upon false claims, false collections, and probably a duty to refund excess payments received from insurers and counterparties to credit default swaps.

The cost of the largest economic crime in human history is very human indeed.

 

Elderly Man Allegedly Dies in Court Fighting Wells Fargo ‘Wrongful’ Foreclosure
http://www.alternet.org/economy/elderly-man-allegedly-dies-court-fighting-wells-fargo-wrongful-foreclosure

Follow the Money Trail: It’s the blueprint for your case

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.
Editor’s Analysis and Comment: If you want to know where all the money went during the mortgage madness of the last decade and the probable duplication of that behavior with all forms of consumer debt, the first clues have been emerging. First and foremost I would suggest the so-called bull market reflecting an economic resurgence that appears to have no basis in reality. Putting hundred of billions of dollars into the stock market is an obvious place to store ill-gotten gains.
But there is also the question of liquidity which means the Wall Street bankers had to “park” their money somewhere into depository accounts. Some analysts have suggested that the bankers deposited money in places where the sheer volume of money deposited would give bankers strategic control over finance in those countries.
The consequences to American finance is fairly well known here. But most Americans have been somewhat aloof to the extreme problems suffered by Spain, Greece, Italy and Cyprus. Italy and Cyprus have turned to confiscating savings on a progressive basis.  This could be a “fee” imposed by those countries for giving aid and comfort to the pirates of Wall Street.
So far the only country to stick with the rule of law is Iceland where some of the worst problems emerged early — before bankers could solidify political support in that country, like they have done around the world. Iceland didn’t bailout bankers, they jailed them. Iceland didn’t adopt austerity to make the problems worse, it used all its resources to stimulate the economy.
And Iceland looked at the reality of a the need for a thriving middle class. So they reduced household debt and forced banks to take the hit — some 25% or more being sliced off of mortgages and other consumer debt. Iceland was not acting out of ideology, but rather practicality.
The result is that Iceland is the shining light on the hill that we thought was ours. Iceland has real growth in gross domestic product, decreasing unemployment to acceptable levels, and banks that despite the hit they took, are also prospering.
From my perspective, I look at the situation from the perspective of a former investment banker who was in on conversations decades ago where Wall Street titans played the idea of cornering the market on money. They succeeded. But Iceland has shown that the controls emanating from Wall Street in directing legislation, executive action and judicial decisions can be broken.
It is my opinion that part or all of trillions dollars in off balance sheet transactions that were allowed over the last 15 years represents money that was literally stolen from investors who bought what they thought were bonds issued by a legitimate entity that owned loans to consumers some of which secured in the form of residential mortgage loans.
Actual evidence from the ground shows that the money from investors was skimmed by Wall Street to the tune of around $2.6 trillion, which served as the baseline for a PONZI scheme in which Wall Street bankers claimed ownership of debt in which they were neither creditor nor lender in any sense of the word. While it is difficult to actually pin down the amount stolen from the fake securitization chain (in addition to the tier 2 yield spread premium) that brought down investors and borrowers alike, it is obvious that many of these banks also used invested money from managed funds as gambling money that paid off handsomely as they received 100 cents on the dollar on losses suffered by others.
The difference between the scheme used by Wall Street this time is that bankers not only used “other people’s money” —this time they had the hubris to steal or “borrow” the losses they caused — long enough to get the benefit of federal bailout, insurance and hedge products like credit default swaps. Only after the bankers received bailouts and insurance did they push the losses onto investors who were forced to accept non-performing loans long after the 90 day window allowed under the REMIC statutes.
And that is why attorneys defending Foreclosures and other claims for consumer debt, including student loan debt, must first focus on the actual footprints in the sand. The footprints are the actual monetary transactions where real money flowed from one party to another. Leading with the money trail in your allegations, discovery and proof keeps the focus on simple reality. By identifying the real transactions, parties, timing and subject moment lawyers can use the emerging story as the blueprint to measure against the fabricated origination and transfer documents that refer to non-existent transactions.
The problem I hear all too often from clients of practitioners is that the lawyer accepts the production of the note as absolute proof of the debt. Not so. (see below). If you will remember your first year in law school an enforceable contract must have offer, acceptance and consideration and it must not violate public policy. So a contract to kill someone is not enforceable.
Debt arises only if some transaction in which real money or value is exchanged. Without that, no amount of paperwork can make it real. The note is not the debt ( it is evidence of the debt which can be rebutted). The mortgage is not the note (it is a contract to enforce the note, if the note is valid). And the TILA disclosures required make sure that consumers know who they are dealing with. In fact TILA says that any pattern of conduct in which the real lender is hidden is “predatory per se”) and it has a name — table funded loan. This leads to treble damages, attorneys fees and costs recoverable by the borrower and counsel for the borrower.
And a contract to “repay” money is not enforceable if the money was never loaned. That is where “consideration” comes in. And a an alleged contract in the lender agreed to one set of terms (the mortgage bond) and the borrower agreed to another set of terms (the promissory note) is no contract at all because there was no offer an acceptance of the same terms.
And a contract or policy that is sure to fail and result in the borrower losing his life savings and all the money put in as payments, furniture is legally unconscionable and therefore against public policy. Thus most of the consumer debt over the last 20 years has fallen into these categories of unenforceable debt.
The problem has been the inability of consumers and their lawyers to present a clear picture of what happened. That picture starts with footprints in the sand — the actual events in which money actually exchanged hands, the answer to the identity of the parties to each of those transactions and the reason they did it, which would be the terms agreed on by both parties.
If you ask me for a $100 loan and I say sure just sign this note, what happens if I don’t give you the loan? And suppose you went somewhere else to get your loan since I reneged on the deal. Could I sue you on the note? Yes. Could I win the suit? Not if you denied you ever got the money from me. Can I use the real loan as evidence that you did get the money? Yes. Can I win the case relying on the loan from another party? No because the fact that you received a loan from someone else does not support the claim on the note, for which there was no consideration.
It is the latter point that the Courts are starting to grapple with. The assumption that the underlying transaction described in the note and mortgage was real, is rightfully coming under attack. The real transactions, unsupported by note or mortgage or disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act, cannot be the square peg jammed into the round hole. The transaction described in the note, mortgage, transfers, and disclosures was never supported by any transaction in which money exchanged hands. And it was not properly disclosed or documented so that there could be a meeting of the minds for a binding contract.
KEEP THIS IN MIND: (DISCOVERY HINTS) The simple blueprint against which you cast your fact pattern, is that if the securitization scheme was real and not a PONZI scheme, the investors’ money would have gone into a trust account for the REMIC trust. The REMIC trust would have a record of the transaction wherein a deduction of money from that account funded your loan. And the payee on the note (and the secured party on the mortgage) would be the REMIC trust. There is no reason to have it any other way unless you are a thief trying to skim or steal money. If Wall Street had played it straight underwriting standards would have been maintained and when the day came that investors didn’t want to buy any more mortgage bonds, the financial world would not have been on the verge of extinction. Much of the losses to investors would have covered by the insurance and credit default swaps that the banks took even though they never had any loss or risk of loss. There never would have been any reason to use nominees like MERS or originators.
The entire scheme boils down to this: can you borrow the realities of a transaction in which you were not a party and treat it, legally in court, as your own? So far the courts have missed this question and the result has been an unequivocal and misguided “yes.” Relentless of pursuit of the truth and insistence on following the rule of law, will produce a very different result. And maybe America will use the shining example of Iceland as a model rather than letting bankers control our governmental processes.

Banking Chief Calls For 15% Looting of Italians’ Savings
http://www.infowars.com/banking-chief-calls-for-15-looting-of-italians-savings/

Banks Attempting to Fight MERS Decision With Public Relations

What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

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For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).

Editor’s Analysis: The banks are threatening to slow down lending because of the Oregon MERS decision. They want to be fear in the hearts of realtors and sellers alike who will no doubt be recruited to join in lobbying efforts to change the law in Oregon to allow MERS in the chain of title. People who live in Oregon should be VERY vigilant to see that such a provision doesn’t get tacked onto to some innocuous bill that has nothing to do with MERS, foreclosures, mortgages or even real property.

Here is the problem for the banks: The reality is that that under real property law in every state you must record transfers of interest in real property if you want to be able to protect yourself against subsequent buyers or lenders who nothing about prior off-record dealings. Recording is what stabilizes the market. Where the recording rules are followed then there is notice to the world of who has what stake in any particular piece of property. A buyer or lender can buy or lend without worrying if they are really getting title or a perfected lien.

MERS is an intentional parallel universe in which transfer are NOT recorded and someone can pop up later claiming to be the new owner, beneficiary, trustee or whatever. It creates uncertainty in the marketplace which is bad for business generally and no doubt is going to spawn thousands of lawsuits on title insurance and title claims because MERS by its own admission never handles a dime, never gets the origination documents, and never does anything except maintain a relatively unsecured technology platform in which the members make, change, alter or amend data relating back to the so-called origination of the loan.

They attempt to cure this fatal defect with signed affidavits and other documents fabricated only when there is litigation executed by unauthorized people, robosignors, surrogate signors without corporate resolutions that the bank would require from borrowers but don’t want applied to themselves. The robo-signed, fabricated or fraudulent documents become part of the record but on close reading say nothing, which means that under case law in all the states the filings would be considered “wild” which means that it is out of the chain of title.

But the problem lies even deeper than that. MERS is the nominal trustee on the deed of trust or the nominal mortgagee on a mortgage. It disclaims any interest in the obligation, note or mortgage, saying that it is there to “facilitate” the transfer, sale or securitization of loans and other forms of credit — a function easily performed for a statutorily required fee by the statutorily authorized recording office in each county in which each property is located.

If you drill down a little deeper, you will find that MERS, as nominee is named as nominee for an apparently disclosed principal identified as the “lender.” But the “lender” loans nothing in most of these transactions, as the wire transfer receipt and wire transfer instructions will show.

So what you REALLY have is a nominee for  a nominee for an undisclosed principal, whom we all know should be the investors or their REMIC, but isn’t because the investment banks took the ownership diverting the paperwork and the money away from the investors, leaving them, and the borrowers, holding an empty bad or perhaps better said “a holographic image of an empty paper bag.”

These are table funded loans (predatory per se as per TILA and Reg Z) on steroids. While the banks are temporarily claiming ownership, they are trading selling and hedging and insuring the loans in packages making a fortune while the investors are left with fatally defective, unenforceable claims against he borrowers (see the various complaints filed by investors against the investment banks).

The flow of money from insurance — promised to investors and hedge products promised to investors never materializes because the banks kept the loans as though they owned them and then sold them at a premium to pools that were never funded with the investors’ money. Their money went to the banks as well which the banks used as their own money to make all those trades.

So the Oregon Supreme Court is scheduled to hear a case called Niday vs. GMAC Mortgage because the lower appellate court said that in order to collect or foreclose on a debt, the debt must be owed to you and not someone else. This is also the law in all states —  only an actual creditor who is owed money from the borrower can submit a “credit bid”in lieu of cash assuming the debt is owed in connection with the financing of the property.

So the Banks and servicers are getting the story out through the media wherever they can that these rulings are misguided and will have terrible consequences on the marketplace when in fact the reverse is true. What the banks and servicers are doing is introducing a level of uncertainty that has never been seen before in the American marketplace. Their response to attempts to curb their illicit practices has been to threaten the marketplace with a freeze on lending. In other words, they are trying to bully us into letting them get away with it. Will you let them?

controversial-mers-decision-breaks-oregons-chain-nonjudicial-foreclosures

60 MINUTES: SECURITIZATION PROPERTY TITLES ARE A “TRAIN WRECK”

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary SEE LIVINGLIES LITIGATION SUPPORT AT LUMINAQ.COM

GET LUMINAQ COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION REPORT

PAYMENT TO HOMEOWNERS TO BACK OFF LITIGATION PROPOSED

30,000 QUIET TITLE ACTIONS ALREADY FILED AND NUMBERS ARE CLIMBING SHARPLY

SHEILA BAIR: A Flood of Litigation from Homeowners is Swamping the Court System.

60 MINUTES; SECOND CRISIS IN THE MAKING

60 MINUTES OVERTIME: WHO OWNS YOUR MORTGAGE

Scott Pelley did a strong pice on the securitization scam last night on 60 minutes (see above links and watch the video). BUT THE SECURITIZATION MYTH WAS NEVERTHELESS PERPETUATED. According to Pelley, we don’t know who owns the mortgages AND THE TITLE IS CORRUPTED so people won’t be able to sell or refinance their house. The clear implication is that we don’t know who owns the house. But the answer is as simple Property Law 101. There is no mystery here. The fact that the securitizers intentionally or unintentionally screwed up the paperwork and the closings is not the homeowners’ problem.

WHO OWNS THE HOUSE? THE HOMEOWNER OF COURSE. THAT WOULD BE THE PERSON OR PERSONS IN THE PROPERTY RECORDS OF COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE WHO WERE PROPERLY REGISTERED AS THE GRANTEE OF DEED FROM THE FORMER PROPERTY OWNER. The implication that the securitizers actually have some right to the house is wrong, and CBS was unintentionally carrying the message from Wall Street that this is just a paperwork mess that could be cleaned up. But as we have repeatedly said, if it were that simple, it COULD be corrected legally and they wouldn’t have need to have $10 per hour clerical people signing as vice-president of 20  different lending institutions, most of which they never heard of, were never employed by and who didn’t even know of their existence.

The reason why the paperwork is so screwed up is that Wall Street tried the usually successful practice of burying the opposition in paper. But the paper is meaningless. What Pelley missed in his focus on robo-signing was that the closing with the homeowner was defective in the first place and the only “correction” that is possible is to get another signature from the borrower. Good luck. The fact that Federal and state lending laws require that the lender be identified and that the fees and costs all be disclosed before the closing required that information to be on the promotional information given to the buyer, the Good Faith estimate, and the closing statement as well as the promissory note and mortgage or deed of trust. None of that was done.

SO THE QUESTION OF WHO OWNS THE MORTGAGE IS IRRELEVANT. There is no mortgage or deed of trust that can be enforced. The liability for the loan runs from the borrower to the lender. The party on the documents was not the lender. THAT is why this can’t be corrected without the cooperation of the borrowers who are now going to be presented with various proposals to induce them to sign off on paperwork that will make the initial filing of a mortgage valid and legal. It is highly unlikely, without a very significant payment estimated between $20,000 and $100,000 that any homeowner or former homeowner is going to sign such a document.

If the home is STILL worth less than the proposed mortgage, a significant number of homeowners simply won’t sign.

The bottom line is that the liability exists — only to the initial investor or successors who purchased mortgage bonds — and even there, such rights would only be valid if established i courts of equity where the “creditor” would come in with “clean hands” and a credible claim about how they are suffering a loss. Such parties might be and probably would be subject to answers, affirmative defenses, set-off, counterclaims and especially suits for quiet title, which are the last thing that pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury want to get involved with.

THE REAL BOTTOM LINE IS THAT NEARLY ALL THE LOANS WERE UNDISCLOSED TABLE-FUNDED LOANS MEANT FOR THE SECURITIZATION MARKET, VIOLATING FEDERAL AND STATE LENDING LAWS. AT LEAST 96% OF ALL “LOAN TRANSACTIONS” HAD MONEY CHANGE HANDS BUT NONE OF THOSE HAD ANY VALID DOCUMENTATION.

PELLEY CALLED THIS A TRAIN WRECK. I disagree. I CALL IT JUSTICE AND THE APPLICATION OF LAW INSTEAD OF THE RULE OF WEALTHY MEN. When Xerox forgot to patent their document copying process, nobody said we should treat it as though they had the patent. Quite the contrary. When bankers, who have been doing this for hundreds of years, “forget” to document their liens and prioritize them, nobody should be saying we should give it to them anyway. Why? Because we already know they sold the same thing multiple times. In many cases, perhaps most, the “creditor has been paid, and perhaps over paid.

The consequences of homeowners getting an unintended collateral benefit from Wall Street’s screw-ups is unusual only because it is the little guy who is getting the benefit. But it is also society at large, where the attempted transfer of wealth did not succeed. Homeowners are realizing that they actually didn’t lose their house and are not at risk of losing their homes and that if they have any liability they have no burden of finding out the amount due or the identity of the creditor to whom it is due. The world is realizing that the mortgage bonds were empty pieces of paper and they have trading spit balls instead of proprietary currency.

The opportunity presented by this turn of events is enormous in terms of our ability to rebuild infrastructure, upgrade education, and level the playing field of what we want as a free market without domination by giants that are too big too fail and too big to manage or regulate.



PRIORITY OF LIENS: TWISTED TAIL OF TITLE FRAUD

THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT CASE LAW IN VARIOUS CASES REPORTED IN THIS BLOG SHOWS THAT WHEN ONE INSTITUTION CONFRONTS ANOTHER, THE APPARENTLY INFERIOR LIEN BECOMES EITHER SUPERIOR, OR THE ONLY LIEN. CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS, HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS TAKE NOTE: YOUR LIEN MIGHT BE WORTH THE ENTIRE HOUSE IF YOU FILE FOR A DECLARATORY ACTION RAISING THE PRIORITY OF YOUR LIEN. HELOC AND SECOND MORTGAGE HOLDERS TAKE NOTE AS WELL. AND OF COURSE HOMEOWNERS OR THOSE WHO THINK THEY ARE EX-HOMEOWNERS TAKE NOTE: YOU MIGHT STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A QUIET TITLE ACTION AND RECLAIM YOUR PROPERTY — ALLOWING ANY ACTUAL “LOSER” IN THE DEAL TO MAKE THEIR CLAIM BUT BARRING NOMINAL PARTIES FROM WINDFALL PROFITS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RISK OR INVESTMENT.

There is practically nobody left who doesn’t see that the “ownership” of the loan is a big red question mark. The question that is unresolved is whether that is relevant to questions of title and foreclosure sales. Here is the issue: In most cases the title record (the official title records books located in the property clerk’s office) show only one “party” to the note (a company identified as a lender) and one “party” to the security instrument — the mortgage or Deed of Trust — (a company identified as the mortgagee or beneficiary most frequently MERS or some other straw man or nominee).

So the first problem is that from the start, the ownership of the note and the ownership of the mortgage are split intentionally by the parties who engineered the “loan” closing. With the exception of a few states where the big banks lobbied for corrective legislation that probably is unenforceable or unconstitutional, it is not possible to enforce a mortgage that is not incident to a note. Each state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code and its own property laws that make it impossible for one person to get the house and another to get a monetary judgment for the note —- both based upon the same obligation.

  • They must be the same person or there is no enforcement of the security instrument (i.e., no foreclosure). And in those states, the mortgage or deed of trust is not incident to the note unless they have a common “owner.” So even before we get to the issue of securitization of the receivable, we have a problem. There is basically no law that would allow foreclosure of a so-called mortgage or deed of trust in which the holder of the mortgage or deed of trust is different than the holder of the note.

Before we get to the securitization issue, there is one more factor that is covered by Reg Z and the Truth in Lending Act. It is whether the “loan” was table funded. A table funded loan is one in which the party identified as a lender was not the source of the money in the transaction. The prohibition and restriction against these transactions is meant to keep the consumer informed about the identity of the party with whom he/she is doing business and therefore able to decide whether in fact they want to do business with the party who is really funding the loan.

  • The title problem with a table-funded loan is obvious: the note is supposedly a description of the obligation that arises when the borrower accepts the benefits of the monetary advance from the source of funds. In a table funded loan, the note does NOT describe the real parties and therefore is not proper evidence of the obligation and thus cannot be used as a substitute for proof of the obligation.
  • Federal law and rules state that anyone who as a matter of practice is doing table-funded loans, is defined as a predatory lender.
  • This means that if someone wants to enforce the obligation, they must have more than the note to prove their case. This is precisely where the pretender lenders are finessing the courts — because before the antics of the last decade, there was no difference between the obligation and the note and everyone on both sides of even an adversary proceeding usually agreed that the original note was proper evidence of the obligation.
  • This also means that if someone wants to foreclose, they need something more than the note, because the note, as we have seen, is NOT the complete evidence of the obligation — there is another party involved who was undisclosed and who was the source of the funds. So the obligation was between the borrower and the source of the funds. But the borrower was not told or informed that the money being advanced was from another entity.
  • Ordinarily this would not present a major problem, but it still would require corrective action in order to clear title for  purposes of a satisfaction or release of the mortgage or deed of trust, refinance, sale, second mortgage, condominium association lien, homeowner association lien, HELOC, non-judicial sale or judicial sale. Without this corrective action ON RECORD at the county recorder’s office, the documents releasing or transferring title to the property would be fatally defective in that the real party who advanced the funds did not execute a release or satisfaction, leaving the borrower or the borrower’s successor with the exposure of yet another foreclosure or another claim on the original obligation. This defect is either suspect or apparent on its face when you see MERS involved or an “originating Lender” that is not a bank (and usually out of business now).

All of this mind-numbing analysis morphs from nitpicking to highly relevant when securitization enters the picture. Securitization as it was used in actual practice, i.e., real world reality, was simply a process by which the payments were split from the obligation, not the note and reframed as the basis for a third party obligation under the terms of a mortgage bond sold to third party investors. So the source of funding never receives the note or any of the borrower’s closing documents. He receives a mortgage bond in which there are multiple payors, obligors, and contingent liabilities only one of which is the borrower’s obligation to repay the obligation.

There are two primary defects in this process that are of high significance:

  1. In practice, the intermediaries used the documentation for securitization to multiply rather than split the obligation to pay amongst the various payors and co-obligors.
  • This means that for every dollar that was advanced for the benefit of the borrower, an obligation was ADDED to the receivable stream for each payor or co-obligor that was ADDED to the obligation to make payments under the mortgage bond. This is where the intermediaries began to make multiples of the money being funded rather than small basis points as was customary in the industry.
  • Through the use of highly sophisticated cloaked transactions, each dollar funded was multiplied as a nominal receivable which in turn was sold multiple times and insured multiple times in multiple ways.
  • Hence the the total evidence of the borrower’s obligation consists of the closing borrower documents PLUS the closing investor documents. The total accounting consists of the the servicing record of the borrower’s payments PLUS the distribution and tape record of reports and payments to the bond holders.
  • This totality of the evidence reveals that the borrower’s obligation resulted in multiple payments by multiple payors and co-obligors, some of whom made money participating in the sham scheme, and some of whom lost money in the scheme.
  • In most cases, one of the groups that lost money were the original investors who advanced money for their share of the flow of receivables described in the mortgage bond, which included, at all times, the receivables due from third party payors and co-obligors. Other losers were traders and institutions that were creating the appearance of an unregulated but phantom securities market in which profits and losses were apparently made on a daily basis, but which in fact were all accounting entries much like the Madoff scheme.
  • The current foreclosure scheme ignores these factors enabling intermediaries dubbed “pretender lenders” to profit from the confusion by pretending to be lenders when in fact they were never lenders of record and never lenders in the sense that they ever advanced any money. The intermediaries are filing false, fabricated and even forged or back-dated affidavits in the name of “Trustees” for trusts that do not exist or which have been dissolved or paid in whole or in part. The lender having been paid or settled as to the obligation under the mortgage bond thus releases any further claim. The intermediaries profit by pocketing the multiples of payments received, and the borrower suffers from the loss of a home or enforcement of a note that was never the evidence of the obligation.
  1. In practice, the actual source of funding — the party who advanced funds and who received a mortgage bond instead of the evidence of the borrower’s obligation —- NEVER held the note and was never intended to hold the note — and NEVER was the mortgagee or beneficiary and never was intended to be the mortgagee or beneficiary. Thus a declaratory action against the mortgagee or beneficiary of record should succeed in raising the priority of the interest of the plaintiff above that of the record holder of the security instrument, since the record holder has no obligation owed to it, and never was intended to be the recipient of funds nor to have the right or capacity to foreclose on the loan.

THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT CASE LAW IN VARIOUS CASES REPORTED IN THIS BLOG SHOWS THAT WHEN ONE INSTITUTION CONFRONTS ANOTHER, THE APPARENTLY INFERIOR LIEN BECOMES EITHER SUPERIOR, OR THE ONLY LIEN. CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS, HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS TAKE NOTE: YOUR LIEN MIGHT BE WORTH THE ENTIRE HOUSE IF YOU FILE FOR A DECLARATORY ACTION RAISING THE PRIORITY OF YOUR LIEN. HELOC AND SECOND MORTGAGE HOLDERS TAKE NOTE AS WELL. AND OF COURSE HOMEOWNERS OR THOSE WHO THINK THEY ARE EX-HOMEOWNERS TAKE NOTE: YOU MIGHT STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A QUIET TITLE ACTION AND RECLAIM YOUR PROPERTY — ALLOWING ANY ACTUAL “LOSER” IN THE DEAL TO MAKE THEIR CLAIM BUT BARRING NOMINAL PARTIES FROM WINDFALL PROFITS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RISK OR INVESTMENT.

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