Jurisdictional Defense —- Certificate Holders vs Trust

Litigators often miss the point that the foreclosure is brought on behalf of certificate holders who have no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage — and there is no assertion, allegation or exhibit that says otherwise.


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Here is an excerpt from one of my recent drafts on this subject:


LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: the complaint attempts to state a cause of action on behalf of the certificate holders of an apparent trust, although the trust is not identified as to the jurisdiction in which it was created or the jurisdiction in which it operates.
Even assuming that such a trust exists and that it issued certificates, there is no allegation or attachment of an exhibit demonstrating that the certificates contain a conveyance enabling the holder of the certificate to enforce the alleged debt, note or mortgage upon which the complaint relies. In fact, independent investigation shows the exact opposite.
Nor is there any allegation that any money is due to the certificate holders or any allegation that the certificate holders possess the promissory note or have the right to enforce either the promissory note or the mortgage. Even if the indenture for the certificates were produced before this court, it would only show a contract for payment from a party other than the homeowner in this action. Accordingly, no justiciable controversy has been presented to the court. In the absence of an amendment curing the above defects, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
  1. As to Bank of New York Mellon there is no allegation or attachment to the complaint that alleges or demonstrates an agency relationship between Bank of New York Mellon and the certificate holders, on whose behalf the complaint is allegedly filed. If Bank of New York Mellon is the trustee of an existing trust and the trust is alleged to own the debt note and mortgage along with the rights to enforce, then the agency or representative capacity of Bank of New York Mellon is with the trust, and not with the certificate holders. Based upon the allegations of the complaint and independent research defendant asserts that there is no representative capacity between Bank of New York Mellon and the certificate holders.
  2. As to the alleged trust which has not been properly identified there is no allegation that the action is brought on behalf of the trust; but the implied allegation is that the trust is the plaintiff. The complaint states that the action is brought on behalf of the certificate holders who merely hold securities or instruments apparently issued in the name of the alleged trust. There is no allegation or exhibit attached to the complaint that would support any implication that Bank of New York Mellon possesses a power of attorney for the certificate holders or the trust. In fact, in litigation between Bank of New York Mellon and investors who have purchased such certificates, Bank of New York Mellon has denied any duty owed to the certificate holders.
  3. As to the certificate holders, there is no allegation or exhibit demonstrating that the certificate holders have any right, title or interest to the debt, note or mortgage nor any right to enforce the debt, note or mortgage. Based upon independent research, the certificate holders do not possess any right, title or interest to the debt, note or mortgage nor any right to enforce. In fact, in Tax Court litigation the certificate holders are deemed to be holding an unsecured obligation, to wit: a promise to pay issued in the name of a trust which may simply be the fictitious name of an investment bank. There is no contractual relationship between the defendant and the certificate holders. Further, no such relationship has been alleged or implied by the complaint or anything contained in the attachments to the complaint.
  4. As to the certificate holders, they are neither named nor identified. Yet the complaint states that the lawsuit is based upon a claim for restitution to the certificate holders. The reference to the trust may be identification of the certificates but not the certificate holders. In fact, based upon independent investigation, the holders of such certificates never received any payments from the borrower nor from any servicer who collected payments from the borrower nor from the proceeds of any foreclosure. In the case at bar. the complaint is framed to obscure the fact that the forced sale of the property will not be used to satisfy the debt, note or mortgage in whole or in part.
  5. As to any of the parties listed in the complaint as being a plaintiff or part of the plaintiff there is no allegation or exhibit demonstrating that any of them paid value for the debt, or received a conveyance of an interest in the debt, note or mortgage from a party who has paid value for the debt as required by article 9 § 203 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by state law, which states that a condition precedent to the enforcement of a mortgage is the payment of value for the debt. Hence regardless of who is identified as being the actual plaintiff none of the parties listed can demonstrate financial injury arising from nonpayment or any other act by the defendant.
  6. In the absence of any amendment to cure the above defects, the entire complaint and exhibits must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of a plaintiff who has legal standing to bring a claim against the defendant.
The only thing I would add to the existing second affirmative defense is the affirmative statement that based upon independent investigation, such signatures were neither authorized nor proper, to wit: they consist of forgeries or the product of robosigned in which the signature of a person is affixed without knowledge of the contents of the instrument to which it is affixed.
In my opinion, the specificity that I have employed in the above comments not only provides a basis for dismissal, but also the foundation to support Discovery requests that might otherwise be denied, to wit: who, if anyone, ever paid money for the debt?

Rescission and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

I was recently requested to review a 6th Circuit Opinion in which the court stated that the rescission was barred by res judicata — i.e. that the matter had already been litigated and that the homeowner was therefore barred from bringing it up again.
The Court never considered that it was wrong in the first place and that the decisions that ignored the rescission were themselves void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court started with the premise that the bank must win on this rather than from the point of view that the law should be applied, not personal preferences. Thus such decisions come down to “because I said so” rather than through any legal analysis.
I think the court has missed the point completely. A deed has no statute of limitations. Even a mortgage deed or deed of trust has no statute of limitations. It only expires after the contractual terms end. A rescission, especially if it is recorded, has no expiration. All of these things can ONLY be removed by (a) a proper pleading (b) proof that the offending document should be canceled and removed from the chain of title and (c) filed within the time limit prescribed by statute.
The court has turned this on its head. There is no lawsuit required to make rescission effective. There is no tender. There are no conditions whatsoever — see Jesinoski v Countrywide (SCOTUS). It is effective as a matter of law and if recorded remains a permanent impediment to any subsequent instrument claiming clear title (as though the rescission did not exist) in any instrument executed or recorded after the rescission was sent and/or recorded.
The borrower is obligated to do nothing. The borrower can do nothing because even if it was the borrower that wanted to remove the rescission it would need to be done through court procedure. Otherwise, any person properly relying upon what appears in the title chain in the county records might act based upon their proper belief that the rescission exist would then find themselves having spent or lent money to a homeowner who in fact either had no title to the home or was already encumbered by the very instruments that were rendered void by operation of law. I can already see how foreign investors and lenders could get stuck by that having read the Federal, State and local laws and thinking themselves perfectly protected, and ending up with nothing.
The time limit is set on the bank, not the borrower. It is set by the statute as 20 days from receipt of the rescission to (1) comply or (2) file suit to vacate or cancel the rescission. This is a burden on the bank, not the borrower. To construe the statute any other way would be to violate the terms of the statute and to violate the specific explicit instructions from the US Supreme Court. Any decision or ruling that the bank or creditor could contest after 20 days would mean that the rescission is not effective when mailed as set forth by the Statute and Jesinoski. Such a ruling would mean that the rescission is not effective by operation of law; it would mean that the rescission is effective ONLY if and when the bank files suit to vacate or cancel the rescission and loses. How one would logically say that the rescission is not effective until there is a lawsuit is incomprehensible.
Rescission therefore is a fact and not a claim, pleading or defense. It may be raised as a defense merely to show that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, to wit: that the note and mortgage were rendered VOID by operation of law and as specifically stated in Reg Z which carries the full force of law. It follows that nobody can make a claim based upon void instruments. It also follows that the void instrument (i.e., the mortgage or deed of trust) must be removed from the chain of title as a void instrument. Hence quiet title is appropriate.
Rescission is an event and the recording of it preserves the rights and benefits of rescission against the whole world. What courts and lawyers have failed to comprehend is that the rescission may not be ignored or even canceled or vacated or waived by the homeowner who sent it and recorded it. With a deed you can file a corrective deed but all parties to it must join in the correction. Otherwise it remains. The converse is also true. if as a matter of law the mortgage or deed of trust has been rendered void by operation of law, then it is void for all purposes and against all claims to the contrary from all claimants of every kind, especially if it is recorded.
The court here has essentially adopted the strategy of the banks. By creating multiple layers of transmission, assignment, delivery and endorsement it gradually appears that the end successor indeed owns the debt, loan, note and mortgage. But if you start at the base of the chain and come to realize that the originator was not the lender and that the first transferee was merely a conduit who paid no money either for the origination nor the acquisition of the loan, one can easily see how the borrower’s rights have been egregiously violated.
This court has done the same thing. It is taking the original ruling that the erroneous ruling (without subject matter jurisdiction) ignoring but not removing the rescission somehow was valid because the court later said that the claims as precluded by having been previously litigated,a decision later affirmed by appellate court. They can say it but it is erroneous, false and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This is the rule of men rather than the rule of law. If the trial court had ignored the deed, mortgage or deed of trust without proper pleading and proof of a claim upon which such relief could be granted, the same result would apply.
This is not some technicality. Allowing parties who have no interest or injury to apply for relief that properly belongs to other parties opens up floodgates of malicious practices in the marketplace in which the courts will face in full circle the absurdity of their own prior rulings when they believed that the banks must be right even if what they did was wrong.
That the previous decisions considered the arguments of the homeowner and rejected them is irrelevant as long as the issue is lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If there was no such jurisdiction then none of the decisions are effective as a matter of law.
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