Maples Finance Shows as SIV for Deutsch Bank

Tony,
I got an interesting email to my blog BUT when I replied POOF they disappeared! I have been researching this for a bit now.

I need information on the following tip:

“Deutsche Bank National Trust passed the certificate to the administator of the main trust Maples Finance Limited, You want to check out Indymac c1-1 Corp they are incorporated in Cayman Islands.”

This is where most of the Corporations are formed.

Maples Finance, which provides clients with a multi-jurisdictional legal and specialized management service from offices in Jersey, the British Virgin Islands and Dublin as well as the Cayman Islands. Maples Finance also provides management and administration services for Cayman Islands’ investment funds and Cayman Islands’ structured finance vehicles.

Maples Finance provides directives to structured finance vehicles which undertake a wide range of transactions including, loans and loan programmes, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), cashflow CDOs, securitizations and structured investment vehicles.

All of which have been issued to and are held by Maples Finance Limited, a licensed trust company incorporated in the Cayman Islands (in such capacity, the ” Trustee Share“), under the terms of a declaration of trust in favor of charitable purposes. The Issuer will not have any material assets other than the Collateral Securities and certain other eligible assets. The Collateral Securities and such other eligible assets will be pledged to the Trustee as security for the Issuer’s obligations under the Notes and the Indenture.

This is where we need to find the info.

DinSFLA

Trust, Trustees, Constructive Trust, Fiduciary Duties

Editor’s Note: I am currently working on the issue of fiduciary duty, so I would appreciate receiving material from any of you that have submissions on the subject.
There is an article in the Florida Bar Journal this month on this topic. “If a fiduciary has special skills or becomes a fiduciary on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise, the fiduciary is under a duty to use those skills” . P. 22 Florida Bar Journal March, 2010 , “Understanding Fiduciary Duty” by John F Mariani, Christopher W Kammerer and Nancy Guffey Landers. So if a party presents itself to a borrower as a “lender” one would reasonable presume that they employed one or more underwriters who would perform due diligence on the loan, property and viability of the transactions including borrower’s income, affordability etc. A borrower would NOT reasonably presume that the “lender” didn’t care whether or not they would make the payments now or at some time in the future when the loan reset.
It is a fascinating subject, but the area I am centering in on, is the presumption of a trusted relationship giving rise to a fiduciary duty where (1) the superior party takes on MORE tasks than called for by the contractual relationship between the two would normally imply, and (2) where the transaction is so complex and the knowledge one of the parties so superior, that the injured party is virtually forced to rely on the superior party.
It doesn’t hurt either where the borrower is told not to bother with an attorney (“You can’t change anything anyway,” or “These documents are standard documents using Fannie Mae, FHA, HUD, Freddie Mac forms” etc.). Trust me, nobody who wrote those forms had nominees or MERS in mind when they were prepared.
The issue is particularly important when we look at the layers of Trustees (implicit or explicit) in each of the securitized transactions. Whether it is the Trustee on the Deed of Trust who obviously has duties to both the Trustor (homeowner) and beneficiary (?!?), the Trustee for the aggregate pool under the pooling and service agreement, The Trustee of the Structured Investment Vehicle which typically off shore, the so-called Trustee for the SPV (REMIC) that issued the mortgage backed securities, each of whom presumptively is the successor to the “Trustees” before it, we are stuck with layers upon layers of documents that contain discrepancies within the documents and between the provisions of the documents and the actions of the parties.
You also have the key issue that the true chronology of events differs substantially from the apparent chronology, starting with the fact that the mortgage backed securities were sold prior to the funding of the loan, the assignment and assumption agreement was executed prior to the borrower being known, and the pooling and service agreement also executed prior to any transaction with the borrower.
The use of “close-out” dates and the requirement that assignments be recorded or in recordable form creates another layer of analysis. On the one hand you have clear provisions that explicitly state that the “loan” is not accepted into the alleged “trust” while on the other hand you have the parties acting as though it was accepted into the “trust.”
You have entities described as trusts that have no property, tangible or intangible in them, and “trustees” named where the enabling documents chips away relentlessly at the powers and duties of the trustee leaving you with an agent whose powers are so limited they could be described as a candidate to be an agent rather than one with actual agency powers.
The laws allowing the borrower to claw back undisclosed fees and profits are obviously based upon the presumption that the party who received those fees had some duty toward the borrower to act in good faith, knowing that the borrower was relying upon them to advise them correctly. Steering them into a loan that is likely or guaranteed to put them into foreclosure is obviously a breach of that trust, and taking compensation to act against the interest of the borrower is exactly what Truth in Lending and deceptive lending laws are all about.
The article below clearly highlights the issues. The agent or broker gets paid only upon “closing the sale.” The agent gets paid a standard industry fee for doing so. But when the fee is a yield spread premium or some other form of kickback or rebate undisclosed to the borrower, the debtor ends up in a product that is not easily understood and is probably better for the “ledner” than the loan product that would have been offered if the “lending parties” were acting in good faith.
So this article should be read with an eye toward applying similar fact patterns to the securitized loan situation where the loan originator was in many cases not even a bank but looked like a bank to the borrower.
In the securities industry the issue is in flux more than the laws applying to mortgages where the investment represents the entire wealth of many borrowers. The stakes are usually much higher than in an individual stock purchase transaction.
March 4, 2010

Trusted Adviser or Stock Pusher? Finance Bill May Not Settle It

You have probably seen the television commercial, the one where you seem to be watching an intimate conversation between family members. But at the end, you learn that the conversation was actually between a broker and his client.

The advertisement is meant to evoke the idea of financial adviser as confidant, and is part of brokerage firms’ broader effort in recent years to recast their image — from mere stock pushers to trustworthy advisers.

But in interviews, former and current brokers said the ad told only part of the story. All said their jobs depended less on giving advice and more on closing sales. The more money they brought in, the more they, and their firms, would earn.

“I learned a lot about being a good salesman at Merrill,” said David B. Armstrong, who left Merrill Lynch after 10 years and with partners started an advisory firm in Alexandria, Va. “The amount of training I sat through to properly evaluate investment opportunities was almost nonexistent relative to the training I got on how to sell them.”

While the issue of broker responsibility is not new, it has resurfaced as Congress has been considering financial overhaul legislation. In his original draft, Senator Christopher J. Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, proposed requiring brokers to put their customers’ interests first — what is known as fiduciary duty — when providing investment advice. But in recent weeks, the chances of this proposal’s making it into the bill began to dim.

Senator Tim Johnson, a South Dakota Democrat on the Banking Committee, has proposed an 18-month study of the brokerage and investment advisory industries, an effort that would replace Senator Dodd’s provision.

Imposing a fiduciary requirement could have an impact on investment firms’ profits. Guy Moszkowski, a securities industry analyst at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said that the impact of a fiduciary standard was hard to determine because it would depend on how tightly the rules were interpreted. But he said it could cost a firm like Morgan Stanley Smith Barney as much as $300 million, or about 6 to 7 percent of this year’s expected earnings, if the rules were tightly defined. “It’s very nebulous, but I think that is a reasonable estimate,” he added.

In a research report about Morgan Stanley last year, Mr. Moszkowski wrote, “Financial advisers will be expected to take into account not just whether a product or investment is suitable for the client, but whether it is priced favorably relative to available alternatives, even though this could compromise the revenue the financial adviser and company could realize.”

Technically speaking, most brokers (including those who sell variable annuities or the 529 college savings plans) are now only required to steer their clients to “suitable” products — based on a customer’s financial situation, goals and stomach for risk.

But Marcus Harris, a financial planner who left Smith Barney 10 months ago to join an independent firm in Hunt Valley, Md., said the current rules leave room for abuse. “Under suitability, advisers would willy-nilly buy and sell investments that were the flavor of the month and make some infinitesimal case that they were somehow appropriate without worrying,” he said.

Kristofer Harrison, who spent a couple of years at Smith Barney before leaving to work as an independent financial planner in Clarks Summit, Pa., said the fact that brokers were paid for investments — but not advice — also fostered the sales mentality.

“The difficulty I had in the brokerage industry” he said, “is that you don’t get paid for the delivery of financial advice absent the sale of a financial product. That is not to say the advice I rendered was not of professional quality, but in the end, I always had the sales pitch in the back of my mind.”

Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Harris and Mr. Harrison all said they had decided to become independent because they felt constrained by their firms’ emphasis on profit-making and their inability to provide comprehensive advice.

A current branch manager of a major brokerage firm who did not want to be identified because he did not have his employer’s permission to speak to the media, confirmed that “you are rewarded for producing more fees and commissions.” While he said that “at the end of the day, I think that the clients’ interests are placed first and foremost by most advisers,” he added that “we are faced with ethical choices all day long.”

Brokers are typically paid a percentage of fees and commissions they generate. The more productive advisers at banks and big brokerage firms could collect 50 percent of the fees and commissions they generate, said Douglas Dannemiller, a senior analyst at Aite Group, a financial services research group.

The firms may also make money through other arrangements, including what is known as revenue sharing, where mutual fund managers may, for instance, agree to share a portion of their revenue with the brokerage firm. By doing this, the funds may land on the brokerage firm’s list of “preferred” funds. Some brokerage firms, including Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney disclose their revenue sharing information on their Web sites, or at the point of sale. Edward Jones discloses it as well, as the result of a settlement of a class-action lawsuit. UBS and Wells Fargo Advisors declined to comment on whether it discloses this information.

Unlike fiduciaries, brokers do not have to disclose how they are paid upfront or whether they are have incentives to push one investment over another. “The way the federal securities law regulates brokers, it does not require the delivery of information other than at the time of the transaction,” said Mercer E. Bullard, an associate professor at the University of Mississippi School of Law who serves on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s investment advisory committee.

The legislative language on fiduciary responsibility was one part of the financial overhaul bill aimed at protecting consumers’ interests. Another part, setting up an independent consumer protection agency, may also be watered down.

The study proposal by Senator Johnson may be included in the actual bill, which means it would not be subject to debate. And consumer advocates contended that the study would stop regulators from making any incremental consumer-friendly changes until the study was completed. The study would also require the S.E.C. to go over territory already covered in a 228-page study, conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2008 at a cost of about $875,000, the advocates said.

“In my opinion, the Johnson study is a stalling tactic that will either substantially delay or totally prevent a strong fiduciary standard from being applied,” said Kristina Fausti, a former S.E.C. lawyer who specialized in broker-dealer regulation.

“The S.E.C. has been studying issues related to investment-adviser and broker-dealer regulation and overall market conditions for over 10 years,” she said. “It’s puzzling to me why you would ask an agency to conduct a study when it is already an expert in the regulatory issues being discussed.”

Even after the study was completed, legislation would still need to be passed to give the S.E.C. authority to create a fiduciary standard for brokers who provide advice. “As we all know, the appetite for doing this in one or two years is certainly not going to be what it is today,” said Knut Rostad, chairman of the Committee for the Fiduciary Standard, a group of investment professionals advocating the standard. His group circulated an analysis that tried to illustrate where answers to the study’s questions could be found.

Yield Spread Premiums Prove Appraisal Fraud: The Key to Understanding The Mortgage Mess

OK I’m upping the ante here with some techno-speak. But I’ll try to make it as simple as possible.

YIELD is the percentage or dollar return on investment. For example,

  1. if you buy a bond for $1,000 and the interest rate is 5%, the yield is 5%.
  2. You are expecting to receive $50 per year in interest, which is your yield, assuming the bond is repaid in full when it is due.
  3. Another example is if you buy the same bond for $900.
  4. The interest rate is still 5% which means it still pays $50 per year in interest. But instead of investing $1,000, you have invested $900 and you are still getting $50 per year in interest.
  5. Your yield has increased because $50 is more than 5% of $900.
  6. In fact, it is a yield of 5.55% (yield base). You compute it by dividing the dollar amount of the interest paid ($50) by the dollar amount of the investment ($900). $50/$900=5.55%.
  7. But you are also getting repaid the full $1,000 when the bond comes due so adding to the money you get in interest is the gain you made on the bond (assuming you hold it to maturity). That difference in our example is $100, which is the difference between $900 and $1,000.
  8. If the bond is a ten year bond, for simplicity sake we will divide the extra $100 you are going to make by 10 years which means you will be getting an extra $10 per year.
  9. If you divide that extra $10 by your investment of $900 you are getting an average annual gain of 1.1%. Adding the base yield of 5.5% to the extra yield on gain of 1.1%, you get a total yield of 6.6%.
  10. The difference between the interest rate on the bond (5%) and the real yield to you as the investor (6.6%) is 1.6%, which could be expressed as a yield spread.

YIELD SPREAD can be expressed in either principal dollar terms or in interest rate. In the above example the dollar value of the yield spread is $100, being the difference between the par value of the bond (the amount that you hope will be repaid in full) and the amount you actually invested.

For decades there has been an illegal trick played between originating lenders using yield spread that resutled in an additional commission or kickback paid to the mortgage broker, commonly referred to as a yield spread premium. This occurs when the broker, with full consent of the “lender” steers the homeowner into a loan product that is more expensive than the one the homeowner would get from another more honest broker and lender.

  1. So for example, if you qualify for a 5% (interest) thirty year fixed loan, but the broker convinces you that a different loan is the only one you can qualify for or that the different loan is “better” than the other one, we shall say in our example that he steers you into a loan for 7%.
  2. The yield spread is 2% which may not sound like much, but it means everything to your loan broker and originating lender.
  3. The kickback to the broker is often several hundred or evens several thousand dollars — which is the very thing consumers were intended to be protected against in TILA (Truth in Lending Act).
  4. By not disclosing the yield spread premium he deprived you of the knowledge that you get get better terms elsewhere and he didn’t bother tell you that instead of working for you he was working for himself.
  5. Sometimes this is discovered right on the HUD statement disguised amongst the myriad of numbers that you didn’t understand when you signed the closing papers. They were required by federal law to disclose this to you and they are required to send you back the money that was paid as the kickback and for a variety of reasons it is grounds to rescind the transaction, making the Deed of Trust or mortgage unenforceable or void.
  6. The kickback is called a yield spread premium in the language of the industry. On this phase of the transaction we’ll call it Yield Spread Premium #1 or YSP1.

Now we get to the securitization part of the “loan.” If you will go back to the beginning of this article you will see that the investor was seeking and expecting $50 per year in interest. Buying the deal for $1,000 gives the investor the 5% YIELD he was seeking.

What Wall Street did was work backwards from the $50, and asked the following stupid and illegal question: What is the least amount of money we could fund in mortgages and still show the $50 in income? Answer: Anything we can get homeowners to sign.

  1. In our simple example, if they get a homeowner to sign a note calling for 10% interest, then all Wall Street needs to come up with is $500. Because 10% of $500 is $50 and $50 is what the investor was expecting.
  2. Wall Street sells the bond for $1,000 and funds $500 leaving themselves with a YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM of 5%+ or a value of $500, which is just as illegal as the kickbacks described above. We will call this YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM #2.
  3. They take $50 out of this $500 YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM and put into a reserve fund so they can pay the interest whether the homeowner pays or not. That is why they don’t want homeowners and investors to get together, because they will discover that the investor was paid the first year out of the reserve and payments from homeowners and then stopped receiving payment even though there was continued revenue.
  4. But Wall Street also had another problem. Since they had siphoned off $450 and probably sent most of it off-shore in an off balance sheet transaction (to a Structured Investment vehicle [SIV]). the time would eventually come when the investor would want his $1,000 repaid in full just like they said it would. That would leave them $450 short and possibly criminally liable for taking $1,000 to fund a $500 mortgage.
  5. So you can see that if the homeowner pays every cent owed, this is bad news to the people on Wall Street. They would be required to give the investor $1,000 when all they received from the homeowner was $500. Therefore they had to make certain that they (a) had a method of covering the difference that would give them “cover” when demand was made for the $1,000 and (b) a method of triggering that coverage.
  6. They also needed to make it as difficult as possible for investors to get together to fire the agent of the partnership (SPV) formed to issue the bonds they bought, which they did in the express terms of the bond indenture. So logistically they needed to keep investors away from investors and to keep investors away from borrowers so that none of them could compare notes.
  7. To cover the money they took from the investor they purchased insurance contracts (credit default swaps is one form). They wrote the terms themselves so that when a certain percentage of the pool failed they could declare it a failure and stop paying the ivnestors anything. The failure of the pool would trigger the insurance contracts.
  8. Under normal circumstances if you buy a car, you can insure it once and if it is wrecked you get the money for it. Imagine if you could buy insurance on it thirty times over at discounted rates. So you smash the car up and instead of receiving $30,000 for the car you receive $900,000. That is what Wall Street did with your mortgage. This was not risk taking much less excessive risk taking. It was fraud.
  9. So IF THE LOAN FAILED or was declared a failure as being part of a pool that went into failure, the insurance paid off.
  10. Hence the only way they could cover themselves for taking $1,000 on a $500 loan was by making absolutely certain the loan would fail.
  11. It wasn’t enough to use predatory loan tactics to trick people into loans that resulted in resets that were higher than their annual income. Wall Street still had the problem of people somehow making the payments anyway or getting bailed out by parents or even the government.
  12. They had to make sure the homeowner didn’t want the loan anymore and the only way to do that was to make certain that the homeowner would end up in a position wherein far more was owed on the loan than the house ever was worth and far more than it would ever be worth in the foreseeable future.
  13. They had to make sure that the federal government didn’t step in and help the homeowners, so they created a scheme wherein the federal government used all its resources to bail out Wall Street which had created the myth of losses on loan defaults for notes and mortgages they never owned. It would then become politically and economically impossible for the government to bail out the homeowners.
  14. This is why principal reduction is off the table. If these loans become performing again, insurance might not be triggered and the investors might demand the full $1,000. With insurance on the $500 loan they stand to collect $15,000. without it, they stand to lose $1000. There is no middle ground.
  15. So they needed a method to get the “market” to rise in values as much as possible to levels they were sure would be unsustainable. That was easy. They blacklisted the appraisers who wanted to practice honestly and paid appraisers, mortgage brokers and “originating lenders” (often owned by Wall Street firms) 3-10 times their normal fees to get these loans closed. They created “lenders” that were not banks or funding the loans that had no assets and then bankrupted them.
  16. With the demand for the AAA rated and insured MBS at an all-time high the demand went out to mortgage brokers not to bring them a certain number of mortgages but to bring in a certain dollar amount of obligations because Wall Street had already sold the bonds “forward” (meaning they didn’t have the underlying loans yet).
  17. With demand for loans exceeding the supply of houses, they successfully created the “market”conditions to inflate the market values on a broad scale thus giving them plausible deniability as to the appraisal fraud on any one particular house.

Whether you call it appraisal fraud or simply an undisclosed yield spread premium, the result is the same. That money is due back to the homeowner and there is a liability to the investors that they don’t know about. Why are the fund managers so timid about pressing the claims? Perhaps because they were not fooled.

Wall Street Banks Don’t Own Toxic Loans: ABC

NOW AVAILABLE ON AMAZON/KINDLE!!!

This is why it is critically important that (a) you get help in organizing your information (b) getting a forensic analysis, review or even a TILA Audit (c) that you secure a third party expert declaration that puts the the facts in issue and (d) that you aggressively pursue discovery without trying to convince the Judge that the mortgage, note or obligation is invalid.

see how-to-be-an-expert-witness

Everyone seems to be getting it right — including the New York Times lead editorial this morning — except the main point. It’s been said that there are two kinds of truth — reality and the collective perception of reality whether it is wrong or right. see self-dealing-part-ii-investigations-started
REALITY: The main point missed by nearly everyone is that in the securitization of real estate loans — residential and commercial — the Wall Street Banks do not own the toxic loans and never did. The simple ABC is that the loans were executed by homeowners and then trafficked like illegal drugs through middlemen until they ended up in the hands of investors (pension funds, sovereign wealth funds etc.).
The actual amount and movement of money was kept carefully hidden from investors and homeowners, violating Federal, State, and common law. Much of this money actually belongs in the hands of homeowners, investors, and taxing authorities from Federal State and Local governments.

CONSENSUS FALSEHOOD: The banks made loans that were too risky and “relaxed” their underwriting standards. A slew of defaults occurred causing a danger of a run on the banks. [The truth is that risk never entered the picture: there is no risk in arranging a loan (with investor funds) that you know for sure is guaranteed to fail because it will reset to a payment level that the homeowner could never be able to pay under any conceivable circumstances.]

THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH: Profits piled up off-shore that are being repatriated on a gradual basis showing incredible gains at the Wall Street Banks that supposedly lost hundreds of billions of dollars. The truth is they never lost a dime. The truth is the loan was sold multiple times through multiple intermediaries each of whom in each “sale” were paid fees and profits vastly exceeding any prior compensation to those who arranged or made loans prior to securitization.
Second Hidden Yield Spread Premium: As I have pointed out before the hidden yield spread premium was jaw-dropping (when the loans were packaged by the aggregator and then sold to the Special Purpose Vehicle that issued and sold the mortgage-backed securities. This second YSP was sent off-shore to the Bahamas or the Caymans to Structured Investment Vehicles with their own trustees, who scattered the actual depository accounts all around the world. The beneficiaries were the 100 Club — the main players in the creation, promotions and protection of the scheme through government contacts, plausible deniability, and simple non-disclosure sometimes achieved through the sheer complexity of the arrangements.

Nobody wants to acknowledge this fact because it would be admission that the con game is still on and that government is still part of it. They took many trillions of dollars to “bail out” banks that had arranged the bad loans but never underwrote them.

After centuries of lending in which banks made loans and were the obvious source of funds and the obvious losers if the loans went bad, it seems that there is hardly a soul in media, government, or the judiciary that is willing to come right out and say the banks are by nature intermediaries and that they carried their business of intermediation too far (removing the risk for bad loans).

In the old model, prior to Glass Steagel being repealed, the use of money held on deposit (i.e, your checking, savings or CD account) at a depository institution was the source of funds for the loans, thus putting the bank at risk. A bad loan meant that the payback had to be covered by the bank’s capital reserves that were regulated to make sure there was always enough money on hand to satisfy the demands of depositors who needed the use of the money they had deposited into the bank, for safe-keeping.

In fact, the scheme was built upon the premise that by not actually having any risk and by entering into “hedge (insurance) contracts, they could make far more money arranging bad loans than good loans. Logistically they guaranteed their profit by inserting terms into mortgage backed bond indentures that cut the investor out of the bounty.
The result, as always, was that Wall Street won and everyone else lost. 1 in 50 people now are living strictly on food stamps in this country. And the number is rising. Leading the pack are white-haired white people whose numbers are growing exponentially, followed by blacks and Hispanics. Fifty percent of the securitized loans were refi’s. Yet the misconception is that this crisis only affects people who bought houses they could not afford.
January 3, 2010
New York Times Editorial

Avoiding a Japanese Decade

Thankfully, 2009 ended better than it began. Economists talk about green shoots of recovery taking hold. Consumer confidence has improved. Equity markets have soared. But for all the progress, the American economy remains extremely vulnerable.

To understand those economic risks, it is worth considering Japan’s experience in the 1990s. A bursting housing bubble there sparked a banking crisis that was followed by a decade of economic stagnation.

The Japanese government lacked the resolve to do what was necessary. It failed to fix its banks and stopped its early fiscal stimulus before recovery had taken hold, leaving the economy all too vulnerable to outside shocks, including the Asian currency crisis and the dot-com collapse in 2001. Japan’s annual growth rate — which had averaged 4 percent since 1973 — slowed to less than 1 percent, on average, from 1992 to 2003.

President Obama’s economic advisers have learned from Japan’s experience. But they may not have learned enough. (Certainly Congress has not been paying attention.) If they are not careful, they could end up repeating some of the big mistakes that condemned Japan’s economy to a lost decade.

The green shoots are barely out of the ground and Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress are already demanding that the administration “do something” to cut the budget gap. We worry that the political drumbeat may be too hard to resist. In 1997, after three years of tepid growth, the Japanese government stopped its stimulus: it raised a consumption tax, ended a temporary income tax cut, increased social security premiums and nipped recovery in the bud.

Japan’s other blunder was its unwillingness to fix its banks. Regulators did not force banks and indebted firms to recognize trillions of yen worth of bad loans. Banks trundled along like zombies, squandering credit to keep insolvent firms on their feet. When the Asian currency crisis hit, many undercapitalized banks toppled over.

The Obama administration has not been quite as forgiving with the banks, but it still has been nowhere near aggressive enough. The regulatory reform meant to curb bankers’ destructive risk-taking is moving at a snail’s pace through Congress. While the Treasury has forced banks to raise capital, many — including some of the largest — remain thinly capitalized and weak.

Banks have been unwilling to sell bad assets and take a loss. They remain stuffed with risky commercial and residential mortgages and consumer debt. Bankers, meanwhile, have made things worse by insisting on paying themselves huge bonuses after profiting so handsomely from the taxpayers’ tolerance and largess.

There are two big problems with that. The bankers’ taste for risk has not been in any way quenched. And the American public is, justifiably, fed up. That means if there is another bank crisis — say when the Federal Reserve takes away the punch bowl of low interest rates — it will be a lot harder to get Congress to approve another bailout, no matter how necessary.

The Obama administration has still done a far better job — up to now — in addressing the crisis than Japan’s governments did. As dismal as 2009 was, it pales when compared with what would have happened without the fiscal stimulus and the Fed’s enormous monetary boost.

The White House is now pushing another mini-stimulus plan for next year. Chances are it will need to do a lot more to push reform and boost the economy. If there is an overarching lesson from Japan’s lost decade, it is that half measures don’t pay.

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