Chase Admits Violations of Consent Order

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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see http://dtc-systems.net/2015/03/jpmorgan-chase-admits-failure-comply-april-13-2011-independent-foreclosure-review-consent-order/#more-2157

see also 27_page_settlement2

We already knew that the servicers, banks and trustees were violating the settlements and consent orders that were entered against them for filing fraudulent papers in fraudulent foreclosures. Now the question is what to do about it.

With respect to the 2011 consent orders Chase admitted the wrongdoing and the settlement was supposed to compensate and give notice to borrowers who had been defrauded.

In the proposed settlement, Chase acknowledges that it filed in bankruptcy courts around the country more than 50,000 payment change notices that were improperly signed, under penalty of perjury, by persons who had not reviewed the accuracy of the notices.  More than 25,000 notices were signed in the names of former employees or of employees who had nothing to do with reviewing the accuracy of the filings.  The rest of the notices were signed by individuals employed by a third party vendor on matters unrelated to checking the accuracy of the filings.

The first question that SHOULD come to mind is WHY a multi trillion dollar bank would need or want to engage in such practices? After all they were committing perjury by their own admission. The second question is why borrowers who were hurt by this behavior have not used the admissions to win their foreclosure cases? And the third question is what is the effect of these admissions?

The answer lies in the lies. The plain truth is, based upon my direct knowledge in several cases, that Chase did not own the loans, the Trusts therefore could not have purchased the loans and that not only Chase was lying but so was US Bank when it was named in foreclosure actions as Trustee for a Trust that plainly did not purchase the loans nor was any of the paperwork showing a transfer authentic. The underlying transaction simply isn’t there and Chase (and other banks) successfully hoodwinked courts into applying legal presumptions that were plainly contrary to the facts.

I think the admission could be used as an argument that the banks are not entitled to the legal presumptions that normally apply because of the wrongful behavior that they have admitted. If they want to show that the Trust bought the loan then they must prove it and not just produce a self-serving piece of paper that says it happened. we know it didn’t happen. Why should the burden of proof fall on a homeowner with limited resources?

The bank, with virtually unlimited resources and exclusive access to all the information, should be able to show the transaction date, amount and proof of payment (wire transfer receipt, wire transfer instructions, canceled check etc.) for the loans that were allegedly acquired and/or conveyed by the assignor and the assignee. With obviously unclean hands, the banks should not be rewarded for their subterfuge. The bank should not be allowed to claim any presumptions, legal or otherwise, that are normally applied to documents or commercial paper. If they really have a case, let them prove it — or at least respond to discovery without objection on various spurious grounds.

When I represented banks if someone had said that we didn’t own the loan or never funded the loan I would have stopped them dead with proof of the actual movement of money and that would have ended the discussion. Instead we are splitting hairs in court with the banks saying they don’t want to produce actual proof. All they need, according to them, is some self-serving piece of fabricated paper with a forged signature containing perjurious statements and the court is bound to accept such paper and apply legal presumptions that what is written on the paper is true. They have the temerity to argue that when we all know that the paper is inherently untrustworthy and not credible, given their admissions and continuous behavior.

I think discovery directed at compliance with the settlements and consent orders ought to be pressed against the banks, on the grounds that they could not have fulfilled all conditions precedent because among the conditions precedent are the requirements set forth in the settlements and consent orders. At trial I think the argument should be made, using the settlements and consent orders as exhibits, with Judicial notice, that the banks are not entitled to the presumptions and that they must prove every fact they would otherwise have the court “presume” or “assume.”

Comments invited

see also Katie Porter on servicing

BANKS STOP FORECLOSURES AS THEY REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH CONSENT ORDERS

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our South Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. In Northern Florida and the Panhandle call 850-765-1236. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.

 

SEE ALSO: http://WWW.LIVINGLIES-STORE.COM

 

The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

EDITOR’S NOTE AND PRACTICE SUGGESTIONS: The approach taken by federal agencies and law enforcement with respect to illegal behavior on the part of the Wall Street banks and their affiliates, subsidiaries and co-venturers has basically been a collection of smoke and mirrors designed to create the illusion that the problems are being fixed. In fact the reality is that the problems are being swept under the rug leaving the economy, the middle class, and the title records of nearly all real estate transactions in shambles.

The temporary hold on foreclosure actions is the result of further scrutiny by federal agencies and law enforcement AND  the growing trend of lawyers for homeowners citing the consent orders in their  denials, defenses, and counterclaims.

The problems are obvious. We start off with the fact that  the notes and mortgages would ordinarily be considered unenforceable, illegal and possibly criminal. Then we have these consent decrees  in which administrative agencies and law enforcement agencies have found the behavior of the parties in the paper securitization trail to a violated numerous laws, rules and regulations. The consent decrees and settlements signed by virtually all of the players in the paper securitization chain require them to take action to correct wrongful foreclosures. Of course we all knew that  they would do nothing of the kind, since the result would be an enormous fiscal stimulus to the economy and restoration of wealth to the middle class at the expense of the banks who stole the money in the first place.

You can take it from the express wording as well as the obvious intention in the consent orders and settlements that most of the prior foreclosures were wrongful and then it would be wrongful to proceed with any further foreclosures without correcting or curing the problems caused by wrongful foreclosure on unenforceable notes and mortgages that are not owned by the originator of the alleged loan or any successor thereto. The further problem for them is that none of them were ever a creditor in the loan transaction.

There can be little doubt now that the principal intermediary was the investment bank that received deposits from investors under false pretenses.  There is no indication that the deposits from investors were ever credited to any trust or special purpose vehicle. Therefore  there can be no doubt that the alleged trust could have ever entered into a transaction in which it paid for the ownership of a debt, note or mortgage. It’s obvious that they are owed nothing from borrowers through that false paper chain and that there obviously could be no default with respect to the alleged trust or any of its predecessors or successors. Therefore the mortgage bonds supposedly issued by the trust were empty with respect to any mortgages that supposedly backed the bonds.

By the application of simple logic and following the actual money trail from the investors down to the borrowers, it is obvious that the investors were tricked into making a loan without documentation or security. This is why the megabanks and all of their affiliates and associates have taken such great pains to make sure that the investors and the borrowers don’t get together to compare notes. Most of the notes signed by borrowers would not have been acceptable to the investors even if the investors were named on the promissory note and mortgage. And both the investors and the borrowers would have been curious about all of the money taken out of the funds advanced by investors as undisclosed compensation in the making of the loan.

 So the banks are facing a major liability problem as well as an accounting problem. The accounting problem is that they are carrying  mortgage bonds and hedge products on their books as assets when they should be carried as liabilities.

The liability problem is horrendous. Most of the money taken from investors was taken under false pretenses. In most cases a receiver would be appointed and the investors would claw back as much as possible to achieve restitution.

This is further complicated by the fact that the homeowners are entitled to restitution as well as damages, treble damages and attorneys fees for all of the undisclosed compensation. This is why the banks want foreclosure and not modification or settlements. They need the foreclosure to complete the illusion that the alleged trust or special purpose vehicle was the proper owner of the debt, note and mortgage despite the fact that the trust neither paid for it nor accepted the assignment.

Thus  lawyers are now directing their discovery requests to the methods utilized by the banks and their affiliates to determine whether a particular foreclosure was wrongful and if so to determine the required corrective action.  It is perhaps the most appropriate question to ask and the most relevant as well.

The required corrective action should be the return of the home to the homeowner. That is what  would ordinarily happen if the scale of the problem was not so huge.

But the law does not favor that approach when applied by judges, lawyers, homeowners, legislators and law enforcement.  Instead, investors and homeowners alike are stuck in a web of politics instead of the application of black letter law that has existed for centuries.  As a result the government response has been tepid at best misleading virtually everyone with so-called settlements that work out to be a fraction of a cent on each dollar  that was stolen by the banks and a fraction of a cent on each dollar representing the value of homes that were taken in illegal foreclosures.

Fortunately none of these consent orders or settlements bar individual actions by homeowners against the appropriate parties. Below are the links to consent orders that may apply to your case — even where the Plaintiff or party initiating foreclosure sales is NOT named as one of these. One or more of them is usually somewhere in the so-called securitization chain. Hat tip to 4closurefraud.org.

Links to the OCC and former OTS Enforcement Actions (Issued April 2011):

 

 

Links to Enforcement Action Amendments for Servicers Entering the Independent Foreclosure Review Payment Agreement (Issued February 2013):

 

 

Wells, Citi Halt Most Foreclosure Sales as OCC Ratchets Up Scrutiny
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_96/wells-citi-halt-most-foreclosure-sales-as-occ-ratchets-up-scrutiny-1059224-1.html

Thousands of Days Late, Billions of Dollars Short: OCC
http://4closurefraud.org/2013/05/18/thousands-of-days-late-billions-of-dollars-short-occ-correcting-foreclosure-practices/

US BANK: Lawsuit to Take Aurora Woman’s House is Guaranteed
http://4closurefraud.org/2013/05/17/us-bank-lawsuit-to-take-aurora-womans-house-is-guaranteed/

Short sales routinely show up in credit reports as foreclosures
http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-harney-20130519,0,111610.story {EDITOR’S NOTE: SEND OBJECTION TO CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES}

 

BANK AMNESTY AGAIN: Leaving Consumers to Fend (Litigate) for Themselves

“To someone who lost his house to mortgage servicer incompetence or malfeasance, that’s not restitution. It’s an insult. “The capped pool of cash payments is wholly inadequate in light of the scale of the harm,” says Alys Cohen, staff attorney for the National Consumer Law Center.”   Adam Levin, abcnews.com

Editor’s Analysis: In case after case across the country it is readily apparent that there complete strangers making claims on mortgages, foreclosing, evicting and even collecting “Trial Payments” while they intend to do nothing other than Foreclose — because that is where the money is and because it is only through a foreclosure that they cap the losses and pass them onto investors despite having received large scale payments of insurance and other hedges.

The Banks have it their way despite the obvious unconscionable, illegal, immoral and unethical breach of trust between consumer and bank and between banks.

Whether it is the Chase WAMU deal, or the BOA countrywide deal, or the Indy-mac One West deal, the facts are in — we don’t need to theorize anymore — the banks are NOT the creditors, they cannot shows proof of loss, proof of payment or any financial transaction that would entitle them to enforce an invalid note or foreclose on an invalid, unperfected mortgage lien.

But the institutionalization of hypocrisy and deviant behavior on the part of the Banks has left us with “settlements” that settle nothing, leaving millions of homeowners who lost their homes to entities that received a windfall from the foreclosure process and the windfall from dual tracking “modification” reviews that were a pure sham designed only to get the homeowner in the deepest hole possible so that foreclosure would become inevitable.

At our members conference this Wednesday, we will talk about what is getting traction in the modification of mortgages and what is getting traction in the litigation of mortgage disputes.

The important thing to remember that is that the MONEY never came from ANY of the parties in the sham securitization chain starting with the originator. While there are exceptions — like World Savings — the truth defeats further claims regarding the Wachovia acquisition and then the Wells Fargo acquisition of Wachovia. Either the assignments were missing or they fabricated and forged.

If you ask yourself why they wouldn’t have had the assignments done all nice and proper which is the way the banking world works when BORROWERS must sign documents, you will feel uncomfortable with Wall Street explanations of volume causing the paperwork confusion. It was the exact same volume that produced millions of “originated” mortgages where the i’s were dotted and T’s were crossed —- that is, where the Borrower had to sign. The banks had no trouble then — it was only when the banks had to sign that there was a problem. Where the securitization participants had to sign was neither disclosed nor drafted nor executed.

The simple reason is that there was nothing to sign. There was no financial transaction where money exchanged hands which is why I am pounding on the point that the lawyers should be aiming at the money rather than the documentation. “For value received” means that value was paid or transferred. When you ask for the wire transfer receipt or cancelled check that shows payment and which would establish proof of loss, you are asking to see the transaction upon which the banks place all their reliance.

Their argument that they don’t need to show the actual transaction is a dodge to protect themselves from showing that the transactions in the bogus securitization scheme were all a sham. Your argument should be simple — they say they lost money and that the homeowners owes it. Let’s see the actual proof that they made the loan, lost the money and have not already been paid. The assignments are not accompanies by actual money exchanging hands which means that the assignment lacked consideration and was therefore an executory contract at best, pending payment.

Then you need to ask yourself why there was no consideration when you know that money was funded from somewhere for a loan to the “benefit” of your client (albeit based upon fraud in the execution and fraud in the inducement including appraisal fraud). YOU must tackle the basic issue in the mind of just about every judge — as long as the money was there at the “closing” of the loan, and the borrower signed the papers, and then defaulted on those promises, what difference does it make whether some OTHER papers were fabricated or even forged.

The fact remains, your client, in the eyes of the Judge, got the loan, agreed to the terms and then defaulted. In our world, when you default on a loan, judgment is entered, foreclosure is completed and eviction, if necessary proceeds. The banks have relied upon this perception for years which considerable success. The reason borrowers often lose in litigation is that they arguing about the wrong thing. As soon as they go after the documentation first they are going down a rabbit hole. It is a tacit admission that the loan was valid, the note is evidence of the loan and the mortgage secures the note. DENY and DISCOVER puts that front and center as an issue of fact in dispute.

By going after the money transactions and requiring proof of payment and proof of loss and asking for the accounting data that shows the loan receivable on the books of an entity, you are striking at the heart of the sham transaction.

If you ask me for a loan for $100 and I say “Sure, just sign this note,” and you go ahead and sign the note, what happens when I don’t give you the $100 loan. The answer, which has caused considerable confusion in the foreclosure defense world is that I can nonetheless sue you (on its face the note LOOKS like a negotiable instrument) , but I can’t win. Because if you deny that I ever completed the loan transaction by funding the loan to you, then I have to prove that I gave you the money. I can’t because I didn’t. My argument that you did receive a loan that day and therefore you owe me the money is a lie. You owe the money to whoever actually gave you the money.

At the closing of these loans originated by nominees with no power to touch the money and whose only source of income was fees, not interest on the loan, the borrower was fooled by the fact that the money showed up for the loan. It never occurred to the borrower to ask any questions since the paperwork, and all the disclosures required by law told him a story about the loan. The borrower could not possibly know that the story told by the documents, the documents he or she signed at closing were all a lie.

The Banks will take the position that everyone was authorized to make representations and act for everyone else — except when it comes to paying down the debts with money received from insurance and the proceeds of credit default swaps, federal bailouts etc. In THAT case the bank says it was not the agent of the investors and had no duty to either the investor or the borrower since the banks were the named insureds — made possible only because they purposefully put the name of a nominee on the note, a nominee on the mortgage (or even two nominees on the mortgage) so that the banks could open up a window of time during which they could claim ownership of the loans despite the fact that they had not funded one dime to originate or purchase any loan.

Thus if go for the money first and THEN show the the fabrication, forgery and perjury in documents, the case makes sense and can be presented to the court without giving one inch of admission that the loan, the note or mortgage were real, valid or enforceable. AND by sending a standard QWR and FDCPA letter, the banks have nowhere to hide. In litigation the motion becomes a petition to enforce the RESPA 6 inquiry and the FDCPA inquiry either through direct order or through discovery.

THEN you force the disclosure of the identity of the creditor who actually has a negative account balance on their books for the loan, directly or indirectly, and seek modification or settlement based upon the facts of the case. HAMP modification is impossible, settlement is impossible without first establishing who could submit a credit bid at auction or who could execute a valid satisfaction and release of the debt.

Latest Bank Amnesty Leaves Consumers Adrift

Fraud Is The Biggest Bubble In History
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/01/fraud-is-the-biggest-bubble-in-history/

Homeowners Settlements, Shortsales and Modifications Opportunities Arise for Investors

Whether it is in Bankruptcy Court, Federal Civil, or State Civil, the trend is obvious — more and more cases are being settled, modified or otherwise resolved outside the courtroom. In some cases, the settlement is relatively easy, with the pretender lender agreeing to sharp principal reductions and long term paybacks at low fixed rates. The homeowner need only be wary of getting an Order from a Judge through a new or existing lawsuit that quiets title and a new title policy that not exclude risks associated with securitization, assignment or sale into the secondary market. If you need help with this call our customer service line and we will find someone to help settle the matter or help your attorney. 520-405-1688.
But in other cases, especially in bankruptcy court, we have a growing list of homeowners who seek “hard money” sources that will enable them to buy the house out of the bankruptcy estate at deep discounts. In some cases these are loans and in others it is an outright purchase by the investor with an option granted to the homeowner to purchase from the investor. In the meanwhile the homeowner rents from the hard money source on a triple net lease, meaning that the homeowner takes care of everything from utilities to repairs and maintenance. That reduces the monthly rent for the homeowner but it also eliminates any landlord liability.

As an example, we have someone who is in bankruptcy court with 2 1/2 acres, two completed structures on the block and the ability to buy the property out of the estate for 20% of the original finance appraised value. She needs a hard money source who will lend or buy. The specs on the deal make it about as risk free as one could get. And the return make it about as high a return as anyone could even imagine. So if there are investors out there who are looking for deals, look no further. Just call our customer service line (520-405-1688) and ask for a telephone appointment with me and I’ll put you in touch with the right people.

SPECTRE OF FRAUD OF ALL TYPES HAUNTING BOFA, CITI, CHASE, WELLS ET AL

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New York AG Schneiderman Comes out Swinging at BofA, BoNY
Posted By igradman On August 5, 2011 (4:28 pm) In Attorneys General

This is big.  Though we’ve seen leading indicators over the last few weeks that New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman might get involved in the proposed Bank of America settlement over Countrywide bonds, few expected a response that might dynamite the entire deal.  But that’s exactly what yesterday’s filing before Judge Kapnick could do.

Stating that he has both a common law and a statutory interest “in protecting the economic health and well-being of all investors who reside or transact business within the State of New York,” Schneiderman’s petition to intervene takes a stance that’s more aggressive than that of any of the other investor groups asking for a seat at the table.

Rather than simply requesting a chance to conduct discovery or questioning the methodology that was used to arrive at the settlement, the AG’s petition seeks to intervene to assert counterclaims against Bank of New York Mellon for persistent fraud, securities fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

Did you say F-f-f-fraud?  That’s right.  The elephant in the room during the putback debates of the last three years has been the specter of fraud.  Sure, mortgage bonds are performing abysmally and the underlying loans appears largely defective when investors are able to peek under the hood, but did the banks really knowingly mislead investors or willfully obstruct their efforts to remedy these problems?  Schneiderman thinks so.  He accuses BoNY of violating:

Executive Law § 63(12)’s prohibition on persistent fraud or illegality in the conduct of business: the Trustee failed to safeguard the mortgage files entrusted to its care under the Governing Agreements, failed to take any steps to notify affected parties despite its knowledge of violations of representations and warranties, and did so repeatedly across 530 Trusts. (Petition to Intervene at 9)

By calling out BoNY for failing to enforce investors’ repurchase rights or help investors enforce those rights themselves, the AG has turned a spotlight on the most notoriously uncooperative of the four major RMBS Trustees.  Of course, all of the Trustees have engaged in this type of heel-dragging obstructionism to some degree, but many have softened their stance.

since investors started getting more aggressive in threatening legal action against them.  BoNY, in addition to remaining resolute in refusing to aid investors, has now gone further in trying to negotiate a sweetheart deal for Bank of America without allowing all affected investors a chance to participate.  This has drawn the ire of the nation’s most outspoken financial cop.

And lest you think that the NYAG focuses all of his vitriol on BoNY, Schneiderman says that BofA may also be on the hook for its conduct, both before and after the issuance of the relevant securities.  The Petition to Intervene states that:

Countrywide and BoA face liability for persistent illegality in:
(1) repeatedly breaching representations and warranties concerning loan quality;
(2) repeatedly failing to provide complete mortgage files as it was required to do under the Governing Agreements; and
(3) repeatedly acting pursuant to self-interest, rather than
investors’ interests, in servicing, in violation of the Governing Agreements. (Petition to Intervene at 9)

Though Countrywide may have been the culprit for breaching reps and warranties in originating these loans, the failure to provide loan files and the failure to service properly post-origination almost certainly implicates the nation’s largest bank.  And lest any doubts remain in that regard, the AG’s Petition also provides, “given that BoA negotiated the settlement with BNYM despite BNYM’s obvious conflicts of interest, BoA may be liable for aiding and abetting BNYM’s breach of fiduciary duty.” (Petition at 7) So much for Bank of America’s characterization of these problems as simply “pay[ing] for the things that Countrywide did.

As they say on late night infomercials, “but wait, there’s more!”  In a step that is perhaps even more controversial than accusing Countrywide’s favorite Trustee of fraud, the AG has blown the cover off of the issue of improper transfer of mortgage loans into RMBS Trusts.  This has truly been the third rail of RMBS problems, which few plaintiffs have dared touch, and yet the AG has now seized it with a vice grip.

In the AG’s Verified Pleading in Intervention (hereinafter referred to as the “Pleading,” and well worth reading), Schneiderman pulls no punches in calling the participating banks to task over improper mortgage transfers.  First, he notes that the Trustee had a duty to ensure proper transfer of loans from Countrywide to the Trust.  (Pleading ¶23).  Next, he states that, “the ultimate failure of Countrywide to transfer complete mortgage loan documentation to the Trusts hampered the Trusts’ ability to foreclose on delinquent mortgages, thereby impairing the value of the notes secured by those mortgages. These circumstances apparently triggered widespread fraud, including BoA’s fabrication of missing documentation.”  (Id.)  Now that’s calling a spade a spade, in probably the most concise summary of the robosigning crisis that I’ve seen.

The AG goes on to note that, since BoNY issued numerous “exception reports” detailing loan documentation deficiencies, it knew of these problems and yet failed to notify investors that the loans underlying their investments and their rights to foreclose were impaired.  In so doing, the Trustee failed to comply with the “prudent man” standard to which it is subject under New York law.  (Pleading ¶¶28-29)

The AG raises all of this in an effort to show that BoNY was operating under serious conflicts of interest, calling into question the fairness of the proposed settlement.  Namely, while the Trustee had a duty to negotiate the settlement in the best interests of investors, it could not do so because it stood to receive “direct financial benefits” from the deal in the form of indemnification against claims of misconduct.  (Petition ¶¶15-16) And though Countrywide had already agreed to indemnify the Trustee against many such claims, Schneiderman states that, “Countrywide has inadequate resources” to provide such indemnification, leading BoNY to seek and obtain a side-letter agreement from BofA expressly guaranteeing the indemnification obligations of Countrywide and expanding that indemnity to cover BoNY’s conduct in negotiating and implementing the settlement.  (Petition ¶16)  That can’t be good for BofA’s arguments that it is not Countrywide’s successor-in-interest.

I applaud the NYAG for having the courage to call this conflict as he sees it, and not allowing this deal to derail his separate investigations or succumbing to the political pressure to water down his allegations or bypass “third rail” issues.  Whether Judge Kapnick will ultimately permit the AG to intervene is another question, but at the very least, this filing raises some uncomfortable issues for the banks involved and provides the investors seeking to challenge the deal with some much-needed backup.  In addition, Schneiderman has taken pressure off of the investors who have not yet opted to challenge the accord, by purporting to represent their interests and speak on their behalf.  In that regard, he notes that, “[m]any of these investors have not intervened in this litigation and, indeed, may not even be aware of it.” (Pleading ¶12).

As for the investors who are speaking up, many could take a lesson from the no-nonsense language Schneiderman uses in challenging the settlement.  Rather than dancing around the issue of the fairness of the deal and politely asking for more information, the AG has reached a firm conclusion based on the information the Trustee has already made available: “THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS UNFAIR AND INADEQUATE.” (Pleading at II.A)  Tell us how you really feel.

[Author’s Note: Though the proposed BofA settlement is certainly a landmark legal proceeding, there is plenty going on in the world of RMBS litigation aside from this case. While I have been repeatedly waylaid in my efforts to turn to these issues by successive major developments in the BofA case, I promise a roundup of recent RMBS legal action in the near future.  Stay tuned…]

Article taken from The Subprime Shakeout – http://www.subprimeshakeout.com

 

Investors Settle for $600 million — so which loans get credit for that payment?

Editor’s Note: This is what we are hearing about. What about the settlements that go unreported? The number of settlements that are off-record (unreported) is unknown but suspected to be very high. [One of the reasons why it is SO important to get the true CURRENT status of the SPV and the true FULL accounting of payments to the investors because THEY are the creditors.] You might be sitting on a loan where the principal balance has been paid in whole or in part, which makes those monthly statements wrong, along with notices of delinquency, notices of default, notices of sale and foreclosure suits.

These lawsuits and settlements are DIRECTLY related to the balance due on homeowner loans. The investors were the ONLY source of capital. That capital was pooled and channeled through SPV’s. It was from the pool that loans were funded. Don’t get confused by mistakes in the media. The securities were FIRST sold to investors and THEN they went looking for people to loan the money.

So each time that a payment has been made on behalf of any pool from any source there should be an allocation to the borrower’s principal balance for each of the loans in that pool. Instead, the game is on: credit the investors but don’t tell the borrowers anything. That enables the PRETENDER LENDERS to grab houses for nothing and to collect monthly payments on loans that are already paid in full, unknown to the borrower. It’s the perfect crime: the borrower knows he has missed payments. What he/she doesn’t know is that someone made the payments already.  Worst case scenario for the pretender lenders is that they collect twice (collectively as a group).

By Jef Feeley and Edvard Pettersson

April 23 (Bloomberg) — Countrywide Financial Corp. investors, led by a group of New York retirement funds, have agreed to settle a class-action lawsuit for more than $600 million, a person familiar with the case said.

U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer in Los Angeles in December certified a class of investors who bought Countrywide shares or certain debt securities from March 12, 2004, to March 7, 2008. The U.S. appeals court in San Francisco on April 19 denied the defendants permission to appeal that ruling. No settlement papers have been filed.

Shirley Norton, a spokeswoman for Bank of America Corp., which acquired Countrywide in 2008, declined to comment. Jennifer Bankston, a spokeswoman for Labaton Sucharow LLP, the firm representing the pension funds, said mediation between the parties took place this month and declined to comment on the settlement.

The New York State Common Retirement Fund and five New York City pension funds claimed former Countrywide Chief Executive Officer Angelo Mozilo and other executives hid from them that the company was fueling its growth by letting underwriting standards deteriorate. Bank of America acquired Calabasas, California-based Countrywide, which was the biggest U.S. home lender, in July of 2008.

The Daily Journal, a Los Angeles legal newspaper, first reported the settlement.

SEC Lawsuit

Mozilo, 71, is also a defendant, together with two other former Countrywide executives, in a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission lawsuit alleging he publicly reassured investors about the quality of the company’s home loans while he issued “dire” internal warnings and sold about $140 million of his own Countrywide shares.

He wrote in an e-mail in September 2006 that Countrywide was “flying blind” and had “no way” to determine the risks of some adjustable-rate mortgages, according to the SEC complaint filed in June.

David Siegel, a lawyer for Mozilo, didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment.

The class-action lawsuit names 50 defendants, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and 23 other Countrywide underwriters. It also named the auditing firm KPMG LLP. The underwriters and KPMG are accused of securities-law violations and not fraud.

Dean Kitchens, a lawyer representing the underwriters, and Todd Gordinier, a lawyer representing KPMG, didn’t immediately return calls seeking comment.

The case is In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Securities Litigation, 07-05295, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles).

–Editor: Michael Hytha, Peter Blumberg.

To contact the reporter on this story: Jef Feeley in Wilmington, Delaware, at jfeeley@bloomberg.net; Edvard Pettersson in Los Angeles at epettersson@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: David E. Rovella at drovella@bloomberg.net.

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