How “servicer advances” advance the false premise of securitization of loans.

Since the times of ancient Greece and even before that, it has been a commonly used statement that before discussion of an issue each party should precisely define their terms. The obvious conclusion has been that without agreed definitions, it is highly probable that each side is talking about something different and making no point in the debate. Every generation since then has agreed with that premise.

This is exactly what is happening in the world of finance. Wall Street has its own definitions that are never disclosed to the marketplace, consumers, investors, the courts or government regulators.

Each of those entities or people have their own definitions  based upon partial information and mostly blind faith in certain facts that appear to be axiomatically true. even the Federal reserve under the venerated Alan Greenspan made that error.

Wall Street capitalizes on that assymetric information to create a completely illegal place for itself in the economy — that of disguised principal while everyone else thinks they are merely acting in their assigned and proper role as broker.

What I find fascinating is the meaning of securitization of servicing advances. Remember that securitization means, by definition and by law, that an asset or group of assets has been sold for value to multiple investors in exchange for pro rata ownership of those assets. That is the essence of all securitization, including IPOs and existing common stock traded on national or international security exchange services or platforms.

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Analyzing the data published by the firms promoting “securitization,” we see that no “loan” or debt has ever been purchased and sold by a grantor who owned the underlying obligation or a grantee who paid any value. “Securitization” exists — but not for the paper or the money trail (payments and collections). The securities issued are based upon a discretionary unsecured promise to make indefinite payments to buyers of certificates issued by the promisor (securities brokerage firm).
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The terms of payments from securities brokerage firms to investors who purchased certificates have no direct relationship to the terms of payments scheduled from homeowners, who are unaware that the sale of the securities resulting from their signatures greatly exceeds the amount of their transaction, leaving a zero balance due and quite possibly opening the door for a claim for greater compensation as the essential party making the securitization scheme possible. This is discussed at length on my blog.
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The securitization scheme has many subplots. One of them is “servicer advances.” A real servicer advance is one in which the company designated as the servicer receives, processes, accounts, and distributes money to the investors.
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To my knowledge and my proprietary database, there is not one existing scenario that conforms to that description. In plain terms, servicers do not make advances mainly because they do not pay investors — ever. And as I have previously discussed on this blog, they don’t receive payments either.
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So these falsely labeled “servicers” can’t and don’t create data entries reflecting the receipt of payments — but law firms seeking foreclosure argue or imply that they do receive such payments and that their “records” are business records — i.e., records of business conducted by the designated “servicer” who in fact performs no servicing duties.
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The true meaning of a servicer advance under the current schemes of securitization claims is that some of the money paid to investors is labeled as a servicer advance even though the servicer paid nothing and had no duty to pay the investors anything (just like the homeowner had no duty to pay anything because securitization sales had eliminated the debt).
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That duty (to pay investors) was reserved for the promisor, who we will remember is a securities brokerage company that is not a “servicer.” The label “servicer advance” comes from the reports issued (fabricated) by the company designated as “Master Servicer,” showing that some scheduled homeowner payments have not been paid or received. This disregards the obvious premise that there is no payment due.
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The reader should understand that the sole reason investors would be paid regardless of the number or amount of incoming scheduled payments from homeowners is that the securities firm wants to keep selling unregulated securities (certificates). That is the point of the securitization scheme —- to sell securities.
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While incoming payments from homeowners are a partial basis for payments to investors, the promise requires that new securities from new securitization schemes are being sold, producing revenues and the ability to say that certain “tranches” (that contain nothing) are “over-collateralized.”
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The reader should also understand that the fact that homeowners are making payments is the sole factual support — in law and, in fact — that payments are due. In a twisted way, homeowners, through their ignorance of the actual events in which they are key players, are playing an active role in deceiving each other, the government, investors, and the courts.
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The promissory note and mortgage role in this scenario are strictly symbolic. But they do raise the legal presumption that they are valid documents if they are facially valid according to the state statute. Nonetheless, the real reason anyone believes that payments are due when they’re not due is that homeowners make the scheduled payments to anyone who commands them to do so.
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So the fact that the investors received their promised payment from the securities firm that controls the scheme (but does not own anything) is why they call it an “advance. The idea that it came from a “Servicer” is just a fabrication to imply that a third party was involved. But that is enough to raise the facial presumption from the self-serving documentation and claims prepared by the securities firm or on its behalf.
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The prospectus for each securitization plan reveals the plot to claim “servicer advances” by labeling money not paid by homeowners (whether due or not) as a “servicer advance.” The prospectus shows that a fictional reserve account is created by selling certificates containing the investors’ money.
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The prospectus discloses that investors would receive payments from a reserve pool, which is disclosed as a return of the money the investor paid. But that is exactly the money amount used to claim “servicer advances.” The reserve account may actually exist in some securitization schemes. Still, the “reserve account” is completely controlled by the securities brokerage firm that served as the bookrunner underwriter of the securities (certificates offered for sale).
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And the money proceeds of the sale of derivatives (more unregulated securities traded in the shadow banking marketplace) based on the “servicer advances” go to the investment bank, not the servicer. This is yet another way to reduce any hypothetical (fictional) loan account below a zero balance.
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Since the investors have contractually agreed to that arrangement, the fact that it is not an advance and only a return of capital make no legal difference. So they are converting false declarations of homeowner “defaults” into saleable assets, thus creating the foundation for securitization of false claims of “servicer advances.”
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As you can see from the above explanation, the answers to almost every question dealing with securitization of debt are extremely convoluted. In fact, the vice president of asset management for Deutsche Bank described it as “counterintuitive.” The reason that it is counterintuitive is that it doesn’t make any sense, once you break it down into its component pieces.
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The big stumbling block for everyone is the fact that money appears to have been paid to or paid on behalf of the homeowner. It is therefore assumed as axiomatically true that the money reported to have been paid to the homeowner or paid on behalf of the homeowner must have been alone, if for no other reason than the fact that the homeowner executed a note and mortgage and then started paying.
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 But even that apparent reality is not true in most cases. Nearly all existing transactions that have been labeled as mortgage loan transactions are directly or indirectly the product of supplemental securitization schemes.
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That is to say that most of such transactions consist entirely of reports of payments that never occurred. To the extent that such transactions were presented as paying off a previously classified mortgage loan transaction, such reports were entirely untrue in most cases.
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As long as both transactions resulted from a controlled securitization scheme by a common securities brokerage firm acting as the book runner underwriter of certificates offered for sale to investors, there was no need to transfer any money. Our investigation has revealed the absence of any evidence ingesting that any such money was transferred.  This raises a basic defense for homeowners: lack of consideration and breach of the alleged contract.
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 If the homeowner received, for example, $30,000 from the “refinancing” of the property, but signed a note for $500,000, based upon the false premises of a payoff of the previous “mortgage loan,” the consideration for the note and the mortgage is either completely absent or at least mostly absent.
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 What most people do not understand is that the “refinancing” was just an opportunity to start another controlled securitization scheme with the new set of securities being sold without the retirement of the old securitization scheme or those securities.
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PRACTICE NOTE: The presence of servicer advances described in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement provides a foundation for the homeowner’s defense based on standing. Since servicer advances have priority in the liquidation of property, the outcome of foreclosure results in payment to the investment bank rather than the designated creditor. Proper discovery and objections at trial are likely to successfully undermine the most basic element of the claim: legal standing.
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There is a false premise implied in “servicer advances” that leads to false conclusions. The false premise is that the money is owed to the “Master Servicer,” and the debt is that of the investors on whose behalf the advances were presumably made. The fact that there were no such advances remains concealed, and the fact that the investors have absolutely no liability to the recipient of the “servicer advances” is also concealed. But this false premise that is always implied if the subject comes up, is usually sufficient to convince a judge that servicer advances are irrelevant. Upon proper scrutiny and analysis, the subject of servicer advances are highly relevant and even dispositive of the entire claim.

REVERSE “MORTGAGES” ARE SUBJECT TO SAME DEFENSES AS ANY OTHER HOMEOWNER TRANSACTION

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I am getting a lot more inquiries about reverse mortgages in which Foreclosure is threatened. That’s far, there appears to be no difference in the challenges and offenses available to homeowner homeowners between what is ordinarily falsely described as a “conventional Loan” and a “reverse mortgage loan.” The goal of the finance side of these transactions is the same: the sale of securities.

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So here is a common response that I am giving to people to make inquiries:

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The only players you have mentioned or companies that are claiming to be servicers. Based upon my research and analysis in other cases, I think it is highly unlikely that PHH, Ocwen, or Celink ever performed any services that are ordinarily associated with the use of the term “servicer.” I don’t think they are even authorized to perform those services. They are placeholders whose names are used to deflect attention from a real players, none of whom on or maintain a loan account receivable. In all probability, this transaction was subject to false claims of securitization, which means that securities were issued, but they did not represent any interest in any debt, note or mortgage.
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The procedures that are being offered to you or merely devices for you to waive rights to challenge their claim. I think there’s a high probability that the apparent debt has been extinguished through the process of securitization. At securitization, many layers of securities are issued and sold that re-pay the players and produce outsized profits that are not disclosed to the homeowners. On the finance side, nobody treats the transaction with the homeowner as though it was a loan except for purposes of “enforcement.”  In order to achieve their goal, it is necessary to fabricate false documentation and present them as valid and authentic memorialization of transactions. But the transactions never occurred.
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This is very confusing to anyone who is not fairly knowledgeable about investment banking, accounting and law. So that includes homeowners, lawyers and judges. Using the label of a “loan” the players are able to use the label of “lender” and “servicer.” None of these labels are true in the sense that they describe the actual function of the company is described as performing some role in connection with the loan.
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What all of that means is that if you are going to challenge them, you have an uphill battle to convince a skeptical judge that you were not simply trying to wiggle out of a legitimate debt. I’ve been litigating these specific cases for nearly 16 years. While I have been either instrumental or the actual lead attorney defending homeowners from these false claims, I can say that without any doubt, the process is a lot easier if the homeowner starts early and does not wait to assert challenges until they are actually in court. I have won cases in both categories, but it is a lot easier if the attorney can state and show that there were previous statutory attempts to obtain knowledge of the identity alleged creditor, and the existence and status of the alleged loan account.
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Black Knight fka Lender Processing Systems — Short memories can hurt you

Frankly, I am frequently bewildered by the astonishment of people who should know better. Everything that I report on my blog is derived from actual concrete reliable data and information and previous legal proceedings in which there were administrative findings of fact and legal consequences. Some followers of my blog are well-intentioned but are married to the view that the system is so corrupt, nobody can do anything about it. But I have been doing “something about it” (i.e., winning cases) for 15 years — along with several dozen other lawyers and even many pro se homeowners. Even people in other countries have had success.

This blog and my radio show and webinars are devoted to one thing: getting homeowners to wake up as early as possible to the fact that they have been duped into a transaction about which they know nothing but which they think they know everything.

I don’t deny that the results are corrupt. But I do think that the consequences of entering the legal system without knowledge of legal procedure will produce a fatal result in most cases. Being right is not enough

Black Knight is a financial technology (FINTECH) company that played a pivotal role in the creation and promotion of false fabricated documents. In turn, this resulted in the fake national narrative that the loan account receivables still existed when in fact those accounts were extinguished during the process of securitization. And that is because securitization was not and never was intended to securitize any obligation owed by any homeowner who was falsely labeled as a borrower.

Without that false narrative, judges would have refused to allow foreclosure judgments to be entered or foreclosure sales to be conducted. But just like any other court action, the judge is restricted to consider only what is presented — not what should’ve been presented or what could’ve been presented. Before the era of false claims of securitization of debt, judges regularly refused to allow foreclosure even when they were uncontested — if the paperwork was not properly presented in the correct form. The only thing that has changed is that the investment banking community has entered the lending marketplace with the paperwork that is properly presented in the correct form, but which is false.

Black Knight, Inc. went public in 2017, underwritten by Goldman Sachs. This is a closely related company to Black Knight Financial Services LLC. Black Knight has branded itself as an authority for data on real estate and in particular mortgage lending. But it continues, through its direct operations and its relations with closely related companies to provide “gap” documents that are completely fabricated, false, backdated, and forged by automated processes.

In other words, it is directly or indirectly involved in the creation of false data that it then reports. Black Knight has an indemnification agreement in which it protects Servicelink (another closely related Black Knight company) from any claims. That is because the “services” performed by Servicelink and other companies is the man behind the curtain — i.e., the actual company that provides automated processing of receipts from homeowners, records of those receipts, and deposit of those funds into accounts controlled by the investment banking company who has no ownership interest in any payments, obligation legal debt, note or mortgage from any homeowner.

In plain language, this means that homeowner payments are revenue to the investment banks and not a reduction in any loan account receivable. And THAT is because there is no loan account receivable —- a fact that is nearly universally rejected by anyone who does not have years or decades of experience in investment banking and accounting.

But just because it is rejected by people who are ignorant of the facts, does not mean it is wrong or in any way misleading.

Had tip to summer chic.

There were several other press releases across the country just like this one. The one thing missing from all of these suits, settlements and orders is the connection of the dots. If we know that the industry was using fraudulent, forged, false, backdated, robosigned documents then two questions emerge:

  • Why were the related foreclosures not reversed?
  • More fundamentally, why were fake documents needed? In an industry in which lenders literally wrote the laws, the template documents, and the procedures by which loans were originated and enforced, why was it so easy to originate the loans in extreme volume and not so easy to enforce them without falsifying documents?

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Jennifer López
DATE: December 16, 2011 702-486-3782

NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL SUES LENDER PROCESSING
SERVICES FOR CONSUMER FRAUD

Carson City, NV – Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto announced today a lawsuit against Lender Processing Services, Inc., DOCX, LLC, LPS Default Solutions,
Inc. and other subsidiaries of LPS (collectively known “LPS”) for engaging in deceptive practices against Nevada consumers.

The lawsuit, filed on December 15, 2011, in the 8th Judicial District of Nevada, follows an extensive investigation into LPS’ default servicing of residential mortgages in
Nevada, specifically loans in foreclosure. The lawsuit includes allegations of widespread document execution fraud, deceptive statements made by LPS about efforts to correct document fraud, improper control over foreclosure attorneys and the foreclosure process, misrepresentations about LPS’ fees and services, and evidence of an overall press for speed and volume that prevented the necessary and proper focus on accuracy and integrity in the foreclosure process.

The robo-signing crisis in Nevada has been fueled by two main problems: chaos and speed,” said Attorney General Masto. “We will protect the integrity of the foreclosure process. This lawsuit is the next, logical step in holding the key players in the foreclosure fraud crisis accountable.”

The lawsuit alleges that LPS:

1) Engaged in a pattern and practice of falsifying, forging and/or fraudulently executing foreclosure-related documents, resulting in countless foreclosures that were predicated upon deficient documentation;

2) Required employees to execute and/or notarize up to 4,000 foreclosure-related documents every day;

3) Fraudulently notarized documents without ensuring that the notary did so in the presence of the person signing the document;

4) Implemented a widespread scheme to forge signatures on key documents, to ensure that volume and speed quotas were met;

5) Concealed the scope and severity of the document execution fraud by misrepresenting that the problems were limited to clerical errors;

6) Improperly directed and/or controlled the work of foreclosure attorneys by imposing inappropriate and arbitrary deadlines that forced attorneys to churn through foreclosures at a rate that sacrificed accuracy for speed;

7) Improperly obstructed communication between foreclosure attorneys and their clients; and

8 ) Demanded a kickback/referral fee from foreclosure firms for each case referred to the firm by LPS and allowed this fee to be misrepresented as “attorney’s fees” on invoices passed on to Nevada consumers and/or submitted to Nevada courts.

LPS’ misconduct was confirmed through testimony of former employees, interviews of servicers and other industry players, and extensive review of more than 1 million pages of relevant documents. Former employees and industry players describe LPS as an assembly-line sweatshop, churning out documents and foreclosures as fast as new requests came in and punishing network attorneys who failed to keep up the pace.

LPS is the nation’s largest provider of default mortgage services, processing more than fifty percent of all foreclosures annually.

The Office of the Nevada Attorney General recently indicted Gary Trafford and Gerri Sheppard as part of a separate, criminal investigation into the conduct of robo-signing scheme which resulted in the filing of tens of thousands of fraudulent documents with the Clark County Recorder’s Office between 2005 and 2008.

Nevada homeowners who are in foreclosure or are facing foreclosure are advised to seek assistance as soon as possible. Homeowners can find information for a counseling agency approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) by calling 800-569-4287 or by visiting http://1.usa.gov/NVCounselingAgencies.

Additional information on foreclosure resources can be found at www.foreclosurehelp.nv.gov.

Anyone who has information regarding this case should contact the Attorney General’s Office hotline at 702-486-3132 (when promoted select “0”) to obtain information on how to submit a written complaint. Nevada consumers can file a complaint with the Nevada Attorney General’s Office about LPS by sending a letter with copies of any supporting documentation to the Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection: 555 E. Washington Ave Suite 3900, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

EDITOR’S NOTE: Contrary to what has been written or implied by people who are either misinformed or who are being directly paid by intermediaries for the investment banks on Wall Street, the simple answer to the direct question that I have posed above is that the reason for the fake documentation is that there was no real documentation that could be used. There was no real documentation because there were no real transactions supporting the documents that were used in foreclosure.
Every long-term illegal scheme has three main attributes:
  1. A false national narrative created by advertising and government complicity.
  2. False labels that comply with the false national narrative, combined with government acceptance of those labels.
  3. Addiction to the revenue produced by the scheme. This applies to all players, high and low.

When you look at the Madoff Ponzi scheme (40 years), the Purdue pharma scheme (30 years) on OxyContin, or the securitization Ponzi scheme (30 years), the elements are the same. And the results are interesting from an academic point of view: despite the catastrophic results of those schemes, there remain many people (Including those in government) who still subscribe to the narrative and use the labels. It’s very challenging to let go of a belief even when there is ample evidence and even knowledge of the falsity of the presumptions.

 

Sometimes the client figures it out better than the lawyer

The problem has always been how to present this counterintuitive reality to a judge who is convinced that securitization of a loan DID occur even though the transaction was not in fact a loan and no sale occurred.

After decades of litigating and teaching litigation, the one common theme throughout my career has been the knowledge that often your best ideas come from the client, who is unencumbered by thoughts of what can’t be done.

One such client of mine in the state of Hawaii asked a simple question. She asked whether the homeowner, post-foreclosure, could ask for surplus funds. Surplus funds are defined by statute to mean that once the debt is paid including all expenses of enforcement, the remainder of the proceeds of a forced sale of the property should be returned to the homeowner. This is basic law applied in all jurisdictions. The “lender” does not get a bonus — at least not legally.

So that sparked some thought and analysis. If the claim was based on a nonexistent loss, then the entire proceeds of the sale should be turned over to the homeowner. In addition,  the filing of a motion or petition for accounting for the money proceeds from the sale could reveal the nonexistence of the implied loss and the nonexistent claim. That, in turn, could lead to a claim for sanctions or damages for filing a frivolous lawsuit. And that might all be included in a petition for declaratory, injunctive, and supplemental relief in which the court is asked to declare fee title, unencumbered, vested in the homeowner.

In any event, procedurally, the demand for an accounting followed by a motion to enforce the demand seems appropriate and should send the foreclosure mill spiraling. You see, the money never goes to the named claimant where the alleged claim was based upon securitization of the debt — because the loan, debt, note, and mortgage were never securitized. (Securitization means breaking up an asset into component parts that are sold to investors in pro-rata shares. Such sales never occurred. Securities were sold but they did not represent an ownership interest in any asset.)

The problem has always been how to present this counterintuitive reality to a judge who is convinced that securitization of a loan DID occur even though the transaction was not in fact a loan and no sale occurred.

The answer might be, in addition to the defensive strategies suggested on these pages, that instead of an appeal you file a motion to compel an accounting and a motion to open limited discovery on the accounting. The motion is actually a motion to compel the return of surplus cash generated from the sale of the property. Of course, that might need to wait until the sale to a third party but there are good arguments for filing it when the credit bid is offered by the named claimant.

Thus far, the banks have been selling property and then depositing the cash into an account controlled by a concealed investment bank notwithstanding the naming of the sham conduit claimant in whose name the foreclosure process was started. Frequent sleight of hand name changes occurs post-judgment or even post-sale.

It is difficult to imagine any court denying the request for the return of excess funds. Obviously, the argument from the foreclosure mill would be something like this: “The loss has already been established as the law of the case and the sale price was less than the loss, so there is no surplus.” But that argument flies in the face of current judicial doctrine which holds that even in a default situation you must still prove the damages.

And once the court is convinced you to have a right to see what happened to the money, it is difficult to imagine that the court would not order the foreclosure mill to produce the accounting. Like a request for identification of the creditor and the loan account receivable, such orders will be ignored because they must be ignored — even at the expense of sanctions. And the reason is quite obvious after reviewing thousands of cases — there is no loan account, there is no loss and there is no creditor despite all appearances to the contrary.

So if they file a false accounting they are probably committing or suborning perjury. And I don’t think many people are willing to sign such documents for any amount of money unless they don’t value their freedom.

The interesting thing about procedural rules is that the judge is more than happy to apply them if they can get rid of the case. In this case, a motion for sanctions for failure to comply with the homeowner’s request and the judge’s order will most likely produce either a direct win for the homeowner or a very satisfactory settlement — albeit with someone who had no right to settle with you.

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
  • Yes you DO need a lawyer.
  • If you wish to retain me as a legal consultant please write to me at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com.
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Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

How and Why to Litigate Foreclosure and Eviction Defenses

Wall Street Transactions with Homeowners Are Not Loans

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I think the biggest problem for people understanding the strategies that I have set forth on this blog is that they don’t understand the underlying principles. It simply is incomprehensible to most people how they could get a “loan” and then not owe it. It is even more incomprehensible that there could be no creditor that could enforce any alleged obligation of the homeowner. After all, the homeowner signed a note which by itself creates an obligation.
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None of this seems to make sense. Yet on an intuitive level, most people understand that they got screwed in what they thought was a lending process.
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The reason for this disconnect between me and most of the rest of the world is that most people have no reason to know what happens in the world of investment banking. As a former investment banker, and as a direct witness to these seminal events that gave rise to the claims of “securitization” I do understand what happened.
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In this article, I will try to explain, from a different perspective, what really happened when most homeowners thought that they were closing a loan transaction. For this to be effective, the reader must be willing to put themselves in the shoes of an investment banker.
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First, you must realize that every investment banker is merely a stockbroker. They do business with investors and other investment bankers. They do not do business with consumers who purchase goods and services or loans. The investment banker is generally not in the business of lending money. The investment banker is in the business of creating capital for new and existing businesses. They make their money by brokering transactions. They make the most money by brokering the sales of new securities including stocks and bonds.
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The compensation received by the investment banker for brokering a transaction varied from as little as 1% or 2% to as much as 20%. The difference is whether they were brokering the sale of existing securities or underwriting new securities. Obviously, they had a very large incentive to broker the sale of new securities for which they would receive 7 to 10 times the compensation of brokering the sale of existing securities.
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But the Holy Grail of investment banking was devising some system in which the investment bank could issue a new security from a fictional entity and receive the entire proceeds of the offering. This is what happened in “residential lending.” And this way, they could receive 100% of the offering instead of a brokerage commission.
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But as you’ll see below, by disconnecting the issuance of securities from the ownership of any perceived obligation from consumers, investment bankers put themselves in a position in which they could issue securities indefinitely without limit and without regard to the amount of the transaction with consumers (homeowners) or investors.
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In short, the goal was to make it appear as though loans have been securitized even know they had not been securitized. In order for any asset to have been securitized it would need to have been sold off in parts to investors. What we see in the residential market is that no such sale ever occurred. Under modern law, a “sale” consists of offer, acceptance, payment, and delivery. So neither the investment bank nor any of the investors to whom they had sold securities, ever received a conveyance of any right, title, or interest to any debt, note, or mortgage from a homeowner.
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At the end of the day, the world was convinced that the homeowner had entered into a loan transaction while the investment banker had assured itself and its investors that it would be free from liability for violation of any lending laws — as a “lender.”
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Neither of them maintained a loan account receivable on their own ledgers even though the capital used to pay homeowners originated from banks who loaned money to investment bankers (based upon sales of “certificates” to investors), which was then used to pay homeowners as little as possible from the pool of capital generated by the loans and certificate sales of “mortgage-backed bonds.”
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From the perspective of the investment banker, payment was made to the homeowner in exchange for participation in creating the illusion of a loan transaction despite the fact that there was no lender and no loan account. This was covered up by having more intermediaries claim rights as servicers and the creation of “payment histories” that implied but never asserted the existence or establishment of a loan account. Of course, they would need to dodge any questions relating to the identification of a creditor. That could be no creditor if there was no loan account. This tactic avoided perjury.
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Of course, this could only be accomplished through deceit. The consumer or homeowner, government regulators, and the world at large, would need to be convinced that the homeowner had entered into a secured loan transaction, even though no such thing had occurred. From the investment bankers’ perspective, they were paying the homeowner as little money as possible in order to create the foundation for their illusion.
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By calling it “securitization of loans” and selling it that way, they were able to create the illusion successfully. They were able to maintain the illusion because only the investment bankers had the information that would show that there was no business entity that maintained a ledger entry showing ownership of any debt, note, or mortgage — against which losses and gains could or would be posted in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (and law). This is called asymmetry of information and a great deal has been written on these pages and by many other authors.
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Since the homeowner had asked for a loan and had received money, it never occurred to any homeowner that he/she was not being paid for a loan or loan documents, but rather was being paid for a service. In order for the transaction to be perceived as a loan obviously, the homeowner had to become obligated to repay the money that had been paid to the homeowner. While this probably negated the consideration paid for the services rendered by the homeowner, nobody was any the wiser.
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As shown below, the initial sale of the initial certificates was only the beginning of an infinite supply of capital flowing to the investment bank who only had to pay off intermediaries to keep them “in the fold.” By virtue of the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1998, none of the certificates were regulated as securities; so disclosure was a matter of proving fraud (without any information) in private actions rather than compliance with any statute. Further, the same investment banks were issuing and trading “hedge contracts” based upon the “performance” of the certificates — as reported by the investment bank in its sole discretion.
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It was a closed market, free from any free market forces. The theory under which Alan Greenspan, Fed Chairman, was operating was that free-market forces would make any necessary corrections, This blind assumption prevented any further analysis of the concealed business plan of the investment banks — a mistake that Greenspan later acknowledged.
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There was no free market. Neither homeowners nor investors knew what they were getting themselves into. And based upon the level of litigation that emerged after the crash of 2008, it is safe to say that the investors and homeowners were deprived of any bargaining position (because the main aspects fo their transition were being misrepresented and concealed), Both should have received substantially more compensation and would have bargained for it assuming they were willing to even enter into the transaction — highly doubtful assumption.
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The investment banks also purchased insurance contracts with extremely rare clauses basically awarding themselves payment for nonexistent losses upon their own declaration of an “event” relating to the “performance” of unregulated securities. So between the proceeds from the issuance of certificates and hedge contracts and the proceeds of insurance contracts investment bankers were generally able to generate at least $12 for each $1 that was paid to homeowners and around $8 for each $1 invested by investors in purchasing the certificates.
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So the end result was that the investment banker was able to pay homeowners without any risk of loss on that transaction while at the same time generating capital or revenue far in excess of any payment to the homeowner. Were it not for the need for maintaining the illusion of a loan transaction, the investment banks could’ve easily passed on the opportunity to enforce the “obligation” allegedly due from homeowners. They had already made their money.
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There was no loss to be posted against any account on any ledger of any company if any homeowner decided not to pay the alleged obligation (which was merely the return of the consideration paid for the homeowner’s services). But that did not stop the investment banks from making claims for a bailout and making deals for loss sharing on loans they did not own and never owned. No such losses ever existed.
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Investment bankers first started looking at the consumer lending market back in 1969, when I was literally working on Wall Street. Frankly, there was no bigger market in which they could participate. But there were huge obstacles in doing so. First of all none of them wanted the potential liability for violation of lending laws that had recently been passed on both local and Federal levels (Truth in Lending Act et al.)
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So they needed to avoid classification as a lender. They achieved this goal in 2 ways. First, they did not directly do business of any kind with any consumer or homeowner. They operated strictly through “intermediaries” that were either real or fictional. If the intermediary was real, it was a sham conduit — a company with virtually no balance sheet or income statement that could be collapsed and “disappeared” if the scheme ever collapsed or just hit a bump in the road.
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Either way, the intermediary was not really a party to the transaction with the consumer or homeowner. It did not pay the homeowner nor did it receive payments from the homeowner. It did not own any obligations from the homeowner, according to modern law, because it had never paid value for the obligation.
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Under modern law, the transfer or conveyance of an interest in a mortgage without a contemporaneous transfer of ownership of the underlying obligation is a legal nullity in all states of the union. So transfers from the originator who posed as a virtual creditor do not exist in the eyes of the law — if they are shown to be lacking in consideration paid for the underlying obligation, as per Article 9 §203 Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all 50 states. The transfers were merely part of the illusion of maintaining the apparent existence of the loan transaction with homeowners.
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And this brings us to the strategies to be employed by homeowners in contesting foreclosures and evictions based on foreclosures. Based upon my participation in review of thousands of cases it is always true that any question regarding the existence and ownership of the alleged obligation is treated evasively because the obligation does not exist and cannot be owned.
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In court, the failure to respond to such questions that are posed in proper form and in a timely manner is the foundation for the victory of the homeowner. Although there is a presumption of ownership derived from claims of delivery and possession of the note, the proponent of that presumption may not avail itself of that presumption if it fails to answer questions relating to rebutting the presumption of existence and ownership of the underlying obligation. Such cases usually (not always) result in either judgment for the homeowner or settlement with the homeowner on very favorable terms.
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The homeowner is not getting away with anything or getting a free house as the investment banks have managed to insert into public discourse. They are receiving just compensation for their participation in this game in which they were drafted without their knowledge or consent. Considering the 1200% gain enjoyed by the investment banks which was enabled by the homeowners’ participation, the 8% payment to the homeowner seems only fair. Further, if somehow the homeowners’ apparent obligation to pay the investment bank survives, it is subject to reformation, accounting, and computation as to the true balance and whether it is secured or not. 
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The obligation to repay the consideration paid by the investment bank (through intermediaries) seems to be a negation of the consideration paid. If that is true, then there is neither a loan contract nor a securities contract. There is no contract because in all cases the offer and acceptance were based upon different terms ( and different deliveries) without either consideration or execution of the terns expected by the homeowner under the advertised “loan contract.”
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Payments By Homeowners Do Not Reduce Loan Accounts

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Each time that a homeowner makes a payment, he or she is perpetuating the myth that they are part of an enforceable loan agreement. There is no loan agreement if there was no intention for anyone to be a lender and if no loan account receivable was established on the books of any business. The same result applies when a loan is originated in the traditional way but then acquired by a successor. The funding is the same as what is described above. The loan account receivable in the acquisition scenario is eliminated.
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Once the transaction is entered as a reference data point for securitization it no longer exists in form or substance.

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For the past 20 years, most homeowners have been making payments to companies that said they were “servicers.” Even at the point of a judicial gun (court order) these companies will fail or refuse to disclose what they do with the money after “receipt.” Because of lockbox contracts, these companies rarely have any access to pools of money that were generated through payments from homeowners.
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Like their counterparts in the origination of transactions with homeowners, they are sham conduits. Like the originators, they are built to be thrown under the bus when the scheme implodes. They will not report to you the identity of the party to whom they forward payments that they have received from homeowners because they have not received the payments from homeowners and they don’t know where the money goes.
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As I have described in some detail in other articles on this blog, with the help of some contributors, the actual accounting for payments received from homeowners is performed by third-party vendors, mostly under the control of Black Knight. Through a series of sham conduit transfers, the pool of money ends up in companies controlled by the investment bank. Some of the money is retained domestically while some is recorded as an offshore off-balance-sheet transaction.
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In order to maintain an active market in which new certificates can be sold to investors, discretionary payments are made to investors who purchase the certificates. The money comes from two main sources.
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One source is payments made by homeowners and the other source is payments made by the investment bank regardless of whether or not they receive payments from the homeowners. The latter payments are referred to as “servicer advances.” Those payments come from a reserve pool established at the time of sale of the certificates to the investors, consisting of their own money, plus contributions from the investment bank funded by the sales of new certificates. They are not servicer advances. They are neither in advance nor did they come from a servicer.
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Since there is no loan account receivable owned by anyone, payments received from homeowners are not posted to such an account nor to the benefit of any owner of such an account (or the underlying obligation). Instead, accounting for such payments are either reported as “return of capital” or “trading profits.” In fact, such payments are neither return of capital nor trading profit. Since the investment bank has already zeroed out any potential loan account receivable, the only correct treatment of the payment for accounting purposes would be “revenue.” This includes the indirect receipt of proceeds from the forced sale of property in alleged “foreclosures.”
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By retaining total control over the accounting treatment for receipt of money from investors and homeowners, the investment bank retains total control over how much taxable income it reports. At present, most of the money that was received by the investment bank as part of this revenue scheme is still sitting offshore in various accounts and controlled companies. It is repatriated as needed for the purpose of reporting revenue and net income for investment banks whose stock is traded on the open market. By some fairly reliable estimates, the amount of money held by investment banks offshore is at least $3 trillion. In my opinion, the amount is much larger than that.
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As a baseline for corroboration of some of the estimates and projections contained in this article and many others, we should consider the difference between the current amount of all the fiat money in the world and the number and dollar amount of cash-equivalents in the shadow banking market. In 1983, the number and dollar amount of such cash equivalents was zero. Today it is $1.4 quadrillion — around 15-20 times the amount of currency.
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Success in Litigation Depends Upon Litigation Skills: FOCUS

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I have either been lead counsel or legal consultant in thousands of successful cases defending Foreclosure. Thousands of others have been reported to me where they used my strategies to litigate. Many of them resulted in a judgment for the homeowner, but the majority were settled under the seal of confidentiality.
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Thousands more have reported failure. In reviewing those cases it was clear that they were either litigated pro se or by attorneys who were not skilled in trial practice and who had no idea of the principles contained in this article and my many other articles on this blog. I would describe the reason for these failures as “too little too late.” In some ways, the courts are designed more to be final than to be fair. There are specific ways that information becomes evidence. Most people in litigation do not understand the ways that information becomes evidence and therefore fail to object to the foundation, best evidence, hearsay etc.
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Even the people that submit wee phrased and timely discovery demands fail, more often than not, to move for an order to compel when the opposition fails or refuses to answer the simple questions bout the establishment, existence, and ownership of the underlying alleged obligation, debt, note or mortgage. Or they failed to ask for a hearing on the motion to compel, in which case the discovery is waived. Complaining about the failure to answer discovery during the trial when there was no effort to enforce discovery is both useless and an undermining of the credibility of the defense.
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Since I have been litigating cases for around 45 years, I don’t expect younger attorneys to be as well-versed and intuitive in a courtroom as I have been. It’s also true that many lawyers, both older and younger than me, have greater skills than I have. But it is a rare layperson that can win one of these cases without specific training knowledge and experience in motion practice and trial law.
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In the final analysis, if the truth was fully revealed, each foreclosure involves a foreclosure lawyer who does not have any idea whose interest he/she is representing. They may know that they are being paid from an account titled in the name of the self-proclaimed servicer. And because of that, they will often make the mistake of saying that they represent the servicer. They are pretty careful about not specifically saying that the named plaintiff in a judicial foreclosure or the named beneficiary in a nonjudicial foreclosure is their client. That is because they have no retainer agreement or even a relationship with the named plaintiff or the named beneficiary. Such lawyers have generally never spoken with anyone employed by the named plaintiff or the named beneficiary.
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When such lawyers and self-proclaimed servicers go to court-ordered mediation, neither one has the authority to do anything except show up. Proving that the lawyer does not actually represent the named trustee of the fictitious trust can be very challenging. But there are two possible strategies that definitely work.
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The first is to do your legal research and find the cases in which investors have sued the named trustee of the alleged REMIC trust for failure to take action that would’ve protected the interest of the investors.
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The outcome of all such cases is a finding by the court that the trustee does not represent the investors, the investors are not beneficiaries of the “Trust,” and that the trustee has no authority, right, title, or interest over any transaction with homeowners. Since the named trustee has no powers of a trustee to administer the affairs of any active trust with assets or a business operating, it is by definition not a trustee. For purposes of the foreclosure, it cannot be a named party either much less the client of the attorney, behind whom the securitization players are hiding because of a judicial doctrine called “judicial immunity.”
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The second thing you can do is to ask, probably during mediation at the start, whether the lawyer who shows up is representing for example “U.S. Bank.” Or you might ask whether US Bank is the client of the lawyer. The answer might surprise you. In some cases, the lawyer insisted that they represented “Ocwen” or some other self-proclaimed servicer.
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Keep in mind that when you go to mediation, frequently happens that it is attended by a “coverage lawyer” who might not even be employed by the Foreclosure bill. Such a lawyer clearly knows nothing about the parties or the case and will be confused even by the most basic questions. If they fail to affirm that they represent the named trustee of the named fictitious trust, that is the time to stop  the proceeding and file a motion for contempt for failure to appear (i.e., failure of the named plaintiff or beneficiary to appear since no employee or authorized representative appeared.)
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And the third thing that I have done with some success is to make an offer. You will find in most cases that they are unwilling and unable to accept or reject the offer. A substantial offer will put them in a very bad position. Remember you are dealing with a lawyer and a representative from the alleged servicer who actually don’t know what’s going on. Everyone is on a “need to know” footing.
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So if you make an offer that the lawyer thinks could possibly be reasonable and might be acceptable to an actual lender who was holding the loan account receivable, the lawyer might be stuck between a rock and a hard place. Rejection of an offer that the client might want to accept without notifying the client is contrary to bar rules.
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But both the lawyer and the representative of the alleged servicer know that they have no authority. So they will often ask for a continuance or adjournment of the mediation. At that point, the homeowner is well within their rights to file a motion for contempt. In most cases, the court order for mediation requires that both parties attend with full authority to settle the case. In plain language, there is no reason for the adjournment. But they need it because they know they have no authority contrary to the order mandating mediation. Many judges have partially caught on to this problem and instruct the foreclosure mill lawyer to make sure he doesn’t need to “make a call.”
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Every good trial lawyer knows that they must have a story to tell or else, even if the client is completely right, they are likely to lose. You must focus on the main issues.
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The main issue in foreclosure is the establishment, existence, and ownership of the alleged underlying obligation. All of that is going to be presumed unless you demonstrate to the court that you are seeking to rebut those presumptions. There can be no default and hence no remedy is there is either no obligation or no ownership of the obligation by the complaining party.
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Discovery demands should be drafted with an eye towards what will be a motion to compel and proposed order on the motion to compel. They should also be drafted with an eye toward filing a motion in limine. Having failed and refused to answer basic questions about the establishment, existence, and ownership of the alleged underlying obligation, the motion in limine would ask the court to limit the ability of the foreclosure mill to put on any evidence that the obligation exists or is owned by the named Plaintiff or beneficiary. They can’t have it both ways.
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Failure to follow up is the same thing as waiving your defenses or defense narrative.
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So that concludes my current attempt to explain how to win Foreclosure cases for the homeowner. I hope it helps.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
  • Yes you DO need a lawyer.
  • If you wish to retain me as a legal consultant please write to me at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com.
*
Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

OK Let’s Try It Anyway — Amicus Briefs

We now have an opportunity to attack the most absurd of the decisions on 2 grounds, to wit: The first is that the decisions are wrong based upon existing judicial doctrine, statutory law, and court precedent. The second is that the decisions are wrong because the justification for bending the law is also wrong.

 

Please Donate to Support Neil Garfield’s Efforts to stop Foreclosure Fraud.

Please Donate to Support Neil Garfield’s Efforts to stop Foreclosure Fraud.

I know what I said and I meant it. But I have come under a lot of pressure particularly from one person in Hawaii whose financial contributions have been a substantial factor in keeping this effort alive. So I am drafting and filing an amicus brief for filing in Hawaii and I will do the same, assuming financial support is forthcoming, in other states. I still think it is a long shot but I am also convinced that the mere filing will bring more attention to the facts.

The Hawaii case has similarities to most other cases brought by people claiming ownership or authority resulting from the securitization of debt. But in one case, the court went far off the reservation to prevent the homeowner from winning the case despite clear law in Hawaii that the statute of limitations on the obligation, even if it existed, had long run out. That is not a contested issue in the case. Hawaii is not Florida and the Bartram case does not apply. The statute has run and that is the end of it.

So the foreclosure mill invented something out of thin air. It offered up the following theory: the statute of limitations for a claim based on adverse possession expires in 20 years — obviously longer than the actual law for collecting on claims for money in Hawaii. When first raised I told my client that she need not worry about it. The theory was patently absurd. No judge could possibly rule that way. I was wrong.

Please Donate to Support Neil Garfield’s Efforts to stop Foreclosure Fraud.

Please Donate to Support Neil Garfield’s Efforts to stop Foreclosure Fraud.

This is an example of judicial overreach on a grand scale.

First of all, adverse possession is a claim brought by a landowner. It does not expire in 20 years. It starts in 20 years — after a landowner has been occupying land owned by someone else for 20 consecutive years without interruption. A party claiming to be a mortgagee is not a landowner and there is no allegation or any facts in this case that the named “mortgagee” ever occupied or owned any land.

All of this is traceable to one fact — the nearly universal consensus about the status and ownership of the loans is wrong — but is now institutionalized by those who think they understand loans but know absolutely nothing about investment banking — much less understand the intersection of investment banking and lending. This forms the background for ultra vires actions in the courts.

There was no loan. I know, I know. If it looks like a duck etc. That duck is a hologram with no substance in the real world. The reason it looks like a loan is because it was labeled as a loan.

In most cases, it was a securities deal that was concealed from the homeowner or prospective homeowner. In the end, nobody was holding a loan account receivable as an entry on their ledger therefore nobody could claim ownership of any loan account. And that’s why supposed transfers of the loan account had to be fabricated, forged, backdated, and filled with misinformation.

Viewed from that perspective, each homeowner or prospective homeowner should have been paid compensation for their role as an issuer in the securitization scheme. Because this game was concealed we have no way of knowing what the outcome of bargaining would have been had the homeowner known that they were being drafted into a concealed securitization scheme.

But we do know the value that the securitization players used for payment to the homeowner, to wit: The principal amount of the transaction paid to the homeowner. And we now know that “at the end of the day” nobody maintained ownership of any loan, so the transaction could not be considered a loan — i.e., there was no lender at the end of the day.

Viewed from that perspective, foreclosure is an attempt to get back the consideration that they paid to the homeowner for issuing the note and mortgage, without which securitization could not have occurred. Had they been less busy trying to avoid liability for violations of the Truth in Lending Act and other federal and state lending laws, they would’ve maintained the role of creditor and therefore they would have satisfied the factual foundation to allege the existence of a loan. But they didn’t.

From the point of view of legal analysis, the landing statutes never applied because it wasn’t a loan. This was a securitization scheme from start to finish. But it never was a scheme to securitize the debt, note, or mortgage (or payments) of any homeowner. Of all of the different types of securities and contracts that were issued sold and traded, none of them conveyed any interest in the debt, note, mortgage, or payments made by anyone.

Please Donate to Support Neil Garfield’s Efforts to stop Foreclosure Fraud.

Please Donate to Support Neil Garfield’s Efforts to stop Foreclosure Fraud.

One of the biggest problems is that both homeowners and their attorneys have accepted the labeling promoted by Wall Street. When I first started writing about the scheme in 2006 I raised the alarm that this was nothing like what it seems to be. There were no loans and there were no debts nor any owners of debts. And that is what Wall Street intended.

So there are two labels that must be rejected out of hand at the very beginning. The first is the label of “loan”. The second is the label of “Foreclosure.”

The present situation in Hawaii is mirrored in hundreds of other decisions across the country. The absurdity of some of these decisions is clear to most legal analysts. But the justification for such decisions rests on a dissociative condition: the erroneous belief that lending and securitization intersected. They didn’t. We now have an opportunity to attack the most absurd of the decisions on 2 grounds, to wit: The first is that the decisions are wrong based upon existing judicial doctrine, statutory law, and court precedent. The second is that the decisions are wrong because the justification for bending the law is also wrong.

Join with me as we undertake the effort to alter the trajectory of these decisions which effectively ratify and even Institutionalize illegal and fraudulent behavior

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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Qui Tam? Class Action? Mass joinder? Wrongful foreclosure?

The problem with qui tam in connection with mortgages and foreclosures is that they have not yet worked except in rare instances. The biggest hurdle seems to be that the agency that supposedly got defrauded (e.g. FDIC) by false claims steps forward and says it was OK. You can’t force them to admit that they were defrauded and if they are unwilling to do so, there is no possible claim. The false claims act apparently needs amendment such that an agency may not ratify or forgive criminal behavior.

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The second thing that usually trips up a qui tam action is that the relator must be someone with specific knowledge that is outside of the public domain and specific to that individual. Most such actions are dismissed because they are merely disguised class actions.
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The third thing that is an obstacle to a successful qui tam action is that the expense of litigation is much higher than ordinary litigation. So most people file such actions in the hope of a state AG or the US AG accepting the action and litigating it. If the AG steps on it, the inference is raised that the qui tam lacks merit or can’t be raised to the necessary level of proof — making it that much harder to prove a prima facie case.
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All that said, the reason why people keep trying to go for qui tam actions is that the rewards can be enormous. One person received $31 million in a settlement. See stories on Lynn Simoniak.
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My personal preference (which could be dead wrong) is a mass joinder action in which homeowners who have or had loans claimed as securitized by one specific REMIC trust scheme, bring a claim essentially stating that it was all a lie. I like it because proving that the loan was not securitized is actually quite simple in discovery.
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You end up not actually proving it, but rather blocking the opposition from introducing any evidence that the transaction was a loan and was securitized. If there is no evidence supporting the securitization of the “loan” the claims of the lawyers, servicer, trust and trustee are left without any foundation. And once that is the case any past, current or future foreclosure judgments or sales are void, not merely voidable.
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Without securitization (or some other enforceable agreement detailing the rights between the owner of the underlying obligation and the foreclosure players) there is no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage and no authority to administer, collect or enforce.

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
  • Yes you DO need a lawyer.
  • If you wish to retain me as a legal consultant please write to me at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com.
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Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

How to Challenge The Credibility of Documents Offered to Support Foreclosure

Legal presumptions are not meant to be used as a means for achieving an illegal or unjust result. But they do exactly that when apparently facially valid documents are left unchallenged.

A successful challenge to the credibility of the source of documents initially filed in foreclosure will end the case in favor of the homeowner. the reason is simple: with legal presumptions operating in favor of the foreclosure mill they have no case to offer or prove.

If you start at the beginning and challenge the narrative immediately it can and should lead to excellent results for homeowners under siege by profiteers seeking to force the sale of the subject property.

The plain truth is that all documents from securitization schemes seeking to foreclose are false. But at first glance they appear to be facially valid, which only raises legal presumptions if the deems the document to come from a credible source. This is true in all jurisdictions.

It’s high time for lawyers and pro se litigants to challenge the presentation of initial documents as coming from a source that (1) has a stake in the outcome and is therefore biased and (2) not credible based upon administrative findings in all 50 states in which the documents were not merely found to be defective but also untrue.

In all cases based upon securitization schemes, not even the named Plaintiff knows who owns the debt, note or mortgage. Ask anyone. Even in appellate proceedings the foreclosure mills had to admit they had no idea about the identity or existence of a creditor.

In other cases, attorneys were forced to admit that they never had any contract or or even CONTACT with their “client.” Cases whose style beings with the words “US Bank. Deutsche Bank, or Bank of New York Mellon” are sham cases with sham clients. The lawyer is neither instructed by nor paid by the bank nor is to processing the foreclosure on behalf of either the bank or any trust.

The same lack of knowledge is true for the foreclosure mill who operates under the protection of litigation immunity, the servicer who is receiving instructions from an investment bank posing as Master Servicer, a trustee who has no knowledge or administrative powers over the loan, a trust that has never been party to negotiation or sale of the debt or note or mortgage.

see RobosigningAdministrativeOrder

In all 50 states you have administrative orders in the courts, and administrative findings by the Departments of Justice and Attorneys general and even county clerks that point out with specificity the fact that the documents used by foreclosure mills were faked. That is fact, not opinion.

In hundreds of cases including some where I was lead counsel, there are specific recorded findings from trial judges as to how the foreclosure was faked.

It should not be that hard for lawyers to argue to the court that given the amount of work done (thousands of man hours) investigating the mortgage lending and foreclosure practices, some credence should be given to the now universal view that the documents were faked.

There can be no dispute that the documents all come from parties who have a unique and essential interest in the outcome of the foreclosure claim — i.e., preservation of revenue and achievement of additional revenue arising from the proceeds of a forced sale, none of which will be directed to anyone who paid value for the debt, note or mortgage.

The indicia of credibility and reliability are simply not there. And the indicia of lack of credibility and reliability are all there. Legal presumptions therefore are not legally available. 

It is not a big leap to also argue that the documents contained data that was also also untrue because in every case where the documents were faked, there was no follow up of actual evidence or proof of the claim.

It never happened that the investment banks said “ok, just to make everyone feel better here is the actual proof that the loan was owned by XYZ Corp, who suffered an actual (rather than hypothetical) financial loss arising from nonpayment of the debt. So the foreclosure although based upon false documentation did not produce an unjust result.”

That didn’t happen because there was no such evidence. In every case the foreclosure resulted in a windfall profit to all the participants in the foreclosure.

Remember you are simply challenging the presumption, thus allowing the claimant to prove its claim without the presumption. that is exactly  what the rules require. The fact that you defeat a presumption and that the claimant’s attorneys are forced to actually prove the truth of the matters asserted on the documents is not a stand alone reason for entry of judgment in favor of the homeowner.

THIS IS NOT A PUNISHMENT WHERE THE CLAIMANT IS DEPRIVED OF ITS CLAIM BECAUSE IT DID  SOMETHING ILLEGAL. IF THEY CAN STILL PROVE THE CLAIM, THEY WIN.

If indeed the homeowner does owe money to the claimant and they are both parties to a loan  agreement that the homeowner has breached then the claimant is entitled to foreclosure.

Legal presumptions are not meant to be used as a means for achieving an illegal or unjust result. But they do exactly that when apparently facially valid documents are left unchallenged.

In virtually all cases, such documents are not even facially valid, once you examine the contents and the signature block. Look at it. Study it. And then create your defense narrative. 

These cases are winnable because they should be won by homeowners not because of some technical argument.

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. IN FACT, STATISTICS SHOW THAT MOST HOMEOWNERS FAIL TO PRESENT THEIR DEFENSE PROPERLY. EVEN THOSE THAT PRESENT THE DEFENSES PROPERLY LOSE, AT LEAST AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL, AT LEAST 1/3 OF THE TIME. IN ADDITION IT IS NOT A SHORT PROCESS IF YOU PREVAIL. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
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If you think foreclosures are a thing of the past, think again

In order to maintain the illusion of legality and an orderly marketplace the banks and their servicers must continue to push foreclosures even if it means going after people who are not actually withholding payments. The legacy of the mortgage meltdown and the brainless government policies that let the banks get away with what they had done, is that the crime not only continues but is being repeated with each new claimed securitization or “resecuritization” of residential loans.

As I predicted in 2006, the  tidal wave of foreclosures was in fact unprecedented, underestimated and continues to this day. With a starting point of around 2002, foreclosures attributed to the mortgage meltdown have continued unabated for 17 years. I said it would 20-30 years and I am sticking with that, although new evidence suggests it will go on much longer. So far more than 40 million people have been displaced from their homes and their lives.

Google Buffalo and New Jersey, for example and see whether they think foreclosures are a thing of the past. They don’t. And the people in Buffalo are echoing sentiments across the nation where the economy seems better, unemployment is down, wages are supposedly increasing but foreclosures are also increasing.

And let’s not forget that back in the early and mid 2000’s foreclosures did not mention trustees or trusts. In fact when the subject was raised by homeowners it was vehemently denied in courts cross the country. The denials were that the trusts even existed. This was not from some homeowner or local lawyer. This was from the banks and their attorneys. It turns out they were telling the truth then.

The trusts didn’t exist and there were no trustees. But in the upside down world of foreclosure here we are with most foreclosures filed in the name of a nonexistent implied trust on behalf of a “trustee” with no trustee powers, obligations or duties to administer any assets much less loans in foreclosure.

In order to understand this you must throw out any ideas of a rational market driven by fundamental economics and accept the fact that the banks  and their servicers continue to be engaged in the largest economic crime in human history. Their objective is foreclosure because that accomplishes two goals: first, it rubber stamps prior illegal practices and theft of borrowers’ identities for purposes of trading profits and second, it gives them a free house and free money.

If they lose a foreclosure case nobody suffers a financial loss. If they win, which they do most of the time (except where homeowners aggressively defend) they get a free house and the proceeds of sale are distributed to the players who are laughing, pardon the pun, all the way to the bank. Investors get ZERO.

As for modifications, look closely. The creditor is being changed along with the principal interest and payments. It might just be a new loan, except for the fact the new “lender” is a servicer like Ocwen who has not advanced any money for the purchase or acquisition the loan. But that’s OK because neither did the lender or the claimant. Modification is a PR stunt to make it look like the banks are doing something for borrowers when in fact they are stealing or reassigning the loan to a totally different party from anyone who previously appeared in the chain of title.

Modification allows the banks to claim that the loan is performing — thus maintaining the false foundation supporting trades and profits amounting to dozens of times the amount of the loan. Watch what happens when you ask for acknowledgement from the named Plaintiff in judicial states or the named beneficiary in nonjudicial states. You won’t get it. If US Bank was really a trustee then acknowledging a settlement on its behalf would not be a problem. As it stands, that is off the table.

The mega banks, with unlimited deep pockets derived from their massive economic crimes, began a campaign of whack-a-mole to create the impression that foreclosures were on the decline and the crisis is over. Their complex plan involves decreasing the number of filed foreclosures where the numbers are climbing and increasing the filed foreclosures where they have allowed the numbers to sink. Add that to their planted articles in Newspapers and Magazines around the country and it all adds up to the impression that foreclosures derived from claimed securitized loans are declining.

Not so fast. There were over 600,000 reported foreclosures last year and the numbers are rising this year. Most of them involve false claims of securitization where the named claimant is simply appointed to pretend to be the injured party. It isn’t and in many cases a close look at the “name” of the claimant reveals that no legal person or entity is actually named.

US Bank is often named but not really present. It says it is not appearing on its own behalf but as Trustee. The trust is not specifically named but is implied without the custom and practice of naming the jurisdiction in which the trust was organized or the jurisdiction in which it maintains a business. That’s because there is no trust and there is no business and US Bank owns no debt, note or mortgage in any capacity. The certificates are held by investors who acknowledge that they have no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage. So who is the claimant? Close inspection reveals that nobody is named.

In fact, those foreclosures proceed often without contest because homeowners mistakenly believe they are in default. In equity, if the facts were allowed in as evidence, the homeowner would be entitled to a share of the bounty that was a windfall to the investment bank and its affiliates by trading on the borrower’s signature. A “free house” only partially compensates the homeowner for the illegal noncensual trading on his name with the intent of screwing him/her later.

Upon liquidation of the property the proceeds of sale are deposited not by an owner of the debt, but by one of the players who just added insult to injury to both the borrower and the original investors who paid real money but failed to get an interest in the fabricated closing documents — i.e., the note and mortgage.

The Banks have succeeded in getting everyone to think about how unfair it is that homeowners would even think of pursuing a “free house”. By doing that they distract from the fact that the homeowners and the investors who put up the origination or acquisition money are both excluded from the huge profits generated by trading on the signature of borrowers and the money of investors who do not get to share in the bounty, which is often 20-40 times the amount of the loan.

The courts don’t want to hear about esoteric arguments about the securitization process. Judges assume that somewhere in the complex moving parts of the securitization scheme there is an owner of the debt who will get compensated as a result of the homeowner’s refusal or failure to make monthly payments of interest and principal. That assumption is untrue.

This is revealed when the money from the sale of property is traced. If you trace the check you will be mislead. Regardless of where the check is mailed, the check is actually cashed by a servicer who deposits it to the account of an investment bank who has already received many times the amount of the loan principal. That money is neither credited to the account of the borrower nor reported, much less distributed to investors who bought certificates (wrongly named “mortgage bonds”).

Neither the investors who bought the original uncertificated certificates nor the investors who purchased contracts based upon the apparent value of the certificates ever see a penny of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale.

In order to maintain the illusion of legality and an orderly marketplace the banks and their servicers must continue to push foreclosures even if it means going after people who are not actually withholding payments. The legacy of the mortgage meltdown and the brainless government policies that let the banks get away with what they had done, is that the crime not only continues but is being repeated with each new claimed securitization or “resecuritization” of residential loans.

When the economy contracts, as it always does, the number of foreclosures will shoot up like a thermometer held over a steam radiator. And instead of actually looking for facts people will presume them. And that will lead to more tragedy and more inequality of income, wealth and opportunity in a country that should be all about a level playing field. This is not the marketplace doing its work. It is the perversion of the marketplace caused by outsized and unchecked power of the banks.

My solution is predicated on the idea that everyone is to blame for this. Everyone involved should share in losses and gains from this illicit scheme. Foreclosures should come to a virtual halt. Current servicers should be barred from any connection with these loan accounts. Risk and loss should be shared based upon an equitable formula. And securitization should be allowed to continue as long as securitization is actually happening — so long as the investors and borrowers are aware that they are the only two principals on opposite sides of a complex transaction in which trading profits are likely as part of the disclosed compensation of the intermediaries in the loans originated or acquired.

Disclosure allows the borrowers and the investors to bargain for better deals — to share in the bounty. And if there is no such bounty with full disclosure it will then be because market forces have decided that there should not be any such rewards.

PTSD: A Breakdown of Securitization in the Real World

By using the methods of magicians who distract the viewer from what is really happening the banks have managed to hoodwink even the victims and their lawyers into thinking that collection and foreclosure on “securitized” loans are real and proper. Nobody actually stops to ask whether the named claimant is actually going to receive the benefit of the remedy (foreclosure) they are seeking.

When you break it down you can see that in many cases the investment banks, posing as Master Servicers are the parties getting the monetary proceeds of sale of foreclosed property. None of the parties in the chain have lost any money but each of them is participating in a scheme to foreclose on the property for fun and profit.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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It is worth distinguishing between four sets of investors which I will call P, T, S and D.

The P group of investors were Pension funds and other stable managed funds. They purchased the first round of derivative contracts sometimes known as asset backed securities or mortgage backed securities. Managers of hedge funds that performed due diligence quickly saw that that the investment was backed only by the good faith and credit of the issuing investment bank and not by collateral, debts or mortgages or even notes from borrowers. Other fund managers, for reasons of their own, chose to overlook the process of due diligence and relied upon the appearance of high ratings from Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch combined with the appearance of insurance on the investment. The P group were part of the reason that the Federal reserve and the US Treasury department decided to prop up what was obviously a wrongful and fraudulent scheme. Pulling the plug, in the view of the top regulators, would have destroyed the investment portfolio of many if not most stable managed funds.

The T group of investors were traders. Traders provide market liquidity which is so highly prized and necessary for a capitalist economy to maintain prosperity. The T group, consisting of hedge funds and others with an appetitive for risk purchased derivatives on derivatives, including credit default swaps that were disguised sales of loan portfolios that once sold, no longer existed. Yet the same portfolio was sold multiple time turning a hefty profit but resulted in a huge liability when the loans soured during the process of securitization of the paper (not the debt). The market froze when the loans soured; nobody would buy more certificates. The Ponzi scheme was over. Another example that Lehman pioneered was “minibonds” which were not bonds and they were not small. These were resales of the credit default swaps aggregated into a false portfolio. The traders in this group included the major investment banks. As an example, Goldman Sachs purchased insurance on portfolios of certificates (MBS) that it did not own but under contract law the contract was perfectly legal, even if it was simply a bet. When the market froze and AIG could not pay off the bet, Hank Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs literally begged George W Bush to bail out AIG and “save the banks.” What was saved was Goldman’s profit on the insurance contract in which it reaped tens of billions of dollars in payments for nonexistent losses that could have been attributed to people who actually had money at risk in loans to borrowers, except that no such person existed.

The S group of investors were scavengers who were well connected with the world of finance or part of the world of finance. It was the S group that created OneWest over a weekend, and later members of the S group would be fictitious buyers of “re-securitized” interests in prior loans that were subject to false claims of securitization of the paper. This was an effort to correct obvious irregularities that were thought to expose a vulnerability of the investment banks.

The D group of investors are dummies who purchased securitization certificates entitling them to income indexed on recovery of servicer advances and other dubious claims. The interesting thing about this is that the Master Servicer does appear to have a claim for money that is labeled as a “servicer advance,” even if there was no advance or the servicer did not advance any funds. The claim is contingent upon there being a foreclosure and eventual sale of the property to a third party. Money paid to investors from a fund of investor money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the “certificate” or “MBS” or “Mortgage Bond,” is labeled, at the discretion of the Master Servicer as a Servicer Advance even though the servicer did not advance any money.

This is important because the timing of foreclosures is often based entirely on when the “Servicer Advances” are equal to or exceed the equity in the property. Hence the only actual recipient of money from the foreclosure is not the P investors, not any investors and not the trust or purported trustee but rather the Master Servicer. In short, the Master servicer is leveraging an unsecured claim and riding on the back of an apparently secured claim in which the named claimant will receive no benefits from the remedy demanded in court or in a non-judicial foreclosure.

NOTE that securitization took place in four parts and in three different directions:

  1. The debt to the T group of investors.
  2. The notes to the T and S group of traders
  3. The mortgage (without the debt) to a nominee — usually a fictitious trust serving as the fictitious name of the investment bank (Lehman in this case).
  4. Securitization of spillover money that guaranteed receipt of money that was probably never due or payable.

Note that the P group of investors is not included because they do not ever collect money from borrowers and their certificates grant no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage. When you read references to “securitization fail” (see Adam Levitin) this is part of what the writers are talking about. The securitization that everyone is talking about never happened. The P investors are not owners or beneficiaries entitled to income, interest or principal from loans to borrowers. They are entitled to an income stream as loans the investment bank chooses to pay it. Bailouts or even borrower payoffs are not credited to the the P group nor any trust. Their income remains the same regardless of whether the borrower is paying or not.

Confused? Beware of Scams

One of the fundamental cancers growing out of the “Securitization” craze is that it opened the door to financial scams of increasing diversity. The article below demonstrates one of those scams. None of this would be possible if it were not for the fact that “securitization” was and continues to be a scam as to residential loans starting in the late 1990’s.

Basic rule for all “deals”: if you don’t fully understand it or have someone who does understand it, don’t do it. With 50 years of experience on Wall Street, in business and practicing law (41 years) I can sniff out a scam in minutes.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key elements of a scam. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORMWITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP!

see – More REMIC Scams Emerging – Fla. Office of financial Regulation Starts Investigation

This scam was only possible because nobody understands “Securitization.” Even fewer people understand what “REMIC” means. This scam told people that the IRS would pay refunds to them to pay off their residential mortgage loans. The money was to be derived from a REMIC Trust.

Because REMIC Trusts rarely exist, the perpetrators of this nonsense were able to use that fact to convince people that this REMIC did exist. All the criminals had to do was copy the PSA from some other scam masquerading as a REMIC Trust and Presto! they could say they had a trust. The “REMIC” designation was simply added for flavor, as though the entity actually was formed and funded and acquired residential mortgages with money derived from mostly institutional investors.

Securitization comes in three main flavors:

  1. Securitization as a concept
  2. Securitization documents as they are written
  3. Securitization in practice in real life.

In the real world those three flavors should all be the same, but they are not. real life practice is inconsistent with the written documents and the concept of securitization. Instead of spreading risk the investment banks are concentrating it. That’s why the 2008 hiccup turned into a landslide. The only people making money off of alleged
“loans” are the investment banks acting as intermediaries between the investors and borrowers.

There is nothing wrong with securitization as a concept. There is everything wrong with securitization as it has been written into thousands of false REMIC documents supposedly creating a REMIC Trust. And in practice it was wide open for “moral hazard” — i.e., outright theft.

The reason that virtually all “documents” are fabricated in foreclosures is that the actual path of investment ran off a completely different track than the one portrayed in court. But using false documents has now been institutionalized, paving the way for the proliferation of financial scams against people who were already scammed.

I offer the following guide: if the word “REMIC” is used, the real facts are almost always certain to reveal a scam, whether you are in foreclosure proceedings or dealing with some “rescue operation”.

IN ALL CASES HIRE AN INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL AND /OR LEGAL ADVISER BEFORE YOU SPEND MONEY THAT YOU WILL NEVER SEE AGAIN.

Same Old Story: Paper Trail vs, Money Trail (Freddie Mac)

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

The explanations of securitization contained on the websites of the government Sponsored Entities (GSE’s) clearly demonstrate what I have been writing for 11 years and reveal a pattern of illusion and deception.

The most important thing about a financial transaction is the money. In every document filed in support of the illusion of securitization, it steadfastly holds firm to discussion of paper instruments and not a word about the actual location of the money or the actual identity of the obligee of that money debt.

Each explanation avoids the issue of where the money goes and how it was “processed” (i.e., stolen, according to me and hundreds of other scholars.)

It underscores the fact that the obligee (“debt owner” or “holder in due course” is never present in any legal proceeding or actual transaction or transfer of of the debt. This leaves us with only one  conclusion. The debt never moved, which is to say that the obligee was always the same, albeit unaware of their status.

Knowing this will help you get traction in the courtroom but alleging it creates a burden of proof for you to prove something that you know is true but can only be confirmed with access to the books, records an accounts of the parties claiming such transactions ands transfers occurred.

GET A CONSULT

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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For one such example see Freddie Mac Securitization Explanation

And the following diagram:

Freddie Mac Diagram of Securitization

What you won’t find anywhere in any diagram supposedly depicting securitization:

  1. Money going to an originator who then lends the money to the borrower.
  2. Money going to a named REMIC “Trust” for the purpose of purchasing loans or anything else.
  3. Money going to the alleged unnamed beneficiaries of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  4. Money going to the alleged unnamed investors who allegedly purchased “certificates” allegedly issued by or on behalf of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  5. Money going to the originator for sale of the debt, note and mortgage package.
  6. Money going to originator for endorsement of note to alleged transferee.
  7. Money going to originator for assignment of mortgage.
  8. Money going to the named foreclosing party upon liquidation of foreclosed property. 
  9. Money going to the homeowner as royalty for use of his/her/their identity forming the basis of value in issuance of derivatives, hedge products and contract, insurance products and synthetic derivatives.
  10. Money being credited to the obligee’s loan receivable account reducing the amount of indebtedness (yes, really). This is because the obligee has no idea where the money is coming from or why it is being paid. But one thing is sure — the obligee is receiving money in all circumstances.

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

S&P: Mortgage-backed security market making a comeback in 2017 First quarter issuance doubled 2016’s total

First quarter issuance doubled 2016’s total

By Ben Lane at Housingwire.com

http://www.housingwire.com/articles/39794-sp-mortgage-backed-security-market-making-a-comeback-in-2017

Editor’s Note: Does anyone else seek stark similarities between what happened in 2007/08 and what is happening now?  This is evidence that the housing bubble is complete.  By now we know how this will play out in the near future.

money

Back in February, DBRS predicted that the residential mortgage-backed security market could see a resurgence in 2017 thanks to rising interest rates, which both drive down refinances and make securitization a more financially appealing option.

As it turns out, that’s exactly what’s happening.

A new report from Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings shows that RMBS-related issuance, which S&P defines as prime, re-performing/nonperforming, rental bonds, servicer advances, and risk-sharing deals, doubled in the first quarter of 2017 compared to last year.

According to S&P’s report, there was $14 billion in RMBS-related issuance in 2017’s first quarter, up from $7 billion in the same time period in 2016.

As a result of the strong first quarter, S&P said that it is increasing its 2017 forecast for RMBS issuance from $35 billion to $50 billion.

It should be noted that even if 2017’s total RMBS issuance reaches $50 billion, it would still be below 2015’s total of $54 billion. But $50 billion would top 2016’s total of $34 billion and 2014’s total of $38 billion.

According to the S&P report, 2017’s first quarter issuance consisted of $5 billion in credit risk-sharing deals from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and $4 billion of re-performing/non-performing loans.

S&P noted that the rise in jumbo issuance and non-conforming issuance is “positive for markets as issuers are now supplying enough issuance to support the development of a secondary market.”

And if that continues, a “broader scope of mainstream fixed-income investors” should be attracted to the market, S&P adds.

“Given this RMBS issuance surge, we are adjusting our 2017 forecast up to $50 billion and will have to continue monitoring the various components,” S&P states in the report. “The $5 billion of (risk-sharing) issuance suggests it reaching an issuance pace that has allowed it to be an ongoing investment program for many market participants.”

S&P’s report also compared securitization volume for consumer loans (auto loans, credit cards, commercial loans) and residential mortgages over the last 15 years.

The report shows that all four loan categories have grown substantially since 2001, but the volume of securitization in each category is down.

“Compared to 2007 leverage levels, residential mortgages today are $1 trillion less, whereas the other three loan products have substantially more leverage,” S&P notes in its report.

“Looking at the share of those that are securitized, all markets have seen lower utilization of securitization, with auto loans at 17.5% securitized, credit cards at 13%, CMBS at 17%, and non-agency RMBS at only 8%,” the report continues. “For the various products, these utilization rates are significantly lower than rates used in 2001, 2004, or 2007.”

The report states auto, credit card, and residential loans each saw an increase in the first quarter, which could be the start of some institutions increasing their securitization utilization. On the other hand, it may reflect the issuers taking advantage of “near-ideal issuance conditions and demand,” the report states.

 

Can you really call it a loan when the money came from a thief?

The banks were not taking risks. They were making risks and profiting from them. Or another way of looking at it is that with their superior knowledge they were neither taking nor making risks; instead they were creating the illusion of risk when the outcome was virtually certain.

Securitization as practiced by Wall Street and residential “mortgage” loans is not just a void assignment. It is a void loan and an enterprise based completely on steering all “loans” into failure and foreclosure.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Perhaps this summary might help some people understand why bad loans were the object of lending instead of good loans. The end result in the process was always to steer everyone into foreclosure.

Don’t use logic and don’t trust anything the banks put on paper. Start with a blank slate — it’s the only way to even start understanding what is happening and what is continuing to happen. The following is what you must keep in mind and returning to for -rereading as you plow through the bank representations. I use names for example only — it’s all the same, with some variations, throughout the 13 banks that were at the center of all this.

  1. The strategic object of the bank plan was to make everyone remote from liability while at the same time being part of multiple transactions — some real and some fictitious. Remote from liability means that the entity won’t be held accountable for its own actions or the actions of other entities that were all part of the scheme.
  2. The goal was simple: take other people’s money and re-characterize it as the banks’ money.
  3. Merrill Lynch approaches institutional investors like pension funds, which are called “stable managed funds.” They have special requirements to undertake the lowest possible risk in every investment. Getting such institutional investors to buy is a signal to the rest of the market that the securities purchased by the stable managed funds must be safe or they wouldn’t have done it.
  4. Merrill Lynch creates a proprietary entity that is neither a subsidiary nor an affiliate because it doesn’t really exist. It is called a REMIC Trust and is portrayed in the prospectus as though it was an independent entity that is under management by a reputable bank acting as Trustee. In order to give the appearance of independence Merrill Lynch hires US Bank to act as Trustee. The Trust is not registered anywhere because it is a common law trust which is only recognized by the laws of the State of New York. US Bank receives a monthly fee for NOT saying that it has no trust duties, and allowing the use of its name in foreclosures.
  5. Merrill Lynch issues a prospectus from the so-called REMIC entity offering the sale of “certificates” to investors who will receive a hybrid “security” that is partly a bond in which interest is due from the Trust to the investor and partly equity (like common stock) in which the owners of the certificates are said to have undivided interests in the assets of the Trust, of which there are none.
  6. The prospectus is a summary of how the securitization will work but it is not subject to SEC regulations because in 1998 an amendment to the securities laws exempted “pass-through” entities from securities regulations is they were backed by mortgage bonds.
  7. Attached to the prospectus is a mortgage loan schedule (MLS). But the body of the prospectus (which few people read) discloses that the MLS is not real and is offered by way of example.
  8. Attached for due diligence review is a copy of the Trust instrument that created the REMIC Trust. It is also called a Pooling and Servicing Agreement to give the illusion that a pool of loans is owned by the Trust and administered by the Trustee, the Master Servicer and other entities who are described as performing different roles.
  9. The PSA does not grant or describe any duties, responsibilities to be performed by US Bank as trustee. Actual control over the Trust assets, if they ever existed, is exercised by the Master Servicer, Merrill Lynch acting through subservicers like Ocwen.
  10. Merrill Lynch procures a triple AAA rating from Moody’s Rating Service, as quasi public entity that grades various securities according to risk assessment. This provides “assurance” to investors that the the REMIC Trust underwritten by Merrill Lynch and sold by a Merrill Lynch affiliate must be safe because Moody’s has always been a reliable rating agency and it is controlled by Federal regulation.
  11. Those institutional investors who actually performed due diligence did not buy the securities.
  12. Most institutional investors were like cattle simply going along with the crowd. And they advanced money for the purported “purchase” of the certificates “issued” by the “REMIC Trust.”
  13. Part of the ratings and part of the investment decision was based upon the fact that the REMIC Trusts would be purchasing loans that had already been seasoned and established as high grade. This was a lie.
  14. For all practical purposes, no REMIC Trust ever bought any loan; and even where the appearance of a purchase was fabricated through documents reflecting a transaction that never occurred, the “purchased” loans were the result of “loan closings” which only happened days before or were fulfilling Agreements in which all such loans were pre-sold — i.e., as early as before even an application for loan had been submitted.
  15. The normal practice required under the securities regulation is that when a company or entity offers securities for sale, the net proceeds of sale go to the issuing entity. This is thought to be axiomatically true on Wall Street. No entity would offer securities that made the entity indebted or owned by others unless they were getting the proceeds of sale of the “securities.”
  16. Merrill Lynch gets the money, sometimes through conduits, that represent proceeds of the sale of the REMIC Trust certificates.
  17. Merrill Lynch does not turn over the proceeds of sale to US Bank as trustee for the Trust. Vague language contained in the PSA reveals that there was an intention to divert or convert the money received from investors to a “dark pool” controlled by Merrill Lynch and not controlled by US Bank or anyone else on behalf of the REMIC Trust.
  18. Merrill Lynch embarks on a nationwide and even world wide sales push to sell complex loan products to homeowners seeking financing. Most of the sales, nearly all, were directed at the loans most likely to fail. This was because Merrill Lynch could create the appearance of compliance with the prospectus and the PSA with respect to the quality of the loan.
  19. More importantly by providing investors with 5% return on their money, Merrill Lynch could lend out 50% of the invested money at 10% and still give the investors the 5% they were expecting (unless the loan did NOT go to foreclosure, in which case the entire balance would be due). The balance due, if any, was taken from the dark pool controlled by Merrill Lynch and consisting entirely of money invested by the institutional investors.
  20. Hence the banks were not taking risks. They were making risks and profiting from them. Or another way of looking at it is that with their superior knowledge they were neither taking nor making risks; instead they were creating the illusion of risk when the outcome was virtually certain.
  21. The use of the name “US Bank, as Trustee” keeps does NOT directly subject US Bank to any liability, knowledge, intention, or anything else, as it was and remains a passive rent-a-name operation in which no loans are ever administered in trust because none were purchased by the Trust, which never got the proceeds of sale of securities and was therefore devoid of any assets or business activity at any time.
  22. The only way for the banks to put a seal of legitimacy on what they were doing — stealing money — was by getting official documents from the court systems approving a foreclosure. Hence every effort was made to push all loans to foreclosure under cover of an illusory modification program in which they occasionally granted real modifications that would qualify as a “workout,” which before the false claims fo securitization of loans, was the industry standard norm.
  23. Thus the foreclosure became extraordinarily important to complete the bank plan. By getting a real facially valid court order or forced sale of the property, the loan could be “legitimately” written off as a failed loan.
  24. The Judgment or Order signed by the Judge and the Clerk deed upon sale at foreclosure auction became a document that (1) was presumptively valid and (b) therefore ratified all the preceding illegal acts.
  25. Thus the worse the loan, the less Merrill Lynch had to lend. The difference between the investment and the amount loaned was sometimes as much as three times the principal due in high risk loans that were covered up and mixed in with what appeared to be conforming loans.
  26. Then Merrill Lynch entered into “private agreements” for sale of the same loans to multiple parties under the guise of a risk management vehicles etc. This accounts for why the notional value of the shadow banking market sky-rocketed to 1 quadrillion dollars when all the fiat money in the world was around $70 trillion — or 7% of the monstrous bubble created in shadow banking. And that is why central banks had no choice but to print money — because all the real money had been siphoned out the economy and into the pockets of the banks and their bankers.
  27. TARP was passed to cover the banks  for their losses due to loan defaults. It quickly became apparent that the banks had no losses from loan defaults because they were never using their own money to originate loans, although they had the ability to make it look like that.
  28. Then TARP was changed to cover the banks for their losses in mortgage bonds and the derivative markets. It quickly became apparent that the banks were not buying mortgage bonds, they were selling them, so they had no such losses there either.
  29. Then TARP was changed again to cover losses from toxic investment vehicles, which would be a reference to what I have described above.
  30. And then to top it off, the Banks convinced our central bankers at the Federal Reserve that they would freeze up credit all over the world unless they received even more money which would allow them to make more loans and ease credit. So the FED purchased mortgage bonds from the non-owning banks to the tune of around $3 Trillion thus far — on top of all the other ill-gotten gains amounting roughly to around 50% of all loans ever originated over the last 20 years.
  31. The claim of losses by the banks was false in all the forms that was represented. There was no easing of credit. And banks have been allowed to conduct foreclosures on loans that violated nearly all lending standards especially including lying about who the creditor is in order to keep everyone “remote” from liability for selling loan products whose central attribute was failure.
  32. Since the certificates issued in the name of the so-called REMIC Trusts were not in fact backed by mortgage loans (EVER) the certificates, the issuers, the underwriters, the master servicers, the trustees et al are NOT qualified for exemption under the 1998 law. The SEC is either asleep on this or has been instructed by three successive presidents to leave the banks alone, which accounts for the failure to jail any of the bankers that essentially committed treason by attacking the economic foundation of our society.

Mnuchin as Treasury Secretary: Lackey for the TBTF Banks

Mnuchin was and remains “the guy between the guys.” Billed as the organizer of OneWest his role was to provide a layer between the founders and the rest of the world. His prospective appointment As Secretary of the US Treasury means that the TBTF banks would have a lackey to do what the banks wanted the US Treasury to do.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
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It is reported that OneWest foreclosed on 40,000 homes. I have already described to you that Foreclosures sponsored or initiated by OneWest were very often done in the name of another entity. For example, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Those are not counted in the number of homes foreclosed by OneWest. My experience is that the number of homes foreclosed where OneWest was the party “pulling the strings” (not entirely accurate since control was centralized far from OneWest) is at least equal to the number reported for foreclosure cases in which OneWest was the foreclosing party.
 *
The average “originated” principal amount of debt in which a homeowner received financial benefit from a direct receipt of funds or funds paid out on behalf of the homeowners to pay off an old “loan” or to pay the seller is reported as an average of $225,000.
The rest is arithmetic. If you multiply the number of foreclosures reported (40,000) times the principal amount of debt that a rose from the origination of transactions with homeowners on refi or prospective homeowners who were buying ($225,000) then you get a total of $9,000,000,000.
 *
If you look at the deal between the FDIC, the US Bankruptcy Trustee for IndyMac, and OneWest, you will not find $9 billion in consideration for the purchase of loans by OneWest from the IndyMac estate. Both the FDIC and the US Bankruptcy Trustee were under a duty to maximize the return to creditors. They did not receive $9 billion for sold loans because there were no loans to sell. OneWest principals merely put up or promised to commit around $1-$2 Billion in capital to qualify as a bank and to take over the service contracts and brick and mortar locations of IndyMac. This is nearly identical to the Chase-WAMU deal.
 *
But there is more: under a very lucrative loss sharing agreement with the FDIC, OneWest submitted claims to the FDIC to cover 80% of the alleged losses on nonperforming loans and then, after getting paid, proceeded to foreclose for the whole amount. 
 *
There is no evidence of any particular loan or pool of loans being sold to OneWest for any consideration that traveled from OneWest to either the FDIC as receiver or the US Bankruptcy trustee for the state of IndyMac. Yet OneWest followed the industry practice of stepping AS THOUGH they were the creditor, claiming they were the holder of negotiable paper because the real creditors — investors who advanced money as though they were buying real MBS (which were bogus securities issued by a nonexistent entity that never did any business) — were unaware of the status of their claim against the REMIC Trusts that were ostensibly purchasing loan portfolios but lacked the funding to do so because the Trusts never received the proceeds of sale of the MBS. 
 *
Second, OneWest did not actually have any business records. They are all  fabricated or outsourced (or both) to a subdivision of several different “servicing” entities that are directed by LPS/Blacknight. LPS is tasked with (1) selecting the Plaintiff or beneficiary of a foreclosure (2) collecting and creating records (3) fabrications and forgeries (and robosigning) of assignments, endorsements etc.
 *
Bottom Line: OneWest foreclosed on loans in which it was neither the owner nor the servicer. While it acquired servicing rights from IndyMac, the real servicers were selected by “Master Servicers” (underwriters/TBTF Banks) of the nonexistent trusts. So while IndyMac theoretically had servicing rights for the most part the actual job of servicing was done elsewhere, under the watchful eye of LPS. Thus when OneWest acquired the IndyMac servicing “business” it was in a actuality acquiring nothing.
 *
Thus approximately $9 billion in foreclosures, as reported in the media resulted in windfall profits to OneWest of a percentage of the liquidated properties, estimated total at around $6 billion, around two thirds of which $6 billion) was given to the “Master Servicers” as “recovery” of “servicer advances” (which neither came from the servicers nor were they advances as the payments were taken from dynamic dark pools consisting mostly of investor money), netting $2 Billion to OneWest plus “servicing fees” despite the fact that they performed very little or no servicing.
 *
The organizers of OneWest were billionaires that went into it on the premise and promise that they would make a few billion dollars, although they were never entirely clear on where the profits were coming from. OneWest was then sold after the windfall the profit projections slumped because there were practically no more alleged IndyMac originated “loans” to foreclose. The PR spin was that they were getting out because their temporary agreement to operate OneWest was expiring. But the real reason was that there was nothing left to plunder and the founders were getting increasingly uncomfortable about where the money was coming from. OneWest could have easily slipped into the roles occupied by Ocwen, SPS, Bayview et al etc and “acquired” more loans in Re-REMIC deals, but the founders wanted no part of it.
 *
Homeowners lost their homes on the premise that they thought they had a legitimate loan from a legitimate lender. But IndyMac was originating loans under pre-sale agreements that were effective BEFORE even the applications for loans were received. The Purchase and Assumption Agreement provided that the actual lender’s identity would be withheld from the borrower (a direct violation of TILA). The money for the funding of the alleged loan transactions came from the dark pools, the constituents of which were robbed of their right to the notes and mortgages. The irony is that the counterparty to IndyMac’s Purchase and Assumption Agreements were mere conduits and in many cases sham conduits.
 *
Mnuchin was and remains “the guy between the guys.” Billed as the organizer of OneWest his role was to provide a layer between the founders and the rest of the world. His prospective appointment As Secretary of the US Treasury means that the TBTF banks would have a lackey to do what the banks wanted the US Treasury to do. This greases the wheels of false securitization. The banks have never stopped in their “perfect” crime wave and are if anything speeding up with false and sometimes true claims of securitization of just about anything — including “servicer advances.” That adds insult to injury in that they are using their scheme of theft from investors and selling rights to participate in the scheme to investors. In the end, it is simply a scheme to use other people’s money and then step into their shoes without them knowing it.

California Suspends Dealings with Wells Fargo

The real question is when government agencies and regulators PLUS law enforcement get the real message: Wells Fargo’s behavior in the account scandal is the tip of the iceberg and important corroboration of what most of the country has been saying for years — their business model is based upon fraud.

Wells Fargo has devolved into a PR machine designed to raise the price of the stock at the expense of trust, which in the long term will most likely result in most customers abandoning such banks for fear they will be the next target.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article104739911.html

John Chiang, California Treasurer, has stopped doing business with Wells Fargo because of the scheme involving fraud, identity theft and customer gouging for services they never ordered on accounts they never opened. It is once again time for Government to scrutinize the overall business plan and business map of Wells Fargo and indeed all of the top (TBTF) banks.

Wells Fargo is attempting to do crisis management, to wit: making sure that nobody looks at other schemes inside the bank.

It is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) that was conceived by Senator Elizabeth Warren who has revealed the latest example of big bank fraud.

The simple fact is that in this case, Wells Fargo management made an absurd demand on their employees. Instead of the national average of 3 accounts per person they instructed managers and employees to produce 8 accounts per customer. Top management of Wells Fargo have been bankers for decades. They knew that most customers would not want, need or accept 5 more accounts. Yet they pressed hard on employees to meet this “goal.” Their objective was to defraud the investing public who held or would buy Wells Fargo stock.

In short, Wells Fargo is now the poster child for an essential defect in business structure of public companies. They conceive their “product” to be their stock. That is how management makes its money and that is how investors holding their stock like it until they realize that the entire platform known as Wells Fargo has devolved into a PR machine designed to raise the price of the stock at the expense of trust, which in the long term will most likely result in most customers abandoning such banks for fear they will be the next target. Such companies are eating their young and producing a bubble in asset values that, like the residential mortgage market, cannot be sustained by fundamental facts — i.e., real earnings on a real trajectory of growth.

So the PR piece about how they didn’t know what was going on is absurd along with their practices. Such policies don’t start with middle management or employees. They come from the top. And the goal was to create the illusion of a rapidly growing bank so that more people would buy their stock at ever increasing prices. That is what happens when you don’t make the individual members of management liable under criminal and civil laws for engaging in such behavior.

There was only one way that the Bank could achieve its goal of 8 accounts per customer — it had to be done without the knowledge or consent of the customers. Now Wells Fargo is trying to throw 5,000 employees under the bus. But this isn’t the first time that Wells Fargo has arrogantly thrown its customers and employees under the bus.

The creation of financial accounts in the name of a person without that person’s knowledge or consent is identity theft, assuming there was a profit motive. The result is that the person is subjected to false claims of high fees, their credit rating has a negative impact, and they are stuck dealing with as bank so large that most customers feel that they don’t have the resources to do anything once the fraud was discovered by the Consumer Financial protection Board (CFPB).

Creating a loan account for a loan that doesn’t exist is the same thing. In most cases the “loan closings” were shams — a show put on so that the customer would sign documents in which the actual party who loaned the money was left out of the documentation.

This was double fraud because the pension funds and other investors who deposited money with Wells Fargo and the other banks did so under the false understanding that their money would be used to buy Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) issued by a trust with assets consisting of a loan pool.

The truth has emerged — there were no loan pols in the trusts. The entire derivative market for residential “loans” is built on a giant lie.  But the consequences are so large that Government is afraid to do anything about it. Wells Fargo took money from pension funds and other “investors,” but did not give the proceeds of sale of the alleged MBS to the proprietary vehicle they created in the form of a trust.

Hence the trust was never funded and never acquired any property or loans. That means the “mortgage backed securities” were not mortgage backed BUT they were “Securities” under the standard definition such that the SEC should take action against the underwriters who disguised themselves as “master Servicers.”

In order to cover their tracks, Wells Fargo carefully coached their employees to take calls and state that there could be no settlement or modification or any loss mitigation unless the “borrower” was at least 90 days behind in their payments. So people stopped paying an entity that had no right to receive payment — with grave consequences.

The 90 day statement was probably legal advice and certainly a lie. There was no 90 day requirement and there was no legal reason for a borrower to go into a position where the pretender lender could declare a default. The banks were steering as many people, like cattle, into defaults because of coercion by the bank who later deny that they had instructed the borrower to stop making payments.

So Wells Fargo and other investment banks were opening depository accounts for institutional customers under false pretenses, while they opened up loan accounts under false pretenses, and then  used the identity of BOTH “investors” and “borrowers” as a vehicle to steal all the money put up for investments and to make money on the illusion of loans between the payee on the note and the homeowner.

In the end the only document that was legal in thee entire chain was a forced sale and/or judgment of foreclosure. When the deed issues in a forced sale, that creates virtually insurmountable presumptions that everything that preceded the sale was valid, thus changing history.

The residential mortgage loan market was considerably more complex than what Wells Fargo did with the opening of the unwanted commercial accounts but the objective was the same — to make money on their stock and siphon off vast sums of money into off-shore accounts. And the methods, when you boil it all down, were the same. And the arrogant violation of law and trust was the same.

 

Who is the Creditor? NY Appellate Decision Might Provide the Knife to Cut Through the Bogus Claim of Privilege

The crux of this fight is that if the foreclosing parties are forced to identify the creditors they will only have two options, in my opinion: (a) commit perjury or (b) admit that they have no knowledge or access to the identity of the creditor

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see http://4closurefraud.org/2016/06/10/opinion-here-ny-court-says-bank-of-america-must-disclose-communications-with-countrywide-in-ambac-suit/

We have all seen it a million times — the “Trustees”, the “servicers” and their agents and attorneys all beg the question of identifying the names and contact information of the creditors in foreclosure actions. The reason is simple — in order to answer that question truthfully they would be required to admit that there is no party that could properly be defined as a creditor in relation to the homeowner.

They have successfully pushed the point beyond the point of return — they are alleging that the homeowner is a debtor but they refuse to identify a creditor; this means they are being allowed to treat the homeowner as a debtor while at the same time leaving the identity of the creditor unknown. The reason for this ambiguity is that the banks, from the beginning, were running a scheme that converted the money paid by investors for alleged “mortgage backed securities”; the conversion was simple — “let’s make their money our money.”

When inquiry is made to determine the identity of the creditor the only thing anyone gets is some gibberish about the documents PLUS the assertion that the information is private, proprietary and privileged.  The case in the above link is from an court of appeals in New York. But it could have profound persuasive effect on all foreclosure litigation.

Reciting the tension between liberal discovery and privilege, the court tackles the confusion in the lower courts. The court concludes that privilege is a very narrow shield in specific situations. It concludes that even the attorney-client privilege is a shield only between the client and the attorney and that adding a third party generally waives that privilege. The third party privilege is only extended in narrow circumstances where the parties are seeking a common goal. So in order to prevent the homeowner from getting the information on his alleged creditor, the foreclosing parties would need to show that there is a common goal between the creditor(s) and the debtor.

Their problem is that they can’t do that without showing, at least in camera, that the identity of the creditor is known and that somehow the beneficiaries of an empty trust have a common goal (hard to prove since the trust is empty contrary to the terms of the “investment”). Or, they might try to identify a creditor who is neither the trust nor the investors, which brings us back to perjury.

Self Serving Fabrications: Watch for “Attorney in Fact”

In short, the proffer of a document signed not by the grantor or assignor but by a person with limited authority and no knowledge, on behalf of a company claiming to be attorney in fact is an empty self-serving document that provides escape hatches in the event a court actually looks at the document. It is as empty as the Trusts themselves that never operated nor did they purchase any loans.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.

If you had a promissory note that was payable to someone else, you would need to get it endorsed by the Payee to yourself in order to negotiate it. No bank, large or small, would accept the note as collateral for a loan without several conditions being satisfied:

  1. The maker of the note would be required to verify that the debt and the fact that it is not in dispute or default. This is standard practice in the banking industry.
  2. The Payee on the note would be required to endorse it without qualification to you. Like a check, in which you endorse it over to someone else, you would say “Pay to the order of John Smith.”
  3. The bank would need to see and probably keep the original promissory note in its vault.
  4. The credit-worthiness of the maker would be verified by the bank.
  5. Your credit worthiness would be verified by the bank.

Now imagine that instead of an endorsement from the payee on the note, you instead presented the bank with an endorsement signed by you as attorney in fact for the payee. So if the note was payable to John Jones, you are asking the bank to accept your own signature instead of John Jones because you are the authorized as an agent of John Jones.  No bank would accept such an endorsement without the above-stated requirements PLUS the following:

  1. An explanation  as to why John Jones didn’t execute the endorsement himself. So in plain language, why did John Jones need an agent to endorse the note or perform anything else in relation to the note? These are the rules of the road in the banking and lending industry. The transaction must be, beyond all reasonable doubt, completely credible. If the bank sniffs trouble, they will not lend you money using the note as collateral. Why should they?
  2. A properly executed Power of Attorney naming you as attorney in fact (i.e., agent for John Jones).
  3. If John Jones is actually a legal entity like a corporation or trust, then it would need a resolution from the Board of Directors or parties to the Trust appointing you as attorney in fact with specific powers to that completely cover the proposed authority to endorse the promissory note..
  4. Verification from the John Jones Corporation that the Power of Attorney is still in full force and effect.

My point is that we should apply the same rules to the banks as they apply to themselves. If they wouldn’t accept the power of attorney or they were not satisfied that the attorney in fact was really authorized and they were not convinced that the loan or note or mortgage was actually owned by any of the parties in the paper chain, why should they not be required to conform to the same rules of the road as standard industry practices which are in reality nothing more than commons sense?

What we are seeing in thousands of cases, is the use of so-called Powers of Attorney that in fact are self serving fabrications, in which Chase (for example) is endorsing the note to itself as assignee on behalf of WAMU (for example) as attorney in fact. A close examination shows that this is a “Chase endorses to Chase” situation without any actual transaction and nothing else. There is no Power of Attorney attached to the endorsement and the later fabrication of authority from the FDIC or WAMU serves no purpose on loans that had already been sold by WAMU and no effect on endorsements purportedly executed before the “Power of Attorney” was executed. There is no corporate resolution appointing Chase. The document is worthless. I recently had a case where Chase was not involved but US Bank as the supposed Plaintiff relied upon a Power of Attorney executed by Chase.

This is a game to the banks and real life to everyone else. My experience is that when such documents are challenged, the “bank” generally loses. In two cases involving US Bank and Chase, the “Plaintiff” produced at trial a Power of Attorney from Chase. And there were other documents where the party supposedly assigning, endorsing etc. were executed by a person who had no such authority, with no corporate resolution and no other evidence that would tend to show the document was trustworthy. We won both cases and the Judge in each case tore apart the case represented by the false Plaintiff, US Bank, “as trustee.”

The devil is in the details — but so is victory in the courtroom.

ABSENCE OF CREDITOR: Breaking Down the Language Of The “Trust”

The problem with all this is that the REMIC Trust never received the proceeds of sale of the MBS and therefore could not have paid for or purchased any loans. It had no assets. And THAT is why the Trust never shows up as a Holder in Due Course (HDC).  HDC is a very strong status that changes the risk of loss on a note. Under state law (UCC) of every state alleging and proving HDC status means that the entire risk shifts to the maker of the note (the person who signed it) even if there were fraudulent or other circumstances when the note was signed.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

A reader pointed to the following language, asking what it meant:

The certificates represent obligations of the issuing entity only and do not represent an interest in or obligation of CWMBS, Inc., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. or any of their affiliates.   (See left side under the 1st table –  https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/906410/000114420407029824/v077075_424b5.htm)

If an “investor” pays money to the underwriter of the issuance of MBS from a “REMIC Trust” they are getting a hybrid security that (a) creates a liability of the REMIC Trust to them and (2) an indirect ownership of the loans acquired by the trust.

The wording presented means that only the REMIC Trust owes the investors any money and the ownership interest of the investors is only as beneficiaries of the trust with the trust assets being subject to the beneficiaries’ claim of an ownership interest in the loans. But if the Trust is and remains empty the investors own nothing and will never see a nickle except by (a) the generosity of the underwriter (who is appointed “Master Servicer” in the false REMIC Trust, (b) PONZI and Pyramid scheme payments (I.e., receipt fo their own money or the money of other “investors) or (c) settlement when the investors catch the investment bank with its hand in the cookie jar.

The wording of the paperwork in the false securitization scheme reads very innocently because the underwriting and selling institutions should not be the obligor for payback of the investor’s money nor should the investors be allocated any ownership interest in the underwriting or selling institutions.

The problem with all this is that the REMIC Trust never received the proceeds of sale of the MBS and therefore could not have paid for or purchased any loans. It had no assets. And THAT is why the Trust never shows up as a Holder in Due Course (HDC).  HDC is a very strong status that changes the risk of loss on a note. Under state law (UCC) of every state alleging and proving HDC status means that the entire risk shifts to the maker of the note (the person who signed it) even if there were fraudulent or other circumstances when the note was signed.

By contrast, the allegation and proof that a Trust was a holder before suit was filed or before notice of default and notice of sale in a deed of trust state, means that the holder must overcome the defenses of the maker. If one of the defenses is that the holder received a void assignment, then the holder must prove up the basis of its stated or apparent claim that it is a holder with rights to enforce. The rights to enforce can only come from the creditor, directly or indirectly.

And THAT brings us to the issue of the identity of the creditor. This is something the banks are claiming is “proprietary” information — a claim that has been accepted by most courts, but I think we are nearing the end of the silly notion that a party can claim the right to enforce on behalf of a creditor who is never identified.

Why The Investors Are Not Screaming “Securities Fraud!”

Everyone is reporting balance sheets with assets that derive their value on one single false premise: that the trusts that issued the original mortgage bonds owned the loans. They didn’t.

SUPPORT LIVINGLIES!

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 ========================

This article is not a substitute for an opinion and advice from competent legal counsel — but the opinion of an attorney who has done no research into securitization and who has not mastered the basics, is no substitute for an opinion of a securitization expert.

Mortgage backed securities were excluded from securities regulation back in 1998 when Congress passed changes in the laws. The problem is that the “certificates” issued were (a) not certificates, (b) not backed by mortgages because the entity that issued the MBS (mortgage bonds) — i.e. the REMIC Trusts — never acquired the mortgage loans and (c) not issued by an actual “entity” in the legal sense [HINT: Trust does not exist in the absence of any property in it]. And so the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) was a conduit for nothing. [HINT: It can only be a “conduit” if something went through it] Hence the MBS were essentially bogus securities subject to regulation and none of the participants in this dance was entitled to preferred tax treatment. Yet the SEC still pretends that bogus certificates masquerading as mortgage backed securities are excluded from regulation.

So people keep asking why the investors are suing and making public claims about bad underwriting when the real problem is that there were no acquisition of loans by the alleged trust because the money from the sale of the mortgage bonds never made it into the trust. And everyone knows it because if the trust had purchased the loans, the Trustee would represent itself as a holder in course rather than a mere holder. Instead you find the “Trustee” hiding behind a facade of multiple “servicers” and “attorneys in fact”. That statement — alleging holder in due course (HDC) — if proven would defeat virtuality any defense by the maker of the instrument even if there was fraud and theft. There would be no such thing as foreclosure defense if the trusts were holders in due course — unless of course the maker’s signature was forged.

So far the investors won’t take any action because they don’t want to — they are getting paid off or replaced with RE-REMIC without anyone admitting that the original mortgage bonds were and remain worthless. THAT is because the managers of those funds are trying to save their jobs and their bonuses. The government is complicit. Everyone with power has been convinced that such an admission — that at the base of all “securitization” chains there wasn’t anything there — would cause Armageddon. THAT scares everyone sh–less. Because it would mean that NONE of the up-road securities and hedge products were worth anything either. Everyone is reporting balance sheets with assets that derive their value on one single false premise: that the trusts that issued the original mortgage bonds owned the loans. They didn’t.

Banks are essentially arguing in court that the legal presumptions attendant to an assignment creates value. Eventually this will collapse because legal presumptions are not meant to replace the true facts with false representations. But it will only happen when we reach a critical mass of trial court decisions that conclude the trusts never owned the loans, which in turn will trigger the question “then who did own the loan” and the answer will eventually be NOBODY because there never was a loan contract — which by definition means that the transaction cannot be called a loan. The homeowner still owes money and the debt is not secured by a mortgage, but it isn’t a loan.

You can’t force the investors into a deal they explicitly rejected in the offering of the mortgage bonds — that the trusts would be ACQUIRING loans not originating them. Yet all of the money from investors who bought the bogus MBS went to the “players” and then to originating loans, not acquiring them.

And you can’t call it a contract between the investors and the borrowers when neither of them knew of the existence of the other. There was no “loan.” Money exchanged hands and there is a liability of the borrower to repay it — to the party who gave them the money or that party’s successor. What we know for sure is that the Trust was never in that chain.

The mortgage secured the performance under the note. But the note was itself part of the fraud in which the “borrower” was prevented from knowing the identity of the lender, the compensation of the parties, and the actual impact on his title. The merger of the debt into the note never happened because the party named on the note was not the party giving the money. Hence the mortgage should never have been released from the closing table much less recorded.

So if the fund managers admit they were duped as I have described, then they can kiss their jobs goodbye. There were plenty of fund managers who DID look into these MBS and concluded they were just BS.

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