Wells Fargo, Ocwen and Fake REMIC Trust Crash on Standing

What is surprising about this case is that there was any appeal. The trial court had no choice but to dismiss the foreclosure claim.

  1. A copy of the note without an indorsement was attached to the complaint. This leads to the presumption that the indorsement was attached after the complaint was filed. Standing must be proven to ex isa at the time the suit was filed.
  2. The robo-witness could have testified as to the date the indorsement was affixed but he said he didn’t know.
  3. The robo-witness was unable to testify that the default letter had been sent.
  4. It didn’t help that the foreclosure case had been brought before by two different parties and then dismissed.
  5. Attorneys attempted to admit into evidence an unsigned Pooling and Servicing Agreement that could not be authenticated and was merely “a copy of a printout obtained from the SEC website”. This is an example of how court’s are rejecting the SEC website as a government document subject to judicial notice or even introduction into evidence without competent testimony providing the foundation for introducing the PSA for a fake trust.
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see Wells Fargo, as trustee v Madl

Note that the style of the case shows that Wells Fargo was never the Plaintiff. The purported or implied trust was the named Plaintiff. But as Wells Fargo explained in its own article, the Trust is not the Plaintiff and neither are the certificate holders the Plaintiff because their certificates most often expressly state that the holder of the certificate does NOT have any right, title or interest in the “underlying” loans.

In fact if you read it carefully you will see that no trust is actually named or mentioned. AND the failure of the “trust instrument” (the PSA) shows that the trust was never created and never existed. An unsigned, incomplete document downloaded from a site (SEC.gov) that anyone can access to upload documents is not evidence.

PROOF OF STANDING REQUIRED: SEFFAR v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS INC

It is NOT enough to ALLEGE standing. They must PROVE it. Judges across the country are making mistakes with this simple concept. Standing to SUE is presumed if you allege (in words or by incorporation of exhibits) that you have it. Possession of the “original note” can be alleged but at trial the foreclosing party must PROVE (not argue) that (1) they have the original note and (2) they have the right to enforce it either because they own it or because they have been authorized by a person who owns it or a person who has the right to enforce it. 

Get a consult! 202-838-6345
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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In the end we are closing in on the unthinkable: that anyone who was entitled to be treated as creditor was severed from the transactions leaving all other parties floating and leaving legal analysts to wonder (the borrower, that is) or make fraudulent representations (the banks and servicers) that the putative creditors cannot refute.
In the end, with very few exceptions, none of the trusts own anything and none of the servicers or trustees have any authority over any loans. This is the direct result of asymmetry of knowledge. The investors, the borrowers and the closing agents and even the sales agents do not have sufficient information to know what is going on — forcing everyone to look to the “Bank” who appears to be the source of funding.
And the Banks get to explain it in whatever way benefits them the most. They are thus permitted to explain away any hint that they were stealing investor money on an unprecedented scale. That is what happened in the TARP bailout and that is what happens in court.
Here is a 4th DCA case in Florida that spells out the difference between alleging a case and proving it.

SEFFAR v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS INC

Taoufiq SEFFAR, Appellant, v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellee.

No. 4D13–3514.

    Decided: March 25, 2015

David H. Charlip of Charlip Law Group, LC, Aventura, for appellant. Raymond Hora of McCalla Raymer, LLC, Orlando, for appellee.

Appellant challenges a final judgment of foreclosure, claiming that the court erred in denying his motion for involuntary dismissal. He claimed that appellee did not prove standing to foreclose at the time suit was filed. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to show the plaintiff had standing and reverse. (e.s.)

Appellant executed a note and mortgage to ABN Amro Mortgage Group [EDITOR’S NOTE: SEARCH ABN AMRO ON THIS BLOG]. (“ABN”) in 2006. In 2009, appellant received a letter from CitiMortgage informing him that the servicing of his note and mortgage was being transferred from CitiMortgage to Residential Credit Solutions (“RCS”). RCS also sent a letter informing appellant of the transfer of the servicing of the loan. When he defaulted on the mortgage, RCS sent him a notice of default and subsequently filed suit, alleging that it had the right to enforce the note and mortgage. [EDITOR’S NOTE: HOMEOWNER DID NOT DEFAULT ON ANY OBLIGATION DUE RCS]

Attached to the complaint was the mortgage and note to ABN. The note was stamped “original” and did not contain any endorsements or allonges. Also attached was an assignment of the mortgage from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), as receiver for Franklin Bank, to Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems (“MERS”), as nominee for RCS. [EDITOR’S NOTE: THE PRESENCE OF EITHER FRANKLIN OR MERS TELLS US THAT THE SUBJECT LOAN IS SUBJECT TO FALSE CLAIMS OF SECURITIZATION WHERE THE SOURCE OF FUNDS HAS BEEN CUT OFF FROM ITS INVESTMENT DESTROYING ITS STATUS AS A CREDITOR]

About nine months after filing the complaint, RCS filed what it claimed was the “original” note. Filed with this note was an undated, blank allonge, payable to the bearer, allegedly executed by a vice president of ABN. Nothing about the appearance of this allonge, as contained in the appellate record, shows that it was affixed to the note with which it was filed. (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: NO PROOF THE “ALLONGE” WAS ATTACHED? THEN THE ALLONGE IS  A NULLITY. NO PRESUMPTION APPLIES].

Just two weeks before the foreclosure trial, RCS moved to substitute Bayview Loan Servicing as the plaintiff, alleging it had transferred servicing of the loan to Bayview. The documents attached to the motion do not mention that the ownership of the loan or mortgage was also transferred. The trial court allowed the substitution over appellant’s objection. (e.s.)

At trial, a litigation manager for Bayview testified. He was not a records custodian for RCS or for Bayview. He was not familiar with the computer systems that either of the prior servicers, CitiMortgage and RCS, used for compiling information on the loan or how it was inputted into the systems. He had no information as to whether the information on the loans was inputted into the prior servicers’ systems correctly. He could not testify to the truth or accuracy of RCS’s records, just that they were provided to Bayview. (e.s. [EDITOR’S NOTE: THESE ARE ELEMENTS OF PROOF THAT ARE ABSENT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF NEARLY EVERY ROBO-WITNESS]

He testified that Bayview was the servicer and holder of the note. He believed that Bayview had acquired the note through a purchase agreement with RCS, but he had not seen the agreement, nor did he have a copy of it. His belief that Bayview was the owner of the note under the purchase agreement was based on “a screen shot of our capital assets systems, which has information in regards to the status of the loan with us.” This screen shot was not produced at trial.

[Editor’s NOTE: Recent case decisions state that screen shots are hearsay and do not fall within any exceptions to the hearsay rule and are therefore barred from being admitted into evidence. The most important point to take away from this is that the witness nearly always knows absolutely nothing other than the script that he was required to memorize. Getting to that is actually fairly easy if you know how to do cross examination.]

 

As to the allonge with the blank endorsement from ABN, he did not know when it was executed or whether the signature on it was a “wet ink” signature or a stamp. He did not know whether the allonge was affixed to the note prior to it being filed in the court file. He did not know if the vice president who signed the allonge on ABN’s behalf was in the employ of ABN in November 2009, when Bayview’s records showed that servicing of the loan had been transferred from ABN to Franklin Bank. (e.s.)

The manager agreed that on January 29, 2010, when RCS mailed appellant a notice of intent to take legal action on the note and mortgage, RCS was not the owner and holder of the note by way of the September 30, 2009 assignment of mortgage, but testified, “[t]here may have been a purchase agreement or some other document.” He testified that, on that date, “I only know that RCS was servicing. I don’t know for a fact who was the holder of the note at the time.” While he did testify that RCS owned the note and mortgage on the date the complaint was filed, he then inconsistently stated that RCS had brought the suit as the servicer of the loan, not its owner. (e.s.)

Although appellant moved for involuntary dismissal on the ground that Bayview had not proved standing because it had not shown that it had the right to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage, the trial court rejected this claim. It entered a final judgment of foreclosure in which it found that Bayview was due and owing the unpaid balance of the note. This appeal follows.

Appellant argues that Bayview failed to prove that it was the owner or holder of the note and that it had the right to foreclose. Based upon this confusing record, we agree that it presented no competent evidence that RCS was the holder of the note at the time it filed suit or that it was a nonholder in possession and entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, Bayview failed to prove standing.

Standing of the plaintiff to foreclose on a mortgage must be established at the time the plaintiff files suit. See McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So.3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). McLean set forth the requirements that a plaintiff may prove standing in a mortgage foreclosure:

Standing may be established by either an assignment or an equitable transfer of the mortgage prior to the filing of the complaint ․ For example, standing may be established from a plaintiff’s status as the note holder, regardless of any recorded assignments․

If the note does not name the plaintiff as the payee, the note must bear a special endorsement in favor of the plaintiff or a blank endorsement․ Alternatively, the plaintiff may submit evidence of an assignment from the payee to the plaintiff ․

Even in the absence of a valid written assignment, the mere delivery of a note and mortgage, with intention to pass the title, upon a proper consideration, will vest the equitable interest in the person to whom it is so delivered.

Id. at 173 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant notes several deficiencies in Bayview’s proof which result in a failure to show standing to foreclose the mortgage. First, while the note and mortgage were originally held by ABN, the only assignment of mortgage attached to the complaint and introduced at trial was one from FDIC as receiver for Franklin Bank to MERS as nominee for RCS. There is no proof of any transfer of the note or mortgage from ABN to Franklin Bank. Second, while Bayview contends that the undated allonge supplies the connection, as it shows a transfer payable to bearer, there was no proof that the allonge was attached to the note, and Bayview presented no proof of when it was executed. (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: THE ENDORSEMENT MEANS NOTHING IF IT WASN’T ON THE NOTE. IT WASN’T ON THE NOTE UNLESS THE ALLONGE WAS AFFIXED TO THE NOTE. THE ENDORSEMENT MEANS NOTHING WITHOUT FOUNDATION TESTIMONY PROVING THAT THE ENDORSER HAD THE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE ENDORSEMENT] Finally, there was no competent evidence of what rights Bayview acquired from RCS.

We recently addressed how a plaintiff may show it is entitled to foreclose on a promissory note in Murray v. HSBC Bank, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D239 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 21, 2015):

“Because a promissory note is a negotiable instrument and because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note, the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be ․ a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder.” Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So.3d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

A “person entitled to enforce” an instrument is: “(1) [t]he holder of the instrument; (2)[a] nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or (3)[a] person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to s[ection] 673.3091 or s[ection] 673.4181(4).” § 673.3011, Fla. Stat. (2013). A “holder” is defined as “[t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Thus, to be a holder, the instrument must be payable to the person in possession or indorsed in blank. See § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2013).

Although, nine months after filing the complaint, RCS filed what purported to be the original note with an allonge payable to bearer, it was undated and there is no proof it was affixed to the promissory note. “An allonge is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” See Booker v. Sarasota, Inc., 707 So.2d 886, 887 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed.1990)); see also Isaac v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 74 So.3d 495, 496 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The litigation manager did not know when the allonge was executed, or whether it was affixed to the note prior to filing. No evidence was presented that the allonge was executed and attached to the note prior to the filing of the initial complaint. Indeed, RCS did not allege in the complaint that it owned and held the mortgage. It merely alleged that it had the right to foreclose the note and mortgage. Therefore, the allonge provided no evidence that RCS was a “holder” at the time it filed the complaint.

Alternatively, Bayview argues that RCS was a nonholder in possession. However, Murray shows the fallacy of that claim. In Murray, we held that the lender, HSBC, had not proved standing where it had alleged that it was a nonholder in possession of the note and mortgage, because it did not prove that each prior transfer of the note conferred the right to enforce it: (e.s.)

HSBC was thus left to enforce the note under section 673.3011(2) as a nonholder in possession of the instrument with the rights of a holder. The issue then is whether HSBC is a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder.

Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 35 A.3d 452 (2011), is instructive. There, the court held that the plaintiff was a nonholder in possession and analyzed whether it had rights of enforcement pursuant to a Maryland statute that employs the same language as section 673.3011, Florida Statutes. Anderson, 35 A.3d at 462. “A transfer vests in the transferee only the rights enjoyed by the transferor, which may include the right to enforce [ment],” through the “shelter rule.” Id. at 461–62.

A nonholder in possession, however, cannot rely on possession of the instrument alone as a basis to enforce it․ The transferee does not enjoy the statutorily provided assumption of the right to enforce the instrument that accompanies a negotiated instrument, and so the transferee “must account for possession of the unendorsed instrument by proving the transaction through which the transferee acquired it.” (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: NO PRESUMPTIONS AND THEREFORE NO CASE FOR ENFORCEMENT IF NO TRANSACTION PROVEN. THE TRANSACTION IS NOT PRESUMED] Com. Law § 3–203 cmt. 2. If there are multiple prior transfers, the transferee must prove each prior transfer. Once the transferee establishes a successful transfer from a holder, he or she acquires the enforcement rights of that holder. See Com. Law § 3–203 cmt. 2. A transferee’s rights, however, can be no greater than his or her transferor’s because those rights are “purely derivative.” (e.s.)

Murray, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D239 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Because HSBC did not offer evidence of one of the prior transfers of the note, we held it did not prove that it was a nonholder in possession.

Similarly, in this case, Bayview did not prove that either RCS or itself was a nonholder in possession. It never connected FDIC as receiver of Franklin Bank, from which RCS acquired an assignment of mortgage, to ABN, the original note holder.

As alternative proof of its “ownership” of the note and mortgage, Bayview relied on a letter from RCS to the appellant, notifying him of the transfer of servicing rights to RCS, and a similar one from Bayview when it became the servicer of the loan. Neither letter addressed a right to enforce the note. None of the servicer agreements were placed in evidence to prove what rights either RCS or Bayview acquired under those agreements. (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: It is very rare that the servicer agreements are proffered by “Plaintiff” Trust (or other sham nominee) in evidence because those agreements, like Assignment and Assumption Agreements contain information that the securitization players don’t want the borrower, the court or government regulators or enforcers to see].Finally, as to the transfer between RCS and Bayview, the litigation manager testified that while he believed that Bayview purchased the note and mortgage from RCS, he had never seen a purchase agreement, and no document memorializing the purchase was entered into evidence. Therefore, because there is a gap in the transfer of the note and mortgage, Bayview did not prove that RCS, and subsequently Bayview, were nonholders in possession. See Murray, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D239. 

Simply stated, the evidence presented was woefully inadequate to prove standing to foreclose. It was quite apparent from the record that Bayview’s litigation manager did not have the requisite knowledge, nor did he produce documentary evidence, to support the claim.

We thus reverse and direct judgment in favor of the appellant dismissing the foreclosure on the mortgage for failure of the appellee to prove its standing.

Reversed and remanded.

WARNER, J.

CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

Attacking Legal Presumptions:”False in One, False in All”

Anyone defending a foreclosure these days should start with the assumption that the entire infrastructure of “loans” and foreclosures consists of lies. This assists in planning objections and cross examination. More importantly it provides the narrative that casts doubt on the trustworthiness of testimony and documentary evidence — which in turn can deprive the the foreclosing party of the essential ingredient to its case: legal presumptions.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Dan Edstrom, senior forensic analyst does a lot of legal research in addition to his work as a forensic analyst. He has reminded me of a concept that is neither a statute nor a legal doctrine, as such, but which is nonetheless applied in many different kinds of cases, I think he is right in his assertion that it ought to be utilized in foreclosure litigation.
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The basic premise of the case for foreclosure is that the homeowner received a loan from the originator and that the current party has purchased the loan. Neither assertion is true in most instances. So the foreclosing party relies on legal presumptions attached to facially valid documents and robo-witnesses that testify to the virtually nonexistent “boarding process.”
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Those legal presumptions are liberally applied in favor of the banks and servicers, who often bring the case in the name of a party who is a complete stranger to the alleged loan. But if the presentation of evidence is interrupted by appropriate objections and followed up with appropriate cross examination it is not uncommon that the witness is lying about the source and authenticity of business records and other documents that are used to “prove” the case for foreclosure.
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The next step, often missed, is to raise the issue of trustworthiness of the testimony and the documents such that the legal presumptions should not apply. Those presumptions, by all accounts, are to be applied in certain circumstances UNLESS there are indications of a lack of trustworthiness.
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Thus the case that should be made is to prove lack of trustworthiness, rather than the virtually futile attempt to prove facts that are almost certainly within the sole care, custody and control of the banks and servicers and who withhold that information because it would show that they are pretenders in their alleged roles. Exposing the lies requires cross examination revealing inconsistencies in the documents or the testimony or both.
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Hence the material necessary for victory could be in the evidence proffered by the the foreclosing party at trial. The more lies you expose, the less relevant are the legal presumptions. And there should be no prejudice to the the opposing side to being required to prove their case without legal presumptions — i.e., proving the loan and the subsequent sales of the loan.
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After exposing these lies then, the defender could move to strike the documents that were admitted based upon legal presumptions, thus requiring the foreclosing party to prove its case without legal presumptions. The motion also serves as a signal to the trier of fact that the evidence admitted over objection from the homeowner should be given little or no weight.
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Here is what Dan sent me, which provoked my writing this article:

The concept of false in one, false in all is frequently used across the country in jury instructions in regards to witness testimony. See California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) 107. Witnesses; see also Book of Approved Jury Instructions (“BAJI”) 2.22; See Bandana Trading Co., Inc. v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 1440, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495 (Ct. App. 2008). See also in a criminal case: State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567 (1960). More Civil cases: See Lawnton v. Virginia Stevedoring Co., 50 N.J. Super. 564, 581 (App. Div. 1958), Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 266 (E.&A. 1941), Coleman v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 120 N.J.L. 384, 387 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For a full discussion of the use and application of the maxim, see, Vol. 3A Wigmore on Evidence (1970) Sec. 1008 et. seq. “It should certainly not be of importance to tell the ordinary man of the world that he should distrust the statements of a witness whom he believes to be a liar.” (Wallace v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (1930) 105 Cal.App. 664, 671 [288 P. 834].)

BAJI 2.22: “A witness, who is willfully false in one material part of is or her testimony, is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.”

When the conduct of [Plaintiff] in this proceeding is viewed in its entirety, it compels the Court to invoke the ancient and venerable principle of “Falsus in uno, falsus in omni” (Latin; “false in one, false in all”) upon [Defendant] which, after review, is wholly appropriate in the context presented, Deering v. Metcalf 74 NY 501 (1878).

Here is footnote 35 from In re Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536 – Dist. Court, D. New Jersey 2010
Latin maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is neither a provision adopted by means of any United States statute, regulation, etc., nor a legal canon of any kind. Literally translated into English as “false in one thing, false in everything,” the maxim: (a) prompts logical caution as to the entirety of the position taken by the speaker who, as part of his/her position, misrepresents a certain fact; and, as such, (b) has been adopted into the panoply of policies of American jurisprudence related to the propriety of findings made by the trier of fact. See Kanawha & M.R. Co. v. Kerse, 239 U.S. 576, 581, 36 S.Ct. 174, 60 L.Ed. 448 (1916); Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 778, 31 L.Ed. 863 (1888) (“[The falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus] rule does not necessarily mean that the man who falsifies once is a liar; but it means that justice will not rest on testimony a substantial part of which is proved to be false”); Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 21 A.2d 820 (N.J. (Ct.E. & App.) 1941) (explaining that the maxim is not a rule of law but a guidance that – if testimony of a witness on a material issue is willfully false and given with an intention to deceive, the jurors may disregard the entirety of that witness’ testimony).
Thx,
Office: 916.207.6706

FAMILIARITY IS BREEDING CONTEMPT IN THE COURTS

Business Records Exception On Shaky Ground: The main point is foundation: the affidavit or testimony by the robo-witness must show that the company he works for is in fact the servicer of the loan, as authorized by the owner of the debt, and that he/she has actual knowledge of the procedures and posting policies of the servicer and the owner of the debt. I would add that this “corporate representative” must show that he/she and the “servicer” is authorized to speak for, and thus appear for the foreclosing party.

see http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/home/id=1202770275522/Casting-Doubt-on-Validity-of-Servicer-Affidavits-in-Foreclosure-Litigation?mcode=1202615326010&curindex=0&slreturn=20160925141040

Hearsay is always excluded from evidence — at least when it is ruled as hearsay. A document is hearsay in nearly all instances and thus may not be introduced into evidence — unless it satisfies the elements of a exception to the hearsay rule of exclusion.

In foreclosures the main hearsay event arises from the fact that no creditor appears in court. It is virtually always a company that claims to be a servicer for the owner of the debt, but the situation is nearly always opaque as to the identity of the owner of the debt who they say authorized them as servicer.

The typical testimony from a robo-witness, on leading questions from the attorney, is that he/she is familiar with the the record keeping process and policies of the servicer and that the letter, or payment history sought to be introduced into evidence was produced in the ordinary course of business from records kept in the ordinary course of business based upon entries made at or near the time of an actual event. Of course, with most of such documents there is no “event” and that is a problem for banks and servicers.

New York seems to be leading the way on the issue of whether these documents are trustworthy exceptions to the hearsay rule of exclusion. See the above link.

Judges in New York now know they will be reversed unless there is clear and competent evidence that the witness can attest from their own personal knowledge using one or more of their five senses — i.e., that they have seen and heard and followed the process of making and keeping records and that they had access to the records showing that the “servicer” was authorized to act as such.

The reason why banks have shifted from the old tried and true practice of sending a representative of the alleged owner of the debt to court is that such a person knows too much and would either be required to perjure themselves or tell the truth, to wit: that the company he/she works for is not the owner of the debt and he/she has no idea who is the owner. Such a person would be forced to admit either ignorance of any transaction in which their employer purchased the loan or that the loan was not in fact purchased by his/her employer.

Such an admission would completely obliterate the claim of the company claiming to be a servicer on behalf of the owner of the debt. This in turn would eliminate the business records exception to the hearsay rule of exclusion. We could go deeper into the number of IT platforms that are maintained and by whom they are maintained and whether the “servicer” even has access to the actual records, but it seems potentially unnecessary with decisions coming from appellate courts who are worried about opening the door on hearsay in millions of other cases unrelated to foreclosure.

Those courts are rapidly retreating from the temporary imposition of an extended exception to the hearsay rule because they can readily see how justice would not be served in criminal and civil matters if the rule remains as loose as it is now.

It is much better for the banks to send someone who knows nothing and therefore cannot accidentally or otherwise tell the truth about these bogus loans and fraudulent foreclosures. The banks are in essence throwing the servicers under the bus, along with the attorneys hired by the servicers. But the walls are caving in on them and they will soon need to put up or shut up — producing a real witness with real (not presumed) knowledge or take a voluntary dismissal. As we have seen in thousands of cases, when presented with that choice the banks voluntarily dismiss their actions even when it means they must pay attorney fees to the homeowner.

The obvious conclusion is that there is no such witness and the facts asserted by the foreclosing party are pure fiction, reliant entirely upon illusion and the erroneous application of legal presumptions.

From the article cited above:

“Lenders will need to find ways in which to meet the new requirements imposed in order to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule announced in decisions such as Royal. For instance, lenders may seek to avoid altogether obtaining affidavits from third-party loan servicers, and instead use representatives of the lender, who can attest to their familiarity with the lender’s record-keeping practices and procedures, in order to submit affidavits and documents to the court.

 
Alternatively, if lenders continue to insist, even after Royal and the other decisions of the Second Department discussed above, to use affidavits from third-party loan servicers in mortgage foreclosure litigation, then the best practice will be to have loan servicers (as opposed to lenders) be the party to act as the plaintiff in the foreclosure litigation. So long as the loan servicer is authorized to do so by the lender, courts have found that loan servicers have standing to present claims for foreclosure and sale on behalf of the lender that owns and holds the note and mortgage at the time of the commencement of the action. See, e.g., Flushing Preferred Funding Corp. v. Patricola Realty Corp., 964 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2012).”

4th DCA Florida gets It!! Judgment Reversed for Borrower! HSBC Goes Down in Flames

For More Information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

This is not a legal opinion on your case. Get a lawyer.

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This case is important for many reasons:

  1. It is short. While that seems inconsequential, it seems highly significant to me that the 4th DCA would reverse the trial judge and direct entry of judgment for the Borrower based upon the application of simple laws and rules that I have been advocating for 8 years.
  2. It does not remand for a new trial or further proceedings. it directs that judgment be entered for the borrower. End of story.
  3. Standing: If the foreclosing party lacks standing it doesn’t matter how many payments were allegedly “missed.” A party who has no injury or interest in the subject matter cannot bring the claim.
  4. The assignment and the note “endorsement” was after the suit was filed. Hence at the time of the filing of the foreclosure lawsuit, there could be no standing and therefore the lawsuit should have been dismissed. It is for that reason that the 4th DCA directs judgment for the borrower.
  5. The burden of proof is on the bank — not the borrower. IN order to sustain a complaint at trial, the burden of proof is on the alleged creditor to prove its standing. AND THAT MEANS that discovery demands, routinely rejected by judges, can be enforced.
  6. The alleged endorsement was undated: The Court found that an undated endorsement cannot prove standing. The witness at trial must testify that he/she knows everything relevant about the endorsement, who did it, when and why. Robo-witnesses don’t have that information because the bank won;t let them have it. If they did have that information they would either be required to reveal that there was no underlying transaction, or perjure themselves.
  7. The court completely accepts the fact that the banks are backdating documents and it says backdating an assignment does nothing to help the bank. In other words, lying about it doesn’t cure the bank’s case.
  8. EVIDENCE: The witness testified that he knew nothing other than what he could see on the face of the assignment. As I have said for 8 years, that is pure hearsay — simply reading a document into the record does not mean that the recitals in the document are true. The fact that it is a document doesn’t mean it is a business record. And the fact that it is a business record doesn’t mean it is a valid exception to the hearsay rule. Judges, by the thousands ruled in millions of cases that such a proffer was admissible evidence. They were and remain wrong for doing so. If the witness cannot testify from personal knowledge about the matters asserted in a document, then neither the witness nor the document can be admitted into evidence. The question is not whether the the witness correctly read aloud what was in the document (probably backdated and forged). The question is whether the information on the document is reliable and trustworthy and true. A document could have the appearance of reliability and trustworthiness but the recitals in the document might not be true. The homeowner cannot cross examine a document and a homeowner cannot cross examine a witness about the accuracy of the matters asserted in the document if the witness knows nothing except what is written on the document.

=====================================

JUNIOR A. HARRIS,
Appellant,

v.

HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee for NAAC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-1,
Appellee.

No. 4D14-54

[September 9, 2015]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Cynthia G. Imperato, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE08029493(11).

Kenneth V. Hemmerle, II, Fort Lauderdale, and Richard P. McCusker, Jr., Delray Beach, for appellant.

Donna L. Eng, Michael K. Winston, and Dean A. Morande of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

The borrower appeals from a final judgment of foreclosure entered for the bank after a trial. The borrower argues that the bank failed to prove it had standing when it filed the action. We agree and reverse for entry of judgment for the borrower.

The bank’s original complaint attached a copy of a note payable to another entity. The note did not contain an endorsement.

The bank later filed a second amended complaint. Attached were copies of the note and an assignment of the note. The note now contained an endorsement to the bank. However, the endorsement was undated. The assignment purported to transfer the note to the bank on an “effective” date before the bank filed its original complaint.

However, the assignment was executed after the bank filed its original complaint.

The borrower answered and raised lack of standing as an affirmative defense. The borrower argued that the endorsement was undated and the assignment was executed after the bank filed its original complaint.

At trial, the bank introduced into evidence the original note and the assignment. On the factual issue of whether the note was assigned to the bank before or after the bank filed the original complaint, the bank’s witness possessed no knowledge or information other than what the assignment’s face reflected.

After the close of all evidence, the trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure for the bank.
This appeal followed. Our review is de novo. See Lloyd v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 160 So. 3d 513, 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“We review the sufficiency of the evidence to prove standing to bring a foreclosure action de novo.”) (citation omitted).

We agree with the borrower that the bank failed to prove it had standing when it filed the action. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.

First, the note’s endorsement to the bank was undated. See Matthews v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 160 So. 3d 131, 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[T]he note introduced at trial . . . did not establish standing when the suit was commenced. The blank endorsement was undated.”).

Second, the assignment was “backdated” after the bank filed the action. See id. (“Nor does the backdated assignment, standing alone, establish standing.”) (citation omitted); Vidal v. Liquidation Props., Inc., 104 So. 3d 1274, 1277 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“Allowing assignments to be retroactively effective would be inimical to the requirements of pre-suit ownership for standing in foreclosure cases.”).

Third, on the factual issue of whether the note was assigned to the bank before or after the bank filed the original complaint, the bank’s witness possessed no knowledge or information other than what the assignment’s face reflected. See Lloyd, 160 So. 3d at 515 (“Plaintiff’s evidence supporting its claim that the assignment . . . ‘related back’ to before the suit commenced was also insufficient to prove standing in this case. The witness testified that he did not have any information, other than the document itself, to verify when the assignment took place.”).

Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the borrower.

Reversed and remanded.

GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

– See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2015/09/09/harris-v-hsbc-bank-usa-na-notes-endorsement-to-the-bank-was-undated-the-assignment-was-backdated-factual-issue-of-whether-the-note-was-assigned-to-the-bank/#sthash.FLUGXD2A.ynDnEINB.dpuf

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