The Big Hoax: Are “Sales” of “Loans” and “Servicing” Real?

Posted on May 14, 2019 by Neil Garfield

References to sales of loans and servicing rights are usually merely false assertions to distract homeowners and lawyers from looking at what is really happened. By accepting the premise that the loan was sold you are accepting that the loan was (a) real and (b) owned by the party who was designated to appear as a “Seller.”

By accepting the premise that the servicing data and documents were transferred you are accepting that the transferor had the correct data and documents and that the designated servicer is actually in position to represent the accounting records of the party whose name was used to initiate the foreclosure.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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As Reynaldo Reyes of Deutsche Bank said in deposition and in recorded interviews, the entire structure and actual events are “counterintuitive.” The banks count on that for good reason. Most lawyers and almost all homeowners assume that at least some of what the banks are saying is true. In fact, nearly everything they say, write or produce as “business records” is a fabrication. But homeowners, lawyers and judges buy it as though it was solid gold.

In defending homeowners from foreclosure, lawyers who win more cases than they lose do so because of their willingness to believe that the entire thing is a hoax. Their withering cross examination and use of discovery reveals the complete absence of any corroborating evidence that would be admissible in court.

Even the most “biased” judges will concede that the case for foreclosure has not been made and they rule for the homeowner. But this only happens if the lawyer takes the opposition to task.

Chase did not acquire loans from WAMU and WAMU did not acquire loans from Long Beach etc. At the time of the claimed “acquisition” those loans were long gone, having been funded or purchased by one of the big 4 investment banks, directly or indirectly (through intermediate investment banks or simple cham conduit fictitious names or entities). In fact the ONLY time that the actual debt was clearly owned by anyone was, at best, a 30 day period during which the investment bank had the debt on its balance sheet as an asset.

So all sales from any seller other than one of the investment banks is a ruse. And there are no references to sales by the investment banks because that would be admitting and accepting potential liability for lending and servicing violations. It would also lead to revelations about how many times and in how many pieces the debt was effectively sold to how many investors who were NOT limited to those who had advanced money to the investment bank for shares in a nonexistent trust that never owned anything and never transacted any business.

Similarly the boarding process is a hoax. There is generally no actual transfer of servicing even with the largest “servicers.” They are all using a central platform on which data is kept, maintained, managed and manipulated by a third party who is kept concealed using employees who are neither bonded nor trained in maintaining accurate records nor protecting private data.

There is no transfer of servicing data. There is no “boarding” and no “audit.” In order to keep up the musical chairs game in which homeowners and lawyers are equally flummoxed, the big investment banks periodically change the designation of servicers and simply rotate the names, giving each one the login and password to enter the central system (usually at a server maintained in Jacksonville, Florida).

BOTTOM LINE: If you accept the premises advanced by the lawyers for the banks you will almost always lose. If you don’t and you aggressively pound on the legal foundation for the evidence they are attempting to use in court the chances of winning arise above 50% and with some lawyers, above 65%.

To be successful there are some attitudes of the defense lawyer that are necessary.

  • The first is that they must believe or be willing to believe that their client deserves to win. A lawyer who thinks that the client is only entitled to his/her time or a delay of the “inevitable” will never, ever win.
  • The second is that they must believe or be willing to believe that the entire scheme of lending, servicing and foreclosure is a hoax. Each word and each document that a lawyer assumes to be valid, authentic and not fabricated is a step toward defeat.
  • The third is that the lawyer must fight to reveal the gaps, consistencies and insufficiencies of the evidence and not to prove that this is the greatest economic crime in human history. All trials are won and lost based on evidence. The burden is always on the foreclosing party or the apparent successors to the foreclosing party to prove that title properly passed.
  • Fourth is arguably the most important and the one that is most overlooked. The lawyer must believe or be willing to believe that the foreclosure was not initiated on behalf of any party who could reasonably described as a creditor or owner of the debt. The existence of the trust, the presence of a real trust in any transaction in which a loan was purchased, sold or settled to a trustee, and the various permutations of strategies employed by the banks are not mere technical points. They are a coverup for the fact that no creditor and no owner of the debt ever receives any benefit from a successful foreclosure of the property.

Yes it is counterintuitive. You are meant to think otherwise and the banks are counting on that with you, your lawyer and the judge. But just because something is counterintuitive doesn’t mean that it isn’t true.

Filed under: boarding process, burden of persuasion, burden of pleading, BURDEN OF PROOF, CORRUPTION, discovery, Discovery -Subpoena, evidence, expert witness, Fabrication of documents, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, forgery, investment banking, Investor, legal standing, originator, Pleading, prima facie case, Servicer, sham transactions, TRIAL OBJECTIONS, trial strategy | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

Not even the Federal Government Can Determine Who owns Your Loan

Posted on July 5, 2016 by Neil Garfield

It was impossible to trace the majority of the mortgage loans on the over 300 homes sold by DSI that were the subject of the FBI investigation; it would have been harder yet to identify individual victims of the fraud given that the mortgages were securitized and traded. (Emphasis added.)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Originally posted at http://mortgageflimflam.com
With additional edits by http://4closurefraud.org

“Counter-intuitive” is the way Reynaldo Reyes (Deutschbank VP Asset Management) described it in a taped telephone interview with a borrower who lived in Arizona.  “we only look like the Trustee. The real power lies with the servicers.”

And THAT has been the problem since the beginning. That means “what you think you know is wrong.” This message has been delivered in thousands of courtrooms in millions of cases but Judges refuse to accept it. In fact most lawyers, even those doing foreclosure defense, and even their clients — the so-called borrowers — can’t peel themselves away from what they think they know.

In the quote above it is obvious that the sentencing document reveals at least two things: (1) nobody can trace the loans themselves which in plain English means that nobody can know who loaned the money to begin with in the so-called loan origination” and (2) nobody can trace the ownership of the loans — i.e., the party who is actually losing money due to nonpayment of the loan. Of course this latter point was been creatively obscured by the banks who set up a scheme in which the victims (investors, managed funds, etc.) continue to get payments long after the “borrower” has ceased making payments.

If nobody knows who loaned the money then the presumption that the loan was consummated when the “borrower”signed documents placed in front of them is wrong for two reasons: (1) all borrowers sign loan documents before funding is approved which means that no loan is consummated when the documents are signed. and (2) there is no evidence that the “originator” funded the loans (regardless of whether it is a bank or some fly by night operation that went bust years ago) loaned any money to the “borrower.” (read the articles contained in the link above).

The reason why I put quotation marks around the word borrower is this: if I don’t lend you money then how are you a borrower, even if you sign loan papers? The courts have nearly universally got this wrong in virtually all of their pretrial rulings and trial rulings. Their attitude is that there must have been a loan and the homeowner must be a borrower because obviously there was a loan. What they means is that since money hit the closing table or the last “lender” received a payoff there must have been a loan. What else would you call it?

Certainly the homeowner meant for it to be a loan. The problem is that the originator did not intend for it to be a loan because they were not lending any money. The originator played the traditional part of a conduit (see American Brokers CONDUIT for example). The originator was paid a fee for the use of their name and traditionally sold the homeowner on taking a loan through the friendly people at XYZ Speedy No Fault Lending, Inc. (a corporation that often does not exist).

Somebody else sent money but it wasn’t a loan to the homeowner. It was the underwriter who was masquerading as the Master Servicer for a Trust that also does not exist. Where did the underwriter get the money? Certainly not from its own pockets. It took money from a dynamic dark pool that should not exist, according to the false “securitization” documents (Prospectus and Pooling and Servicing Agreement).

Who deposited the money into the dark pool? The sellers of fake “mortgage-backed securities”who took money from pension funds and other managed funds under the false pretense that the money would be under management of a specific REMIC Trust that in actuality does not exist, never conducted business under any name, never had a bank account, and for which the Trustee had no duties except window dressing to make it look good to investors. How is that possible? NY law allows for the documentation of a trust without any registration. The Trust does not exist in the eyes of the law unless there is something in it. This like a stick figure is not a person.

None of the money from investors went into any Trust account or any account of any trustee to be held and managed for a REMIC Trust. Sound crazy? It is crazy, but it is also true which is why it is impossible for even the Federal Government with virtually limitless resources cannot tell you who loaned you any money nor who owns any debt from you.

The money was surreptitiously deposited into hundreds of dark pools in institutions around the world. The actual business of the dark pols was to create the illusion of profits for the banks and a huge dark reserve that siphoned some $5 trillion out of the U.S. economy and more out of other economies around the world.

To cover their tracks, the banks took some of the money from the dark pool and started a chain reaction of offering what appeared to be loans but which in most cases were financial death sentences.

The investors, for sure, have a potential claim against the homeowners who received actual benefit from a flow of funds, but without being named in the loan documents, they have no direct right of foreclosure. And then there is the problem of coming up with the correct list of investors whose money was commingled with hundreds of fake trusts. The investors know that collectively, as a group they are owed money from homeowners as a group. But NOBODY KNOWS which investors match up with what alleged loan. The homeowner can ONLY be a “borrower” if they executed a loan contract and the contract became enforceable because there was offer, acceptance and consideration flowing both ways. Without all four legs of the stool it collapses.

Judges resist this “gift” to homeowners while ignoring and accepting the consequence of a gift of enormous proportions to the few banks at the top who started all this. Somehow word has spread that the middle and lower class is the right place to put the burden of this illegal bank behavior.

The homeowner’s offer of consideration is the promise to pay principal sometimes with interest. The originator’s offer of consideration is not to the homeowner. The originator has offered services for a fee to the conduits and sham corporations that put the originator up to selling bad loans from undisclosed third parties to people who lacked the financial knowledge to understand what was happening. So no contract there. No contract? No borrower. No contract? No lender. Hence the term I used back in 2007, “pretender lender.” I should have also coined the term “mock borrower.”

Sound impossible? Here is the finding from the sentencing document:

During the time of the information, DSI worked with two “preferred lenders,” Wells Fargo Bank and J.P. Morgan Chase. Certain employees and managers of those two preferred lenders knew about the incentive programs offered by DSI and the builders, and knew that the incentives were not being disclosed in the loan files. (Emphasis added.)

And that is what we mean by “counter-intuitive.” It is a lie, a cover-up and a fraudulent scheme directed at multiple  victims. Under existing law, foreclosure is not an option for persons who lack standing and have unclean hands. Nearly all loan transactions were table funded and that means, according to TILA, that they are and were predatory loans. And that means, according to me, that it is impossible to allow any equitable relief be had by those who have unclean hands — especially those who seek foreclosure, which is an equitable remedy.

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Articles of Deception: PSA and Reynaldo Reyes Affidavit for Deutsch Bank as Trustee

Posted on November 17, 2014 by Neil Garfield

WITHOUT CONFUSION AND OBFUSCATION, COMBINED WITH STONEWALLING, THERE WOULD BE NO FORECLOSURE OF ANY DEBT SUBJECT TO CLAIMS OF SECURITIZATION —- NEIL GARFIELD, WWW.LIVINGLIES.ME

For further information please call 954-495-9867 and 520-405-1688

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Hat tip to Carol Molloy who sent me the affidavit

See Reynaldo Reyes Affidavit New Jersey Union County 2010 CCF11162014

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Reynaldo Reyes, AVP of Deutsch Bank said to a borrower, in a taped interview, that the whole scheme was “counter-intuitive.” In plain language that means that nothing is what it appears to be. And THAT in turn means that disclosures” were deceptive or “counter-intuitive.” And THAT means that the disclosures at closing were also “counter-intuitive” or deceptive. Reyes in a sworn affidavit drafted many times and edited by various top level attorneys for the banks has submitted an affidavit on behalf of Deutsch Bank but which will be used by Banks to try to legitimize their deceptive tactics. Again, to put it simply, they were lying to everyone — investors, borrowers, regulators, law enforcement, Congress, and the President.

Witness the following paragraph from Reyes’ affidavit. Here he says in the affidavit in Paragraph 1, that the Trustees serve the Trust. But then he takes it all back by saying that the Servicers perform all the functions of administering the loans — not on behalf of the Trustee, but rather on behalf of the Trust. THAT can only mean that the named Trustee, is not the Trustee. It means that the power of administering the Trust assets is with the servicers. Does that mean the servicers should be sued for wrongful foreclosures? Then why is the Trust named or the Trustee named?

So the beginning of the PSA, which designates a Trustee, is merely window dressing to give the impression that Deutsch Bank is the Trustee with all the powers of a Trustee, when in fact, the servicer is the one who performs most or all of the functions of a Trustee. But they do so giving the impression that they must go back to the Trustee or the “investor” when in fact they assert the power to do everything. In their circular reasoning, they could say to the court that they must get approval from the investor and then leave the court room. Then they speak for the investors, according to the servicers. So now they come back to the homeowner or homeowner’s counsel and say the application for modification or settlement has been declined. Whether that assertion turns out to be true after analysis in court is another story.

This is contrary to the position taken by U.S. Bank and Deutsch Bank and BONY Mellon in foreclosure cases where they sue for foreclosure in their own name as Trustee for the REMIC Trust. It also accounts for why they sometimes sue as Trustees for the certificate holders, and sometimes even get away with saying they are trustees only for the certificates delivered to the investors. This of course makes no sense, since they are neither holding nor asserting ownership over the certificates.

Paragraph 7: No entity services loans on behalf of the trustees. The trustees and the loan services that are appointed by the the PSA’s each perform their designated functions on behalf of the trusts. In other words, loan servicers to service mortgage loans that have been pooled and sold into a securitization trust are performing services on behalf of the trusts, not on behalf of the trustees.

Then we get to Paragraph 10 which admits that the Trustee has neither any accounts nor any information or business records of its own. According to this paragraph 10, the Trustee receives loan level data from the servicers “to facilitate certain payments to bondholders.” But wait here comes the language that takes all THAT away: “However, for a number of trusts” [unspecified, but probably all of them] “a party other than the Trustee handles those payments responsibilities.” And then the rest is taken away by his statement that “With respect to the Trusts for which the Trustees serve as a Trustee but not as securities administrators, the Trustee do not receive loan level data.”

Get it? Just like the PSA, Reyes’ affidavit says one thing and then takes it all away in the next breath. The fact is that in virtually no case is the Trustee the securities administrator. And that, Reyes, says means that the Trustee neither gets loan level data, nor does it make payments to the bondholders. “Other parties” perform those functions. Who? The servicer who is according to Reyes the party with the actual powers of the Trustee. So why is Deutsch claiming to be a Trustee.

The answer is very simple — MONEY. The sellers of mortgage bonds pay Deutsch to rent their name to underwriters to make it appear as though an independent fiduciary is handling the money, the purchase or origination of loans, and the enforcement or modification of loans. This is meant to deceive the investors into a false sense of complacency. The same is true for borrowers, although at this point “complacency” would hardly be the word.

Everyone believed the wording at the beginning of the PSA and practically nobody read the PSA from end to end to see that the beginning was sales material and the end was a hodgepodge of obfuscation to make it difficult if not impossible to determine the identity of the players or what they were doing. This analysis can certainly NOT be done without reference to the underlying transaction in which we see who actually sent money to originate the loans, from whom they received the money etc.

The fact is that that while most people think the Trusts acquired the loans by sale of the loans into the trust, the evidence shows that practically none of them were sold to the Trust. The only logical conclusion from the facts at hand is that the investors’ money was pooled in an entirely different scheme while hiding behind claims of securitization.

The investors money was used directly, without their knowledge or consent, to fund origination of loans like the toxic Pick a Pay, reverse amortization, payment increase cap (usually 7.5%) that results in what appears to be affordable payments, but also results in uncontrolled liability.

A $139,000 loan that I recently analyzed, indicates the eventual liability could be nearly $4 million — all at the end of 30 years of payments, resulting in an undisclosed hidden balloon payment in the 13th payment and every payment thereafter which thanks to the miracles of compounding interest and an adjustable rate that could go as high as over 12% APR process an obligation that looks affordable but is infinitely not affordable. The interest alone on the new principal (original balance + deferred interest on negative amortization loan) could exceed $24,000 per month on a $139,000 loan.

Then you get to paragraph 11: Here the affidavit produces more obfuscation by referring to the Master Servicer who might (or might not) be responsible for performing any duties. But in the PSA you see the ultimate authority for virtually everything lies with the Master Servicer, who also turns out to be the the underwriter and seller of mortgage bonds. And since we now know that the Trustee had neither trust accounts nor any control or responsibility for the accounts, THAT makes it impossible for the Trustee to have received any proceeds from the sale of bonds issued by the Trust.

Since a Trust cannot operate except through the Trustee by law (see New York law and the law of your state for more information) it is an inevitable conclusion that there were no accounts established for the Trust in the manner expected by the investors who bought the mortgage bonds. And since there was no money in the Trust, the Trust could not have originate or purchased any loan documents, regardless of whether or not there was in fact an underlying loan transaction at the base of the chain relied upon by these parties when they foreclose.

Then Reyes gets to the meat of why he submitted the affidavit. BONY Mellon did the same thing by a lawsuit and so have hundreds of investors, insurers, guarantors, holders of loss mitigation hedge contracts, whose cases have been quietly settled. Reyes states that “the Trustee would not be in the best position to address further inquiries by the Court concerning any possible ‘irregularity in the handling of foreclosure proceedings.’” So to put it simply, Reyes is disclaiming any role in foreclosures and trying to distance Deutsch bank from wrongful foreclosures [i.e. most or nearly all of them] despite its APPARENT AUTHORITY.

Examination of the PSA reveals deep within its pages, prohibitions and restrictions against either the Trustee or the bond purchasers (“trust beneficiaries”) from knowing or even inquiring about anything involving the business of the trust, which we already know never existed because the trust never received its IPO (bond sale) money. This is why servicers assert control over the settlement and modification process. This is why they say the investor declined the modification or settlement because they never contacted the investor or the trust or the Trustee.

The truth is that the servicers assert, in the final analysis, the right to speak for the investors even thought they have a patent CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING FROM SERVICER ADVANCES. A true servicer would be required to mitigate the damages and minimize the losses. Servicers have no interest in doing that because they can make a ton of money for having advanced the principal and interest payment to the creditors from an account that contained the investors money and that would count, as stated in the PSA, as payment in full to the creditor — so the creditor could not declare a default against the servicer.

And THAT is why these foreclosures are pushed through, among other reasons, [avoiding workouts, modifications and settlements] to wit: the foreclosures proceed even though the creditors (investors) are being paid right through the date of foreclosure. The reason is the banks want to “recover” those “advances” (paid from money stolen from the investors) not from the borrower and not from the creditors, who have already been paid, but through a claim against the final liquidation of the property to a third party “innocent” purchaser. BY controlling the foreclosure process, the servicer gets paid a lot of money and protects the banks against claims for refunds and damages arising out of the improper loan practices, loan processing by the servicer, and wrongful foreclosures.

So far the servicers have fooled the courts into thinking that their claim to recover servicer advances is somehow secured. It isn’t. In order to do that the court would be required to issue a declaratory judgment specifying the breakup of the mortgage lien on a continual basis for each servicer advance or find that the total advanced by the servicer from the underwriter’s controlled slush fund, is subject to an equitable mortgage lien. Equitable liens are not accepted in virtually any court because ti would require the buyer of property to make exhaustive investigation into matters that a re not contained on the face of the note or mortgage.

PRACTICE NOTE FOR LAWYERS:

You might want to get the court to take judicial notice of the affidavit and just to be on the safe side get a certified copy of it. You might want to file a motion for involuntary dismissal based upon the affidavit of Reyes who was THE person in charge of the trustee “program.” Think also about a subpoena for Reyes to appear at trial, if there is one.

Reyes is saying that only the servicer can enforce. And he is saying that when the servicer acts, it does so for trust NOT THE TRUSTEE. So the Trustee, according to him is not a proper party to bring the action. The inference corroborates what I have been saying all along. It is that the investors are the real parties in interest and the servicer is acting in a representative capacity — IF IT IS THE TRUSTEE NAMED IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT (THE PSA).

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , | 14 Comments »

Perils of Pooling: OneWest

Posted on July 31, 2013 by Neil Garfield

Apparently my article yesterday hit a nerve. NO I wasn’t saying that the only problems were with BofA and Chase. OneWest is another example. Keep in mind that the sole source of information to regulators and the courts are the ONLY people who understand mergers and acquisitions. So it is a little like one of those TV shows where the only way they can get an arrest and conviction is for the perpetrator or suspect to confess. In this case, they “confess” all kinds of things to gain credibility and then lead the agencies and judicial system down a rabbit hole which is now a well trodden path. So many people have gone down that hole that most people that is the way to get to the truth. It isn’t. It is part of a carefully constructed series of complex conflicting lies designed carefully by some very smart lawyers who understand not just the law but the way the law works. The latter is how they are getting away with it.

Back to OneWest, which we have detailed in the past.

The FDIC has posted the agreement at http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/IndyMacMasterPurchaseAgrmt.pdf

OneWest was created almost literally overnight (actually over a weekend) by some highly placed players from Wall Street. There is an 80% loss sharing arrangement with the FDIC and yes, there appears to be some grey area about ownership of the loans because of that loss sharing agreement. But the evidence of a transaction in which the loans were actually purchased by a brand new entity that was essentially unfunded is completely absent. And that is because OneWest and Deutsch take the position that the loans were securitized despite IndyMac’s assurances to the contrary. The only loans in which OneWest appears to be a player are those in which the loan was subject to (false) claims of securitization. No money went to the trustee, no money went to the trust, no assets went into the pool because the REMIC asset pool lacked the funding to purchase any assets.

Add to that a few facts. Deutsch is usually the “trustee”of the REMIC asset pool, but Reynaldo Reyes says he has nothing to do. He has no trust accounts and makes no decisions and performs no actions. Sound familiar. I have him on tape and his deposition has already been taken and publicized on the internet by others. Reyes says the whole arrangement is “counter-intuitive” (a very creative way of saying it is a lie). It is up to the servicer (OneWest) to decide what loans are subject to modification, mediation or even reinstatement. It is up to the servicer as to when to foreclose. And the servicer here is OneWest while the Master Servicer appears to be the investment banking arm of Deutsch, although I do not have that confirmed.

The way Reyes speaks about it the whole thing ALMOST makes sense. That is, until you start thinking about it. If Deutsch Bank has an extensive trust subsidiary, which it does, then why is a VP of asset management in control of the trust operations of the REMIC asset pools. Answer: because there are no funded trusts and there are no asset pools with assets. Hence any statement by OneWest that it is the owner of the loan is untrue as is the allegation that Deutsch is the trustee because all trustee duties have been delegated to the servicer. That leaves the investor with an empty box for an asset pool and no trustee or manager or even an agent to to actually know what is going on or who is monitoring their money and investments.

Note that like BOfA using Red Oak Merger Corp., there is the creation of a fictional entity that was not used by the name of, no kidding, “Holdco.” This is to shield OneWest from certain liabilities as a lender. Legally it doesn’t work that way but practically it generally does work that way because judges listen to bank lawyers to tell them what all this means. That is like asking a 1st degree murder defendant to explain to the jury the meaning of reasonable doubt.

Now be careful here because there is a “loan sale” agreement referenced in the package posted by the FDIC. But it refers to an exhibit F. There is no exhibit F and like the ambiguous agreements with the FDIC in Countrywide and Washington mutual, there are words there, but they don’t really say anything. Suffice it to say that despite some fabricated documents to the contrary, there is no evidence I have seen that any loan  receivable was transferred to or from a REMIC asset pool, Indy-mac, or Hold-co.

These people were not stupid and they are not idiots. And their lawyers are pretty smart too. They know that with the presumption of a funded loan in existence, the banks could pretty much get away with saying anything they wanted about the ownership, the identity of the creditor and the ability to make a credit bid at the auction of a property that should never have been foreclosed in the first instance — and certainly not by these people.

But if you dig just a little deeper you will see that the banks are represented to the regulatory authorities that they own the bonds (not true because the bonds were created and issued to specific investors who bought them); thus they include the bonds as significant items on their balance sheet which allows them to be called mega banks or too big to fail when in fact they have a tiny fraction of the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve which follows the Basel accords.

Then when you turn your head and peak into courtrooms you find the same banks claiming ownership of the loan receivable, which was created when the funding occurred at the “closing” of the loan. They know they are taking inconsistent positions but most judges lack the sophistication to pinpoint the inconsistency. And that is how 5 million people lost their homes.

On the one hand the banks are claiming there was no fraud in the issuance of mortgage backed bonds by a REMIC asset pool formed as a trust. In fact, they say the loans were transferred into the REMIC asset pool. Which means that ownership of the mortgage bonds is ownership of the loans — at least that is what the paperwork shows that was used to sell pension funds on buying these worthless bogus bonds. Then they turn around and come to court as the “holder” and get a foreclosure sale in which the bank submits the credit bid and buys the property without spending one dime. What they have done is, in lay terms, offered the debt to pay for the property. But the debt, according to the same people is owned by the investors or the REMIC trust, not the banks.

Then they turn to the insurers and counterparties on credit default swaps, and the Federal reserve that is buying these bonds and they say that the banks own the bonds, have an insurable interest, and should receive the proceeds of payments instead of the investors who actually put up the money. And then they say in court that the account receivable is unpaid, there is a default, and therefore the home should be foreclosed. What they have done is create a chaotic complex of lies and turn it into an illusion that changes colors and density depending upon whom the banks are talking with.

There is no default on the account receivable if the account was paid, regardless of who paid it — as long as it was really paid to either the owner of the loan receivable or the authorized agent of the owner (i.e., the investor/lender). And so it is paid. And if paid, there can be no action on the note because the loan receivable has been satisfied. There can be no action on the mortgage because it was never a perfected lien and because the loan receivable was extinguished by PAYMENT. You can’t use the mortgage to enforce the note which is evidence for enforcement of a debt when the debt no longer exists.

Judges are confused. The borrower must owe money to someone so why not simply enter judgment and let the creditors sort it out amongst themselves. The answer is because that is not the rule of law and if a creditor has a claim against the borrower it should be brought by that creditor not some stranger to the transaction whose actions are stripping the real creditor of lien rights and collection rights over the debt. What the courts are doing, by analogy, is saying that you must have killed someone when you fired that gun so we will dispense with evidence and a jury and proceed to sentencing. We will let the people in the crowd decide who is the victim who can bring a wrongful death action against you even if we don’t even know when the gun was fired and who pulled the trigger. In the meanwhile you are sentenced to death or life in prison under our rocket docket for murders of unknown persons.

 

 

Filed under: AMGAR, CDO, CORRUPTION, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 20 Comments »

They Just Don’t Get It: Meltdown Primer

Posted on January 22, 2013 by Neil Garfield

CHECK OUT OUR DECEMBER SPECIAL!

What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).

Editor’s Analysis: Reynaldo Reyes, the asset manager for Deutsch that pretends to be a trustee of non existent unfunded trusts said it best: “it’s all very counter-intuitive.” In reality he was giving a clue. It isn’t that we haven’t yet unravelled the tangled web of deceit and exotic financial instruments and absurd risk taking. It all boils down to one thing: it doesn’t make sense, it was illegal from the start and it will never make sense. The reason it is counter intuitive is that there is no explanation except lying, cheating, stealing and cover-ups.

Whether you start from the top down, the bottom up or even start in the middle and spread out to the top and bottom, there is no connection between the money trail, the promises and representations made, and the document trail which proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that theft, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, theft and cover-up were at the heart of what Wall Street called a securitization plan but which in practice was not securitization of credit but rather a PONZI s scheme completely dependent upon more investors buying bogus mortgage bonds. The crash didn’t happen because of mortgage de faults. It happened because investors stopped buying the bogus mortgage bonds. That is the red flag on all Ponzi Schemes. When people stop buying and start demanding their money back, the scheme collapses.

Under normal circumstances, the perpetrators — Madoff, Dreier, Stanford et al — go to jail, a receiver is appointed and the receiver does the best job possible of clawing back all the illicit gains, profits and accounts of the perpetrators. That is what should happen with he mortgage mess but that would mean admitting that the judicial system let millions of foreclosures go through the system because of bad lawyering, bad representation by pro se litigants and bad practices by the bench which failed to see the correct chain of title and then failed to inquire why not. —-

YES that IS the way it was. When I represented banks and HOA foreclosing on their liens, if I didn’t have my paperwork in order, the Judge sent me back to do it right — even if the other side didn’t show up. Why? Because the Judge understood that bad paperwork means bad title and that dozens of others could be effectively defrauded by allowing a bad foreclosure to proceed to sale, allowing an unproven creditor to submit a credit bid, and allowing a homeowner who legally still owned the home after the foreclosure to be evicted.

Back in those days certain presumptions applied — legal or informal — that the debt was real, the note was valid, and the mortgage was perfected. it was further correctly assumed that the borrower was in default.

The problem is that the old presumptions and assumptions remain while the facts are wildly different than the old-style foreclosures. Instead of the Judge being able to peruse the documents behind the mortgage, he must either accept the proffer of the facts from the lawyers for the foreclosing entity or have an evidentiary hearing, which he certainly doesn’t want on his calendar because all his other cases would pile up in a bottle neck. Thus lying in court became an acceptable substitute for having the right verifiable paperwork.

People ask me — how do I prove this? Lawyers ask me the same question. My answer is spend the daily rate for Lexus-nexus and get cases on point in your jurisdiction. They will say that where the facts and documents are uniquely within the knowledge and custody of the the defendant, the appropriate remedy is discovery and that the respondent to discovery has a higher duty to provide clear, concise and  extensive answers. In short, the burden of persuasion changes to the the foreclosing party — whether you are in a judicial or non-judicial venue.

Any other approach would have the Judge making findings in the absence of real evidence and actual facts, which is exactly the problem in the current judicial climate, although the tide is definitely turning in many states.

A quick look at the reality of the Ponzi scheme reveals the true nature of the illegality that the regulators and law enforcement faced, understaffed and underfunded against a well staffed and over-funded banking sector.

Let’s start in this article from the top. There the investment banking firm forms what appears to be a REMIC trust and they create a selling entity to put some distance between the investment banking firm and the actual sale. The sale takes place, to wit: the investors gives the investment banking money and the investor gets either a certificate (rarely) or some acknowledgment ina statement that the investor is now the proud owner of an interest in a REMIC trust governed by the REMIC provisions of the internal Revenue Code, which allows the REMIC trust to be a tax-exempt entity meaning the flow of funds from investments by the REMIC will only be taxed once even though it is coming through another entity. If that were true, there would be no problem. The problem is that it is not true and for the most never was true and never was the intent of the banks.

So to recap thus far, the money went from the bank account of the investors to the bank account of the investment bank or to an entity wholly controlled by the investment bank. Where it did NOT go was into a trust account wherein the Trustee for the REMIC pool would collect and disburse all funds, receipts and disbursements as set forth in the investor prospectus and pooling and service agreement.

If you look at the Taylor Bean and Whitaker setup, you’ll see, as Dan Edstrom has pointed out, that the money was instead put into a vast commingled account which they called a custodial account, but they never state for whom they are the custodian. And that is because they were skimming the money in a tier 2 yield spread premium and other “proprietary trading” also known as three pocket Monty — you take the money out of one pocket to transfer it to another pocket but on the way a few dollars drops into a secret third pocket. This vast Superfund was used as a TBW piggy bank as well as the source of funding for mortgages.

Without getting into the farce of “proprietary trading” being the cover for outright theft of investors money, let’s look at what happened next with the money.

People with the right connections were told to create mortgage origination companies. These companies would act as the payee on the note and the secured party on the mortgage or deed of trust, but they would never ever be allowed to touch the actual funding of the mortgage nor would they have the right to make a loan that would fall under the provisions of the assignment and assumption agreement signed with the aggregator (Countrywide, for example). SO XYZ company is created and they have a bank account and all that but the funding of the mortgage never touches the bank account of XYZ or any person associated with XYZ. The simple reason is that Wall Street being composed largely of thieves, understood that when the balances became high enough in the originators accounts, many if them would abscond with the money. So the wire transfer was made directly from the Superfund account (euphemistically referred to as a warehouse credit facility set up solely at the discretion of the aggregation (e.g. Countrywide.).

It was the coincidence of timing that convinced the closing agent and the borrower that the money had come from the “lender” identified on the disclosure paperwork and in the note and mortgage, when in fact, the originator was a mere nominee working for a fee. The originator could not under generally accepted accounting rules, book the transaction as a loan receivable because there was no offsetting entry debiting a cash account or other account over which the originator had control. The originator had control over nothing — the underwriting, funding, approval of the loan was left to the undisclosed aggregator using a computer system designed explicitly for this purpose. Without approval from Countrywide, the originator was not permitted to communicate approval of the loan.

The real lender were the investors whose money had been diverted from the REMIC trust into the Superfund. This created a common law partnership instead of a REMIC trust. This partnership with no name was the lender but the banks made sure that the true lender in an obviously illegal table-funded transaction was never disclosed. As far as the closing agent and borrower were concerned the coincidence of having the money there at the same time as the closing with the originator was proof of enough about what was going on. After all, who would send money for a mortgage transaction unless they thought they were getting a valid enforceable note and a mortgage or deed of trust securing the provisions of that note, which was valid evidence of the debt.

Unfortunately for the investors, the banks had other ideas than using the money the way they promised in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement, and they had other plans than protecting the investors enforceable rights under a valid promissory note, and they had a different idea about securing a note payable to the investors with the investors having a perfected mortgage lien against the property.

Bottom Line: The wire transfer receipt shows a loan emanating from the Superfund and that the money from the Superfund was advanced by the investors, but other than the wire transfer receipts there was not a shred of documentary evidence showing that the investors were going to be repaid under the terms of the mortgage-backed bonds in the REMIC because the mortgage bonds never made into the REMIC and their money never  made it into the largely or completely unfunded REMIC trust.

On the contrary, the documents produced by the originator under direction of the aggregator who was functioning under the thumb of the investment banks, all tell a wildly different story. According to the documents, the originator made the loan and assigned or sold it to the aggregator who sold it to the REMIC, which presumably protected the investors in a round about way even if it was a lie. The main problem with the bank’s version of the story is that XYZ never got paid for the loan or mortgage in a transfer or assignment transaction. And the aggregator never got paid by the REMIC trust for the loans either. The lack of consideration is not merely a technicality but rather part of a larger plot to steal from investors and homeowners.

The trust reposed in the banks by investors and homeowners alike basically was like putting red meat in front of a lion. The reason for the subterfuge was that the banks wanted to and did in fact get away with borrowing the loss of the investors by pretending to be the owner of the loans for a temporary period of time. By doing that they had what appeared to be ownership, proof of loss, albeit without any proof of payment. Now the insurers and credit default swap parties are hip to this trick and suing the investment banks.

The net result is that the actual financial transaction is largely undocumented, unsecured, and unenforceable in terms of method of repayment. The debt to investors (not the REMIC trusts) exists — less the insurance, CDS and bailouts received by the agents of the investors — but it is not documented. Conversely, the documented transaction lacks consideration of any kind, thus describing a financial transaction that never actually occurred. Any assignment therefore was pure lies and hype, since the reference was to originating documents that were procured by misrepresentation or fraud, without consideration, and obviously no perfected lien, which is not subject to nullification of instrument.

The banks and regulators and law enforcement don’t like my explanation because it would require them to do their work, and the people in charge of the banks to go to jail, costing a could of hundred millioin dollars to prove the case against the right people. Whether they like it or not, the regulators and law enforcement needs to do their job or face recriminations from the public once the true nature of this scheme is fully revealed. And make no mistake about it. I am not the only one who knows. The truth is coming out and that is why Judges are turning.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 40 Comments »

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