How and Why to Litigate Foreclosure and Eviction Defenses

Posted on December 2, 2020 by Neil Garfield

Wall Street Transactions with Homeowners Are Not Loans

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I think the biggest problem for people understanding the strategies that I have set forth on this blog is that they don’t understand the underlying principles. It simply is incomprehensible to most people how they could get a “loan” and then not owe it. It is even more incomprehensible that there could be no creditor that could enforce any alleged obligation of the homeowner. After all, the homeowner signed a note which by itself creates an obligation.
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None of this seems to make sense. Yet on an intuitive level, most people understand that they got screwed in what they thought was a lending process.
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The reason for this disconnect between me and most of the rest of the world is that most people have no reason to know what happens in the world of investment banking. As a former investment banker, and as a direct witness to these seminal events that gave rise to the claims of “securitization” I do understand what happened.
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In this article, I will try to explain, from a different perspective, what really happened when most homeowners thought that they were closing a loan transaction. For this to be effective, the reader must be willing to put themselves in the shoes of an investment banker.
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First, you must realize that every investment banker is merely a stockbroker. They do business with investors and other investment bankers. They do not do business with consumers who purchase goods and services or loans. The investment banker is generally not in the business of lending money. The investment banker is in the business of creating capital for new and existing businesses. They make their money by brokering transactions. They make the most money by brokering the sales of new securities including stocks and bonds.
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The compensation received by the investment banker for brokering a transaction varied from as little as 1% or 2% to as much as 20%. The difference is whether they were brokering the sale of existing securities or underwriting new securities. Obviously, they had a very large incentive to broker the sale of new securities for which they would receive 7 to 10 times the compensation of brokering the sale of existing securities.
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But the Holy Grail of investment banking was devising some system in which the investment bank could issue a new security from a fictional entity and receive the entire proceeds of the offering. This is what happened in “residential lending.” And this way, they could receive 100% of the offering instead of a brokerage commission.
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But as you’ll see below, by disconnecting the issuance of securities from the ownership of any perceived obligation from consumers, investment bankers put themselves in a position in which they could issue securities indefinitely without limit and without regard to the amount of the transaction with consumers (homeowners) or investors.
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In short, the goal was to make it appear as though loans have been securitized even know they had not been securitized. In order for any asset to have been securitized it would need to have been sold off in parts to investors. What we see in the residential market is that no such sale ever occurred. Under modern law, a “sale” consists of offer, acceptance, payment, and delivery. So neither the investment bank nor any of the investors to whom they had sold securities, ever received a conveyance of any right, title, or interest to any debt, note, or mortgage from a homeowner.
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At the end of the day, the world was convinced that the homeowner had entered into a loan transaction while the investment banker had assured itself and its investors that it would be free from liability for violation of any lending laws — as a “lender.”
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Neither of them maintained a loan account receivable on their own ledgers even though the capital used to pay homeowners originated from banks who loaned money to investment bankers (based upon sales of “certificates” to investors), which was then used to pay homeowners as little as possible from the pool of capital generated by the loans and certificate sales of “mortgage-backed bonds.”
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From the perspective of the investment banker, payment was made to the homeowner in exchange for participation in creating the illusion of a loan transaction despite the fact that there was no lender and no loan account. This was covered up by having more intermediaries claim rights as servicers and the creation of “payment histories” that implied but never asserted the existence or establishment of a loan account. Of course, they would need to dodge any questions relating to the identification of a creditor. That could be no creditor if there was no loan account. This tactic avoided perjury.
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Of course, this could only be accomplished through deceit. The consumer or homeowner, government regulators, and the world at large, would need to be convinced that the homeowner had entered into a secured loan transaction, even though no such thing had occurred. From the investment bankers’ perspective, they were paying the homeowner as little money as possible in order to create the foundation for their illusion.
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By calling it “securitization of loans” and selling it that way, they were able to create the illusion successfully. They were able to maintain the illusion because only the investment bankers had the information that would show that there was no business entity that maintained a ledger entry showing ownership of any debt, note, or mortgage — against which losses and gains could or would be posted in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (and law). This is called asymmetry of information and a great deal has been written on these pages and by many other authors.
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Since the homeowner had asked for a loan and had received money, it never occurred to any homeowner that he/she was not being paid for a loan or loan documents, but rather was being paid for a service. In order for the transaction to be perceived as a loan obviously, the homeowner had to become obligated to repay the money that had been paid to the homeowner. While this probably negated the consideration paid for the services rendered by the homeowner, nobody was any the wiser.
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As shown below, the initial sale of the initial certificates was only the beginning of an infinite supply of capital flowing to the investment bank who only had to pay off intermediaries to keep them “in the fold.” By virtue of the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1998, none of the certificates were regulated as securities; so disclosure was a matter of proving fraud (without any information) in private actions rather than compliance with any statute. Further, the same investment banks were issuing and trading “hedge contracts” based upon the “performance” of the certificates — as reported by the investment bank in its sole discretion.
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It was a closed market, free from any free market forces. The theory under which Alan Greenspan, Fed Chairman, was operating was that free-market forces would make any necessary corrections, This blind assumption prevented any further analysis of the concealed business plan of the investment banks — a mistake that Greenspan later acknowledged.
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There was no free market. Neither homeowners nor investors knew what they were getting themselves into. And based upon the level of litigation that emerged after the crash of 2008, it is safe to say that the investors and homeowners were deprived of any bargaining position (because the main aspects fo their transition were being misrepresented and concealed), Both should have received substantially more compensation and would have bargained for it assuming they were willing to even enter into the transaction — highly doubtful assumption.
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The investment banks also purchased insurance contracts with extremely rare clauses basically awarding themselves payment for nonexistent losses upon their own declaration of an “event” relating to the “performance” of unregulated securities. So between the proceeds from the issuance of certificates and hedge contracts and the proceeds of insurance contracts investment bankers were generally able to generate at least $12 for each $1 that was paid to homeowners and around $8 for each $1 invested by investors in purchasing the certificates.
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So the end result was that the investment banker was able to pay homeowners without any risk of loss on that transaction while at the same time generating capital or revenue far in excess of any payment to the homeowner. Were it not for the need for maintaining the illusion of a loan transaction, the investment banks could’ve easily passed on the opportunity to enforce the “obligation” allegedly due from homeowners. They had already made their money.
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There was no loss to be posted against any account on any ledger of any company if any homeowner decided not to pay the alleged obligation (which was merely the return of the consideration paid for the homeowner’s services). But that did not stop the investment banks from making claims for a bailout and making deals for loss sharing on loans they did not own and never owned. No such losses ever existed.
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Investment bankers first started looking at the consumer lending market back in 1969, when I was literally working on Wall Street. Frankly, there was no bigger market in which they could participate. But there were huge obstacles in doing so. First of all none of them wanted the potential liability for violation of lending laws that had recently been passed on both local and Federal levels (Truth in Lending Act et al.)
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So they needed to avoid classification as a lender. They achieved this goal in 2 ways. First, they did not directly do business of any kind with any consumer or homeowner. They operated strictly through “intermediaries” that were either real or fictional. If the intermediary was real, it was a sham conduit — a company with virtually no balance sheet or income statement that could be collapsed and “disappeared” if the scheme ever collapsed or just hit a bump in the road.
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Either way, the intermediary was not really a party to the transaction with the consumer or homeowner. It did not pay the homeowner nor did it receive payments from the homeowner. It did not own any obligations from the homeowner, according to modern law, because it had never paid value for the obligation.
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Under modern law, the transfer or conveyance of an interest in a mortgage without a contemporaneous transfer of ownership of the underlying obligation is a legal nullity in all states of the union. So transfers from the originator who posed as a virtual creditor do not exist in the eyes of the law — if they are shown to be lacking in consideration paid for the underlying obligation, as per Article 9 §203 Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all 50 states. The transfers were merely part of the illusion of maintaining the apparent existence of the loan transaction with homeowners.
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And this brings us to the strategies to be employed by homeowners in contesting foreclosures and evictions based on foreclosures. Based upon my participation in review of thousands of cases it is always true that any question regarding the existence and ownership of the alleged obligation is treated evasively because the obligation does not exist and cannot be owned.
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In court, the failure to respond to such questions that are posed in proper form and in a timely manner is the foundation for the victory of the homeowner. Although there is a presumption of ownership derived from claims of delivery and possession of the note, the proponent of that presumption may not avail itself of that presumption if it fails to answer questions relating to rebutting the presumption of existence and ownership of the underlying obligation. Such cases usually (not always) result in either judgment for the homeowner or settlement with the homeowner on very favorable terms.
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The homeowner is not getting away with anything or getting a free house as the investment banks have managed to insert into public discourse. They are receiving just compensation for their participation in this game in which they were drafted without their knowledge or consent. Considering the 1200% gain enjoyed by the investment banks which was enabled by the homeowners’ participation, the 8% payment to the homeowner seems only fair. Further, if somehow the homeowners’ apparent obligation to pay the investment bank survives, it is subject to reformation, accounting, and computation as to the true balance and whether it is secured or not. 
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The obligation to repay the consideration paid by the investment bank (through intermediaries) seems to be a negation of the consideration paid. If that is true, then there is neither a loan contract nor a securities contract. There is no contract because in all cases the offer and acceptance were based upon different terms ( and different deliveries) without either consideration or execution of the terns expected by the homeowner under the advertised “loan contract.”
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Payments By Homeowners Do Not Reduce Loan Accounts

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Each time that a homeowner makes a payment, he or she is perpetuating the myth that they are part of an enforceable loan agreement. There is no loan agreement if there was no intention for anyone to be a lender and if no loan account receivable was established on the books of any business. The same result applies when a loan is originated in the traditional way but then acquired by a successor. The funding is the same as what is described above. The loan account receivable in the acquisition scenario is eliminated.
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Once the transaction is entered as a reference data point for securitization it no longer exists in form or substance.

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For the past 20 years, most homeowners have been making payments to companies that said they were “servicers.” Even at the point of a judicial gun (court order) these companies will fail or refuse to disclose what they do with the money after “receipt.” Because of lockbox contracts, these companies rarely have any access to pools of money that were generated through payments from homeowners.
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Like their counterparts in the origination of transactions with homeowners, they are sham conduits. Like the originators, they are built to be thrown under the bus when the scheme implodes. They will not report to you the identity of the party to whom they forward payments that they have received from homeowners because they have not received the payments from homeowners and they don’t know where the money goes.
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As I have described in some detail in other articles on this blog, with the help of some contributors, the actual accounting for payments received from homeowners is performed by third-party vendors, mostly under the control of Black Knight. Through a series of sham conduit transfers, the pool of money ends up in companies controlled by the investment bank. Some of the money is retained domestically while some is recorded as an offshore off-balance-sheet transaction.
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In order to maintain an active market in which new certificates can be sold to investors, discretionary payments are made to investors who purchase the certificates. The money comes from two main sources.
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One source is payments made by homeowners and the other source is payments made by the investment bank regardless of whether or not they receive payments from the homeowners. The latter payments are referred to as “servicer advances.” Those payments come from a reserve pool established at the time of sale of the certificates to the investors, consisting of their own money, plus contributions from the investment bank funded by the sales of new certificates. They are not servicer advances. They are neither in advance nor did they come from a servicer.
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Since there is no loan account receivable owned by anyone, payments received from homeowners are not posted to such an account nor to the benefit of any owner of such an account (or the underlying obligation). Instead, accounting for such payments are either reported as “return of capital” or “trading profits.” In fact, such payments are neither return of capital nor trading profit. Since the investment bank has already zeroed out any potential loan account receivable, the only correct treatment of the payment for accounting purposes would be “revenue.” This includes the indirect receipt of proceeds from the forced sale of property in alleged “foreclosures.”
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By retaining total control over the accounting treatment for receipt of money from investors and homeowners, the investment bank retains total control over how much taxable income it reports. At present, most of the money that was received by the investment bank as part of this revenue scheme is still sitting offshore in various accounts and controlled companies. It is repatriated as needed for the purpose of reporting revenue and net income for investment banks whose stock is traded on the open market. By some fairly reliable estimates, the amount of money held by investment banks offshore is at least $3 trillion. In my opinion, the amount is much larger than that.
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As a baseline for corroboration of some of the estimates and projections contained in this article and many others, we should consider the difference between the current amount of all the fiat money in the world and the number and dollar amount of cash-equivalents in the shadow banking market. In 1983, the number and dollar amount of such cash equivalents was zero. Today it is $1.4 quadrillion — around 15-20 times the amount of currency.
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Success in Litigation Depends Upon Litigation Skills: FOCUS

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I have either been lead counsel or legal consultant in thousands of successful cases defending Foreclosure. Thousands of others have been reported to me where they used my strategies to litigate. Many of them resulted in a judgment for the homeowner, but the majority were settled under the seal of confidentiality.
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Thousands more have reported failure. In reviewing those cases it was clear that they were either litigated pro se or by attorneys who were not skilled in trial practice and who had no idea of the principles contained in this article and my many other articles on this blog. I would describe the reason for these failures as “too little too late.” In some ways, the courts are designed more to be final than to be fair. There are specific ways that information becomes evidence. Most people in litigation do not understand the ways that information becomes evidence and therefore fail to object to the foundation, best evidence, hearsay etc.
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Even the people that submit wee phrased and timely discovery demands fail, more often than not, to move for an order to compel when the opposition fails or refuses to answer the simple questions bout the establishment, existence, and ownership of the underlying alleged obligation, debt, note or mortgage. Or they failed to ask for a hearing on the motion to compel, in which case the discovery is waived. Complaining about the failure to answer discovery during the trial when there was no effort to enforce discovery is both useless and an undermining of the credibility of the defense.
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Since I have been litigating cases for around 45 years, I don’t expect younger attorneys to be as well-versed and intuitive in a courtroom as I have been. It’s also true that many lawyers, both older and younger than me, have greater skills than I have. But it is a rare layperson that can win one of these cases without specific training knowledge and experience in motion practice and trial law.
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In the final analysis, if the truth was fully revealed, each foreclosure involves a foreclosure lawyer who does not have any idea whose interest he/she is representing. They may know that they are being paid from an account titled in the name of the self-proclaimed servicer. And because of that, they will often make the mistake of saying that they represent the servicer. They are pretty careful about not specifically saying that the named plaintiff in a judicial foreclosure or the named beneficiary in a nonjudicial foreclosure is their client. That is because they have no retainer agreement or even a relationship with the named plaintiff or the named beneficiary. Such lawyers have generally never spoken with anyone employed by the named plaintiff or the named beneficiary.
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When such lawyers and self-proclaimed servicers go to court-ordered mediation, neither one has the authority to do anything except show up. Proving that the lawyer does not actually represent the named trustee of the fictitious trust can be very challenging. But there are two possible strategies that definitely work.
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The first is to do your legal research and find the cases in which investors have sued the named trustee of the alleged REMIC trust for failure to take action that would’ve protected the interest of the investors.
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The outcome of all such cases is a finding by the court that the trustee does not represent the investors, the investors are not beneficiaries of the “Trust,” and that the trustee has no authority, right, title, or interest over any transaction with homeowners. Since the named trustee has no powers of a trustee to administer the affairs of any active trust with assets or a business operating, it is by definition not a trustee. For purposes of the foreclosure, it cannot be a named party either much less the client of the attorney, behind whom the securitization players are hiding because of a judicial doctrine called “judicial immunity.”
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The second thing you can do is to ask, probably during mediation at the start, whether the lawyer who shows up is representing for example “U.S. Bank.” Or you might ask whether US Bank is the client of the lawyer. The answer might surprise you. In some cases, the lawyer insisted that they represented “Ocwen” or some other self-proclaimed servicer.
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Keep in mind that when you go to mediation, frequently happens that it is attended by a “coverage lawyer” who might not even be employed by the Foreclosure bill. Such a lawyer clearly knows nothing about the parties or the case and will be confused even by the most basic questions. If they fail to affirm that they represent the named trustee of the named fictitious trust, that is the time to stop  the proceeding and file a motion for contempt for failure to appear (i.e., failure of the named plaintiff or beneficiary to appear since no employee or authorized representative appeared.)
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And the third thing that I have done with some success is to make an offer. You will find in most cases that they are unwilling and unable to accept or reject the offer. A substantial offer will put them in a very bad position. Remember you are dealing with a lawyer and a representative from the alleged servicer who actually don’t know what’s going on. Everyone is on a “need to know” footing.
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So if you make an offer that the lawyer thinks could possibly be reasonable and might be acceptable to an actual lender who was holding the loan account receivable, the lawyer might be stuck between a rock and a hard place. Rejection of an offer that the client might want to accept without notifying the client is contrary to bar rules.
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But both the lawyer and the representative of the alleged servicer know that they have no authority. So they will often ask for a continuance or adjournment of the mediation. At that point, the homeowner is well within their rights to file a motion for contempt. In most cases, the court order for mediation requires that both parties attend with full authority to settle the case. In plain language, there is no reason for the adjournment. But they need it because they know they have no authority contrary to the order mandating mediation. Many judges have partially caught on to this problem and instruct the foreclosure mill lawyer to make sure he doesn’t need to “make a call.”
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Every good trial lawyer knows that they must have a story to tell or else, even if the client is completely right, they are likely to lose. You must focus on the main issues.
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The main issue in foreclosure is the establishment, existence, and ownership of the alleged underlying obligation. All of that is going to be presumed unless you demonstrate to the court that you are seeking to rebut those presumptions. There can be no default and hence no remedy is there is either no obligation or no ownership of the obligation by the complaining party.
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Discovery demands should be drafted with an eye towards what will be a motion to compel and proposed order on the motion to compel. They should also be drafted with an eye toward filing a motion in limine. Having failed and refused to answer basic questions about the establishment, existence, and ownership of the alleged underlying obligation, the motion in limine would ask the court to limit the ability of the foreclosure mill to put on any evidence that the obligation exists or is owned by the named Plaintiff or beneficiary. They can’t have it both ways.
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Failure to follow up is the same thing as waiving your defenses or defense narrative.
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So that concludes my current attempt to explain how to win Foreclosure cases for the homeowner. I hope it helps.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
  • Yes you DO need a lawyer.
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Filed under: CORRUPTION, discovery, Discovery -Subpoena, evidence, foreclosure mill, investment banking, Investor, legal standing, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Motions, originator, Presumptions, prima facie case, securities fraud, standing, TILA, TRIAL OBJECTIONS | Tagged: , , , | 5 Comments »

Older Forensic Title Analyses Need Updating — Even Ours

Posted on December 21, 2018 by Neil Garfield
 A recent request from an old client brought to mind the changes that have occurred, as in her case, since 2011 — more than 7 years ago.
A quick review indicates that the facts were correct but the conclusions need tweaking. And the title record should be updated. Many new laws and case decisions have occurred since that report was finished and many new facts have been revealed about these older transactions.

For example it now appears that our assumption about the flow of payments was incorrect.
  1. Your payments were being made to a subservicer who was forwarding money on a separate contract to a Master Servicer.
  2. The Master Servicer then authorized, in its sole discretion, third parties to make certain payments to investors who had purchased certificates issued in the name of a trust, which turns out to not exist.
  3. The trust name was being used as a fictitious name for the named underwriter of the certificate offering. But the actual transaction was not an underwriting; it was simply a sale by the party posing as underwriter (implying it was working for a third party, presumably the nonexistent trust).
  4. By contract, the investors purchased their right to receive money arising out of a promise to pay issued by the named underwriter (i.e., seller) that was unrelated to the terms of repayment on any note.
  5. And most importantly the investors waived any right, title or interest to the loans, debts, notes or mortgages.
  6. Thus you can see that actions undertaken in the name of the holders of certificates or a REMIC Trust or the Trustee of a REMIC trust are all fabricated, to hide the fact that the obligation of the borrower has been transformed into an unsecured obligation to pay intermediaries who converted the investors’ money and thus claim to be principals entitled to enforce a debt in which they had no investment.
  7. Most of the documents uploaded to SEC.gov, if at all, are either unsigned or incomplete (or both) lacking a mortgage loan schedule or any reference to a particular loan. Such documents are ONLY uploaded to SEC.GOV which has no power to charter or approve any entities nor their filings, as long as they have been granted access to upload documents. Their existence on SEC.GOV means nothing.
  8. An assignment without actual transfer of the debt is without effect. In virtually all cases involving false claims of securitization no payment of any kind was ever made by any party in the chain for the origination or purchase of the loan. Our Case Analysis examines the issues arising from transfer of a promissory note which can cause legal presumptions to arise concerning ownership of the debt and transfers thereof.
  9. Analysis of the fictitious “trust” documents reveals the absence of essential elements of a trust hence leading to the conclusion that no actual trust was intended notwithstanding the illusions and implications contained in the documents themselves and the representations of attorneys and representatives of “servicers” to the contrary. Upon case analysis (apart from title analysis contained in our TERA report) the following basic elements of a trust are usually absent.
    1. Complete signed trust instrument
    2. Trustee with powers to administer the affairs of the trust and the trust assets
    3. Trustor/settlor creating the trust.
    4. Beneficiaries of the trust
    5. RES: anything that has been entrusted to the named trustee to manage on behalf of the beneficiaries
My suggestion, if the issues are still pending, is that you order the current TERA and the PDR PLUS, which includes a recorded CONSULT.
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Filed under: CORRUPTION, discovery, expert witness, Fabrication of documents, foreclosure, forensic investigation, forgery, Investor, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

Discovery Changes and Broadens After Hawaii Supreme Court Decision

Posted on October 15, 2018 by Neil Garfield

Based on questions that greeted me when I got to my desk this morning, here are just some of the thoughts that apply — a case review and analysis for each case being necessary to actually draft the right questions and to close any trap doors.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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NOTE: Procedural questions should be posed to local counsel who knows local discovery rules and court procedure. My answer is based upon general knowledge and not based upon any experience in litigating discovery issues in your state.
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The effect of the new decision in the link above is most probably (a) a broadening of existing discovery requests (b) rehearings on recent decisions denying discovery and (c) an opportunity and a reason to ask the questions you really want to ask.
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The first question is whether the questions you would ask now are already within the scope of the questions you have already asked. If so, generally speaking, there is nothing to do. In this scenario you could send a letter, I think, that clarifies your questions in view of the new Supreme Court ruling. The letter would specifically address certain issues that were raised in questions already asked and tells them the details you expect. This could be done in a supplemental request for discovery citing the new Supreme Court decision. Check with local counsel.
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Second, and this is more likely, your case should be analyzed within the context of the new decision. It seems to me that the decision opens up some broader scope of discovery than had previously been submitted. Your opposition will fight this tooth and nail. Pointing to the Hawaii Supreme Court decision is not going to be enough even if the property is in Hawaii. You need to have a very clear narrative that explains why you are asking for the answers to questions and the production of documents and answers to request for admissions. Without a clear defense narrative your first Motion to Compel them to respond will likely fail. The general rule is that discovery, with certain exceptions, can be any request that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. By “admissible” the meaning is evidence that is relevant and “probative” to the truth of the matter asserted. It isn’t relevant unless it ties into either the case against you or the defense narrative. Lack of clarity can be fatal.
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The opposition is going to claim privilege, privacy, and proprietary information. You should force them to be more specific as to how the identification of the creditor is proprietary, or an invasion of privacy or some privilege. Tactically I would let them paint themselves into a corner, so you need someone who knows how to litigate. Once it is established that they can’t or won’t disclose the matters into which you have inquired, then the question becomes how they will prove authority from the creditor without identification of the creditor from whom all authority flows.
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That could lead to a motion for summary judgment wherein you allege that they have failed and refused to make disclosure as to the most fundamental aspect of pleading a case. Since their authorization to initiate and maintain a foreclosure action must relate back to the authorization of the creditor (owner of the debt) and they now have not or will not identify that party(ies), the presumption of authority must be considered rebutted, thus requiring them to prove their case with facts and not with the benefit of legal presumptions.
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Since they have admitted on record that they cannot prove they are acting on behalf of the creditor, it follows that they cannot prove authority to initiate or maintain a foreclosure action. Hence, the outcome is certain. They will not be able to prove standing although they might have made certain assertions or allegations that might pass for standing such that they can withstand a motion to dismiss or demurrer. The essential assertion of standing is either rebutted or barred from proof. Hence judgment should be entered for the homeowner.
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Some of this might come out in a motion for sanctions which is virtually certain to come from you when they fail to properly respond to your requests for discovery. This is intricate litigation that should be handled by a local attorney.
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Again don’t start a second front in the battle if you have already covered it in your previously submitted requests for discovery. I think you have asked most of the right questions, although now with this decision it becomes more refined.Among the questions I would ask in view of the new decision from the Supreme Court of Hawaii are the following presented only as narrative draft, subject to improvement by local counsel:
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  1. Does the trust exist under the laws of any jurisdiction? If yes, describe the jurisdiction in which the trust is recognized as existing.
  2. Was the trust organized under the laws of any jurisdiction? If yes, when and where?
  3. Does the trust own the subject debt? If yes, please explain why the trust is not claimed as a holder in due course.
  4. Does the trust allow the beneficiaries an interest in the assets of the trust?
  5. Please describe the manner in which the certificate holders are beneficiaries of a trust.
  6. Does the named Trustee of the Trust have any rights or obligations to monitor trust assets?
  7. Does the named Trustee of the Trust engage in any activities in which it is administering the assets of the Trust.
  8. Describe the assets of the Trust.
  9. Please identify the Trustor or Settlor of the Trust.
  10. Please identify the date, place and parties involved in any transaction in which assets were entrusted to the named trustee for the benefit of named or described beneficiaries.
  11. Please identify the date, place and parties involved in any transaction in which assets were purchased by the Trust or in which a Trustor or Settlor purchased assets that were then entrusted to the named trustee of the Trust for the benefit of named or described beneficiaries.
  12. Is the named Trust a fictitious name being used by one or more other entities?
  13. Do the certificates contain provisions in which the holder of the certificate disclaims any right, title or interest to assets of the Trust or any right, title or interest to the subject loan? If yes, please describe the provision, in what document it is located, the date of the document, and where that document currently exists in the care, custody and/or control of the Trust or any party doing business as or on behalf of the named Trust.
  14. Please describe the owner of the debt, to wit: describe the party currently carrying a receivable on its books that includes the subject loan, wherein no other party is ultimately entitled to proceeds of payments, proceeds or recovery on the subject loan.
  15. Is it your contention that residential foreclosure is legally allowed without ownership of the underlying debt from the borrower? If so, describe the elements of a party who would be legally allowed to foreclose on a residential mortgage without ownership of the underlying debt.
  16. Does the Trust have a bank account in the name of the Trust?
  17. Does the Trust have a bank account in the name of the named Trustee as Trustee for the Trust.
  18. If the answer to either of the two preceding question is yes, please describe the account, its location and identify the signatories on said account.
  19. Please describe the retainer agreement between the named Trust and current counsel of record including all the parties thereto, the date(s) of execution and date that the agreement became effective, the names of the signatories, and their authority to execute the instrument.
  20. With respect to loans attributed to or allegedly owned by the Trust please describe the parties who make decisions, along with a description of their authority, with respect to the following relating to the subject loan:
    1. Whether to foreclose
    2. When to foreclose
    3. What documents are needed for foreclosure
    4. Applications for modification
    5. Terms of modification
    6. Terms for settlement of the debt

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

Same Old Story: Paper Trail vs, Money Trail (Freddie Mac)

Posted on May 15, 2018 by Neil Garfield

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

The explanations of securitization contained on the websites of the government Sponsored Entities (GSE’s) clearly demonstrate what I have been writing for 11 years and reveal a pattern of illusion and deception.

The most important thing about a financial transaction is the money. In every document filed in support of the illusion of securitization, it steadfastly holds firm to discussion of paper instruments and not a word about the actual location of the money or the actual identity of the obligee of that money debt.

Each explanation avoids the issue of where the money goes and how it was “processed” (i.e., stolen, according to me and hundreds of other scholars.)

It underscores the fact that the obligee (“debt owner” or “holder in due course” is never present in any legal proceeding or actual transaction or transfer of of the debt. This leaves us with only one  conclusion. The debt never moved, which is to say that the obligee was always the same, albeit unaware of their status.

Knowing this will help you get traction in the courtroom but alleging it creates a burden of proof for you to prove something that you know is true but can only be confirmed with access to the books, records an accounts of the parties claiming such transactions ands transfers occurred.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

For one such example see Freddie Mac Securitization Explanation

And the following diagram:

Freddie Mac Diagram of Securitization

What you won’t find anywhere in any diagram supposedly depicting securitization:

  1. Money going to an originator who then lends the money to the borrower.
  2. Money going to a named REMIC “Trust” for the purpose of purchasing loans or anything else.
  3. Money going to the alleged unnamed beneficiaries of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  4. Money going to the alleged unnamed investors who allegedly purchased “certificates” allegedly issued by or on behalf of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  5. Money going to the originator for sale of the debt, note and mortgage package.
  6. Money going to originator for endorsement of note to alleged transferee.
  7. Money going to originator for assignment of mortgage.
  8. Money going to the named foreclosing party upon liquidation of foreclosed property. 
  9. Money going to the homeowner as royalty for use of his/her/their identity forming the basis of value in issuance of derivatives, hedge products and contract, insurance products and synthetic derivatives.
  10. Money being credited to the obligee’s loan receivable account reducing the amount of indebtedness (yes, really). This is because the obligee has no idea where the money is coming from or why it is being paid. But one thing is sure — the obligee is receiving money in all circumstances.

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

Filed under: boarding process, BURDEN OF PROOF, CORRUPTION, discovery, Discovery -Subpoena, escrow agent, evidence, Fabrication of documents, foreclosure, Investor, legal standing, securities fraud, Servicer, sham transactions, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 18 Comments »

STANDING: Fla. 4th DCA Rules PSA Hearsay and Therefore Not Admissible — Case Dismissed

Posted on October 31, 2017 by Neil Garfield

The Pooling and Servicing Agreement MIGHT be self-authenticating under F.S. 90.902 but still inadmissible as hearsay. Thus the PSA is NOT a substitute for evidence of an actual transfer of the loan to a purported REMIC trust.

PLUS: PRESUMPTION OF STANDING DOES NOT APPLY IF THE NOTE AT TRIAL IS DIFFERENT FROM THE NOTE ATTACHED TO THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT. “The note attached to the complaint was not in the same condition as the original produced at trial.”

NO PRESUMPTION: “where the copy [attached to the complaint] differs from the original, the copy could have been made at a significantly earlier time and does not carry the same inference of possession at the filing of the complaint.”

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
See Fla 4th DCA Case PSA Hearsay and Diffferent Note
Friedle v BONY as successor in interest to JPM Chase, as Trustee
“the PSA purportedly establishes a trust of pooled mortgages.[e.s.].. [this] particular mortgage  was not referenced in the documents filed with the SEC … [the Plaintiff] did not present sufficient evidence through its witness to admit this unsigned document [e.s.] as its business record. While the witness testified that a mortgage loan schedule, which listed the subject mortgage, was part of the Bank’s business records, the mortgage loan schedule itself does not purport to show that the actual loan was physically transferred.” [e.s.]
*
Here we have a court openly questioning whether claims of securitization are real or false. But they limit their opinion to the specific defects that arise from fatally defective evidence. And THAT is the way to win — i.e., to successfully defend an attempt at foreclosure.
*
Those who follow my work here know that I have long said that the Trusts are empty and that the use of the name of the Trust is a fraud upon the court, since the Trust does not exist and the Trustee has no apparent or actual authority over any loans. If the Trustee has not received a particular loan to hold in trust, there is no trust — at least not as to that particular loan.
*
You may also recall that I have repeatedly said starting in 2007, that there is no evidence that the notes exist after the alleged loan closings. As Katherine Ann Porter found when she did her study at the University of Iowa, the original notes were destroyed. Hence it has been my opinion that the “original” notes had to be fabricated and forged. Porter is the same Katie Porter who is now running for Congress in California. She wants to hold the banks accountable for their fraud.
*
Interestingly enough the trial judge in this case was the same Senior Judge (Kathleen Ireland) as in a case I won with Patrick Giunta back in 2014 in which she said on record that the evidence was not real and dismissed the foreclosure case in that instance. Here she received the PSA as a self authenticating document. While I think that point is arguable, this case turns on the hearsay objection timely made by counsel for the homeowner. The point that has been missed and is missed across the country is that just because a document is authenticated — by any means — does not mean it is admissible into evidence. It is not admissible in evidence if it is excluded by other rules of evidence.
*
The words on the PSA introduced at trial were plainly hearsay — just as the words in any document are hearsay. Apparently, as I have seen in other cases, the document as also unsigned. The words on the PSA are not admissible unless there is a qualifying exception to the hearsay rule. As such the appellate court ruled that the PSA had to be excluded from evidence. Since the Plaintiff was attempting to foreclose based upon authority granted in the PSA, Plaintiff was left standing naked in the wind because for purposes of this case, there was no PSA and therefore no authority.
*
Plaintiff tried to make a case for the business records exclusion. But that cornered them.

In this case, the foreclosing bank’s witness could not testify that the Bank had possession of the note prior to filing the complaint. The Bank conceded that it presented no testimony that its present servicer or its prior servicer had possession of the note at the inception of the foreclosure action.

And at trial, Plaintiff attempted to prove possession by introduction of the PSA. Without possession there is no legal standing.

The Bank did not present sufficient evidence through its witness to admit this unsigned document as its business record.

*

And there is the problem. The “servicer” (who also derives its purported authority ultimately from the PSA) cannot claim that the PSA is part of its business records without opening a door that the banks want to avoid. Even if the “servicer” had a copy of the PSA it could not state that this was a business record of the servicer nor that it was a copy of the original. If they did say that, then they would be opening the door for discovery, so far denied in most instances, into who gave the “servicer” the copy and why. it would also open up discovery into the business records of the trust, which would reveal a “hologram of an empty paper bag” as I put it 10 years ago.

*

No PSA, no trust, = no plaintiff or beneficiary. Note that the testimony from the robo-witness employed by the subservicer scrupulously avoids saying that the “business records” are the records of the Plaintiff. That is implied but never stated because they are not business records of the Plaintiff Trust. That trust has no business, no assets and no existence as to any loan. The trust has no business records. That implication  should be attacked in cross examination. The foreclosing party will attempt to use circular reasoning to defeat your attack. But in the end they are relying upon the PSA which must be excluded from evidence.

*

Lastly, this decision corroborates another thing I have been saying for years — that even minor changes on the face of an original instrument must be explained and reconciled. There is nothing wrong with putting annotations on the face of a note but you do so at your own risk. Whatever you have written or stamped on the note is an alteration. That doesn’t invalidate the note; but in order for the note to be received in evidence as proving the debt, the markings or alterations must be explained and reconciled by a witness with personal knowledge. None of the robo-witnesses have sufficient knowledge (or room in their memorized script) to explain all the markings.

*

The mistake made by trial lawyers for homeowners is the failure to make a timely objection. The appellate court specifically addresses this in a footnote as it reconciles this opinion which is vastly different from its other opinions:

1 We have held in past cases that the PSA together with a mortgage loan schedule are sufficient to prove standing, but in those cases the witness offering the evidence appears to have been able to testify to the relationship of the various documents and their workings, or that the documents were admitted into evidence without objection. See, e.g., Boulous v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 210 So. 3d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

*

The court is pointing defense lawyers in the right direction without actually giving legal advice. They are saying that had cross examination been more proficient and a timely objection made they would have ruled this before. That may or may not be true. But the point is that they have now issued this ruling and it is law in the 4th DCA of Florida.

PRACTICE NOTE: I think the objections in this case could have been any or all of the following:
  1. OBJECTION! From the face-off the document there are no identifying stamps or marks that could be used to authenticate the PSA. Hence the document is not self-authenticating.
  2. OBJECTION! The document is unsigned, Hence the document is irrelevant.
  3. OBJECTION! The unsigned copy of a document is not the best evidence of the PSA as a trust instrument, if indeed one exists. 
  4. OBJECTION! Lack of foundation. If the Plaintiff is attempting to use the document anyway, counsel must elicit testimony and documents that provide an alternate foundation for admission of the PSA and an alternate foundation for authority that, so far, they claim arises from the PSA that cannot be admitted into evidence.
  5. OBJECTION! Hearsay! The document is and contains hearsay. There is no foundation for any exception to hearsay.

If the objection(s) is sustained, this should be followed by a Motion to Strike the testimony of the witness and all documents introduced as evidence except for his name and address. If you don’t do this your objection is sustained but the offending testimony and documents stay in the court record.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , | 6 Comments »

9th Circuit: Assignment in Breach of PSA is Voidable not Void. Here is why they are wrong

Posted on June 21, 2017 by Neil Garfield

The thousands of trial court and appellate decisions that have hung their hat on illegal assignments being “voidable” demonstrates either a lack of understanding of common law business trusts or an adherence to a faulty doctrine in which homeowners pay the price for fraudulent bank activities.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see Turner v Wells Fargo

Some of the problems might be in the presentation of evidence, failures to object and failure to move to strike evidence or testimony. But most of it deals with the inability of lawyers and the Courts to pierce the veil of uncertainty and complexity with which the banks have covered their fraudulent tracks.

Here are the reasons the assignment might be void. No self-serving newly invented doctrine can overcome the failure of an illegal assignment.

  1. Common Law Trusts are almost always formed under New York State law that allows unregistered trusts to be created for business purposes. Any act in contravention of the express provisions of the trust instrument (usually the Pooling and Servicing Agreement) is void, not voidable. It cannot be revived through ratification — especially when there is nobody around to change the trust instrument, thus ratifying the void act.
  2. Many if not most assignments are fabricated for foreclosure and either nonexistent or backdated to avoid the fact that the assignment is void when it is fabricated — years after the so-called trust was described in a trust instrument that is rarely complete because no mortgage loan schedule at the time of the drafting of what is in most cases an incomplete trust instrument.
  3. Assignments are clearly void and not entitled to any presumptions under the UCC if they are dated after the loan was declared in default (albeit by a party who had no right to declare a default much less enforce the debt or obtain a forced sale of homestead and other residential properties) schedule existed at the time of the drafting of the trust instrument. The application of UCC presumptions after the alleged date of default is simply wrong.
  4. The fact that an instrument COULD be ratified does not mean that it WAS ratified. What is before the court is an illegal act that has not been ratified. The possibility that the parties to the trust instrument (trustor, trustee, beneficiaries) could change the instrument to allow the illegal act AND apply it retroactively is merely speculative — and against all legal doctrine and common sense. These courts are ruling on the possibility of a nonexistent act that without analysis of the trust instrument, is declared to be possibly subject to “ratification.”
  5. Assuming the trust even exists on paper does not mean that it ever entered into an actual transaction in which it acquired the “loan” which means the debt, note and mortgage.
  6. Any “waiver” or “ratification” would result in the loss of REMIC status under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code. No rational beneficiary would ratify the act of accepting even a performing loan after the cutoff period. To do so would change the nature of the trust from a REMIC vehicle entitled to pass through tax treatment. Hence even if the beneficiaries were entitled to change, alter, amend or modify the trust instrument they would be firing a tax bullet into their own heads.  Every penny received by a beneficiary would be then be taxed as ordinary income including return of principal.
  7. No rational beneficiary would be willing to change the trust instrument from accepting only properly underwritten performing loans to loans already declared in default.
  8. No Trustee, or beneficiary has the power to change the terms of the trust or to ratify an illegal act.
  9. In fact the trust instrument specifically prohibits the trustee and beneficiaries from knowing or even asking about the status of loans in the trust. Under what reasonable scenario could anyone even know that they were getting a non-performing loan outside the 90 day cutoff period.
  10. The very act of introducing the possibility of ratification where none exists under the trust instrument is the adjudication of rights of senior investors who are not present in court nor given notice of its proceeding. Such decisions are precedent for other defenses and claims in which the trust instrument could be changed to the detriment of the beneficiaries.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

Ally $52 Million settlement for “Deficient Securitization”

Posted on November 25, 2016 by Neil Garfield

All of these adjectives describing securitization add up to one thing: the claims were false. For the most part none of the securitizations ever happened.

And that means that the REMIC trusts never purchased the debt, note or mortgage.

And THAT means the “servicer” claiming the right to administer a loan on behalf of the trust is false.

And THAT arguably means the business records of the servicer are not business records of the creditor.

And THAT my friends means what I have been saying for 10 years: virtually none of the foreclosures were legal, moral or justified. The real transaction was never revealed and never documented. The “closing” documents were fake, void and fraudulent. And THAT is grounds for cancellation of the note and mortgage.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/compliance-regulation/ally-to-pay-52m-to-settle-subprime-rmbs-investigation-1091364-1.html

It is hard to imagine any scenario under which Government cannot know what I have been saying for years — that the claims of securitization are false and the documents for the loans were fraudulent. Government has decided to ignore the facts thus transforming a nation of laws into a nation of men.

In plain English the decision was made to let the chips fall on borrowers, who were victims of the double blind fraud, despite clear and irrefutable evidence that the banks malevolent behavior caused the 2008 meltdown. The choice was made: based upon information from the birthplace of securitization fraud, Government decided that it was better to artificially prop up the securities markets and TBTF banks than to preserve the purchasing power and household wealth of the ordinary man and woman. The economy — driven by consumer spending (70% of GDP) — had the rug pulled out from under it. And THAT is why the effects of rescission are still with us 8 years after the great meltdown.

The fact that there are 7,000 community banks, credit unions and savings banks using the exact same electronic payments platform as the TBTF banks was washed aside by the enormous influence exerted by a dozen banks who controlled Washington, DC, the state legislatures, and the executive branch in most of the states.

The American voter came to understand that they had been screwed by their representatives in Government. They voted for Sanders, they voted for Trump and they voted for anyone who was for busting up government. But they still face daunting challenges as they continue to crash into a rigged system that favors a handful of merciless bankers who have bought their way into the Federal and State Capitals.

Chipping away at the monolithic Government Financial complex individual homeowners are winning case after case in court without notice by the media. It isn’t noticed because in most instances the cases are settled, even after judgment, with a seal of confidentiality. Most people don’t fight it at all. They sweep up and leave the keys on the counter believing they have committed some wrong and now they must pay the price. THAT is because they have not received the necessary information to realize that they can and should fight back.

Filed under: CORRUPTION, credit unions, discovery, foreclosure, Government Financial Complex, GTC | Honor, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: , , , , , , | 11 Comments »

Deutsch Bank: Going Down With the Details

Posted on September 7, 2016 by Neil Garfield

It is getting increasingly obvious to the courts that there is something inherently wrong with foreclosures. The substitutions without leave of court and the repeated filing for foreclosure on the same default are coming back to bite the ‘securitization fail” scheme of the banks.

see http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202766695379/Deutsche-Bank-Trust-Co-Americas-v-Smith-20152381?kw=Deutsche%20Bank%20Trust%20Co.%20Americas%20v.%20Smith%2C%202015-2381&cn=20160907&pt=Daily%20Decisions&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=New%20York%20Law%20Journal&slreturn=20160807093854

If you start with the premise that the trusts were never funded and therefore never existed, everything starts to make sense. In ordinary circumstances with ordinary loans the pronouncement of every bank foreclosure attorney rings hollow: “Judge this is a standard foreclosure.” If that were true they wouldn’t be losing cases procedurally, allowing them to linger sometimes for a decade or more, and they wouldn’t be trying to slip in a “substitution of Plaintiff” without leave of court. And they probably would not be foreclosing on so many dead people.

This case, decided today, gives us an example of how things can go wrong for the banks, servicers and trustees. But first I would remind the reader that virtually all foreclosures over the past 10 years have been allowed without admissible evidence or pleading. They have succeeded in foreclosing based upon two elements: (1) fabricated paper and (2) getting a judge to apply legal presumptions that are contrary to the true facts. The banks have been helped by the judicial aversion to the “free house” myth, and the corollary myth that if the foreclosure is allowed to proceed, nobody is getting a free house. Neither myth is true.

So in this case there are two points made. First that New York like many states operates under the rule that if the case has been “discontinued” (i.e., dismissed twice) the third attempt should be dismissed because the two prior dismissals operate, as a matter of law, as an adjudication on the merits, meaning that res judicata applies. This is narrowly applied to those cases where the allegations are essentially the same as the two prior cases.

In prior decades I represented lenders and homeowner associations enforcing their liens by foreclosure. It was a rare occurrence that we ever had to go into court more than once to prove our case, and rarer still that we had our case dismissed because of inaction or refusal to answer discovery. Now it is practically the rule that the foreclosure cases are vetted on whether they are contested or not. Those cases that are contested are pushed to the back of the line because that is where the foreclosing parties, strangers to the transaction, are vulnerable to losing their spurious claims.

Since most foreclosures are uncontested, these banks, servicers and trustees are free to get their foreclosure judgments and forced sales without objection from anyone by a factor of roughly 25:1. So the banks are playing the odds. For every case that is contested it is best for banks to delay it while they get 25 others through without objection. But the Courts are catching up with this strategy and it won’t be long before some very strong orders are entered demanding explanations of what is really going on. The time is coming when we return to the days when judges scrutinized the foreclosures and asked pointed questions even in uncontested cases.

In prior times the lender or association would always show its records if it was demanded by the homeowner or property owner. Now despite a new Federal rule preventing blanket objections, banks routinely object to all or nearly all of the requests in discovery, frequently resulting in an order to compel discovery which is often ignored resulting in dismissal.

The other point raised by the Court was the practice of simply changing the style of the case by inserting a new or “corrected” name of the Plaintiff or foreclosing party. The principle is simple: if you want to substitute parties you need leave of court. In order to get permission you need to recite the facts under which the original lawsuit was correctly filed but now, as the result of intervening events, it needs to be prosecuted in favor of a new party. Often this requires an amendment to the complaint in a judicial state. This general rule is now universally rejected by the banks who have convinced judges to ignore the rules and allow the change in the name of the case — instead of demanding an explanation of the change.

The Banks don’t want to explain it because they have no reasonable explanation for changing the parties around. It is often done for strategic reasons rather than substantive reasons — neither of the Plaintiffs — old or new — having any interest in the loan, debt, note or mortgage.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , | 7 Comments »

Problems with Lehman and Aurora

Posted on August 23, 2016 by Neil Garfield

Lehman had nothing to do with the loan even at the beginning when the loan was funded, it acted as a conduit for investor funds that were being misappropriated, the loan was “sold” or “transferred” to a REMIC Trust, and the assets of Lehman were put into a bankruptcy estate as a matter of law.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

—————-
I keep receiving the same question from multiple sources about the loans “originated” by Lehman, MERS involvement, and Aurora. Here is my short answer:
 *

Yes it means that technically the mortgage and note went in two different directions. BUT in nearly all courts of law the Judge overlooks this problem despite clear law to the contrary in Florida Statutes adopting the UCC.

The stamped endorsement at closing indicates that the loan was pre-sold to Lehman in an Assignment and Assumption Agreement (AAA)— which is basically a contract that violates public policy. It violates public policy because it withholds the name of the lender — a basic disclosure contained in the Truth in Lending Act in order to make certain that the borrower knows with whom he is expected to do business.

 *
Choice of lender is one of the fundamental requirements of TILA. For the past 20 years virtually everyone in the “lending chain” violated this basic principal of public policy and law. That includes originators, MERS, mortgage brokers, closing agents (to the extent they were actually aware of the switch), Trusts, Trustees, Master Servicers (were in most cases the underwriter of the nonexistent “Trust”) et al.
 *
The AAA also requires withholding the name of the conduit (Lehman). This means it was a table funded loan on steroids. That is ruled as a matter of law to be “predatory per se” by Reg Z.  It allows Lehman, as a conduit, to immediately receive “ownership” of the note and mortgage (or its designated nominee/agent MERS).
 *

Lehman was using funds from investors to fund the loan — a direct violation of (a) what they told investors, who thought their money was going into a trust for management and (b) what they told the court, was that they were the lender. In other words the funding of the loan is the point in time when Lehman converted (stole) the funds of the investors.

Knowing Lehman practices at the time, it is virtually certain that the loan was immediately subject to CLAIMS of securitization. The hidden problem is that the claims from the REMIC Trust were not true. The trust having never been funded, never purchased the loan.

*

The second hidden problem is that the Lehman bankruptcy would have put the loan into the bankruptcy estate. So regardless of whether the loan was already “sold” into the secondary market for securitization or “transferred” to a REMIC trust or it was in fact owned by Lehman after the bankruptcy, there can be no valid document or instrument executed by Lehman after that time (either the date of “closing” or the date of bankruptcy, 2008).

*

The reason is simple — Lehman had nothing to do with the loan even at the beginning when the loan was funded, it acted as a conduit for investor funds that were being misappropriated, the loan was “sold” or “transferred” to a REMIC Trust, and the assets of Lehman were put into a bankruptcy estate as a matter of law.

*

The problems are further compounded by the fact that the “servicer” (Aurora) now claims alternatively that it is either the owner or servicer of the loan or both. Aurora was basically a controlled entity of Lehman.

It is impossible to fund a trust that claims the loan because that “reporting” process was controlled by Lehman and then Aurora.

*

So they could say whatever they wanted to MERS and to the world. At one time there probably was a trust named as owner of the loan but that data has long since been erased unless it can be recovered from the MERS archives.

*

Now we have an emerging further complicating issue. Fannie claims it owns the loan, also a claim that is untrue like all the other claims. Fannie is not a lender. Fannie acts a guarantor or Master trustee of REMIC Trusts. It generally uses the mortgage bonds issued by the REMIC trust to “purchase” the loans. But those bonds were worthless because the Trust never received the proceeds of sale of the mortgage bonds to investors. Thus it had no ability to purchase loan because it had no money, business or other assets.

But in 2008-2009 the government funded the cash purchase of the loans by Fannie and Freddie while the Federal Reserve outright paid cash for the mortgage bonds, which they purchased from the banks.

The problem with that scenario is that the banks did not own the loans and did not own the bonds. Yet the banks were the “sellers.” So my conclusion is that the emergence of Fannie is just one more layer of confusion being added to an already convoluted scheme and the Judge will be looking for a way to “simplify” it thus raising the danger that the Judge will ignore the parts of the chain that are clearly broken.

Bottom Line: it was the investors funds that were used to fund loans — but only part of the investors funds went to loans. The rest went into the pocket of the underwriter (investment bank) as was recorded either as fees or “trading profits” from a trading desk that was performing nonexistent sales to nonexistent trusts of nonexistent loan contracts.

The essential legal problem is this: the investors involuntarily made loans without representation at closing. Hence no loan contract was ever formed to protect them. The parties in between were all acting as though the loan contract existed and reflected the intent of both the borrower and the “lender” investors.

The solution is for investors to fire the intermediaries and create their own and then approach the borrowers who in most cases would be happy to execute a real mortgage and note. This would fix the amount of damages to be recovered from the investment bankers. And it would stop the hemorrhaging of value from what should be (but isn’t) a secured asset. And of course it would end the foreclosure nightmare where those intermediaries are stealing both the debt and the property of others with whom thye have no contract.

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“Get three months behind and you’ll get a modification”: The Big Lie That Servicers and Banks are Still Using

Posted on May 16, 2016 by Neil Garfield

The bottom line is that millions of people have been told that line and most of them stopped paying for three months because of it. It was perfectly reasonable for them to believe that they had just been told by the creditor that they must stop paying if they want relief. Judges have heard this repeatedly from homeowners. So what is the real reason such obvious bank behavior is overlooked?

More to the point — what choice does the homeowner have other than believing what they just heard from an apparently authorized service representative?

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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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In the course of the last ten years I have personally interviewed homeowners, reviewed the documents and or received reports from homeowners that were duped into going to default by that famous line: “You must be three months behind.” It is patently true that every homeowner who had that conversation believed that they were being told to stop making payments. No, it didn’t make any sense; but it also was beyond comprehension that the servicers were in fact aiming at foreclosure instead of workouts that would have preserved the value of the alleged loan, and mitigated the rush into the worst recession seen in modern times.

On cross examination the point is always made that the “representative” did not use the words “Stop paying.” And thus the point is made that the announcement that a three month delinquency was necessary for a modification was simply that: just information. Yet the behavior of millions of homeowners shows that virtually every one of them believed they were told to stop paying in “code” language. If that is not reasonable reliance, I don’t know what is.

However there is much bigger point. The three month announcement was (a) false and (b) an intentional policy to lure people into default and foreclosure. It has been previously reported here and elsewhere that an officer at Bank of America said point blank to his employees “We are in the foreclosure business, not the modification business.”

The legal point here is (a) unclean hands and (b) estoppel. In most cases homeowners ended up withholding three months worth of payments, as they reasonably believed they had been instructed to do, many times faithfully paying on a three month trial or “forbearance” plan, and sometimes even paying for many months beyond the “trial” period, or even years. Then suddenly the servicer/bank stops accepting payments and won’t respond to calls and letters from the homeowners asking what is going on.

Then they get a notice of default, a notice of their right to reinstate if they pay a certain sum (which is most often miscalculated) and then they get served with a foreclosure notice. The entire plan was aimed at foreclosure. And now, thanks to recent court doctrine, homeowners are stuck with intensely complicated instruments and behavior, only to find out that despite all law to the contrary, “caveat emptor” (Let the buyer beware).

The trick has always been to make the non-payment period as long as possible so that (1) reinstatement is impossible for the homeowner and (2) to increase the value of servicer advances. Each month the homeowner does not make a payment the value of fraudulent claims for “servicer advances” goes up. And THAT is the reason why you see cases going on for 10 years and more. every month you miss a payment, the Master Servicer increases its claims on the final proceeds of liquidation of the home.

In the banking world it is axiomatic that a loan “in distress” should be worked out with the borrower because that will be the most likely way to preserve the value of the loan. In every professional seminar I ever attended relating to residential and commercial loans the main part of the seminar was devoted to workouts, modification or settlement. We have had literally millions of such opportunities in which people were instead either lured into default or unjustly and fraudulently induced to drop their request for modification or to go into a “default” period that they thought was merely a waiting period before the modification was complete.

The result: asset values tanked: the alleged loan, the alleged MBS, and the value of the subject property was crushed by servicers looking out for their real boss — the Master Servicer and operating completely against the interests of the investors who are completely ignorant of what is really going on. Don’t kid yourself — US Bank and other alleged Trustees of REMIC Trusts have not taken a single action as Trustee ever and the REMIC Trust never existed, never was an active business (even during the 90 day period allowed), and the “Trust” was never administered by any Trust department of any of the banks who are claimed to be Trustees of the “REMIC Trust”. Both the Trust and the Trustee are window dressing as part of a larger illusion.

My opinion as a former investment banker, is that this is all about money. The “three month” announcement was meant to steer the homeowner from a HAMP modification, which was routinely “rejected by investor” (when no contact was ever made with the investor). This enabled the banks to “capture” (i.e., steal) the alleged loan using one of two means: (1) an “in-house” modification that in reality made the servicer the creditor instead of the investor whose money was actually in the deal and/or (2) a foreclosure and sale in which the servicer picked up all or nearly all of the proceeds by “recovery” of nonexistent servicer advances.

It isn’t that the investors did not receive money under the label of “servicer advances.” It is that the money investors received were neither advances nor were they paid by the servicer (same as the origination or acquisition of the loan which is “presumed” based upon fabricated, forged, robo-signed documents). There is no speculation required as to where the money came from or who had access to it. The prospectus and PSA combined make it quite clear that the investors can receive their own money back in satisfaction of the nonexistent obligation from a nonexistent REMIC Trust that issued worthless and fraudulent MBS but never was in business, nor was it ever intended to be in business.

Servicer advances can only be “recovered” when the property is liquidated. There is no right of recovery against the investors. But the nasty truth is that there is no right of “recovery” of servicer advances anyway because there is nothing to recover. By labeling money paid from a pool of investor money as “servicer advances” we again have the creation of an illusion. They make it look like the Master Servicer is advancing money when all they are doing is exercising control over the investors’ money.

Thus the three month announcement is a win win for the Master Servicer — either they convert the loan from being subject to claims by investors to an “in-house” loan, or they take the full value of the alleged loan and reduce it to zero by making false claims for recovery — but only if there is a foreclosure sale. Either way the investor gets screwed and so does the homeowner both of whom were pawns and victims in an epic fraud.

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The Mortgage Loan Schedule: Ascension of a False Self-Serving Document

Posted on May 5, 2016 by Neil Garfield

At no time were the Trusts anything but figments of the imagination of investment banks.

As an exhibit to the alleged Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the Mortgage Loan Schedule” appears to have legitimacy. Peel off one layer and it is an obvious fraud upon the court.

The only reason the banks don’t allege holder in due course status is because nobody in their chain ever paid anything. The transactions referred to by the assignment or endorsement or any other document never happened — but they are  wrongly presumed to be true.

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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

Our Services: https://livinglies.me/2016/04/11/what-can-you-do-for-me-an-overview-of-services-offered-by-neil-garfield/

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I’m seeing more and more cases where once again the goal post keeps moving, in order to keep the court and foreclosure defense counsel off balance. Now it is the attachment of a “Mortgage Loan Schedule” [MLS] to the PSA. As an exhibit to the alleged Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the “Mortgage Loan Schedule” appears to have legitimacy. Peel off one layer and it is an obvious fraud upon the court.

Here is my thought. The MLS supposedly attached to the PSA never has any proof as to when it was attached. It has the same problem as the undated endorsement on the note only worse. It is not a facially valid document of transfer. It relies, derivatively on the PSA that was created long before an MLS existed even if they were telling the truth (which they are not — the trusts are empty).

The securitization process is described in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement along with the parties who are involved in the purchase, Sale and ownership of the alleged loans that were “purchased” by the Trust. But there was no purchase. If there was a purchase the bank would assert status as a holder in due course, prove the payment and the borrower would have no defenses against the Trust, even if there were terrible violations of the lending laws.

First you create the trust and then after you have sold the MBS to investors you are supposed turn over the proceeds of the sale of mortgage backed securities (MBS) to the Trustee for the Trust. This never happened in any of the thousands of Trusts I have reviewed. But assuming for a moment that the proceeds of sale of MBS were turned over to the Trust or Trustee THEN there is a transaction in which the Trust purchases the loan.

The MLS, if it was real, would be attached to assignments of mortgages and bulk endorsements — not attached to the PSA. The MLS as an exhibit to the PSA is an exercise in fiction. Adhering strictly to the wording in the PSA and established law from the Internal Revenue Code for REMIC Trusts, and New York State law which is the place of origination of the common law trusts, you would THEN sell the loan to the trust through the mechanism in the PSA. Hence the MLS cannot by any stretch of the imagination have existed at the time the Trust was created because the condition precedent to acquiring the loans is getting the money to buy them.

The MLS is a self serving document that is not proven as a business record of any entity nor is there any testimony that says that this is in the business records of the Trust (or any of the Trust entities) because the Trust doesn’t have any business records (or even a bank account for that matter).

They can rely all they want on business records for payment processing but the servicer has nothing to do with the original transaction in which they SAY that there was a purchase of the loans on the schedule. The servicer has no knowledge about the putative transaction in which the loans were purchased.

And we keep coming back to the same point that is inescapable. If a party pays for the negotiable instrument (assuming it qualifies as a negotiable instrument) then THAT purchasing party becomes a holder in due course, unless they were acting in bad faith or knew of the borrower’s defenses. It is a deep stretch to say that the Trustee knew of the borrower’s defenses or even of the existence of the “closing.”By alleging and proving the purchase by an innocent third party in the marketplace, there would be no defenses to the enforcement of the note nor of the mortgage. There would be no foreclosure defenses with very few exceptions.

There is no rational business or legal reason for NOT asserting that the Trust is a holder in due course because the risk of loss, if an innocent third party pays for the paper, shifts to the maker (i.e., the homeowner, who is left to sue the parties who committed the violations of lending laws etc.). The only reason the banks don’t allege holder in due course status is because nobody in their chain ever paid anything. There were no transactions in which the loans were purchased because they were already funded using investor money in a manner inconsistent with the prospectus, the PSA and state and federal law.

Hence the absence of a claim for holder in due course status corroborates my factual findings that none of the trusts were funded, none of the proceeds of sale of MBS was ever turned over to the trusts, none of the trusts bought anything because the Trust had no assets, or even a bank account, and none of the Trusts were operating entities even during the cutoff period. At no time were the Trusts anything but figments of the imagination of investment banks. Their existence or nonexistence was 100% controlled by the investment bank who in reality was offering false certificates to investors issued by entities that were known to be worthless.

Hence the bogus claim that the MLS is an attachment to the PSA, that it is part of the PSA, that the Trust owns anything, much less loans. The MLS is just another vehicle by which banks are intentionally confusing the courts. But nothing can change the fact that none of the paper they produce in court refers to anything other than a fictional transaction.

So the next question people keep asking me is “OK, so who is the creditor.” The answer is that there is no “creditor,” and yes I know how crazy that sounds. There exists a claim by the people or entities whose money was used to grant what appeared to be real residential mortgage loans. But there was no loan. Because there was no lender. And there was no loan contract, so there is nothing to be enforced except in equity for unjust enrichment. If the investment banks had played fair, the Trusts would have been holders in due course and the investors would have been safe.

But the investors are stuck in cyberspace without any knowledge of their claims, in most instances. The fund managers who figured it out got fat settlements from the investment banks. The proper claimant is a group of investors whose money was diverted into a dynamic commingled dark pool instead of the money going to the REMIC Trusts.

These investors have claims against the investment banks at law, and they have claims in equity against homeowners who received the benefit of the investors’ money but no claim to the note or mortgage. And the investors would do well for themselves and the homeowners (who are wrongly described as “borrowers”) if they started up their own servicing operations instead of relying upon servicers who have no interest in preserving the value of the “asset” — i.e., the claim against homeowners for recovery of their investment dollars that were misused by the investment banks. An educated investor is the path out of this farce.

 

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The Truth is Coming Out: More Questions About Loan Origination, Debt, Note, Mortgage and Foreclosure

Posted on December 3, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For further assistance please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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Carol Molloy, Esq., one of our preferred attorneys is now taking on new cases for litigation support only. This means that if you have an attorney in the jurisdiction in which your property is located, then Carol can serve in a support role framing pleadings, motions and discovery and coaching the lawyer on what to do and say in court. Carol Molloy is licensed in Tennessee and Massachusetts where she has cases in both jurisdictions in which she is the lead attorney. As part of our team she gets support from myself and others. call our numbers above to get in touch with her.

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Hat tip to our lead investigator Ken McLeod (Chandler, Az) who brought this case to my attention. It is from 2013.

see New York Department of Housing vs Deutsch

Mysteriously seemingly knowledgeable legislators passed statutes permitting government agencies to finance mortgage loans in amounts for more than the property is worth, to people who could not afford to pay, without the need to document things such as income, and then to allow the chopping up the [*7]loans into little pieces to sell to new investors, so that if a borrower defaulted in repayment of the loan, the lender would not have the ability to prove it actually owned the debt, let alone plead its name correctly. The spell cast was so widespread that courts find almost everyone involved in mortgage foreclosure litigation raising the “Sgt. Schultz Defense” of “I know nothing.”

Rather than assert its rights and perhaps obligations under the terms of the mortgage to maintain the property and its investment, respondent has asserted the Herman Melville “Bartleby the Scrivener Defense” of “I prefer not to” and relying on the word “may” in the document, has elected to do nothing in this regard. Because this loan appears to have been sold to investors, it may be asked, does not the respondent have a legal obligation to those investors to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve the property such as collecting the rents and maintain the property as permitted in the mortgage documents?

It should be noted that in its cross-motion in this action Deutsche asserts that its correct name is “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-3, Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3” and not the name petitioner placed in the caption. Which deserves the response “you’ve got to be kidding.” Deutsche is not mentioned in the chain of title; it is listed in these HP proceedings with the same name as on the caption of the foreclosure action in which it is the plaintiff and which its counsel drafted; and its name is not in the body of foreclosure action pleadings. In the foreclosure proceeding Deutsche pleads that it “was and still is duly organized and existing under the laws of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.” However, there is no reference to or pleading of the particular law of the USA under which it exists leaving the court to speculate whether it is some federal banking statute, or one that allows Volkswagens, BMW’s and Mercedes-Benz’s to be imported to the US or one that permitted German scientists to come to the US and develop our space program after World War II.

As more and more cases are revealed or published, the truth is emerging beyond a reasonable doubt about the origination of the loans, the actual debt (identifying creditor and debtor), the note, the mortgage and the inevitable attempt at foreclosure and forced sale (forfeiture) of property to entities who have nothing to do with any actual transaction involving the borrower. The New York court quoted above describes in colorful language the false nature of the entire scheme from beginning to end.

see bankers-who-commit-fraud-like-murderers-are-supposed-to-go-to-jail

see http://www.salon.com/2014/12/02/big_banks_broke_america_why_nows_the_time_to_break_our_national_addiction/

The TRUTH of the matter, as we now know it includes but is not limited to the following:

  1. DONALD DUCK LOANS: NONEXISTENT Pretender Lenders: Hundreds of thousands of loan closings involved the false disclosure of a lender that did not legally or physically exist. The money from the loan obviously came from somewhere else and the use of the non-existent entity name was a scam to deflect attention from the real nature of the transaction. These are by definition “table-funded” loans and when used in a pattern of conduct constitutes not only violation of TILA but is dubbed “predatory per se” under Reg Z. Since the mortgage and note and settlement documents all referred to a nonexistent entity, you might just as well have signed the note payable to Donald Duck, who at least is better known than American Broker’s Conduit. Such mortgages are void because the party in whose favor they are drafted and signed does not exist. Such a mortgage should never be recorded and is subject to a quiet title action. The debt still arises by operation of law between the debtor (borrower) and the the creditor (unidentified lender) but it is not secured and the note is NOT presumptive evidence of the debt. THINK I’M WRONG? “SHOW ME A CASE!” WELL HERE IS ONE FOR STARTERS: 18th Judicial Circuit BOA v Nash VOID mortgage Void Note Reverse Judgement for Payments made to non-existent entity
  2. DEAD ENTITY LOANS: Existing Entity Sham Pretender Lender: Here the lender was alive or might still be alive but it is and probably always was broke, incapable of loaning money to anyone. Hundreds of thousands of loan closings involved the false disclosure of a lender that did not legally or physically make a loan to the borrower (debtor). The money from the loan obviously came from somewhere else and the use of the sham entity name was a scam to deflect attention from the real nature of the transaction. These are by definition “table-funded” loans and when used in a pattern of conduct constitutes not only violation of TILA but is dubbed “predatory per se” under Reg Z. Since the mortgage and note and settlement documents all referred to an entity that did not actually loan money to the borrower, (like The Money Source) such mortgages are void because the party in whose favor they are drafted and signed did not fulfill a black letter element of an enforceable contract — consideration. Such a mortgage should never be recorded and is subject to a quiet title action. The debt still arises by operation of law between the debtor (borrower) and the the creditor (unidentified lender) but it is not secured and the note is NOT presumptive evidence of the debt.
  3. BRAND NAME LOANS FROM BIG BANKS OR BIG ORIGINATORS: Here the loans were disguised as loans from the entity that could have loaned the money to the borrower — but didn’t. Millions of loan closings involved the false disclosure of a lender that did not legally or physically make a loan to the borrower (debtor). The money from the loan came from somewhere else and the use of the brand name entity (like Wells Fargo or Quicken Loans) name was a scam to deflect attention from the real nature of the transaction. These are by definition “table-funded” loans and when used in a pattern of conduct constitutes not only violation of TILA but is dubbed “predatory per se” under Reg Z. Since the mortgage and note and settlement documents all referred to an entity that did not actually loan money to the borrower, such mortgages are void because the party in whose favor they are drafted and signed did not fulfill a black letter element of an enforceable contract — consideration. Such a mortgage should never be recorded and is subject to a quiet title action. The debt still arises by operation of law between the debtor (borrower) and the the creditor (unidentified lender) but it is not secured and the note is NOT presumptive evidence of the debt.
  4. TRANSFER WITHOUT SALE: You can’t sell what you don’t own. And you can’t own the loan without paying for its origination or acquisition. Millions of foreclosures are predicated upon acquisition of the loan through a nonexistent purchase — but facially valid paperwork leads to the assumption or even presumption that the sale of the loan took place — i.e., delivery of the loan documents in exchange for payment received. These loans can be traced down to one of the three types of loans described above by asking the question “Why was there no payment.” In turn this inquiry can start from the question “Why is the Trust not named as a holder in due course?” The answer is that an HDC must acquire the loan for value and receive delivery. What the banks are doing is showing evidence of delivery and an “assignment” or “power of attorney” that has no basis in real life — the endorsement of the note or assignment of the mortgage was fabricated, robo-signed and is subject to perjury in court testimony. Using the Pooling and Servicing Agreement only shows that more fabricated paperwork was used to fool the court into thinking that there is a pool of loans which in most cases does not exist — a t least not in the REMIC Trust.
  5. VIOLATION OF THE TRUST DOCUMENT: Most trusts are governed by New York law. Some of them are governed by Delaware law and some invoke both jurisdictions (see Christiana Bank). The laws that MUST be applied to the REMIC Trusts declare that any action taken without express authority from the Trust instrument is VOID. The investors still have not been told that their money never went into the trust, but that is what happened. They have also not been told that the Trust issued mortgage bonds but never received the proceeds of sale of those bonds. And they have not been told that the Trust, being unfunded, never acquired the loans. And that is why there is no assertion of holder in due course status. Some courts have held that the PSA is irrelevant — but they are failing to realize that such a ruling by definition eliminates the foreclosure as a viable action; that is true because the only basis of authority to pursue foreclosure, collection or any other enforcement of the sham loan documents is in the PSA which is the Trust document.
  6. THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS WITHOUT ACCOUNTING: “Servicer” advances that are actually made by the servicer but pulled from an account controlled by the broker dealer who sold the mortgage bonds. These payments continue regardless of whether the borrower is paying or not. Banks fight this issue because it would require that the actual creditors be identified and given notice of proceedings that are being pursued contrary to the interests of the investors. Those payments negate any default between the debtor and the actual creditor who has been paid. They also reduce the amount due. The same holds true for proceeds of insurance, guarantees, loss sharing with the FDIC and proceeds of hedge products like credit default swaps. Legally it is clear that these payments satisfies the payments due from the borrower but gives rise to an unsecured volunteer payment recapture through a claim for unjust enrichment. That could lead to a money judgment, the filing of the judgment and the foreclosure of the judgment lien. But the banks don’t want to do that because they would definitely be required to show the money trail — something they are avoiding at all costs because it would unravel the entire fraudulent scheme of “securitization fail.” (Adam Levitin’s term).
  7. ESTOPPEL: Inducing people to go into default so that there can be more foreclosures: Millions of people called the servicer asking for a modification or workout that the servicer obviously had no right to entertain. The servicer customer representative gave the impression that the borrower was talking to the right person. And this trusted person then started practicing law without a license by advising that modifications could not be requested until the borrower was at least 90 days in arrears. All of this was a lie. HAMP and other programs do NOT require 90 day arrearage. The purpose was to get homeowners in so deep that they could never get out because the servicers are charged with the job of getting as many loans into foreclosure as possible. By telling the borrower to stop paying they were (a) telling them the right thing because the servicer actually had no right to collect the payment anyway and (b) they put the servicer in an estoppel position — you can’t tell a borrower to stop paying and then say THEY breached the “agreement”. Stopping payment was a the request or demand of the servicer. Further complicating the process was the intentional loss of submissions by borrowers; the purpose of these “losses” (like “lost notes” was to elongate the process and get the borrower deeper and deeper into the false arrearage claimed by the servicer.

The conclusion is obvious — complete strangers to the actual transaction (between the actual debtor and actual creditor) are using the names of other complete strangers to the transaction and faking documents regularly to close out serious liabilities totaling trillions of dollars for “faulty”, fraudulent loans, transfers and foreclosures. As pointed out in many previous articles here, this is often accomplished through an Assignment and Assumption Agreement in which the program requires violating the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), the HAMP modification program etc. Logically it is easy to see why they allowed “foreclosures” to languish for 5-8 years — they are running the statute of limitations on TILA violations, rescission etc. But the common law right of rescission still exists as does a cause of action for nullification of the note and mortgage.

The essential truth in the bottom line is this: the paperwork generated at the loan closing is “faulty” and most often fabricated and the borrower is induced to execute documents that create a second liability to an entity who did nothing in exchange for the note and mortgage except get paid as a pretender lender — all in violation of disclosure requirements on Federal and state levels. This is and was a fraudulent scheme. Hence the “Clean hands” element of equitable relief in foreclosure as well as basic contract law prevent the right to enforce the mortgage, the note or the debt against the debtor/borrower by strangers to the transaction with the borrower.

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Levitin and Yves Smith – TRUST=EMPTY PAPER BAG

Posted on September 26, 2014 by Neil Garfield

Living Lies Narrative Corroborated by Increasing Number of Respected Economists

It has taken over 7 years, but finally my description of the securitization process has taken hold. Levitin calls it “securitization fail.” Yves Smith agrees.

Bottom line: there was no securitization, the trusts were merely empty sham nominees for the investment banks and the “assignments,” transfers, and endorsements of the fabricated paper from illegal closings were worthless, fraudulent and caused incomprehensible damage to everyone except the perpetrators of the crime. They call it “infinite rehypothecation” on Wall Street. That makes it seem infinitely complex. Call it what you want, it was civil and perhaps criminal theft. Courts enforcing this fraudulent worthless paper will be left with egg on their faces as the truth unravels now.

There cannot be a valid foreclosure because there is no valid mortgage. I know. This makes no sense when you approach it from a conventional point of view. But if you watch closely you can see that the “loan closing” was a shell game. Money from a non disclosed third party (the investors) was sent through conduits to hide the origination of the funds for the loan. The closing agent used that money not for the originator of the funds (the investors) but for a sham nominee entity with no rights to the loan — all as specified in the assignment and assumption agreement. The note and and mortgage were a sham. And the reason the foreclosing parties do not allege they are holders in due course, is that they must prove purchase and delivery for value, as set forth in the PSA within the 90 day period during which the Trust could operate. None of the loans made it.

But on Main street it was at its root a combination pyramid scheme and PONZI scheme. All branches of government are complicit in continuing the fraud and allowing these merchants of “death” to continue selling what they call bonds deriving their value from homeowner or student loans. Having made a “deal with the devil” both the Bush and Obama administrations conscripted themselves into the servitude of the banks and actively assisted in the coverup. — Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me

For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

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John Lindeman in Miami asked me years ago when he first starting out in foreclosure defense, how I would describe the REMIC Trust. My reply was “a holographic image of an empty paper bag.” Using that as the basis of his defense of homeowners, he went on to do very well in foreclosure defense. He did well because he kept asking questions in discovery about the actual transactions, he demanded the PSA, he cornered the opposition into admitting that their authority had to come from the PSA when they didn’t want to admit that. They didn’t want to admit it because they knew the Trust had no ownership interest in the loan and would never have it.

While the narrative regarding “securitization fail” (see Adam Levitin) seems esoteric and even pointless from the homeowner’s point of view, I assure you that it is the direct answer to the alleged complaint that the borrower breached a duty to the foreclosing party. That is because the foreclosing party has no interest in the loan and has no legal authority to even represent the owner of the debt.

And THAT is because the owner of the debt is a group of investors and NOT the REMIC Trust that funded the loan. Thus the Trust, unfunded had no resources to buy or fund the origination of loans. So they didn’t buy it and it wasn’t delivered. Hence they can’t claim Holder in Due Course status because “purchase for value” is one of the elements of the prima facie case for a Holder in Due Course. There was no purchase and there was no transaction. Hence the suing parties could not possibly be authorized to represent the owner of the debt unless they got it from the investors who do own it, not from the Trust that doesn’t own it.

This of course raises many questions about the sudden arrival of “assignments” when the wave of foreclosures began. If you asked for the assignment on any loan that was NOT in foreclosure you couldn’t get it because their fabrication system was not geared to produce it. Why would anyone assign a valuable loan with security to a trust or anyone else without getting paid for it? Only one answer is possible — the party making the assignment was acting out a part and made money in fees pretending to convey an interest the assignor did not have. And so it goes all the way down the chain. The emptiness of the REMIC Trust is merely a mirror reflection of the empty closing with homeowners. The investors and the homeowners were screwed the same way.

BOTTOM LINE: The investors are stuck with ownership of a debt or claim against the borrowers for what was loaned to the borrower (which is only a fraction of the money given to the broker for lending to homeowners). They also have claims against the brokers who took their money and instead of delivering the proceeds of the sale of bonds to the Trust, they used it for their own benefit. Those claims are unsecured and virtually undocumented (except for wire transfer receipts and wire transfer instructions). The closing agent was probably duped the same way as the borrower at the loan closing which was the same as the way the investors were duped in settlement of the IPO of RMBS from the Trust.

In short, neither the note nor the mortgage are valid documents even though they appear facially valid. They are not valid because they are subject to borrower’s defenses. And the main borrower defense is that (a) the originator did not loan them money and (b) all the parties that took payments from the homeowner owe that money back to the homeowner plus interest, attorney fees and perhaps punitive damages. Suing on a fictitious transaction can only be successful if the homeowner defaults (fails to defend) or the suing party is a holder in due course.

Trusts Are Empty Paper Bags — Naked Capitalism

student-loan-debt-home-buying

Just as with homeowner loans, student loans have a series of defenses created by the same chicanery as the false “securitization” of homeowner loans. LivingLies is opening a new division to assist people with student loan problems if they are prepared to fight the enforcement on the merits. Student loan debt, now over $1 Trillion is dragging down housing, and the economy. Call 520-405-1688 and 954-495-9867)

The Banks Are Leveraged: Too Big Not to Fail

When I was working with Brad Keiser (formerly a top executive at Fifth Third Bank), he formulated, based upon my narrative, a way to measure the risk of bank collapse. Using a “leverage” ration he and I were able to accurately define the exact order of the collapse of the investment banks before it happened. In September, 2008 based upon the leverage ratios we published our findings and used them at a seminar in California. The power Point presentation is still available for purchase. (Call 520-405-1688 or 954-495-9867). You can see it yourself. The only thing Brad got wrong was the timing. He said 6 months. It turned out to be 6 weeks.

First on his list was Bear Stearns with leverage at 42:1. With the “shadow banking market” sitting at close to $1 quadrillion (about 17 times the total amount of all money authorized by all governments of the world) it is easy to see how there are 5 major banks that are leveraged in excess of the ratio at Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill Lynch et al.

The point of the article that I don’t agree with at all is the presumption that if these banks fail the economy will collapse. There is no reason for it to collapse and the dependence the author cites is an illusion. The fall of these banks will be a psychological shock world wide, and I agree it will obviously happen soon. We have 7,000 community banks and credit unions that use the exact same electronic funds transfer backbone as the major banks. There are multiple regional associations of these institutions who can easily enter into the same agreements with government, giving access at the Fed window and other benefits given to the big 5, and who will purchase the bonds of government to keep federal and state governments running. Credit markets will momentarily freeze but then relax.

Broward County Court Delays Are Actually A PR Program to Assure Investors Buying RMBS

The truth is that the banks don’t want to manage the properties, they don’t need the house and in tens of thousands of cases (probably in the hundreds of thousands since the last report), they simply walk away from the house and let it be foreclosed for non payment of taxes, HOA assessments etc. In some of the largest cities in the nation, tens of thousands of abandoned homes (where the homeowner applied for modification and was denied because the servicer had no intention or authority to give it them) were BULL-DOZED  and the neighborhoods converted into parks.

The banks don’t want the money and they don’t want the house. If you offer them the money they back peddle and use every trick in the book to get to foreclosure. This is clearly not your usual loan situation. Why would anyone not accept payment in full?

What they DO want is a judgment that transfers ownership of the debt from the true owners (the investors) to the banks. This creates the illusion of ratification of prior transactions where the same loan was effectively sold for 100 cents on the dollar not by the investors who made the loan, but by the banks who sold the investors on the illusion that they were buying secured loans, Triple AAA rated, and insured. None of it was true because the intended beneficiary of the paper, the insurance money, the multiple sales, and proceeds of hedge products and guarantees were all pocketed by the banks who had sold worthless bogus mortgage bonds without expending a dime or assuming one cent of risk.

Delaying the prosecution of foreclosures is simply an opportunity to spread out the pain over time and thus keep investors buying these bonds. And they ARE buying the new bonds even though the people they are buying from already defrauded them by NOT delivering the proceeds fro the sale of the bonds to the Trust that issued them.

Why make “bad” loans? Because they make money for the bank especially when they fail

The brokers are back at it, as though they haven’t caused enough damage. The bigger the “risk” on the loan the higher the interest rate to compensate for that risk of loss. The higher interest rates result in less money being loaned out to achieve the dollar return promised to investors who think they are buying RMBS issued by a REMIC Trust. So the investor pays out $100 Million, expects $5 million per year return, and the broker sells them a complex multi-tranche web of worthless paper. In that basket of “loans” (that were never made by the originator) are 10% and higher loans being sold as though they were conventional 5% loans. So the actual loan is $50 Million, with the broker pocketing the difference. It is called a yield spread premium. It is achieved through identity theft of the borrower’s reputation and credit.

Banks don’t want the house or the money. They want the Foreclosure Judgment for “protection”

 

Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CDO, community banks, CORRUPTION, credit unions, escrow agent, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Neil Garfield Show, Occupy Movement, originator, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, Student Loans, taxes, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 54 Comments »

Loan Without Money

Posted on August 18, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

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If you went to the loan closing, signed the papers and then gave them to the closing agent and then the “lender” didn’t fund the loan, what would you do? If you ask an attorney he or she would probably demand the return of the closing papers. If the mortgage got recorded the attorney would threaten a variety of consequences unless the filing with the county recorder was nullified (because it can never be physically removed).

If you were then contacted by a mysterious stranger who said forget the loan papers, I’ll loan you the money, you might have accepted. This mysterious person sends the money to the closing agent who disperses it to the Seller of the property or pay off the prior mortgage etc.

Now imagine that the first “lender” ( the one who DIDN’T make the loan) has “assigned” the documents you executed to another party who also didn’t loan any money to you and who didn’t pay for the assignment because they knew full well that the loan papers were worthless. And the “lender” designated on the note and mortgage doesn’t ask for money because they know they didn’t loan a dime to you. But they gladly accept fees for “acting” as though they were the lender and renting their name out to be used as “lender.”

And finally imagine that the assignee of the worthless documentation you executed again assigns and endorses the note and mortgage to still another party, like a REMIC Trust. What did the REMIC Trust get? Nothing, right? Not so fast.

If this last transfer of the “loan” PAPERS (described as “documents” to make them sound more important) was purchased for value in good faith without knowledge of your defense that you never received the loan, you might still be liable on that note you executed even though you never received the loan. Yes you owe the holder in due course in addition to owing the money to the mystery stranger who wired the money to the closing agent. The Trust COULD enforce the loan or at least try to do so and it would be legal because they would be a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE (HDC). An HDC can enforce free from borrower’s defenses. That is the risk of signing documents and letting them get out of your hands before you receive what you expected as part of the deal.

Why then is there no evidence or allegation by any forecloser in the securitization schemes that they have HDC status? I represented hundreds of banks, lenders, and associations in foreclosures. If anyone was holding the paper as an HDC that is what I would have said in the pleading and then I would have proven it. end of story. The borrower might have a lawsuit against the third parties who tricked him but the HDC still has a good chance of prevailing despite grievous violations of lending laws and procedures at closing — including lack of consideration (they didn’t fund the loan for which you executed the closing documents).

The ILLUSION of a loan closing has been created because both “loan” scenarios in fact occurred AT THE SAME TIME at most “loan” closings. Two different deals — one where you didn’t get the money and the other where you did. One where you signed the closing documents but didn’t get the loan and the other where you signed nothing and got the money from the loan.  In other words, you signed documents, you delivered them to the closing agent and they were delivered and recorded. But the “lender” didn’t give you any money. Ground zero for the confusion and illusion is the receipt of money by the closing agent fro the mysterious stranger instead of the party in whose favor you executed the note and mortgage.

And here is the good news. The banks know full well they can’t win if they allege they have HDC status or even that the Trust has HDC status. So they allege that they are “holders” or they allege they are “holders with rights to enforce.” More often than not they simply allege either that they are simply a “holder” or that they have the “rights to enforce.” They let the court make the rest of the assumptions and essentially treated as though the party foreclosing on you had HDC status. That is ground zero for judicial error.

The Trust never issued payment to the assignor of the loan because the assignor didn’t ask for any money except for fees in “acting” its part in the scheme. The assignments and endorsements, the more powers of attorney, the higher the stack of paper. And the higher the stack of paper the more it looks like the the loan MUST be valid and enforceable, that you did stop paying on it, and that therefore you MUST be in default.

Meanwhile the mysterious stranger is getting paid by the people who entered into an agreement — a pooling and servicing agreement — under which the investors get paid from the Trust, Trustee or Master Servicer that issued bonds to the mysterious stranger. The terms of payment are very different than the terms of your note but that doesn’t matter because they never loaned you money anyway. The real basis of the ability of the servicer and trustee to see to it that you receive your expected payment is the ability of these brokers, conduits and sham corporate entities and trusts to get their hands on your money, and the money of investors in the Trust.

Why did the mysterious stranger send money for you? Was it a gift? Of course not. But without documentation the mysterious has exactly one legal right — to demand payment at any time for the entire balance of the loan plus reasonable interest. No foreclosure, because there is no mortgage. No acceleration necessary because you already owe the entire amount. Your homestead property is NOT at risk in Florida and many other states, because the mysterious stranger has no mortgage recorded. And the full balance of the loan to the mysterious stranger is completely dischargeable in a chapter 7 bankruptcy or can be reduced substantially in a Chapter 13 or chapter 11 Bankruptcy.

Why did the mysterious stranger make the loan? Because the stranger was tricked by the same people who tricked you — under several layers of complicated relationships such that it is difficult to pin the blame on anyone. But this isn’t about blame. It is about money. Either they made a loan or they didn’t. And the answer is that nobody in their chain of “title” to the loan PAPERS ever paid one dime to loan you money or buy your loan. They are hiding that from both investors and you.

The mysterious stranger gave a broker money because he thought the broker was the intermediary between the mysterious stranger and a REMIC Trust that was issuing a semi-public offering of Mortgage Banked Securities (MBS). The stranger thinks he is an investor buying securities when in fact he has just opened the door for the broker to use his money in anyway the broker wanted, including lining the broker’s own pocket with the principal that should have loaned on good solid viable loans. The illusion is enhanced by the broker when the broker makes certain that the mysterious stranger is addressed as an “investor” or “trust beneficiary” of the REMIC trust.

The mysterious stranger who made the actual lender is tricked into believing that he has purchased a fractional ownership of thousands of mortgages including yours. That what the Prospectus and PSA seem to be saying. In reality the money that the mysterious stranger gave to the broker, stayed with the broker and that satisfied the feeding frenzy of sharks circulating around each dump of money from mysterious strangers.

“Bonuses” that were incomprehensible to the rest of the world were lavished upon the people who actually made this trick work. The  bonuses came from “profits” that were declared by the brokers from some incredibly lucky “trades” that never existed in which the Trust “bought” the loans at a price far higher than the principal balance of the loans, including yours.

AND THAT IS THE REASON FOR THE LOST, DESTROYED, FABRICATED LOAN AND TRANSFER DOCUMENTS. THE BANKS ARE CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF NEGLIGENCE THAT OVERRIDES THE TRUTH — IT WAS FRAUD. The only reason you would destroy a cash equivalent document is because you told someone it promised payment of $100, when in fact it promised only $60. The Banks can’t reveal the real money trail without revealing their vulnerability to criminal prosecution.

Of course the problem was that the broker didn’t loan you any money and either did the trust, the trustee, the servicer or any of the conduits or other intermediaries. And so none of them were entitled to have or do anything with the PAPER that had your signature on them — which contained one key term that they didn’t want anyone to see — the principal balance stated on the note.

If the mysterious stranger found out that for every dollar he paid the broker for a mortgage bond, only 60% was being used for loans, then the mysterious stranger would stop giving the broker money and would have demanded the return of all funds. But the mysterious strangers who in reality had given naked undocumented demand loans to homeowners had no idea that anything was wrong because the payments they were receiving were exactly what they expected.

So when the “borrower” is asked “did you get the loan.” His answer is “which one are you asking about?” Because no loan was ever made, directly or indirectly by the “lender” on the note and mortgage. Did you stop paying? Of course, why should I pay someone who I thought was my lender but isn’t.

All of that is the exact reason why the investor “mysterious stranger” lawsuits have all been settled for hundreds of billions of dollars. But in the end this is about the mysterious stranger and the lender designated on the note and mortgage. The fact that either way the mysterious stranger’s money was to be used for loans is not the point under our system of law. If anyone wants to enforce commercial paper based upon a loan that was never made, they lose if they are merely a “holder,” and “holder” status is all that the foreclosers have ever alleged. Their “right to enforce”comes from cyberspace rather than the owner of the loan. The owner of the loan, is in the final analysis a mysterious stranger to any of their PAPER.

The solution to our economic crisis that simply won;t end until this wrong is addressed is to stop rewarding bad behavior and let the mysterious strangers and the borrowers meet each other in the market place. Under threat of a demand loan due in full right now, nearly all homeowners would execute enforceable, clean notes and mortgages in favor of the mysterious strangers and then they could BOTH sue the intermediaries that corrupted the title and investments of the “mysterious strangers.”

Presented correctly by counsel for the homeowner, the men and women sitting on the bench will accept the truth as long as you exercise your rights to object to the use of presumptions instead of facts and demand your right to receive discovery that would disprove all the presumptions upon which the brokers and their nominees rely. Stop admitting things you know nothing about. Presume that there is a shady reason why the foreclosing party never asserts itself as an HDC. That is your clue to the truth.

 

Filed under: AMGAR, CORRUPTION, discovery, escrow agent, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, forms, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, originator, Pleading, Servicer, STATUTES, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 14 Comments »

The CLOUD: No Name, No Docs, No Terms, No Balance Due: MBS Investors Screwed and Taking Borrowers Down With Them

Posted on September 20, 2013 by Neil Garfield

Writing with the flu. Despite symptoms and medication that makes me dizzy, I feel compelled to write about something that is getting traction out there. The more you look at the false claims of securitization the more it stinks. We are dealing with a system that is based on really big lies. I’m sure our leaders of government have a very appealing rationalization why we must pretend the mortgage bonds are real, why we must pretend the mortgages are real, why we must pretend the notes are real, and why we must pretend the debts and defaults are real. But those are lies based on sham transactions. And those lies are based in public policy. And public policy is contrary to law.

My focus is on cases pending in the judicial branch of government. Our system of government was designed to insert the judicial branch into disputes so that fractures in public policy do not cheat citizens out of their basic rights. In this case, the failure of the other two branches of government to include the rights of homeowners is damaging both to the society generally and producing millions of cases of unjust enrichment and displacement of millions of people from their homes in cases, where if all facts were known two facts would be inescapably accepted: (1) mortgages filed as encumbrances against real property were fatally defective and unenforceable and (2) the balance owed on the debt is either impossible to ascertain or zero, with a liability owed to homeowners on the overpayments received in the midst of that opaque cloud we are calling “securitization.”

The trigger for the writing of this article is once again coming from BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON as the “Trustee” of vast numbers of REMIC Trusts. Bill Paatalo, a private investigator, uncovered an officer of BONY who is very frustrated with BOA and others who are telling borrowers that BONY is the owner of their loan. Indeed, suits have been brought in the name of BONY without any reference to the trust; and of course suits have been brought in the name of BONY as Trustee of a REMIC Trust, which represents but does not own the loans (the ownership interest being “conveyed” with the issuance of the mortgage bond to investors who were duped into thinking they were buying high grade investments. BONY and DEUTSCH both say such suits are brought without their authorization and have instructed servicer’s to cease and desist using the name of Deutsch of BONY MELLON in foreclosure suits.

The problem revealed is contained in an email Paatalo posted from an officer of BONY MELLON, who wants BOA to stop telling people that BONY is the owner of their loans. He says BONY doesn’t own the loans and has no right, power or obligation to modify or mitigate damages caused by the borrower failing or stopping payments on the loan they unquestionably received. He says BONY is the Trustee for the loan and denies ownership and further denies the ability or right to modify.

What he doesn’t say is what he means by “Trustee for the loan” and why the “trust” should be considered real as a legal person when there is no financial account or assets held in the name of the Trust. Like Reynaldo Reyes at Deutsch Bank, he is basically saying there are no trust assets, there never was any funding of the trust, and there never was an assignment or purchase of the loan by the trust — for the simple reason that the Trust never had a bank account much less the money to buy loans or anything else.

So Reyes and this newly revealed actor from BONY are saying the same thing. They are Trustees in name only without any duties because no money or assets are in the trust. Which brings us back to the beginning. If the loan was securitized, the Trust would have had a bank account to receive money advanced by investors who were purchasing alleged mortgage bonds that promised that the investor also was an owner of the loans — an undecided percentage interest in the loans.

That money in the Trust account would have been used to fund or purchase the loan to the borrower. And the Trust would have been the mortgagee or beneficiary on the mortgage or deed of trust. There would have been no need for MERS, or originators or any of the countless sham corporations that are now out of business and who supposedly loaned money to borrowers. If it was real, the records would show the Trust paid for the loan and the recorded documents from the loan closing would clearly show the Trust as the lender.

It is really a very simple deal, if it is real. But complexity was introduced by Wall Street, the effect of which was that the lenders didn’t get the loans they were expecting, didn’t get the collateral they thought they were getting and didn’t even get named as lenders despite the fact that it was investor money that was used to make and acquire the loans. Like the borrowers, investors were stepping into a cloud that intentionally obscured the ownership of the loan.

On the one hand, the Banks covered ownership by the issuance and execution of an Assignment and Assumption Agreement, but that was before any loan applications existed, just like the prospectus and sale of the bonds — a process known as selling forward on Wall Street. On the other hand, the bonds were issued in the name of the investment banks, a process called Street Name on Wall Street. On the third hand, the loan documents showed neither the investment banks nor the investors or even the REMIC Trusts. instead they showed some other entity as the lender even though the “lender” had advanced mooney whatsoever — a process later dubbed as “pretender lenders” by me in in my writing and seminars.

By pushing title through pretender lenders and private exchanges that registered title that was never published (like the county recorders’ offices publish recorded deeds, mortgages and liens), the Banks created a Cloud which by definition created clouded title to the property, the loan and created a mortgage document that was recorded despite naming the wrong terms and the wrong payee.

Pushing title away from the investors who advanced the money and toward themselves, the Banks were able to play with the money as if it were their own, and even purchase insurance and credit default swaps payable to the banks, who were clearly the intermediary agents of the investors. And the Banks even got the government to guarantee half the loans even though the underwriting standards were ignored — since the banks had no risk of loss on the loans (they were using investor money and they were getting the right to receive third party payments from the government and private parties). Eventually after the meltdown, the Banks became part of a program where tens of billions of dollars worth of the bogus mortgage bonds owned by the investors were sold to the Federal government (some $50 Billion per month).

Through their creation of the Cloud, the banks were able to take the money of the investors and receive it as their own, concealing the initial theft (skimming) off the top by creating sham proprietary trades. Now they are receiving judgments and deeds from foreclosure auctions based upon their submission of a credit bid that clearly violates the very specific provisions of state statutes that identify who can submit a credit bid rather than cash at the auction. Only the actual owner of the unpaid account receivable has the right to submit a credit bid.

And by the creation of the Cloud judges and lawyers missed the point completely. The result is stripping the investors of value, ownership and right to collect on the loans they advanced. At no time has any Servicer filed a foreclosure in the name of the investors whose money was used to fund the deal. In no case is there any underlying real transaction in which real money was paid and something was received in exchange. The Courts are now the vehicle of public policy and manifest injustice by enforcement of unenforceable mortgages for fabricated notes referring to non existent debts.

The net result is that public policy and government action is contrary to the rule of law.

Filed under: CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , | 57 Comments »

Follow the Money Trail: It’s the blueprint for your case

Posted on March 18, 2013 by Neil Garfield
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.
Editor’s Analysis and Comment: If you want to know where all the money went during the mortgage madness of the last decade and the probable duplication of that behavior with all forms of consumer debt, the first clues have been emerging. First and foremost I would suggest the so-called bull market reflecting an economic resurgence that appears to have no basis in reality. Putting hundred of billions of dollars into the stock market is an obvious place to store ill-gotten gains.
But there is also the question of liquidity which means the Wall Street bankers had to “park” their money somewhere into depository accounts. Some analysts have suggested that the bankers deposited money in places where the sheer volume of money deposited would give bankers strategic control over finance in those countries.
The consequences to American finance is fairly well known here. But most Americans have been somewhat aloof to the extreme problems suffered by Spain, Greece, Italy and Cyprus. Italy and Cyprus have turned to confiscating savings on a progressive basis.  This could be a “fee” imposed by those countries for giving aid and comfort to the pirates of Wall Street.
So far the only country to stick with the rule of law is Iceland where some of the worst problems emerged early — before bankers could solidify political support in that country, like they have done around the world. Iceland didn’t bailout bankers, they jailed them. Iceland didn’t adopt austerity to make the problems worse, it used all its resources to stimulate the economy.
And Iceland looked at the reality of a the need for a thriving middle class. So they reduced household debt and forced banks to take the hit — some 25% or more being sliced off of mortgages and other consumer debt. Iceland was not acting out of ideology, but rather practicality.
The result is that Iceland is the shining light on the hill that we thought was ours. Iceland has real growth in gross domestic product, decreasing unemployment to acceptable levels, and banks that despite the hit they took, are also prospering.
From my perspective, I look at the situation from the perspective of a former investment banker who was in on conversations decades ago where Wall Street titans played the idea of cornering the market on money. They succeeded. But Iceland has shown that the controls emanating from Wall Street in directing legislation, executive action and judicial decisions can be broken.
It is my opinion that part or all of trillions dollars in off balance sheet transactions that were allowed over the last 15 years represents money that was literally stolen from investors who bought what they thought were bonds issued by a legitimate entity that owned loans to consumers some of which secured in the form of residential mortgage loans.
Actual evidence from the ground shows that the money from investors was skimmed by Wall Street to the tune of around $2.6 trillion, which served as the baseline for a PONZI scheme in which Wall Street bankers claimed ownership of debt in which they were neither creditor nor lender in any sense of the word. While it is difficult to actually pin down the amount stolen from the fake securitization chain (in addition to the tier 2 yield spread premium) that brought down investors and borrowers alike, it is obvious that many of these banks also used invested money from managed funds as gambling money that paid off handsomely as they received 100 cents on the dollar on losses suffered by others.
The difference between the scheme used by Wall Street this time is that bankers not only used “other people’s money” —this time they had the hubris to steal or “borrow” the losses they caused — long enough to get the benefit of federal bailout, insurance and hedge products like credit default swaps. Only after the bankers received bailouts and insurance did they push the losses onto investors who were forced to accept non-performing loans long after the 90 day window allowed under the REMIC statutes.
And that is why attorneys defending Foreclosures and other claims for consumer debt, including student loan debt, must first focus on the actual footprints in the sand. The footprints are the actual monetary transactions where real money flowed from one party to another. Leading with the money trail in your allegations, discovery and proof keeps the focus on simple reality. By identifying the real transactions, parties, timing and subject moment lawyers can use the emerging story as the blueprint to measure against the fabricated origination and transfer documents that refer to non-existent transactions.
The problem I hear all too often from clients of practitioners is that the lawyer accepts the production of the note as absolute proof of the debt. Not so. (see below). If you will remember your first year in law school an enforceable contract must have offer, acceptance and consideration and it must not violate public policy. So a contract to kill someone is not enforceable.
Debt arises only if some transaction in which real money or value is exchanged. Without that, no amount of paperwork can make it real. The note is not the debt ( it is evidence of the debt which can be rebutted). The mortgage is not the note (it is a contract to enforce the note, if the note is valid). And the TILA disclosures required make sure that consumers know who they are dealing with. In fact TILA says that any pattern of conduct in which the real lender is hidden is “predatory per se”) and it has a name — table funded loan. This leads to treble damages, attorneys fees and costs recoverable by the borrower and counsel for the borrower.
And a contract to “repay” money is not enforceable if the money was never loaned. That is where “consideration” comes in. And a an alleged contract in the lender agreed to one set of terms (the mortgage bond) and the borrower agreed to another set of terms (the promissory note) is no contract at all because there was no offer an acceptance of the same terms.
And a contract or policy that is sure to fail and result in the borrower losing his life savings and all the money put in as payments, furniture is legally unconscionable and therefore against public policy. Thus most of the consumer debt over the last 20 years has fallen into these categories of unenforceable debt.
The problem has been the inability of consumers and their lawyers to present a clear picture of what happened. That picture starts with footprints in the sand — the actual events in which money actually exchanged hands, the answer to the identity of the parties to each of those transactions and the reason they did it, which would be the terms agreed on by both parties.
If you ask me for a $100 loan and I say sure just sign this note, what happens if I don’t give you the loan? And suppose you went somewhere else to get your loan since I reneged on the deal. Could I sue you on the note? Yes. Could I win the suit? Not if you denied you ever got the money from me. Can I use the real loan as evidence that you did get the money? Yes. Can I win the case relying on the loan from another party? No because the fact that you received a loan from someone else does not support the claim on the note, for which there was no consideration.
It is the latter point that the Courts are starting to grapple with. The assumption that the underlying transaction described in the note and mortgage was real, is rightfully coming under attack. The real transactions, unsupported by note or mortgage or disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act, cannot be the square peg jammed into the round hole. The transaction described in the note, mortgage, transfers, and disclosures was never supported by any transaction in which money exchanged hands. And it was not properly disclosed or documented so that there could be a meeting of the minds for a binding contract.
KEEP THIS IN MIND: (DISCOVERY HINTS) The simple blueprint against which you cast your fact pattern, is that if the securitization scheme was real and not a PONZI scheme, the investors’ money would have gone into a trust account for the REMIC trust. The REMIC trust would have a record of the transaction wherein a deduction of money from that account funded your loan. And the payee on the note (and the secured party on the mortgage) would be the REMIC trust. There is no reason to have it any other way unless you are a thief trying to skim or steal money. If Wall Street had played it straight underwriting standards would have been maintained and when the day came that investors didn’t want to buy any more mortgage bonds, the financial world would not have been on the verge of extinction. Much of the losses to investors would have covered by the insurance and credit default swaps that the banks took even though they never had any loss or risk of loss. There never would have been any reason to use nominees like MERS or originators.
The entire scheme boils down to this: can you borrow the realities of a transaction in which you were not a party and treat it, legally in court, as your own? So far the courts have missed this question and the result has been an unequivocal and misguided “yes.” Relentless of pursuit of the truth and insistence on following the rule of law, will produce a very different result. And maybe America will use the shining example of Iceland as a model rather than letting bankers control our governmental processes.

Banking Chief Calls For 15% Looting of Italians’ Savings
http://www.infowars.com/banking-chief-calls-for-15-looting-of-italians-savings/

Filed under: alternative medicine, AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS COOPERATIVE, AMGAR, ATM, bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 146 Comments »

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