The difference between paper instruments and real money

Posted on January 4, 2017 by Neil Garfield

There is a difference between the note contract and the mortgage contract. They each have different terms. And there is a difference between those two contracts and the “loan contract,” which is made up of the note, mortgage and required disclosures.Yet both lawyers and judges overlook those differences and come up with bad decisions or arguments that are not quite clever.

There is a difference between what a paper document says and the truth. To bridge that difference federal and state statutes simply define terms to be used in the resolution of any controversy in which a paper instrument is involved. These statutes, which are quite clear, specifically define various terms as they must be used in a court of law.

The history of the law of “Bills and Notes” or “Negotiable Instruments” is rather easy to follow as centuries of common law experience developed an understanding of the problems and solutions.

The terms have been defined and they are the law not only statewide, but throughout the country, with the governing elements clearly set forth in each state’s adoption of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) as the template for laws passed in their state.

The problem now is that most judges and lawyers are using those terms that have their own legal meaning without differentiating them; thus the meaning of those “terms of art” are being used interchangeably. This reverses centuries of common law and statutory laws designed to prevent conflicting results. Those laws constrain a judge to follow them, not re-write them. Ignoring the true meaning of those terms results in an effective policy of straying further and further from the truth.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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So an interesting case came up in which it is obvious that neither the judge nor the bank attorneys are paying any attention to the law and instead devoting their attention to making sure the bank wins — even at the cost of overturning hundreds of years of precedent.
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The case involves a husband who “signed the note,” and a wife who didn’t sign the note. However the wife signed the mortgage. The Husband died and a probate estate was opened and closed, in which the Wife received full title to the property from the estate of her Husband in addition to her own title on the deed as Husband and Wife (tenancy by the entireties).
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Under state law claims against the estate are barred when the probate case ends; however state law also provides that the lien (from a mortgage or otherwise) survives the probate. That means there is no claim to receive money in existence. Neither the debt nor the note can be enforced. The aim of being a nation of laws is to create a path toward finality, whether the result be just or unjust.
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There is an interesting point here. Husband owed the money and Wife did not and still doesn’t. If foreclosure of the mortgage lien is triggered by nonpayment on the note, it would appear that the mortgage lien is presently unenforceable by foreclosure except as to OTHER duties to maintain, pay taxes, insurance etc. (as stated in the mortgage).

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The “bank” could have entered the probate action as a claimant or it could have opened up the estate on their own and preserved their right to claim damages on the debt or the note (assuming they could allege AND prove legal standing). Notice my use of the terms “Debt” (which arises without any documentation) and “note,” which is a document that makes several statements that may or may not be true. The debt is one thing. The note is quite a different animal.
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It does not seem logical to sue the Wife for a default on an obligation she never had (i.e., the debt or the note). This is the quintessential circumstance where the Plaintiff has no standing because the Plaintiff has no claim against the Wife. She has no obligation on the promissory note because she never signed it.
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She might have a liability for the debt (not the obligation stated on the promissory note which is now barred by (a) she never signed it and (b) the closing of probate. The relief, if available, would probably come from causes of action lying in equity rather than “at law.” In any event she did not get the “loan” money and she was already vested with title ownership to the house, which is why demand was made for her signature on the mortgage.
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She should neither be sued for a nonexistent default on a nonexistent obligation nor should she logically be subject to losing money or property based upon such a suit. But the lien survives. What does that mean? The lien is one thing whereas the right to foreclose is another. The right to foreclose for nonpayment of the debt or the note has vanished.

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Since title is now entirely vested in the Wife by the deed and by operation of law in Probate it would seem logical that the “bank” should have either sued the Husband’s estate on the note or brought claims within the Probate action. If they wanted to sue for foreclosure then they should have done so when the estate was open and claims were not barred, which leads me to the next thought.

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The law and concurrent rules plainly state that claims are barred but perfected liens survive the Probate action. In this case they left off the legal description which means they never perfected their lien. The probate action does not eliminate the lien. But the claims for enforcement of the lien are effected, if the enforcement is based upon default in payment alone. The action on the note became barred with the closing of probate, but that left the lien intact, by operation of law.

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Hence when the house is sold and someone wants clear title for the sale or refinance of the home the “creditor” can demand payment of anything they want — probably up to the amount of the “loan ” plus contractual or statutory interest plus fees and costs (if there was an actual loan contract). The only catch is that whoever is making the claim must actually be either the “person” entitled to enforce the mortgage, to wit: the creditor who could prove payment for either the origination or purchase of the loan.
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The “free house” mythology has polluted judicial thinking. The mortgage remains as a valid encumbrance upon the land.

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This is akin to an IRS income tax lien on property that is protected by homestead. They can’t foreclose on the lien because it is homestead, BUT they do have a valid lien.

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In this case the mortgage remains a valid lien BUT the Wife cannot be sued for a default UNLESS she defaults in one or more of the terms of the mortgage (not the note and not the debt). She did not become a co-borrower when she signed the mortgage. But she did sign the mortgage and so SOME of the terms of the mortgage contract, other than payment of the loan contract, are enforceable by foreclosure.

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So if she fails to comply with zoning, or fails to maintain the property, or fails to comply with the provisions requiring her to pay property taxes and insurance, THEN they could foreclose on the mortgage against her. The promissory note contained no such provisions for those extra duties. The only obligation under the note was a clear statement as to the amounts due and when they were due.  There are no duties imposed by the Note other than payment of the debt. And THAT duty does not apply to the Wife.

The thing that most judges and most lawyers screw up is that there is a difference between each legal term, and those differences are important or they would not be used. Looking back at AMJUR (I still have the book award on Bills and Notes) the following rules are true in every state:

  1. The debt arises from the circumstances — e.g., a loan of money from A to B.
  2. The liability to pay the debt arises as a matter of law. So the debt becomes, by operation of law, a demand obligation. No documentation is necessary.
  3. The note is not the debt. Execution of the note creates an independent obligation. Thus a borrower may have two liabilities based upon (a) the loan of money in real life and (b) the execution of ANY promissory note.
  4. MERGER DOCTRINE: Under state law, if the borrower executes a promissory note to the party who gave him the loan then the debt becomes merged into the note and the note is evidence of the obligation. This shuts off the possibility that a borrower could be successfully attacked both for payment of the loan of money in real life AND for the independent obligation under the promissory note.
  5. Two liabilities, both of which can be enforced for the same loan. If the borrower executes a note to a third person who was not the party who loaned him/her money, then it is possible for the same borrower to be required, under law, to pay twice. First on the original obligation arising from the loan, (which can be defended with a valid defense such as that the obligation was paid) and second in the event that a third party purchased the note while it was not in default, in good faith and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. The borrower cannot defend against the latter because the state statute says that a holder in due course can enforce the note even if the borrower has valid defenses against the original parties who arranged the loan. In the first case (obligation arising from an actual loan of money) a failure to defend will result in a judgment and in the second case the defenses cannot be raised and a judgment will issue. Bottom Line: Signing a promissory note does not mean the maker actual received value or a loan of money, but if that note gets into the hands of a holder in due course, the maker is liable even if there was no actual transaction in real life.
  6. The obligor under the note (i.e., the maker) is not necessarily the same as the debtor. It depends upon who signed the note as the “maker” of the instrument. An obligor would include a guarantor who merely signed either the note or a separate instrument guaranteeing payment.
  7. The obligee under the note (i.e., the payee) is not necessarily the lender. It depends upon who made the loan.
  8. The note is evidence of the debt  — but that doesn’t “foreclose” the issue of whether someone might also sue on the debt — if the Payee on the note is different from the party who loaned the money, if any.
  9. In most instances with nearly all loans over the past 20 years, the payee on the note is not the same as the lender who originated the actual loan.

In no foreclosure case ever reviewed (2004-present era) by my office has anyone ever claimed that they were a holder in due course — thus corroborating the suspicion that they neither paid for the loan origination nor did they pay for the purchase of the loan.

If they had paid for it they would have asserted they were either the “lender” (i.e., the party who loaned money to the party from whom they are seeking collection) or the holder in due course i.e., a  third party who purchased the original note and mortgage for good value, in good faith and without any knowledge of the maker’s defenses). Notice I didn’t use the word “borrower” for that. The maker is liable to a party with HDC status regardless fo whether or not the maker was or was not a borrower.

“Banks” don’t claim to be the lender because that would entitle the “borrower” to raise defenses. They don’t claim HDC status because they would need to prove payment for the purchase of the paper instrument (i.e., the note). But the banks have succeeded in getting most courts to ERRONEOUSLY treat the “banks” as having HDC status, thus blocking the borrower’s defenses entirely. Thus the maker is left liable to non-creditors even if the same person as borrower also remains liable to whoever actually gave him/her the loan of money. And in the course of those actions most homeowners lose their home to imposters.

All of this is true, as I said, in every state including Florida. It is true not because I say it is true or even that it is entirely logical. It is true because of current state statutes in which the UCC was used as a template. And it is true because of centuries of common law in which the current law was refined and molded for an efficient marketplace. But what is also true is that law judges are the product of law school, in which they either skipped or slept through the class on Bills and Notes.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments »

Is Donald Duck Your Lender?

Posted on March 14, 2014 by Neil Garfield

 

I was asked a question a few days ago that runs to the heart of the problem for the banks in enforcing false claims for foreclosure and false claims of losses that should really allocated to the investors so that the investor would get the benefits of those loss mitigation payments. This is the guts of the complaints by insurers, investors, guarantors et al against the investment banks — that there was fraud, not breach of contract, because the investment bank never intended to follow the plan of securitization set forth in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement. The question asked of me only reached the issue of whether borrowers could claim credit for third party payments to the creditor. But the answer, as you will see, branches much further out than the scope of the question.

If you look at Steinberger in Arizona and recent case decisions in other jurisdictions you will see that if third party payments are received by the creditor, they must be taken into account — meaning the account receivable on their books is reduced by the amount of the payment received. If the account receivable is reduced then it is axiomatic that the account payable from the borrower is correspondingly reduced. Each debt must be taken on its own terms. So if the reduction was caused by a payment from a third party, it is possible that the third party might have a claim against the borrower for having made the payment — but that doesn’t change the fact that the payment was made and received and that the debt to the trust or trust beneficiaries has been reduced or even eliminated.

The Court rejected the argument that the borrower was not an intended third party beneficiary in favor of finding that the creditor could only be paid once on the debt. I am finding that most trial judges agree that if loss-sharing payments were made, including servicer advances (which actually come from the broker dealer to cover up the poor condition of the portfolio), the account is reduced as to that creditor. The court further went on to agree that the “servicer” or whoever made the payment might have an action for unjust enrichment against the borrower — but that is a not a cause of action that is part of the foreclosure or the mortgage. The payment, whether considered volunteer or otherwise, is credited to the account receivable of the creditor and the borrower’s liability is corresponding reduced. In the case of servicer payments, if the creditor’s account is showing the account current because it received the payment that was due, then the creditor cannot claim a default.

A new “loan” is created when a volunteer or contractual payment is received by the creditor trust or trust beneficiaries. This loan arises by operation of law because it is presumed that the payment was not a gift. Thus the party who made that payment probably has a cause of action against the borrower for unjust enrichment, or perhaps contribution, but that claim is decidedly unsecured by a mortgage or deed of trust.

You have to think about the whole default thing the way the actual events played out. The creditor is the trust or the group of trust beneficiaries. They are owed payments as per the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements. If those payments are current there is no default on the books of creditor. If the balance has been reduced by loss- sharing or insurance payment, the balance due and the accrued interest are correspondingly reduced. And THAT means the notice of default and notice of sale and acceleration are all wrong in terms of the figures they are using. The insurmountable problem that is slowly being recognized by the courts is that the default, from the perspective of the creditor trust or trust beneficiaries is a default under a contract between the trust beneficiaries and the trust.

This is the essential legal problem that the broker dealers (investment banks) caused when they interposed themselves as owners instead of what they were supposed to be — intermediaries, depositories, and agents of the investors (trust beneficiaries). The default of the borrower is irrelevant to whether the trust beneficiaries have suffered a loss due to default in payment from the trust. The borrower never promised that he or she or they would make payment to the trust or the trust beneficiaries — and that is the fundamental flaw in the actual mortgage process that prevailed for more than a dozen years. There would be no flaw if the investment banks had not committed fraud and instead of protecting investors, they diverted the money, ownership of the note and ownership of the mortgage or deed of trust to their own controlled vehicles. If the plan had been followed, the trusts and trust beneficiaries would have direct rights to collect from borrowers and foreclose on their property.

If the investment banks had not intended to divert the money, income, notes and mortgages or deeds of trust from the creditor trust or trust beneficiaries, then there would have no allegations of fraud from the investors, insurers and government guarantee agencies.

If the investment banks had done what was represented in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements, then the borrower would have known that the loan was being originated for or on behalf of the trust or beneficiaries and so would the rest of the world have known that. The note and mortgage would have shown, at origination, that the loan was payable to the trust and the mortgage or deed of trust was for the benefit of the trust or trust beneficiaries, as required by TILA and all the compensation earned by people associated with the origination of the loan would have had to have been disclosed (or returned to the borrower for failure to disclose). That would have connected the source of the loan — the trust or trust beneficiaries — to the receipt of the funds (the homeowner borrowers).

Instead, the investment banks hit on a nominee strawman plan where the disclosures were not made and where they could claim that (1) the investment bank was the owner of the debt and (2) the note and mortgage or deed of trust were executed for the benefit of a nominee strawman for the investment bank, who then claimed an insurable interest as owner of the debt. As owner of the debt, the investment banks received loss sharing payments from the FDIC. As agents for the investors those payments should have been applied to the balance owed the investors with a corresponding reduction in the balance due from the borrower —- if the payments were actually made and received and were not hypothetical or speculative. The investment banks did the same thing with the bonds, collecting payments from insurers, counterparties to credit default swaps, and guarantees from government sponsored entities.

When I say nominee or strawman I do not merely mean MERS which would have been entirely unnecessary unless the investment banks had intended to defraud the investors. What I am saying is that even the “lender” for whom MERS was the “nominee” falls into the same trapdoor. That lender was also merely a nominee which means that, as I said 7 years ago, they might just as well have made out the note and mortgage to Donald Duck, a fictitious character.

Since no actual lender was named in the note and mortgage and the terms of repayment were actually far different than what was stated on the borrower’s promissory note (i.e., the terms of the mortgage bond were the ONLY terms applicable to the plan of repayment to the creditor investors), the loan contract (or quasi loan contract, depending upon which jurisdiction you are in) was never completed. Hence the mortgage and note should never have been accepted into the file by the closing agent, much less recorded.

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Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CORRUPTION, escrow agent, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Neil Garfield Show, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 61 Comments »

New Jersey Clears Docket: Dismisses 80,000+ cases

Posted on March 13, 2014 by Neil Garfield

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GUEST TONIGHT: KENNETH HANKS, ESQ. TITLE EXPERT

One might ask why a lender would delay the prosecution of their claim. The answer is that they wouldn’t delay if they thought they had a solid claim. I know. I have represented banks on loans, foreclosures, associations in foreclosures etc. And I have proposed that if the Courts were to order the alleged ‘holders” to show the actual money trail so we would all know what transactions actually took place, their dockets would be clear, because most of the transactions described on assignments and indorsements never took place.

We have seen cases dating back to the 1990’s that have not been prosecuted and judges in all states are dismissing for failure to prosecute, which in turn brings up the statute of limitations, which I warn you is applied very differently from state to state. But in many cases they cannot refile because the statute of limitations has run and they are out of luck. So why would a bank (who is representing to the court that it the loser in a transaction with the borrower ) allow so many cases to be dismissed? Is there reason for this madness?

I believe there is. But the reason probably varies from case to case. Suffice it to say that we will see what plays out in New Jersey. My guess is that many of the documents used by foreclosers represent transactions that were fictitious or duplications of other transactions and now they are picking which story to go with in court but he courts are getting annoyed with the actual complexity of what seems to be a “simple” claim. The borrower didn’t pay, isn’t that enough? Actually no.

The essential problem that is now bubbling to the surface after years of suppression is this: the lender is receiving payments based upon a different deal and computation than the deal and computation the borrower is required to pay. The lender’s right to repayment comes from the bond indenture on the mortgage bond issued by a REMIC trust that never had any money, assets, income or expenses.

That indenture doesn’t say the investor will be paid according to the homeowner notes on loans originated or acquired by the trust or with the money from the trust beneficiaries. It provides for a specific yield of interest and principal regardless of what the notes say and even regardless (many times) of whether the borrower pays or not. Those terms are different than the terms signed by the homeowner. And the note and mortgage, were mostly executed in favor of parties who did not make any loan, never received the delivery of the note and never had any interest in the transaction. So what good are assignments from parties with zero ownership interest to convey?

We have reached a turning point where courts and others are saying to the banks, “if your claims are real, why didn’t you prosecute them for years?”

http://www.wnyc.org/story/new-jersey-breaks-foreclosure-logjam-yields-flood-dismissals/

Filed under: CASES, evidence, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, Neil Garfield Show, originator, Pleading, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 42 Comments »

WHY JOIN ORIGINATOR AND THE PARTY WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ILLEGAL TABLE FUNDED LOAN

Posted on June 11, 2013 by Neil Garfield

Amongst the cases I review and manage, the question was raised by one of the homeowners as to why I insisted on holding both the originator and subsequent intermediaries in the alleged securitization chain and/or table-funded loan where both the party alleging having (1) the capacity to sue see SEC Corroborates Livinglies Position on Third Party Payment While Texas BKR Judge Disallows Assignments After Cut-Off Date, (2) the standing to sue and/or the authority to initiate foreclosures and (3) financial injury where they allege sale or assignment of the note. The reason is simple from a tactical and legal point of view. I wish to close out their options to keep moving the goal posts.

Here is the answer I wrote to the customer, whose property is located in a judicial state. This particular person is being pro-active — always a wise choice — in that he has been making his payments, was told to to stop making payments if he wanted a modification which he did initially and then changed his mind and reinstated, and remains convinced he was the victim of various forms of fraud and crimes including false Appraisals of the supposedly fair market value of the property at the time of the loan closing or the alleged loan closing. His goal is not a free house. His goal is to pursue any rights you might have for modification or settlement of his claims with respect to the illusion of a loan closing and the office of a closing agent. As any reader of this blog knows, it is my opinion that any such loan closing was in fact an illusion and that all the parties participating in that illusion were paid actors pretending to be something they were not —  less creating plausible deniability for any of the improper actions of the intermediaries at the “loan closing.”

There is a reason why I insist on continuing the joinder of those two defendants. Embrace wants to be dismissed out with prejudice because it says that sold the loan to Wells. I want to say that they didn’t sell the loan to Wells.  If I prevail on that point then Wells Fargo is out as a plaintiff in any foreclosure they might file, and potentially out as a servicer since they might not be able to show any authority.  If that is the case then they owe you an accounting for all of the money they collected from you and a statement of what they did with the money that they collected from you. You might well have a cause of action against Wells Fargo for taking money under false pretenses.

 If I don’t Prevail on that point and somehow they are able to show that Wells Fargo paid for the loan and owns the loan by virtue of that payment, then Embrace is still a proper party in the action because they are the owner of record of a mortgage based on a note that was never funded by Embrace.  The issue here is whether or not the mortgage was transferred with the debt and that issue is tied closely with the issue of securitization, which both of them deny. I believe that I will be able to show that the loan is subject to claims of securitization on behalf of a loan pool that may never have existed or which might not exist now.  and if I am able to show that the loan pool was never funded and therefore could never have paid for the loan then the apparent authority of both defendants is eviscerated.

  Either way, I don’t want to let either of them out of the litigation quite yet.  If we prevail on the question of whether or not there was an actual sale and the sale was authorized (see my blog article from yesterday) then Embrace is the only party left on record in the recording office. At that point I would drill down on them to see whether or not they can show that they fulfill their part of the bargain with you, to wit: that you sign a note and they give you adequate disclosure under the law and they fund a loan to you. It is my position that they did not give adequate disclosure and that they did not fund a loan to you even if the loan was not securitized. The best they can say is that this was a table funded loan which is according to Reg Z of the Federal Reserve a predatory loan  per se if it was part of a pattern of conduct.

 Given the statistics and information we have about both defendants it is my opinion that the chances are 96% that the loan was allegedly sold into the secondary market where it is the subject of a potential claim from an asset pool. The problem I wish to reveal here is that the entire chain of ownership collapses on itself. The other problem that I want to addressed is who actually received the money that you pay every month and what did they do with it (who did they pay).  the strategy here is to show that regardless of whether or not a claim of securitization exists, there were co-obligors (Wells Fargo),  insurance payments and proceeds of credit default swaps and multiple resales all of which should be applied against the amount owed to the real creditor, whoever that might be, thus reducing the loan receivable.

 If I can tie the loan receivable to one which derives its value from the alleged loan made to you, even if the originator paid for it, then there is a strong argument for agency and allocation of receipts under which the payment of monthly payments and the receipt of insurance proceeds and the proceeds from other obligors (including but not limited to counterparties on credit default swaps) were received and kept, like in the Credit Suisse case. 

From that point forward it is a simple accounting task to allocate third-party receipts of insurance and hedge money to the benefit of the investors whether they received it or not. The auditing standards under the rules of the financial accounting standards Board would require a further analysis and allocation of the money received —  specifically the reduction of the loan receivable or bond receivable held by the investors (directly if the REMIC trust was ignored or indirectly if the agents for the trust purchased insurance and hedge products, the proceeds of which should have been credited to the investors.

 If the investors are the real creditors than the amount that they are entitled to have repaid to them does not exceed the amount they advanced. It practically goes without saying that if the money advanced from investors was based on their reasonable belief that they were acquiring title to the loans funded by the money advanced by the investors, they should recover part or all of their investment to the extent that the other players (see the SEC order against Credit Suisse) paid for insurance and hedge products using the money of the investors and kept the proceeds for themselves —-  thus explaining rising reports of profits in the banks who are supposedly merely intermediaries in the conduct of commerce which was in sharp decline.

 In the end, under a series of unjust enrichment and other common-law actions, as well as the requirements of statute and the terms of the promissory note executed by the borrower, all money received in that manner should reduce the principal balance due from the borrower because the creditor has already been paid either directly or indirectly through its agents who were either authorized or possessed of apparent authority.

In fact , the great likelihood is that the banks received substantial overpayments amounting to multiples of the original principal amount of the loan.  According to both law and the terms of the proposed agreement between the borrower and the apparent lender, subject to the terms of the documents themselves as well as state and federal law, the borrower is entitled to recover all such undisclosed payments and receipts which are defined under the truth in lending act as “compensation.”

 Thus while the creditors not entitled to any more recovery than the amount advanced under an alleged loan, the borrower is entitled to full recovery of all money paid in connection with or related to the loan received by the borrower, regardless of the original source of the loan and any agreements between the intermediaries in the alleged securitization chain that do not have the signature of the borrower on them. The reason is public policy. While securitization was not considered in the original passage of laws  it was the overreaching by banks to the disadvantage of consumers and borrowers that was sought to be discouraged by penalties that would be so great as to prevent the practice altogether.

 Usually it is money that is taken under false pretenses and the illusion of securitization claims is no exception. But in the case of the borrower it is the signature of the borrower that was obtained under the false pretenses that  the party obtaining the borrower’s signature. The consideration was the money advanced by an unrelated party tot he transaction (investor) who thought their money was first going through a REMIC trust that would give them certain tax advantages.

Regards

Neil

 Garfield, Gwaltney, Kelley & White

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Tallahassee, Florida 32309

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Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 82 Comments »

LAWYER BONANZA!: Wells Fargo Foreclosing on Homeowner Who Made all Payments and Paid Extra

Posted on May 17, 2013 by Neil Garfield

WELLS FARGO MAKES HUGE ERROR ADMITTING LACK OF POWER TO BIND CREDITOR TO MODIFICATIONS OR SETTLEMENTS

The simple truth is that the banks are not nearly as interested in the property as they are in the foreclosure. It is the foreclosure sale that creates the illusion of a stamp of approval from the state government that the entire securitization scheme was valid and it creates the reality of a presumption of the validity of the deed issued at the so-called auction of the property upon submission of  false credit bid from a non-creditor who is a stranger (not in privity) to the transaction alleged. — Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me

see also http://livinglies.me/2013/05/16/estoppel-when-the-bank-tells-you-to-stop-making-payments/

Editor’s Comment and Analysis: Wells Fargo is foreclosing on a man who has made his payments early and made extra payments to pay down the principal allegedly due on his mortgage. In response to media questions as to their authority to foreclose, the response was curious and very revealing. Wells Fargo said that the reason was that the securitization documents contain restrictions and prohibitions that prevent modifications of mortgage.

The fact that Wells Fargo offered a particular payment plan and the homeowner accepted it together with the fact that the homeowner made the required payments and even added extra payments, all of which was accepted by Wells Fargo and cashed  doesn’t seem to bother Wells Fargo but it probably will bother a judge who sees both the doctrine of estoppel and a simple contract in which Wells Fargo had the apparent authority to make the offer, accept the payments, and bind the actual creditors (whoever they might be).

It also corroborates our continuing opinion that when Wells Fargo and similar banks received insurance and creditable swap payments, they should have been applied to the receivable account of the investors which in turn would have resulted by definition in a reduction of the amount owed. The reduction in the amount owed would obviously decrease the amount payable by the borrower. If we follow the terms of the only contract that was signed by the borrower then any overpayments to the creditor beyond account receivable held by the creditor would be due and payable to the borrower. It is a violation of the spirit and content of the federal bailout to allow the banks to keep the money that is so desperately needed by the investors who supplied the money and the homeowners whose loans were paid in whole or in part by insurance and credit default swaps.

The reason I am interested in this particular case and the reason why I think it is of ultimate importance to understand the significance of the Wells Fargo response to the media is that it corroborates the facts and theories presented here and elsewhere that the original promissory note vanished and was replaced by a mortgage bond, the terms of which were vastly different than the terms of the promissory note signed by the homeowner.

Wells Fargo seeks to impose the terms, provisions, conditions and restrictions of the securitization documents onto the buyer without realizing that they have admitted that the original promissory note signed by the homeowner and therefore the original mortgage lien or deed of trust were never presented to the actual lenders for acceptance or approval of the loan.

CONVERSION OF PROMISSORY NOTE TO MORTGAGE BOND WITHOUT NOTICE

In fact, Wells Fargo has now admitted that the terms of the loan are governed strictly by the securitization documents. How they intend to enforce securitization documents whose existence was actively hidden from the borrower is going to be an interesting question.  If the position of the banks were to be accepted, then any creditor could change the essential terms of the debt or the essential terms of repayment without notice or consent from the borrower despite the absence of any reference to such power in the documents presented to the borrower for the borrower’s signature.

 But one thing is certain, to wit: the closing documents presented to the borrower  were incomplete and failed to disclose both the real parties in table funded loans (making the loans predatory per se as per TILA and Reg Z) and the existence and compensation of intermediaries, the disclosure of which is absolutely mandatory under federal law. Each borrower who was deprived of knowledge of multiple other parties and intermediaries and their compensation has a clear right of action for recovery of all undisclosed fees, interest, payments, attorney fees and probably treble damages.

This case also clearly shows that despite the representations by counsel and “witnesses” Wells Fargo has now admitted the basic fact behind its pattern of conduct wherein they claim to be the authorized sub servicer fully empowered by the real creditors and then claim to have no responsibility or powers with respect to the loan or the real creditors (which appears to include the Federal Reserve if their purchase of mortgage bonds had any substance).

Wells Fargo, US Bank, Bank of New York and of course Bank of America have all been sanctioned with substantial fines of up to seven figures so far in individual cases where they clearly took inconsistent positions and the judge found them to be in contempt of court because of the lies they told and levied those sanctions on both the attorneys and the banks.

It was only a matter of time before this entire false foreclosure mess blew up in the face of the banks. You can be sure that Wells Fargo will attempt to bury this case by paying off the homeowner and any other people that have been involved who could blow the whistle on their illegal, fraudulent and probably criminal behavior.

This is not the end of the game for Wells Fargo or any other bank, but it is one more concrete step toward revealing basic truth behind the mortgage mess, to it: the Wall Street banks stole the money from the investors, stole the ownership of the loans from the “trusts” and have been stealing houses despite the absence of any monetary or other consideration in the origination or acquisition of any loan. This absence of consideration removes the paperwork offered by the banks from the category of a negotiable instrument. None of the presumptions applicable to negotiable instruments apply.

Once again I emphasize that in practice lawyers should immediately take control of the narrative and the case by showing that the party seeking foreclosure possesses no records of any actual or real transaction in which money exchanged hands. This means, in my opinion, that the allegations of investors in lawsuits against the investment banks on Wall Street are true, to wit: they were entitled to an forcible notes and enforceable mortgages but they didn’t get it. That is an admission in the public record by the real parties in interest that the notes and mortgages are fabricated because they referred to commercial transactions that never occurred.

Going back to my original articles when I started this blog in 2007, the solution to the current mortgage mess which includes the corruption of title records across the country is that the intermediaries should be cut out of the process of modification and settlement. A different agency should be given the power to match up investors and borrowers and facilitate the execution of new promissory notes new mortgages or deeds of trust that are in fact enforceable but based in reality as to both the value of the property and the viability of the loan. It is the intermediaries including the Wall Street banks, sub servicers, Master servicers, and so-called trustees that are abusing the court process and clogging the court calendars with false claims. Get rid of them and you get rid of the problem.

http://4closurefraud.org/2013/05/16/wells-fargo-forecloses-on-florida-man-who-paid-on-time-early/

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , | 92 Comments »

Insurance, Credit Default Swaps, Guarantees: Third Party Payments Mitigate Damages to “Lender”

Posted on March 28, 2013 by Neil Garfield
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Editor’s Analysis: The topic of conversation (argument) in court is changing to an inquiry of what is the real transaction, who were the parties and did they pay anything that gives them the right to claim they suffered financial damages as a result of the “breach” by the borrower. And the corollary to that is what constitutes mitigation of those damages.

If the mortgage bond derives its value solely from underlying mortgage loans, then the risk of loss derives solely from those same underlying mortgages. And if those losses are mitigated through third party payments, then the benefit should flow to both the investors who were the source of funds and the borrowers balance must be correspondingly and proportionately adjusted. Otherwise the creditor ends up in a position better than if the debtor had paid off the debt.

If your Aunt Sally pays off your mortgage loan and the bank sues you anyway  claiming they didn’t get any payment from YOU, the case will be a loser for the bank and a clear winner for you because of the defense of PAYMENT. The rules regarding damages and mitigation of damages boil down to this — the alleged injured party should not be placed in a position where he/she/it is better off than if the contract (promissory) note had been fully performed.

If the “creditor” is the investor lender, and the only way the borrower received the money was through intermediaries, then those intermediaries are not entitled to claim part of the money that the investor advanced, nor part of the money that was intended for the “creditor” to offset a financial loss. Those intermediaries are agents. And the transaction,  while involving numerous intermediaries and their affiliates, is a single contemporaneous transaction between the investor lender and the homeowner borrower.

This is the essence of the “Single transaction doctrine” and the “step transaction doctrine.” What the banks have been successful at doing, thus far, is to focus the court’s attention on the individual steps of the transaction in which a borrower eventually received money or value in exchange for his promise to pay (promissory note) and the collateral he used to guarantee payment (mortgage or deed of trust). This is evasive logic. As soon as you have penetrated the fog with the single transaction rule where the investor lenders are identified as the creditor and the homeowner borrower is identified as the debtor, the argument of the would-be forecloser collapses under its own weight.

Having established a straight line between the investor lenders and the homeowner borrowers, and identified all the other parties as intermediary agents of the the real parties in interest, the case for  damages become much clearer. The intermediary agents cannot foreclose or enforce the debt except for the benefit of an identified creditor which we know is the group of investor lenders whose money was used to fund the tier 2 yield spread premium, other dubious fees and profits, and then applied to funding loans by wire transfer to closing agents.

The intermediaries cannot claim the house because they are not part of that transaction as a real party in interest. They may have duties to each other as it relates to handling of the money as it passes through various conduits, but their principal duty is to make sure the transaction between the creditor and debtor is completed.

The intermediaries who supported the sale of fake mortgage bonds from an empty REMIC trust cannot claim the benefits of insurance, guarantees or the proceeds of hedge contracts like credit default swaps. For the first time since the mess began, judges are starting to ask whether the payments from the third parties has relevance to the debt of the borrower. To use the example above, are the third parties who made the payments the equivalent of Aunt Sally or are they somehow going to be allowed to claim those proceeds themselves?

The difference is huge. If the third parties who made those payments are the equivalent of Aunt Sally, then the mortgage is paid off to the extent that actual cash payments were received by the intermediary agents. Aunt Sally might have a claim against the borrower or it might have been a gift, but in all events the original basis for the transaction has been reduced or eliminated by the receipt of those payments.

If Aunt Sally sues the borrower, it would  be for contribution or restitution, unsecured, unless Aunt sally actually bought the loan and received an assignment along with a receipt for her funds. If there was another basis on which Aunt Sally made the payment besides a gift, then the money should still be credited to the benefit of the investor lenders who have received what they thought was a bond payable but in reality was still the note payable.

In no event are the intermediary agents to receive those loss mitigation payments when they had no loss. And to the extent that payments were received, they should be used to reduce the receivable of the investor lender and of course that would reduce the payable owed from the homeowner borrower to the investor lender. To do otherwise would be to allow the “creditor” to end up in a much better position than if the homeowner had simply paid off the loan as per the promissory note or faked mortgage bond.

None of this takes away from the fact that the REMIC trust was not source the funds used to pay for the mortgage origination or transfer. That goes to the issue of the perfection of the mortgage lien and not to the issue of how much is owed.

Now Judges are starting to ask the right question: what authority exists for application of the third party payments to mitigate damages? If such authority exists and the would-be foreclosures used a false formula to determine the principal balance due, and the interest payable on that false balance then the notice of delinquency, notice of default, and foreclosure proceedings, including the sale and redemption period would all be incorrect and probably void because they demanded too much from the borrower after having received the third party payments.

If such authority does not exist, then the windfall to the banks will continue unabated — they get the fees and tier 2 yield spread premium profits upfront, they get the payment servicing fees, they get to sell the loan multiple times without any credit to the investor lender, but most of all they get the loss mitigation payments from insurance, hedge, guarantee and bailouts for a third party loss — the investor lenders. This is highly inequitable. The party with the loss gets nothing while a party who already has made a profit on the transaction, makes more profit.

If we start with the proposition that the creditor should not be better off than if the contract had been performed, and we recognize that the intermediary investment bank, master servicer, trustee of the empty REMIC trust, subservicer, aggregator, and others did in fact receive money to mitigate the loss on those certificates and thus on the loans supposedly backing the mortgage bonds, then the only equitable and sensible conclusion would be to credit or allocate those payments to the investor lender up to the amount they advanced.

With the creditor satisfied or partially satisfied the mortgage loan, regardless of whether it is secured or not, is also satisfied or partially satisfied.

So the question is whether mitigation payments are part of the transaction between the investor lender and the homeowners borrower. While this specific application of insurance payments etc has never been addressed we find plenty of support in the case law, statutes and even the notes and bonds themselves that show that such third party mitigation payments are part of the transaction and the expectancy of the investor lender and therefore will affect the borrower’s balance owed on the debt, regardless of whether it is secured or unsecured.

Starting with the DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES, we can assume that if there is such a duty, and there is, then successfully doing so must be applicable to the loan or contract and is so treated in awarding damages without abridgement. Keep in mind that the third party contract for mitigation payments actually refer to the borrowers. Those contracts expressly waive any right of the payor of the mitigation loss coverage to go after the homeowner borrower.

To allow all these undisclosed parties to receive compensation arising out of the initial loan transaction and not owe it to someone is absurd. TILA says they owe all the money they made to the borrower. Contract law says the payments should first be applied to the investor lender and then as a natural consequence, the amount owed to the lender is reduced and so is the amount due from the homeowner borrower.

See the following:

Pricing and Mitigation of Counterparty Credit Exposures, Agostino Capponi. Purdue University – School of Industrial Engineering. January 31, 2013. Handbook of Systemic Risk, edited by J.-P. Fouque and J.Langsam. Cambridge University Press, 2012

  • “We analyze the market price of counterparty risk and develop an arbitrage-free pricing valuation framework, inclusive of collateral mitigation. We show that the adjustment is given by the sum of option payoff terms, depending on the netted exposure, i.e. the difference between the on-default exposure and the pre-default collateral account. We specialize our analysis to Interest Rates Swaps (IRS) and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as underlying portfolio, and perform a numerical study to illustrate the impact of default correlation, collateral margining frequency, and collateral re-hypothecation on the resulting adjustment. We also discuss problems of current research interest in the counterparty risk community.” pdf4article631

Whether this language  makes sense to you or not, it is English and it does say something clearly — it is all about risk. And the risk of the investor lender was to have protected by Triple A rating, insurance, and credit default swaps, as well as guarantees and provisions of the pooling and servicing agreement, for the REMIC trust. Now here is the tricky part — the banks must not be allowed to say on the one hand that the securitization documents are real even if there was no money trail or consideration to support them on the one hand then say that they are not real for purposes of receiving loss mitigation payments, which they want to keep even if it leaves the real creditor with a net loss.

To put it simply — either the parties to the underwriting of the bond to investors and the loan to homeowners were part of the the transaction (loan from investor to homeowner) or they were not. I fail to see any logic or support that they were not.

And the simple rule of measure of how these parties fit together is found under the single transaction doctrine. If the step transaction under scrutiny would not have occurred but for the principal transaction alleged, then it is a single transaction.

The banks would argue they were trading in credit default swaps and other exotic securities regardless of what lender fit with which borrower. But that is defeated by the fact that it was the banks who sold to mortgage bonds, it was the banks who set up the Master Servicer, it was the banks who purchased the insurance and credit default swaps and it was the underwriting investment bank that promised that insurance and credit default swaps would be used to counter the risk. And it is inescapable that the only risk applicable to the principal transaction between investor lender and homeowner borrower was the risk of non payment by the borrower. These third party payments represent the proceeds of protection from that risk.

Would the insurers have entered into the contract without the underlying loans? No. Would the counterparties have entered into the contract without the underlying loans? No.

So the answer, Judge is that it is an inescapable conclusion that third party loss mitigation payments must be applied, by definition, to the loss. The loss was suffered not by the banks but by the investors whose money they took. The loss mitigation payments must then be applied against the risk of loss on the money advanced by those investors. And the benefit of that payment or allocation is that the real creditor is satisfied and the real borrower receives some benefit from those payments in the way of a reduction of the his payable to the investor.

It is either as I have outlined above or the money — all of it — goes to the borrower, to the exclusion of the investor under the requirements of TILA and RESPA. While the shadow banking system is said to be over $1.2 quadrillion,  we must apply the same standards to ourselves and our cases as we do to the opposing side. Only actual payments received by the participants in the overall obscured investor lender transaction with the homeowner borrower.

Hence discovery must include those third parties and review of their contracts for the court to determine the applicability of third party payments that were actually received in relation to either the subject loan, the subject mortgage bond, or the subject REMIC pool claiming ownership of the subject loan.

The inequality between the rich and not-so-rich comes not from policy but bad arithmetic.

As the subprime mortgage market fell apart in late 2007 and early 2008, many financial products, particularly mortgage-backed securities, were downgraded.  The price of credit default swaps on these products increased.  Pursuant to their collateral agreements, many protection buyers were able to insist on additional collateral protection.  In some cases, the collateral demanded represented a significant portion of the counterparty’s assets.  Unsurprisingly, counterparties have carefully evaluated, and in some cases challenged, protection buyers’ right to such additional collateral amounts.  This tension has generated several recent lawsuits:

• CDO Plus Master Fund Ltd. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 07-11078 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007) (dispute over demand     for collateral on $10,000,000 protection on collateralized debt obligations).

• VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 08 1563 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008) (same).

• UBS AG v. Paramax Capital Int’l, No. 07604233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (dispute over demand for $33 million additional capital from hedge fund for protection on collateralized debt obligations).

Given that the collateral disputes erupting in the courts so far likely represent only a small fraction of the stressed counterparties, and given recent developments, an increase in counterparty bankruptcy appears probable.

http://www.capdale.com/credit-default-swaps-the-bankrupt-counterparty-entering-the-undiscovered-country

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 79 Comments »

Weidner: Notes Are Not Negotiable Instruments

Posted on July 10, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Notes:  

Matt Weidner appears to have mastered the truth about securitization and how to apply it in foreclosure defense cases. The article below is really for lawyers, paralegals and very sophisticated pro se litigants. His point about being careful about how you present this is very well taken. This is for lawyers to do and lawyers should read this and get with the program. Securitization turned about to be virtually all SHAM transactions with the real financial transaction hidden away from the view of the borrower, the courts and even securitization analysts. The operative rule here is that the existence of a financial transaction does not mean that strangers to that transactions can claim any rights. 

These loans were nearly always funded by other parties who had made promises to investors whose money was used to fund the mortgages. The very existence of co-obligors and payments by them defeats the arguments of the banks and servicers. I’d like to see ONE investor come into court and say that yes, they would ratify the inclusion of a defaulted loan into their pool years after the cutoff date which negates their tax benefits. There is o reasonable basis for an investor to do or say that. That leaves the loan undocumented, unsecured and subject to offset for predatory and wrongful lending practices.

The wrong way of approaching this is any way in which you are going into court to disclaim the obligation when everyone knows you received the money or the benefit of the money. The obligation exists. And the only way to discharge that debt is through payment, waiver (or bankruptcy) or forgiveness. Anything that smells like “I don’t owe this money anymore” is going to be rejected in most cases. But an attack on the lien and the reality of the true creditor is a different story. That needs to be presented as simply as possible and I think I good way to start is to deny the loan, obligation, note, mortgage etc on the basis of an absence of any financial transaction between the borrower and the party named on the documents upon which the foreclosers rely. Any discovery at all will reveal that the money never came from the payee on the note or mortgagee or beneficiary on the mortgage or deed of trust. 

by Matt Weidner:

Let’s start with real basic stuff here.  Sometimes law is complex, nuanced,difficult.  Other times it’s black and white…you just read the words, look at the facts and the answer is unavoidable.  Such is the case with the simmering dispute over the fact that the notes that are part of nearly every residential foreclosure case are not negotiable instruments.  Oh sure, too many courts won’t take the time to consider the argument and…just yesterday I heard an appellate court argument where the judges just kept repeating the mantra, “this is a negotiable instrument” without ever doing any analysis at all and without any finding of that “fact” from the trial court.  The attorney needed to stop the appellate judge right there and say, “No Your Honor, it’s Not A Negotiable Instrument”.

Just last week, in a trial court, here’s exactly the way it went down.  Now, keep in mind, this argument in court was supplemented by a long and detailed memo similar to the one attached here.  The best part it was in front of one of Florida’s most respected and brilliant judges.  He’s been on the bench longer than I’ve been alive, he knows more law in the tip of his finger than most lawyers get in their whole bodies in an entire lifetime, he’s presided over tens of thousands of foreclosure cases. It was a beautiful thing to see an argument before a dedicated jurist whose seen and heard it all before that really made him sit up, dig in to those decades of judicial wisdom and then do the heavy lifting. That’s one of the beautiful things about this job….despite decades of work and hundreds of years of law, out of nowhere something new and exciting can still get the intellect and wisdom fired up and shooting like a cannon. Here’s how it goes down:

Your honor, I’ve highlighted and present for you the statutory definition of a “negotiable instrument”.  Because it’s a statutory definition, it’s black and white. We cannot alter or weave or color it with shades of gray….here’s what it is:

673.1041 Negotiable instrument.—
(1) Except as provided in subsections (3), (4), and (11), the term “negotiable instrument” means
an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other
charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(a) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a
holder;
(b) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(c) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering
payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money.

FL Article 3

Now, we’re all stuck with exactly that definition. Before we examine the note in this case, let’s first think about what a negotiable instrument is….a check made payable to a person for $100. An IOU for $100.  Bills of lading with a total included.  It’s all real simple.

So now that we’re fixed about what a negotiable instrument is, let’s examine what it ain’t.  What ain’t a negotiable instrument, as defined by Florida law is the standard Fannie/Freddie Promissory note and the following paragraphs are the primary reasons why.  Read each one carefully and ask, “Are these sentences conditions or undertakings other than the promise to repay money?” (Of course they are)

4.         BORROWER’S RIGHT TO PREPAY

I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time before they are due.  A payment of Principal only is known as a “Prepayment.”  When I make a Prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in writing that I am doing so.  I may not designate a payment as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments due under the Note.

I may make a full Prepayment or partial Prepayments without paying a Prepayment charge.  The Note Holder will use my Prepayments to reduce the amount of Principal that I owe under this Note.  However, the Note Holder may apply my Prepayment to the accrued and unpaid interest on the Prepayment amount, before applying my Prepayment to reduce the Principal amount of the Note.  If I make a partial Prepayment, there will be no changes in the due date or in the amount of my monthly payment unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes.

5.         LOAN CHARGES

If a law, which applies to this loan and which sets maximum loan charges, is finally interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with this loan exceed the permitted limits, then:  (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from me which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me.  The Note Holder may choose to make this refund by reducing the Principal I owe under this Note or by making a direct payment to me.  If a refund reduces Principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial Prepayment.

10.  UNIFORM SECURED NOTE

This Note is a uniform instrument with limited variations in some jurisdictions.  In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Security Deed (the “Security Instrument”), dated the same date as this Note, protects the Note Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep the promises which I make in this Note.  That Security Instrument describes how and under what conditions I may be required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts I owe under this Note.  Some of those conditions are described as follows:

If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender’s prior written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law.

If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration.  The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument.  If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower.

3210-FloridaFRNote-Freddie_UI

So, the deal is, if we were sitting in a law school classroom, there’s not a chance in the world but that every student in the room and the professor would agree and understand that the document being examined side by side is not covered by the definition provided.  The problem is we get into courtrooms and we get infected by considerations that are beyond and above the operative law.  Judgment gets clouded by preconceived notions and prejudices against our neighbors and favoritism for the criminal banking institutions that caused all this mess. Even to this day, years into this, years into all the fraud and the lies and the deceit, it’s like we’re still hypnotized by the banks and their black magic and voodoo.

Now, if you really want to take it a step deeper, Margery Golant makes a very credible argument that in doing this analysis we cannot just look at the note alone, but that we must also examine the mortgage that follows with it.  They truly are two integrated documents and you can see from her highlights that so many of the provisions in the mortgage have nothing to do with security and everything to do with conditions on the payment of money….these provisions are just jammed into the mortgage and kept out of the note to try and prop up this artifice of negotiability.  Read her highlights with this analysis in mind:

Fannie Florida Mortgage with Golant Highlights

Further supported by this case Sims v New Falls

Now, understand the industry never intended these notes and mortgages to transfer via endorsement.  The industry set this whole system up so that the notes and mortgage would transfer via Article 9 of the UCC.  It’s just so plain and simple.  They never set it up or intended that million dollar notes and mortgages would transfer via forged endorsements, undated squiggles and rubber stamps or floating allonges.  Of course not…that’s just crazy.  The entire system was created such that notes and mortgages and all the servicing agreements and rights and liabilities would transfer via far more formalized Assignments, with names and dates and notary stamps and witnesses.  The Article 9 transfer regime had nothing to do with protecting consumers, but everything to do with protecting the players in the industry from the scams, the lies, the cons that they all like to play on one another. (Hello, LIBOR anyone?)

But when the shifty con artists that set this whole securitization card game up, they were so focused on how much money they were making, they never considered what would happen when the whole house of cards blew down.  When it blew down, they threw their Article 9 intentions out the window and adopted the whole Article 3 negotiable instrument delusion.  Isn’t it an absurd argument when they cannot answer the question, “if assignments don’t matter, why do you still bother to do them?”  It’s because they do matter….assignments were and remain the foundation of their transfers.  The problem is Assignments, what with their pesky dates and legible names and notaries and all reveal the lies and the fraud and the con that developed once the system came crashing down and they all started stealing from one another. (With the explicit approval of our state and federal government to do so….too big to jail you know.)

Anywhoo, there’s still some faint glimmer of hope as long as we still have good judges out there that are willing to think these things through and do the heavy lifting, we might be able to rescue our nation’s judicial system and in fact our nation as a whole from this deep, dark black pit that we’ve all descended down.

I urge everyone to be very careful with these arguments.  I’m a very big supporter of pro se people and consumers being integrated into their courtrooms and being fully engaged in the public spaces they own. I’ve also seen some very good pro se people go into courtrooms and do some very beautiful things.  In some ways it’s like a “From the mouths of babes” experience.  Language and arguments stripped away from all their lawyerly pretense can have a magic effect on a judge’s ear and thoughtfully and well-prepared arguments are often received with great enthusiasm from our circuit courts….particularly those judges that recognize the roots of our civilian circuit justice system.  The danger is that ill-prepared and poorly presented arguments will taint the ears and poison the minds of judges that might otherwise accept with an open mind…..keep that in mind.  Max Gardner is the Obi One Kenobe of all this and there’s just something about the way he lays it out so clear and clean and simple that has it all make sense.  I really encourage everyone to get all his material and invest in the week long bootcamp before you go trying any of this out…..MAX GARDNER BOOTCAMP

And now my briefs:

Motion-to-Dismiss

Initial-Brief


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Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 109 Comments »

Arizona Supreme Court Hogan Case Holds that Note is Not required to Start Foreclosure

Posted on May 19, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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“the trustee owes the trustor a fiduciary duty, and may be held liable for conducting a trustee’s sale when the trustor is not in default. See Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 476, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (1978).” Hogan Court

Editor’s Comment: Here is another example of lawyers arguing out of a lack of understanding of the securitization process and trying to compress an elephant into a rabbit hole. They lost, unsurprisingly.

If you loaned money to someone, you want the money repaid. You DON’T want to be told that because you don’t have the note you can never enforce the loan repayment. You CAN start enforcement and you must prove why you don’t have the note in a credible way so that the court has footprints leading right up to the point that you don’t have the note. But the point is that you can start without the note. 

The Supreme Court apparently understood this very well and they didn’t address the real issue because nobody brought it up. The issue before them was whether someone without the note could initiate the foreclosure process. Nobody mentioned whether the same party could submit a credit bid at the auction which is what I have been pounding upon for months on end now.

Apparently, right or wrong, the feeling of the courts is that there is a very light burden on the right to initiate a foreclosure whether it is judicial or non-judicial. It is very close to the burden of the party moving to lift stay in a bankruptcy procedure. Practically any colorable right gives the party enough to get the stay — because the theory goes — whether it is a lift stay or starting the ball rolling on a foreclosure there is plenty the borrower can do to  oppose the enforcement procedure. I don’t agree with either standard or burden of proof in the case of securitized mortgages but it is about time we got real about what gets traction in the courtroom and what doesn’t.

In the Hogan case the Court makes a pretty big deal out of the fact that Hogan didn’t allege that WAMU and Deutsch were not entitled to enforce the note. From the court’s perspective, they were saying to the AG and the borrowers, “look, you are admitting the debt and admitting this is the creditor, what do you want from us, a free pass?”

This is why you need real people with real knowledge and real reports that back up and give credibility to deny the debt, deny the default, deny that WAMU and/or Deutsch are creditors, plead payment and force WAMU and Deutsch to come forward with pleadings and proof. Instead WAMU and Deutsch skated by AGAIN because nobody followed the money. They followed the document trail which led them down that rabbit hole I was referencing above.

In order to deny everything without be frivolous, you need to have concrete reasons why you think the debt does not exist, the debt does not exist between the borrower and these pretender lenders, the debt was paid in full, and deny that the loan was NOT secured (i.e. that the mortgage lien was NOT perfected when filed).

For anyone to do that without feeling foolish you must UNDERSTAND how the securitization model AS PRACTICED turned the entire lending model on its head. Then everything makes sense, which is why I wrote the second volume which you can get by pressing the appropriate links shown above. But it isn’t just the book that will get you there. You need to give rise to material, relevant issues of fact that are in dispute. For that you need a credible report from a credible expert with real credentials and real experience and training.

I follow the money. In fact the new book has a section called “Show Me the Money”. To “believe” is taken from an ancient  language that means “to be willing”. I want you to believe that the debt that the “enforcers” doesn’t exist and never did. I want you to believe that the declarations contained in the note, mortgage (deed of trust), substitution of trustee etc. are all lies. But you can’t believe that unless you are willing to consider the the idea it might be true. That I might be right.

At every “Securitized” closing table there were two deals taking place — one perfectly real and the other perfectly unreal, fake and totally obfuscated. The deal everyone is litigating is the second one,  starting with the documents at closing and moving up the chain of securitization. Do you really think that some court is going to declare that everyone gets a free house because some i wasn’t dotted or t crossed on the back of the wrong piece of paper when you admit the debt, the default and the amount due?

It is the first deal that is real because THAT is the one with the money exchanging hands. The declarations contained in the note, mortgage and other documents all refer to money exchanging hands between the named payee and secured party on one side and the borrower on the other. The deal in those documents never happened. The REAL DEAL was that money from investor lenders was poured down a pipe through which the loans were funded. The parties at the closing table with the borrower had nothing to do with funding; acquiring, transferring the receivable, the obligation, note or the mortgage or deed of trust.

Every time you chase them down the rabbit hole of the document trail you miss the point. The REAL DEAL had no documents and couldn’t possibly be secured. And if you read the wording from the Hogan decision below you can see how even they would have considered the matter differently if the simple allegation been made that the borrower denied that WAMU and Deutsch had any right to enforce the note either as principals or as agents. They were not the creditor. But Hogan and its ilk are not over — yet.

There is still a matter to be determined as to whether the party who initiated the foreclosure is in fact a creditor under the statute and can therefore submit a credit bid in lieu of cash. THAT is where the rubber meets the road — where the cash is supposed to exchange hands. And THAT is where nearly all the foreclosures across the country fail. The failure of consideration means the sale did not take place. If the borrower was there or someone for him was there and bid a token amount of money it could be argued in many states that the other bid being ineligible as a credit bid, the only winning bidder is the one who offered cash.

————————————————————

Hogan argues that a deed of trust, like a mortgage, “may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4(c) (1997); see Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 568-69, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (1938).

-6-
We agree. (e.s.) But Hogan has not alleged that WaMu and Deutsche Bank are not entitled to enforce the underlying note; rather, he alleges that they have the burden of demonstrating their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure may proceed. Nothing in the non-judicial foreclosure statutes, however, imposes such an obligation. See Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citing A.R.S. § 33-807 and observing that “Arizona’s [non-]judicial foreclosure statutes . . . do not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings”); In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (stating that non-judicial foreclosures may be conducted under Arizona’s deed of trust statutes without presentation of the original note).

———————AND SPEAKING OF  DEUTSCH BANK: READ THIS AS GRIST FOR THE ABOVE ANALYSIS——-

Disavowal by-DEUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY-AS-TRUSTEE-NOTICE-TO-CERTIFICATE-HOLDERSForeclosure-Practice-Notice-10-25[1]

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 17 Comments »

Pandemic Lying Admission: Deutsch Bank Up and Down the Fake Securitization Chain

Posted on May 18, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

One problem with securitization in practice even under the academic model is the effect on potential enforcement of the obligation, even assuming that the “lender” is properly identified in the closing documents with the buyer of the loan product and the closing papers of the buyer of the mortgage bonds (and we’ll assume that the mortgage bonds are real and valid, as well as having been issued by a fully funded REMIC in which loans were properly assigned and transferred —- an assumption, as we have seen that is not true in the real world). Take this quote from the glossary at the back of this book and which in turn was taken from established authoritative sources used by bankers, securities firms and accountants:

cross guarantees and credit default swaps, synthetic collateralized asset obligations and other exotic equity and debt instruments, each of which promises the holder an incomplete interest in the original security instrument and the revenue flow starting with the alleged borrower and ending with various parties who receive said revenue, including but not limited to parties who are obligated to make payments for shortfalls of revenues.

Real Property Lawyers spot the problem immediately.

First question is when do these cross guarantees, CDS, Insurance, and other exotic instruments arise. If they are in existence at the time of the closing with the borrower homeowner then the note and mortgage are not properly drafted as to terms of repayment nor identity of the lender/creditor. This renders the note either unenforceable or requiring the admission of parole evidence in any action to either enforce against the borrower or enforce the cross obligations of the new cross creditors who supposedly are receiving not just rights to the receivable but to the actual note and the actual mortgage.

Hence even a truthful statement that the “Trustee” beings this foreclosure on behalf of the “trust” as creditor (assuming a Trust existed by law and that the Trustee, and beneficiaries and terms were clear) would be insufficient if any of these “credit enhancements” and other synthetic or exotic vehicles were in place. The Trustee on the Deed of Sale would be required to get an accounting from each of the entities that are parties or counterparties whose interest is effected by the foreclosure and who would be entitled to part of the receivable generated either by the foreclosure itself or the payment by counterparties who “bet wrong” on the mortgage pool.

The second question is whether some or any or all of these instruments came into existence or were actualized by a required transaction AFTER the closing with the homeowner borrower. It would seem that while the original note and mortgage (or Deed of Trust) might not be affected directly by these instruments, the enforcement mechanism would still be subject to the same issues as raised above when they were fully actualized and in existence at the time of the closing with the homeowner borrower.

Deutsch Bank was a central player in most of the securitized mortgages in a variety of ways including the exotic instruments referred to above. If there was any doubt about whether there existed pandemic lying and cheating, it was removed when the U.S. Attorney Civil Frauds Unit obtained admissions and a judgment for Deutsch to pay over $200 million resulting from intentional misrepresentations contained in various documents used with numerous entities and people up and down the fictitious securitization chain. Similar claims are brought against Citi (which settled so far for $215 million in February, 2012) Flagstar Bank FSB (which settled so far for $133 million in February 2012, and Allied Home Mortgage Corp, which is still pending. Even the most casual reader can see that the entire securitization model was distorted by fraud from one end (the investor lender) to the other (the homeowner borrower) and back again (the parties and counterparties in insurance, bailouts, credit default swaps, cross guarantees that violated the terms of every promissory note etc.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Recovers $202.3 Million From Deutsche Bank And Mortgageit In Civil Fraud Case Alleging Reckless Mortgage Lending Practices And False Certifications To HUD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                  Thursday May 10, 2012

Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Stuart F. Delery, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, Helen Kanovsky, General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and David A. Montoya, Inspector General of HUD, announced today that the United States has settled a civil fraud lawsuit against DEUTSCHE BANK AG, DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS, INC., DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES, INC. (collectively “DEUTSCHE BANK” or the “DEUTSCHE BANK defendants”) and MORTGAGEIT, INC. (“MORTGAGEIT”). The Government’s lawsuit, filed May 3, 2011, sought damages and civil penalties under the False Claims Act for repeated false certifications to HUD in connection with the residential mortgage origination practices of MORTGAGEIT, a wholly-owned subsidiary of DEUTSCHE BANK AG since 2007. The suit alleges approximately a decade of misconduct in connection with MORTGAGEIT’s participation in the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA’s”) Direct Endorsement Lender Program (“DEL program”), which delegates authority to participating private lenders to endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. Among other things, the suit accused the defendants of having submitted false certifications to HUD, including false certifications that MORTGAGEIT was originating mortgages in compliance with HUD rules when in fact it was not. In the settlement announced today, MORTGAGEIT and DEUTSCHE BANK admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged in the Complaint, including that, contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations. MORTGAGEIT also admitted that it submitted certifications to HUD stating that certain loans were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance when in fact they were not; that FHA insured certain loans endorsed by MORTGAGEIT that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance; and that HUD consequently incurred losses when some of those MORTGAGEIT loans defaulted. The defendants also agreed to pay $202.3 million to the United States to resolve the Government’s claims for damages and penalties under the False Claims Act. The settlement was approved today by United States District Judge Lewis Kaplan.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara stated: “MORTGAGEIT and DEUTSCHE BANK treated FHA insurance as free Government money to backstop lending practices that did not follow the rules. Participation in the Direct Endorsement Lender program comes with requirements that are not mere technicalities to be circumvented through subterfuge as these defendants did repeatedly over the course of a decade. Their failure to meet these requirements caused substantial losses to the Government – losses that could have and should have been avoided. In addition to their admissions of responsibility, Deutsche Bank and MortgageIT have agreed to pay damages in an amount that will significantly compensate HUD for the losses it incurred as a result of the defendants’ actions.”

Acting Assistant Attorney General Stuart F. Delery stated: “This is an important settlement for the United States, both in terms of obtaining substantial reimbursement for the FHA insurance fund for wrongfully incurred claims, and in obtaining the defendants’ acceptance of their role in the losses they caused to the taxpayers.”

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www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  1/45/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

HUD General Counsel Helen Kanovsky stated: “This case demonstrates that HUD has the ability to identify fraud patterns and work with our partners at the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to pursue appropriate remedies. HUD would like to commend the work of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York in achieving this settlement, which is a substantial recovery for the FHA mortgage insurance fund. We look forward to continuing our joint efforts with the Department of Justice and the SDNY to combat mortgage fraud. The mortgage industry should take notice that we will not sit silently by if we detect abuses in our programs.”

HUD Inspector General David A. Montoya stated: “We expect every Direct Endorsement Lender to adhere to the highest level of integrity and accountability. When the combined efforts and attention of the Department of Justice, HUD, and HUD OIG are focused upon those who fail to exercise such integrity in connection with HUD programs, the end result will be both unpleasant and costly to the offending party.”

The following allegations are based on the Complaint and Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) filed in Manhattan federal court by the Government in this case:

Between 1999 and 2009, MORTGAGEIT was a participant in the DEL program, a federal program administered by the FHA. As a Direct Endorsement Lender, MORTGAGEIT had the authority to originate, underwrite, and endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. If a Direct Endorsement Lender approves a mortgage loan for FHA insurance and the loan later defaults, the holder of the loan may submit an insurance claim to HUD for the costs associated with the defaulted loan, which HUD must then pay. Under the DEL program, neither the FHA nor HUD reviews a loan before it is endorsed for FHA insurance. Direct Endorsement Lenders are therefore required to follow program rules designed to ensure that they are properly underwriting and endorsing mortgages for FHA insurance and maintaining a quality control program that can prevent and correct any deficiencies in their underwriting. These requirements include maintaining a quality control program, pursuant to which the lender must fully review all loans that go into default within the first six payments, known as “early payment defaults.” Early payment defaults may be signs of problems in the underwriting process, and by reviewing early payment defaults, Direct Endorsement Lenders are able to monitor those problems, correct them, and report them to HUD. MORTGAGEIT failed to comply with these basic requirements.

As the Complaint further alleges, MORTGAGEIT was also required to execute certifications for every mortgage loan that it endorsed for FHA insurance. Since 1999, MORTGAGEIT has endorsed more than 39,000 mortgages for FHA insurance, and FHA paid insurance claims on more than 3,200 mortgages, totaling more than $368 million, for mortgages endorsed for FHA insurance by MORTGAGEIT, including more than $58 million resulting from loans that defaulted after DEUTSCHE BANK AG acquired MORTGAGEIT in 2007.

As alleged in the Complaint, a portion of those losses was caused by the false statements that the defendants made to HUD to obtain FHA insurance on individual loans. Although MORTGAGEIT had certified that each of these loans was eligible for FHA insurance, it repeatedly submitted certifications that were knowingly or recklessly false. MORTGAGEIT failed to perform basic due diligence and repeatedly endorsed mortgage loans that were not eligible for FHA insurance.

The Complaint also alleges that MORTGAGEIT separately certified to HUD, on an annual basis, that it was in compliance with the rules governing its eligibility in the DEL program, including that it conduct a full review of all early payment defaults, as early payment defaults are indicators of mortgage fraud. Contrary to its certifications to HUD, MORTGAGEIT failed to implement a compliant quality control program, and failed to review all early payment defaults as required. In addition, the Complaint alleges that, after DEUTSCHE BANK acquired MORTGAGEIT in January 2007, DEUTSCHE BANK managed the quality control functions of the Direct Endorsement Lender business, and had its employees sign and submit MORTGAGEIT’s Direct Endorsement Lender annual certifications to HUD. Furthermore, by the end of 2007, MORTGAGEIT was not reviewing any early payment defaults on closed FHA-insured loans. Between 1999 and 2009, the FHA paid more than $92 million in FHA insurance claims for loans that defaulted within the first six payments.

***

Pursuant to the settlement, MORTGAGEIT and the DEUTSCHE BANK defendants will pay the United States $202.3 million within 30 days of the settlement.

As part of the settlement, the defendants admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for certain misconduct. Specifically,

MORTGAGEIT admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for the following:

www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  2/4

5/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

MORTGAGEIT failed to conform fully to HUD-FHA rules requiring Direct Endorsement Lenders to maintain a compliant quality control program;

MORTGAGEIT failed to conduct a full review of all early payment defaults on loans endorsed for FHA insurance;

Contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations;

MORTGAGEIT endorsed for FHA mortgage insurance certain loans that did not meet all underwriting requirements contained in HUD’s handbooks and mortgagee letters, and therefore were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance under the DEL program; and;

MORTGAGEIT submitted to HUD-FHA certifications stating that certain loans were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance when in fact they were not; FHA insured certain loans endorsed by MORTGAGEIT that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance; and HUD consequently incurred losses when some of those MORTGAGEIT loans defaulted.

The DEUTSCHE BANK defendants admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for the fact that after MORTGAGEIT became a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of DB Structured Products, Inc and Deutsche Bank AG in January 2007:

The DEUTSCHE BANK defendants were in a position to know that the operations of MORTGAGEIT did not conform fully to all of HUD-FHA’s regulations, policies, and handbooks;

One or more of the annual certifications was signed by an individual who was also an officer of certain of the DEUTSCHE BANK defendants; and;

Contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations.

***

The case is being handled by the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit. Mr. Bharara established the Civil Frauds Unit in March 2010 to bring renewed focus and additional resources to combating financial fraud, including mortgage fraud.

To date, the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit has brought four civil fraud lawsuits against major lenders under the False Claims Act alleging reckless residential mortgage lending.

Three of the four cases have settled, and today’s settlement represents the third, and largest, settlement. On February 15, 2012, the Government settled its civil fraud lawsuit against CITIMORTGAGE, INC. for $158.3 million. On February 24, 2012, the Government settled its civil fraud suit against FLAGSTAR BANK, F.S.B. for $132.8 million. The Government’s lawsuit against ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE CORP. and two of its officers remains pending. With today’s settlement, the Government has achieved settlements totaling $493.4 million in the last three months. In each settlement, the defendants have admitted and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged in the Government’s Complaint.

The Office’s Civil Frauds Unit is handling all three cases as part of its continuing investigation of reckless lending practices.

The Civil Frauds Unit works in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, on which Mr. Bharara serves as a Co-Chair of the Securities and Commodities Fraud Working Group. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

Mr. Bharara thanked HUD and HUD-OIG for their extraordinary assistance in this case. He also expressed his appreciation for the support of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Division in Washington, D.C.

www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  3/4

5/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Lara K. Eshkenazi, Pierre G. Armand, and Christopher B. Harwood are in charge of the case.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 42 Comments »

Securitization – The Undead Heart of The Shadow Banking Machine

Posted on April 26, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment: 

The article below was written by David Malone of the Golem XIV: Author of the Debt Generation, website, and was submitted to this blog by ELLEN BROWN

Ellen is an attorney and the author of eleven books, including Web of Debt: The Shocking Truth About Our Money System and How We Can Break Free. Her websites are webofdebt.com and ellenbrown.com.  She is also chairman of the Public Banking Institute.

Securitization – The Undead Heart of The Shadow Banking Machine

At the centre of all debates about the Banking crisis, the shadow Banking system and the bank bail-outs is Debt. For a long time I have been arguing that what this debt is, is in fact a new, bank created, bank issued and ultimately bank debased debt-backed currency. And the collapse in value of this unregulated currency IS the crisis. Its cause and its logic.

In order to explain why I think this and why I do not think ‘fixing’ the banking system back to any semblance of how it was, just prior to the crash, will be anything other than a disaster, I have to explain how debt is turned into money. And how, clever as this process is, it also contains within it the seeds of its own undoing.

To do so I have to take you into the undead heart of the machine – securitization. Securitization is what animates the global financial and shadow banking system in whose shadow we now live. It is how modern finance turns debt into money. It is the impious alchemical dream of turning lead to gold, water into wine.

When Securitization was invented it soon wrested control of the money supply away from nations and gave it to the banks. Nations still printed and controlled their currency. But securitization gave banks the ability to print their own currency. And this new securitized currency, based on debt, was theirs to print, control, spend, and ultimately to debase. In short, it gave banks a power to rival nations. It is worth, therefore, understanding its outlines at least. Please don’t panic. Like most financial stuff its not nearly as difficult as the priesthood would have you believe.

So here we go into the hocus-pocus world of debt finance.

The Banker’s problem.

We start with a debt. It could be a loan extended to a corporation or a mortgage. We’ll go with a mortgage. A mortgage is a debt and a promise to pay that debt. This was the bedrock of traditional banking. The bank lent out cash in return for a greater amount to be paid back, but in installments over 25-30 years. Of course over the years there were risks of inflation and default if the debtor lost their job or died. These are ‘credit risks’ that were the stuff of traditional banking.

Traditional ‘credit risk’ banking was a slow business – and that was the problem.

All debts were ‘held to maturity’ (to the end of the mortgage) by the bank. All the debts/mortgages were therefore dead end deals. In that they generally did not, could not, lead to anything else. Money went out. A debt was held in its place and the money slowly came back. The bank’s profit came from what was and is called, ‘the spread’ between the rate of interest the bank charges on the money it has lent out and the interest the bank pays on the money it borrows. The main places the banks ‘borrowed’ was from central banks, from investors – either share holders or bond holders and most importantly from their own depositors. You can see that the scope for banks to grow in size wealth and power, was constrained by the rate of flow of real money in to the bank and the turn over of loans.

For banking to really grow the amount of money to borrow and the turn-over of loans had to be increased. Securitization did both these things. It cut the umbilical to an older gentler age.

The last hold-out of the barter system.

In a funny way banking was the very last hold out of the barter system. The bank gave you money – very modern – but in return you gave the bank a lien/a claim on your property. You bartered your house and a promise to give a steady stream from your income as collateral for cash. You got cash from the deal which you could spend – and used it to buy the property. But the bank did not get cash. In fact it got something it could not spend. It got an agreement to pay. And you if the debt defaulted then the bank got a house. Now that is barter.

The genius of securitization finally did away with the barter element of banking. It did so by turning mortgages (debt agreement) into money. Nothing short of modern alchemy.

This is how it works.

The key difference between debt and money is that you can spend money. So what do you have to do to debt to be able to spend it?

Three things: Standardize it and Guarantee it and when you have done these two, the third, Liquefy it, will follow of its own accord.

So first –

Standardize it

Think of a pocket full of coins. What makes them work is that they are all the same. Same metal, same designs, same issuer, same bank behind them, same value. Everyone knows what they are getting when they accept a standard coin. So everyone is happy to accept them knowing that the next person will also be happy.

Now think of a mortgage. Now imagine you have a pocket full of these. Which banks do. Each one is unique. Unique amount, unique collateral (the house) and unique credit risks of the particular person paying back the loan. The skill of the banker was to assess all these variables. The short-coming was that the end product was a pocket full of different and unique debt agreements. Like having a pocket full of different coins in different currencies. Very difficult to get people to accept random coins as payment.

Step one in securitization is to deal with that problem. Basically by melting the mortgages down to their base metal and recasting them.

And recasting them does one other critical job.  The problem with mortgages its that sometimes the borrower defaults and the bank loses some of the money it lent out. To put it in terms of our coin analogy, in every pocket-full there will be one which turns out to be a tin plug. But which one?

Securitization solves this problem.

The failure rate of mortgages, any loan in fact, is a matter of probability. Melting down and recasting the mortgages spreads the loss evenly. If you expect one mortgage in every hundred to default that would mean anyone buying a mortgage from you would have a one in a hundred chance of getting the one that will deafult and end up with a worthless piece of paper. But in securitization all hunderd mortgages are sliced in to an hundred peices and each securitiy gets one piece each from each mortgage. Now when that one in a hundred defaults the loss is evenly spread.

Suddenly there is no unknown. There is a mathematically expressible probability that the whole pool will lose one hundredth of its value. That is easy to calculate into the value/worth/price of the bundle. And one hundredth of that loss will turn up in each of the recast slices. Mortgages go in. Securities come out. Each made from the melted and recast value of all the mortgages in the pot. Each is stamped into the same form with the same worth. You have convert unique debt agreements into a standard coinage of known value. Suddenly you have a pocket full of money.

Standardizing is the first step towards inventing a new form of money. You have ceased bartering your cash in return for a dead end debt, and instead converted the debt back into money. And rather fabulously this money YOU control. The central bank doesn’t control how much gets printed. You do. All you have to do is print up debt agreements and securitize them. And you can potentially print as much as you like whenever you like. It really is a license to print money.

That is a security in its simplest possible form. But if you would like to be able to spend this money you have to now guarantee it. Step two.

Guarantee it

All money that isn’t actually made of gold or silver is actually a promissory note or debt. It is debt issued by the central bank and backed by the CB’s and the Nation’s promise to honour that note. Weird isn’t it. Here we are talking about how to turn debt to money. When all along it’s actually how to turn one kind of debt into another one. The difference between the two debts is how spend-able it is. How spend-able it is, is sometimes called its fungability or liquidity. I only mention this so you know what is really meant when bankers use these terms.

Anyway back to the chase. Money is money because it is guaranteed by the central bank and the state, to be always, 100% of the time, worth what the coin or note says it is worth and therefore will always be accepted as payment. The question here, is how exactly does this promise work? What is it the CB is promising to do.

We often hear CB’s referred to as the lender of last resort. In many ways it is better to think of them as a buyer of last resort. In the final analysis the CB promise and guarantee ultimately means the CB will itself accept those coins from you. So YOU will never be left holding a worthless piece of paper or scrap of metal. You need never fear being left with worthless coins because the CB which issues the stuff guarantees to accept them, buy them back from you. As long as everyone knows this then no one is afraid to accept and hold the stuff. And this is the Liquidity of realm money.

What the CB will give you in return for the money you eventually tender back to them, is another knotty problem. At the least we, the CB would say, will accept our notes and coins as payment for any debts you have. (Now I know this doesn’t make the problem go away. But don’t blame me for the short-comings of money. They were problems before I came along!)

So for the purposes of our discussion here, when you tender a coin for payment, no one is going to say to you, “Oh, no thanks. I don’t trust those things. Haven’t you got something else?”

Except, of course, when the credibility of that CB guarantee itself is called into question – sovereign default. When that happens the spend-able value of those notes and coins evaporates like a kiss on the wind. Which is exactly the risk the Bank bail-outs are forcing on us all. Just ask the Greeks, Latvians and Icelanders.

This problem of a guarantee is a serious problem for securitization and for the shadow banking system. Because the shadow banking system and the system of securitization does not have access to the Central Banks and their ultimate promise ‘to accept as payment’. For the simple reason that the CB did not issue the securitized debt/money. So why should they promise? They do, of course, accept some of the securities as collateral for getting a loan of ‘real’ money. But the promise-to-buy is not without conditions and can be withdrawn. Securitized debt-money does not benefit from the guarantee that the CB will be the purchaser of last resort for their currency. Thus securities are NOT guaranteed the way the CB’s own money is.

So the question is, what promise or guarantee could the bankers come up with to take the place of the CB promise? Who or what could be the buyer of last resort to stand behind their securitized money?

The answer is ingenious and/or foolish depending on your temperament and the situation. In ‘good’ times the answer works. The problem is in bad times it doesn’t. AT ALL.

But in good times, the answer is that the ‘market’ promises to be the buyer of last resort. Now of course the market is also the issuer as well. Which makes it rather circular. But as long as everyone in the market – the banks, money market funds, pension funds, rating agencies will accept the securitized debt as money then there is your promise. There is no promise by one single all powerful God who will redeem all promises. In place there is a promise that in a vast market there will always be enough buyers to buy and redeem whatever the market needs to move. Redemption without God. Good trick.

You standardize the debts, you guarantee someone will always accept them as payment and you automatically get the last ingredient for free – liquidity. And with liquidity the whole thing runs like a mighty river.

The point is that unlike the original debt we now have a tradable asset that is a kind of currency. The more readily it can be sold the more ‘liquid’ it is as an asset and the more it is like money/cash. Which is a good trick. Because debt is a dead end. Whereas cash is the open road.

So in place of a single God-like promise, there is a market of groomed and powdered god-lets who collectively have pretensions to being a god – and this ‘market god’ ‘guarantees’ that there will always be some god-let who wants to buy securitized debt. Now you can see where all the talk of ‘frozen credit markets’ comes from. What they are really saying is that the ‘market’s’, the god-let’s, promise, turned out to be good only as long as it wasn’t really needed, when times were good, but was worthless as soon as it was needed. That detail was presumably somewhere in the very small print.

And indeed down in the small print you find out that the undeclared complication running through all is RISK. It was there when I said ‘one in a hundred mortgages will default’. Seemed so reasonable when I said it, didn’t it? That was where the devil crept in. Who says it is always one in a hundred?

This is where we get to all the AAA rating stuff. This is where the dark side of securitization lurks.

PART TWO TO FOLLOW.

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SEC POSTS Promissory NOTE SCAM INFO

Posted on September 29, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Broken Promises:
Promissory Note Fraud

A promissory note is a form of debt – similar to a loan or an IOU – that a company may issue to raise money. Typically, an investor agrees to loan money to the company for a set period of time. In exchange, the company promises to pay the investor a fixed return on his or her investment, typically principal plus annual interest.

While promissory notes can be legitimate investments, those that are marketed broadly to individual investors often turn out to be scams. The SEC and state securities regulators across the nation have joined forces to combat the fraudulent sale of promissory notes to investors. But we can’t stop every fraud.

That’s why you should ask tough questions – and demand answers – before you consider investing in a promissory note. Be sure you understand how they work and what risks they pose. These tips will explain how promissory note fraud can occur and will help you to spot the scams.

Anatomy of a Promissory Note Fraud

Fraudsters across the nation have recently begun to use promissory notes as vehicles to defraud investors out of hundreds of millions of dollars. Most promissory note scams follow predictable, fraudulent fact patterns:

  • The fraudsters – who may or may not be affiliated with the company – persuade independent life insurance agents to sell promissory notes, luring them with lucrative commissions of up to twenty or even thirty percent. These agents often do not have a license to sell securities. And in selling the notes, they frequently rely solely on the information the company gives them – which later proves to be false or misleading.

  • Investors purchase the promissory notes, enticed by the promise of a high, fixed-rate return – up to fifteen or twenty percent – with a very low level of risk. The promissory notes may appear all the more attractive because the seller falsely claims that they’re “guaranteed” or insured. And few investors ask tough questions about these investments because they know and trust the sellers, insurance agents with whom they’ve done business in the past.

  • The fraudsters use a portion of the money they collect from investors to pay the sellers their commissions. But they typically abscond with the rest, squandering it on personal expenses or high-flying life styles.

  • They may also use some of the proceeds to support an elaborate “Ponzi” scheme in which money coming in from the sale of new notes pays the interest on older notes. Some fraudsters try to avoid repaying investors’ principal by convincing investors to “roll-over” their promissory notes upon maturity. These investors may, for at least a time, continue to receive interest payments – but they rarely get their principal back.

Promissory note scams often target the elderly, bilking them of their retirement savings at a time when they can least afford to lose it. But no one is immune. Fraudsters rarely discriminate when it comes to separating investors from their money. And most investors don’t even realize their investment dollars are at risk until it’s far too late.

Tips To Avoid Promissory Note Scams

Here’s how you can avoid the costly mistake of investing in a sham promissory note:

  • Bear in mind that legitimate corporate promissory notes are not usually sold to the general public. Instead, they tend to be sold privately to sophisticated buyers who do their own “due diligence” or research on the company. If someone calls you up or knocks on your door trying to sell you a promissory note, chances are you’re dealing with a scam.

  • Find out whether the investment is registered with the SEC or your state securities regulator – or whether it’s exempt from registration. Most legitimate promissory notes can easily be verified by checking the SEC’s EDGAR database or by calling your state securities regulator, which you can find at the website of the North American Securities Administrators Association. If the promissory note is not registered, you’ll have to do your own thorough investigation to confirm whether the company has the ability to pay its debt.

  • Be skeptical if the seller tells you that the promissory note is not a security. The types of promissory notes involved in promissory note scams usually are securities and must be registered with either the SEC or your state securities regulator – or they must meet an exemption.

  • Make sure the seller is properly licensed. Insurance agents can’t sell securities – including promissory notes – without a securities license. Call your state securities regulator, and ask whether the person or firm is licensed to sell securities in your state and whether they have a record of complaints or fraud. You can also get this information by calling FINRA’s public disclosure hotline at (800) 289-9999 or by visiting their website.

  • Beware of promises of “risk free” returns. These claims are usually the bait con artists use to lure their victims. Always remember that if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.

  • Watch out for promissory notes that are supposedly “insured” or “guaranteed,” especially if a foreign insurance company is involved. Be sure to call your state insurance commissioner to find out whether the foreign insurance company can legally do business in the United States.

  • Compare the rate of return on the promissory note with current market rates for similar fixed-rate investments, long-term Treasury bonds, or FDIC-insured certificates of deposit. If the seller promises an above-market rate on a short-term note, proceed with caution.

What To Do If You Run into Trouble

If you believe you’ve invested in a promissory note scam, act promptly. By law, you only have a limited time to take legal action.

Contact the SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy. You can send us your complaint by using our online complaint form. Or you can reach us as follows:

U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
Office of Investor Education and Advocacy
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0213
Fax: (202) 772-9295

You should also contact your state securities regulator and, if an insurance agent sold you the promissory note, your state insurance commissioner.

Learn More About Promissory Notes

For more information, visit the website of FINRA, where you can read an alert on Promissory Notes Can Be Less Than Promised.

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Conservative NC Court of App: Power of Sale is Not Favored Under the Law

Posted on June 7, 2010 by Neil Garfield

GET LOAN SPECIFIC RECORDS PROPERTY SEARCH AND SECURITIZATION SUMMARY

because a foreclosure under a power of sale is not favored in the law and must be “watched with jealousy,” see In re Foreclosure of Goforth Props., 334 N.C. at 375, 432 S.E.2d at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that the evidence presented to the trial court was not sufficient to establish that the Note was payable to Deutsche Bank for Soundview, and so was not sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of fact that “Novastar Mortgage, Inc., . . . transferred and assigned its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-4 (`Lender’).”

Conservative NC Court of Appeals says “Show us the note!”

Today, June 07, 2010, 31 minutes ago | admin From Home Equity Theft Reporter:

Another trial court screw-up in a foreclosure action was recently reversed – this time by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which ruled that a lender seeking to foreclose on a mortgage had failed to properly provide sufficient competent evidence that it was the holder of the promissory note secured by the mortgage. Accordingly, it ruled that the lender was not entitled to go forward with a foreclosure

sale.(1)

For the ruling, see In re Foreclosure of Adams, No. COA09-1455 (N.C.

App. June 1, 2010).

(1) An excerpt from the ruling (bold text is my emphasis, not in the original text):

[S]ince the photocopies of the Note and Deed of Trust presented to the trial court indicate that the original holder of both instruments was Novastar, not Deutsche Bank for Soundview, and since these photocopies do not indicate that Novastar negotiated, indorsed or transferred the Note to Deutsche Bank for Soundview, respondents contend the photocopied instruments alone were not sufficient to establish that Deutsche Bank for Soundview is the current holder of the Note.

We recognize that, in the present case, the testimony by affidavit from Ms. Smith, the assistant secretary of Deutsche Bank for Soundview——an out-of-state entity——as well as the in-person testimony offered by Ms. Cole indicated that Deutsche Bank for Soundview is the current holder of the Note and Deed of Trust. However, neither the in-person testimony from Ms. Cole nor the testimony by affidavit from Ms. Smith expressly showed that Novastar transferred or assigned its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to Deutsche Bank for Soundview.

Moreover, as we discussed above, the photocopied Note and Deed of Trust, which were described in Ms. Smith’s affidavit as “exact reproductions” of the original instruments, do not show that the Note was indorsed, transferred, or otherwise made payable by Novastar, the original holder of the instrument, to Deutsche Bank for Soundview.

Thus, whereas the record in In re Foreclosure of Brown, 156 N.C. App. 477, 577 S.E.2d 398 (2003), also included an Assignment of Deed of Trust as evidence showing that the original holder of the note and deed of trust had assigned its interest in said instruments to the party seeking to foreclose on the respondent—borrowers, the record before the trial court in the present case contained no such additional evidence.

Accordingly, because a foreclosure under a power of sale is not favored in the law and must be “watched with jealousy,” see In re Foreclosure of Goforth Props., 334 N.C. at 375, 432 S.E.2d at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that the evidence presented to the trial court was not sufficient to establish that the Note was payable to Deutsche Bank for Soundview, and so was not sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of fact that “Novastar Mortgage, Inc., . . . transferred and assigned its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-4 (`Lender’).”

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Discovery, Forensic Analysis and Motion Practice: The Prospectus

Posted on March 26, 2010 by Neil Garfield

USE THIS AS A GUIDE FOR DISCOVERY, FORENSIC ANALYSIS AND MOTION PRACTICE TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE

see for this example SHARPS%20CDO%20II_16.08.07_9347

Comments in Red: THIS IS A PARTIAL ANNOTATION OF THE PROSPECTUS. IF YOU WANT A FULL ANNOTATION OF THIS PROSPECTUS OR ANY OTHER YOU NEED AN EXPERT IN SECURITIZATION TO DO IT. THERE ARE THREE OBVIOUS JURISDICTIONS RECITED HERE: CAYMAN ISLANDS, UNITED STATES (DELAWARE), AND IRELAND WITH MANY OTHER JURISDICTIONS RECITED AS WELL FOR PURPOSES OF THE OFFERING, ALL INDICATING THAT THE INVESTORS (CREDITORS) ARE SPREAD OUT ACROSS THE WORLD.

Note that the issuance of the bonds/notes are “non-recourse” which further corroborates the fact that the issuer (SPV/REMIC) is NOT the debtor, it is the homeowners who were funded out of the pool of money solicited from the investors, part of which was used to fund mortgages and a large part of which was kept by the investment bankers as “profit.”There is no language indicative that anyone other than the investors own the notes from homeowner/borrowers/debtors. Thus the investors are the creditors and the homeowners are the debtors. Without the investors there would have been no loan. Without the borrowers, there would would have been no investment. Hence, a SINGLE TRANSACTION.

If you read carefully you will see that there is Deutsch Bank as “initial purchaser” so that the notes (bonds) can be sold to pension funds, sovereign wealth funds etc. at a profit. This profit is the second tier of yield spread premium that no TILA audit I have ever seen has caught.

The amount of the “LEVEL 2” yield spread premium I compute on average to be approximately 30%-35% of the total loan amount that was funded FOR THE SUBJECT LOAN on average, depending upon the method of computation used.Thus a $300,000 loan would on average spawn two yield spread premiums, “level 1” being perhaps 2% or $6,000 and “level 2” being 33% or $100,000, neither of which were disclosed to the borrower, a violation of TILA.

The amount of the yield spread premium is a complex number based upon detailed information about the what actually took place in the sale of all the bonds and what actually took place in the sale of all the loan products to homeowners and what actually took place in the alleged transfer or assignment of “loans” into a master pool and what actually took place in the alleged transfer or assignment of “loans” into specific SPV pools and the alleged transfer or assignment of “loans” into specific tranches or classes within the SPV operating structure.

Here is the beginning of the prospectus with some of the annotations that are applicable:

Sharps CDO II Ltd., (obviously a name that doesn’t show up at the closing with the homeowner when they sign the promissory note, mortgage (or Deed of Trust and other documents. You want to ask for the name and contact information for the entity that issued the prospectus which is not necessarily the same company that issued the securities to the investors) an exempted company (you might ask for the identification of any companies that are declared as “exempted company” and their contact information to the extent that they issued any document or security relating to the subject loan) incorporated with limited liability you probably want to find out what liabilities are limited) under the laws of the Cayman Islands (ask for the identity of any foreign jurisdiction in which enabling documents were created, or under which jurisdiction is claimed or referred in the enabling documentation) (the “Issuer”) (Note that this is the “issuer” you don’t see don’t find about unless you ask for it), and Sharps CDO II Corp., (it would be wise to check with Delaware and get as much information about the names and addresses of the incorporators) a Delaware corporation (the “Co-Issuer” and together with the Issuer, the “Co-Issuers”), pursuant to an indenture (don’t confuse the prospectus with the indenture. The indenture is the actual terms of the bond issued just like the “terms of Note” specify the terms of the promissory note executed by the borrower/homeowner at closing) (the “Indenture”), among the Co-Issuers and The Bank of New York, as trustee (Note that BONY is identified “as trustee” but the usual language of “under the terms of that certain trust dated….etc” are absent. This is because there usually is NO TRUST AGREEMENT designated as such and NOT TRUST. In fact, as stated here it is merely an agreement between the co-issuers and BONY, which it means that far from being a trust it is more like the operating agreement of an LLC) (the “Trustee”), will issue up to U.S.$600,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class A-1 Notes”), U.S.$100,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class A-2 Notes”), U.S.$60,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2046 (the “Class A-3 Notes” and, together with the Class A-1 Notes and the Class A-2 Notes, the “Class A Notes”), U.S.$82,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class B Notes”), U.S.$52,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class C Notes”), U.S.$34,000,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class D-1 Notes”) and U.S.$27,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class D-2 Notes” and, together with the Class D-1 Notes, the “Class D Notes”). The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are collectively referred to as the “Senior Notes.” The Class A-2 Notes, the Class A-3 Notes, the Class
B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes and the Subordinated Notes (as defined below) are collectively referred to as the “Offered Notes.” Concurrently with the issuance of the Senior Notes, the Issuer will issue U.S.$27,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class D-2 Notes” and, together with the Class D-1 Notes, the “Class D Notes pursuant to the Indenture and U.S.$45,000,000 Subordinated Notes due 2046 (the “Subordinated Notes”) pursuant to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Issuer (the “Issuer Charter”) and in accordance with a Deed of Covenant (“Deed of Covenant”) and a Fiscal Agency Agreement (the “Fiscal Agency Agreement”), among the Issuer, The Bank of New York, as Fiscal Agent (in such capacity, the “Fiscal Agent”) and the Trustee, as Note Registrar (in such capacity, the “Note Registrar”). The Senior Notes and the Subordinated Notes are collectively referred to as the “Notes.” Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft (“Deutsche Bank”), New York Branch (“Deutsche Bank AG, New York Branch” and, in such capacity, the “TRS Counterparty”) will enter into a total return swap transaction (the “Total Return Swap”) with the Issuer pursuant to which it will be obligated to purchase (or cause to be purchased) the Class A-1 Notes issued from time to time by the Issuer under the circumstances described herein and therein. (cover continued on next page)

It is a condition to the issuance of the Notes on the Closing Date that the Class A-1 Notes be rated “Aaa” by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) and “AAA” by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (“Standard & Poor’s,” and together with Moody’s, the “Rating Agencies”), that the Class A-2 Notes be rated “Aaa” by Moody’s and “AAA” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class A-3 Notes be rated “Aaa” by Moody’s and “AAA” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class B Notes be rated at least “Aa2” by Moody’s and at least “AA” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class C Notes be rated at least “A2” by Moody’s and at least “A” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class D-1 Notes be rated “Baa1” by Moody’s and “BBB+” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class D-2 Notes be rated “Baa3” by Moody’s and “BBB-” by Standard & Poor’s.
This Offering Circular constitutes the Prospectus (the “Prospectus”) for the purposes of Directive 2003/71/EC (the “Prospectus Directive”). Application has been made to the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (the “Financial Regulator”) (you could ask for the identification and contact information of any financial regulator referred to in the offering circular, prospectus or other documents relating to the securitization of the subject loan), as competent authority under the Prospectus Directive for the Prospectus to be approved. Approval by the Financial Regulator relates only to the Senior Notes that are to be admitted to trading on the regulated market of the Irish Stock Exchange or other regulated markets for the purposes of the Directive 93/22/EEC or which are to be offered to the public in any Member State of the European Economic Area. Any foreign language text that is included within this document is for convenience purposes only and does not form part of the Prospectus.
Application has been made to the Irish Stock Exchange for the Senior Notes to be admitted to the Official List and to trading on its regulated market.
APPROVAL OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATOR RELATES ONLY TO THE SENIOR NOTES WHICH ARE TO BE ADMITTED TO TRADING ON THE REGULATED MARKET OF THE IRISH STOCK EXCHANGE OR OTHER REGULATED MARKETS FOR THE PURPOSES OF DIRECTIVE 93/22/EEC OR WHICH ARE TO BE OFFERED TO THE PUBLIC IN ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA.
SEE “RISK FACTORS” IN THIS OFFERING CIRCULAR FOR A DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN FACTORS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION
WITH AN INVESTMENT IN THE NOTES. THE SENIOR NOTES ARE NON-RECOURSE OBLIGATIONS OF THE CO-ISSUER AND THE NOTES ARE LIMITED
RECOURSE OBLIGATIONS OF THE ISSUER, PAYABLE SOLELY FROM THE COLLATERAL DESCRIBED HEREIN.
THE NOTES DO NOT REPRESENT AN INTEREST IN OR OBLIGATIONS OF, AND ARE NOT INSURED OR GUARANTEED BY, THE TRUSTEE, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., DEUTSCHE BANK OR ANY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AFFILIATES. Note that you have more than one trustee without any specific description of where one trustee ends and the other begins. It is classic obfuscation and musical chairs. NOTE ALSO THAT TRUSTEE DISCLAIMS ANY INTEREST IN THE BONDS BEING ISSUED [REFERRED TO AS “NOTES” JUST TO MAKE THINGS MORE CONFUSING].

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 14 Comments »

The Trustee Has a Duty to Cancel the Underlying Note After Sale!!

Posted on February 2, 2010 by Neil Garfield

From Sal Danna

Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 147 Cal. App. 3d 225 – Cal: Court of Appeals, 2nd Dist., Div. 4 1983

How this document has been cited

—stating that a trustee ” `is the agent of all the parties to the escrow… and bears a fiduciary relationship to each of them.'”- in Hatch v. Collins, 1990 and one similar citation
—we note that decisions concerning secured promissory notes have evidenced a policy favoring the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions- in Guardian Sav. & Loan Assn. v. MD ASSOCIATES, 1998 and one similar citation
Cotton Lane contends that this statute does not apply to this case, however, because “[t] he `judgment’referred to in Code of Civil Procedure sections 580b and 580d refers only to a judgment rendered in [California] and not to a judgment pursued in a state allowing deficiencies following foreclosure sales. “- in Cardon v. Cotton Lane Holdings, Inc., 1992 and one similar citation
The court distinguished this situation from cases such as ours where both instruments are executed in the same state, finding that where the laws of California apply to both the promissory note and the deed of trust,” the trustee under a deed of trust has a duty to cancel the note following a nonjudicial foreclosure– in Ballengee v. Sadlier, 1986 and one similar citation
It is well established that under Civil Code section 1642, several agreements concerning the same subject matter and made as part of the same transaction must be construed together- in ANSWAR, LTD. v. BOLD ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, 2007 and one similar citation
However, the trustee need not cancel the note when the beneficiary may seek a deficiency judgment in another jurisdiction.
– in California Title Insurance Practice: June 1990 Supplement and one similar citation
Kerivan explained its analysis by quoting from the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws section 229, comment e: ” `Issues which do not affect any interest in the land, although they do relate to the foreclosure, are determined… by the law which governs the debt for which the mortgage was given. Examples of such latter issues are the mortgagee’s rights to hold the …- in Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Khaloghli, 1986 and one similar citation
He is the agent of all parties to the deed of trust and owes duties to the trustor as well as to the beneficiary- in Ballengee v. Sadlier, 1986 and one similar citation
Both the note and the guaranty contain a California choice of law clause, and a suit on the deficiency is a suit on the note without regard to the deed or the location of the property- in Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Khaloghli, 1986 and one similar citation
Moreover, the Kerivan court stated in dicta that no deficiency judgment would be appropriate “if the trial court ascertained that [the] note and the deed of trust were to be construed under the laws of [California]….”- in Cardon v. Cotton Lane Holdings, Inc., 1992 and one similar citation

IE Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.

– How cited
702 P. 2d 596, 39 Cal. 3d 281, 216 Cal. Rptr. … – Cal: Supreme …, 1985 – Google Scholar
In April 1977, Associates, a general partnership, purchased certain real property from the Bishops for $105,000. As part of the purchase price, Associates gave the Bishops a promissory note for $8,250, secured by a deed of trust in favor of the Bishops, naming Safeco as trustee. The …
Cited by 47 – Related articles

[CITATION] California mortgage and deed of trust practice

R Bernhardt – 1990 – Continuing Education of the Bar– …
Cited by 27 – Related articles – All 2 versions

Cardon v. Cotton Lane Holdings, Inc.

– How cited
841 P. 2d 198, 173 Ariz. 203 – Ariz: Supreme Court, 1992 – Google Scholar
In 1984 and 1985, Petitioner Wilford A. Cardon (Mr. Cardon) made several trips to Los
Angeles, California to negotiate a loan for Cardon Oil Co. from Imperial Bank of Commerce (Imperial
Bank), a bank chartered in Canada. On these occasions, Mr. Cardon negotiated with the …
Cited by 32 – Related articles

Hatch v. Collins

– How cited
225 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 275 Cal. Rptr. … – … of Appeals, 1st Dist., Div. 2, 1990 – Google Scholar In this action to set aside a foreclosure sale of three parcels of real property which occurred more than seven years ago, plaintiffs and appellants Noel Hatch and Nola Hatch appeal from summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants and respondents, who are the beneficiaries …
Cited by 18 – Related articles

Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Khaloghli

– How cited
183 Cal. App. 3d 107, 227 Cal. Rptr. … – … of Appeals, 4th Dist., Div. 3, 1986 – Google Scholar
(1a) On cross motions for summary judgment, the superior court ruled for Khosro Khaloghli, an individual guarantor of a multimillion-dollar note and deed of trust on an apartment complex located in Texas, and against Consolidated Capital Income Trust, the lender, who brought this …
Cited by 15 – Related articles

Ballengee v. Sadlier

– How cited
179 Cal. App. 3d 1, 224 Cal. Rptr. … – Cal: Court of Appeals, 6th …, 1986 – Google Scholar
Ballengee loaned money to Timothy and Judy Sadlier (Sadlier). Sadlier executed a promissory note for $70,000 secured by a second deed of trust on real property in Santa Cruz County. The existing first deed of trust was in favor of Crocker National Bank (Crocker). Sadlier …
Cited by 15 – Related articles

In Re Crystal Properties, Ltd., LP

– How cited
268 F. 3d 743 – Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 2001 – Google Scholar
Beal Bank (“Beal”) appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the debtor, Crystal Properties (“Crystal”). Beal asserts that the bankruptcy and district courts incorrectly concluded that Crystal was not required to pay interest at the …
Cited by 15 – Related articles – All 2 versions

In re Bisbee

– How cited
754 P. 2d 1135, 157 Ariz. 31 – Ariz: Supreme Court, 1988 – Google Scholar
On February 10, 1986, Mr. and Mrs. Bisbee, as debtors in possession, filed an adversary complaint against Security National Bank seeking to invalidate the Bank’s security interests. Rule 7001(2), F.Bk.R. Under federal bankruptcy law, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession has …
Cited by 15 – Related articles

Romo v. Stewart Title of California

– How cited
35 Cal. App. 4th 1609, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d … – Cal: Court of Appeals, 1st …, 1995 – Google Scholar
This is the second appeal before us in this action by a home seller against an escrow agent for various misdeeds which allegedly occurred in connection with the sale of plaintiff’s house. In the first appeal we held that the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff’s claims for …
Cited by 12 – Related articles

Guardian Sav. & Loan Assn. v. MD ASSOCIATES

– How cited
75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 64 Cal. App. 4th … – … of Appeal, 1st Dist., Div. 1, 1998 – Google Scholar
In 1983, Michael D. Barker was recruited by the chairman of Guardian Savings and Loan Association (hereafter Guardian) to act as a development partner for office building projects in a territory that included San Francisco. The parties’ first investment was in 100 First Street in San …
Cited by 7 – Related articles – All 2 versions

Equating California Foreclosure Sales with Ordinary Residential Sales

R Breitman – S. Cal. L. Rev., 1994 – heinonlinebackup.com
Commentators on state foreclosure practices have set forth pro- posals designed to equate the foreclosure sale with the ordinary sale of residential real property in an arm’s length transaction.’ This Note will discuss the feasibility of making the foreclosure sale similar to …
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In re Rossi

– How cited
86 BR 220 – Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 9th Circuit, 1988 – Google Scholar
In re Robert Anthony ROSSI, Debtor. In re Patricia Ann ROSSI, Debtor. In re Eugene
HESTER; Claudette Hester, Debtors. Lawrence A. DIAMANT, Trustee, Appellant, v. BANK OF
A. LEVY, Appellee. Richard J. TEJEDA and Louie W. Tejeda, Appellants, v. Lawrence A. …
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Conceptualizing Yahoo-v. LCRA: Private Law, Constitutional Review, and …

A Ben-Ezer, AL Bendor – Cardozo L. Rev., 2003 – heinonlinebackup.com
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CONFLICT OF LAWS Ayelet Ben-Ezer* and Ariel L. Bendor** Table of Contents Introduction
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Application of California’s Antideficiency Statutes in Conflict of Laws Contexts

JH Shadduck – Cal. L. Rev., 1985 – heinonlinebackup.com
18. 147 Cal. App. 3d 225, 195 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes
105-12. 19. In Hersch, the litigants conceded that Younker v. Reseda Manor, 255 Cal. App. 2d
431, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1967), a case seemingly decided under the traditional theory, …
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[CITATION] California Title Insurance Practice: June 1990 Supplement

JL Hosack, DR Briggs – 1990 – California Continuing Education of …
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IN RE STRATTON

299 BR 616 – Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon, 2003 – Google Scholar
After the commencement of the representation, Defendant and Debtor agreed that Defendant
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ANSWAR, LTD. v. BOLD ENTERTAINMENT, LLC

Cal: Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate Dist., Div. 5, 2007 – Google Scholar
This case arises from the production of an animated feature film titled Dinotopia: Quest for the
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[CITATION] California Title Insurance Practice: June 1994 Update

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[CITATION] Real Estate Opinion Letters

RA Thompson – 1990 – Practising Law Institute
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On Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 6:53 AM, Walter Hackett <whhackett3@yahoo.com> wrote:

My understanding, developed during my years in banking, has always been that once an election of remedies is made by the obligee of the Note to non-judicially foreclose the Note ceases to have any existence as evidence of an obligation.  The only time I ever delivered a Note to a Trustee was when submitting a request for a full reconveyance.  I read this case to mean the Trustee must make demand on the holder of the Note upon conclusion of a non-judicial foreclosure sale but not as a condition to conducting one.  In 27 years I never provided a Note to a Trustee before a non-judicial foreclosure was concluded (and don’t remember doing so afterwards).

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , | 9 Comments »

Foreclosure Defense: WHERE’S THE NOTE?

Posted on June 19, 2008 by Neil Garfield

In the context of the Mortgage Meltdown-Securitization Frenzy, it just might be possible that most of the promissory notes issued by homeowners on refinancing or purchasing their homes are lost and destroyed. It might even be all of them. If that is the case, it can be argued that nobody is entitled to receive payments under this unique circumstance. It sounds silly, but the documents from each closing, which more and more resemble the issuance of a security, and the securitization process that led up to the sale of asset backed securities to investors, parsed the notes and security instruments to such an extreme that there is no one party who has possession, control, custody, authority or even knowledge enough to enforce the terms of the note or the mortgage.

At this point it appears to us in our investigation, that the actual real party(ies) in interest cannot be identified by anyone.

As we probe deeper into this mess, many thins are becoming apparent, not the least of which was that the alleged financial geniuses who became “gurus” were simply ordinary people who understood barely enough of the process to SELL it.

We have not found, thus far, anyone in the financial industry or any text, treatise or book, that contains a complete and valid description of the logistics of the typical mortgage meltdown transaction — starting with pre-sales to hood-winked investors of asset backed securities (often before any loan was closed) and ending with the loan closing on the ground where some poor sap had been convinced that he/she was a real estate investor.

EVERYONE WE KNOW HAS SOME KNOWLEDGE OF PART OF THE PROCESS BUT NOBODY HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE TOTAL PROCESS — AND THIS APPEARS INTENTIONAL TO CREATE THE FACADE OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY WHEN THE MESS EXPLODED, WHICH MANY OF THE PLAYERS KNEW WOULD HAPPEN SOONER OR LATER. 

The promissory note is the instrument that is being enforced at a mortgage foreclosure, or in the non-judicial sale states (which we contend violates fundamental due process rights) where the process of notice of sale commences.

In the judicial sale states the “lender” must file a foreclosure action and start off with alleging that they are the owner of the note and possess the rights under the mortgage. They say that they were the one that the borrower(s) was supposed to pay and they have not received payment. But in this unique context, the “lender” is not the actual lender and never was.

We know Taylor Bean is filing foreclosure suits affirmatively alleging that they don’t have the note and don’t know where it is. We know that Wells’ Fargo has been found to have pre-sold the mortgage loan PRIOR TO LOAN closing and was never the real party in interest even though their name was used at closing. It appears that every loan from 2001-2008 is subject to the analysis in these pages. It is possible that loans prior to that date might also be affected.

When you or your client appeared at closing to get the loan and refinance the home or purchase the home, they had already pre-sold or pre-arranged the sale of your loan to a mortgage aggregator. This “sale” involved assignments and begins the process of parsing the various documents into what becomes, in the end, meaningless gibberish. The straightforward nature of the foreclosure process has become a corkscrew of reverse logic, lost documents, dubious powers and even more dubious obligations to pay on the note. 

We have found no situation, as yet, where the original note has appeared or where there is any allegation that anyone knows where it is. We are receiving streaming reports that the notes are lost or destroyed. ANd we have some suspicions, that the actual rights to the enforcement of the note and/or mortgage, and perhaps the physical custody of the notes, actually might reside in the Cayman Islands or some such safe harbor, where a structured investment vehicle with no actual interest in the note or mortgage is holding all or some of the rights of the “lender” by virtue of transmittal documents or assignments that conflict with other assignments in the securitization process. 

Thus it may fairly be argued that there is no known person to the borrower against which he can exercise his rights of rescission, no known person or entity to whom payment may fairly be made without risking a claim for payment from third parties who claim entitlement from assignments or pledges that may or may not be valid, in whole or in part.

THIS IS WHY THE FIILNG OF A BANKRUPTCY ON BEHALF OF A BORROWER SEEKING TO FORESTALL FORECLOSURE MAY RESULT IN ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE OR EVEN BAR GRIEVANCES — AS TO BOTH THE LAWYER FOR THE PETITIONER AND THE LAWYER FOR THE ALLEGED LENDER.

THE “LENDER” IS ACTUALLY UNKNOWN. THE AMOUNT OF MONEY OWED, IF ANY, IS UNLIQUIDATED BECAUSE OF THE RIGHT TO RESCISSION, AND THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE REFUNDS, REBATES AND DAMAGES. AND THE SECURITY INSTRUMENT IS AT BEST CONTINGENT AND PROBABLY VOID BECAUSE OF THE RIGHT TO RESCIND. UNDER TILA, SECURITIES LAWS AND OTHER FRAUDULENT AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS AT THE FEDERAL AND STATE LEVEL. 

IF THE SCHEDULES ARE FILED PROPERLY, THEN WHEN THE “LENDER’ FILES A MOTION TO LIFT THE AUTOMATIC STAY, THE BURDEN THEN FALLS ON THE LENDER TO PROVE ITS CASE BEFORE GETTING THE ORDER LIFTING THE STAY. ON THE PETITIONER’S SCHEDULES, IT IS SHOWN THAT THE “LENDER” IS MERELY A LOAN SERVICER OR OTHER THIRD PARTY THAT NO LONGER HAS ANY INTEREST IN THE NOTE NOR POSSESSION OR AUTHORITY TO PROCEED IN FORECLOSURE. THIS “LENDER” IS SHOWN AS HAVING A CONTINGENT, UNLIQUIDATED CLAIM OF UNKNOWN AMOUNT, AND IT IS UNSECURED.

“JOHN DOE” ET AL IS LISTED ON THE SCHEDULES AS BEING PARTIES WHO DESPITE DEMAND FROM THE BORROWER, ARE NOT DISCLOSED BUT WHO MAY HAVE A CLAIM AGAINST THE PETITIONER. AND JANE DOE IS ALSO AN  DISCLOSED PARTY(IES) WHOSE OWN OBLIGATIONS HAVE BEEN MERGED WITH THE THE PETITIONER.

It would be the position of the Petitioner that the payment has been either made or is covered by a sinking fund, insurance, co-borrower payment, third party payment or fund from proceeds of the sale of asset backed securities. 

At this point there is little doubt that the assignments or sales of the note were split off or parsed from the obligation to pay in the securitization process. Other parties were either substituted as obligors under the note, co-borrowers, etc. Thus the mortgage service provider could at best only state what they have received from a particular borrower on a particular piece of property securing a particular note.

But this servicer cannot state whether OTHER payments have been made upstream that cover the revenue from the borrower’s note. And neither the servicer (nor the Trustee in non-judicial sale states) can state that they have possession of the original note, or any document from the current holder of the original note because the note is gone. In fact they cannot state or assert they know where such documentation exists or even that they know who would know where such documentation or authority exists. 

Filed under: CDO, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Mortgage | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

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