NJ Appellate Court Decision Goes to Achilles Heel of “Securitizers”

“In order to have standing to foreclose a mortgage, a party ‘must own or control the underlying debt.'”

New Jersey litigants need look no further. In fact, in every other state of the U.S. you will find the same decisions each quoting from several other to the same effect. Courts across the country have usually confused the issue and accepted the allegation of ownership as proof of ownership. This court answers that as well:

To establish such ownership or control, Plaintiff must present properly authenticated evidence that it is the holder of the note or a non-holder in possession with rights of the holder.”

So what is a holder, such that the party has established “ownership or control of the underlying debt.” That is the issue that has been blurred by the banks.

The banks focus on the state statutes (UCC) enabling a holder to enforce without ever establishing that the party owns or controls the underlying debt. If you think about it that is nonsense. But that one thing, more than anything else, is responsible for millions of wrongful foreclosures. 

see NJ Decision On POA and MERS

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Here are some basic black letter rules, quoted in the NJ case, that have been followed for centuries:

  1. A holder must possess the original note.
  2. Transfer of possession must be “authenticated by an affidavit or certification based upon personal knowledge.”
  3. A party relying upon power of attorney or other document must produce the authenticated original of that document.
  4. Using the words “as attorney in fact” means nothing unless the party is able to produce a witness who, in their own personal knowledge, knows and states that the POA is in writing and has not been revoked.
  5. That witness must be able to lay the factual foundation and authentication for introduction of the Power of Attorney or any other such document.
  6. Without such foundation and authentication, any testimony or documents proffered by virtue of the POA cannot be admitted into evidence and for purposes of the case then, such statements or documents do not exist.
  7. A party who claims a legal relationship with another party and who relies upon it for proffering evidence must provide evidence of the legal relationship.
  8. A Power of Attorney must be in writing, duly signed and acknowledged as set forth in state statutes. Oral Powers of Attorney cannot be used to circumvent the requirement that interests in real property (including mortgages) must be in writing.
  9. A party seeking to enforce a note must be able to establish, though competent evidence, the location and the previous locations of the note in order to establish possession and the right to enforce, respectively.
  10. Certifications must be based upon personal knowledge and not general familiarity.
  11. If testimony is offered based upon a “review” of records, the records must be present or the witness must identify those records and how the witness acquired personal knowledge of their content.
  12. Assignments of mortgage must be authenticated by a person who has personal knowledge of the assignment (and the circumstances in which the assignment occurred). Otherwise the assignment is hearsay and must be excluded from evidence unless otherwise admitted for different reasons. Hearsay statements in assignments cannot be admitted into evidence and for purposes of the case then, such statements do not exist.
  13. The fact that an assignment or other document exists as an original or a copy does not mean that what is written on it can be admitted into evidence. But without a proper objection, the document can be admitted into evidence as proof of the matters asserted therein.
  14. A document signed by an agent or “nominee” like MERS after the demise of the principal is void because the power of attorney expires upon expiration of the principal. If the originator no longer exists, MERS is not authorized to act on behalf of the originator.

Attorney Verification of Foreclosure Complaints

This is a blatant flaunting and end run around the rule of law. Following a 15 year tradition of fabricating “facially valid” documents, lawyers are having an employee of the law firm sign documents to verify a complaint or other filing.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Practically every consult I do for attorneys in litigation involves some document that was fabricated, forged and/or robosigned. This trick at misdirection of the court is accomplished by fabricating a document that looks to be facially valid but contains nothing but blatant lies about the people who signed it, the people who offered it, and the lawyers who pursue a false narrative based upon the presumptive validity of documents they know are not just flawed but more importantly fictitious having been fabricated strictly for the purpose of litigation and foreclosure.

Such documents are inadmissible, so the false proffer in court is that they are old valid and authentic documents that were not fabricated for use in court.

The latest turn (although not new) in these events is the execution of a “verification” or other document to be filed with the court by an employee of a law firm that at least initially starts the foreclosure. You may remember that David Stern and others made millions providing this service to banks, servicers and other parties who were involved in the initiation or maintenance of an action to foreclose. While Stern lost his license to practice law, he made off with tens of millions of dollars in fees directly attributable to falsifying documents.

Like the Bernie Madoff situation, some people were thrown under the bus and some people were not. Madoff’s PONZI scheme was not a singular event involving the the largest economic crime ($60 Billion) in Wall Street history. The publication of it gave convenient cover to underwriting banks and other cooperating entities involved in the absolute greatest of all PONZI schemes — the sale of worthless securities issued by empty trusts (over $5 trillion). The PONZI aspect was the same. But Madoff’s scheme was barely 1% of the amount stolen by Wall Street banks. And the Courts have been unwitting accomplices.

The actual “promise to pay” the investors came from the empty trust and not a homeowner or group of homeowners. The debt owed by homeowners was never owed to either the creditor (the investors) nor the trust (which was empty and never operated).  And the payments came from a dynamic dark pool consisting entirely of investor money that was legally and actually supposed to be in a bank account clearly labeled for the REMIC Trust that issued the RMBS — and then managed by a “Trustee” but the Trustee turned out to have no power. All the payments received by investors came from the dark pool — not from borrower payments or recoveries in foreclosure.

All power was vested in the “Master Servicer” which of course was the underwriter who sold the bogus RMBS in the first place — another hallmark of control always present in PONZI schemes. The entire scheme was based upon invested capital being diverted from the trusts — and then covered up by (a) payments out of the dynamic dark pool (PONZI) and (b) originating rather than buying nonconforming loans (a more elaborate PONZI).  The rest of the money was concealed in “trading profits” that are gradually released from the stockpile of money sucked out of the economy by the participating banks.

All of these transactions were “off balance sheet.” Since there were no “real transactions” in “real life” (loans, sales of loans creating a chain) the obvious fraud could only be covered up by getting court orders on a mass scale that assumed the false bank narrative was true. Those court orders and judgments were the first and only presumptively legal document in the entire chain. This is why the banks seek foreclosures at all costs to seal up potential civil and criminal liability for their initial theft from investors. Modifications must be done for purpose of appearances, but they are an intrusion into the business plan of getting as many foreclosures booked as possible.

In order to obtain such orders judges had to be satisfied that the designated forecloser was indeed a “lender” or “Creditor.” In order to do that the banks had to present fraudulent documents. In order to get the fraudulent documents through the system, the bank attorneys knew that in most cases they would only need to present “facially valid documents.” The judges would not look “under the hood.” And borrowers who could see the scam did not have access to information that would lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Hence most contested foreclosures are still resolved in favor of the co-venturers involved in the fraudulent scheme.

Foreclosure mills are among the people whom the banks will readily throw under the bus (“we’re shocked to discover that our law firm was committing such heinous crimes”). If the law firms were unwilling to provide these “extracurricular services” they never would have retained the business of foreclosures. The banks needed to win because they needed that one legal document that would create the almost conclusive presumption that everything that preceded the judgment allowing foreclosure. And the banks knew that could only be done by fraudulent misrepresentations to the courts, to borrowers, to government agencies including law enforcement that to date has jailed absolutely nobody except Lorraine Brown of DOCX.

So what do I say when represented by an obviously  false document executed by an employee of the foreclosure mill? For example I just received (hat tip to Bill Paatalo) one such “verification” in  which the signor declares that the client is out of town and so the law firm is executing the verification for the client.

The obvious response is that (1) being located somewhere else doesn’t prevent an authorized competent person from doing the verification (2) the absence of a competent witness does not give authority to anyone else to verify as though they were a competent witness (3) the verification does not and probably cannot assert that the signor is competent, to wit:

COMPETENCY consists of (a) OATH (b) PERCEPTION (C) MEMORY and (d) the ability to communicate what the witness saw, heard or otherwise experienced personally.

The law firm clearly has no personal knowledge and therefore is executing the verification just to satisfy the elements of a facially valid verification, when both reason and parole evidence clearly shows that the verification is a sham.

Hence, sanctions should be appropriate against the employee who signed it, the lawyer, the law firm and the “client” if the client knew that this was being done. Of course in most cases the party named as bringing the foreclosure is NOT the client, which is another fraudulent misrepresentation in court that would defeat jurisdiction. The client is always the sub-servicer who takes orders from the “Master Servicer”, i.e.  the underwriter who created bogus trusts to issue bogus mortgage bonds and walked away with trillions of dollars.

 

FAMILIARITY IS BREEDING CONTEMPT IN THE COURTS

Business Records Exception On Shaky Ground: The main point is foundation: the affidavit or testimony by the robo-witness must show that the company he works for is in fact the servicer of the loan, as authorized by the owner of the debt, and that he/she has actual knowledge of the procedures and posting policies of the servicer and the owner of the debt. I would add that this “corporate representative” must show that he/she and the “servicer” is authorized to speak for, and thus appear for the foreclosing party.

see http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/home/id=1202770275522/Casting-Doubt-on-Validity-of-Servicer-Affidavits-in-Foreclosure-Litigation?mcode=1202615326010&curindex=0&slreturn=20160925141040

Hearsay is always excluded from evidence — at least when it is ruled as hearsay. A document is hearsay in nearly all instances and thus may not be introduced into evidence — unless it satisfies the elements of a exception to the hearsay rule of exclusion.

In foreclosures the main hearsay event arises from the fact that no creditor appears in court. It is virtually always a company that claims to be a servicer for the owner of the debt, but the situation is nearly always opaque as to the identity of the owner of the debt who they say authorized them as servicer.

The typical testimony from a robo-witness, on leading questions from the attorney, is that he/she is familiar with the the record keeping process and policies of the servicer and that the letter, or payment history sought to be introduced into evidence was produced in the ordinary course of business from records kept in the ordinary course of business based upon entries made at or near the time of an actual event. Of course, with most of such documents there is no “event” and that is a problem for banks and servicers.

New York seems to be leading the way on the issue of whether these documents are trustworthy exceptions to the hearsay rule of exclusion. See the above link.

Judges in New York now know they will be reversed unless there is clear and competent evidence that the witness can attest from their own personal knowledge using one or more of their five senses — i.e., that they have seen and heard and followed the process of making and keeping records and that they had access to the records showing that the “servicer” was authorized to act as such.

The reason why banks have shifted from the old tried and true practice of sending a representative of the alleged owner of the debt to court is that such a person knows too much and would either be required to perjure themselves or tell the truth, to wit: that the company he/she works for is not the owner of the debt and he/she has no idea who is the owner. Such a person would be forced to admit either ignorance of any transaction in which their employer purchased the loan or that the loan was not in fact purchased by his/her employer.

Such an admission would completely obliterate the claim of the company claiming to be a servicer on behalf of the owner of the debt. This in turn would eliminate the business records exception to the hearsay rule of exclusion. We could go deeper into the number of IT platforms that are maintained and by whom they are maintained and whether the “servicer” even has access to the actual records, but it seems potentially unnecessary with decisions coming from appellate courts who are worried about opening the door on hearsay in millions of other cases unrelated to foreclosure.

Those courts are rapidly retreating from the temporary imposition of an extended exception to the hearsay rule because they can readily see how justice would not be served in criminal and civil matters if the rule remains as loose as it is now.

It is much better for the banks to send someone who knows nothing and therefore cannot accidentally or otherwise tell the truth about these bogus loans and fraudulent foreclosures. The banks are in essence throwing the servicers under the bus, along with the attorneys hired by the servicers. But the walls are caving in on them and they will soon need to put up or shut up — producing a real witness with real (not presumed) knowledge or take a voluntary dismissal. As we have seen in thousands of cases, when presented with that choice the banks voluntarily dismiss their actions even when it means they must pay attorney fees to the homeowner.

The obvious conclusion is that there is no such witness and the facts asserted by the foreclosing party are pure fiction, reliant entirely upon illusion and the erroneous application of legal presumptions.

From the article cited above:

“Lenders will need to find ways in which to meet the new requirements imposed in order to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule announced in decisions such as Royal. For instance, lenders may seek to avoid altogether obtaining affidavits from third-party loan servicers, and instead use representatives of the lender, who can attest to their familiarity with the lender’s record-keeping practices and procedures, in order to submit affidavits and documents to the court.

 
Alternatively, if lenders continue to insist, even after Royal and the other decisions of the Second Department discussed above, to use affidavits from third-party loan servicers in mortgage foreclosure litigation, then the best practice will be to have loan servicers (as opposed to lenders) be the party to act as the plaintiff in the foreclosure litigation. So long as the loan servicer is authorized to do so by the lender, courts have found that loan servicers have standing to present claims for foreclosure and sale on behalf of the lender that owns and holds the note and mortgage at the time of the commencement of the action. See, e.g., Flushing Preferred Funding Corp. v. Patricola Realty Corp., 964 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2012).”

The Affiant who googled Bank of New York Mellon had “Standing”

By William Hudson

Just because you can thread a needle and replace the button on your shirt, doesn’t mean you should attempt your own vasectomy. Furthermore, just because you faithfully read LivingLies on a daily basis doesn’t mean you should organize a national Qui Tam foreclosure defense action. Despite the sophisticated knowledge necessary to testify about complex financial matters, The Bank of New York Mellon called on servicer Wells Fargo’s “loan verification analyst” to testify about the Bank’s standing on a note bearing a blank indorsement. The loan verification analyst testified that she had learned about the transfer through research she had done “on the internet” and furthermore claimed that “the internet will illustrate the transfer occurred in 2006.” Like I said, it might be best to leave the heavy-financial analysis to the experts.

 
In SOSA v THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON | FL 4DCA – the extent of the witness’s knowledge on the subject of standing and holder status is what she claims she learned from a search on “the internet.” Although this type of evidence is insufficient to establish a bank’s standing (as nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder in this particular case) the trial court thought otherwise. Sadly, millions of people have lost their homes because a bank “employee” with no personal knowledge and who didn’t possess the necessary expertise is allowed to testify on matters they are unqualified to testify upon. In Sosa, the witness didn’t even work for the Bank or servicer and was unable to describe the relationship between the parties.

 
Attorneys who fail to challenge the testimony of such a witness, fail to file a motion to strike or allow an Affidavit to stand that is proffered by an unqualified individual- are not defending their client’s interests. In light of this case it might be wise to remember that an affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, should set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Specifically, an affidavit used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment must be made on: a) personal knowledge b) must be based on facts that are admissible in evidence, and must c) show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated in the affidavit.

 
Personal Knowledge
Absent personal knowledge, statements in an affidavit are hearsay and generally inadmissible as evidence. In the case of Sam’s Riverside, Inc. v. Intercon Solutions, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Iowa 2011), outlines the significance of the personal-knowledge requirement for affidavit evidence in a trademark-infringement lawsuit. The judge in Sam’s Riverside rejected the plaintiff’s employee’s declaration that stated that Internet screen shots were true and accurate representations of certain web pages operated by the defendant because the affidavit did not establish the declarant’s personal knowledge of that information.

 

 

An employee testifying on behalf of a bank who glances at a computer screen does not possess the necessary personal experience to have an understanding of complex financial instruments as well as the private side of the mortgage transaction. The employee should be deposed and asked more than the usual, “Did you read the defendant’s account screen?” The court noted in Sam’s Riverside that the declaration did not state that the declarant had ever visited the web pages or that he had personal knowledge about the contents of the websites mentioned. Sam’s Riverside teaches that a good affidavit should not merely state that it is based on personal knowledge, but instead, it must show how the affiant obtained such personal knowledge. In the world of mortgage securitization- the people who created the system most likely couldn’t explain it to a judge, let alone an employee low on the totem pole.

 

 

It is well settled that statements in affidavits based “on information and belief” violate the personal-knowledge requirement of Rule 56(c). Other qualifying statements, however, like stating “to my knowledge” or “I believe,” cause confusion when assessing whether the personal-knowledge requirement is satisfied. Because of this “to my knowledge” qualifier, the court should hold that there is no admissible evidence to establish that most servicers own the debt and should be paid, let alone should summary judgment be issued in favor of a lender when the rules of evidence are not satisfied. Courts have uniformly ruled that the term “to my knowledge” is redundant and legally insignificant-especially when the bank employee has absolutely no knowledge about the complex financial transactions they are being called to testify upon.

 
Facts—Not Opinions
“‘The affidavit is no place for ultimate facts and conclusions of law.’” A.L. Pickens Co., Inc. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 650 F.3d 118, 121 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, Part 2, ¶ 56.22(1) at 56-1316 (Supp. 1979)). Yet, too often an affidavit is based on opinions or false conclusions. An unqualified affiant’s opinion on legal questions should not be entitled to any weight whatsoever when it comes to testifying about a loan that was most likely never consummated and was securitized and delivered to a fictitious trust. Only the wire instructions or ledgers can legally demonstrated the transaction happened as reported. Unfortunately instead of compelling discovery so the homeowner can get to the actual facts, the homeowner will be stonewalled while the court relies on inaccurate and incompetent testimony in the form of a low-level bank employee.

 
Only when the testimony of an affiant is challenged by a knowledgeable attorney does the homeowner have a chance of refuting legal conclusions that are not supported by facts. Frequently, a judge will allow the bank employee to make legal conclusions or offer impermissible opinions, while the homeowner’s own attorney fails to defend against the false testimony. An affidavit, for example, should stay with the facts of a case. When an affiant declares, for example, that “the homeowner was in default” when there is no indication that the investor was not being paid by servicer advances, insurance proceeds or other coverage- the homeowner’s attorney must interject or forever let that testimony stand as fact.

 
Admissible Evidence
In federal courts, statements in an affidavit must be excluded if they do not comply with Federal Rules of Evidence. See:Reed v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 160 F.R.D. 572, 575 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Hearsay statements in an affidavit are not admissible unless the statement complies with a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. A hearsay exception that is routinely used in morgage-tort cases is the business-record exception. Reliance on “business records” does not violate the personal-knowledge requirement, as long as the affiant is qualified to, and does, set forth the detailed foundation for the business-record exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The issue in mortgage foreclosure cases is that the business records of loan servicers are seriously deficient as far as what is going on behind the scenes. Although the database may show the homeowner stopped paying, there is unlikely an actual default. The screenshot that banks usually rely as evidence is fatally defective and should be challenged. Until the attorney has the ledgers, confirmation that the servicer paid for the note, and other evidence nothing should be assumed. Relying on copies of documents that don’t exist- like notes that are created when the borrower goes into default should not be permissible.

 
The latest type of fraud on the court consists of the bank possessing a signature and other elements in a computer file that enable them to reconstruct a mortgage note that doesn’t actually exist until the loan goes into default. A technician than compiles the pieces together to recreate the note. The bank employee will then attest that they have in their possession the physical “wet-ink” note. When the homeowner compels the bank to see the note they claim to have in their possession, the note will then be reported lost. How convenient. It is much easier to explain away a lost note than it is to have actual evidence that a felony has been committed.

 
The affiant attesting to the foundation for the business-record exception should be compelled to explain how he or she obtained such knowledge and to explain indepth what the records mean starting at the beginning of the chain of assignments. The bank records, county records are often fabricated to create the illusion of assignment. However, if you look closely at the documents, inconsistencies can be found. It is also important that homeowners monitor affidavits submitted in their case. In a recent case the Lending Lies team is aware of, counsel for CitiMortgage altered an affidavit and forged an indorsement on a note contained in an appeal. Only after the judge based her ruling on the fraudulent Affidavit, did the homeowner discover that documents presented in the lower court had been altered and submitted in the appellee brief. The homeowner is proceeding with criminal charges against CitiMortgage and their counsel.

 
It is imperative that the homeowner and attorney leave no stone unturned in order to get to the “real story”. It is also important that both homeowner and attorney keep an eye on case documents to ensure the bank doesn’t resort to altering documents mid-trial. In most foreclosure defense cases the bank cannot meet the burden of proof if challenged and unless the judge accommodates an unqualified witness whose testimony will be used to foreclose on an unsuspecting homeowner.

 
Competent Witness
The affiant must establish that he or she is competent to lay the foundation or make the statements in the affidavit. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. Information regarding the affiant’s position with the company, job duties, and responsibilities, as well as that person’s knowledge of the company’s record-making and record-keeping practices should be documented. The witness should be examined on the company’s computer systems, how and when information is put into the computer system, and especially about the ledger, who the homeowner’s payments are forwarded to (if any) and if they are aware if the investors are being paid. Typically all a bank witness can testify about is a computer file containing information they have no control over.

 

Personal knowledge is often inferred by the judge based on an affiant’s position and the nature of the matters to which he or she testifies in the affidavit. For example, an employee who indorses mortgage notes as Vice President may be a contract employee with a rubber stamp. The majority of bank employees testifying on behalf of the bank are not competent to testify on complex legal and financial matters. An affiant’s personal knowledge and competence should not be presumed.

 

Challenging Affidavits
To challenge an affidavit that does not meet the standard requirements, requires that litigants file a motion to strike the affidavit in a timely manner and be specific as to the portions of the affidavit that are being challenged. See, e.g., Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 69 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir.1995). Failing to strike a motion waives your right to challenge the affidavit on appeal. This can be a fatal failure and all elements of an appeal should be vetted. An appeal that is too general can be struck. An affidavit made in bad faith or done to delay a case can result in an award including attorney’s fees (see: Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(h)). In the case of a fraudulent affidavit intended to deceive the court, sanctions and a judgment against the bank should be issued.

 
Merely alleging that documents have been robo-signed in order to obtain a new cause of action will not be granted, and attorneys who have attempted to do so have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Me Lee v. LNV Corp., 2012 WL 1203403 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2012-dismissing robo-signing allegations couched as an attempt to plead fraud claim). Singer v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2011 WL 2940733, *2 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2011- holding that allegations of robo-signing do not constitute a plausible claim for relief). Homeowners must present more than bare allegations of ‘robosigning’ without any other factual support. Forensic document examiner Gary Michaels has built a successful practice finding document irregularities including digital alteration, forged signatures, metadata left on original documents and jpeg distortion that the naked eye cannot see. Again, when the homeowner obtains hard evidence of fraud, challenges bank affidavits and demands to see the actual evidence- the banks have a tendency to back down and start negotiating with the homeowner.

 
Conclusion
Obviously, it is critical for affidavit statements to be truthful, but it is equally important that the procedural aspects of obtaining evidence ensure its reliability and admissibility, especially with evidence that the banks are engaging in gross fraud to create the illusion of ownership through fraudulent documents and false affidavits. Banks that have taken shortcuts like the bank did in Sosa v. Bank of New York Mellon will lose if the affiant’s knowledge is challenged. Furthermore, banks that attempt to automate the process will eventually get sloppy and slip up if a competent foreclosure attorney authenticates documents, and attacks the witnesses qualifications. It is also important that an attorney ensure that the affiant is testifying on the documents submitted in the case, not a new set of documents that bank counsel slipped into the record unbeknownst to the homeowner. Conducting an investigation on the documents and affiant in a foreclosure case, now takes the skill of an attorney prosecuting a criminal. Also make sure the affiant has the documents properly notarized and that the affidavit is done under penalty of perjury.

 
In the case of Sosa v. Bank of New York Mellon, the judge ruled that the evidence submitted was not competent to establish the bank’s standing as nonholder in possession with the rights of the holder, but getting to this point took skill on the part of the attorney. Had the attorney allowed the affiant’s testimony to stand the homeowner would have lost on appeal. Judges May and Judge Gerber are judges that apparently understand that when the rule of law is followed the right party will prevail.
See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2016/03/24/sosa-v-the-bank-of-new-york-mellon-fl-4dca-the-witnesss-entire-body-of-knowledge-on-the-subject-was-limited-to-what-the-witness-learned-from-a-search-on-the-internet-su/#sthash.BmGMLqB7.dpuf

BONY Objections to Discovery Rejected

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It has been my contention all along that these cases ought to end in the discovery process with some sort of settlement — money damages, modification, short-sale, hardest hit fund programs etc. But the only way the homeowner can get honest terms is if they present a credible threat to the party seeking foreclosure. That threat is obvious when the Judge issues an order compelling discovery to proceed and rejecting arguments for protective orders, (over-burdensome, relevance etc.). It is a rare bird that a relevance objection to discovery will be sustained.

Once the order is entered and the homeowner is free to inquire about all the mechanics of transfer of her loan, the opposition is faced with revelations like those which have recently been discovered with the Wells Fargo manual that apparently is an instruction manual on how to commit document fraud — or the Urban Lending Solutions and Bank of America revelations about how banks have scripted and coerced their employees to guide homeowners into foreclosure so that questions of the real owner of the debt and the real balance of the debt never get to be scrutinized. Or, as we have seen repeatedly, what is revealed is that the party seeking a foreclosure sale as “creditor” or pretender lender is actually a complete stranger to the transaction — meaning they have no ties i to any transaction record, and no privity through any chain of documentation.

Attorneys and homeowners should take note that there are thousands upon thousands of cases being settled under seal of confidentiality. You don’t hear about those because of the confidentiality agreement. Thus what you DO hear about is the tangle of litigation as things heat up and probably the number of times the homeowner is mowed down on the rocket docket. This causes most people to conclude that what we hear about is the rule and that the settlements are the exception. I obviously do not have precise figures. But I do have comparisons from surveys I have taken periodically. I can say with certainty that the number of settlements, short-sales and modifications that are meaningful to the homeowner is rising fast.

In my opinion, the more aggressive the homeowner is in pursuing discovery, the higher the likelihood of winning the case or settling on terms that are truly satisfactory to the homeowner. Sitting back and waiting to see if the other side does something has been somewhat successful in the past but it results in a waiver of defenses that if vigorously pursued would or could result in showing the absence of a default, the presence of third party payments lowering the current payments due, the principal balance and the dollar amount of interest owed. If you don’t do that then your entire case rests upon the skill of the attorney in cross examining a witness and then disqualifying or challenging the testimony or documents submitted. Waiting to the last minute substantially diminishes the likelihood of a favorable outcome.

What is interesting in the case below is that the bank is opposing the notices of deposition based upon lack of personal knowledge. I would have pressed them to define what they mean by personal knowledge to use it against them later. But in any event, the Judge correctly stated that none of the objections raised by BONY were valid and that their claims regarding the proper procedure to set the depositions were also bogus.

tentative ruling 3-17-14

Bank Lawyers Beware!

I know from past experience that the prosecuting attorneys at bar associations tend to move in packs. There is actually a pretty good reason for this. Certain practices by attorneys are emulated by other attorneys and spreads from state to state. Based upon a recent decision in New York State, I believe we’re going to see some serious prosecutions against attorneys for the pretender lenders.

In this case the censured attorney, David A. Cohen,  and his Long Island firm was trying to collect debts from people who weren’t already pay their bills or were not the ones who owed money to the firm’s client – creditors. I will concede that this is not the case against a foreclosure mill. And I think there is still political resistance to going after the lawyers  who represent the pretender lenders. But if you look at the reasoning in this case, it is not hard to see where the New York State Bar Association is going with this.

There were voluminous complaints about the firm spanning a 16 year period. That suggests that in cases where the homeowner believes that the attorney representing the pretender lender is violated ethical rules, or where the attorney for the homeowner believes that to be the case, a grievance should be filed.  But I caution people about doing this because they  frequently don’t know enough about the facts to be sure if a violation occurred.  It is unfair to attribute unethical conduct to an attorney who was merely advocating on behalf of a client and taking positions with which you do not agree. False filings will also create a paper jam in which the real filings for real violations get lost. SO don’t take this article as a green light to pepper the Bar Associations with vague grievances.

Cohen and his firm received numerous admonitions about his firm’s practices.

The court concluded in Matter of Cohen & Slamowitz, 2008-10218, that Cohen and Cohen & Slamowitz “engaged in a pattern and practice of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” under the Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5)(223 NYCRR 1200.3[a][5]. The judges said an attorney does not necessarily have to have personal knowledge of the specifics of his firm’s misconduct to be held responsible.“Even if the individual respondent lacked personal knowledge of the particular client matters … the pattern and practice of misconduct established at the hearing, which were pervasive within C&S [Cohen & Slamowitz] since 1996, were sufficient to impute such knowledge to him as senior partner of C&S,” [e.s.] the panel held in its per curiam ruling. The judges added that not only was Cohen personally advised in 2002 to “exercise caution,” “supervise [his] staff adequately,” and put in place “appropriate and reasonable procedures” that could be monitored, but he and his firm also received numerous letters of caution and admonition. The court said Cohen & Slamowitz has about 300 employees, including attorneys, paralegals and other staff.

Among the problems noted by the court was an attempt in 2005 to collect from a debtor identified as “Ghulam Mujtaba” of Flushing. The court said that Cohen & Slamowitz mistakenly pursued collection from Dr. Gholam Mujtaba of Corona.
 Given the various settlement and OCC consent decrees that have been entered against virtually all of the major banks and servicers, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the lawyers have not been put on notice of the existence of major defects in the claims of their clients. Unlike civil litigation, lawyers are held to a higher standard of behavior in connection with their practice of law. The ethical and disciplinary rules make it clear that the lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Here in this case, the court opened up the possibility for imputing knowledge to the attorney even though there are attempts to create compliance departments and other organizational tools that are meant to isolate the actual licensed attorneys from the illegal conduct perpetrated by their firm.
 If a bank came to me for representation in the foreclosure properties based upon loans that are subject to claims of securitization, I would make absolutely certain that there were procedures in effect within the bank to make sure that we were naming the right plaintiff, naming the right defendant, that a default was definitely present, and that we could account for the balance due. I would ask the bank “are you actually owed the money on this loan?”
 The use of professional witnesses that are hired specifically for that purpose is somewhat understandable given the volume of foreclosure litigation. What is not understandable or forgivable is hiring people specifically for the purpose of giving false testimony based upon records that were specially prepared for trial and not prepared in the ordinary course of business. It is improper and perhaps perjury to state that the entire business record is present when it clearly does not show the original loan transaction, all the transactions that occurred between the time of the loan closing and the filing of foreclosure, and all the transactions that occurred as disbursements to trust beneficiaries or other third parties. It is improper and perhaps perjury to state that the entire business record is present when the witness cannot state from personal knowledge or with the use of business records that qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule, that the record of disbursements is also present —  including all payments received by the alleged creditor.
 Some attorneys haven’t thrown under the bus, but there are dozens of other law firms that may be involved in the production or proffering of false, fraudulent, fabricated or forged documents.
 On the other hand it should be stated that withholding evidence is not necessarily a violation of the code of conduct for attorneys —  unless the withholding of that evidence results in making prior testimony or evidence subject to a charge of perjury. I don’t think that attorneys can or should be held to a standard in which their conduct is subject to variable interpretations. Any grievance filed on these grounds must be very specific as to what is being alleged is a violation. I publish this article merely as a prediction and warning that certain behavior which is now condoned in the foreclosure mills can be and probably will be imputed to the partners, regardless of how well they think they have insulated themselves.
 One of the things I wonder about is the practice of asserting in court that the attorney for the foreclosure represents “everybody.” The risk here is twofold: first that might include the trust beneficiaries that his client is screwing; second that might include the borrower because some of the parties included in “everybody” have a fiduciary duty to the borrower. I wonder if there are potential trap doors for the attorneys who are representing pretender lenders that include not only disciplinary complaints but perhaps joinder as defendants in a lawsuit filed for negligent undertaking.
 As always, nothing in this article should be interpreted as a definitive statement on the law. Pro se litigants should consult with an attorney licensed in the area in which the property is located before making a decision or taking any action. Attorneys should do their own research and make their own decisions as to what constitutes a breach of ethics or a breach of the disciplinary rules.

New Mexico Supreme Court Wipes Out Bank of New York

bony-v-romero_nm-sup.ct.-reverses-with-instruction_2-14

There are a lot of things that could be analyzed in this case that was very recently decided (February 13, 2014). The main take away is that the New Mexico Supreme Court is demonstrating that the judicial system is turning a corner in approaching the credibility of the intermediaries who are pretending to be real parties in interest. I suggest that this case be studied carefully because their reasoning is extremely good and their wording is clear. Here are some of the salient quotes that I think it be used in motions and pleadings:

We hold that the Bank of New York did not establish its lawful standing in this case to file a home mortgage foreclosure action. We also hold that a borrower’s ability to repay a home mortgage loan is one of the “borrower’s circumstances” that lenders and courts must consider in determining compliance with the New Mexico Home Loan Protection Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 58-21A-1 to -14 (2003, as amended through 2009) (the HLPA), which prohibits home mortgage refinancing that does not provide a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower. Finally, we hold that the HLPA is not preempted by federal law. We reverse the Court of Appeals and district court and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate its foreclosure judgment and to dismiss the Bank of New York’s foreclosure action for lack of standing.

The Romeros soon became delinquent on their increased loan payments. On April 1, 2008, a third party—the Bank of New York, identifying itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage—filed a complaint in the First Judicial District Court seeking foreclosure on the Romeros’ home and claiming to be the holder of the Romeros’ note and mortgage with the right of enforcement.

The Romeros also raised several counterclaims, only one of which is relevant to this appeal: that the loan violated the antiflipping provisions of the New Mexico HLPA, Section 58-21A-4(B) (2003).[They were lured into refinancing into a loan with worse provisions than the one they had].

Litton Loan Servicing did not begin servicing the Romeros’ loan until November 1, 2008, seven months after the foreclosure complaint was filed in district court.

At a bench trial, Kevin Flannigan, a senior litigation processor for Litton Loan Servicing, testified on behalf of the Bank of New York. Flannigan asserted that the copies of the note and mortgage admitted as trial evidence by the Bank of New York were copies of the originals and also testified that the Bank of New York had physical possession of both the note and mortgage at the time it filed the foreclosure complaint.

{9} The Romeros objected to Flannigan’s testimony, arguing that he lacked personal knowledge to make these claims given that Litton Loan Servicing was not a servicer for the Bank of New York until after the foreclosure complaint was filed and the MERS assignment occurred. The district court allowed the testimony based on the business records exception because Flannigan was the present custodian of records.

{10} The Romeros also pointed out that the copy of the “original” note Flannigan purportedly authenticated was different from the “original” note attached to the Bank of New York’s foreclosure complaint. While the note attached to the complaint as a true copy was not indorsed, the “original” admitted at trial was indorsed twice: first, with a blank indorsement by Equity One and second, with a special indorsement made payable to JPMorgan Chase.

the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings that the Bank of New York had standing to foreclose and that the HLPA had not been violated but determined as a result of the latter ruling that it was not necessary to address whether federal law preempted the HLPA. See Bank of N.Y. v. Romero, 2011-NMCA-110, ¶ 6, 150 N.M. 769, 266 P.3d 638 (“Because we conclude that substantial evidence exists for each of the district court’s findings and conclusions, and we affirm on those grounds, we do not addressthe Romeros’ preemption argument.”).

We have recognized that “the lack of [standing] is a potential jurisdictional defect which ‘may not be waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even sua sponte by the appellate court.’” Gunaji v. Macias, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 20, 130 N.M. 734, 31 P.3d 1008 (citation omitted). While we disagree that the Romeros waived their standing claim, because their challenge has been and remains largely based on the note’s indorsement to JPMorgan Chase, whether the Romeros failed to fully develop their standing argument before the Court of Appeals is immaterial. This Court may reach the issue of standing based on prudential concerns. See New Energy Economy, Inc. v. Shoobridge, 2010-NMSC-049, ¶ 16, 149 N.M. 42, 243 P.3d 746 (“Indeed, ‘prudential rules’ of judicial self-governance, like standing, ripeness, and mootness, are ‘founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of courts in a democratic society’ and are always relevant concerns.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we address the merits of the standing challenge.[e.s.]

the Romeros argue that none of the Bank’s evidence demonstrates standing because (1) possession alone is insufficient, (2) the “original” note introduced by the Bank of New York at trial with the two undated indorsements includes a special indorsement to JPMorgan Chase, which cannot be ignored in favor of the blank indorsement, (3) the June 25, 2008, assignment letter from MERS occurred after the Bank of New York filed its complaint, and as a mere assignment

of the mortgage does not act as a lawful transfer of the note, and (4) the statements by Ann Kelley and Kevin Flannigan are inadmissible because both lack personal knowledge given that Litton Loan Servicing did not begin servicing loans for the Bank of New York until seven months after the foreclosure complaint was filed and after the purported transfer of the loan occurred. 
[NOTE BURDEN OF PROOF]

(“[S]tanding is to be determined as of the commencement of suit.”); accord 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 584 (2009) (“A plaintiff has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage in which the plaintiff has no legal or equitable interest.”). One reason for such a requirement is simple: “One who is not a party to a contract cannot maintain a suit upon it. If [the entity] was a successor in interest to a party on the [contract], it was incumbent upon it to prove this to the court.” L.R. Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Grebe, 1981-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 96 N.M. 22, 627 P.2d 864 (citation omitted). The Bank of New York had the burden of establishing timely ownership of the note and the mortgage to support its entitlement to pursue a foreclosure action. See Gonzales v. Tama, 1988-NMSC- 016, ¶ 7, 106 N.M. 737, 749 P.2d 1116

[THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REMEDIES ON THE NOTE AND REMEDIES ON THE MORTGAGE]

(“One who holds a note secured by a mortgage has two separate and independent remedies, which he may pursue successively or concurrently; one is on the note against the person and property of the debtor, and the other is by foreclosure to enforce the mortgage lien upon his real estate.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

3. None of the Bank’s Evidence Demonstrates Standing to Foreclose

{19} The Bank of New York argues that in order to demonstrate standing, it was required to prove that before it filed suit, it either (1) had physical possession of the Romeros’ note indorsed to it or indorsed in blank or (2) received the note with the right to enforcement, as required by the UCC. See § 55-3-301 (defining “[p]erson entitled to enforce” a negotiable instrument). While we agree with the Bank that our state’s UCC governs how a party becomes legally entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument such as the note for a home loan, we disagree that the Bank put forth such evidence.

a. Possession of a Note Specially Indorsed to JPMorgan Chase Does Not Establish the Bank of New York as a Holder

{20} Section 55-3-301 of the UCC provides three ways in which a third party can enforce a negotiable instrument such as a note. Id. (“‘Person entitled to enforce’ an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the [lost, destroyed, stolen, or mistakenly transferred] instrument pursuant to [certain UCC enforcement provisions].”); see also § 55-3-104(a)(1), (b), (e) (defining “negotiable instrument” as including a “note” made “payable to bearer or to order”). Because the Bank’s arguments rest on the fact that it was in physical possession of the Romeros’ note, we need to consider only the first two categories of eligibility to enforce under Section 55-3-301.

{21} The UCC defines the first type of “person entitled to enforce” a note—the “holder” of the instrument—as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” NMSA 1978, § 55-1-201(b)(21)(A) (2005); see also Frederick M. Hart & William F. Willier, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 12.02(1) at 12-13 to 12-15 (2012) (“The first requirement of being a holder is possession of the instrument. However, possession is not necessarily sufficient to make one a holder. . . . The payee is always a holder if the payee has possession. Whether other persons qualify as a holder depends upon whether the instrument initially is payable to order or payable to bearer, and whether the instrument has been indorsed.” (footnotes omitted)). Accordingly, a third party must prove both physical possession and the right to enforcement through either a proper indorsement or a transfer by negotiation. See NMSA 1978, § 55-3-201(a) (1992) (“‘Negotiation’ means a transfer of possession . . . of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder.”). [E.S.] Because in this case the Romeros’ note was clearly made payable to the order of Equity One, we must determine whether the Bank provided sufficient evidence of how it became a “holder” by either an indorsement or transfer.

Without explanation, the note introduced at trial differed significantly from the original note attached to the foreclosure complaint, despite testimony at trial that the Bank of New York had physical possession of the Romeros’ note from the time the foreclosure complaint was filed on April 1, 2008. Neither the unindorsed note nor the twice-indorsed

7

note establishes the Bank as a holder.

{23} Possession of an unindorsed note made payable to a third party does not establish the right of enforcement, just as finding a lost check made payable to a particular party does not allow the finder to cash it. [E.S.]See NMSA 1978, § 55-3-109 cmt. 1 (1992) (“An instrument that is payable to an identified person cannot be negotiated without the indorsement of the identified person.”). The Bank’s possession of the Romeros’ unindorsed note made payable to Equity One does not establish the Bank’s entitlement to enforcement.

We are not persuaded. The Bank provides no authority and we know of none that exists to support its argument that the payment restrictions created by a special indorsement can be ignored contrary to our long-held rules on indorsements and the rights they create. See, e.g., id. (rejecting each of two entities as a holder because a note lacked the requisite indorsement following a special indorsement); accord NMSA 1978, § 55-3-204(c) (1992) (“For the purpose of determining whether the transferee of an instrument is a holder, an indorsement that transfers a security interest in the instrument is effective as an unqualified indorsement of the instrument.”).

[COMPETENCY OF WITNESS]

the Bank of New York relies on the testimony of Kevin Flannigan, an employee of Litton Loan Servicing who maintained that his review of loan servicing records indicated that the Bank of New York was the transferee of the note. The Romeros objected to Flannigan’s testimony at trial, an objection that the district court overruled under the business records exception. We agree with the Romeros that Flannigan’s testimony was inadmissible and does not establish a proper transfer.

Litton Loan Servicing, did not begin working for the Bank of New York as its servicing agent until November 1, 2008—seven months after the April 1, 2008, foreclosure complaint was filed. Prior to this date, Popular Mortgage Servicing, Inc. serviced the Bank of New York’s loans. Flannigan had no personal knowledge to support his testimony that transfer of the Romeros’ note to the Bank of New York prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint was proper because Flannigan did not yet work for the Bank of New York. See Rule 11-602 NMRA (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the

9

witness has personal knowledge of the matter. [E.S.] Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.”). We make a similar conclusion about the affidavit of Ann Kelley, who also testified about the status of the Romeros’ loan based on her work for Litton Loan Servicing. As with Flannigan’s testimony, such statements by Kelley were inadmissible because they lacked personal knowledge.

[OBJECTION TO HEARSAY BUSINESS RECORDS REVERSED AND SUSTAINED]

When pressed about Flannigan’s basis of knowledge on cross-examination, Flannigan merely stated that “our records do indicate” the Bank of New York as the holder of the note based on “a pooling and servicing agreement.” No such business record itself was offered or admitted as a business records hearsay exception. See Rule 11-803(F) NMRA (2007) (naming this category of hearsay exceptions as “records of regularly conducted activity”).

The district court erred in admitting the testimony of Flannigan as a custodian of records under the exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay for “business records” that are made in the regular course of business and are generally admissible at trial under certain conditions. See Rule 11-803(F) (2007) (citing the version of the rule in effect at the time of trial). The business records exception allows the records themselves to be admissible but not simply statements about the purported contents of the records. [E.S.] See State v. Cofer, 2011-NMCA-085, ¶ 17, 150 N.M. 483, 261 P.3d 1115 (holding that, based on the plain language of Rule 11-803(F) (2007), “it is clear that the business records exception requires some form of document that satisfies the rule’s foundational elements to be offered and admitted into evidence and that testimony alone does not qualify under this exception to the hearsay rule” and concluding that “‘testimony regarding the contents of business records, unsupported by the records themselves, by one without personal knowledge of the facts constitutes inadmissible hearsay.’” (citation omitted)). Neither Flannigan’s testimony nor Kelley’s affidavit can substantiate the existence of documents evidencing a transfer if those documents are not entered into evidence. Accordingly, Flannigan’s trial testimony cannot establish that the Romeros’ note was transferred to the Bank of New York.[E.S.]

[REJECTION OF MERS ASSIGNMENT]

We also reject the Bank’s argument that it can enforce the Romeros’ note because it was assigned the mortgage by MERS. An assignment of a mortgage vests only those rights to the mortgage that were vested in the assigning entity and nothing more. See § 55-3-203(b) (“Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as a holder in due course.”); accord Hart & Willier, supra, § 12.03(2) at 12-27 (“Th[is] shelter rule puts the transferee in the shoes of the transferor.”).

[MERS CAN NEVER ASSIGN THE NOTE]

As a nominee for Equity One on the mortgage contract, MERS could assign the mortgage but lacked any authority to assign the Romeros’ note. Although this Court has never explicitly ruled on the issue of whether the assignment of a mortgage could carry with it the transfer of a note, we have long recognized the separate functions that note and mortgage contracts perform in foreclosure actions. See First Nat’l Bank of Belen v. Luce, 1974-NMSC-098, ¶ 8, 87 N.M. 94, 529 P.2d 760 (holding that because the assignment of a mortgage to a bank did not convey an interest in the loan contract, the bank was not entitled to foreclose on the mortgage); Simson v. Bilderbeck, Inc., 1966-NMSC-170, ¶¶ 13-14, 76 N.M. 667, 417 P.2d 803 (explaining that “[t]he right of the assignee to enforce the mortgage is dependent upon his right to enforce the note” and noting that “[b]oth the note and mortgage were assigned to plaintiff.

[SPLITTING THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE]

(“A mortgage securing the repayment of a promissory note follows the note, and thus, only the rightful owner of the note has the right to enforce the mortgage.”); Dunaway, supra, § 24:18 (“The mortgage only secures the payment of the debt, has no life independent of the debt, and cannot be separately transferred. If the intent of the lender is to transfer only the security interest (the mortgage), this cannot legally be done and the transfer of the mortgage without the debt would be a nullity.”). These separate contractual functions—where the note is the loan and the mortgage is a pledged security for that loan—cannot be ignored simply by the advent of modern technology and the MERS electronic mortgage registry system.

[THE NOBODY ELSE IS CLAIMING ARGUMENT IS EXPLICITLY REJECTED]

Failure of Another Entity to Claim Ownership of the Romeros’ Note Does Not Make the Bank of New York a Holder

{37} Finally, the Bank of New York urges this Court to adopt the district court’s inference that if the Bank was not the proper holder of the Romeros’ note, then third-party-defendant Equity One would have claimed to be the rightful holder, and Equity One made no such claim.

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{38} The simple fact that Equity One does not claim ownership of the Romeros’ note does not establish that the note was properly transferred to the Bank of New York. In fact, the evidence in the record indicates that JPMorgan Chase may be the lawful holder of the Romeros’ note, as reflected in the note’s special indorsement.

[HOLDER MUST PROVE ENTITLEMENT TO ENFORCE — NO PRESUMPTION ALLOWED]

Because the transferee is not a holder, there is no presumption under Section [55-]3-308 [(1992) (entitling a holder in due course to payment by production and upon signature)] that the transferee, by producing the instrument, is entitled to payment. The instrument, by its terms, is not payable to the transferee and the transferee must account for possession of the unindorsed instrument by proving the transaction through which the transferee acquired it.

[LENDER’S OBLIGATION TO ASSURE THAT THE LOAN IS VIABLE]

B. A Lender Must Consider a Borrower’s Ability to Repay a Home Mortgage Loan in Determining Whether the Loan Provides a Reasonable, Tangible Net Benefit, as Required by the New Mexico HLPA

{39} For reasons that are not clear in the record, the Romeros did not appeal the district court’s judgment in favor of the original lender, Equity One, on the Romeros’ claims that Equity One violated the HLPA. The Court of Appeals addressed the HLPA violation issue in the context of the Romeros’ contentions that the alleged violation constituted a defense to the foreclosure complaint of the Bank of New York by affirming the district court’s favorable ruling on the Bank of New York’s complaint. As a result of our holding that the Bank of New York has not established standing to bring a foreclosure action, the issue of HLPA violation is now moot in this case. But because it is an issue that is likely to be addressed again in future attempts by whichever institution may be able to establish standing to foreclose on the Romero home and because it involves a statutory interpretation issue of substantial public importance in many other cases, we address the conclusion of both the

12

Court of Appeals and the district court that a homeowner’s inability to repay is not among “all of the circumstances” that the 2003 HLPA, applicable to the Romeros’ loan, requires a lender to consider under its “flipping” provisions:

No creditor shall knowingly and intentionally engage in the unfair act or practice of flipping a home loan. As used in this subsection, “flipping a home loan” means the making of a home loan to a borrower that refinances an existing home loan when the new loan does not have reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances, including the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan and the borrower’s circumstances.

Section 58-21A-4(B) (2003); see also Bank of N.Y., 2011-NMCA-110, ¶ 17 (holding that “while the ability to repay a loan is an important consideration when otherwise assessing a borrower’s financial situation, we will not read such meaning into the statute’s ‘reasonable, tangible net benefit’ language”).

[DOOMED LOANS — WHO HAS THE RISK?]

We have been presented with no conceivable reason why the Legislature in 2003 would consciously exclude consideration of a borrower’s ability to repay the loan as a factor of the borrower’s circumstances, and we can think of none. Without an express legislative direction to that effect, we will not conclude that the Legislature meant to approve mortgage loans that were doomed to end in failure and foreclosure. Apart from the plain language of the statute and its express statutory purpose, it is difficult to comprehend how an unrepayable home mortgage loan that will result in a foreclosure on one’s home and a deficiency judgment to pay after the borrower is rendered homeless could provide “a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower.”

[LENDER’S OBLIGATION TO MAKE SURE IT IS A VIABLE TRANSACTION] a lender cannot avoid its own obligation to consider real facts and circumstances [E.S.] that might clarify the inaccuracy of a borrower’s income claim. Id. (“Lenders cannot, however, disregard known facts and circumstances that may place in question the accuracy of information contained in the application.”) A lender’s willful blindness to its responsibility to consider the true circumstances of its borrowers is unacceptable. A full and fair consideration of those circumstances might well show that a new mortgage loan would put a borrower into a materially worse situation with respect to the ability to make home loan payments and avoid foreclosure, consequences of a borrower’s circumstances that cannot be disregarded.

if the inclusion of such boilerplate language in the mass of documents a borrower must sign at closing would substitute for a lender’s conscientious compliance with the obligations imposed by the HLPA, its protections would be no more than empty words on paper that could be summarily swept aside by the addition of yet one more document for the borrower to sign at the closing.

[THE BLAME GAME]

Borrowers are certainly not blameless if they try to refinance their homes through loans they cannot afford. But they do not have a mortgage lender’s expertise, and the combination of the relative unsophistication of many borrowers and the potential motives of unscrupulous lenders seeking profits from making loans without regard for the consequences to homeowners led to the need for statutory reform. See § 58-21A-2 (discussing (A) “abusive mortgage lending” practices, including (B) “making . . . loans that are equity-based, rather than income based,” (C) “repeatedly refinanc[ing] home loans,” rewarding lenders with “immediate income” from “points and fees” and (D) victimizing homeowners with the unnecessary “costs and terms” of “overreaching creditors”).

[FEDERAL PREEMPTION CLAIM FROM OCC STATEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE BANK OF NEW YORK ANY PROTECTION]

 

While the Bank is correct in asserting that the OCC issued a blanket rule in January 2004, see 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2004) (preempting state laws that impact “a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers”), and that the New Mexico Administrative Code recognizes this OCC rule, neither the Bank nor our administrative code addresses several actions taken by Congress and the courts since 2004 to disavow the OCC’s broad preemption statement.

 

Applying the Dodd-Frank standard to the HLPA, we conclude that federal law does not preempt the HLPA. First, our review of the NBA reveals no express preemption of state consumer protection laws such as the HLPA. Second, the Bank provides no evidence that conforming to the dictates of the HLPA prevents or significantly interferes with a national bank’s operations. Third, the HLPA does not create a discriminatory effect; rather, the HLPA applies to any “creditor,” which the 2003 statute defines as “a person who regularly [offers or] makes a home loan.” Section 58-21A-3(G) (2003). Any entity that makes home loans in New Mexico must follow the HLPA, regardless of whether the lender is a state or nationally chartered bank. See § 58-21A-2 (providing legislative findings on abusive mortgage lending practices that the HLPA is meant to discourage).

How Do I Use an Expert Declaration?

With judges under pressure to clear their calendar, the strategy of the banks in delaying prosecution of foreclosure cases is coming to an end. And the opportunity for the borrower, as well as a good reason for action, has just begun. An aggressive approach is more likely to yield good results than any strategy predicated upon delay. And judges are prone to blame the delay on the homeowner who wants to stay in his home rent-free for as long as possible.

So having an aggressive plan to prosecute the case with solid answers and affirmative defenses is key to getting the judges curiosity — why is the homeowner trying so hard to move the case along and the bank stonewalling and delaying the action alleging they need relief? Some lawyers, like Jeff Barnes, don’t know how to litigate with kid gloves on. When they take a case it is to draw blood and Barnes has established himself as not only an aggressive attorney but one who often wins a satisfactory result for his clients.

My expert declaration covers the gamut from property issues through UCC and contract issues. Securitization is something I understand very well — how it is intended to be used, how the law got passed exempting it from being characterized as securities or insurance products and how it was sold to Congress and Clinton as an innovative way to spread and reduce risk of loss, thus raising an investment with a medium degree of risk of loss to very low and therefore suitable for stable managed funds who are required to put their money into extremely low risk triple A rated investments.

All that said, for all I know and can say, neither my declaration nor testimony is ever dispositive in the final ruling of the case, with a few exceptions. On the other hand out of hundreds of times my declarations or testimony has been used in court, the number of times the banks have proffered an alternate “expert” to say I was wrong, mistaken or had used defective analysis to reach my conclusions is ZERO. And the banks took my deposition in a class action suit in which I was admitted as an expert witness in Federal Court — the deposition lasted six full working days 9:00am to 5:00pm. About the only negative thing they had to say after hours and hours of testimony was that my opinion was “grandiose” to which I answered that it was not nearly as grandiose as the fraud their clients were perpetrating upon our society.

So the most common question is how can I use your expert declaration? And the first answer I  always give is (a) my declaration, whether notarized or not, is never and should never be a substitute for actual facts applicable to the actual case which requires actual witnesses who have actual knowledge (usually from the opposition in discovery) and (b) you should have a plan for your case that does not call for a knock-out punch in the first hearing. If you think that is going to happen you are deluding yourself.

The most common attack on my affidavit is a motion to strike or a memorandum that alleges that I am not a credible expert. But the rules on admission of expert testimony are so lax that almost anyone can be admitted as an expert but he Judge is not required to presume the expert knows what he is talking about or has anything of value to offer. Thus a proper foundation of facts, timelines, paper trails and money trails needs to be laid out in front of the judge in a manner and form that makes it easy to understand. The declaration is only one step of a multistage process. When the opposition attacks the declaration, they are trying to distract the court from the real issues.

The best and most fruitful uses of an expert declaration are to use them when battling for information through the discovery. That is where cases are often won and lost, where cases end up being settled to the satisfaction of the borrower or lost, pending appeal. The expert declaration tells the court what the expert looked at and raises issues and opinions including the information that is absent which will resolve the issue of whether the forecloser actually has a cause of action upon which relief could be granted (an inquiry applicable to both judicial and non-judicial states).
Expert declarations have been used with success in hearings on discovery because it explains why you need to take the deposition of a specific witness or compel production of certain documents or compel answers to interrogatories. Once that order is entered agreeing that you are entitled to  the information it is often the case that the mater is settled within hours or days.
To a lesser degree expert declarations have been successful in non-judicial states where the homeowner seeks a temporary restraining order. And a fair amount of traction has been seen where it is used to show the court hat there are material issues of fact in dispute to defeat a motion for summary judgment, sometimes effective if there is a cross-motion for summary judgment for the homeowner where there is an effective attack on the affidavit filed in support of the forecloser’s motion for summary judgment.
The least traction for the expert declaration is where homeowners attempt to use it as a substitute for evidence — which means no live witnesses testifying to facts that lay the foundation for introduction of documents into evidence. And there are mixed results on motions to lift stay — but even where effective temporarily the debtor is usually required to file an adversary action.
After you file the declaration along with some pleading that states the purpose of the filing, you will most likely be met with a barrage of attacks on the use of the affidavit. They are trying to bait you into an argument about me and whether anything I said was true. Of course they do not submit an affidavit from an expert who comes to contrary conclusions; but even if the declaration is perfect, it is no substitute for real evidence. It is the reason why you need to get a court order requiring the forecloser to answer discovery and how they should answer it. It is support for why you believe your discovery will lead to admissible evidence or cut short the litigation. The declaration explains why you want to pursue the money trail to see of negotiation of the note and mortgage ever took place. The assignment says yes but if the payment isn’t there, no transaction exists. The UCC and contract law are in complete agreement — offer, acceptance and payment are required to enforce a contract. And on the offer side, you can either start with the investor or the borrower.
In live testimony it is my job to show the court what really happened not by piling presumption on opinions but by pointing to the facts you revealed in discovery and then explaining what transactions actually occurred. The only actual transaction — the only time money exchanged hands was when investors advanced money to be used for the acquisition or origination of loans.
But the intermediaries usurped the money and kept part of it instead of funding mortgages. And the intermediaries diverted title to the loan documents from the investors and claimed ownership so they could create the illusion of an insurable interest and the illusion of a risk of loss justifying the credit default swap contracts.
It was also used by the banks to sell worthless mortgage bonds to the Federal Reserve. We know now that the “trustee” of the REMIC trust never received any of the investment dollars advanced by the investors. The reason we know that the mortgage bonds are worthless is that there is no record of the existence of a trust account for the REMIC pool. Hence, the trust had no money to buy or originate the loan.

But it is nonetheless true that the investors advanced money and the borrowers got some of it. The amount received by or on behalf of the borrower is a legitimate debt owed by the borrowers to the investors as lenders. If you say otherwise, your entire argument will be viewed with justifiable skepticism. But the investors cannot be grouped by REMIC common law trusts under New York law because they too, like the assignments and allonges and endorsements, lack any money or other transfer of consideration in exchange  for the loan.

So we have consideration without a REMIC trust, without an enforceable contract which means that the debt existed but there were no agreed terms — the note and bond terms are very different, contrary to the requirements of TILA and Reg Z. Thus the investors may have received bonds issued by the REMIC trust, but their money never went into the trust contrary to the terms of the prospectus. So the investors are owed the money as a group by the borrowers as a group. That means the only way to refer to the investors as a group (contrary to their belief because they think their money went into the REMIC trust) is a partnership arising by operation of law. That is a common law general partnership. But because equitable liens a NOT allowed by law, they have n way to use the mortgage lien or the note. But they do have a claim, even if it is unsecured.

And the amount owed to the investors is different than the amount of principal on the defective notes and mortgages. That is because the investment bank took more money than it used for funding mortgages and pocketed the difference. So the transaction with the borrower gives rise to a liability to the investor lenders but the borrowers are only one of several co-obligors by contract and through tort theory. And the money received by the intermediary bank that claimed the bond and loans as their own using investor money should be credited to the receivable account of the investor. The argument here is that the investment banks cannot pretend to be agents of the investors for purpose for taking money from the investors and then claim not to be the agent for the purpose of receiving money from co-obligors including the homeowner.

It is only by untangling this mess that the request for modification from the investors can be directed to the right parties but that requires the investors’ identities to be revealed. There can be no meaningful modification, mediation or litigation without getting this straight.
Let’s start with the borrower. The borrower executes a note and mortgage. If the borrower denies ever getting a loan from the payee or mortgagee or beneficiary, then the issue is in dispute as to whether the borrower’s initial transaction was anything more than offer for someone to accept.
TILA says the lender must be disclosed, as well as common sense. If the payee was merely a nominee performing fee for service, then there is no payee and no mortgagee or beneficiary — and under property law there is nobody known to borrower who can execute a satisfaction of mortgage on the day of closing.
So we have the issuance of a note that might qualify as a security that is NOT exempted from registration and security regulations and/or the note and mortgage constitute an offer. The fact that there was no lender disclosed and no disclosed source of funds (a table funded loan labeled predatory per se by Reg Z and TILA) means that the terms of the note and the terms of the security instrument have not been accepted — and at this pointing our example there is only one party who can accept it — the party who loaned actual money to the borrower — I.e., the sourceof the  funds.
Now as it turns out that the source if funds was a group of investors who were not offered the note nor offered the terms expressed on the note and instead they agreed to the terms of the prospectus/indenture. But those terms were immediately breached just as the law was immediately broken when the borrower was tricked into executing a security issuance or an offer.
The investors thought their money was going into a REMIC trust just like the borrower trout that the originator was indeed his lender. Neither the investors nor the borrowers were told that there were dozens of intermediaries who were making money off of the issuance of the bond and the issuance of the note, neither of which bound the investor lender nor the borrower to anything. But nobody except the investment banks acting supposedly as intermediaries knew that the banks were claiming town both the bonds and the loans — at least long enough to trade on them.
Since the borrower did not agree to the terms of the bond and the investor didn’t agree to the terms of the note, they have no offer, they have no acceptance but they do have consideration. I have appeared in several class actions in Phoenix and Reno and dozens of cases in bankruptcy court, civil state and Federal cases.
Where the lawyer used my declaration as a means to an end — discovery, they got good results. Where they tried to suit in lieu of admissible evidence it is not so valuable. A few hundred motions for summary judgment have been turned down based upon my affidavit, but in other cases, the Judge accepted me as an expert but said that my opinion evidence was not supported by supporting affidavits from people with personal knowledge — I.e., competent witnesses to lay a competent foundation. Thus expert declarations are a valuable tool if they are backed up by real facts and issues — a task for the lawyer or pro se litigant, not the expert unless you are going to pay tens of thousands of dollars using the expert’s valuable time to perform clerical work.

Nardi Deposition Reveals All about JPM-WAMU Slick Transactions

NOTE IF ANYTHING, THIS DEPOSITION PROVES THE NEED FOR AN EXPERT FORENSIC COMPUTER ANALYST TO ASSIST IN DISCOVERY AND PERHAPS EVEN PLEADING. THAT IS WHY MY LAW FIRMS AND OTHERS ARE CREATING ALLIANCES WITH LAWYERS WHO HAVE EXPERIENCE IN BOTH THE PRACTICE OF LAW, LITIGATION AND DETAILED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WHAT TO LOOK FOR, HOW TO LOOK FOR FACTS LEADING TO THE DISCOVERY OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN A COURT OF LAW.

I am going through the Nardi deposition a line by line. I have completed the first 50 pages. If you have a case where JPM is foreclosing even if it is doesn’t involve WAMU, you should read the whole thing. I have the link below. Below the link are my notes and comments on the first 50 pages of the deposition. IN the context of other things we know this is a picture of fraud in the making while at the same time keeping the people who are the boots on the ground actors unaware of the consequences of what they are doing.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/102949976/120509-JPMC-v-Waisome-FL-Lawrence-Nardi-Deposition

Garfield Notes on Nardi deposition JP Morgan Chase, as successor to Washington Mutual v. Waisome, 5th Judicial Circuit, Florida Case NUmber 2009-CA-005717, May 9 2012

1.  No prior banking experience. No education in banking or finance. No academic degree. No direct knowledge as to any of the events, documents, or transactions relating to the subject loan because her scope of employment was to assist in litigation or settlement of contested cases. Worked at Citibank dealing with credit cards and assisted in programming.
2. Worked with PHH on loan originations. Line 21, Page 9, I was the originations or preserve rare. I worked with the borrowers on collecting documents, getting them prepared for eventual closing of their loan, working with underwriting and making sure that the documents they needed to push the loan package forward were provided. Basically kind of the air traffic controller of the loan origination’s part of the business.
3. Line 12 page 10 I was not a supervisor. I had a support staff but they were pooled into groups that basically support in five or 10 other loan officers. So I was supervised. We were in a pool.
4. Worked with Merrill Lynch as a series 7 and series 66 broker.
5. Worked at Washington Mutual starting in September 2007.
6. My duties were to work with deceased borrowers estates at Washington Mutual
7.   line11 page 16 I didn’t have anything to do with loss mitigation. I was focusing on establishing that line of communication verifying that these people have the authority to act on behalf of of the deceased.
8. RECORDS SYSTEMS CHANGE:  line 18  page 16 I was actually going back and kind of redoing some of the filing systems that they had an kind of getting that more modernized. And that probably took me through the first 1 1/2 years or thereabouts.
9. SHELLY TREVIN BECAME MY SUPERVISOR
10. Worked with a guy named Vinnie and a lady named Laura.
11. Assigned different states. i was assigned Florida and some smaller states (line 20 page 24)
12. Line 5 page MSP: mortgage servicing platform. It’s a widely used system. In fact all of the major services I have ever worked for have used it. So Washington Mutual was using it. Chase was also using it so I had the benefit of that. So the training for that for me was kind of redundant.
13. LIne 6 page 27 (question was whether Fidelity LPS developed the software).  I am not an expert on everything at Fidelity. My understanding is that fidelity developed this software and licensed it to individual servicers. So that’s my understanding is that actually they own it. It’s their property. Where releasing it as a servicer.
14 line 3 page 28. IMAGE WEB: I believe it was called image web. Image web Wesley default software for any time you need to look up image documents, whether it be notes, mortgages, origination packages, applications. You know, whatever was deemed worthy of saving where necessary to save for servicing purposes.
15. line 13 page 28  a separate servicing system for the home-equity loans.  I think it was called ACLS.  And they had a customer service collection system called CACS  that was used for home equity collections.  those are example of systems they had that we would have used at Washington Mutual that weren’t used at the majors. The major system used being MSP.
16. LIne 21 Page 28 Outlook email was major server for communication within Chase.
17. Line 23, Page 28, MSP is really the central repository for all information related to a loan so most people work out of that anytime they’re coming in contact with, you know, servicing.
18. everyone has a unique identifying usually three digit code assigned to them and they have to set their own password.
19. I have the ability you know part of my duties were to document the things that I was doing. So yes I have the ability to enter data into certain areas. Not all areas can be manipulated. I could enter notes into the system. I could change stop code so that if I was dealing with alone that was in litigation and it needed to stop certain things like collection activities or foreclosure processing, I could put stops on the system. (line 13 Page 29)
20. Lin  se 9 page 31.   We had different client numbers that were assigned to different sets of loans. The Washington Mutual client was 156. The Chase client was like 465.
21. MAJOR PROJECT INTEGRATING CHASE AND WAMU LOANO PACKAGES: LINE 2 PAGE 33:  my understanding is that they drew resources from all areas of the business. I don’t think there was any one department that was involved in handling that transaction or that project.
22. Line 8 page 33: I don’t know if there was a specific person in charge of it. I can imagine based on my experience in some of the projects that I’ve seen in other places that there is probably a project manager and several business heads of business people that were running it but I wasn’t in charge I wasn’t part of the project specifically so I don’t really know.
23. LIne 6 page 39: CHASE LOANS VERSUS INVESTOR LOANS:    if you are looking for specific investor or owner information you would go into a screen called MAS1. And then there is a sub screen within that called INV1 which would tell you, if there is an investor, who it is. And if it’s Chase owned, it would say Chase owned.
24. line 17 page 40:  I believe that we keep records of these investor codes potentially outside the system. I’ve never accessed an investor list with an MSP, so it’s possible it’s there. I just don’t know.
25: NO NEED TO MEMORIZE THE USER ID: LINE 6 PAGE 41:  it’s not something you necessarily have to memorize because when you login using your password is going to tell you it’s going to memorialize everything. You don’t have to memorize it. I think mine was OY$.
26. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTOR: line 17  page 41:   I believe there are also three digits for the investor codes. But when you go into MAS1 and INV1 it actually spells out the name of the investor,.    so if it’, for instance, a chase loan, it will say J.P. Morgan Chase. If it’s Bank of America, it will say Bank of America. It will spell out the name and the address of the investor or owner for you right there on the screen. So you don’t have to interpret a code it’s right there.
27. EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE INVESTOR KEPT HIDDEN FROM EMPLOYEES GIVEN THAT 96% OF ALL LOANS WERE SUBJECT TO CLAIMS OF SECURITIZATION. THIS SHOWS HOW THE BANKS TEMPORARILY CLAIMED OWNERSHIP OF THE LOANS FOR PURPOSES OF TRADING, HEDGING AND COLLECTING INSURANCE, FEDERAL BAILOUTS AND PROCEEDS OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS LEAVING THE PRIVATE INVESTORS OUT IN THE COLD AND THEREFORE PREVENTING OR INTERFERING WITH THE PROCESS OF ALLOCATING SUCH PAYMENTS TO THE ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE FO THE INVESTOR AND DECREASING THE ACCOUNT PAYABLE OF THE BORROWER. LINE 11 PAGE 42:  I don’t remember a specific instance where I was dealing with a private investor loan.
28. COLLATERAL FILE SHIPPED OUT WITHIN 15 DAYS OF THE NOTICE OF CHANGE OF SERVICER — BUT HOW DOES SHE KNOW THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED? AND WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT WHAT WAS IN THE COLLATERAL FILE? LINE 2 PAGE 45
29. HANDLING OF FILES AND SHIPPING OF FILES. WHO IS AUTHORIZED. collateral file and credit file: line 8. page 47:  you referenced a collateral file. There is also a credit file. Sometimes you need stuff from the credit file and sometimes you don’t. The collateral file you know sometimes you need it sometimes you don’t. So depending on what you need, there is an electronic request for each one. You send it to the customer service folks. The credit file and there is certain restrictions as to who can actually order it. You have to have certain authorization. You can only send it certain places. You have to either send it to someone if you are sending it to someone within the company they have to have it’s a very short list within the company who can get it. Generally we ship it only to counsel when it needs to go out of custody and services. So you would include your identifier to show you have the authority to order it. You need to identify where it’s going so the firm it’s being shipped to, custody services, will accept that. Basically it’s an email transmission, and that works constantly. So they will go in, pull up the work order, have a person that’s designated to be able to enter the file room, go in and pull the file, and then ship it off to the firm was requesting it. I’m almost 100% certain that they use FedEx almost exclusively for the shipping.
30.  Inside counsel is ANITA Smith or Kendall Forster LINE 3 PAGE 50.
31. NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE OF THE PHYSICAL FILES. HEARSAY ON HEARSAY. LINE 10 PG 50. This would seem to indicate that all her testimony about the movement of the physical files is hearsay based upon computer entries by people she doesn’t know, or things she was told by counsel or someone else working for other departments, indicating multiple records custodians.

Mark Stopa: Preparing for Trial In a Foreclosure Case

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary SEE LIVINGLIES LITIGATION SUPPORT AT LUMINAQ.COM

EDITOR’S NOTE: Stopa makes some very good points for lawyers to consider, the main one being that you should make it as hard as possible for the would-be forecloser to prove their case. If they really have the goods, they will prove it; but as we have seen time after time, the documents are fabricated, even forged and they have no witnesses to authenticate the documents. The mistake made by lawyers and pro se litigants alike is that they know they signed a note and they assume the note was valid. So they shy away from denying the authenticity of the documents or the validity of the documents. That is a mistake.

Start at the beginning. Look carefully at the documents and see if they actually describe the transaction as you NOW understand it given the claims of securitization and transfers. Look even more carefully — the so-called original note might be mechanically fabricated indicating that they did not proffer the original note into evidence — which means that the original note is still out there, somewhere, in the hands of someone else. Of course it also means that the attorney and his/her client are attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon the court, especially if the attorney’s office had anything to do with fabricating or signing the documents offered at a hearing or at trial.

If you start from the premise that the documents are invalid, not the originals, and do not describe the transaction that actually occurred — as to parties or terms — then you are on the right track. To assume otherwise, is to give up most of your ground before you even begin. And of course that means a gift to the pretender lender who is now attempting to foreclose on a home using a loan that it did not fund or purchase.

Preparing for Trial In a Foreclosure Case by Mark Stopa

Posted on May 11, 2011 by Mark Stopa http://www.stayinmyhome.com
I have a trial tomorrow in a foreclosure case. It’s in Lee County, of course – the county where the judges prosecute cases by setting trials sua sponte. Right now, I’m earnestly preparing for trial, but I thought I’d take a break to discuss the two issues are paramount in virtually every foreclosure case/trial. Depending on the facts of a particular case, there may be other issues, of course, but these two issues are critical to a Plaintiff’s ability to win at trial and should, in my view, be vigorously defended in virtually every case:

1. Introducing the Note into evidence.

2. Proving the homeowner’s default in payments and the amount owed.

Re. the former, we all know the Plaintiff must introduce the original Note into evidence, failing which a foreclosure judgment cannot lawfully be entered. The fact that a Note is “self-authenticating” makes this seem like a low hurdle – the Plaintiff’s attorney simply needs to hand the original Note to the judge and it will be admitted into evidence. Fortunately for homeowners, it’s not that simple.

Under Fla. Stat. 673.3081, if a homeowner denies the authenticity of a Note or the signatures thereon in the pleadings, the Plaintiff must authenticate the Note, and its signatures, at trial. There is still a presumption the Note and all signatures are authentic, but by contesting authentication, a homeowner can force the bank to authenticate the Note at trial. This may be harder than you think. For instance, if I challenge the authenticity of a blank indorsement, the Plaintiff must put on testimony from someone who can swear, under oath, that he/she saw the indorsement executed or that he/she recognizes the signature and it is authentic. Similarly, if I challenge the authenticity of the Note, the Plaintiff must present a witness who can testify he/she saw the homeowner sign the Note or who recognizes the homeowner’s signature based on other documents. The way that Notes change hands between banks, neither of these things would be very easy, and I doubt the Plaintiffs’ lawyers will be prepared to deal with these evidentiary issues. In other words, it’s quite possible that if the homeowner preserves these evidentiary objections at trial, the Plaintiff’s lawyers won’t be prepared for them and won’t even have the requisite witness(es) at trial to testify.

Re. the second issue, testimony at trial must generally be based on personal knowledge. That means the Plaintiff must testify to events he/she has seen with his/her eyes or heard with his/her ears. This is virtually impossible to do with regard to proving a homeowner did not pay a mortgage payment or proving the amount owed, so the Plaintiff invariably must rely on documents to prove these facts. This is permissible, but only if the Plaintiff can introduce these documents under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

Again, this is harder than you think. The Plaintiff must show: (1) the documents are a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation; (2) made at or near the time of the event; (3) by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (4) kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity; and (5) that it was the regular practice of that business to make such a record. All five elements must be satisfied or the documents cannot be used as evidence at trial.

I’m not trying to teach anyone how to practice law. Rather, my point is that there are virtually always things that can be done to make it difficult for a bank to prevail in a foreclosure case; these are just two examples. So don’t give up – keep fighting foreclosure!

Mark Stopa

BKR Judge SLAMS LPS and Sanctions Servicer For Improper Accounting and Fraudulent Practices

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary SEE LIVINGLIES LITIGATION SUPPORT AT LUMINAQ.COM

REPRESENTATIONS BY COUNSEL ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PROOF

SEE 52867919-In-Re-Wilson-Memorandum-Opinion-07-Apr-2011

NOTABLE QUOTES:

“The fraud perpetrated on the Court, Debtors, and trustee would be shocking if this Court had less experience concerning the conduct of mortgage servicers. One too many times, this Court has been witness to the shoddy practices and sloppy accountings of the mortgage service industry. With each revelation, one hopes that the bottom of the barrel has been reached and that the industry will self correct. Sadly, this does not appear to be reality. This case is one example of why their conduct comes at a high cost to the system and debtors.”

“The abuse begins with a title. In this case, Ms. Goebel was cloaked with the position of “Assistant Secretary,” in a purposeful attempt to convey an experience level and importance beyond her actual abilities. Ms. Goebel is an earnest young woman, but with no training or experience in banking or lending. By her own account, she has rocketed through the LPS hierarchy receiving
92    12/1/10 TT 382:5-8. 93    12/1/10 TT 382:9-384:21. 94 Id. 95    12/1/10 TT 342:25-343:10. 96 12/1/10 TT 341:5-8, 14-19.
21
Case 07-11862    Doc 304    Filed 04/07/11    Entered 04/07/11 08:07:49    Main Document Page 22 of 26
promotions at a pace of one (1) promotion per six (6) to eight (8) month period.97    Her ability to slavishly adhere to LPS’ procedures has not only been rewarded, but has assured the development of her tunnel vision. Ms. Goebel does not understand the importance of her duties, and LPS failed to provide her with the tools to question the information to which she attests.”

“It is evident that LPS blindly relied on counsel to account for the loan and all material representations. In short, the affidavit was nothing other than a farce and hardly the evidence required to support relief. The facts supporting a default are the lender’s to prove, not counsel’s. In this case the lender and LPS cloaked Ms. Goebel with a title that implied knowledge and gravity. LPS could have identified Ms. Goebel as a document execution clerk but it didn’t. The reason is evident, LPS wanted to perpetrate the illusion that she was both Option One’s employee and a person with personal and detailed knowledge of the loan. Neither was the case.

The hearing on the Motion for Sanctions provides yet another piece to in the puzzle of loan administration. In Jones v. Wells Fargo,104 this Court discovered that a highly automated software
103 12/1/10 TT 341:5-8, 14-19; 379:4-13. 104 Jones v. Wells Fargo, 366 B.R. 584 (Bankr.E.D.La. 2007).
25
Case 07-11862    Doc 304    Filed 04/07/11    Entered 04/07/11 08:07:49    Main Document Page 26 of 26
package owned by LPS and identified as MSP administered loans for servicers and note holders but was programed to apply payments contrary to the terms of the notes and mortgages. In In re Stewart,105 additional information was acquired regarding postpetition administration under the same program, revealing errors in the methodology for fees and costs posted to a debtor’s account.”

Submitted by Nye Lavalle

First, thanks to Lisa Epstein for her dedication and forwarding this ruling to me…  Next, as you each know, for years, I have documented thousands of abuses, schemes, frauds, shams etc… involved in mortgage servicing, bankruptcy, securitization, foreclosure etc…  I also was the first to show the scams and schemes of Fidelity National and its off-spring such as LPS.

I reduced the banking industry’s scams and abuses into three primary areas or categories OVER 12 YEARS AGO!!!!.  The three (3) major issues I have informed you all of are as follows:

#1 BANKS CAN’T COUNT and the amounts they claim are owed for payoff, principal balance, escrow, payments due etc… can NEVER be trusted or accepted without a complete audit of the servicing history from origination to specific date (i.e. acceleration, payoff, foreclosure, bankruptcy etc…)  I have informed all of you that the “computer systems” used can’t compute and once a so-called “mistake” is made (i.e. programmed financial engineering scheme) the system can’t go back and adjust the system and amortize the loan correctly.  Affiants, as I have said over and over again in countless affidavits and reports, simply take numbers off a computer screen (garbage in – – garbage out) that is usually a third-party system and the affiant has NO INDEPENDENT OR RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE as to the facts of the amount and how those amounts were arrived at.  With my scripted depo questions, time-and-time again, affiants never audit or simply conduct a “sample check” of the entire “servicing history” from origination to present date, to ascertain any errors, miscalculations, misapplications, wrongful charges, etc…  The lawyers (foreclosure mills) prepare the affidavits and check the payments.  As the EMC executive told me in mid 90s “you must sue the lawyers, they are ALL in on it!”
#2 BANKS CAN’T ACCOUNT for the chain of title and ownership of the note and who has authority to foreclose, accelerate, modify, approve assumptions etc…  In other words, they can’t account for the actual note holder and how such status was established and if the note has been pledged, sold to others, hypothecated, traded, transferred etc…  Affiants, as I have said over and over again in countless affidavits and reports, simply take the information off a computer screen (garbage in – – garbage out) that is usually a third-party system and the affiant has NO INDEPENDENT OR RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE as to the facts of note ownership and they have not reviewed the PSA, necessary assignments, wet ink original notes, indorsements, authorities for the indoresements, checks and wire transmittals, collateral and custodial records and other evidence that the actual holder took possession, control, and ownership of the note.  They simply take the information from the last public recording and go with that ignoring all the intermediary assignments.  This has been going on for decades now.  Again, the lawyers (foreclosure mills) prepare the affidavits and check the title history and often charge a fee for the “title search” that isn’t worth the paper it is written on.  As the EMC executive told me in mid 90s “you must sue the lawyers, they are ALL in on it!”
#3 WHEN CAUGHT WITH THEIR HAND IN THE COOKIE JAR (i.e. cooking the books jar) the banks and their lawyers will fabricate evidence, documents, provide perjured testimony, create false affidavits, destroy documents and claim its a gummy bear jar, not a cookie jar.  In essence, NOTHING, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING A BANK, LENDER, SERVICER, OR THEIR LAWYERS place in pleadings, affidavits, summary judgment motions, assignments, indorsements, deposition testimony etc… CAN NEVER BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE OR AS FACT without a complete forensic review, audit, and examination of all wet ink docs, records, financial accountings etc… that PROVE EACH AND EVERY ALLEGATION AND FACT IN A PLEADING, AFFIDAVIT, OR TESTIMONY.
The bottom-line here is that lawyers must QUESTION EVERYTHING AND CHALLENGE EVERYTHING.  If not, you may be mal-practicing knowing everything you know now.  Money MUST be spent in depositions to make them prove up their cases (they can’t) and e-discovery is and will be critical since they will continue to fabricate evidence and testimony.
In any event, you must read each line and paragraph of this order as WELL AS THE TRANSCRIPTS TO THIS CASE.  I have read some, will one of you be good enough to go on Pacer and secure rest and post on one of the many sites we support!
Nye

I will not stop until Justice Prevails!!

by Tracey T. Wilson

The Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Sandra A. Ford was NOT a Pro Se case. Sandra A. Ford was defended by Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc., attorneys; Ms. Jurow and Rebecca Schore and the case was decided January 28th 2011. The case in New Jersey that WAS defended and won Pro Se was Deutsche Bank vs. Tracey T. Wilson. Tracey T. Wilson was the Pro Se defendant and the case was decided ninedays earlier on January 19th 2011 in favor of the Pro Se defendant.
To ignore the case Deutsche Bank vs. Tracey T. Wilson allows concealment of the following facts and truths in the case not disclosed to the public:
• Tracey T. Wilson et al, Pro Se defendant was the first Appellate case decided in the State of NJ in a foreclosure matter in favor of the Defendant. The appellate decision was on January 19th, 2011 and was not approved for publication since defendant was Pro Se and not an attorney.
• Defendant was Pro Se due to the fact that upon the onset of the initial foreclosure action in October 2007 every attorney she contacted in the State of NJ refused to take the case to defend the foreclosure action and told her that there was nothing she could do. Defendants did not qualify for free Legal Services of New Jersey due to family incomes being over the Legal Aid Services guidelines. Finally, an attorney who actually accepted the case in August of 2008 was never heard in the court when his Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment was not granted by the court. Judge quoted that “defendant did not deserve a second “bite at the apple” simply because they now have an attorney.
• Defendants owned the property with her husband of 25 years since 1994 and had previously paid over $370k in mortgage payments through the years.
• Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a Certification with a signature from the plaintiff’s attorney. This submission / signed document was not based upon personal knowledge, but was based upon incompetent hearsay by the plaintiff’s attorney.
• Attorneys’ for plaintiff never proved that they were the lawful holder to the note and mortgage prior to their commencement of foreclosure action. As of today Plaintiff has still not proved that they were a holder in due course.
• The court did not dismiss foreclosure complaint filed by plaintiff, but however within the next six months from March 2008 through August 2008 were allowed several adjournments for plaintiff to produce assignment of mortgage and original mortgage note. As the months progressed awaiting the plaintiff to produce valid documentation, within those six months plaintiff produced an assignment that was signed by Laura Hescott, alleged AVP of Washington Mutual and notarized by Bethany Hood, in the State of MN; A certification from Ann Garbis; and a final certification from Janine Timmons on August 29th 2008. Laura Hescott and Bethany Hood were at that time employees of LPS and are now known to the public as Robo-signers who have admitted fraud and not having any personal knowledge. The certification from Janine Timmons was accepted by the court on August 29th 2008, without allowing defendant discovery. The court granted Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff. Defendant was denied due process.
• Defendant obtained attorney to file a Motion to Reconsider, however, as mentioned in earlier bullet points this motion was denied in October 2009.
• Defendant asked her attorney to Appeal the Final decision and attorney told her he would NOT write appeal and then provided incorrect dates of final decision, documentation, due dates, etc.
• With no other choice defendant Tracey T. Wilson filed her own appeal Pro Se in December 2009.
• Plaintiff never responded to Appeal.
• The case was placed on the calendar for the Appellate Judges on November 3rd, 2010.
• The Appellate Court rendered their decision on January 19th 2011 in favor of Pro Se Defendant and the case was REVERSED AND REMANDED back to the lower court. Same Judge who presided over the case since 2007.
• Unfortunately, within the thirteen month time period when the appeal was submitted December 2009 and Appellate Court decision on January 19th 2011, a Sheriffs sale notice was placed on my home December 16th 2009 less than two weeks after my appeal was submitted with a sale date of January 6, 2010.
• Findings reveal that my home was sold to the bank at sheriffs’ sale in February 17th 2010 for $100.00.
• The home was sold to a third party (believed to be an investor) in June 2010 for $262,000.00 to cure the debt to prevent the sheriff sale, the plaintiff was asked to pay in excess of $550,000.00 which included tagged on erroneous fees b y the bank.
• Other illegal tactics such as the mortgage never being filed in the County Clerk’s office and altered files of tax record lot and block numbers exist.
• As of today, there is no property and I have been told there is nothing I can do to ever get my home back. The case should be dismissed since my home was foreclosed upon illegally and there is no property however the Judge has now requested a trail for June 2011 for the “Discovery” that was never granted to me in the first place. The court no longer has jurisdiction since there is no equitable property, however plaintiff will once again be given the chance to produce documents he was not able to produce to the Appellate Court nor during the four years this case has gone on for.
• The banks want a pass on the law and want to skirt the law; there are no laws currently on the books that have allowed for the injustice done to our society. – Standing is a major issue.
• The Republic has to be for the people and by the people. The banks are attacking a main component of the constitution which is protection of its citizen’s property rights. They did not take care of their due diligence. The whole premise of home ownership has been eroded.
• This is why they want to conceal my case and not hear the truth.
• I will not stop until Justice Prevails!!

Tracey T. Wilson

NJ: GAME OVER — STANDING REQUIRED — NO PRETENDER LENDERS ALLOWED — PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED TO AUTHENTICATE

ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD

COMBO ANALYSIS TITLE AND SECURITIZATION

BORROWER APPEARED PRO SE

GAME OVER: EVIDENCE REQUIRED, NOT PRESUMPTIONS

EVEN IF HOLDER, THEY ARE NOT HOLDER IN DUE COURSE; DEFENSES APPLY

SEE 01.28.2011 NJ CT OF APPEALS REVERSE NO STANDING -WELLS-FARGO-BANK-N-A-As-Trustee-Respondent-V-SANDRA-a-FORD-Appellant[1]

NOTABLE QUOTES:

This appeal presents significant issues regarding the evidence required (E.S.) to establish the standing of an alleged assignee of a mortgage and negotiable note to maintain a foreclosure action.

Wells Fargo claims that it acquired the status of a holder in due course as a result of this assignment and therefore is not subject to any of the defenses defendant may have been able to assert against Argent.

Wells Fargo asserted that Argent had assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo but that the assignment had not yet been recorded.

Wells Fargo subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. This motion was supported by a certification of Josh Baxley, who identified himself as “Supervisor of Fidelity National as an attorney in fact for HomEq Servicing Corporation as attorney in fact for [Wells Fargo].”

Baxley’s certification stated: “I have knowledge of the amount due Plaintiff for principal, interest and/or other charges pursuant to the mortgage due upon the mortgage made by Sandra A. Ford dated March 6, 2005, given to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, to secure the sum of $403,750.00.” Baxley did not indicate the source of this purported knowledge. Baxley’s certification also alleged that Wells Fargo is “the holder and owner of the said Note/Bond and Mortgage”

The documents defendant alleged were forgeries included a purported handwritten note by her stating that she was employed by Bergen Medical Center at a monthly salary of $9500, even though her actual income was only approximately $10,000 per year.
Defendant also alleged that “[t]he estimate for closing fees that was given to me prior to closing was around $13,000.00 and the Good Faith Estimate of Closing Costs was for $13,673.90 but on the closing statement they were $36,259.06.”

On appeal, defendant argues that (1) Wells Fargo failed to establish that it is the holder of the negotiable note she gave to Argent and therefore lacks standing to pursue this foreclosure action; (2) even if Wells Fargo is the holder of the note, it failed to establish that it is a holder in due course and therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Wells Fargo is not subject to the defenses asserted by defendant based on Argent’s alleged predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with execution of the mortgage and note; and (3) even if Wells Fargo is a holder in due course, it still would be subject to certain defenses and statutory claims defendant asserted in her answer and counterclaim.

We conclude that Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action. Therefore, the summary judgment in Wells Fargo’s favor must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to address defendant’s other arguments.

we note that Wells Fargo argues in its answering brief that “[defendant] is estopped to contest Wells Fargo’s standing”; “defendant’s brief exceeds the scope of this appeal,” and “[defendant’s] arguments are counterintuitive.” These arguments are clearly without merit and do not warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
“As a general proposition, a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt.” Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (Ch. Div. 2010) (slip op. at 3). In the absence of a showing of such ownership or control, the plaintiff lacks standing to proceed with the foreclosure action and the complaint must be dismissed. See id. at ___ (slip op. at 35-36).1

If a debt is evidenced by a negotiable instrument, such as the note executed by defendant, the answer to this question is governed by Article III of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to -605, in particular N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301. See generally Raftogianis, supra, ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 3-8). N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301 states in pertinent part:
“Person entitled to enforce” an instrument means [1] the holder of the instrument, [2] a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of the holder, or [3] a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to [N.J.S.A.]12A:3-309 or subsection d. of [N.J.S.A.] 12A:3-418. [EDITOR’S NOTE: A KEY POINT NOT RAISED BY THE HOMEOWNER NOR DISCUSSED BY THE COURT IS THAT ARGENT DID NOT LOAN THE MONEY CONTRARY TO REPRESENTATIONS AT CLOSING. THEREFORE THE DEBT IS NOT EVIDENCED BY A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. HENCE THE PREMISE OF THIS COURT AND ALL COURTS IS WRONG. THE DEBT IS NOT EVIDENCED BY ANY WRITING BUT IT STILL EXISTS. SINCE THE NOTE DOES NOT DESCRIBE THE DEBT IT DESCRIBES A NON-EXISTENT TRANSACTION. THUS THE MORTGAGE SECURING THE DEBT REFERENCED IN THE NOTE SECURES A FICTITIOUS TRANSACTION AND IS SUBJECT TO QUIET TITLE]

N.J.S.A. 12A:3-201(b) provides in pertinent part that “if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder.”

Therefore, even if Wells Fargo had presented satisfactory evidence that it was in “possession” of the note executed by defendant (which is discussed later in this opinion), Wells Fargo admittedly presented no evidence of “its indorsement by [Argent].” Therefore, Wells Fargo was not a “holder” of the note within the first category of “person entitled to enforce” an instrument under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301. See Raftogianis, ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 6).

the question is whether Wells Fargo presented adequate evidence that it fell within the second category of “person entitled to enforce” an instrument under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-A-3627-06T1 301; that is, “a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder.”

Transfer of an instrument occurs “when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.”

the documents that Wells Fargo relied upon in support of its motion for summary judgment to establish its status as a holder were not properly authenticated. A certification will support the grant of summary judgment only if the material facts alleged therein are based, as required by Rule 1:6-6, on “personal knowledge.” See Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 489 (App. Div. 2003). Baxley’s certification does not allege that he has personal knowledge that Wells Fargo is the holder and owner of the note. In fact, the certification does not give any indication how Baxley obtained this alleged knowledge. The certification also does not indicate the source of Baxley’s alleged knowledge that the attached mortgage and note are “true copies.”

Furthermore, the purported assignment of the mortgage, which an assignee must produce to maintain a foreclosure action, see N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, was not authenticated in any manner; it was simply attached to a reply brief. The trial court should not have considered this document unless it was authenticated by an affidavit or certification based on personal knowledge. See Celino v. Gen. Accident Ins., 211 N.J. Super. 538, 544 (App. Div. 1986).

On the remand, defendant may conduct appropriate discovery, (e.s.) including taking the deposition of Baxley and the person who purported to assign the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo on behalf of Argent.

for the guidance of the trial court in the event Wells Fargo is able to establish its standing on remand, we note that even though Wells Fargo could become a “holder” of the note under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-201(b) if Argent indorsed the note to Wells Fargo even at this late date, see UCC Comment 3 to A-3627-06T1 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-203, Wells Fargo would not thereby become a “holder in due course” that could avoid whatever defenses defendant would have to a claim by Argent because Wells Fargo is now aware of those defenses. See N.J.S.A. 12A:3-203(c); UCC Comment 4 to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-203; see generally 6 William D. Hawkland & Larry Lawrence, Hawkland and Lawrence UCC Series [Rev.] § 3-203:7 (2010); 6B Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, supra, § 3-203:14R. Consequently, if Wells Fargo produces an indorsed copy of the note on the remand, the date of that indorsement would be a critical factual issue in determining whether Wells Fargo is a holder in due course.




GMAC HALTS FORECLOSURES ADMITTING FALSE AFFIDAVITS

SERVICES YOU NEED

From testimony in a Chase case, same as dozens of others I have seen —-

Q. So if you didn’t review any books, records, and documents or computerized records, how is it that you had personal knowledge of all the matters contained therein?

A. Well, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge. That is our process.

KEEP IN MIND that these admitted facts now are the same facts treated with incredulity and derision from the bench and opposing counsel. The Judges were wrong. The foreclosures were wrong. Now what? How will homeowners and counsel be treated in court now? Will the Judge still think the homeowner is trying to get out of a legitimate debt or will the Courts start to allow these cases to heard on their MERITS instead of improper PRESUMPTIONS? Will the courts start following rules of evidence or will they continue to give the “benefit of the doubt” (i.e., and improper presumption) to the foreclosure mill that fabricated documents with false affidavits?

The tide is turning from defending borrowers to prosecuting damage claims for slander of title, fraud, appraisal fraud, and criminal prosecutions by state, local and federal law enforcement. GMAC is only the first of the pretender lenders to admit the false representations contained in pleadings and affidavits. The methods used to to obtain foreclosure sales were common throughout the industry. The law firms and fabrication mills will provide precious little cover for the culprits whose interests they served. AND now that millions of homes were foreclosed, their position is set and fixed — they can no longer “fix” the problem by manipulating the documents.

The bottom line is that GMAC mortgagors who “lost” their homes still own them, as I have repeatedly opined on these pages. The damages are obvious and the punitive damages available are virtually inevitable. Maybe Judges will change their minds about applying TILA and RESPA, both of which amply cover this situation. Maybe those teeth in those statutes do NOT lead to windfall gains for homeowners but only set things right.

These people can move back into their homes in my opinion and even taken possession from those who allegedly purchased them, since the title was based upon a fatal defect in the chain. Whether these people will end up owing any money and whether they might still be subject to foreclosure from SOMEBODY is not yet known, but we know that GMAC-sponsored foreclosures are now admitted to be defective. There is no reason to suppose that GMAC was any different from any of the other pretender lenders who initiated foreclosure sales either on false pleading or false instructions using the power of sale in non-judicial states.

Those hundreds of millions of dollars earned by the foreclosure mills, those tens of billions of wealth stolen from homeowner are all up for grabs as lawyers start to circle the kill, having discovered that there is more money here than any personal injury or malpractice suit and that anyone can do it with the right information on title and securitization.

With subpoenas coming in from law enforcement agencies around the country, GMAC is the first to crumble, aware that the choice was to either take a massive commercial hit for damages or face criminal charges. Finger pointing will start in earnest as the big boys claim plausible deniability in a scheme they hatched and directed. The little guys will flip on them like pancakes as they testify under oath about the instructions they received which they knew were contrary to law and the rules governing their licenses and charters. Real Estate Brokers, licensed appraisers, licensed mortgage mortgage brokers, notaries, witnesses, title agents and their collective title and liability insurance carriers will soon discover that their licenses, livelihood and reputations are not only at risk but almost certainly headed for a major hit.

There can be no doubt that all GMAC cases will be affected by this action although GMAC has thus far limited the instruction to judicial states. In non-judicial states, most of the foreclosures were done without affidavits because they were uncontested. GMAC will now find small comfort that they didn’t use affidavits but merely false instructions to “Trustees” whose status was acquired through the filing of “Substitution of Trustee” documents executed by the same folks who falsified the affidavits in the judicial states. But the fact is that GMAC was not the creditor and obtained title through a “credit bid.” THEY CAN’T FIX THIS! Thus the transfer of title was void, in my opinion, or certainly voidable.

The denial that the affidavit contained false information is patently false — and, as usual, not under oath (see below). GMAC takes the position that the affidavits were “inadvertently” signed (tens of thousands of them) by persons without knowledge of their truth or falsity and that the action is taken only to assure that the mortgage holder is actually known. So the fight isn’t over and don’t kid yourself. They are not all going to roll over and play dead. Just take this as another large step toward the ultimate remedy — reinstatement of people in their homes, damage awards to people who were defrauded, and thus restoration of hundreds of billions of dollars of wealth back into the economic sector where money is spent and the economy actually works for people who don’t trade false papers at the expense of pensioners and homeowners around the world.

September 20, 2010

GMAC Halts Foreclosures in 23 States for Review

By DAVID STREITFELD

GMAC Mortgage, one of the country’s largest and most troubled home lenders, said on Monday that it was imposing a moratorium on many of its foreclosures as it tried to ensure they were done correctly.

The lender, which specialized in subprime loans during the boom, when it was owned by General Motors, declined in an e-mail to specify how many loans would be affected or the “potential issue” it had identified with them.

GMAC said the suspension might be a few weeks or might last until the end of the year.

States where the moratorium is being carried out include New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida and 18 others, mostly on the East Coast and in the Midwest. All of the affected states are so-called judicial foreclosure states, where courts control the interactions of defaulting homeowners and their lenders.

Since the real estate collapse began, lawyers for homeowners have sparred with lenders in those states. The lawyers say that in many cases, the lenders are not in possession of the original promissory note, which is necessary for a foreclosure.

GMAC, which has been the recipient of billions of dollars of government aid, declined to provide any details or answer questions, but its actions suggest that it is concerned about potential liability in evicting families and selling houses to which it does not have clear title.

The lender said it was also reviewing completed foreclosures where the same unnamed procedure might have been used.

Matthew Weidner, a real estate lawyer in St. Petersburg, Fla., said he interpreted the lender’s actions as saying, “We have real liability here.”

Mr. Weidner said he recently received notices from the opposing counsel in two GMAC foreclosure cases that it was withdrawing an affidavit. In both cases, the document was signed by a GMAC executive who said in a deposition last year that he had routinely signed thousands of affidavits without verifying the mortgage holder.

“The Florida rules of civil procedure are explicit,” Mr. Weidner said. “If you enter an affidavit, it must be based on personal knowledge.”

The law firm seeking to withdraw the affidavits is Florida Default Law Group, which is based in Tampa. Ronald R. Wolfe, a vice president at the firm, did not return calls. The firm is under investigation by the State of Florida, according to the attorney general’s Web site.

Real estate agents who work with GMAC to sell foreclosed properties were told to halt their activities late last week. The moratorium was first reported by Bloomberg News on Monday. Bloomberg said it had obtained a company memorandum dated Friday in which GMAC Mortgage instructed brokers to immediately stop evictions, cash-for-key transactions and sales.

Nerissa Spannos, a Fort Lauderdale agent, said GMAC represents about half of her business — 15 houses at the moment in various stages of foreclosure.

“It’s all coming to a halt,” she said. “I have so many nice listings and now I can’t sell them.”

The lender’s action, she said, was unprecedented in her experience. “Every once in a while you get a message saying, ‘Take this house off the market. We have to re-foreclose.’ But this is so much bigger,” she said.

Ally Says GMAC Mortgage Mishandled Affidavits on Foreclosures

By Dakin Campbell and Lorraine Woellert – Sep 21, 2010

Ally Financial Inc., whose GMAC Mortgage unit halted evictions in 23 states amid allegations of mishandled affidavits, said its filings contained no false claims about home loans.

The “defect” in affidavits used to support evictions was “technical” and was discovered by the company, Gina Proia, an Ally spokeswoman, said in an e-mailed statement. Employees submitted affidavits containing information they didn’t personally know was true and sometimes signed without a notary present, according to the statement. Most cases will be resolved in the next few weeks and those that can’t be fixed will “require court intervention,” Proia said.

“The entire situation is unfortunate and regrettable and GMAC Mortgage is diligently working to resolve the situation,” Proia said. “There was never any intent on the part of GMAC Mortgage to bypass court rules or procedures. Nor do these failures reflect any disrespect for our courts or the judicial processes.”

State officials are investigating allegations of fraudulent foreclosures at the nation’s largest home lenders and loan servicers. Lawyers defending mortgage borrowers have accused GMAC and other lenders of foreclosing on homeowners without verifying that they own the loans. In foreclosure cases, companies commonly file affidavits to start court proceedings.

“All the banks are the same, GMAC is the only one who’s gotten caught,” said Patricia Parker, an attorney at Jacksonville, Florida-based law firm, Parker & DuFresne. “This could be huge.”

No Misstatements

Aside from signing the affidavits without knowledge or a notary, “the sum and substance of the affidavits and all content were factually accurate,” Proia wrote in the e-mail. “Our internal review has revealed no evidence of any factual misstatements or inaccuracies concerning the details typically contained in these affidavits such as the loan balance, its delinquency, and the accuracy of the note and mortgage on the underlying transaction.”

Affidavits are statements written and sworn to in the presence of someone authorized to administer an oath, such as a notary public.

GMAC told brokers and agents to halt evictions tied to foreclosures on homeowners in 23 states including Florida, Connecticut and New York and said it may have to take “corrective action” on other foreclosures, according to a Sept. 17 memo. Foreclosures won’t be suspended and will continue with “no interruption,” Proia said in a statement yesterday.

10,000 a Week

In December 2009, a GMAC Mortgage employee said in a deposition that his team of 13 people signed “a round number of 10,000” affidavits and other foreclosure documents a month without verifying their accuracy. The employee said he relied on law firms sending him the affidavits to verify their accuracy instead of checking them with GMAC’s records as required. The affidavits were then used to complete the process of repossessing homes and evicting residents.

Florida Attorney General William McCollum is investigating three law firms that represent loan servicers in foreclosures, and are alleged to have submitted fraudulent documents to the courts, according to an Aug. 10 statement. The firms handled about 80 percent of foreclosure cases in the state, according to a letter from Representative Alan Grayson, a Florida Democrat.

“It appears that the actions we have taken and the attention we’ve paid to this issue could have had some impact on the actions that GMAC took today, but we can’t take full credit,” Ryan Wiggins, a spokeswoman for McCollum, said yesterday in a telephone interview.

‘Committed Fraud’

In August, Florida Circuit Court Judge Jean Johnson blocked a Jacksonville foreclosure brought by Washington Mutual Bank N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, which had purchased the failed bank’s assets, and Shapiro & Fishman, the companies’ law firm. Documents eventually showed that the mortgage on the house was in fact owned by Washington-based Fannie Mae.

WaMu and the law firm “committed fraud on this court,” Johnson wrote. JPMorgan had presented a document prepared by Shapiro showing the mortgage was sold directly to WaMu in April 2008.

Tom Ice, founding partner of Ice Legal PA in Royal Palm Beach, Florida, said a fourth law firm representing GMAC in recent weeks has begun withdrawing affidavits signed by the GMAC employee.

“The banks are sitting up and taking notice that they can’t use falsified documents in the courtroom,” Ice said. “There may be others doing the same thing. They’re going to come back and say, ‘We’d better withdraw these,’” Ice said in a telephone interview.

Alejandra Arroyave, a lawyer with Lapin & Leichtling, a law firm in Coral Gables, Florida, who represented the employee at his December 2009 deposition, didn’t respond to a request for comment. A phone call to the employee wasn’t returned.

Mortgage Market

GMAC ranked fourth among U.S. home-loan originators in the first six months of this year, with $26 billion of mortgages, according to Inside Mortgage Finance, an industry newsletter. Wells Fargo & Co. ranked first, with $160 billion, and Citigroup Inc. was fifth, with $25 billion.

Iowa Assistant Attorney General Patrick Madigan said the implications of Ally’s internal review and the GMAC employee’s deposition could be “enormous.”

“It would call into question whether other servicers have engaged in similar practices,” Madigan said in a telephone interview. “It would be a major disruption to the foreclosure pipeline.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Dakin Campbell in San Francisco at dcampbell27@bloomberg.net; Lorraine Woellert in Washington at lwoellert@bloomberg.net.

JP Morgan: 8 people, 18,000 signed affidavits per month

The bottom line is that none of these signors of affidavits have ANY personal knowledge regarding any document, event, or transaction relating to any of the loans they are “processing.” It’s all a lie.

In a 35 hour workweek, 18,000 affidavits per month computes as 74.23 affidavits per JPM signor per hour and 1.23 per minute. Try that. See if you can review a file, verify the accounting, execute the affidavit and get it notarized in one minute. It isn’t possible. It can only be done with a system that incorporates automation, fabrication and forgery.

Editor’s Note: Besides the entertaining writing, there is a message here. And then a hidden message. The deponent is quoted as saying she has personal knowledge of what her fellow workers have as personal knowledge. That means the witness is NOT competent in ANY court of law to give testimony that is allowed to be received as evidence. Here is the kicker: None of these loans were originated by JPM. Most of them were the subject of complex transactions. The bottom line is that none of these signors of affidavits have ANY personal knowledge regarding any document, event, or transaction relating to any of the loans they are “processing.” It’s all a lie.

In these transactions, even though the investors were the owners of the loan, the servicing and other rights were rights were transferred acquired from WAMU et al and then redistributed to still other entities. This was an exercise in obfuscation. By doing this, JPM was able to control the distribution of profits from third party payments on loan pools like insurance contracts, credit defaults swaps and other credit enhancements.

Having that control enabled JPM to avoid allocating such payments to the investors who put up the bad money and thus keep the good money for itself. You see, the Countrywide settlement with the FTC focuses on the pennies while billions of dollars are flying over head.

The simple refusal to allocate third party payments achieves the following:

  • Denial of any hope of repayment to the investors
  • Denial of any proper accounting for all receipts and disbursements that are allocable to each loan account
  • 97% success rate in sustaining Claims of default that are fatally defective being both wrong and undocumented.
  • 97% success rate on Claims for balances that don’t exist
  • 97% success rate in getting a home in which JPM has no investment

(THE DEPONENT’S NAME IS COTRELL NOT CANTREL)

JPM: Cantrel deposiition reveals 18,000 affidavits signed per month

HEY, CHASE! YEAH, YOU… JPMORGAN CHASE! One of Your Customers Asked Me to Give You a Message…

Hi JPMorgan Chase People!

Thanks for taking a moment to read this… I promise to be brief, which is so unlike me… ask anyone.

My friend, Max Gardner, the famous bankruptcy attorney from North Carolina, sent me the excerpt from the deposition of one Beth Ann Cottrell, shown below.  Don’t you just love the way he keeps up on stuff… always thinking of people like me who live to expose people like you?  Apparently, she’s your team’s Operations Manager at Chase Home Finance, and she’s, obviously, quite a gal.

Just to make it interesting… and fun… I’m going to do my best to really paint a picture of the situation, so the reader can feel like he or she is there… in the picture at the time of the actual deposition of Ms. Cottrell… like it’s a John Grisham novel…

FADE IN:

SFX: Sound of creaking door opening, not to slowly… There’s a ceiling fan turning slowly…

It’s Monday morning, May 17th in this year of our Lord, two thousand and ten, and as we enter the courtroom, the plaintiff’s attorney, representing a Florida homeowner, is asking Beth Ann a few questions…  We’re in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida.

Deposition of Beth Ann Cottrell – Operations Manager of Chase Home Finance LLC

Q.  So if you did not review any books or records or electronic records before signing this affidavit of payments default, how is it that you had personal knowledge of all of the matters stated in this sworn document?

A.  Well, it is pretty simple, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge of what is in the affidavit on personal knowledge.  That is how our process works.

Q.  So, when signing an affidavit, you stated you have personal knowledge of the matters contained therein of Chase’s business records yet you never looked at the data bases or anything else that would contain those records; is that correct?

A.  That is correct.  I rely on my staff to do that part.

Q.  And can you tell me in a given week how many of these affidavits you might sing?

A.  Amongst all the management on my team we sign about 18,000 a month.

Q.  And how many folks are on what you call the management?

A.  Let’s see, eight.

And… SCENE.

Isn’t that just irresistibly cute?  The way she sees absolutely nothing wrong with the way she’s answering the questions?  It’s really quite marvelous.  Truth be told, although I hadn’t realized it prior to reading Beth Ann’s deposition transcript, I had never actually seen obtuse before.

In fact, if Beth’s response that follows with in a movie… well, this is the kind of stuff that wins Oscars for screenwriting.  I may never forget it.  She actually said:

“Well, it is pretty simple, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge of what is in the affidavit on personal knowledge.  That is how our process works.”

No you didn’t.

Isn’t she just fabulous?  Does she live in a situation comedy on ABC or something?

ANYWAY… BACK TO WHY I ASKED YOU JPMORGAN CHASE PEOPLE OVER…

Well, I know a homeowner who lives in Scottsdale, Arizona… lovely couple… wouldn’t want to embarrass them by using their real names, so I’ll just refer to them as the Campbell’s.

So, just the other evening Mr. Campbell calls me to say hello, and to tell me that he and his wife decided to strategically default on their mortgage.  Have you heard about this… this strategic default thing that’s become so hip this past year?

It’s when a homeowner who could probably pay the mortgage payment, decides that watching any further incompetence on the part of the government and the banks, along with more home equity, is just more than he or she can bear.  They called you guys at Chase about a hundred times to talk to you about modifying their loan, but you know how you guys are, so nothing went anywhere.

Then one day someone sent Mr. Campbell a link to an article on my blog, and I happened to be going on about the topic of strategic default.  So… funny story… they had been thinking about strategically defaulting anyway and wouldn’t you know it… after reading my column, they decided to go ahead and commence defaulting strategically.

So, after about 30 years as a homeowner, and making plenty of money to handle the mortgage payment, he and his wife stop making their mortgage payment… they toast the decision with champagne.

You see, they owe $865,000 on their home, which was just appraised at $310,000, and interestingly enough, also from reading my column, they came to understand the fact that they hadn’t done anything to cause this situation, nothing at all.  It was the banks that caused this mess, and now they were expecting homeowners like he and his wife, to pick up the tab.  So, they finally said… no, no thank you.

Luckily, she’s not on the loan, so she already went out and bought their new place, right across the street from the old one, as it turns out, and they figure they’ve got at least a year to move, since they plan to do everything possible to delay you guys from foreclosing.  They’re my heroes…

Okay, so here’s the message I promised I’d pass on to as many JPMorgan Chase people as possible… so, Mr. Campbell calls me one evening, and tells me he’s sorry to bother… knows I’m busy… I tell him it’s no problem and ask how he’s been holding up…

He says just fine, and he sounds truly happy… strategic defaulters are always happy, in fact they’re the only happy people that ever call me… everyone else is about to pop cyanide pills, or pop a cap in Jamie Dimon’s ass… one or the other… okay, sorry… I’m getting to my message…

He tells me, “Martin, we just wanted to tell you that we stopped making our payments, and couldn’t be happier.  Like a giant burden has been lifted.”

I said, “Glad to hear it, you sound great!”

And he said, “I just wanted to call you because Chase called me this evening, and I wanted to know if you could pass a message along to them on your blog.”

I said, “Sure thing, what would you like me to tell them?”

He said, “Well, like I was saying, we stopped making our payments as of April…”

“Right…” I said.

“So, Chase called me this evening after dinner.”

“Yes…” I replied.

He went on… “The woman said: Mr. Campbell, we haven’t received your last payment.  So, I said… OH YES YOU HAVE!”

Hey, JPMorgan Chase People… LMAO.  Keep up the great work over there.

Debt Validation Letter– Creditor or Collector?

the bailout and insurance money was paid not to the investors or the borrowers, it was paid to the investment bankers who never were at risk. I’m beginning to think that the ultra-sophisticated investors have some dog in this race that prevents them from entering the foreclosure market directly to recover or settle their investments at a much higher rate of recovery than that offered by Wall Street.Maybe they were not deceived after all and the investment bank can prove it.

A short note on why you should send one in addition to the QWR.

The response is usually that a DVL is inappropriate in a mortgage case. The mistake universally made is that this response has merit. It doesn’t. And the reason is that it would only be true if the pretender lender was actually a party to the mortgage transaction. In order to be a party to the mortgage transaction it must be the creditor or the debtor.

If they want to take the position that the the DVL does not apply then the proper response is an objection to that statement and a motion to strike it from the record. The basis of the objection is that the lawyer has failed to establish that his client is a party to the transaction. So now he either must give up or withdraw his objection to the demand that the DVL be answered OR prove that his client is a creditor.

Anyone other than a creditor in a mortgage transaction would of necessity be aan agent or at least alleging some agency relationship which makes them a collector — which is exactly why the Consumer Debt Protection Act was written.

Thus if you can get the pretender lender lawyer to state that the DVL doesn’t apply, your response should be good, now he has raised an issue of fact entitling you to discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the issue fo whether his client is a creditor or a collector.

And by the way, you should also note that the statute requires not validation, but verification. validation would merely be a statement from the same party that says, “Yes, that’s what you owe, now pay up.” Verification requires that the collector actually inquire from the principal, disclose the principal and provide a signed, sworn statement that the information is true, providing the details of what was done, who they spoke with, where the files are and how anyone knows the answers.

The usual trick by the foreclosure mills is to get a signature from anyone on a vague document that doesn’t really say anything and doesn’t really say the signer knows anything. Then the lawyer goes to court and tells the court what it says, and if you don’t object, the lawyer’s statement will be taken as a true summary of the contents. Read the document carefully.

It will usually be vague as to the nature of the signor’s employment, and use words like “familiar with” INSTEAD OF WORDS THAT CONNOTE THAT THEY HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.  THE PERSON SIGNING PROBABLY HAS NO KNOWLEDGE AND EVEN THEY TYPED OUT THE STATEMENT IT WAS PROBABLY DICTATED BY SOMEONE ELSE WHO ALSO DIDN’T HAVE ANY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. THUS THE DOCUMENT AND THE TESTIMONY, IF ANY, ARE HEARSAY AND DO NOT FALL WITHIN ANY EXCEPTION.

Lawyers Beware: A firm grasp of the laws and rules of evidence and the objections that go with that knowledge is the key to winning these cases. Their goal is to prevent you from getting the real information and to keep the investor and the borrower separated by a veil of secrecy or as Countrywide was so fond of saying “confidentiality.”

If the investor and borrower were to actually get together, the investor would find out first that only a small portion of his investment was used to fund mortgages — the rest being kept as fees and betting money that the loan would go bad.

The second thing they would discover as they drilled down further is that the bailout and insurance money was paid not to the investors or the borrowers, it was paid to the investment bankers who never were at risk. I’m beginning to think that the ultra-sophisticated investors have some dog in this race that prevents them from entering the foreclosure market directly to recover or settle their investments at a much higher rate of recovery than that offered by Wall Street. Maybe they were not deceived after all and the investment bank can prove it.

Evidence: Produce the Witness


In practice, this surfaces as a demand letter, affidavit or assignment or other document used by the pretender lender to establish its case. The path to defeat of the homeowner is paved when they fail to object to the introduction of these documents as anything other than an allegation that raises a question of fact. If you make the objection then you are conforming to the rules of evidence and enforcing your rights under the the U.S. Constitution. By directing the Judge’s attention to the question of fact, you then open the door to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Without that, the allegations of the pretender lender will be taken as true and you are just about done.
The 6th Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights, guarantees people the right to confront witnesses who are offering “evidence” against them. This basic right has often been eroded by bad decisions by Judges who do not understand the rules of evidence — but more often affidavits, reports and other documents are often admitted into evidence because of the failure of the opposing party to object. In a great many cases, “evidence” becomes what is allowed by the failure of the party to understand their right to cross examine a witness in live testimony.
RELEVANCE: Neither the computer generated reports nor the affidavits or correspondence of the pretender lender is evidence unless you fail to object to it for (a) lack of foundation and (b) violation of your right to confront the PERSON who entered the data or information written or the PERSON who prepared the document. The same holds true for your forensic report. You can use it to raise a question of fact, but when it comes down to actually proving your case the report is useless without the live testimony of the forensic analyst and the live testimony of an expert who explains what it means.

In practice, this surfaces as a demand letter, affidavit or assignment or other document used by the pretender lender to establish its case. The path to defeat of the homeowner is paved when they fail to object to the introduction of these documents as anything other than an allegation that raises a question of fact. If you make the objection then you are conforming to the rules of evidence and enforcing your rights under the the U.S. Constitution. By directing the Judge’s attention to the question of fact, you then open the door to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Without that, the allegations of the pretender lender will be taken as true and you are just about done.
There are exceptions to allowing a document in as evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted but they are limited exceptions and contain numerous conditions, mostly in the form of providing a foundation for the introduction of the document, the reason for the absence of the witness and whether the witness is actually available to testify and if not, why not.
The parallel tactic used by pretender lenders is to produce a witness that is a shill for the real thing. This comes down to the conventional definition of competency of a witness to testify. In nearly all cases, the witness the pretender lenders offers has no direct personal knowledge of anything contained in the written document, has been recently hired, is not in the department that would have any knowledge and/or is not the true custodian of records who could identify where the data came from, who provided it, when it was created, and the method by which the document is created. In nearly all cases, these documents are fabricated in “service mills” which might actually be in the office of the attorney for the pretender lender where an employee of the law firm or service mill executes the affidavit or document as “limited signing officer,” “assistant secretary,” etc. MERS documents are virtually always executed by people with no connection with MERS and where MERS has no knowledge of the existence of the person nor that they executed a document in the name of MERS.
A competent witness is ONLY a live person in court who has PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE and personally remembers the transaction(s) about which they are offering testimony. The pretender lenders merely grab someone and tell them what to say in court like “I am an authorized representative of Pretender Lender and I am familiar with the facts regarding this loan.” Your objection should be accompanied by a request to voir dire the witness. Who is your employer. what is your job? where do you work? When were you employed? Did you get information about this transaction from documents you were given or that you found? Did you get your information from another person?
Test them on conflicts of the numbers shown in different documents. Ask them if they have personal knowledge of the two documents. You probably will find that they have no personal knowledge of one of them. Ask them to explain the difference if they manage to qualify the witness, as it lessens their credibility to have conflicting demands from the same party.
Establish that the witness doesn’t really know anything on their own because they had nothing to do with the origination or servicing of the loan and nothing to do with the securitization of the loan.
On the securitization of the loan sometimes they will bring in a person who has some connection with the loan from the servicing company. Establish that the servicing company is a bookkeeper and conduit for payments and not the creditor (the obligation, as evidenced by the note is not owed to the witness or their employer).
After establishing that they otherwise do have personal knowledge not gleaned from someone else (hearsay), you ask them if they have any access to the the records of the other parties involved in the securitization of this loan.
Then you establish that therefore they only have the records of a specific period of time involving transactions between the borrower and a particular servicer and NOT the full record of all transactions that occurred as credit or debits to the obligation created when the loan was originated. So they don’t know whether the obligation was transferred or sold or paid by federal bailout or insurance. They don’t know the identity of the creditor.
As soon as they admit lack of knowledge you object to the witness as not having the required personal knowledge and personal recollection of the entire transaction or even parts of it. You therefore object to the the document or report or affidavit they are offering as lacking proper foudnation and as violating your right to cross examine witnesses offering to testify against you.
While the 6th Amendment is often cited just in criminal cases, it is the basis for the rules of evidence in every state in the union. The purpose is not some legal trick. It is to provide the court with some assurance that the information being offered to the court has the required amount of credibility to be useful in finding the facts of the case.
————————————
New York Times
January 11, 2010
Editorial

The Right to Confront Witnesses

Just last June, the Supreme Court decided that when prosecutors rely on lab reports they must call the experts who prepared them to testify. It was an important ruling, based on a defendant’s right to be confronted with witnesses against him, but the court is about to revisit it. The justices should reaffirm that the Sixth Amendment requires prosecutors to call the lab analysts whose work they rely on.

On Monday, the court hears arguments in Briscoe v. Virginia, in which a man was convicted on drug charges. The prosecutors relied on certificates prepared by forensic analysts to prove that the substance seized was cocaine. They did not call the analysts as witnesses.

The defendant should be able to get his conviction overturned based on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the ruling from last June, which held, by a 5-to-4 vote, that using lab reports without calling the analysts violates the Sixth Amendment.

The amendment’s confrontation clause guarantees defendants the right to see prosecution witnesses in person and to cross-examine them, unless they are truly unavailable. In cases that involve drugs, and many that do not, lab analysts’ work can be a critical part of the prosecution’s case. If the prosecutors want to use the reports, they should be required to call the analysts as witnesses.

Critics of the ruling last June argue that it imposes too great a burden and excessive costs on prosecutors. But in states where analysts have to testify, the burden is easily manageable. Ohio’s 14 forensic scientists appeared in 123 drug cases in 2008, less than one appearance each per month.

It is not clear why the Supreme Court is rushing to reconsider this issue. There are some differences in the rules on witnesses between Virginia and Massachusetts. But it may be that with Justice Sonia Sotomayor having replaced Justice David Souter, the dissenters believe they have a fifth vote to erode or undo last June’s ruling.

As a former assistant district attorney, some court analysts argue, she may be more sympathetic to the burden on prosecutors. As a circuit court judge, Justice Sotomayor did often rule for the government in criminal cases, but making predictions of this sort is perilous. Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the court’s most conservative members, wrote the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz.

If the court changes the rule, it would be a significant setback for civil liberties, and not just in cases involving lab evidence. Prosecutors might use the decision to justify offering all sorts of affidavits, videotaped statements and other evidence from absent witnesses.

Foreclosure Defense: New York Judge Gets It HSBC v Valentin N.Y. Sup., 2008

Also submitted by: mortgagefrauds@aol.com

Editor’s Note: For those who are dubious about the legal positions and theories suggested in this blog, this case will be at least somewhat instructive. It is not just a technicality. It is reality. Nobody on the lender’s side can actually trace your note and mortgage to the real party in interest or anyone with actual personal knowledge of the assignments or the effect of those assignments.

This goes directly to the the issue of denying that payment was not made and the affirmative defense that the entire mortgage was prepaid by a third party who does not have any security rights in the property, was not disclosed to the borrower, and who possesses other assignments and cross guarantees through which payments were made, part of which was attributable to the revenue that was assigned.

Note that the note itself has vanished in most cases, has not been assigned and neither has the mortgage. This is a picture of “smart” people eviscerating the “asset” from which an ABS supposedly derived its value thus hoisting a crowd of people up on their own petards.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin N.Y.Sup.,2008. NOTE: THIS OPINION WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN A PRINTED VOLUME. THE DISPOSITION WILL APPEAR IN A REPORTER TABLE. Supreme Court, Kings County, New York.

HSBC BANK USA, N.A., as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Noteholders of Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3, Renaissance Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2005-3,, Plaintiff, v. Candida VALENTIN, Candide Ruiz, et. al., Defendants. No. 15968/07. Jan. 30, 2008. Vincent P. Surico, Esq., De Rose & Surico, Bayside, for Plaintiff. No Opposition submitted by defendants to plaintiff’s Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J. *

1 Plaintiff’s application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference, for the premises located at 572 Riverdale Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 3838, Lot 39, County of Kings) is denied without prejudice. The “affidavit of merit” submitted in support of this application for a default judgment is not by an officer of the plaintiff or someone with a power of attorney from the plaintiff.

Leave is granted to plaintiff, HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED NOTEHOLDERS OF RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2005-3, RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2005-3 (HSBC), to renew its application for an order of reference upon presentation to the Court of compliance with the statutory requirements of CPLR § 3215(f), with “an affidavit of facts” executed by someone who is an officer of HSBC or has a valid power of attorney from HSBC.

Further, the Court, upon renewal of the application for an order of reference requires a satisfactory explanation to questions with respect to: the assignment of the instant nonperforming mortgage loan from the original lender, Delta Funding Corporation to HSBC Bank; the employment history of one Scott Anderson, who assigned the instant mortgage to HSBC, yet in a case I decided last month, HSBC Bank, N .A. v. Cherry, 18 Misc.3d 1102(A), swore in an affidavit to be HSBC’s servicing agent; and the relationship between HSBC, Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB (OCWEN), Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, who all seem to share office space at 1661 Worthington Road, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 (Suite 100). Background Defendants, Candida Valentin and Candide Ruiz, borrowed $340,000 from Delta Funding Corporation, on June 23, 2005.

The note and mortgage were recorded in the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance on July 14, 2005, at City Register File Number (CRFN) 2005000395517. Delta Funding Corporation, by MortgageElectronicRegistrationSystems, Inc. (MERS), its nominee for the purpose of recording the mortgage, assigned the note and mortgage to plaintiff HSBC, on May 1, 2007, with the assignment recorded on June 13, 2007 at CRFN 2007000306260.

Plaintiff’s moving papers for an order of reference fails to present an “affidavit made by the party,” pursuant to CPLR § 3215(f). The application contains an April 23, 2007-affidavit by Jessica Dybas, who states that she is “a Foreclosure Facilitator of OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, servicing agent and attorney in fact to the holder of the bond and mortgage sought to be foreclosed herein.”On that date, the note and mortgage were still held by MERS, as nominee of Delta Funding Corporation. For reasons unknown to the Court, MERS, as nominee of Delta Funding Corporation, or plaintiff HSBC failed to provide any power of attorney authorizing OCWEN to go forward with the instant foreclosure action.

Further, even if HSBC authorized OCWEN to be its attorney in fact, Ms. Dybas is not an officer of OCWEN. She is a “Foreclosure Facilitator,” a job title unknown to this Court. Therefore, the proposed order of reference must be denied without prejudice. Leave is granted to plaintiff HSBC to comply with CPLR § 3215(f) by providing an “affidavit made by the party,” whether by an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC. *2 Further, according to plaintiff’s application, the default of defendants Valentin and Ruiz began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on January 1, 2007. Yet, four months later, plaintiff HSBC was willing to take an assignment of the instant nonperforming loan. The Court wonders why HSBC would purchase a nonperforming loan, four months in arrears?

Additionally, plaintiff HSBC must address a third matter if it renews its application for an order of reference. In the instant action, as noted above, Scott Anderson, as Vice President of MERS, assigned the instant mortgage to HSBC on May 1, 2007. Doris Chapman, the Notary Public, stated that on May 1, 2007, “personally appeared Scott Anderson, of 1661 Worthington Road, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409.”In HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Cherry, at 3, I observed that: Scott Anderson, in his affidavit, executed on June 15, 2007, states he is Vice President of OCWEN. Yet, the June 13, 2007 assignment from MERS to HSBC is signed by the same Scott Anderson as Vice President of MERS. Did Mr. Anderson change his employer between June 13, 2007 and June 15, 2007. The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of HSBC, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Mr. Anderson describing his employment history for the past three years. Lastly, the court notes that Scott Anderson, in the MERS to HSBC assignment gave his address as Suite 100. This is also the address listed for HSBC in the assignment. In a foreclosure action that Idecided on May 11, 2007 (Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Company v. Castellanos, 15 Misc.3d 1134[A] ), Deutsche Bank assigned the mortgage to MTGLQ Investors, L.P. I noted, at 4-5, that MTGLQ Investors, L.P.: According to Exhibit 21.1 of the November 25, 2006 Goldman Sachs 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission … is a “significant subsidiary” of Goldman Sachs…. [T]he January 19, 2007 assignment has the same address for both the assignor Deutsche Bank and the assignee MTGLQ Investors, L.P., at 1661 Worthington Road, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409.

The Court will not speculate about why two major financial behemoths, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs share space in a West Palm Beach, Florida office suite In the instant action, with HSBC, OCWEN and MERS, joining with Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs at Suite 100, the Court is now concerned as to why so many financial goliaths are in the same space. The Court ponders if Suite 100 is the size of Madison Square Garden to house all of these financial behemoths or if there is a more nefarious reason for this corporate togetherness.

If HSBC seeks to renew its application for an order to reference, the Court needs to know, in the form of an affidavit, why Suite 100 is such a popular venue for these corporations. Discussion Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of the defendant or defendant’s admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee “to compute the amount due to the plaintiff.”In the instant action, plaintiff’s application for an order of reference is a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale. (Home Sav. Of Am., F.A. v. Gkanios, 230 A.D.2d 770 [2d Dept 1996] ). *3 Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of CPLR § 3215(f) for a default judgment. On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter, and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party… Where a verified complaint has been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the default shall be made by the party or the party’s attorney. [Emphasis added]. Plaintiff has failed to submit “proof of the facts” in “an affidavit made by the party.”The affidavit is submitted by Jessica Dybas, “a Foreclosure Facilitator of OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, servicing agent and attorney in fact to the holder of the bond and mortgage sought to be foreclosed herein.”There must be an affidavit by an officer of HSBC or a servicing agent, possessing a valid power of attorney from HSBC for that express purpose. Additionally, if a power of attorney is presented to this Court and it refers to pooling and servicing agreements, the Court needs a properly offered copy of the pooling and servicing agreements, to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiff. (EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Batista, 15 Misc.3d 1143(A) [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Lewis, 14 Misc.3d 1201(A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006] ).

Also, the instant application upon defendants’ default must be denied because even though it contains a verified complaint, the attorney’s verification is insufficient to meet the requirements of CPLR § 3215(f). The Court, in Mullins v. Di Lorenzo, 199 A.D.2d 218 [1st Dept 1993], instructed that “a complaint verified by counsel amounts to no more than an attorney’s affidavit and is therefore insufficient to support entry of judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215.”Citing Mullins v. Di Lorenzo, the Court, in Feffer v. Malpeso, 210 A.D.2d 60, 61 [1st Dept 1994], held that a complaint with not more than an attorney’s affidavit, for purposes of entering a default judgment “was erroneous and must be deemed a nullity.”Professor David Siegel, in his Practice Commentaries (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3215: 16) explains that Mullins v. Di Lorenzo is in point here. Perhaps the verified complaint can do service as an affidavit for various purposes within the litigation while the contest is on … but it will not suffice to put an end to the contest with as drastic a step as a default at the outset.It must be kept in mind that even an outright “affidavit” by the plaintiff’s attorney on the merits of the case-except in the relatively rare circumstances in which the attorney happens to have first-hand knowledge of the facts-lacks probative force and is usually deemed inadequate by the courts to establish the merits. A fortiori, a verified pleading tendered as proof of the merits would also lack probative force when the verification is the attorney’s. [Emphasis added ] *4 In Blam v. Netcher, 17 AD3d 495, 496 [2d Dept 2005], the Court reversed a default judgment granted in Supreme Court, Nassau County, holding that: In support of her motion for leave to enter judgment against the defendant upon her default in answering, the plaintiff failed to proffer either an affidavit of the facts or a complaint verified by a party with personal knowledge of the facts (seeCPLR 3215(f): Goodman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. 2 AD3d 581 [2d Dept 2003]; Drake v. Drake, 296 A.D.2d 566 [2d Dept 2002]; Parratta v. McAllister, 283 A.D.2d 625 [2d Dept 2001] ). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion should have been denied, with leave to renew on proper papers (see Henriquez v. Purins, 245 A.D.2d 337, 338 [2d Dept 1997] ). (See Hazim v. Winter, 234 A.D.2d 422 [2d Dept 1996]; Finnegan v. Sheahan, 269 A.D.2d 491 [2d Dept 2000]; De Vivo v. Spargo, 287 A.D.2d 535 [2d Dept 2001]; Peniston v. Epstein, 10 AD3d 450 [2d Dept 2004]; Taebong Choi v. JKS Dry Cleaning Eqip. Corp., 15 AD3d 566 [2d Dept 2005]; Matone v. Sycamore Realty Corp., 31 AD3d 721 [2d Dept 2006]; Crimmins v. Sagona Landscaping, Ltd., 33 AD3d 580 [2d Dept 2006] ). Therefore, the instant application for an order of reference is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew.

The Court will grant plaintiff HSBC an order of reference when it presents: an affidavit by either an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from Scott Anderson clarifying his employment history for the past three years and what corporation he serves as an officer; and, an affidavit by an officer of HSBC explaining why HSBC would purchase a nonperforming loan from Delta Funding Corporation, and why HSBC, OCWEN, MERS, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs all share office space in Suite 100.

Conclusion Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the application of plaintiff, HSBC BANK N.A., AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED NOTEHOLDERS OF RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2005-3, RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2005-3, for an order of reference for the premises located at 572 Riverdale Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 3838, Lot 29, County of Kings), is denied without prejudice; and it is further ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, HSBC BANK N.A., AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED NOTEHOLDERS OF RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2005-3, RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2005-3, to renew its application for an order of reference for the premises located at 572 Riverdale Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 3838, Lot 39, County of Kings), upon presentation to the Court, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order, of: an affidavit of facts either by an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from Scott Anderson, describing his employment history for the past three years; an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff HSBC BANK N.A., AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED NOTEHOLDERS OF RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2005-3, RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2005-3, explaining why plaintiff would purchase a nonperforming loan from Delta Funding Corporation and why plaintiff *5 HSBC BANK N.A., shares office space at Suite 100, 1661 Worthington Road, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409, with Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, MortgageElectronicRegistrationSystems, Inc., Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. N.Y.Sup.,2008. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin Slip Copy, 18 Misc.3d 1123(A), 2008 WL 239932 (N.Y.Sup.), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50164(U) END OF DOCUMENT

Response to Defective Affidavit: Motion to Strike

Here is an example of a defective affidavit: defective-affidavit-of-indebtedness

Here is the analysis of how to respond:

In general the affidavit is insufficient because it does not satisfy the basic requirements of personal knowledge.
1. “Affiant is an employee:” Affiant should be an officer or otherwise identified as having a specific scope of employment that should be identified and described for the period starting with the loan closing up through the date of the affidavit.
2. “Of Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s servicing agent:” Now they are withholding what entity employs the affiant so there is no presumption that the affiant in fact has personal knowledge of anything, or if affiant has personal knowledge of everything involved in the loan transaction and payments.  Nor are they identifying or describing the function of either plaintiff or the servicing agent.
3. “Personally familiar”: Doesn’t mean personal knowledge. He probably got information from others (hearsay), and he does not identify himself as custodian of records for anyone on anything.
4. “The information is found in the servicing agent’s records”: So he might not employed by the servicing agent but he is swearing that the information is contained in their records. Hearsay, and lack of competence to testify because he is allowing that he might NOT have personal knowledge, which is the key component of a witness’ competency to testify — the four elements being oath or affirmation, personal knowledge, recall and the ability to communicate information that is relevant to the case from his personal knowledge and recollection. In addition there is no indication when the servicing agent began to service, who the servicing agent is, and whether they are still the servicing agent. And there is no indication of what information is tracked by the servicing agent — for example, does the servicing agent pay the holder in due course? who is the holder in due course? Since this loan was most likely securitized, what insurance, third party guarantees, reserves, cross collateralization and/or over collateralization payments have been made? Has the obligation been satisfied or assumed and assigned to a government sponsored entity, or in a bailout by the U.S. Treasury or Federal Reserve. Chances are the servicer can only say whether the maker of the note paid the servicer. The servicer cannot say and doesn’t know about third party payments on the note. He also cannot say whetehr paymentes were received by the payee or holder of the note by the borrower nor does he state the authority of the servicer to intermediate the payments.
5. “The entries are made”: How does he know that the entries are made and if so, by whom, under what authority and based upon what information. We already know he might be an employee of the Plaintiff and not the servicer. So he lacks competency to state anything about the business process or record keeping of the servicer.
6. “either people with first hand knowledge or…” if they didn’t have first hand knowledge then somehow they got information from people who had first hand knowledge. Really? who? And how would he know about any of it?
7.  “recording such entries is a regular practice of servicer or plaintiff”: Well, which is it? Which one is he saying has what information? He clearly is only saying that the records of only one company are involved, but he won’t say which one. What about the other one. Were payments made by borrower to one or the other or both? This second admission that there are two entities involved means at the very least that two affidavits are required — one from the servicer and one from the payee on the note. If the note has been assigned, then a third, fourth fifth etc affidavit needs to be executed by all those who have or ever had a claim to the revenue from the note.
8. “There is now due” Lack of foundation for all the above reasons. Affidavit is subject to Motion to strike.
9. The numbers stated as charges tot he account are unsubstantiated by copies of invoices or any other corroboration.

Note produced and Mortgage is not: Several possible answers:

Note produced and Mortgage is not: Several possible answers:

  1. Mortgage itself is not required in original form but a certified copy of what is recorded is required.
  2. That they do not have the original stamped copy is indicative but not proof that the mortgage was assigned or transferred in some way. Therefore you want someone with personal knowledge to swear what happened to the mortgage and specifically whether it was assigned, transferred, hypothecated or whether any instrument was executed by the named mortgagee that effects the terms, rights, obligations, ownership or control over the disposition of the mortgage. Put another way: who is it that could execute a satisfaction of mortgage that would satisfy a title expert?
  3. Original Note produced. Several cases where the “original” was a forged copy of the real original. Check with borrower to determine if it is their signature and whether all borrowers signed.
  4. Just because someone physically has possession of the note does not necessarily mean that they own it — but that raises a strong presumption which can only be rebutted by some proof of either a pattern that the mortgagee and payee on the note admits to regarding selling, transferring etc the note, or some documentation from the mortgagee files that shows that they only retained the rights to service the mortgage and received some payment for the full balance of the note or part of the balance of the note plus a “premium” which amounts to an undisclosed fee (TILA violation).
  5. It is probably true in many cases that any number of people got possession your borrower’s note without any rights to it in the process of multiple assignments. Transfer of possession implies transfer of ownership and rights but that is a presumption, not black letter law. So if you show that that going up the line that A transferred to B who transferred to C who transferred to D and the note is in B’s hands, B has no right to enforce the note or foreclose the mortgage. B lacks standing and they have not joined the real party in interest. They are at most a nominal plaintiff. Even if the statute allows a nominal plaintiff in possession of the note to enforce the note and foreclose on the mortgage, they cannot do so without someone having personal knowledge and authority to state that the note is in default and that the nominal plaintiff is instructed to enforce. But in our example if C instructs nominal Plaintiff B and the note and mortgage are held by D then the standing and real party in interest problem still exists — the Defendant could still be sued again by the real party in interest for a double collection, thus the action must be dismissed with prejudice.
  6. In the securitization process, co-obligors (other borrowers) are created in the merger that results by pooling the mortgages and notes and terms are added, which is what happens when a 12% note is sold to an investor as 12% but it only provides for a 1% option ARM payment. Thus if the investor (owner of asset backed security) is in fact getting paid in full, then it is difficult if not impossible to say that one specific note is in default even if there is no evidence of borrower payment, because of the obvious intervention of third party payments.
  7. “Assignment” of the note must usually be accompanied by physical delivery. But in the securitization process this rarely occurred resulting legally in the Mortgagee/Payee receiving payment in full for a pool of mortgage notes that includes some reference to your borrower’s note. That being the case, the note is paid, the security is severed, and the party who now “owes” on the note is the Mortgagee/Payee who assigned for payment the ownership to a third party who in turn did the same thing. The “default is not that of the borrower anymore because a third party intervened and paid the full balance. This follows the same logic and theory that happens in a refinancing: the mortagee/payee on one mortgage note is paid by a third party. If the third party fails to record a valid assignmentof mortgage or a new mortgage under the laws governing recording, then there is no encumbrance. If the reason the third party paid was because of some deal with the original borrower then the new lender may have a cause of action for an unsecured debt. But in the securitization process the “new” lender is not even disclosed to the original borrower. That they chose to pay off the note is their problem and between them and the seller or their attorney who should have documented the transaction properly.
  8. Rules of evidence in each jurisdiction vary somewhat when it comes to negotiable instruments, assignment, delivery and recordation, so it should be checked both with state and statutes and even with one of the more experienced recording clerks in the county where the property is located.
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