About that letter you receive from the company claimed to be your servicer: PennyMac

People keep getting letters and they tend to treat the information as real simply because it is in writing. That is the nub of the Wall Street scheme — send out written communication and documents without regard to the truth and people will assume that the document or letter would not have been sent if at least someone didn’t think it was true.

SO I was recently sent a copy of a communication that was on PennyMac letterhead. People forget that you can create the letterhead of any company or person and pout it at the top of your document or letter. Any reader assumes that it was sent by that person or company even if it was not sent by or on behalf of that company. And servicers like PennyMac do not send out anything that could be legally binding because they’re just figureheads.

Practically all inconsistent and nonsensical notices and statements received under the “letterhead” of some company that has been claimed by someone to be a servicer can be easily understood — if you accept the premise that multiple FINTECH companies were involved in processing every function that one would normally associate with that of a company receiving and disbursing money.

So here is the comment I made upon receipt of that “letter.” (Calling it a letter may be misleading since it is the automatic production of a document that never included any human intervention, thought, decision, or authority.)

Here are the facts, to a virtual certainty:
  1. This was not sent by PennyMac. It was created and mailed by a FINTECH company and the FINTECH company is not in contract with the alleged company that is claimed (by someone) to be a servicer. The FINTECH company is in contract with intermediaries for an investment bank.
  2. Since it is unsigned there is no presumption that any human ever authorized the letter.  The failure to at least robosign it or stamp it with a signature indicates or even raises the presumption that whoever sent it meant to preserve plausible deniability.
  3. The response to this letter should be a demand (QWR or DVL) for a signed authorization from PennyMAc saying that the letter was authorized by PennyMac on behalf of whoever they are saying is the creditor. Treating the letter as real makes it real and makes it difficult to challenge authority later.
  4. Any demand mailed to their address should include an inquiry as to the meaning of the small font code above the address.
  5. If the letterhead contains a deadline, you should fire back a question about whether this is pursuant to an instruction from an identified creditor or, if there is a self imposed deadline by someone else. If it is PennyMac, please acknowledge that the deadline is imposed by PennyMac. If it is imposed by some third party, then please identify that party and their authority to impose any terms and conditions.
  6. When the letter refers to forbearance or a prior forbearance agreement, an appropriate response would be a request for acknowledgment from an identified creditor as to the existence, terms and conditions of the forbearance agreement.
    1. Failure to challenge the authority of the company claiming to be a “servicer” could later be construed as tacit consent to the authority of that company and the presumption that since they are the servicer and they do have the authority, they must be representing a creditor who has purchased the underlying obligation for value.
    2. Even if the legal presumption is not raised, a factual assumption will arise in the mind of any judge when faced with these tracks in the sand. You always want your alternative narrative to run parallel to the tracks laid by the Foreclosure players.
  7. References to any repayment plan, modification or deferred payment should be treated the same as any reference to forbearance.
  8. The person that they have designated for you to contact is most likely a temporary employee or independent contractor in a call center. This person has no knowledge and no authority to do anything. The same is true for any person designated as being in charge of “escalation.”
  9. As I have stated many times before, what is needed here is not legal argument alone. In order to defeat this scheme, Consumers who think they are subject to some loan agreement should be organizing themselves and raising money for the purpose of paying a team of private investigators. These investigators will reveal facts and circumstances that are inconsistent with the documents sent to the consumer. And the investigation will reveal the stone wall behind which the Foreclosure players are hiding.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 74, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business, accounting and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
  • Yes you DO need a lawyer.
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Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

 

 

What to do if the foreclosure mill refuses to give you an answer about ownership of the “loan”

Summer Chic write me an interesting email and I wrote back. She poses a question that summarizes the entire situation:
She wrote:

Example: PennyMac claimed that they PURCHASED my loan on May 2, 2019  from someone whom they cannot identify. The financial statements from a non-identified company show that somebody “established a NEW loan” on May 9, 2019. Not a single word about the sale

Here is what I wrote back:
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As unusual PennyMac (or Ocwen or whoever) claims that it purchased a specific loan (usually in bulk). So we all know that a claim is good for pleading but litigation is not about “because I said so.” It’s about proof as admitted by the judge.
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In this case the discovery question is simple: who is the party from whom you acquired ownership of the subject loan in exchange for payment of value? They can’t answer that because no such person or entity exists. When you say “they cannot identify” does that mean you have submitted formal court discovery to them and they failed or refused to answer?
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If you mean that you have asked by phone or standard letter and they couldn’t or wouldn’t say who they paid, that fact — the non answer — will have very little legal probity in the case.
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If you mean that you asked in a Qualified Written Request or Debt Validation Letter, then you have invoked administrative process. Failure to answer that question is a failure to establish the single most important question of the case — is the claimant the owner of the underlying obligation (because it paid real value in exchange for a conveyance of ownership of the subject debt, note or mortgage (DOT)? That is, after all their claim if they are claiming ownership or claiming purchase.
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If the named claimant is the owner of the underlying debt then the claimant is the owner of the loan account and can claim a financial loss resulting from nonpayment by the homeowner. Since they have suffered financial damage they are entitled to redress through the courts and that includes judgment on the debt, judgment on the note and judgment on the mortgage (or all three).
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If the named claimant is NOT the owner of the underlying debt then the claimant is NOT the owner of the loan account and cannot claim a financial loss resulting from nonpayment by the homeowner. Since they have not suffered financial damage they are not entitled to redress through the courts and they have no right in law or equity to a judgment on the debt, judgment on the note and judgment on the mortgage (or all three).
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So if administrative process in invoked and they refuse to answer (always the case) then you file complaints with the CFPB and state AG that says, in summary, I am being coerced into a relationship with PennyMac despite the fact that they will not reveal any transaction in which it acquired ownership of my obligation. PennyMac is neither my original lender or table lender nor a successor to anyone who was the original lender or table lender. Its response is required under applicable law. They won’t answer or they are admitting informally that they are unable to identify the transaction except by date but without any information about the “seller” whom they say they cannot identify.
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Lying to AG and CFPB carries some fairly hefty penalties so the banks try to steer clear of flat out lying to those law enforcement agencies. So you usually will find inconsistencies between their answer to the CFPB complaint and what they have previously sent you. You can use those effectively in court as admissions against interest. There will always be inconsistencies because none of what they are saying is or ever was true. But it isn’t up to the judge to dig. It is up to you as litigant to put these inconsistencies squarely in the face of the judge and be able explain in clear persuasive language why this is important.
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If you mean that you asked in formal court discovery, that is an entirely different story. That fact that you asked is relevant. The fact that they didn’t or couldn’t answer is relevant.  And the fact that they failed or refused to answer even after the court entered an order compelling the answer is relevant because you file a motion for sanctions asking for monetary penalties and striking their pleadings.
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Then after they still don’t produce the answer you are in the very strong position of filing a motion in limine — unless the court has already entered an order striking the pleadings of the claimant.
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You cannot pursue a claim if you are unwilling to say how you got hurt. If you are claiming loss from nonpayment you must show entitlement to payment. Otherwise nonpayment is irrelevant. A quick summary of the law is that if the inferences and presumptions arising from allegations of the complaint or exhibits are properly challenged, the homeowner is entitled to rebut those inferences and presumptions.
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But the rebuttal does NOT consist of proving that the claimant does not own the debt, note and mortgage. The rebuttal arises when court rules prevent the claimant from introducing any evidence at trial that they own the debt, note or mortgage. So even if they did own it, and even if you did owe the money, they would still lose because they had not obeyed court rules.
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The fact that a “new loan” seems to have appeared is not dispositive. If there really was change of ownership it is perfectly acceptable for the new owner to change the labels. But more importantly it might be a clue. The new labels might be an indication that the loan data has been included in multiple “portfolios.” Although none of the portfolios consist of anything more than data about the loans instead of ownership of the loans, they all represent different securitization schemes. By challenging the current portfolio and demanding answers to questions about transfers of the loan you can uncover the fact that more than one “implied trust” is being named by underwriters and foreclosure mills as the successor lender.
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Just remember the paperwork introduced as exhibits to the foreclosure complaint or discovery or at trial in most cases is NOT facially valid because it requires the reader to pursue information that is not in the public record. A big error is NOT challenging the facial validity of a document. Failure to do that either waives many of your defenses or makes it a more difficult uphill climb.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
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Who is PennyMac and Why Was It Needed by Wall Street Banks?

I received an email from one of my most prolific contributors that I am republishing here because virtually everything in it is entirely correct. I especially approve of her point about the fact that servicer advances are funded from proceeds of public offerings of stock that were all purchased by the Wall Street banks who did the underwriting.  Substance over form: the banks were giving PennyMac the money to make servicer advances. The banks were using the investor sourced money supply to buy the fake stock offering. None of it was real.

The end result is that all roads lead back to one thing, to wit: all of the money trail and all of the paper trails lead back to a handful of Wall Street banks who had “successfully” created a void between the real parties in interest — investors and homeowners — and the found a way to create the illusion of filling the void that cut out the financial interests of those real parties in interest. 

The banks were only intermediaries. They successfully posed as the real parties in interest when they were trading and issuing derivatives. But at the other end of the stick they maintained their position as intermediaries who had no interest in the debt and therefore could not be defined as lenders subject to the obligations and restrictions imposed by statutory and common law governing lending, consumer practices, servicing or anything else.

All of the fabricated documents that ensued were designed to cover up the fact that there was no person or entity that owned the underlying debt of any homeowner. Hence nobody could claim financial injury — a basic requirement for getting into court or making any claim.

who is PennyMac (PM) and why are they needed.
I think we need to look back at the PM history to answer this question.
PennyMac is a renamed Countrywide Financial which now operates at least 4 (four) known to me organizations.
1. PennyMac (one of most criminal, with Kurland and Spector)
2. Caliber Home Loan Inc, a middle-level intermediary, operated by Chris Mozilo who pass money from table pools to homebuyers via Black Knight (originator)  and smaller “Lenders”
3. BAC Home Loans
4. LandSafe Appraisal (purchased by CoreLogic) . In 2014 BOA sold a very similarly named system, LoanSafe to VA which is now handles all appraisals; plus CoreLogic gradually purchased most smaller appraisal companies*
Why Bank of America needed PennyMac to appear as a Large Lender and a Biggest servicer?
For the same reason why Countrywide needed American’s Wholesale Lender; and Fidelity National needed two (2) DocX,LLC and LPS – to create an additional corporate curtain to cover for the real parties.
Plus to use PennyMac and other “Servicers” as recipients for new bailouts.
If you take a closer look at PennyMac’s finances, here are nothing even close to $368+ billions worth of mortgages financed and 2 million homes serviced by PennyMac.
Moreover, if you see their Prospectuses, you will find out that the underwriters of PM securities (issued by PennyMac) are the same Stockbrokers who purchased PM’s securities, leaving about $29 million in fees to Penny Mac. I doubt is BOA or GS actually “purchased” anything from PM under this “offering” which they issued under glimpse of PennyMac.
But according to the legend, PennyMac now has to pay pay “servers’ advances” to “investors” for four months from their “own funds” until GSE’s (who sold their bonds to Fed. R. in advance) who cover these MBS, will step in and pick up the payments on “behalf of taxpayers  – while  GSE cannot even identify any Trusts where mortgages were pooled.
These GSE SOLD their unsecured bonds to Federal Reserve who buy about $30 Billion per WEEK from GSE beginning March 2020 to present time. Note that no Trusts were involved in these sales and no one homeowner was informed about the cage of ownership of their “debt”
I don’t know which “Servicers’ advances” and to whom PennyMac “pays” now, when the ownership of the “MBS” bonds was passed to Federal Reserve. At least Federal Reserve keeps it secret.
Apparently Kurland and know all risks involved and decided to steal some data from BK to create more money for themselves.
On May 2, 2019 they sent me a letter that “servicing” was transferred to them – but not mentioned by whom.
On May 3, 2019 PM sent a letter to BK informing them that PM is not going to extend their contract.
soon after Black Knight claimed that they “noticed some irregularities of use” their system by PM – apparently after I brought it to their attention. This is why no assignments were recorded reflecting the “sale” of my loan to PennyMac who cannot identify the Seller.
Since Oct. 31st  BK terminated PM as a client .
In Complaint  filed by PM against BK, they insist that the owner/investor is Ginnie Mae (who sold their MBS to Federal Reserve) – but continue to lie to me and DIFS that PennyMac is “owner/investor” in my loan.
The bottom line, as Neil said – these “servicers” and “lenders” are nothing. They are thin-capitalized clowns for hire and nobody sold any loans to GSEs because loans were destroyed at the beginning to create “manipulated data” in Black Knight system which Big Banks  sold as unsecured derivatives which GSE either sell to Federal Reserve or obtain payments from Stockbrokers directly, like FHFA v. Goldman Sachs
“GSE’s ownership” is the same myth to force people paying a long-time non existing “debt”.
So-called “universal income” proposed by Democrats is a camouflaged attempt to make Big Banks  pay royalties from trades to people .
Of course the Government cannot disclose the Truth since it will reveal that during last 40 years they allowed Stockbrokers to destroy property Titles to virtually ALL homes in America; plus create a slavery never existed before, where a small group of people enjoy tax-free profits from free servitude provided to them by the rest of the Country – plus income from stolen homes.
*Lagow worked at LandSafe, Inc., an appraisal company owned by Countrywide Financial and ultimately acquired by Bank of America, from 2004-2008. According to his unsealed complaint, Mr. Lagow observed widespread disregard for laws that regulate Federal Housing Administration (FHA) underwriting and home appraisals.

Specifically, he claimed that Countrywide conspired with LandSafe and homebuilder KB Homes to inflate the appraised value of homes, boosting the size of the lending giant’s loans to homebuyers. In order to accomplish this, the lending giant allegedly used a number of strong-arm tactics to pressure appraisers to report favorable home values.
Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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PennyMac and Other Companies are Making False Claims as “Servicers”: Black Knight, the king of fabricated documents is behind 62% of all “servicing records.”

The bottom line is that companies claiming to be servicers are not servicers although they perform some servicing functions as “clients” of Black Knight.

This provides a veil of plausible deniability for lying in court about testimony and documents. Hiding behind litigation immunity foreclosures are being pursued and granted resulting in windfall payments to intermediaries who never had any stake in the financial stake of any homeowner transaction. 

Examination of the facts shows that the “boarding process” is nonsense i.e., a lie). “New Servicers” simply log on to the Black Knight system. There is no boarding required. It is a total lie to fool courts into believing that the records were tested when they were not. 

Black Knight is not mentioned in part because of its prior record of criminal conduct. That record gives rise to inferences of lack of credibility or questions or credibility — either one of which is enough to prevent the employment of legal presumptions arising from what appear to be facially valid documentation. Without those presumptions there is no case because none of the claimants can offer proof of transactions in which actual ownership and control over the underyling obligation can be established. 

There is nothing like an admission that can change the course of thinking by a judge, lawyer, homeowner or law maker. Except for one thing: when the party not only admits the truth of the matter asserted but affirmatively alleges it in a lawsuit against someone else.

Exhibit A, brought to my attention by multiple sources and contributors to my blog. It is a lawsuit by someone who professes to have no connection with the alleged “servicing” of any transactions that are referred to as residential mortgage loans. It is never named in any lawsuit as a servicer. It does not show up in court as the source of servicing records. It does not send any robowitness to court to say that he/she is familiar with the books and records of this company. And yet, here is Black Knight, formerly Lender Processing Services and DOCX infamy (Lorraine Brown, President went to jail).

In a lawsuit against PennyMac, Black Knight asserts that PennyMac infringed upon its proprietary system that supplies the servicing records for 62% of all “servicing” performed in the U.S., — and that means that in 62% of all foreclosures, the companies that were proffered as servicers were not the servicers or at least did not perform all servicing functions — especially, as you read the complaint, as to payment histories and relevant documents for foreclosure.

So we have the only company that was ever caught red handed with fabricating, falsifying, recording, forging, robosigning false transaction documents. They changed their name but not their business model. Their business model is being the central repository of all the data that is created, stored, and manipulated with respect to 62% of all alleged “loans.”

That makes Ocwen and other loan servicers liars. And I have successfully pointed that out in trial. When you look at the copies submitted to qualify for an exception to the hearsay rule as a “business record” you can see that this did not come off of any particular system. And upon questioning of the witness they will profess ignorance as to the location of the server on which documents and records are created, maintained and manipulated.

No document is ever produced showing that Black Knight was named as servicer for any trust. That is because the trust has nothing and Black Knight is not working for nothing. Black Knight is working for investment banks who are the prime and only drivers of all trading, administration, collection and enforcing of contracts relating to securities and homeowner transactions. The transaction data (38%) not controlled by Black Knight is primarily controlled by a Chase controlled entity in the same way.

So the bottom line is that when the servicer representative comes into court to testify as to the foundation of the payment history, there are two things to remember for cross examination.

First, the copies he/she is attesting to are not from any system owned or controlled by his company and are not the records of the trustee or trust of any REMIC Trust.

Second those records are always missing any references to what goes out. Without entries showing disbursements to creditors, the records are incomplete. Without records showing establishment of the debt as an asset of some creditor, the records are incomplete. And THAT is what undermines the foundation for the admission of the records and can lead to objection and a motion to strike the exhibit during trial.

Failure to object and failure to attack in this way leads inevitably to a finding that the documents are real and that the information is true which then proves a default because the payment history says so.

But it doesn’t prove a default and the litigator must be able to show that. A default is established ONLY when proof of ownership of the asset (Loan) is established in the name of the claimant or Plaintiff. This never happens because there is no creditor showing the loan as an asset on its financial statements.

In current securitization practices, there is no creditor that actually claims ownership under generally accepted accounting principles that require a financial transaction (payment) in exchange for a conveyance of ownership of the underlying debt as a required by Article 9 §203 UCC as adopted by all U.S. jurisdictions. And if they are not creditors then they can’t be considered lenders and therefore can claim that lender liability does not attach to them. 

And without any officer of the trustee or trust testifying that those are there records of test rust, the copies preferred by the foreclosure mill and the robowitness are just props and not evidence and do not qualify as exceptions as business records. Accordingly they are barred by the hearsay rule which stands in the way of any evidence that lacks credibility.

Black Knight vs PennyMac Lawsuit

So why am I saying all this?

Here are some quotes from a complaint filed by high end lawyers representing Black Knight against PennyMac who they say falsely and illegally used the Black Knight systems, namely MSP© and Navigator©. Here is what Black Knight says, which corroborates, word for word what I have been saying for 14 years:

“Black Knight’s proprietary MSP® System, including its interdependent NavigatorTM electronic reference and procedural library, is the mortgage industry’s leading mortgage servicing software [e.s.] package. The result of years of research, complex coding, and continuous improvement, the MSP® System is used to service over 62% of the first lien mortgage loans in the United States, providing its users – the country’s largest and most successful lending institutions – with the ability to manage their portfolios in compliance with a broad set of laws and regulations. Black Knight protects its proprietary system through secrecy, and users of the MSP® System are granted access only under strict nondisclosure agreements with individual access controls.”

Now to be sure, they will claim that they are only providing software that “servicers” use. But that is not the way it actually happens. Black Knight owns, operates, maintains all servers with an iron hand as directed by the investment banks who like Black Knight want to be out of sight and therefore out of mind of any court.

The facts that every litigator should know is that the two parties who are not mentioned — the investment bank who started ands till controls the securitization scheme and Black Knight who is the central repository for all data to make sure that there is no public competition for claiming the same loan, are the only ones that actually out as real parties real witnesses.

So then we come to the fact that claims of servicing by PennyMac are completely false. If you read carefully and make appropriate inquiries one fact stands out: PennyMac is acting under Black Knight. PennyMac may get to make certain entries which in turn are tested by Black Knight and PennyMac may get to print out copies of reports that are produced by certain algorithms at Black Knight but PennyMac has no role in creation or maintenance of business records on Black Knight, who in turn does not do anything for trusts because it has no contracts with trusts. it has contracts with investment banks.

Notice how they are keeping the agreement between PennyMac and Black Knight a secret. Also note that the agreement names Fidelity Information Services, Inc. an Arkansas corporation as the principal and PennyMac is referred to as “client”.

“Pursuant to that certain Master Agreement entered into as of April 30, 2008, together with any addenda thereto (the “Master Agreement”), PennyMac became a registered user of the MSP® System and was granted a limited right to access and use the MSP® System in order to process PennyMac mortgage transactions.[e.s.] The Master Agreement includes clear and comprehensive restrictions against misuse of the MSP® System and associated confidential materials. Due to a confidentiality requirement in the Master Agreement, as well as the volume of documents, Black Knight attaches hereto as Exhibit “A” the cover page of the Master Agreement. A complete copy of the Master Agreement is in the possession of PennyMac, but a duplicate copy will be provided upon request.”

So the lawsuit is couched as a copyright infringement case. But the real purpose is that of the investment banks — to prevent the decentralization of data records that could reveal the fact that loans were sold multiple times in multiple ways. Of course there is also the monopolistic position that Black Knight enjoyed and wanted to protect. But without the support of the investment banks it would never have filed this lawsuit,.

“The MSP® System is made of a number of interdependent “modules,” with each performing a different function in the process of servicing a mortgage loan. These modules work together synergistically to produce the familiar experience and end product that is critical to the system’s success.”

“For example, the following specific aspects of the MSP® System contribute to its unique value: data schema and fields; user experiences and interfaces; files and records; transaction-type codes and sequence codes; input, processing and output transactions; workstation guides; technical support services; and documentation of the foregoing. Data collected are organized in specific files incorporated in a table that includes multiple records, each of which is a row that also includes a series of fields or cells, each of which has a specific name and position range. The confidential logic and business rules that drive the collection and manipulation of the data provide Black Knight a competitive advantage.” [e.s.]

“The NavigatorTM application is a critical component of the MSP® System. Acting in effect as an extremely detailed electronic reference and procedural user manual, it provides authorized users of the MSP® System with comprehensive information regarding each MSP® System module and workstation necessary to understand and use the MSP® System to service mortgage loans. This includes confidential details of MSP®-specific files; data dictionaries; data schema, records, and fields; MSP®-specific transaction-type and sequence codes; processing operations associated with MSP®-specific files; and MSP®-specific input and output transactions. It also contains confidential workstation guides and other user materials explaining how to work with MSP®-specific files and initiate execution of MSP®-specific operations. The NavigatorTM application and its related documentation are made available only to authorized users of the MSP® System for limited uses and are specifically designated by Black Knight as confidential proprietary, and trade secret information.

An authorized MSP® System user can also access data from the MSP® System in real-time using MSP® Mortgage Web Services. Like the NavigatorTM application, MSP® Mortgage Web Services contains detailed confidential documentation explaining its functionality and unique and proprietary data formatting structures and request codes, among other topics. And like the NavigatorTM application, MSP® Mortgage Web Services and its related confidential documentation”

One of our prolific readers and contributors “summer chic” has offered the following information that I consider useful in framing complaints:

On June 8, 2020 Black Knight announced that former OneWest CEO (aka OCC) Joseph Otting joined Black Knight’s  Board of Directors…..
 
 Black Knight is a renamed Lenders Processing Services/DocX who forged millions of assignments which were filed in Courts around the Nations to steal homes from American families.
 
 Bill Foley (FNF) , owner of LPS, DocX, Black Knight, ect. continues its illegal practices as of today while deceive borrowers with bogus Title Insurances. 
 
Speaking about monopoly, Mr. Foley owns majority of US Title Companies.
 
PennyMac is a renamed Countrywide Financial 
 
Caliber Home Loan is a renamed Countrywide Financial
 
HomeXMortgage is a renamed Fremont Loan and Investments
 
Matrix Private Capital is a renamed Lehman Brothers
 
New OCC Mr. Brooks is also a former OneWest CEO….
 
Former BlackRock CEO Michael Bright was CEO of Ginnie Mae….
 
VA Appraisal system is controlled by Bank of America via Core Logic LoanSafe program which is  renamed Countrywide’s LandSafe Appraisal system which BOA sold to VA in 2014….
 
Ginnie Mae’s Senior VP Michael Drayne is a seasoned  fraudster from Chevy Chase bank who was sued by investors and insurers for over $5.2 Billion securities fraud. Drayne was never charged for any damages.

*Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.*

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.

*Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

PennyMac Laundromat: Is anything real there?

PennyMac appears to be a vehicle of “cleaning” fatal title deficiencies to the debt, note and/or mortgage on loans. It operates on behalf of CitiMortgage and multiple other entities on loans where the selection of a claimant is essentially random.

The basic playbook of the banks is to insert a real business entity with no actual connection or transaction involving payment of value for the debt, note or mortgage and fabricating documents to imply that such transactions exist. My investigation and that of others reveals that PennyMac is one such sham conduit, in order to create documents that give rise to the legal presumptions that are available when a document appears to be facially valid.

====================================

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Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 954-451-1230. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================
PennyMac is generally used as a vehicle to launder bad title and pursue foreclosures on behalf of entities that have no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage. Generally speaking all of the documents that purport to involve PennyMac and its predecessors are fabricated and false. They are false because they falsely imply the existence of financial transactions in which value was paid for the debt.
*
All residential home loans are about money and nothing else. The banks seek to distract you and the courts from looking at the money and instead, direct you into looking to documents. If I produced a document that looked facially valid, a judge might accept it as valid and true even though the matter asserted in the document is actually untrue. So for example if I were to produce a “facially valid” document saying I am your father, it wouldn’t be true but it would still be taken as true until you rebut the presumption arising from the “facially valid document.
*
So the first step is really examining a document to determine whether it is facially valid. There are times, strategies and tactics where it might be wise to direct the court’s attention to this issue by simply filing a motion that disputes the facial validity of a particular pleading oir document and asks for an evidentiary hearing on the subject. Some judges grant such motions because a ruling from such a proceeding might propel the case to an early end.
*
A facially valid means what is says. If the document recites all the elements required by statute and it is properly signed (and notarized if so required), the document is facially valid and the legal presumptions are available to the proponent of such a document or pleading.
*
So the court takes as true all assertions on the face of the document. A document is not facially valid if it is impossible to determine what is asserted as factually true.
*
A reference to an external document that is not attached or even identified frequently results in a dispute over the facial validity of the document which may require an evidentiary hearing on the validity and authenticity of the document. But if the opposing party fails to raise such an objection the document will be accepted as facially valid and then the factual assertions contained or implied by the document will generally be taken as true.
*
The debt lies at the root of the loan, the servicing, the collection, and the enforcement of the loan. Without the debt, there is no authority. Without the debt the action is not a foreclosure even though the lawyers label it as a foreclosure. The lawsuit or notice of sale is merely a device to generate revenue which is expressly void against public policy and law.
*
The problem is that the banks developed a scheme by which investors paid for the debt and never received ownership of the debt, note or mortgage. This means that third parties receive borrower payments, insurance payments, bailout payments and proceeds of foreclosure sales — something which is not allowed under current law, nor should it be allowed.
*
None of these third parties ever turn over such money to the investors who paid for value but did not pay value in exchange for ownership of the debt. As a result, any document implying the transfer of the debt through payment of value is substantively invalid because no such transaction ever occurred in the real world.
*
There is no reason for a “successor” to pay a “predecessor” if neither of them owned the debt. The only way you get to own a debt is by paying for it with real value which means money. When you ask for a description of such transactions you will be met with a variety of obscure objections whereas if they had it, they would gleefully reveal it. Neither the note nor the mortgage (or deed of trust) can be actually fully separated from the debt because the obligation to make payment on the debt is all that those documents are about.
*
I’m not saying the debt doesn’t exist. I’m saying based upon review and analysis of documents, there is nobody in the chain of title relied upon by your opposition who has ever participated in a transaction in which value was paid for the debt. Ownership of the debt can only be accomplished, based upon my research, by payment of value for the debt. See Article 9 §203 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by all U.S. jurisdictions including your own.
*
Payment of value for the debt is a condition precedent to enforcement of the debt. This is both common sense and statutory law. If “servicing”, administration, collection or enforcement of the debt is performed on behalf of a claimant that does not own the debt, then the condition precedent is not met. Such actions are illegal and any documents that are created to support such illegal actions are void.
*
If the “servicer” or holder of a limited power of attorney, as in many cases, is not the legally authorized representative of a party who possesses ownership of the debt (i.e., they paid for it) then their actions are illegal, unauthorized and probably fraudulent. In a foreclosure the court must know (not hope) that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale will go to a party or group of parties who paid value in exchange for ownership of the debt. If the court does not know that, it isn’t a foreclosure, which is a remedy exclusively designed to provide restitution of an unpaid debt. 
*
The issue confronting you is that the documents, at first blush, appear to be facially valid. But the reference to an unidentified unattached external document like a Power of Attorney in lieu of an actual servicing agreement reciting the authority of the parties, makes such documents facially invalid but still subject to proof. Upon proving authority as I have outlined above, the document could be deemed valid, if the proffering party proves the line of succession that starts with an owner of the debt. In virtually all “securitization” cases I don’t think any such line of succession exists.

Veira v PennyMac and JPM Chase 4th DCA Finds What Everyone has Known all along — that PennyMac never has standing and Chase, most of the time, doesn’t have standing

Another case showing shifting attitudes toward illegal foreclosures. At the trial level there have been many such decisions, some with an expanded finding of fact showing that the foreclosure was a sham. On appeal, the courts were always looking for ways to sustain the foreclosure; they still do that but more and more appellate courts are starting to understand that there is no party who has standing in most instances — especially a creditor who actually paid value for the debt.

Note how they instruct that judgment must be entered for the borrowers — not dismissal.

And the other thing is that PennyMac is generally a sham in foreclosures. It doesn’t own the debt, it doesn’t own the mortgage, it doesn’t own the note and it probably doesn’t even own the servicing rights.

The big issue continues to be missed. Pleading is different from proof. Asserting standing may meet the requirements of pleading. Proving standing is all about whether the party claiming to be the creditor is the owner of the debt who has paid value for the loan. The presumption arises if the claimant has possession of the original note (if it really is an original and not a fabrication).

The presumption can be rebutted by simply showing that the indorsement was a sham and the assignment of mortgage was sham because there was no transaction in real life in which either party received or paid any money or other value for the loan. Article (§203 UCC prohibits enforcement of the mortgage under those circumstances.

It is black letter law in all jurisdictions that an assignment of mortgage without an actual transfer (purchase and sale of the debt) is a nullity precisely because all jurisdictions have adopted Article 9 §203 UCC.

“However, although the statute makes clear that an assignee has the “same means and remedies the mortgagee may lawfully have,” we have previously held that “[t]he mortgage follows the assignment of the promissory note, but an assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt creates no right in the assignee.” Tilus v. AS Michai LLC, 161 So.3d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing Bristol v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 137 So.3d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) );”[e.s.]

see VIEIRA v. PENNYMAC CORP | FindLaw

GET FREE HELP: Just click here and submit  the confidential, free, no obligation, private REGISTRATION FORM. The key to victory lies in understanding your own case.
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 954-451-1230. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM 
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================

Interesting quotes for foreclosure defense lawyers. As usual with PennyMac, the search was on for the “lost” note, which we all know was destroyed contemporaneously with closing.

The allonge was undated and contained a signature by a JP Morgan representative, but no signature by a Chase Bank representative. The JP Morgan witness could not say when the allonge was executed or when it was imaged into any system.

we perceive the critical issue to be whether sufficient proof was presented at trial to show that Chase Bank transferred the note to JP Morgan, the original plaintiff, prior to suit being filed.

 

Through the JP Morgan witness, PennyMac also introduced into evidence the assignment of mortgage from JP Morgan to PennyMac.

Because it was substituted as plaintiff after suit was filed, PennyMac had to prove at trial that JP Morgan had standing when the initial complaint was filed, as well as its own standing when the final judgment was entered. Lamb v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 174 So.3d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Throughout the proceedings below, the note was lost. Thus, PennyMac had to prove standing and the right to enforce the note, using section 673.3091, Fla. Stat. (2017). Section 673.3091(1)(a), requires in part that “[t]he person seeking to enforce the instrument was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred, or has directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instrument from a person who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred.” (emphasis added).

Standing may be established by possession of the note specially indorsed to the plaintiff or indorsed in blank. Peoples v. Sami II Tr. 2006–AR6, 178 So.3d 67, 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); § 673.2031(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.”); § 673.2031(2), Fla. Stat. (“Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument ,including any right as a holder in due course ”).A plaintiff may also prove standing “through evidence of a valid assignment, proof of purchase of the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer.” Stone, 115 So.3d at 413 (quoting BAC Funding Consortium Inc. ISAOA/ATIMA v. Jean–Jacques, 28 So.3d 936, 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ). That is because “if an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, the transferee has a specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor ” § 673.2031(3), Fla. Stat.

there are problems with PennyMac’s “multi-tiered evidence” arguments. First, it is unclear in what way Chase Bank and JP Morgan are “related entities.” No evidence was presented that JP Morgan and Chase Bank merged or that Chase Bank was completely bought out by JP Morgan. As we have made clear in the past, separate corporate entities, even parent and subsidiary entities, are legally distinct entities. See Wright v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 169 So.3d 251, 251–52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (noting a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are separate and distinct legal entities and a parent corporation cannot exercise the rights of the subsidiary corporation); see also Houk v. PennyMac Corp., 210 So.3d 726, 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (noting a conflict of allegations between affidavits and the complaint where the affidavits alleged PennyMac Loan Services, LLC was the servicer and the complaint alleged PennyMac Corp. was the servicer). There was no explicit testimony or other evidence that Chase Bank sold or equitably transferred the note to JP Morgan.

The major stumbling block is that the allonge was signed by a representative of JP Morgan, and there is no signature on the document by Chase Bank. Section 673.2041, Florida Statutes (2017), clearly requires a signature by the current note holder to constitute an indorsement and transfer of the note to another payee or bearer. § 673.2041, Fla. Stat. (“The term ‘indorsement’ means a signature for the purpose of negotiating the instrument [or] restricting payment of the instrument.”). We have previously said, “[t]o transfer a note, there must be an indorsement, which itself must be ‘on [the] instrument’ or on ‘a paper affixed to the instrument.’ ” Jelic v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 178 So.3d 523, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)(second alteration in original) (emphasis added)(quoting § 673.2041(1), Fla. Stat.).

 

Another PennyMac Crash! CA Case for Homeowner

American jurisprudence is clearly still struggling with the fact that in most cases the forecloser either does not exist or does not have any interest in the loans they seek to enforce. In virtually all instances PennyMac is acting in the role of a sham conduit while allowing its name to be used as the front for a nonexistent lender.

Such foreclosers use semantics and legal procedure to create and cover-up the illusion of “ownership” of the debt (the loan) and the illusion of having the rights to enforce the note bestowed by a true creditor. This case opinion is correct in every respect and it conforms with basic black letter law in all 50 states; yet courts still strive to find ways to allow disinterested parties to foreclose.

Get a consult and Chain of Title Analysis! 202-838-6345
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
Hat tip to Bill Paatalo
see GULIEX v. PennyMAC HOLDINGS LLC, Cal: Court of Appeal, 5th Appellate Dist. 2017 https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9436462246811997539&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=2006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt
This case amply demonstrates the following:
  1. The need for a chain of title report
  2. The need for a chain of title analysis
  3. The need for legal research and good memorandums of law
  4. The need to understand “chains of title” or “chains of events” and the laws applicable thereto (e.g. judicial notice, legal presumptions etc.)
  5. The need to formulate a presentation to the judge that is very persuasive.
  6. The need to appeal when trial judges don’t apply the law or don’t apply the law correctly.

The following are significant quotes from the case.

Plaintiff, a homeowner and borrower, sued the defendant financial institution for wrongs allegedly committed in connection with a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of his residence. Plaintiff’s main theory was that the financial institution did not own his note and deed of trust and, therefore, lacked the authority to foreclose under the deed of trust. (e.s.)

The financial institution convinced the trial court that (1) it was, in fact, the beneficiary under the deed of trust, (2) a properly appointed substitute trustee conducted the foreclosure proceedings, and (3) the plaintiff lacked standing to claim the foreclosure was wrongful. The financial institution argued its chain of title to the deed of trust was established by facts stated in recorded assignments of deed of trust and a recorded substitution of trustee. The trial court took judicial notice of the recorded documents. Based on these documents, the court sustained a demurrer to some of the causes of action and granted summary judgment as to the remaining causes of action. On appeal, plaintiff contends he has standing to challenge the foreclosure and, furthermore, the judicially noticed documents do not establish the financial institution actually was the beneficiary under the deed of trust. We agree. (e.s.)

As to standing, the holding in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 (Yvanova) clearly establishes plaintiff has standing to challenge the nonjudicial foreclosure on the ground that the foreclosing party lacked the authority to initiate the foreclosure because it held no beneficial interest under the deed of trust. (e.s.)

As to establishing facts by judicial notice, it is well recognized that courts may take notice of the existence and wording of recorded documents, but not the disputed or disputable facts stated therein. (e.s.) (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 924, fn. 1; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 (Herrera).) Under this rule, we conclude the facts stated in the recorded assignments of deed of trust and the substitution of trustee were not subject to judicial notice. (e.s.) Therefore, the financial institution did not present evidence sufficient to establish its purported chain of title to the deed of trust. Consequently, the financial institution failed to show it was the owner of the deed of trust and had the authority to foreclose on plaintiff’s residence.

We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

….

The Links in PennyMac’s Purported Chain of Title

“Links” in a chain of title are created by a transfer of an interest in the underlying property from one person or entity to another. An examination of each link in the purported chain of title relied upon by PennyMac reveals that certain links were not established for purposes of the demurrer. Our analysis begins with a description of each link in the purported chain (and each related document, where known), beginning with the husband and wife who sold the residence to Borrower and ending with the trustee’s sale to PennyMac.

Link One-Sale: Clarence and Betty Dake sold the residence to Borrower pursuant to a grant deed dated April 19, 2005, and recorded on June 30, 2005. The parties do not dispute this transfer.

Link Two-Loan: Borrower granted a beneficial interest in the residence to Long Beach Mortgage Company pursuant to a deed of trust dated June 21, 2005, and recorded on June 30, 2005. The parties do not dispute this transfer.

Link Three-Purported Transfer: Long Beach Mortgage Company purportedly transferred its rights to Washington Mutual Bank by means of a document or transaction not identified in the appellate record. Also, the appellate record does not identify when the purported transaction occurred. Borrower disputes the existence of this and subsequent transfers of the deed of trust. (e.s.)

Link Four-Purported Transfer: Washington Mutual Bank purportedly transferred its rights to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association in an unidentified transaction at an unstated time. (e.s.)

Link Five-Assignment: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank, successor in interest to Long Beach Mortgage Company, purportedly transferred the note and all beneficial interest under the deed of trust to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association” pursuant to an assignment of deed of trust dated July 25, 2011, and recorded on July 26, 2011.

Link Six(A)-Assignment: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association transferred all beneficial interest in the deed of trust to PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust Holdings I, LLC pursuant to a “California Assignment of Deed of Trust” dated September 14, 2013, and recorded on November 15, 2013.

Link Seven-Trustee’s Sale: California Reconveyance Company, as trustee under the deed of trust, (1) sold the residence to PennyMac at a public auction conducted on November 20, 2013, and (2) issued a trustee’s deed of sale dated November 21, 2013 and recorded on November 22, 2013. PennyMac, the grantee under the deed upon sale, was described in the deed as the foreclosing beneficiary.

Link Six(B)-Purported Assignment: The day after the trustee’s sale, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association executed a “Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust” dated November 21, 2013, purporting to transfer the deed of trust without recourse to PennyMac Holdings, LLC. The assignment was recorded November 22, 2013. This assignment was signed (1) after JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association had signed and recorded the “California Assignment of Deed of Trust” described earlier as Link Six(A) and (2) after the trustee’s sale was conducted on November 20, 2013. Consequently, it is unclear whether any interests were transferred by this “corporate” assignment.

3. Links Three and Four Are Missing from the Chain

Postscript from Editor: This Court correctly revealed the fraudulent strategy of the banks, to wit: they created the illusion of multiple transfers giving the appearance of a solid chain of title BUT 2 of the transfers were fake, leaving the remainder of the chain void.

Wilmington-Christiana Fail in Back-door Attempt to Have “Trust” Identified as the Owner of Debt, Note and Mortgage

If they had been successful the entire question of whether the Trustee could be named as the foreclosing party would have been off the table — if other courts followed suit. And the entire question of “debt purchasing” could never have been raised despite obvious flaws and defects in fabricated paperwork.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
Hat tip to Bill Paatalo and others
see below for case opinion Blackstone v Sharma v Marvastian, Maryland Special Appeals Court
 *
In their never ending quest to validate illegal acts, misrepresentation and fraud, the banks are throwing as much legal theory against the wall in hopes that some of it will stick. This one starts with the fact that “debt purchasers” are still “debt collectors” regardless of how they self-describe themselves.
 *
There has been a trend in which “debt purchasers” step in front of the pile off fabricated documents and then make the claim for foreclosure or enforcement of the debt. By calling themselves “debt purchasers” they once again are using self-serving descriptions that are designed to confuse homeowners, lawyers and the courts. The truth is that no debt, note or mortgage was purchased by anyone. If there had been a purchase the  foreclosing party would merely refer to EVIDENCE that they paid money for a “loan” that was “owned” by the preceding party. Instead they rely upon legal presumptions carried in fabricated documents.
 *
Despite there having been no movement of the debt by virtue of an actual purchase and sale they continue to call themselves “debt purchasers.” They are not and the implication that the debt was purchase thus morphs into we MUST have purchased it because we now “hold” the note and mortgage.
 *
This case highlights the issues with “substitution of trustees,” and fabricated transfer documents. It also provides guidance on the “substitution of plaintiffs” in non-judicial states. There is no difference.
 *
The Trustee on a deed of trust cannot be fired and replaced by anyone other than the ACTUAL beneficiary.
 *
The Plaintiff in a judicial foreclosure case cannot change unless the attorneys are wiling to amend their pleading to show how the fabricated documents were transferred from the old Plaintiff (which never owned the debt, note or mortgage) to the newly designated Plaintiff.
 *
Both reveal that the actual party in interest in the foreclosure is the subservicer and Master Servicer for a trust that doesn’t really exist and which does not own any assets, have any liabilities nor conduct any business.
 *
====================

KYLE BLACKSTONE, ET AL.,
v.
DINESH SHARMA, ET AL.
TERRANCE SHANAHAN, SUBSTITUTE. TRUSTEE, ET AL.,
v.
SEYED MARVASTIAN, ET AL.

Nos. 1524, 1525 Consolidated Case, September Term, 2015.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Filed: June 6, 2017.

Wright, Shaw Geter, Salmon, James P., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by SALMON, J.

This consolidated appeal originates from two foreclosure cases filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In both cases, substitute trustees (collectively, “appellants”) acting on behalf of Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R (“Ventures Trust”), a statutory trust formed under the laws of the State of Delaware, filed orders to docket foreclosure suits against homeowners in the State of Maryland. The circuit court judges who considered the cases dismissed the actions, determining that pursuant to the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (“MCALA”), codified at Maryland Code (1992, 2015 Repl. Vol.), Business Regulation Article (“B.R.”) § 7-101, et seq., Ventures Trust was required to be licensed as a collection agency and, because Ventures Trust had not obtained such a license, any judgment entered as a result of the foreclosure actions would be void. The dismissal of these foreclosure actions, without prejudice, presents us with two questions:

1. Under the MCALA, does a party who authorizes a trustee to initiate a foreclosure action need to be licensed as a collection agency before filing suit?

2. If the answer to question one is in the affirmative, does the licensing requirement apply to foreign statutory trusts such as Ventures Trust?

We shall answer “yes” to both questions and affirm the judgments entered by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

BACKGROUND

Appeal No. 1524

On August 4, 2006, Dinesh Sharma, Santosh Sharma, and Ruchi Sharma[1](collectively “the Sharmas”) executed a deed of trust that encumbered real property in Potomac, Maryland, in order to secure a $1,920,000 loan. Washington Mutual Bank, FA was the lender. The Sharmas, in December 2007, defaulted on the loan by failing to make payments when due.

Ventures Trust, by its trustee MCM Capital Partners, LLC (“MCM Capital”), acquired ownership and “all beneficial interest” of the loan on October 9, 2013. The substitute trustees[2] appointed by Ventures Trust filed an order to docket, initiating the foreclosure action, on November 25, 2014. The Sharmas owed $3,008,536.23 on the loan as of November 25, 2014.

The Sharmas responded to the foreclosure action by filing a counterclaim which was later severed by order of the circuit court. They also filed a motion to dismiss or enjoin the foreclosure sale pursuant to Md. Rule 14-211.[3] The substitute trustees moved to strike the Sharmas’ motion, which the court granted on May 7, 2015. The Sharmas filed a motion to alter or amend the May 7th order. On June 22, 2015 the court vacated its May 7th order, denied the substitute trustees’ motion to strike the Sharmas’ motion to dismiss, and set a hearing date for arguments concerning the motion to dismiss.

Following a hearing, the court, on August 28, 2015, issued an opinion and order granting the motion to dismiss the foreclosure action without prejudice. In its written opinion the circuit court determined that, pursuant to the MCALA, Ventures Trust was a collection agency and was therefore required to be licensed before attempting to collect on the deed of trust. The circuit court ruled that because Ventures Trust was not licensed as a collection agency, it had no right to file a foreclosure action. In its written opinion, the court also rejected Ventures Trust’s contention that it was a “trust company” and was therefore exempt from MCALA’s licensure requirements. The substitute trustees noted a timely appeal.

Appeal No. 1525

On June 23, 2006, Seyed and Sima Marvastian executed a deed of trust on property in Bethesda, Maryland in order to secure a $1,396,500 loan. Premier Mortgage Funding, Inc. was the lender. The Marvastians defaulted on the loan by failing to make payments when due in December 2012.

Ventures Trust by its trustee MCM Capital acquired the Marvastians’ loan in February 2014. On October 20, 2014, the substitute trustees filed an order to docket, initiating the foreclosure process. At the time of filing, the substitute trustees alleged that the Marvastians owed $1,632,303.26 on the loan.

The Marvastians responded by filing a counterclaim, which was severed by order of the circuit court. They also filed a motion to dismiss or stay the foreclosure sale pursuant to Md. Rule 14-211. Following extensive briefing and a hearing, the court granted the Marvastians’ motion to dismiss, albeit without prejudice. The judge’s reasons for dismissing the case were exactly the same as those given for dismissing the foreclosure case that is the subject of Appeal No. 1524.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[B]efore a foreclosure sale takes place, the defaulting borrower may file a motion to stay the sale of the property and dismiss the foreclosure action. In other words, the borrower, may petition the court for injunctive relief, challenging the validity of the lien or . . . the right of the [lender] to foreclose in the pending action. The grant or denial of injunctive relief in a property foreclosure action lies generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, we review the circuit court’s denial of a foreclosure injunction for an abuse of discretion. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.

Hobby v. Burson, 222 Md. App. 1, 8 (2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Svrcek v. Rosenberg, 203 Md. App. 705, 720 (2012). In the two cases that are the subject of this appeal, the trial judges based their rulings on their legal conclusions. Thus we review those conclusions de novo.

II.

In Finch v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 212 Md. App. 748, 758-64 (2013) we stated that without a license, a collection agency has no authority to file suit against the debtor. Accordingly, a “judgment entered in favor of an unlicensed debt collector constitutes a void judgment[.]” Id. at 764. See also Old Republic Insurance v. Gordon, 228 Md. App. 1, 12-13 (2016) (footnote omitted).

Maryland Code B.R. § 7-101(c) defines a collection agency as follows:

“Collection agency” means a person who engages directly or indirectly in the business of:

(1)(i) collecting for, or soliciting from another, a consumer claim; or

(ii) collecting a consumer claim the person owns, if the claim was in default when the person acquired it;

(2) collecting a consumer claim the person owns, using a name or other artifice that indicates that another party is attempting to collect the consumer claim;

(3) giving, selling, attempting to give or sell to another, or using, for collection of a consumer claim, a series or system of forms or letters that indicates directly or indirectly that a person other than the owner is asserting the consumer claim; or

(4) employing the services of an individual or business to solicit or sell a collection system to be used for collection of a consumer claim.

(Emphasis added.)

As used in the Business Regulations Article, “person” means “an individual . . . trustee . . . fiduciary, representative of any kind, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other entity.” B.R. § 1-101(g). B.R. 7-101(e) defines a “consumer claim” as meaning a “claim that: 1) is for money owed or said to be owed by a resident of the State; and 2) arises from a transaction in which, for a family, household, or personal purpose, the resident sought or got credit, money, personal property, real property, or services.”

Before the law was amended in 2007, MCALA applied only to businesses that collected debts owed to another person. Old Republic, 228 Md. App. at 16. In 2007, the statute was broadened to include persons who engage in the business of “collecting a consumer claim the person owns, if the claim was in default when the person acquired it[.]” B.R. § 7-101(c)(1)(ii).

The legislative history of the 2007 amendment, insofar as here pertinent, was set forth in Old Republic as follows:

[T]he legislative history makes clear that the General Assembly enacted the 2007 amendments to regulate “debt purchasers,” who were exploiting a loophole in the law to bypass the MCALA’s licensing requirements.

The Senate Finance Committee Report on House Bill 1324 explained:

House Bill 1324 extends the purview of the State Collection Agency Licensing Board to include persons who collect consumer claims acquired when the claims were in default. These persons are known as “debt purchasers” since they purchase delinquent consumer debt resulting from credit card transactions and other bills; these persons then own the debt and seek to collect from consumers like other collection agencies who act on behalf of original creditors.

Charles T. Turnbaugh, Commissioner of Financial Regulation and Chairman of the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Board offered the following testimony:

[T]he evolution of the debt collection industry has created a “loophole” used by some entities as a means to circumvent current State collection agency laws. Entities, such as “debt purchasers” who enter into purchase agreements to collect delinquent consumer debt rather than acting as an agent for the original creditor, currently collect consumer debt in the State without complying with any licensing or bonding requirement. The federal government has recognized and defined debt purchasers as collection agencies, and requires that these entities fully comply with the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

This legislation would include debt purchases within the definition of “collection agency,” and require them to be licensed by the Board before they may collect consumer claims in this State. Other businesses that are collecting their own debt continue to be excluded from this law.

Susan Hayes, a member of the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Board, submitted the following in support of the bill:

The traditional method of dealing with distressed accounts has been for creditors to assign these accounts to a collection agency. These agencies, operating under a contingency fee arrangement with the creditor, keep a portion of the amount recovered and return the balance to the creditor. Today, a different option is available — selling accounts receivables to a third party debt collector at a discount.

* * *

HB 1324 closes a loophole in licensing of debt collectors under Maryland law. Just because a professional collector of defaulted debt “purchases” the debt, frequently on a contingent fee basis, should not exclude them from the licensing requirements of Maryland law concerning debt collectors.

Id. at 19-20.

Ventures Trust is in the business of buying from banks, at a discount, mortgages and deeds of trust that are in default. In the cases here at issue, there is no dispute that: 1) when Ventures Trust purchased the loans in question, the loans were in default; and 2) Ventures Trust, by filing (through its agents — the trustees) the foreclosure actions it was attempting to collect “consumer debt.”

As we said in Old Republic, the legislative history of the 2007 amendments to the MCALA make it “clear that the General Assembly had a specific purpose in mind in adopting the 2007 amendments, i.e., including [under the Act] debt purchasers, people who purchased defaulted accounts receivable at a discount, within the purview of MCALA.” Id. at 21. Money owed on a note secured by a deed of trust or a mortgage certainly qualifies as an account receivable. And Ventures Trust is in the business of buying up defaulted mortgages or deeds of trust and instituting foreclosure actions to obtain payment.

Appellants contend that the MCALA does not require a party to be licensed as a collection agency in order to file a foreclosure action. They support that contention with the following argument:

Foreclosures are not mentioned [in B.R. § 7-101(c)], although the Legislature clearly knew how to do so if it had wished. There is no specific statement in the MCALA to the effect that “doing business” as a “collection agency” includes actions taken to enforce a security interest, such as foreclosing on a deed of trust, nor is there any specific statement that such actions would fall into the definition of “collecting” a consumer claim. Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has ever ruled that pursuing a foreclosure proceeding amounts to “doing business” in Maryland as a “collection agency” under the Act, and for good reason. As the Legislature has made clear in numerous statutes, a foreign entity — including a statutory trust such as Ventures Trust — pursuing foreclosure is not “doing business” in Maryland[.]

Appellants emphasize that Md. Code (2014 Repl. Vol.), Corporations and Associations Article § 12-902(a) requires any foreign statutory trust doing business in Maryland to register with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (“SDAT”). Section 12-908(a)(5) provides, however, that “[f]oreclosing mortgages and deeds of trust on property in this State” is not considered “doing business.”

According to appellants, because of “the Legislature’s” express decision to make clear that a foreclosure proceeding brought by a foreign statutory trust is by definition, not doing business in Maryland, a foreign trust does not need to be licensed as a collection agency to file a Maryland foreclosure action. That argument would be strong were it not for the fact (relied upon by both circuit court judges who ruled against appellants below) that section 12-908(a) of the Corporations and Associations Article expressly states that the “doing business” exception granted to foreign trusts is “for the purposes of this subtitle[.]” In other words, the foreign trust exception does not apply to the MCALA.

It is true, as appellants point out, that no Maryland appellate court has ever held that a foreign trust needs a license under the MCALA to file a foreclosure action. But the matter has simply not been addressed by any Maryland appellate court.

Judge Ellen Hollander, in Ademiluyi v. PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust Holdings I, LLC, et al., 929 F.Supp.2d 502, 520-24 (D. Md. 2013) did hold that a MCALA license was needed to bring a foreclosure action based on the allegations set forth in the complaint filed in that case. In Ademiluyi, the holder of the mortgage (PennyMac), filed a foreclosure action on a mortgage even though (it was alleged) that PennyMac purchased the mortgage after it was in default and did not have a debt collection license. Id. at 520. The issue in that case was whether, based on the allegations in the complaint, PennyMac needed a license prior to bringing a foreclosure action. Id.

After a lengthy discussion, Judge Hollander said:

I am persuaded that, even if actions pertinent to mortgage foreclosure are taken in connection with enforcement of a security interest in real property, such actions may constitute debt collection activity under the MCALA. Therefore, based on the facts alleged by plaintiff, PennyMac Holdings may qualify as a collection agency under the MCALA with respect to mortgage debt it seeks to collect, including through judicial foreclosure proceedings or other conduct pertinent to foreclosure.

Id. at 523.

Support for Judge Hollander’s conclusion can be found in a twenty-one page order, dated December 8, 2013, signed by Gordon M. Cooley, Chairperson of the Maryland State Collection Agency Licensing Board.[4] Mr. Cooley ordered several entities, including NPR Capital, LLC, to stop attempting to collect consumer debts by filing foreclosure actions. At page 17 of his order, the Acting Commissioner determined, inter alia, that NPR Capital violated the provisions of the MCALA (specifically B.R. § 7-401(a)) by attempting to collect a debt by filing a foreclosure action at a time when it was not licensed as a collection agency.

When interpreting the MCALA, the ruling by Commissioner Cooley is of consequence because, as the Court of Appeals recently said, it is well established that appellate courts “should ordinarily give `considerable weight’ to `an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute'” it is charged with administering. Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City v. Kougl, 451 Md. 507, 514 (2017), (quoting Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572 (2005)). As can be seen, the Board that administers the MCALA statute is of the view that the MCALA covers persons who attempt to collect consumer debt by filing a foreclosure action.

In support of their position, appellants point out, accurately, that nowhere in the legislative history of the 2007 amendment to the MCALA, is there any mention of foreclosure actions. From this, appellants ask us to infer that the General Assembly did not intend that persons who purchase defaulted mortgages or deeds of trust and then file foreclosure actions needed to purchase a debt collection license. In our view, the absence of a specific reference in the legislative history is not dispositive because, insofar as the issue here presented is concerned, the MCALA is unambiguous.

With exceptions not here relevant except the one discussed in Part III, infra, “a person must have a license whenever the person does business as a collection agency in the State.” B.R. § 7-301(a). The definition of a “collection agency” has five elements. Old Republic, 228 Md. App. at 23 (Nazarian, J. dissenting). Those elements are:

“[a] a person who [b] engages directly or indirectly in the business of . . . collecting a [c] consumer claim the [d] person owns, [e] if the claim was in default when the person acquired it.” BR § 7-101(c)(ii).

Id.

Ventures Trust admits that it meets elements (a), (c), (d) and (e). It argues, however, that element (b) is not met because it does not “engage in the business of collecting” debt by filing foreclosure actions. Boiled down to its essence, appellants’ “not in the business” argument is based on the contention that the General Assembly intended to exempt from the MCALA persons who attempt to collect consumer debt by bringing foreclosure actions. We can find no such intent in the words of the statute or in anything in the Act’s legislative history. We therefore reject that contention and hold that unless some exception to the MCALA is applicable, the licensing requirements of the MCALA applies to persons who attempt to collect a consumer debt by bringing a foreclosure action.

III.

The MCALA states: “This title does not apply to . . . a trust company[.]” B.R. § 7-102(b)(8). The statute does not define “trust company.” See B.R. § 7-101. Appellants claim that even if the MCALA licensing requirement applies to a person who brings a foreclosure action in order to enforce a consumer debt, the MCALA does not apply to Ventures Trust because it is a “trust company.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) defines “trust company” as “[a] company that acts as a trustee for people and entities and that sometimes also operates as a commercial bank.” The appellants claim that Ventures Trust meets that definition because, purportedly, Ventures Trust “certainly holds and maintains trust property.”

We pause at this point to discuss what the record reveals about Ventures Trust. In appellants’ filing with the Montgomery County Circuit Court, appellants’ counsel stated that Ventures Trust is the holder of the notes at issue, and that it is a statutory trust formed in Delaware under 12 DEL. CODE § 3801(g). Ventures Trust has two trustees. They are MCM Capital and Wilmington Federal Savings Fund Society, FSB doing business as Christiana Trust. In Appeal No. 1525, counsel for the substitute trustees orally told the motions judge that Ventures Trust was “like an account at Christiana Bank” and that Christiana Trust was the trustee of Ventures Trust. That representation was also made by counsel for the substitute trustee in that case in a supplemental memorandum where it was said: “Ventures Trust. 2013-I-H-R…, is the holding of a Federal Savings Bank[,] which serves as its co-trustee….”

Using the Black’s Law Dictionary (10th edition) definition of “trust company” set forth above, Ventures Trust does not fit within that definition. It does not act as a bank. Moreover, other entities act as trustees for it. There is nothing in the record that shows that Ventures Trust acts as a trustee for anyone.

Appellants also suggest that we use the slightly different definition of “trust company” set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) because that edition of Black’s was published “around the time of the 1977 amendment” that exempted trust companies from the MCALA. Black’s 1979 definition of “trust company” was as follows: “a corporation formed for the purpose of taking, accepting, and executing all such trusts as may be lawfully committed to it, and acting as testamentary trustee, executor, guardian, etc.” There is no indication in the record that Ventures Trust is a corporation or, as already mentioned, that it acts as a trustee for anyone. Therefore, Ventures Trust does not meet that definition either.

The words “trust company” is defined in Md. Code (2011 Repl. Vol.), Financial Institutions Article (“Fin. Institutions”) § 3-101(g) as meaning “an institution that is incorporated under the laws of this State as a trust company.” But that definition only applies to matters set forth in the Fin. Institutions Article section 3-101(a). In Fin. Institutions §3-501(d), governing common trust funds, the term “trust companies” is defined as including a national banking association that has powers similar to those given to a trust company under the laws of “this State.” That definition, however, only applies to subtitle 5 of the Financial Institutions Article. Md. Code (2011 Repl. Vol.), Estates and Trusts Article§ 1-101(v) also contains a definition of “Trust Company” but it applies only to laws governing the “estates of decedents.” See Estates & Trusts Article § 1-101(a). Lastly, the term “statutory trust” is defined in Md. Code (2011 Repl. Vol.), Corporations and Associations Article § 12-101(h) as meaning: an unincorporated business, trust, or association:

(i) Formed by filing an initial certificate of trust under § 12-204 of this title; and

(ii) Governed by a governing instrument.

(2) “Statutory trust” includes a trust formed under this title on or before May 31, 2010, as a business trust, as the term business trust was then defined in this title.

Ventures Trust admits that it does not fit within any of the above definitions of “trust company” or “statutory trust.” Moreover, even if it did meet one or more of those definitions, there is no indication that the legislature, in 1977, when it exempted “trust companies” from the MCALA, intended those definitions to be used. As appellants concede, we are thus left with the general definition of “trust company” as set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary. See Ishola v. State, 404 Md. 155, 161 (2008)(Dictionary definitions help clarify the plain meaning of a statute.).

The circuit court judge who dismissed the foreclosure action that is the subject of Appeal 1524 reached the following legal conclusion with which we are in complete accord:

MCALA expressly limits the scope of its license requirement exemptions to those “… provided in this title….” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 7-301(a) (emphasis added). MCALA does not explicitly exempt “foreign statutory trusts” that bring foreclosure actions from its licensing requirements. See Bus. Reg. § 7-102(b). In fact, the term “foreign statutory trust” never appears in MCALA. See Bus. Reg. § 7-101, et seq. Thus, the General Assembly expressed a clear intent to subject foreign statutory trusts that bring foreclosure actions in Maryland, like Ventures Trust, to MCALA’s licensing requirements.

CONCLUSION

A debt purchaser that attempts to collect a consumer debt by bringing a foreclosure action is required to have a license unless some statutory exemption applies. Contrary to appellants’ contention, Ventures Trust is not a “trust company” within the meaning of the MCALA and must therefore obtain a debt collection license in accordance with the provisions of the MCALA before bringing a foreclosure action. Because Ventures Trust had no such license, it was barred from filing, through its agents, the two foreclosure actions here at issue.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.

2d Florida DCA Knocks Down CitiMortgage – PennyMac Dance

“In order to establish its entitlement to enforce the lost note, PennyMac could establish standing “through evidence of a valid assignment, proof of purchase of the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer.” BAC Funding Consortium, 28 So. 3d at 939. PennyMac’s filings in support of its motion for summary judgment did not present evidence of any of these things. In the absence of such evidence, the order of substitution standing alone was ineffective to establish PennyMac’s entitlement to enforce the lost note. See Geweye v. Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R, 189 So. 3d 231, 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016); Creadon v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 166 So. 3d 952, 953-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Sandefur v. RVS Capital, LLC, 183 So. 3d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Lamb, 174 So. 3d at 1040-41.”

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

See http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2017/02/16/houk-v-pennymac-corp-fl-2dca-pennymac-failed-to-meet-its-burden-of-showing-the-nonexistence-of-a-genuine-issue-of-material-fact-regarding-its-entitlement-to-enforce-the-lost-note/

The Second  District Court of Appeal in Florida has issued an opinion that diligently follows the law and the facts. This decision should serve as the blue print of foreclosure defense in all cases involving the dance between CitiMortgage and PennyMac. It is a shell game and the Court obviously is growing weary of the claims of “immunity” issued by the banks in foreclosure cases.

It all starts with self serving proclamations of owning the note, the mortgage or both. It NEVER starts with an allegation or assertion of ownership of the debt because they don’t own the debt. When the note was made payable to someone other than the owner of the debt, there could be no merger wherein the debt became merged into the note. And the reason for all this is that the mega banks were engaged in the a program of institutionalizing theft from investors.

The aim of the game is to get a court to enter an order which then raises the presumption that everything that preceded the entry of the order was legal — a presumption that is hard to rebut. So the strategic path for borrowers is to show that the program or scheme is not legal before the foreclosure is entered or to attack for damages based upon fraud after the foreclosure judgment or sale is entered.

In this decision lies the foundation for most cases involving foreclosure defense. The reader is encouraged to use the above link to read and then reread the decision. My comment on the highlights follows:

“In order to establish its entitlement to enforce the lost note, PennyMac could establish standing “through evidence of a valid assignment, proof of purchase of the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer.” BAC Funding Consortium, 28 So. 3d at 939.

COMMENT: Merely alleging that it was the holder of a note when it was lost is insufficient to assume standing to enter a judgment on behalf of the foreclosing party (in this case PennyMac). In the absence of physical possession of the note standing can be established by (1) EVIDENCE of (2) a VALID assignment or (3) PROOF of PURCHASE OF THE DEBT or (4) evidence of “effective” transfer.

The steamrolling presumptions that buried millions of homeowners are now hitting the wall. The main point here is that an allegation is not enough and most importantly standing to file suit does NOT mean that the party has standing for the entry of judgment in favor of the foreclosing party.

The error that both courts and lawyers for litigants have consistently made for the last 10 years is their assumption that a sufficient allegation that a party has legal standing at the time suit is filed (or notice of sale, notice of default, notice of acceleration) means that the party has proven standing with evidence. It does not. Like any other allegation it is subject to being discredited or rebutted. AND it requires proof, which places the burden of persuasion upon the party making that allegation. It is neither the law of the case nor subject to any twisted notion of res judicata to assume that matter is proven when merely alleged.

The 2d DCA shows it has a firm grasp of this basic fact. The fact that standing was challenged in an unsuccessful motion to dismiss does NOT mean the matter is resolved or has been litigated.

Fundamentally the issue in all these cases is about money. The question of foreclosure should always have been a secondary issue of much less importance. American jurisprudence is filled with recitations of how foreclosure was a severe remedy that requires greater scrutiny by the court. Up until about 15 years ago, Judges would sift through the paperwork and deny foreclosure even if it was uncontested if the paperwork raises some unanswered questions. That tradition follows centuries of tradition and doctrine.

Thus the 2d DCA has placed purchasing of the debt and ownership of the debt in the center of the table. In the absence of a party who owns the actual debt, it is possible for a party to seek enforcement of the note, the mortgage or both — but that can only be true if the foreclosing party has indeed acquired the right to enforce the instrument from an instrument signed by the owner of the debt; simply alleging that one is owner of the note has no effect at trial or summary judgment as to evidence of ownership of the debt. And without evidence of the true owner of the debt being the payee on the note, the grant of authority through Powers of Attorney, Servicing agreements or anything else is evidence of nothing.

The use of the word “effective” (i.e., effective transfer) in this decision also opens the door to the rescission debate that was actually settled by the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jesinoski v Countrywide. What does it mean that something is effective? Reviewing court decisions and legislative histories it is clear that “effective” means that the event or thing has already happened at the moment of its rendering. Thus the court here is talking about an effective assignment (not just a piece of paper entitled “assignment”), meaning that all the elements of a proper assignment had been met, and NOT just the writing or execution of the instrument. It is not effective if the elements are missing. And the elements are missing if the proponent of the assignment does not prove the elements — not just allege them.

There is a difference between pleading and proof.

In the absence of such evidence, the order of substitution standing alone was ineffective to establish PennyMac’s entitlement to enforce the lost note. See Geweye v. Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R, 189 So. 3d 231, 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016); Creadon v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 166 So. 3d 952, 953-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Sandefur v. RVS Capital, LLC, 183 So. 3d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Lamb, 174 So. 3d at 1040-41.”

COMMENT: This addresses the musical chairs tactics that have perplexed the Courts, borrowers and attorneys for nearly 2 decades. The court here is presenting for consideration the notion that substitution of parties does not confer anything on the apparent successor or new foreclosing party. What it DOES accomplish is removing the original party from having any legal standing for judgment to be entered in its favor. The claim of “succession”must be proven by the party making the claim — not by the party defending. What it does NOT accomplish is bootstrapping the allegations of standing from the original plaintiff or foreclosing party to a new party also having standing to pursue the judgment.

In all events therefore, the party alleging and/or asserting standing must prove it before the homeowner is required to rebut or even cross examine it.

 

 

Pennymac Forgeries Produce Some New Law

Pennymac tried to outwit the court system, succeeding at the trial level and then failing on appeal. The simple fact is that it is a rare instance where a party can lose a lawsuit based upon a forged instrument. The court will (and should) always find a way to deny such relief.

see sanabria-v-pennymac-mortgage-investment-trust-holdings-i-llc

Simple case. Closing attorney still had copy of the note — 5 pages. Pennymac sued on a 6 page note. Defendants denied that the note was real and denied they signed the document upon which Pennymac was relying. Pennymac said that Florida statutes required Defendants to file a cause of action to get rid of a forged document. The trial court agreed. The appellate court said no, the authenticity of the document and the signature is put in play once it is apparent to all that this the gravamen of the defense.

Florida Statutes 673.308.1 reads in relevant part: [Note §673 is UCC Article 3]

In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings. If the validity of a signature is denied in the pleadings, the burden of establishing validity is on the person claiming validity, but the signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized unless the action is to enforce the liability of the purported signer and the signer is dead or incompetent at the time of trial of the issue of validity of the signature.

Pennymac Trust likens the statute’s passing reference to “specifically” denying a signature’s authenticity to the specificity required to plead a cause of action for fraud under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(b): “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with such particularity as the circumstances may permit.”

So as long as you don’t contest the signature specifically there is an iron clad presumption that you signed it. If the facts fit, then deny or set forth an answer or affirmative defense that specifically denies you signed it. But the word of caution here is that denying it doesn’t do you any good if you don’t have some pretty hard evidence, like this case, that shows that the document and/or the signature is not authentic. In this case the proof was straightforward.

BUT notice that the obvious nature of the forgery, fraud upon the court still somehow managed to escape the Plaintiff Pennymac and the attorneys for Pennymac. I wonder when someone important will look at that and say that is not the way to practice law.

 

 

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