Wells Fargo, Option One, American Home Mortgage Relationship

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. appears in many ways including as servicer (America Servicing Company), Trustee (although it does not appear to be qualified as a “Trust Company”), as claimed beneficiary, as Payee on the note, as beneficiary under the title policy, as beneficiary under the property and liability insurance, and it may have in actuality acted as a mortgage broker without getting licensed as such.

In most securitized loan situations, Wells Fargo appears with the word “BANK” used, but it acted neither as a commercial nor investment bank in the deal. Sometimes it acted as a commercial bank meaning it processed a deposit and withdrawal, sometimes (rarely, perhaps 3-4% of the time) it did act as a lender, and sometimes it acted as a securities underwriter or co-underwriter of asset backed securities.

It might also be designated as “Depositor” which in most cases means that it performed no function, received no money, disbursed no money and neither received, stored, handled or transmitted any documentation despite third party documentation to the contrary.

In short, despite the sue of the word “BANK”, it was not acting as a bank in any sense of the word within the securitization chain. However, it is the use of the word “BANK” which connotes credibility to their role in the transaction despite the fact that they are not, and never were a creditor. The obligation arose when the funds were advanced for the benefit of the homeowner. But the pool from which those funds were advanced came from investors who purchased certificates of asset backed securities. Those investors are the creditors because they received a certificate containing three promises: (1) repayment of principal non-recourse based upon the payments by obligors under the terms of notes and mortgages in the pool (2) payment of interest under the same conditions and (3) the conveyance of a percentage ownership in the pool, which means that collectively 100% of the ivnestors own 100% of the the entire pool of loans. This means that the “Trust” does NOT own the pool nor the loans in the pool. It means that the “Trust” is merely an operating agreement through which the ivnestors may act collectively under certain conditions.  The evidence of the transaction is the note and the mortgage or deed of trust is incident to the transaction. But if you are following the money you look to the obligation. In most  transactions in which a residential loan was securitized, Wells Fargo did not work under the scope of its bank charter. However it goes to great lengths to pretend that it is acting under the scope of its bank charter when it pursues foreclosure.

Wells Fargo will often allege that it is the holder of the note. It frequently finesses the holder in due course confrontation by this allegation because of the presumption arising out of its allegation that it is the holder. In fact, the obligation of the homeowner is not ever due to Wells Fargo in a securitized residential note and mortgage or deed of trust. The allegation of “holder” is disingenuous at the least. Wells Fargo is not and never was the creditor although ti will claim, upon challenge, to be acting within the scope and course of its agency authority; however it will fight to the death to avoid producing the agency agreement by which it claims authority. remember to read the indenture or prospectus or pooling and service agreement all the way to the end because these documents are created to give an appearance of propriety but they do not actually support the authority claimed by Wells Fargo.

Wells Fargo often claims to be Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-6, c/o American Home Mortgage, 4600 Regent Blvd., Suite 200, P.O. Box 631730, Irving, Texas 75063-1730. Both Option One and American Home Mortgage were usually fronts (sham) entities that were used to originate loans using predatory, fraudulent and otherwise illegal loan practices in violation of TILA, RICO and deceptive lending practices. ALL THREE ENTITIES — WELLS FARGO, OPTION ONE AND AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A SINGLE JOINT ENTERPRISE ABUSING THEIR BUSINESS LICENSES AND CHARTERS IN MOST CASES.

WELLS FARGO-OPTION ONE-AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE IS OFTEN REPRESENTED BY LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, more specifically Susana E. Lykins. They list their address as P.O. Box 5480, Cincinnati, Oh 45201-5480, Telephone 513-241-3100, Fax 513-241-4094. Their actual street address is 120 East Fourth Street, Suite 800 Cincinnati, OH 45202. Documents purporting to be assignments within the securitization chain may in fact be executed by clerical staff or attorneys from that firm using that address. If you are curious, then pick out the name of the party who executed your suspicious document and ask to speak with them after you call the above number.

Ms. Lykins also shows possibly as attorney for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. as well as Robert B. Blackwell, at 620-624 N. Main street, Lima, Ohio 45801, 419-228-2091, Fax 419-229-3786. He also claims an office at 2855 Elm Street, Lima, Ohio 45805

Kathy Smith swears she is “assistant secretary” for American Home Mortgage as servicing agent for Wells Fargo Bank. Yet Wells shows its own address as c/o American Home Mortgage. No regulatory filing for Wells Fargo acknowledges that address. Ms. Smith swears that Wells Fargo, Trustee is the holder of the note even though she professes not to work for them. Kathy Smith’s signature is notarized by Linda Bayless, Notary Public, State of Florida commission# DD615990, expiring November 19, 2010. This would indicate that despite the subject property being in Ohio, Kathy Smith, who presumably works in Texas, had her signature notarized in Florida or that the Florida Notary exceeded her license if she was in Texas or Ohio or wherever Kathy Smith was when she allegedly executed the instrument.

NPR Report: How We Found Our Toxic Asset

NPR Report: How We Found Our Toxic Asset

There’s no store where you can buy toxic assets; you have to know a guy. We know Wit Solberg, a former Wall Street trader.

Solberg left Wall Street to set up his own shop, Mission Peak Capital, in Kansas City, Mo. He and a dozen guys sit at desks with their tools: monitors, potato chips, Snapple, chewing tobacco. Pretty much all day long, Solberg looks at those monitors and evaluates toxic assets.

“The big black Angus cow that everybody wants? We’re not buying that cow because it’s too expensive,” he says. “We want the cow that’s got a wounded leg, but she might produce a few more calves for us — and [she’s] cheap.”

Tracking Our Toxic Asset

Solberg starts searching for a bond we might want to buy. And that searching looks a lot like checking your e-mail. Brokers keep sending him announcements about which toxic assets are for sale today. One says: “Cheaper!” Another says: “Super senior steal!”

Around lunchtime, Solberg finds a bond he likes for us. It’s called an Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, or OOMLT (pronounced om-let). Solberg thinks we should offer to buy the bond for “half a cent” on the dollar. That means that, for every $1,000 of the bond’s original value, we’ll offer $5.

But it turns out the guy who’s selling the bond wants 17 or 18 cents on the dollar — more than 30 times what we bid. Solberg says these kind of huge spreads are pretty common in the toxic asset business. People just radically disagree about what things are worth.

Do You Own Part Of Our Toxic Asset?

We’d like to meet some of our partners in the pages of this gigantic financial transaction. If you bought a home in 2005 in Sarasota, Fla., ZIP code 34232, let us know in the comments below or e-mail us. Or if you’ve owned our toxic asset (CUSIP: 41161PUA9), let us know that, too.

We spend two days with Solberg looking for the right toxic asset. One, full of what appear to be California McMansions, seems promising. Solberg prints out a 604-page prospectus that reads like a historical record of the entire financial crisis. It’s all in there — vaporized companies, people struggling to pay their mortgages, and some horribly complicated logic describing which bond holders get paid, in which order, under which conditions. But that bond falls through, too.

Finally, we find a beautiful, totally toxic asset at what Solberg thinks is a good price: $36,000. Back in the bubble, somebody paid $2.7 million for this thing. We buy a piece from Solberg for $1,000. It’s going to be our encyclopedia of the financial crisis.

What Our Toxic Asset Looks Like

Our toxic asset has 2,000 mortgages, many of them in hard-hit states like California, Arizona and Florida. A lot of the people in our bond are really struggling. Almost half are behind on their mortgage payments, and 15 percent of the homes are already in foreclosure.

At some point those homes will be taken over and sold for a loss. Every time that happens, the bond shrinks. Eventually, our part of the bond will disappear entirely.

Until then, we get a little money every month from people paying off their mortgages. We just got a check for $141. If it goes to Thanksgiving, we could double our money.

By the way, we bought the asset with our own money. Any proceeds will go to charity. If we lose money, we take the loss.

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