Was There a Loan Contract?

Posted on July 18, 2016 by Neil Garfield

In addition to defrauding the borrower whose signature will be copied and fabricated for dozens of “sales” of loans and securities deriving their value from a nonexistent loan contract, this distorted practice does two things: (a) it cheats investors out of their assumed and expected interest in nonexistent mortgage loan contracts and  (b) it leaves “borrowers” in a parallel universe where they can never know the identity of their actual creditor — a phenomenon created when the proceeds of sales of MBS were never paid into trust for a defined set of investors.  The absence of the defined set of investors is the reason why bank lawyers fight so hard to make such disclosures “irrelevant” in courts of law.

The important fact that is often missed is that the “warehouse” lender was neither a warehouse nor a lender. Like the originator it is a layer of anonymity in the lending process that is used as a conduit for the funding received by the “borrower.”

None of the real parties who funded the transaction had any knowledge about the transaction to which their funds were committed. The nexus between the investors and/or REMIC Trust and the original loan SHOULD have been accomplished by the Trust purchasing the loan — an event that never occurred. And this is why fabricated, forged documents are used in foreclosures — to cover over the fact that there was no purchase and sale of the loan by the Trust and to cover up the fact that investors’ money was used in ways directly contrary to their interests and their agreement with the bogus REMIC Trusts whose bogus securities were purchased by investors.

In the end the investors were left to rely on the unscrupulous investment bank that issued the bogus MBS to somehow create a nexus between the investors and the alleged loans that were funded, if at all, by the direct infusion of investors’ capital and NOT by the REMIC Trust.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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also see comments below from Dan Edstrom, senior securitization analyst for LivingLies
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David Belanger recently sent out an email explaining in his words the failed securitization process that sent our economy into a toxic spiral that continues, unabated, to weaken our ability to recover from the removal of capital from the most important source of spending and purchasing in our economy. This was an epic redistribution of wealth from the regular guy to a handful of “bankers” who were not really acting as bankers.

His email article is excellent and well worth reading a few times. He nails the use of remote conduits that have nothing to do with any loan transaction, much less a loan contract. The only thing I would add is the legal issue of the relationship between this information and the ability to rescind.

Rescission is available ONLY if there is something to rescind — and that has traditionally been regarded as a loan contract. If there is no loan contract, as Belanger asserts (and I agree) then there is nothing to rescind. But if the “transaction” can be rescinded because it is an implied contract between the source of funds and the alleged borrower, then rescission presumably applies.

Second, there is the question of what constitutes a “warehouse” lender. By definition if there is a warehouse lending contract in which the originator has liabilities or risk exposure to losses on the loans originated, then the transaction would appear to be properly represented by the loan documents executed by the borrower, although the absence of a signature from the originator presents a problem for “consummation” of the loan contract.

But, as suggested by the article if the “warehouse lender” was merely a conduit for funds from an undisclosed third party, then it is merely a sham entity in the chain. And if the originator has no exposure to risk of loss then it merely acted as sham conduit also, or paid originator or broker. This scenario is described in detail in Belanger’s article (see below) and we can see that in practice, securitization was distorted at several points — one of which was the presumption that an unauthroized party (contrary to disclosure and representations during the loan “approval” and loan  “closing”) was inserted as “lender” when it loaned no money. Yet the originator’s name was inserted as payee on the note or mortgagee on the mortgage.

All of this brings us to the question of whether judges are right — that the contract is consummated at the time that the borrower affixes his or her signature. It is my opinion that this view is erroneous and presents moral hazard and roadblock to enforcing the rights of disclosure of the parties, terms and compensation of the people and entities arising out of the “origination” of the loan.

If judges are right, then the borrower can only claim breach of contract for failure to loan money in accordance with the disclosures required by TILA. And the “borrower’s” ability to rescind within 3 days has been virtually eliminated as many of the loans were at least treated as though they had been “sold” to third parties who posed as warehouse lenders who in turn “sold” the loan to even more remote parties, none of which were the purported REMIC Trusts. Those alleged REMIC Trusts were a smokescreen — sham entities that didn’t even serve as conduits — left without any capital, contrary to the terms of the Trust agreement and the representations of the seller of mortgage backed securities by these Trusts who had no business, assets, liabilities, income, expenses or even a bank account.

If judges are right that the contract is consummated even without a loan from from the party identified as “lender” then they are ruling contrary to the  Federal requirements of lending disclosures and in many states in violation of fair lending laws.

There is an outcome of erroneous rulings from the bench in which the basic elements of contract are ignored in order to give banks a favorable result, to wit: the marketplace for business is now functioning under a rule of people instead of the rule of law. It is now an apparently legal business plan where the object is to capture the signature of a consumer and use that signature for profit is dozens of ways contrary to every representation and disclosure made at the time of application and “closing” of the transaction.

As Belanger points out, without consideration it is black letter law backed by centuries of common law that for a contract to be formed and therefore enforceable it must fit the four legs of a stool — offer, acceptance of the terms offered, consideration from the first party to the alleged loan transaction and consideration from the second party. The consideration from the “lender”can ONLY be payment to fund the loan. If the originator does it with their own funds or credit, then they have probably satisfied the requirement of consideration.

But if a third party supplied the consideration for the “loan” AND that third party has no contractual nexus with the “originator” or alleged “warehouse lender”then the requirement of consideration from the “originator” is not and cannot be met. In addition to defrauding the borrower whose signature will be copied and fabricated for dozens of “sales” of loans and securities deriving their value from a nonexistent loan contract, this distorted practice does two things: (a) it cheats investors out of their assumed and expected interest in nonexistent mortgage loan contracts and  (b) it leaves “borrowers” in a parallel universe where they can never know the identity of their actual creditor — a phenomenon created when the proceeds of sales of MBS were never paid into trust for a defined set of investors.

David Belanger’s Email article follows, unabridged:

AND AS I SAID, WITH NO CONSUMMATION AT CLOSING, BELANGER NEVER CONSUMMATED ANY MORTGAGE CONTRACT/ NOTE.

BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONLY PARTY TO THE FAKE CONTRACT THAT FOLLOWED THROUGH WITH THERE CONSIDERATION, WITH SIGNING THE MORTGAGE AND NOTE,

AS REQUIRED, TO PERFORM. BUT GMAC MORTGAGE CORP. DID NOT PERFORM , I.E. LEND ANY MONEY AT CLOSING, AS WE HAVE THE WIRE TRANSFER SHOWING THEY DID NOT FUND THE MORTGAGE AND NOTE AT CLOSING. CANT HAVE A LEGAL CONTRACT IF ONLY ONE OF THE PARTY’S. PERFORMS HIS OBLIGATIONS.

THIS MAKE , AS I SAID. RESCISSION IS VALID. AND THEY HAVE NOT FOLLOWED THRU, THERE PART.

AND IT DOES GIVE ME THE RIGHT TO

RESCIND THE CONTRACT BASED ON ALL NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, THAT THE PARTY TO THE MORTGAGE /NOTE CONTRACT, DID NOT

FULFILL THERE DUTY AND DID NOT PREFORM IN ANY WAY AS REQUIRED TO HAVE A VALID BINDING CONTRACT.

Tonight we have a rebroadcast of a segment from Episode 15 with a guest who is a recent ex-patriot from 17 years in the mortgage banking industry… Scot started out as a escrow agent doing closings, then advanced to mortgage loan officer, processor, underwriter, branch manager, mortgage broker and loss mitigator for the banks. Interestingly, he says,

“Looking back on my career I don’t believe any mortgage closing that I was involved in was ever consummated.”
Tonight Scot will be covering areas relating to:

1 lack of disclosure and consideration
2 substitution of true mortgage contracting partner
3 unfunded loan agreements
4 non-existent trusts
5 securitization of your note and bifurcation of the security interest and
6 how to identify and prove the non-existence of the so-called trust named in an assignment which may be coming after you to foreclose

: http://recordings.talkshoe.com/TC-139335/TS-1093904.mp3

so lets look at what happen a the closing of the mortgage CONTRACT SHELL WE.

1/ MORTGAGE AND NOTES, SAYS A ( SPECIFIC LENDER) GAVE YOU MONEY, ( AS WE KNOW THAT DIDN’T HAPPEN. )

2/ HOME OWNER WAS TOLD AT CLOSING AND BEFORE CLOSING THAT THE NAMED LENDER WOULD SUPPLY THE FUNDS AT CLOSING, AND WAS ALSO TOLD BY THE CLOSING AGENT , THE SAME LIE.

3/ THERE ARE 2 PARTIES TO A CLOSING OF A MORTGAGE AND NOTE, 1/ HOMEOWNER, 2/ LENDER.

3/ Offer and acceptance , Consideration,= SO HOMEOWNERS SIGN A MORTGAGE AND NOTE, IN CONSIDERATION of the said lender’s promises to pay the homeowner for said signing of the mortgage and note.

4/ but the lender does not, follow thru with his CONSIDERATION. I.E TO FUND THE CONTRACT. AND THE LENDER NAMED ON THE CONTRACT, KNEW ALL ALONG THAT HE WOULD NOT BE THE FUNDING SOURCE. FRAUD AT CONCEPTION. KNOWINGLY OUT RIGHT FRAUD ON THE HOMEOWNERS.

5/ THERE ARE NO STATUES OF LIMITATIONS ON FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, OR ANY OTHER FRAUD.

6/ SO AS NEIL AND AND LENDING TEAM, AND OTHERS HAVE POINTED OUT, SO SO MANY TIMES HERE AND OTHER PLACES,

THERE COULD NOT BE ANY CONSUMMATION OF THE CONTRACT AT CLOSING,BY THE TWO PARTY’S TO THE CONTRACT, IF ONLY ONE PERSON TO THE CONTRACT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH,

AND THE OTHER PARTY DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH OR EVEN SUPPLIED ANY ( CONSIDERATION WHAT SO EVER AT CLOSING OF THE CONTRACT.) A MORTGAGE AND NOTE IS A CONTRACT PEOPLE.

7/ SO THIS WOULD GIVE RISE TO THE LAW OF ( RESCISSION).

. A finding of misrepresentation allows for a remedy of rescission and sometimes damages depending on the type of misrepresentation.

AND THE BANKS CAN SCREAM ALL THEY WANT, IF THE PRETENDER LENDER THAT IS ON YOUR MORTGAGE AND NOTE, DID NOT SUPPLY THE FUNDS AT CLOSING, AS WE ALL KNOW DID HAPPEN, THEN THE MORTGAGE CONTRACT IS VOID. AND THERE WAS NO CONSUMMATION AT THE CLOSING TABLE, BY THE PARTY THAT SAID IT WAS FUNDING THE CONTRACT.

CANT GET MORE SIMPLE THAT THAT. and this supports all of the above. that the fake lender did not PERFORM AT CLOSING, DID NOT FUND ANY MONEY OR LOAN ANY MONEY AT CLOSING WITH ANY BORROWER, SO ONLY ONE ( THE BORROWER ) DID PERFORM AT CLOSING. BOTH PARTY’S MUST PERFORM TO HAVE A LEGAL BINDING CONTRACT.

SEE RODGERS V U.S.BANK HOME MORTGAGE ET, AL

THE WAREHOUSE LENDER NATIONAL CITY BANK OF KENTUCKY HELD THE NOTE THEN DELIVERED TO THIRD PARTY INVESTORS UNKNOWN

SECURITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION

5300 South 360 West, Suite 250

Salt Lake City, Utah 84123

Telephone (801) 264-1060

February 20, 2009

VIA EDGAR

U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Division of Corporation Finance

100 F Street, N. E., Mail Stop 4561

Washington, D. C. 20549

Attn: Sharon M. Blume

Assistant Chief Accountant

Re: Security National Financial Corporation

Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2007

Form 10-Q for Fiscal Quarter Ended June 30, 2008

File No. 0-9341

Dear Ms. Blume:

Security National Financial Corporation (the “Company”) hereby supplements its responses to its previous response letters dated January 15, 2009, November 6, 2008 and October 9, 2008. These supplemental responses are provided as additional information concerning the Company’s mortgage loan operations and the appropriate accounting that the Company follows in connection with such operations.

The Company operates its mortgage loan operations through its wholly owned subsidiary, Security National Mortgage Company (“SNMC”). SNMC currently has 29 branch offices across

the continental United States and Hawaii. Each office has personnel who are qualified to solicit and underwrite loans that are submitted to SNMC by a network of mortgage brokers. Loan files submitted to SNMC are underwritten pursuant to third-party investor guidelines and are approved to fund after all documentation and other investor-established requirements are determined to meet the criteria for a saleable loans. (e.s.) Loan documents are prepared in the name of SNMC and then sent to the title company handling the loan transactions for signatures from the borrowers. Upon signing the documents, requests are then sent to the warehouse bank involved in the transaction to submit funds to the title company to pay for the settlement. All loans funded by warehouse banks are committed to be purchased (settled) by third-party investors under pre-established loan purchase commitments. The initial recordings of the deeds of trust (the mortgages) are made in the name of SNMC. (e.s.)

Soon after the loan funding, the deeds of trust are assigned, using the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”), which is the standard in the industry for recording subsequent transfers in title, and the promissory notes are endorsed in blank to the warehouse bank that funded the loan. The promissory notes and the deeds of trust are then forwarded to the warehouse bank. The warehouse bank funds approximately 96% of the mortgage loans to the title company and the remainder (known in the industry as the “haircut”) is funded by the Company. The Company records a receivable from the third-party investor for the portion of the mortgage loans the Company has funded and for mortgage fee income earned by SNMC. The receivable from the third-party investor is unsecured inasmuch as neither the Company nor its subsidiaries retain any interest in the mortgage loans. (e.s.)

Conditions for Revenue Recognition

Pursuant to paragraph 9 of SFAS 140, a transfer of financial assets (or a portion of a financial asset) in which the transferor surrenders control over those financial assets shall be accounted as a sale to the extent that consideration other than beneficial interests in the transferred assets is received in exchange. The transferor has surrendered control over transferred assets if and only if all of the following conditions are met:

1

(a) The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor―placed presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership.

SNMC endorses the promissory notes in blank, assigns the deeds of trust through MERS and forwards these documents to the warehouse bank that funded the loan. Therefore, the transferred mortgage loans are isolated from the Company. The Company’s management is confident that the transferred mortgage loans are beyond the reach of the Company and its creditors. (e.s.)

(b) Each transferee (or, if the transferee is a qualified SPE, each holder of its beneficial interests) has the right to pledge or exchange the assets (or beneficial interests) it received, and no

condition restricts the transferee (or holder) from taking advantage of its right to pledge or exchange and provides more than a trivial benefit to the transferor.

The Company does not have any interest in the promissory notes or the underlying deeds of trust because of the steps taken in item (a) above. The Master Purchase and Repurchase Agreements (the “Purchase Agreements”) with the warehouse banks allow them to pledge the promissory notes as collateral for borrowings by them and their entities. Under the Purchase Agreements, the warehouse banks have agreed to sell the loans to the third-party investors; however, the warehouse banks hold title to the mortgage notes and can sell, exchange or pledge the mortgage loans as they choose. The Purchase Agreements clearly indicate that the purchaser, the warehouse bank, and seller confirm that the transactions contemplated herein are intended to be sales of the mortgage loans by seller to purchaser rather than borrowings secured by the mortgage loans. In the event that the third-party investors do not purchase or settle the loans from the warehouse banks, the warehouse banks have the right to sell or exchange the mortgage loans to the Company or to any other entity. Accordingly, the Company believes this requirement is met.

(c) The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred asset through either an agreement that entitles both entities and obligates the transferor to repurchase or redeem them before their maturity or the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return the specific assets, other than through a cleanup call.

The Company maintains no control over the mortgage loans sold to the warehouse banks, and, as stated in the Purchase Agreements, the Company is not entitled to repurchase the mortgage loans. In addition, the Company cannot unilaterally cause a warehouse bank to return a specific loan. The warehouse bank can require the Company to repurchase mortgage loans not settled by the third-party investors, but this conditional obligation does not provide effective control over the mortgage loans sold. Should the Company want a warehouse bank to sell a mortgage loan to a different third-party investor, the warehouse bank would impose its own conditions prior to agreeing to the change, including, for instance, that the original intended third-party investor return the promissory note to the warehouse bank. Accordingly, the Company believes that it does not maintain effective control over the transferred mortgage loans and that it meets this transfer of control criteria.

The warehouse bank and not the Company transfers the loan to the third-party investor at the date it is settled. The Company does not have an unconditional obligation to repurchase the loan from the warehouse bank nor does the Company have any rights to purchase the loan. Only in the situation where the third-party investor does not settle and purchase the loan from the warehouse bank does the Company have a conditional obligation to repurchase the loan. Accordingly, the Company believes that it meets the criteria for recognition of mortgage fee income under SFAS 140 when the loan is funded by the warehouse bank and, at that date, the Company records an unsecured receivable from the investor for the portion of the loan funded by the Company, which is typically 4% of the face amount of the loan, together with the broker and origination fee income.

2

Loans Repurchased from Warehouse Banks

Historically, 99% of all mortgage loans are settled with investors. In the process of settling a loan, the Company may take up to six months to pursue remediation of an unsettled loan. There are situations when the Company determines that it is unable to enforce the settlement of a loan by the third-party investor and that it is in the Company’s best interest to repurchase the loan from the warehouse bank. Any previously recorded mortgage fee income is reversed in the period the loan was repurchased.

When the Company repurchases a loan, it is recorded at the lower of cost or market. Cost is equal to the amount paid to the warehouse bank and the amount originally funded by the Company. Market value is often difficult to determine for this type of loan and is estimated by the Company. The Company never estimates market value to exceed the unpaid principal balance on the loan. The market value is also supported by the initial loan underwriting documentation and collateral. The Company does not hold the loan as available for sale but as held to maturity and carries the loan at amortized cost. Any loan that subsequently becomes delinquent is evaluated by the Company at that time and any allowances for impairment are adjusted accordingly.

This will supplement our earlier responses to clarify that the Company repurchased the $36,291,000 of loans during 2007 and 2008 from the warehouse banks and not from third-party investors. The amounts paid to the warehouse banks and the amounts originally funded by the Company, exclusive of the mortgage fee income that was reversed, were classified as the cost of the investment in the mortgage loans held for investment.

The Company uses two allowance accounts to offset the reversal of mortgage fee income and for the impairment of loans. The allowance for reversal of mortgage fee income is carried on the balance sheet as a liability and the allowance for impairment of loans is carried as a contra account net of our investment in mortgage loans. Management believes the allowance for reversal of mortgage fee income is sufficient to absorb any losses of income from loans that are not settled by third-party investors. The Company is currently accruing 17.5 basis points of the principal amount of mortgage loans sold, which increased by 5.0 basis points during the latter part of 2007 and remained at that level during 2008.

The Company reviewed its estimates of collectability of receivables from broker and origination fee income during the fourth quarter of 2007, in view of the market turmoil discussed in the following paragraph and the fact that several third-party investors were attempting to back out of their commitments to buy (settle) loans, and the Company determined that it could still reasonably estimate the collectability of the mortgage fee income. However, the Company determined that it needed to increase its allowance for reversal of mortgage fee income as stated in the preceding paragraph.

Effect of Market Turmoil on Sales and Settlement of Mortgage Loans

As explained in previous response letters, the Company and the warehouse banks typically settle mortgage loans with third-party investors within 16 days of the closing and funding of the loans. However, beginning in the first quarter of 2007, there was a lot of market turmoil for mortgage backed securities. Initially, the market turmoil was primarily isolated to sub-prime mortgage loan originations. The Company originated less than 0.5% of its mortgage loans using this product during 2006 and the associated market turmoil did not have a material effect on the Company.

As 2007 progressed, however, the market turmoil began to expand into mortgage loans that were classified by the industry as Alt A and Expanded Criteria. The Company’s third-party investors, including Lehman Brothers (Aurora Loan Services) and Bear Stearns (EMC Mortgage Corp.), began to have difficulty marketing Alt A and Expanded Criteria loans to the secondary markets. Without notice, these investors changed their criteria for loan products and refused to settle loans underwritten by the Company that met these investor’s previous specifications. As stipulated in the agreements with the warehouse banks, the Company was conditionally required to repurchase loans from the warehouse banks that were not settled by the third-party investors.

3

Beginning in early 2007, without prior notice, these investors discontinued purchasing Alt A and Expanded Criteria loans. Over the period from April 2007 through May 2008, the warehouse banks had purchased approximately $36.2 million of loans that had met the investor’s previous criteria but were rejected by the investor in complete disregard of their contractual commitments. Although the Company pursued its rights under the investor contracts, the Company was unsuccessful due to the investors’ financial problems and could not enforce the loan purchase contracts. As a result of its conditional repurchase obligation, the Company repurchased these loans from the warehouse banks and reversed the mortgage fee income associated with the loans on the date of repurchase from the warehouse banks. The loans were classified to the long-term mortgage loan portfolio beginning in the second quarter of 2008.

Relationship with Warehouse Banks

As previously stated, the Company is not unconditionally obligated to repurchase mortgage loans from the warehouse banks. The warehouse banks purchase the loans with the commitment from the third-party investors to settle the loans from the warehouse banks. Accordingly, the Company does not make an entry to reflect the amount paid by the warehouse bank when the mortgage loans are funded. Upon sale of the loans to the warehouse bank, the Company only records the receivables for the brokerage and origination fees and the amount the Company paid at the time of funding.

Interest in Repurchased Loans

Once a mortgage loan is repurchased, it is immediately transferred to mortgage loans held for investment (or should have been) as the Company makes no attempts to sell these loans

to other investors at this time. Any efforts to find a replacement investor are made prior to repurchasing the loan from the warehouse bank. The Company makes no effort to remarket the loan after it is repurchased.

Acknowledgements

In connection with the Company’s responses to the comments, the Company hereby acknowledges as follows:

· The Company is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in the filing;

· The staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to staff comments do not foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filing; and

· The Company may not assert staff comments as defense in any proceeding initiated by the Commission or any person under the Federal Securities Laws of the United States.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at (801) 264-1060 or (801) 287-8171.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Stephen M. Sill

Stephen M. Sill, CPA

Vice President, Treasurer and

Chief Financial Officer

Contract law

Part of the common law series

Contract formation

Offer and acceptance Posting rule Mirror image rule Invitation to treat Firm offer Consideration Implication-in-fact

Defenses against formation

Lack of capacity Duress Undue influence Illusory promise Statute of frauds Non est factum

Contract interpretation

Parol evidence rule Contract of adhesion Integration clause Contra proferentem

Excuses for non-performance

Mistake Misrepresentation Frustration of purpose Impossibility Impracticability Illegality Unclean hands Unconscionability Accord and satisfaction

Rights of third parties

Privity of contract Assignment Delegation Novation Third-party beneficiary

Breach of contract

Anticipatory repudiation Cover Exclusion clause Efficient breach Deviation Fundamental breach

Remedies

Specific performance Liquidated damages Penal damages Rescission

Quasi-contractual obligations

Promissory estoppel Quantum meruit

Related areas of law

Conflict of laws Commercial law

Other common law areas

Tort law Property law Wills, trusts, and estates Criminal law Evidence

Such defenses operate to determine whether a purported contract is either (1) void or (2) voidable. Void contracts cannot be ratified by either party. Voidable contracts can be ratified.

Misrepresentation[edit]

Main article: Misrepresentation

Misrepresentation means a false statement of fact made by one party to another party and has the effect of inducing that party into the contract. For example, under certain circumstances, false statements or promises made by a seller of goods regarding the quality or nature of the product that the seller has may constitute misrepresentation. A finding of misrepresentation allows for a remedy of rescission and sometimes damages depending on the type of misrepresentation.

There are two types of misrepresentation: fraud in the factum and fraud in inducement. Fraud in the factum focuses on whether the party alleging misrepresentation knew they were creating a contract. If the party did not know that they were entering into a contract, there is no meeting of the minds, and the contract is void. Fraud in inducement focuses on misrepresentation attempting to get the party to enter into the contract. Misrepresentation of a material fact (if the party knew the truth, that party would not have entered into the contract) makes a contract voidable.

According to Gordon v Selico [1986] it is possible to misrepresent either by words or conduct. Generally, statements of opinion or intention are not statements of fact in the context of misrepresentation.[68] If one party claims specialist knowledge on the topic discussed, then it is more likely for the courts to hold a statement of opinion by that party as a statement of fact.[69]

Such defenses operate to determine whether a purported contract is either (1) void or (2) voidable. Void contracts cannot be ratified by either party. Voidable contracts can be ratified.

Misrepresentation[edit]

Main article: Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation means a false statement of fact made by one party to another party and has the effect of inducing that party into the contract. For example, under certain circumstances, false statements or promises made by a seller of goods regarding the quality or nature of the product that the seller has may constitute misrepresentation. A finding of misrepresentation allows for a remedy of rescission and sometimes damages depending on the type of misrepresentation.

There are two types of misrepresentation: fraud in the factum and fraud in inducement. Fraud in the factum focuses on whether the party alleging misrepresentation knew they were creating a contract. If the party did not know that they were entering into a contract, there is no meeting of the minds, and the contract is void. Fraud in inducement focuses on misrepresentation attempting to get the party to enter into the contract. Misrepresentation of a material fact (if the party knew the truth, that party would not have entered into the contract) makes a contract voidable.
According to Gordon v Selico [1986] it is possible to misrepresent either by words or conduct. Generally, statements of opinion or intention are not statements of fact in the context of misrepresentation.[68] If one party claims specialist knowledge on the topic discussed, then it is more likely for the courts to hold a statement of opinion by that party as a statement of fact.[69]

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Comments from Dan Edstrom:

My understanding in California (and probably most other states) is the signature(s) were put on the note and security instrument and passed to the (escrow) agent for delivery only upon the performance of the specific instructions included in the closing instructions. The homeowner(s) did not manifest a present intent to transfer the documents or title….   Delivery was not possible until the agent followed instructions 100% (specific performance).  Their appears to be a presumption of delivery that should be rebutted. In California the test for an effective delivery is the writing passed with the deed (but only if delivery is put at issue).
Here is a quote from an appeal in CA:
We first examine the legal effectiveness of the Greggs deed. Legal delivery of a deed revolves around the intent of the grantor. (Osborn v. Osborn (1954) 42 Cal.2d 358, 363-364.) Where the grantor’s only instructions concerning the transaction are in writing, “`the effect of the transaction depends upon the true construction of the writing. It is in other words a pure question of law whether there was an absolute delivery or not.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. at p. 364.) As explained by the Supreme Court, “Where a deed is placed in the hands of a third person, as an escrow, with an agreement between the grantor and grantee that it shall not be delivered to the grantee until he has complied with certain conditions, the grantee does not acquire any title to the land, nor is he entitled to a delivery of the deed until he has strictly complied with the conditions. If he does not comply with the conditions when required, or refuses to comply, the escrow-holder cannot make a valid delivery of the deed to him. [Citations.]” (Promis v. Duke (1929) 208 Cal. 420, 425.) Thus, if the escrow holder does deliver the deed before the buyer complies with the seller’s instructions to the escrow, such purported delivery conveys no title to the buyer. (Montgomery v. Bank of America (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 563; see also Borgonovo v. Henderson (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 220, 226-228 [purported assignment of note deposited into escrow held invalid, where maker instructed escrow holder to release note only upon deposit of certain sum of money by payee].)
LAOLAGI v. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, H032523 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2009).
In most cases I have seen the closing instructions state there can be no encumbrances except the new note and security instrument in favor of {the payee of the note}…
Some of the issues with this (encumbrances) would be who provided the actual escrow funding, topre-existing agreements, the step transaction and single transaction doctrines, MERS, payoffs of previous mortgages (to a lender of record), reconveyance (to a lender of record), etc…
Thx,
Dan Edstrom

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Modification Offers Are Enforceable Contracts

Posted on January 8, 2015 by Neil Garfield

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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We have all seen it, heard and experienced it over and over again. In this case Wells Fargo offered a “temporary” modification, it was accepted and the trial payments were made. Wells Fargo said the modification offer and acceptance lacked consideration — the height of arrogance since they have no transaction with consideration supporting their claim of ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.

Wells disavowed the settlement and went forward with foreclosure. The homeowner’s claim to enforce the modification contract was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, agreeing with Wells Fargo that there was no consideration. The appellate court reversed stating that there was consideration and that it was more than adequate. There are now hundreds of cases in which trial judges and appellate courts have enforced the modification agreements.

Here is one you can look at:

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Unpublished/132390.U.pdf

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The Banks: Consideration is Irrelevant, Really? Then so is payment!

Posted on March 24, 2014 by Neil Garfield
The issue is what are the elements of the loan contract? Who are the parties? And who can enforce it?

I would agree that an overpayment at closing from the source of funds is rare. What is not rare and in fact common is that the wire transfer instructions that accompany the wire transfer receipt often instructs the closing agent to refund any overpayment to the party who wired the money — not the originator. This leads to questions. If it is a true warehouse lender, such instructions could be explained without affecting the validity of the note or mortgage.

In truth, the procedures used usually prevent the originator from ever touching the flow of funds. Wall Street banks were afraid of fraud — that if the originators could touch the money, they might have faked a number of closings and taken the money. In short, the investment banks were afraid that the originators would not use the money the way it was intended. So instead of doing that, they created relationships by having the originators sign Assignment and Assumption agreements before they started lending. This agreement says the loan belongs to an “aggregator” that is merely a controlled entity of the broker dealer. But the money doesn’t come from either the originator or the aggregator. Thus they have an agreement that controls the loan closings but no consideration for that either.
But this is a lot like the insurance payments, proceeds of credit default swaps etc. The contracts almost always specifically waive subrogation or any other right of action against the borrowers or any other enforcement of the notes or mortgages. It has been presumed that these contracts were for the mitigation of losses and that is true. But they are payable to the broker dealers and not the trust or trust beneficiaries. The investment banks committed fraud when they represented to the insurers, FDIC, Fannie, Freddie and CDS counterparties that they had an insurable interest. Those parties presumed that the investment banks were creating these hedge products for the benefit of the owner of the mortgage bonds or the owner of the loans. But it was paid to the investment banks. That is why all those parties are claiming losses that resulted from fraud — all of which have resulted in settlements (except the Countrywide verdict for fraud).
The similarity is this: in both the closing with borrowers and the closings with investors the same fraud occurred. When dealing with the closing agent they interposed their nominee in the closing which resulted in no note and no mortgage in favor of the investors or the trust. Whether the closing agent is liable is another issue. The point is that the money came from a third party which was a controlled entity of the broker dealer. Thus the investor gets a promise from a trust that is not funded while their money is used to pay fees, create the illusion of trading profits for the broker dealer and funding mortgages.
The wire transfer is not a wire transfer from the originator, nor from the bank at which the originator maintains any account. The wire transfer instructions and the wire transfer receipt fail to identify the actual source of funds and fail to refer to the originator as a real party. If they did, there would not be a problem for the banks to enforce the note and mortgage. If they did, the banks would simply show the transaction record and there would be nothing to fight about.
The only occasion in which the banks appeared to be willing to provide adequate documentation for consideration appears to be in a merger or acquisition with the party that was named as the mortgagee in the mortgage document or the beneficiary in the deed of trust. And all the other transactions, the banks say that consideration is irrelevant or they quote the law that says that courts cannot question the adequacy of consideration. They are dodging the issue. We are not saying that consideration was not adequate; what we are saying is that there was no consideration at all. The banks are fighting this issue  because when it comes out that there really was no consideration the entire house of cards could fall.
 The issue is counterintuitive because everyone knows that there was money on the closing table. Unless the issue is argued and presented with clarity, it will appear to the judge that you are trying to say that there was no money on the closing table. And when a judge hears that, or thinks that he heard that, he or she will not take you seriously. There are three parts to every contract —  offer, acceptance, and consideration. A few courts have started to deal with this question. In the context of foreclosure litigation all three elements are in question. If the lenders are investors who believed that their money was being put into a trust that they were beneficiaries of a trust, they are unaware of the fact that their money is being offered to borrowers on terms that are contrary to their instructions. And the loan is not made on behalf of the investors or the trust. It is made on behalf of some sham entity controlled by the broker dealer. Sometimes the origination is made by an actual bank that is acting in the capacity of a sham lender. Either way the money came from the investors.
So the issue is not whether there was money on the table but rather whether there was a meeting of the minds between the investors and lenders in the homeowners as borrowers. The lender documents (trust documents) reveal far different terms of repayment than the borrower documents. Each of them signed on to a deal that actually didn’t exist because neither of them had agreed to the same terms.
 The fact that money was on the table at the time of the alleged closing of the loan can only mean that the homeowner owed money to repay the source of the money. This duty to repay arises by operation of law and extends from the homeowner to the investor despite the lack of any documentation that explicitly states that. The result is false documentation in which the homeowner was induced to sign under the mistaken belief that the payee on the note and the mortgagee on the mortgage was the source of funds.
If you receive funds from John Smith and the note and mortgage are drafted for the benefit of Nancy Jones as “lender” would that bother you? What would you do as closing agent? Why?

Filed under: CORRUPTION, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Pleading, Servicer, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 67 Comments »

BeforeYou Open Your Mouth Or Write Anything Down, Know What You Are Talking About

Posted on December 26, 2013 by Neil Garfield

EDITOR’S NOTE: By popular demand I am writing a new workbook that is up to date on the theories and practices of real estate loans, documentation, securitizations and effective enforcement and foreclosure of the collateral (real property — i.e., the house). The book will be finished around the end of January. If you want to purchase an advance subscription to an advance copy we can give you a discount off the price of $599. You will receive the final edit drafts of each section as completed. And your comments might be included in the final text with attribution. This is an excerpt from what I have done so far ( the references to “boxes” is a reference to artwork that has not yet been completed but the meaning is clear enough from the words):

[Note: I did borrow some phrases and cites from Judge Jennifer Bailey’s Bench Book for Judges in Dade County. But things have changed substantially since she wrote that guide and my book is intended to update the various treatises, books and articles on the subject of mortgage related litigation in the era of securitization]

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The massive volume of foreclosures and real estate closings have resulted in a failure of the judicial system — both Judges and Attorneys to scrutinize the transactions and foreclosures and other enforcement actions for compliance with basic contract law. This starts with whether there is an actual loan at the base of the tree of assignments, endorsements, powers of attorney etc. If the party at the base of the tree did not in fact make any loan and was not possessed of any actual or apparent authority to represent the party who DID make the loan, then the instruments executed in favor of the originator are void, not voidable. This is simply because the loan contract like any contract requires offer, acceptance and consideration. Lacking any meeting of the minds and/or consideration, there was no contract regardless of what one of the parties signed.

 

The interesting issue at the start of our investigation is how to define the loan contract. Is it a contract that arises by operation of statutory or common law? Is it a contract that arises by execution of instruments? What if the borrower executes an instruments that acknowledges receipt of money he never received from the party he thought was giving him the money? Is it possible for the written instruments to create a conflict between the presumptions at law arising from written, properly executed instruments and the real facts that gave rise to a contract that was created by operation of law?

 

These questions come up because there is no actual written loan contract. The borrower and lender do not come together and sign a contract for loan. The contract is implied from the documents and actions contemporaneously occurring at or around the time of the loan “closing.” It appears to be a case of first impression that the borrower is induced to sign documents in favor of someone who, at the end of the day, does NOT give him the loan. This never was a defect before the era of claims of securitization. Now it is central to the issue of establishing the identity and rights of a creditor and debtor and whether the debt is secured or unsecured.

 

Even where the loan contract is solid, the same legal and factual problems arise at the time of the alleged acquisition of the loan where assignments lack consideration because, like the above origination, an undisclosed third party was the actual source of funds.

 

 

 

Definitions:

 

 

 

1)   Debt: in the context of loans, the amount of money due from the borrower to the lender. This may include successors to the lender. In a simple mortgage loan the amount of money due, the identity of the borrower and the identity of the lender are clear. In cases where the mortgage loan is subject to claims of assignments, transfers, sales or securitization by either the borrower or the party claiming to be the lender or the successor to the lender, there are questions of fact and law that must be determined by the court based on the method by which the money advanced to or on behalf of the borrower that leads to a finding by the court of the identity of the party who advanced the money for the origination of the debt or for the acquisition of the debt.

 

a)    In all cases the debt arises by operation of law at the moment that the borrower receives the advance of money from a lender regardless of the method utilized and regardless of the validity of any instruments that were executed by either the borrower or the lender.

 

i)     The acceptance of the money by the borrower raises a strong presumption that the advance of money in the context of the situation was not a gift.

 

ii)    In simple loans the legal instruments that were executed by the borrower at the loan closing are presumptively supported by consideration as expressed in the note or mortgage and a valid contract presumptively exists such that the court can enforce the note and the mortgage.

 

b)   The factual circumstances and any written instruments that were executed by the parties as part of a loan contract govern terms of repayment of the debt.

 

c)    Enforcement of the repayment obligation of the borrower requires either a lawsuit on the loan of money or a lawsuit on a promissory note.

 

i)     If the lawsuit is on the loan of money plaintiff must state the ultimate facts upon which relief could be granted including the factual circumstances of the loan and the fact that the loan was made. In Florida — F.R.C.P. 1.110 (b), Form 1.936

 

ii)    The lawsuit is on a note plaintiff must state the ultimate facts upon which relief could be granted including that the plaintiff owns and holds the note, that Defendant owes the Plaintiff money, and state the amount of money that is owed. In Florida — F.R.C.P. 1.110 (b), Form 1.934

 

(1)Where the Plaintiff alleges it is a party by virtue of a sale, assignment, transfer or endorsement of the note, Plaintiffs frequently fail to allege the required elements in which case the Court should dismiss the complaint — unless the Defendant has already admitted the debt, the note, the mortgage, and the default.

 

(2)The burden of pleading and proving the required elements is on the Plaintiff and cannot be shifted to the defendant without violating the constitutional requirements of due process.

 

(3)Requiring the Defendant to raise a required but missing element of a defective complaint filed by a Plaintiff would require the Defendant to raise the missing element and then deny it as an attempt at stating an affirmative defense that raises no issue other than an element that was required to be in the complaint of the Plaintiff. This is reversible error in that it improperly shifts the burden of pleading onto the Defendant and requires the Defendant to prove facts mostly in the sole control of the Defendant and which would establish standing to bring the action.

 

d)   In those cases where the loan is subject to claims of assignments, transfers, sales or securitization by either party the court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether the legal consideration for the loan (i.e., the advance of money from lender to borrower or for the benefit of the borrower) supports the debt described in the legal instruments that were executed by the borrower at the loan closing.

 

i)     If the Court finds that the legal instruments that were executed by the borrower at the loan closing are not supported by consideration, then the debt simply exists by operation of law and is not secured.

 

(1)Such a finding could only be based on the court determining that the lender described in the legal instruments is a different party than the party who actually loaned the money.

 

(2)Warehouse lending arrangements may be sufficient for the court to determine that the named payee on the note or the identified lender supplied consideration. The court must determine whether the warehouse lender was an actual lender or a strawman, nominee or conduit.

 

ii)    If the court finds that the legal instruments that were executed by the borrower at the loan closing are supported by consideration, then a valid contract may be found to exist that the court can enforce.

 

2)   Mortgage: a contract in which a borrower agrees that the lender may sell the real property (as described in the mortgage) for the purposes of satisfying a debt described in a promissory note that is described in the mortgage contract. It must be a written instrument securing the payment of money or advances made to or on behalf of the borrower. A lien to secure payment of assessments for condominiums, cooperatives and homeowner association is treated as a mortgage contract, pursuant to the enabling documents. See state statutes. For example, F.S. 702.09, Fla. Stat. (2010)

 

a)    a mortgage, if properly perfected, creates a specific lien against the property and is not a conveyance of legal title or of the right of possession to the real property described in the mortgage contract. See state statutes. For example section 697.02, Fla. Stat. (2010), Fla. Nat’l Bank v brown, 47 So 2d 748 (1949).

 

b)   Mortgagee: the party to home the real property is pledged as collateral against the debt described in the note. Mortgagee is presumptively the party named in the mortgage contract. With the advent of MERS and other situations where there is an assignment of the mortgage (expressly or by operation of law) the named mortgagee might be a strawman or nominee for a party described as the lender. In such cases there is an issue of fact as to perfection of the mortgage contract and therefore the mortgage encumbrance resulting from the recording of the mortgage contract. See state statutes. For example F.S. 721.82(6), Fla. Stat. (2010).

 

i)     In Florida the term mortgagee refers to the lender, the secured party or the holder of the mortgage lien. There are several questions of fact and law that the court must determine in order to define and apply these terms.

 

c)    Mortgagor

 

d)   Lender: the party who loaned money to the borrower. If the lender was identified in the mortgage contract by name then the mortgage contract is most likely enforceable.

 

i)     If the lender described in the mortgage contract is a strawman, nominee or conduit then there is an issue of fact as to whether any party could claim to be a secured party under the mortgage contract. Under such circumstances the mortgage contract must be treated as naming no identified secured party. Whether this results in a finding that the mortgage contract is not complete, not perfected or not enforceable is a question of fact that is decided on a case-by-case basis.

 

e)    No right to jury trial exists for enforcement of provisions of the mortgage. However, a right to jury trial exists if timely demanded provided that the foreclosing party seeks judgment on the note or the loan, to wit: financial damages for financial injury suffered by the Plaintiff.

 

i)     Bifurcation of the trial for damages and trial for enforcement of the mortgage contract may be necessary if the basis for the enforcement of the mortgage is non-payment of the note. Any properly raised affirmative defenses relating to setoff or enforceability of the note would be raised in the case for damages.

 

ii)    In that case the trial on the breach of the note would first be needed to render a verdict on the default and then a trial on enforcement of the mortgage would be held before the court without a jury.  Any properly raised defense relating to fees and other costs assessed in enforcement of the mortgage contract.

 

iii)  A question of fact and law must be decided by the court in actions in which the plaintiff merely seeks to enforce the mortgage by virtue of an alleged default by the plaintiff but does not seek monetary damages. Florida Form 1.944 (Foreclosure Complaint) is not specific as to whether it is allowing for a single trial without jury.

 

(1)Since foreclosures are actions in equity, no jury trial is required, but it can be allowed. Since actions for damages require jury trial if properly demanded, it would appear that this issue was not considered when the Florida Form was created.

 

iv)  The requirement that the Plaintiff must own the loan is a requirement that the Plaintiff is not acting in a representative capacity unless it brings the action on behalf of a principal that is disclosed and alleges and attaches to the complaint an instrument that confers upon Plaintiff its authority to do so.

 

v)    Owning the loan means, as set forth in Article 9 of the UCC that the Plaintiff paid for it in money or other consideration that was equivalent to money. The same thing holds true under Article 3 of the UCC for enforcement of the note if the Plaintiff seeks the exalted status of Holder in Due Course which requires payment PLUS no knowledge of defenses all of which must be alleged and proven by the Plaintiff. [1]

 

3)   Note: a written instrument describing the terms of repayment or terms of payment to the payee or a legal successor in interest. In mortgage loans the payor is often described as the borrower. This instrument is usually described in the mortgage contract as the basis for the forced sale of the property. The note is part of a contract for loan of money. It is often considered the total contract. The loan contract is not complete without the loan of money from the payee on the note. If the lender was identified in the note by name then the note is most likely enforceable.

 

[1] In non-judicial states where the power of sale is recognized as a contractual right, the issue is less clear as to the alignment of parties, claims and defenses. In actions to contest substitution of trustees, notices of sale, notices of default etc. it is the borrower who must bring the lawsuit and in some states they must do so within a very short time frame. Check applicable state statutes. The confusion stems from the fact that the Borrower is actually denying the allegations that would have been made if the alleged beneficiary under the deed of trust had filed a judicial complaint. The trustee on the deed of trust probably should file an action in interpleader if a proper objection is raised but this does not appear to be occurring in practice. This leaves the borrower as the Plaintiff and requiring allegations that would, in judicial states, be either denials or affirmative defenses. Temporary restraining orders are granted but usually only on a showing that the Plaintiff has a likelihood of  prevailing — a requirement not imposed on Plaintiffs in judicial states where the lender or “owner” must file the complaint.

 

Filed under: CASES, evidence, foreclosure, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

Follow the Money Trail: It’s the blueprint for your case

Posted on March 18, 2013 by Neil Garfield
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.
Editor’s Analysis and Comment: If you want to know where all the money went during the mortgage madness of the last decade and the probable duplication of that behavior with all forms of consumer debt, the first clues have been emerging. First and foremost I would suggest the so-called bull market reflecting an economic resurgence that appears to have no basis in reality. Putting hundred of billions of dollars into the stock market is an obvious place to store ill-gotten gains.
But there is also the question of liquidity which means the Wall Street bankers had to “park” their money somewhere into depository accounts. Some analysts have suggested that the bankers deposited money in places where the sheer volume of money deposited would give bankers strategic control over finance in those countries.
The consequences to American finance is fairly well known here. But most Americans have been somewhat aloof to the extreme problems suffered by Spain, Greece, Italy and Cyprus. Italy and Cyprus have turned to confiscating savings on a progressive basis.  This could be a “fee” imposed by those countries for giving aid and comfort to the pirates of Wall Street.
So far the only country to stick with the rule of law is Iceland where some of the worst problems emerged early — before bankers could solidify political support in that country, like they have done around the world. Iceland didn’t bailout bankers, they jailed them. Iceland didn’t adopt austerity to make the problems worse, it used all its resources to stimulate the economy.
And Iceland looked at the reality of a the need for a thriving middle class. So they reduced household debt and forced banks to take the hit — some 25% or more being sliced off of mortgages and other consumer debt. Iceland was not acting out of ideology, but rather practicality.
The result is that Iceland is the shining light on the hill that we thought was ours. Iceland has real growth in gross domestic product, decreasing unemployment to acceptable levels, and banks that despite the hit they took, are also prospering.
From my perspective, I look at the situation from the perspective of a former investment banker who was in on conversations decades ago where Wall Street titans played the idea of cornering the market on money. They succeeded. But Iceland has shown that the controls emanating from Wall Street in directing legislation, executive action and judicial decisions can be broken.
It is my opinion that part or all of trillions dollars in off balance sheet transactions that were allowed over the last 15 years represents money that was literally stolen from investors who bought what they thought were bonds issued by a legitimate entity that owned loans to consumers some of which secured in the form of residential mortgage loans.
Actual evidence from the ground shows that the money from investors was skimmed by Wall Street to the tune of around $2.6 trillion, which served as the baseline for a PONZI scheme in which Wall Street bankers claimed ownership of debt in which they were neither creditor nor lender in any sense of the word. While it is difficult to actually pin down the amount stolen from the fake securitization chain (in addition to the tier 2 yield spread premium) that brought down investors and borrowers alike, it is obvious that many of these banks also used invested money from managed funds as gambling money that paid off handsomely as they received 100 cents on the dollar on losses suffered by others.
The difference between the scheme used by Wall Street this time is that bankers not only used “other people’s money” —this time they had the hubris to steal or “borrow” the losses they caused — long enough to get the benefit of federal bailout, insurance and hedge products like credit default swaps. Only after the bankers received bailouts and insurance did they push the losses onto investors who were forced to accept non-performing loans long after the 90 day window allowed under the REMIC statutes.
And that is why attorneys defending Foreclosures and other claims for consumer debt, including student loan debt, must first focus on the actual footprints in the sand. The footprints are the actual monetary transactions where real money flowed from one party to another. Leading with the money trail in your allegations, discovery and proof keeps the focus on simple reality. By identifying the real transactions, parties, timing and subject moment lawyers can use the emerging story as the blueprint to measure against the fabricated origination and transfer documents that refer to non-existent transactions.
The problem I hear all too often from clients of practitioners is that the lawyer accepts the production of the note as absolute proof of the debt. Not so. (see below). If you will remember your first year in law school an enforceable contract must have offer, acceptance and consideration and it must not violate public policy. So a contract to kill someone is not enforceable.
Debt arises only if some transaction in which real money or value is exchanged. Without that, no amount of paperwork can make it real. The note is not the debt ( it is evidence of the debt which can be rebutted). The mortgage is not the note (it is a contract to enforce the note, if the note is valid). And the TILA disclosures required make sure that consumers know who they are dealing with. In fact TILA says that any pattern of conduct in which the real lender is hidden is “predatory per se”) and it has a name — table funded loan. This leads to treble damages, attorneys fees and costs recoverable by the borrower and counsel for the borrower.
And a contract to “repay” money is not enforceable if the money was never loaned. That is where “consideration” comes in. And a an alleged contract in the lender agreed to one set of terms (the mortgage bond) and the borrower agreed to another set of terms (the promissory note) is no contract at all because there was no offer an acceptance of the same terms.
And a contract or policy that is sure to fail and result in the borrower losing his life savings and all the money put in as payments, furniture is legally unconscionable and therefore against public policy. Thus most of the consumer debt over the last 20 years has fallen into these categories of unenforceable debt.
The problem has been the inability of consumers and their lawyers to present a clear picture of what happened. That picture starts with footprints in the sand — the actual events in which money actually exchanged hands, the answer to the identity of the parties to each of those transactions and the reason they did it, which would be the terms agreed on by both parties.
If you ask me for a $100 loan and I say sure just sign this note, what happens if I don’t give you the loan? And suppose you went somewhere else to get your loan since I reneged on the deal. Could I sue you on the note? Yes. Could I win the suit? Not if you denied you ever got the money from me. Can I use the real loan as evidence that you did get the money? Yes. Can I win the case relying on the loan from another party? No because the fact that you received a loan from someone else does not support the claim on the note, for which there was no consideration.
It is the latter point that the Courts are starting to grapple with. The assumption that the underlying transaction described in the note and mortgage was real, is rightfully coming under attack. The real transactions, unsupported by note or mortgage or disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act, cannot be the square peg jammed into the round hole. The transaction described in the note, mortgage, transfers, and disclosures was never supported by any transaction in which money exchanged hands. And it was not properly disclosed or documented so that there could be a meeting of the minds for a binding contract.
KEEP THIS IN MIND: (DISCOVERY HINTS) The simple blueprint against which you cast your fact pattern, is that if the securitization scheme was real and not a PONZI scheme, the investors’ money would have gone into a trust account for the REMIC trust. The REMIC trust would have a record of the transaction wherein a deduction of money from that account funded your loan. And the payee on the note (and the secured party on the mortgage) would be the REMIC trust. There is no reason to have it any other way unless you are a thief trying to skim or steal money. If Wall Street had played it straight underwriting standards would have been maintained and when the day came that investors didn’t want to buy any more mortgage bonds, the financial world would not have been on the verge of extinction. Much of the losses to investors would have covered by the insurance and credit default swaps that the banks took even though they never had any loss or risk of loss. There never would have been any reason to use nominees like MERS or originators.
The entire scheme boils down to this: can you borrow the realities of a transaction in which you were not a party and treat it, legally in court, as your own? So far the courts have missed this question and the result has been an unequivocal and misguided “yes.” Relentless of pursuit of the truth and insistence on following the rule of law, will produce a very different result. And maybe America will use the shining example of Iceland as a model rather than letting bankers control our governmental processes.

Banking Chief Calls For 15% Looting of Italians’ Savings
http://www.infowars.com/banking-chief-calls-for-15-looting-of-italians-savings/

Filed under: alternative medicine, AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS COOPERATIVE, AMGAR, ATM, bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 146 Comments »

No Loan Receivable Account Exists

Posted on August 23, 2012 by Neil Garfield

Everyone seems to be having trouble with winning these cases outright. I think I have discovered the problem.

Most attorneys start in the middle of things because that is how it comes to them. Basic Contracts Law, first day of law school. For an agreement to be enforceable it must have all three of the these components: offer, acceptance and consideration. You can’t have just an offer, you can’t have just an acceptance, there must be some act that the law recognizes as consideration if the offer is accepted. Absent all three there is no way for a party to enforce an agreement for which there was either no acceptance nor any consideration.

If I loan you $100, you owe me $100 whether you sign a piece of paper or not. I offered to make the loan, you agreed to accept it and pay it back. That is true and presumed to be the reasonable interpretation of any exchange of money or property — that it isn’t a gift. And ALL of that is true whether there is documentation or not.

It is equally true that if I induce you to sign the note under the promise that I will loan you the $100, we have offer and acceptance and evidence of both the offer and the acceptance. But if I don’t give you the $100, there is no consideration and the agreement is not enforceable regardless of whether it is in writing or not. In the real world, I might survive a motion to dismiss or even a motion for summary judgment, but I could never win at trial because I don’t have any evidence that the money was delivered to you in cash, check or wire transfer.

But you are still going to lose and have a judgment entered against you for the $100 if you don’t deny that you ever got the money and you probably should add for good measure that you were fraudulently induced to sign a note when I knew I wasn’t going to give you the money.

The deal signed by most borrowers lacked consideration because the money did NOT come from the party representing itself to be the lender. The offer to the borrower was not the deal that the investor-lender or even the nonexistent trust pool was promised so if could not have been offered that way — with all the securitization parties involved and all their compensation contrary to the requirements of TILA for disclosure, whose purpose is to give the borrower an opportunity to exercise choice and seek a better competing deal in the marketplace. The borrower accepted an offer that was not backed by consideration nor the intent to provide it.

Hence there was no meeting of the minds in the first instance.

If you reverse the analysis and say that it was the borrower who made the offer it gets even worse. 99% of the real applications if they contained the true facts would never have been accepted by any investor or even a bank looking for subprime profits.

Hence the basics of contracts law have not been met – — you might have the argument to say there was an offer, but there are not grounds to say there was or even would have been acceptance if the true facts were known, and the documents signed do not reflect either the offer or the acceptance by the actual investor-lender or even the pool, whose documents were routinely ignored.

The real problem of Wall Street lies in the facts not in theory. They took the money in with complete disregard to the wishes and intent and agreement of the investor lenders and then funded loans from their own accounts that were based upon false premises made both to the investor-lenders and the borrowers. It is the fact that the money came from a Wall Street account rather than an investor account that causes the confusion.

That funding was the consideration — but that was separate from the documentary chain used by the securitizers. You can’t point to consideration “over there” and say that was the consideration you gave in exchange for the note and mortgage unless you can show that “over there” was connected to the documents that were presented to the borrower and signed under false pretenses, creating fraud in the inducement and even fraud in the execution of those documents.

They were “borrowing” the consideration from “over there” and borrowing the identity of the investor-lenders and borrowers to create a monumental shrine to Ponzi schemes in which the total nominal value of the scheme exceed world fiat money by 12 times the actual supply of money. The ONLY was to combat this is to dismantle the fraudulent scheme so that the threat posed by “shadow banking” no longer exists, seizure of the assets illegally obtained, and making whatever restitution is possible to investor-lenders and homeowners, past, present and future.

They did the illegal deals and then had their own people “approve”them and even accept them into non-existing pools without bank accounts. They claimed the loans as their own when it was convenient for them to do so — getting the money for plunging values of the mortgage bonds at 100 cents on the dollar.

Then they dumped what was left of the paperwork over the fence and told the investor NOW the loan is yours and you have a loss. But at all times these banks were merely depository institutions and they were accepting deposits from investor-lenders more or less in the same form as a CD. Their balance sheet did not show a loan receivable. It would have shown a liability for the deposit that was due back to the investor-lender but for them inserting fictitious entities that would take the liability and the loss borrower. In other words a shell game supporting the usual Ponzi scheme scenario.

In a word, they merely substituted the mortgage bond owed by a non-existent entity with no assets for a normal loan receivable account. Thus no loan receivable accounts exists.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 133 Comments »

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