CHECKLIST — FDCPA Damages and Recovery: Revisiting the Montana S Ct Decision in Jacobson v Bayview

What is unique and instructive about this decision from the Montana Supreme Court is that it gives details of each and every fraudulent, wrongful and otherwise illegal acts that were committed by a self-proclaimed servicer and the “defective” trustee on the deed of trust.

You need to read the case to see how many different times the same court in the same case awarded damages, attorney fees and sanctions against Bayview who persisted in their behavior even after the judgment was entered.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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This case overall stands for the proposition that the violations of federal law by self proclaimed servicers, trusts, trustees, substituted trustees, etc. are NOT insignificant or irrelevant. The consequences of merely applying the law in a fair and balanced way could and should be devastating to the TBTF banks, once the veil is pierced from servicers like Bayview, Ocwen et al and the real players are revealed.

I offer the following for legal practitioners as a checklist of issues that are usually present, in one form or another, in virtually all foreclosure cases and the consequences to the bad actors when the law is actually applied. The interesting thing is that this checklist does not just represent my perspective. It comes directly from the Jacobson decision by the high court in Montana. That decision should be read, studied and analyzed several times. You need to read the case to see how many different times the same court in the same case awarded damages, attorney fees and sanctions against Bayview who persisted in their behavior even after the judgment was entered.

One additional note: If you think about it, you can easily see how this case represents the overall infrastructure employed by the super banks. It is obvious that all of Bayview’s actions were at the behest of Citi, who like any other organized crime figure, sought to avoid getting their hands dirty. The self proclamations inevitably employ the name of US Bank whose involvement is shown in this case to be zero. Nonetheless the attorneys for Bayview and Peterson sought to pile up paper documents to create the illusion that they were acting properly.

  1. FDCPA —abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors
  2. FDCPA who is a debt collector — anyone other than the creditor
  3. FDCPA Strict Liability 
  4. FDCPA for LEAST SOPHISTICATED CONSUMER
  5. FDCPA STATUTORY DAMAGES
  6. FDCPA COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
  7. FDCPA PUNITIVE DAMAGES
  8. FDCPA INHERENT COURT AUTHORITY TO LEVY SANCTIONS
  9. CUMULATIVE BAD ACTS TEST — PATTERN OF CONDUCT
  10. HAMP Modifications Scam — initial and incentive payments
  11. Estopped and fraud: 90 day delinquency disinformation — fraud and UPL
  12. Rejected Payment
  13. Default Letter: Not authorized because sender is neither servicer nor interested party.
  14. Default letter naming creditor
  15. Default letter declaring amount due — usually wrong
  16. Default letter with deadline date for reinstatement: CURE DATE
  17. Late charges improper
  18. Extra interest improper
  19. Fees even after they lose added to balance “due.”
  20. Notice of acceleration based upon default letter which contains inaccurate information. [Not authorized because sender is neither servicer nor interested party.]
  21. Damages: Negative credit rating — [How would bank feel if their investment rating dropped? Would their stock drop? would thousands of stockholders lose money as a result?]
  22. damages: emotional stress
  23. Damages: Lost opportunities to save home
  24. Damages: Lost ability to receive incentive payments for modification
  25. FDCPA etc: Use of nonexistent or inactive entities
  26. FDCPA Illegal notarizations
  27. Illegal notarizations on behalf of nonexistent or uninvolved entities.
  28. FDCPA naming self proclaimed servicer as beneficiary (creditor/mortgagee)
  29. Assignments following self proclamation of beneficiary (creditor/mortgagee)
  30. Falsely Informing homeowner they cannot reinstate
  31. Wrongful appointment of Trustee under deed of trust
  32. Wrongful and non existent Power of Attorney
  33. False promises to modify
  34. False representations to the Court
  35. Musical entities
  36. False and fraudulent utterance of a document
  37. False and fraudulent recording of a false document
  38. False representations concerning “US Bank, Trustee” — a whole category unto itself. (the BOA deal and others who “sold” trustee position of REMICs to US Bank.) 

Notarized MERS Assignment of DOT as Nominee: Forensic Analysis and Motion Practice

I was looking at an assignment signed by Margaret Dalton, “Vice President”, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) “as nominee” for “Hoecomings” (sic) Financial Network, Inc. with an execution date of March 5, 2010 and a notarization date of the same date, notarized by D. Pakusic in Duval County, Florida, naming United Independent Title as Trustee under the Deed of Trust and purporting to assign the Deed of Trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association.

A forensic analysis report would or should state as follows:

  1. The title chain reveals the property is located in the County of Los Angeles, State of California and contains a purported assignment signed by Margaret Dalton, “Vice President”, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) “as nominee” for “Hoecomings” (sic) Financial Network, Inc. with an execution date of March 5, 2010 and a notarization date of the same date, notarized by D. Pakusic in Duval County, Florida, naming United Independent Title as Trustee under the Deed of Trust and purporting to assign the Deed of Trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association. in public records book ____, at page ____ of the County of _________, in the State of Florida. The document appears on its face to have been prepared by Malcolm-Cisneros, a Law Corporation located at 2112 Business Center Dr., Irvine, California 92612. Given the location of the property in California, the location of the law firm that prepared it in California and the location of of the other parties, the fact that it was “notarized” in Florida raises numerous forensic questions requiring production of additional documentation and facts.
  2. Location Issues: The property is located in the State of California, as are the Trustors under the Deed of Trust (DOT). Margaret Dalton is believed to be located in Irvine, California, possibly employed by or on the premises of the above-referenced Law Corporation. The Notary is located in Duval County, Florida which has no known connection with any of the parties. MERS offices are reported to be located in states other than California and the IT platform is reported to be located in the Midwest. Homecoming Financial Network, Inc. (which undersigned believes was intended by the referenced instruments and title chain) is authorized to do business in the State of California, but upon research does not appear to be a chartered bank, financial institution or lender. HFN is a mortgage originator acting on behalf of unknown sources of funds who may be located anywhere, since they are neither disclosed nor described in the closing documentation nor any document on record. Accordingly there is a question as to the identity of the creditor at the time of the origination of the loan, the identity of the creditor at the current time, and the identity of the creditor at all times between the origination of the loan and the present. There are also questions requiring additional documentation and fats to reveal whether the purported assignment was executed by or on behalf of anyone in Duval County, Florida where the instrument was notarized or in Irvine, California where the instrument may have been executed.
  3. Margaret Dalton’s employment is unknown but it does not appear that she has ever been an employee of MERS, nor that MERS is located where Margaret Dalton apparently signed the document. Previous investigations by the undersigned indicate that MERS is an electronic database privately owned and operated by fewer than 17 employees, which do not include Ms. Dalton. According to information received from MERS, the database platform operated by MERS for its members, has an access procedure consisting of a user ID and password. With such information any person could enter, alter or amend any entry in the MERS database. The procedure also provides access to an automated procedure wherein the user may name a person to serve as “vice-president” or “limited signing officer” for MERS. No record has been produced for this analysis indicating that Ms. Dalton was named as “vice-president” or whether she did so herself, nor whether she was authorized to do so or from whom said authority would be claimed. There is accordingly a question as to whether the document was in fact signed by Ms. Dalton, and if so whether she had authority to sign a document that conveyed an interest in real property.
  4. Given the above information, there is also a question as to whether the notarization was valid or void. Florida law provides that if the Notary knows that the person signing does not possess authority to sign or knows that the person is ignorant of their authority, that the oath administered is invalid and that the instrument is construed to be not notarized, despite the signature and stamp. Recording laws require notarization. Thus there is a question as to whether the document is or would be construed as a recorded instrument despite its obvious appearance in the title record. If it is not construed as a recorded instrument, then the chain of title should be amended to remove this document.
  5. The chain of title, as stated above, reveals a Deed of Trust (DOT) in favor of MERS as nominee. No issues are readily apparent as to the execution of the Deed of Trust. However, the content of the DOT raises factual issues that require further examination and the production of additional documents and information. Since MERS is an IT platform operated for the purposes of its private owners, it is not authorized by Florida Statutes nor California Statutes to serve as the equivalent of a recording record for instruments in the public records. It is a data entry and retrieval system that is private, not public. Since MERS was named as nominee and the MERS documentation available on the internet clearly state that under no circumstances will MERS ever claim an interest in the real property, the DOT, the note, nor will ever be the actual lender, beneficiary or mortgagee in any transaction, the effect of naming MERS raises factual issues since there are questions regarding title raised by the conflict between naming MERS and MERS disclaiming any such interest. There is no record of MERS accepting the position as nominee and if so under what circumstances. Those terms exist in agreements executed between members of MERS and one of the MERS corporations and are unavailable to the undersigned forensic analyst.
  6. The DOT and the above-referenced purported assignment refer to MERS as nominee for HFN, which was neither the creditor nor the lender at the time of the origination of the loan. Thus the DOT appears to name MERS (who disclaims any interest in the loan) on behalf of HFN (who served as a conduit for a table-funded loan transaction, probably as part of the securitization of the subject loan transaction) both of whom served principals that were not disclosed at the time of the origination of the loan nor, to the knowledge of the undersigned, to the present. The effect of misspelling the name of HFN on the purported assignment is unknown, but based upon advice from title agents consulted, it would be ordinarily required in any subsequent transaction, that the document be re-executed with the proper spelling. Whether this affects the legality of the instrument is unknown to the undersigned analyst.
  7. The purported assignment refers only to the DOT, which raises several questions. It is unknown whether an assignment of the note, as evidence of the underlying obligation, was executed at the same time as the purported assignment of the DOT. It is unknown whether all the necessary parties executed instruments required to authorize the assignments, and if so when this was accomplished. If there were no such other assignments then there is a question as to whether the instrument was effective, and if so, whether it intended to provide ownership of the security instrument (DOT) to one party while the ownership of the note remained or was transferred to another party, while at the same time the underlying obligation to yet another party may have existed between the Trustor as debtor and the source of funds for the origination of the loan, as creditor. Additional documentation and facts would be required to make these determinations.
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