A Proposed Bankruptcy for Banks That Will Lead to Bailouts

Posted on July 5, 2017 by Neil Garfield

By STEPHEN J. LUBBEN JUNE 26, 2017

The House passed a measure this month that would repeal Dodd-Frank’s orderly liquidation authority. Susan Walsh/Associated Press

At a time when news about Russia, health care, terrorist attacks and horrific fires dominates the headlines, it can be easy to forget that Congress continues to try to undo the regulatory reforms enacted in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

And the Trump administration, despite getting into office on a wave of populism, seems quite willing to embrace Congress’s rather conventional deregulatory agenda.

One core piece of the congressional drive to dismantle Dodd-Frank is the move to repeal orderly liquidation authority and with it the special powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to deal with big bank insolvency. Instead, Congress would leave the failure of big financial institutions to the general bankruptcy system.

If one desires to return to the Gilded Age, with a financial crisis at least once every decade, this is a splendid plan.

A group of professors recently wrote Congress to alert it to the folly of repealing orderly liquidation authority and replacing it with bankruptcy. The professors’ letter is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough.

The professors largely take Dodd-Frank at face value: When a big bank fails, we should try to use the bankruptcy courts first and resort to orderly liquidation authority only in extreme circumstances. That is fine in the abstract, but it bears thinking a bit more deeply about this issue.

Is it really plausible that any of the top half-dozen or so American financial institutions could resolve their financial distress in bankruptcy court? It could happen, just as I may travel to Mars some day.

More realistically, we have to worry that the hurdles to such a case, and the potential knock-on effects, are so significant that such a bank failure would and should proceed immediately to orderly liquidation authority.

That means that “bankruptcy for banks” should primarily focus on other creatures. For example, it might make sense to devise a bankruptcy court procedure for the next tier of banks and broker-dealers, should they fail. At present the failure of one of the larger “regional” bank groups might overwhelm both the F.D.I.C.’s traditional bank rescue tools and the bankruptcy code.

Seen in that light, it is at least as important that the bankruptcy code address a wide range of financial institutions as it stands ready to address the failure of the next Lehman Brothers.

This reveals the fundamental problem with Congress’s present approach. Not only would it leave regulators with no tools to address the failure of a big financial institution, but it would replace that approach with a form of bankruptcy that would be entirely useless for those financial institutions that might actually use a bankruptcy filing.

In particular, Congress’s proposed bankruptcy process for banks tries to move the “single point of entry” strategy developed for the big banks in orderly liquidation authority to the bankruptcy court. Under this strategy, a bank is recused by forcibly converting junior debt to equity.

All the big American banks are revamping their capital structure to facilitate single point of entry. The medium-size financial institutions are not.

So Congress proposes to kill off orderly liquidation authority, the tool that would be of most use to the really big banks, and replace it with a bankruptcy system that will be irrelevant for the really big banks and won’t work for medium-size banks.

As a result, we will bail out both in the next financial crisis.

Stephen J. Lubben holds the Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in corporate governance and business ethics at Seton Hall Law School and is an expert on bankruptcy.

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Gretchen Morgensen: A Whistle was Blown, but Who was Listening?

Posted on May 1, 2017 by Neil Garfield

The Securities and Exchange Commission calls itself the whistle-blower’s advocate. But one participant in the agency’s lauded whistle-blower program isn’t so sure.

He is Michael J. Lutz, an accounting specialist who raised his hand in early 2013 when he was at Radian Group, the giant mortgage insurer. At the time, Radian was still weathering the subprime crisis; it had insured loads of soured mortgages, and Mr. Lutz believed the company was lowballing the amount it might have to pay in claims on the loans.

Mr. Lutz, 31, worked at Radian’s headquarters in Philadelphia verifying that the company’s internal accounting controls were effective. This task is also known as Sarbanes-Oxley testing, named for the Enron-era legislation that bolstered the penalties for accounting fraud.

Radian was required to set aside reserves against potential losses on bad loans, and Mr. Lutz reckoned that his employer was materially understating those amounts. The company was looking to raise capital through a stock offering, and the lower the reserves, the better the company’s earnings would appear.

For the story continue to:https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/business/30gretchen-morgenson-whistleblowers-radian.html

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Gretchen Morgenson Strikes Again: A Revolving Door Helps Big Banks’ Quiet Campaign to Muscle Out Fannie and Freddie

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Neil Garfield

The charge began under Michael D. Berman, who has served not only as chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, one of the industry’s most influential lobbying organizations, but also as a senior adviser to Shaun Donovan, who was the secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 2009 to 2014.

Conversely, Mr. Berman recruited David H. Stevens — who was one of the lead architects of the Obama administration’s proposal to phase out Fannie and Freddie — to the mortgage bankers group, where Mr. Stevens is now president and chief executive.

Many in Congress believe Fannie and Freddie contributed to the collapse of the housing bubble, and they still rest on a shaky financial foundation, largely because of actions taken by the Treasury and the companies’ regulator.

In and Out of the Revolving Door

Moving back and forth between private practice and public service, several people had central roles inside the Obama administration in developing a new housing finance policy that would phase out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the huge government-backed mortgage firms. After leaving office, three of these former officials, now with connections to various large financial institutions, met several times with government officials to discuss issues related to Fannie and Freddie.

For all the problems associated with Fannie and Freddie, some housing experts say, allowing the nation’s largest banks to assume greater control of the mortgage market would most likely increase costs for borrowers. It would also reduce participation and competition from smaller lenders, and could imperil taxpayers because of the potential for even greater bailouts for financial institutions that Washington considers too important to be allowed to fail.

Elise J. Bean is among those who are troubled by the quiet advances Wall Street is making toward Fannie and Freddie’s turf. A former chief counsel for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Ms. Bean oversaw a bipartisan investigation into the causes of the financial crisis, playing a central role in the committee’s four hearings and helping produce a revealing 650-page report.

“Fannie and Freddie have their flaws, but that doesn’t mean the answer is to hand over their business to the banks,” Ms. Bean said. “Their role in the mortgage market is too important to put under the thumb of banks with a history of toxic mortgages, structured finance abuse and consumer maltreatment.”

Behind the Bailout

Decades ago, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created by the government to provide prospective home buyers with financing in both good times and bad. Fannie was born in 1938 during the Depression, when bank lending dried up. The company didn’t make mortgage loans outright; it bought them from other entities. Later, it pooled loans in securities that it sold to investors.

If credit was scarce, the thinking went, banks would be more inclined to lend knowing they could sell a loan to Fannie or to Freddie, a competitor company created in 1970. A bank could then turn around and make another loan, earning fees while keeping the housing finance wheels spinning.

In addition to benefiting borrowers, this system enabled small community lenders to sell their loans to Fannie and Freddie as easily as even the biggest guns in banking. This gave borrowers a choice of lenders, encouraging competition and keeping costs down.

Although government creations, Fannie and Freddie also had public shareholders. Fannie sold shares for the first time in 1968 and Freddie followed suit two decades later. As the nation’s economy grew and homeownership expanded, Fannie and Freddie became increasingly powerful and profitable institutions.

The unusual hybrid of shareholder-owned companies carrying the government’s imprimatur worked well for a long time. But the combination turned sour in the 1990s when Fannie executives began using the company’s lush profits to finance lobbying efforts that enhanced their stature and independence in Washington.

Throughout these years, Fannie and Freddie’s mounting profits, generated in part by their special ties to the government, which put them at a financial advantage, also drew resentment from the nation’s largest banks.

Fannie’s success wound up being a double-edged sword. Its enfeebled overseer, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, allowed its enormous operations to rest on the tiniest sliver of capital, increasing profits during the fat years. But when the financial crisis hit, expected loan losses at both Fannie and Freddie overwhelmed the small amount of capital the companies had on hand.

About a week before Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, the government stepped in. It put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship under the Federal Housing Finance Agency, a new and stronger regulator created that summer in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act. The companies ultimately drew about $187.5 billion from taxpayers in the bailout. They were put on a tight leash by their government minders and were viewed as political poison by Democrats and Republicans alike.

In an interview on CNBC on Sept. 8, 2008, Henry M. Paulson, the Treasury secretary, talked about the government’s rescue of Fannie and Freddie as a steppingstone to a new housing finance system. “Heaven help us and our nation if we don’t figure out what the right structure is going forward,” he said.

Devising Alternatives

Michael Berman, former chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, has also worked at Housing and Urban Development. He recruited another government official to succeed him at the mortgage bankers group. Ryan Stone for The New York Times

The ink was barely dry on the Fannie and Freddie bailout when the Mortgage Bankers Association got busy. Mr. Berman, then vice chairman of the lobbying group and founder of CWCapital, a commercial real estate lender and management firm specializing in multifamily housing projects, was tapped to organize a campaign to privatize the nation’s broken home mortgage system.

With the housing market in collapse and Fannie and Freddie weakened and reviled, it was the perfect time to push the mortgage bankers’ plan to take over the companies’ business and divide their prized assets.

But with banks’ popularity plummeting after the financial crisis, their proposal had to be carefully framed as a way to protect taxpayers from future bailouts.

When President Obama entered office in 2009, taking Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac off government life support was far down his administration’s to-do list. But when officials began turning their attention to the matter in 2010, the industry-sponsored coalition was ready.

Its answer was to create new mortgage guarantors, backed by private capital, to take the place of Fannie and Freddie. These entities would issue mortgage securities with government guarantees, a report issued by the 22-member Council on Ensuring Mortgage Liquidity in late summer 2009 proposed.

The White Paper

“The centerpiece of federal support for the secondary mortgage market should be a new line of mortgage-backed securities.”

The language in the Mortgage Bankers Association’s white paper about the future of housing finance.

The council, overseen by Mr. Berman, was made up of mostly large banks and mortgage insurers. It also recommended that assets belonging to Fannie and Freddie “be used as a foundation” by the new entities.

Chief among these assets were the mortgage underwriting systems the government-sponsored enterprises had built to bundle loans into securities to be sold to investors.

“The M.B.A.’s position literally was: Get rid of Fannie and Freddie and create these new entities,” Mr. Berman said in a recent interview. “But there were extraordinary amounts of value in the enterprises to be reused in different ways in the new system.”

Michael Berman, then chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, testifying in March 2011 before the Senate Banking Committee on the future of the housing finance system. Scott J. Ferrell/Congressional Quarterly, via Getty Images

At first, the industry’s views gained little traction. The economy was in tatters, and lawmakers were not yet ready to tackle the nation’s enormous and complex housing finance system.

Besides, Fannie and Freddie were providing virtually the only access American borrowers had to mortgages during this period. Yes, they were still drawing money from taxpayers, but at least the companies were financing loans as they always had, while big banks were withdrawing from the market.

Throughout 2009 and 2010, Mr. Berman and his colleagues pitched the mortgage bankers’ ideas, saying that their plan would prevent the need for future bailouts and keep the home loan spigot open.

To access the remaining article please go here.

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NewYorkTimes: How ‘Consumer Relief’ after Mortgage Crisis can Enrich Big Banks

Posted on March 20, 2017 by Neil Garfield

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , | 2 Comments »

Gretchen Morgenson: In Wells Fargo’s Bogus Accounts, Echoes of Foreclosure Abuses

Posted on September 22, 2016 by Neil Garfield

John Stumpf, the chairman and chief executive of Wells Fargo, won a dubious achievement award from one of his interrogators during Tuesday’s scorching hearings on Capitol Hill. The bank’s yearslong practice of opening bogus accounts for customers and charging fees to do so, said Senator Jon Tester, Democrat of Montana, had united the Senate Banking Committee on a major topic for the first time in a decade. “And not in a good way,” he added.

But this was not the first time problematic and pervasive activities at Wells Fargo succeeded in uniting a disparate group. After observing years of abusive mortgage loan servicing practices at the bank, an increasing number of judges hearing foreclosure cases after the financial crisis grew to understand that banks could not always be trusted in their pleadings.

This was a major shift: For decades, the nation’s courts had been largely pro-bank when hearing foreclosure cases, accepting what big financial institutions produced in documentation and amounts owed by borrowers.

“Wells didn’t intentionally educate judges. They didn’t raise their hand and say, ‘Judge, we’re sorry,’” said O. Max Gardner III, a prominent foreclosure defense lawyer who teaches consumer counsel how to represent troubled borrowers. “It was people really digging in and having the resources and the time to ask the right questions about what they were doing with the money.” Those practices included levying improper fees and incorrectly foreclosing on homes.

Tom Goyda, a Wells Fargo spokesman, said: “The housing downturn was a challenging time for our nation, and Wells Fargo has acknowledged that we made mistakes in the handling of mortgage foreclosures along the way. Lenders, investors, along with policy makers and regulators — all sides — learned foreclosure processes had to be addressed, and Wells Fargo made significant improvements to the way we work with customers when they fall behind in their payments and during the foreclosure process.”

During the financial crisis, Wells Fargo was at a remove from Wall Street and was not a big player in creating toxic and complex mortgage securities that were engineered to fail. But the bank’s ability to emerge from the crisis with a relatively good reputation is something of a mystery to anyone who paid attention to its aggressive foreclosure activities.

There were enough problematic foreclosure cases involving Wells Fargo moving through the courts that the bank’s dubious practices seemed as pervasive then as the questionable account-opening scheme does now. And some of the elements of both scandals — improper fees and forgeries — are the same.

  The only difference: Mr. Stumpf, who was named Wells’s chief executive in 2007, has apologized to the customers his bank harmed with its account opening charade. Lawyers who represented troubled borrowers say no such apology came from Mr. Stumpf during the foreclosure mess.

“I sure as heck haven’t seen it,” said Linda Tirelli, a longtime foreclosure defense lawyer at Garvey Tirelli & Cushner in White Plains, who has often battled Wells Fargo. “I don’t remember ever hearing him apologize, because that would admit wrongdoing, and that’s not part of Wells Fargo’s corporate culture. Their culture is about not holding anybody at the top accountable.”

Some judges tried to hold Wells Fargo to account for its foreclosure practices. One was Elizabeth W. Magner, a federal bankruptcy judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana. She was among the first judges to identify problematic patterns in Wells Fargo’s foreclosure practice and to respond with vigor.

In an early 2008 case, she assessed damages and sanctions against Wells Fargo after concluding that the bank had levied fees on Dorothy Chase Stewart, a widowed borrower, without notifying her. This had the effect of pushing Ms. Stewart deeper into default and increasing the amounts she owed.

Judge Magner highlighted Wells’s “abusive imposition of unwarranted fees and charges” and its improper calculation of escrow payments. And, she added, Wells Fargo’s practice of not telling borrowers about the fees they were being charged “is not peculiar to loans involved in a bankruptcy.” Wells had also failed to credit Ms. Stewart with $1,800 that it had charged her for an eviction that did not occur.

An especially egregious aspect of the case involved Wells Fargo’s regular appraisals of the Stewart property. Banks conduct such appraisals when a property is in default to ensure that it is being maintained properly.

But in the Stewart case, the court cast doubt on two of the appraisals Wells Fargo charged Ms. Stewart for in 2005, noting that they were said to have been completed on the same day that Jefferson Parish, the location of the Stewart home, was under an evacuation order because of Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the court found that a unit of Wells had done the appraisals, charging double its costs for them.

In a 2013 Massachusetts case, William G. Young, a Federal District Court judge overseeing a foreclosure, was so distressed by Wells Fargo’s litigation tactics that he required the bank to provide him with a corporate resolution signed by its president and a majority of its board stating that they stood behind the conduct of the bank’s lawyers in the case.

“The disconnect between Wells Fargo’s publicly advertised face and its actual litigation conduct here could not be more extreme,” Judge Young wrote. “A quick visit to Wells Fargo’s website confirms that it vigorously promotes itself as consumer-friendly,” he continued, “a far cry from the hard-nosed win-at-any-cost stance it has adopted here.”

In Tuesday’s Senate hearing, Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, made a similar observation, comparing Wells Fargo’s stated rules of the road — respecting its customers — with its improper account-opening activities.

When judges criticized Wells Fargo in foreclosure cases, bank officials either maintained that the situation was unusual or that the judge was being unreasonable. Only occasionally did the bank concede that it had handled a case badly.

Responses like these also ring a bell today.

One remarkable foreclosure ruling against Wells Fargo came in January 2015, in a Missouri state court. Judge R. Brent Elliott ordered Wells to pay more than $3 million in punitive damages and other costs for harming David and Crystal Holm, borrowers in Holt, Mo., who fought the bank’s improper foreclosure of their home for more than six years.

“Defendant Wells Fargo’s deceptive and intentional conduct displayed a complete and total disregard for the rights” of the couple, wrote Judge Elliott, a circuit judge in the 43rd Judicial District of Missouri. “Wells Fargo took its money and moved on, with complete disregard to the human damage left in its wake.”

Punctuating his view, Judge Elliott cited the testimony of a bank employee who told the court: “I’m not here as a human being. I’m here as a representative of Wells Fargo.”

Wells Fargo said it was appealing the case.

Finally, there was the scathing 2010 contempt ruling in a Wells Fargo foreclosure case by Jeff Bohm, a federal bankruptcy judge in Houston. To the bank’s argument that unintentional errors, including a computer malfunction, had caused Wells to demand money from two borrowers who had previously settled with the lender, Judge Bohm conceded that mistakes could happen.

“However, when mistakes happen not once, not twice, but repeatedly,” he continued, “and when actions are not taken to correct these mistakes within a reasonable period of time, the failure to right the wrong — particularly when the basis for the problem is a monthslong violation of an agreed judgment — the excuse of ‘mistakes happen’ has no credence.”

Seems as though Judge Bohm was onto something.

Twitter: @gmorgenson


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People Who Were Wrong Are the Winners — SO FAR

Posted on May 27, 2014 by Neil Garfield

First of all I don’t think Geithner caused the financial crisis. He certainly contributed to it but it probably would have happened even if he had not undercut Sheila Bair at every opportunity; and yes he should have listened to other people who were saying that the corruption on Wall Street had reached epic proportions.

Second, I think that neither Geithner nor his predecessor, Hank Paulson, as Treasury secretaries, had a real understanding of the crisis at any time up through today. And their bosses, Presidents Bush and Obama were even more clueless. And while they are probably culpable for their negligence and mismanagement of the crisis, the foreclosure madness would have occurred anyway.

Third, it is my belief that the culprits on Wall Street with all their tentacles stretched out across the globe were unstoppable by anyone except a good government with the resources to actually get to the bottom of it. What was missing was the desire to get rid of the problem and the naivete of the leaders in government in failing to notice that the entire banking industry was engaged in faking transactions and documents — and failing to ask why that was necessary.

Fourth my opinion is that the fault lies with the failure of anyone in government to learn anything relevant about the industries they were supposed to be regulating. If they had done so, starting in 1983 when derivatives became adolescent, the adult would have been far more tame and the crises would have been averted entirely.

Homeowners did not create the crisis. Tens of millions of homeowners did not congregate in a room thinking up 450 loan products when there were only 4 or 5. And saying they had bad judgment would absolve almost any perpetrator of economic crime because his victim was too stupid.

The laws were already in place. It was knowledgeable people that were missing. We needed and had faithful servants of the people — but as a society and as a nation each country contributed to the enormous problem that has now been created. And we will keep paying for it as banks take over all commodities we hold dear and “legally” corner the markets with stolen cash and property.

In Nocera’s article on Bankrupt Housing Policy, he points out that ” in the course of perusing another new book about the financial crisis, “Other People’s Houses,” by Jennifer Taub, an associate professor at Vermont Law School, I was reminded of an effort that took place in the spring of 2009 that could have made an enormous difference to homeowners, one that would have required no taxpayer money and might well have become law with a little energetic lobbying from the likes of, well, Tim Geithner. That was an attempt, led by Dick Durbin, the Illinois senator, to change the bankruptcy code so that homeowners who were underwater could modify their mortgages during the bankruptcy process. The moment has been largely forgotten; Taub has done us a favor by putting it back on the table.”

He goes on to say that he had correspondence with Sheila Bair who was undermined and stomped on by the Obama administration for even thinking about relief to homeowners. She was head of the FDIC and prevented from doing her job by a bankrupt policy of save the banks and damn the homeowners. “Because, as Bair told me in an email, “It would have been a powerful bargaining chip for borrowers.” Without the ability to file for bankruptcy, underwater homeowners unable to pay their mortgages were helpless to prevent foreclosures. With it, however, servicers and banks were far more likely to negotiate the debt load. And if they weren’t, a bankruptcy judge would rule on the appropriate debt to be repaid. For all the talk about the need for principal reduction, this change would have been the easiest way to get it.”

According to Adam Levitin, in the same article by Nocera, this should have been a “no-brainer.” I take that too mean that as I have explained above, brains were in short supply during the worst of what we have yet seen of the economic crisis that most of us think is not even half over. Obama may be leaving the crisis as his legacy not because he caused it but because he didn’t do anything about it — or at least anything right.

And I obviously agree with Nocera’s ending comment — “Why is it that the fear of moral hazard only applies to homeowners, and not to the banks?”

Gretchen Morgenson says Geithner admitted he was inept at times. ““We were human.” But this fails to address head-on the possibility that he was a captured regulator, a man locked into the mind-set of the very bankers he was supposed to oversee.”

Gretchen reports without objection from Geithner — “Last week, I asked Sheila C. Bair, the former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for her recollection of these events. She replied with an email recalling that in 2006, she attended her first Basel Committee meeting, the international negotiations that Mr. Geithner was referring to. While there, she pushed unsuccessfully to raise bank capital levels.

Why was she unsuccessful? “I was actively undermined by the Fed, the New York Fed and the comptroller of the currency,” she said. “I later complained to Tim about the way his representative on the Basel Committee had undermined me. He was unapologetic.”

Gretchen has not been given the resources to prove the corruption on Wall Street, but she knows it is there and as the fourth estate the NY Times should have provided her with a blank check for what would have been a Pulitzer or even a Nobel prize. for now we can only agree with her — “We were the lenders of last resort and should have been paid an enormous premium for the use of our money. We were not.”

There are suddenly a spate of articles on what went wrong because Geithner wrote a book and is selling it enhancing his own fortunes while he presided over the worst hit the middle class has had in our history.

Here is what investigators should have been looking for:

Behind door number 1 were the fools. These are the money managers who for reasons the defy explanation did no due diligence and bought empty mortgage bonds issued by a trust that was never going to receive the money, the loans or the property.

Behind door number 2 were the wolves of Wall Street including all the different brokers, dealers, banks, rating agencies and insurers, all the mortgage brokers, real estate brokers, and closing agents and title companies all in league to take as much money as they could out of the system and the hide it behind shadow money equivalent to ten times all the actual money in the world.

Behind door number 3 are the victims. These are the people who knew nothing about mortgages, derivatives or anything else. In the end they were convinced by super salespeople that they could never understand how they could afford the loan nor could they even understand why they must do it anyway. In Florida alone 10,000 such sales people were convicted felons. And yet when we talk of moral hazard we speak of people, and not banks. Why is that?

Filed under: AMGAR, education, escrow agent, foreclosure, Occupy Movement, Title | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 15 Comments »

Gretchen Morgenson: Tide Turning as Judges Get Irritated by Bank and Lawyer Behavior

Posted on October 7, 2013 by Neil Garfield

“Two recent rulings — one in New York involving Bank of America and one in Massachusetts involving Wells Fargo — serve as examples. In the Wells Fargo case, a ruling on Sept. 17 by Judge William G. Young of Federal District Court was especially stinging. In it, he required Wells Fargo to provide him with a corporate resolution signed by its president and a majority of its board stating that they stand behind the conduct of the bank’s lawyers in the case.”

Editor’s Comment: As I am litigating directly now I see evidence of the same trends discussed in the New York Times article. I adopted a different stance than most foreclosure defense attorneys whose strategies are not less valid than my own. They just don’t suit me. I am accustomed to being the aggressor. So I enter a cases in which the bank has been delaying prosecution of the foreclosure case and step up the pace. The Judges here in Tallahassee and elsewhere are taking note — that the banks are curiously opposing our attempts to move the case along. The resulting shift in perception is palpable. Judges are looking at the files and realizing that it is not because of borrowers who frankly did nothing in the file, but because of the banks who never prosecuted the case.

We ask for expedited discovery and a trial order. The bank attorneys inevitably back pedal and state they cannot agree to expediting the case — which has led the Judges to muse aloud about who is the Plaintiff and who is the defendant.

You would think that the bank would be anxious to produce its witnesses and exhibits for discovery. They are not. In one case the bank has been thwarting the deposition of the person who verified the complaint for over three months.  We only asked for the documents upon which the witness relied when she verified the complaint — something that obviously had to exist before they could file the complaint. So far, no witness nor documents.

When I was representing banks in foreclosures, if someone raised any kind of defense or objection I went out of my way to produce the records custodian,and all the records and proof of the receipt of the money including canceled checks and the bookkeeping records of the banks so there would be no mistake about the existence of the default. I would carefully confirm the figures and history of the borrower before I sent the notice of default, acceleration and right to reinstate because all my figures had to be correct — or else the notice was defective and I would have had to start all over again (something I learned the hard way).

Judges are sensing a disconnect between the banks and their alleged lawyers, and they are right to question that. The assignment usually comes from LPS and the Plaintiff bank usually has no direct knowledge of the action because LPS fabricates most of the documents. That is why Judge Young said that if you want to proceed, I want to see a resolution of the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo bank that they ratify and accept the actions taken by the the attorneys supposedly representing them.

You can almost feel the vibrations of a ship groaning as it makes a turn. The banks are in for a rude awakening.

Fair Game

Why Judges Are Scowling at Banks

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

District court judges are not generally known as flamethrowers, but some seem to be losing patience with banks in cases involving lending practices.

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, evidence, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES | Tagged: , , , , | 46 Comments »

Trustees on REMICs Face a World of Hurt

Posted on June 18, 2013 by Neil Garfield

DID YOU EVER WONDER WHY TRUSTEES INSTRUCTED THE INVESTMENT BANKS TO NOT USE THEIR NAME IN FORECLOSURES?

Editor’s Comment: Finally the questions are spreading over the entire map of the false securitization of loans and the diversion of money, securities and property from investors and homeowners. Read the article below, and see if you smell the stink rising from the financial sector. It is time for the government to come clean and tell us that they were defrauded by TARP, the bank bailouts, and the privileges extended to the major banks. They didn’t save the financial sector they crowned it king over all the world.

Nowhere is that more evident than when you drill down on the so-called “trustees” of the so-called “trusts” that were “backed” by mortgage loans that didn’t exist or that were already owned by someone else. The failure of trustees to exercise any power or control over securitization or to even ask a question about the mortgage bonds and the underlying loans was no accident. When the whistle blowers come out on this one it will clarify the situation. Deutsch, US Bank, Bank of New York accepted fees for the sole purpose of being named as trustees with the understanding that they would do nothing. They were happy to receive the fees and they knew their names were being used to create the illusion of authenticity when the bonds were “Sold” to investors.

One of the next big revelations is going to be how the money from investors was quickly spirited away from the trustee and directly into the pockets of the investment bankers who sold them. The Trustee didn’t need a trust account because no money was paid to any “trust” on which it was named the trustee. Not having any money they obviously were not called upon to sign a check or issue a wire transfer from any account because there was no account. This was key to the PONZI scheme.

If the Trustees received money for the “trust” then they would be required under all kinds of laws and regulations to act like a trustee. With no assets in a named trustee they could hardly be required to do anything since it was an unfunded trust and everyone knows that an unfunded trust is no trust at all even if it exists on paper.

Of course if they had received the money as trustee, they would have wanted more money to act like a trustee. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. If they had received the money from investors then they would have spent it on acquiring mortgages. And if they were acquiring mortgages as trustee they would have peeked under the hood to see if there was any loan there. to the extent that the loans were non-confirming loans for stable funds (heavily regulated pension funds) they would rejected many of the loans.

The real interesting pattern here is what would have happened if they did purchase the loans. Well then — and follow this because your house depends upon it — if they HAD purchased the loans for the “trust” there would have no need for MERS, no trading in the mortgages, and no trading on the mortgage bonds except that the insurance would have been paid to the investors like they thought it would. The Federal Reserve would not be buying billions of dollars in “mortgage bonds” per month because there would be no need — because there would be no emergency.

If they HAD purchased the loans, then they would have a recorded interest, under the direction as trustees, for the REMIC trusts. And they would have had all original documents or proof that the original documents had been deposited somewhere that could be audited,  because they would not have purchased it without that. Show me the note never would have gotten off the ground or even occurred to anyone. But most importantly, they would clearly have mitigated damages by receipt of insurance and credit default swaps, payable to the trust and to the investment banker, which is what happened.

No, Reynaldo Reyes (Deutsch bank asset manager in control of the trustee program), it is not “Counter-intuitive.” It was a lie from start to finish to cover up a PONZI scheme that failed like all PONZI schemes fail as soon as the “investors” stop buying the crap you are peddling. THAT is what happened in the financial crisis which would have been no crisis. Most of the loans would never have been approved for purchase by the trusts. Most of the defaults would have been real, most of the debts would have been real, and most importantly the note would be properly owned by the trust giving it an insurable interest and therefore the proceeds of insurance and credit default swaps would have been paid to investors leaving the number of defaults and foreclosures nearly zero.

And as we have seen in recent days, there would not have been a Bank of America driving as many foreclosures through the system as possible because the trustee would have entered into modification and mitigation agreements with borrowers. Oh wait, that might not have been necessary because the amount of money flooding the world would have been far less and the shadow banking system would be a tiny fraction of the size it is now — last count it looks like something approaching or exceeding one quadrillion dollars — or about 20 times all the real money in the world.

At some point the dam will break and the trustees will turn on the investment banks and those who are using the trustee’s name in vain. The foreclosures will stop and the government will need to fess up tot he fact that it entered into tacit understandings with scoundrels. When you sleep with dogs you get fleas — unless the dog is actually clean.

Stay Tuned for more whistle blowing.

In Countrywide Case, Trustees Failed to Provide Oversight on Mortgage Pools

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , | 88 Comments »

Screw the Pooch!!??

Posted on June 14, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

Do some research, think about what you know and what you need to know. Come to my seminar or any seminar on securitization and you will understand the significance. Naked short-selling is the same as selling forward. In both cases you sell to an “investor” something where you have no asset and no money to back it up. You take the money from the investor and use it pretty much any way you like and account for it as “trading profits.” Then you take what is left and you create the illusion of transactions when in fact the documents refer to a virtual transaction in which the parties were different than those described on the closing documents and the terms of repayment of the loan are different than the terms disclosed to either the  investor or the borrower.

This sort of thing is unfathomable to most people, except those who spent a lot of time on Wall Street or doing Wall Street-type things, which is an adequate description of my background. If you sold a car to someone when you didn’t have the car or the money to buy it and then you took the money and put part of it in your pocket as your fee and then went out and bought a junker, you might be charged with civil or criminal fraud. Don’t you think? But on Wall Street these behaviors are permitted in the name of increasing liquidity.

What a country!

Joe Floren Screws the Pooch

by Patrick Byrne

The first time I heard Joe Floren speak I was standing behind him in an elevator in his law firm’s San Francisco office tower  as another lawyer informed him that the subpoena Joe Floren had served the previous day on a colleague of mine had reached her in the hospital, after a difficult delivery of her first child, while she was breastfeeding for the first time.

“Really? That’s beautiful. I love it!” He replied with glee.

Joseph E. Floren, Esq., is a lawyer at Morgan Lewis, the white shoe law firm defending Goldman Sachs against Overstock’s prime broker litigation, and tonight I celebrate the mistake Joe Floren made yesterday.  In filing Goldman’s response to Overstock’s motion to vacate the trial court judge’s decision to stay his own decision to unseal various documents related to this litigation (in more straightforward English: the trial court judge decided to unseal some documents while also deciding to delay acting on his decision, but we objected to this delay, and Goldman responded to our objections), Joe Floren screwed the pooch. He filed something containing an attachment he forgot to redact. That attachment is a previous filing of Overstock’s, a filing which contains but a sample of the shenanigans at Goldman and Merrill that has turned up over the course of five years and millions of pages of discovery, but which filing we had redacted when we made it (as good litigants do).

Fortunately for the cause of all that is good and right about America, Joe Floren’s goof came to the attention of a diligent 1st amendment attorney in California named Karl Olson, who represents the Economist, Bloomberg, the New York Times and Wener Publications (owners of Rolling Stone magazine) in their efforts to obtain the documents.  Karl Olson provided Joe Floren’s sloppy filing to his clients. Tonight these stories appeared:

Rolling Stone: Accidentally Released – and Incredibly Embarrassing – Documents Show How Goldman et al Engaged in ‘Naked Short Selling’

Bloomberg: Goldman, Merrill E-Mails Show Naked Shorting, Filing Says

Economist: An enlightening mistake

Really, Joe Floren?  That’s beautiful.  I love it.

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Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 41 Comments »

FRONT PAGE FORGERY — NY TIMES

Posted on October 4, 2010 by Neil Garfield

SERVICES YOU NEED

“Linda M. Tirelli, a lawyer in White Plains who represents Ms. Nuer in the case against Chase. “This is not about getting a free house for my client. It’s about a level playing field. If I submitted false documents like this to the court, I’d have my license handed to me.”

“Judges may dismiss the foreclosures altogether, barring lenders from refiling and awarding the home to the borrower. That would create a loss for the lender or investor holding the note underlying the property. Almost certainly, lawyers say, lawsuits on behalf of borrowers will multiply.”

EDITORS note: you will have to obtain the paper version of the New York Times to see the three examples of obvious forgeries. The fact that it is on the front page of the newspaper is significant in itself. Gretchen Morgenson has done an excellent job of summing up the examples of fabrication, improper purposes, improper procedures and the probability that actual crimes have been committed.

Although it appears that we are rapidly approaching the reality of this situation, the absence of the “fundamentals” is conspicuous. It is true that the industry practice involved conduct by attorneys, servicers, banks, trustees and others that should probably result in disciplinary actions by the agencies that purport to regulate these entities. But the underlying theme of this article as well as the rest of mainstream media is an assumption that the “defaults” actually exist and therefore that the foreclosures are virtually inevitable but for technical violations on the part of the lenders.

This article also highlights the instances where multiple entities attempted to foreclose on the same property using the same alleged mortgage documents, each making the claim that they are the holder of the note, the real party in interest and possessed of standing to initiate foreclosure proceedings. But the article attributes this to the inability of the “lenders” to deal with the volume of defaults in mortgages.

  • The concept that the mortgages themselves may be fatally defective is completely absent from any reporting on the subject.

  • The concept that the default may not actually exist because the actual creditors have mitigated their losses through receipt of third party payments is completely absent from any reporting on this subject.

  • The concept that the encumbrance on the property may never have been perfected or that it is unenforceable now is completely absent from any reporting on the subject.

Don’t make the mistake of confusing information with evidence. The article in the New York Times as well as this article is merely information. Evidence has a legal definition and if you want to prove something you must meet that definition in order to have some fact or document admitted into the court record and considered in a decision. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. The courts have improperly admitted representations of counsel and improper affidavits as evidence, under the presumption that the underlying facts were undoubtedly true. It would be equally improper of the court to lend the same presumption to you. And this is why I have reversed myself and now discourage homeowners representing themselves in court.  A licensed experienced attorney hopefully will know how important it is to raise properly framed objections as early as possible in the proceedings in order to take control of the narrative.

In fact, all of the representations of counsel and the proffer of information contained in affidavits, assignments, endorsements, powers of attorney, substitutions of trustee, notices of default, notices of sale, or any of the other documents used to initiate foreclosure proceedings contains nothing more than false allegations that should have been subject to a simple denial by the borrower, thus requiring the party seeking affirmative relief to properly plead and prove their case. This they cannot do because of the absence of any fact or witness that would actually support their case.

These cases are not simply flawed. They are complete shams, a fraud upon the court, the homeowner, and any subsequent party  who believes that they received clear title resulting from a foreclosure or short sale. The current conduct of the pretender lenders and their attorneys and foreclosure mills is only a continuation of the Ponzi scheme that started with the first sale of an alleged mortgage bond to an investor who believed that the proceeds were being used primarily to fund loans that were properly valued and subjected to rigorous industry-standard underwriting procedures. The lies told to the investors who were the actual lenders in these transactions were identical to the lies told to the homeowners who were the borrowers in these transactions. Separating these parties–the lender and the borrower–was the core tactic and requirement of those who originated this fraudulent scheme.

The reason for the stonewalling on answers to qualified written requests, on answers to debt validation letters, and on responses to demands for discovery is not just that the fabrication and forgery of documents will be revealed–a fact well known to attorneys whose employees created and executed the fabrications and forgeries. The greater reason is to maintain the separation between the lender and the borrower. At some point in the evolution of this epic drama the lenders and the borrowers will get together and compare notes. At that time, the revelation of fraudulent and perhaps criminal conduct throughout this fraudulent scheme extending over a decade will be unavoidable. Stonewalling kicks the can down the road while the perpetrators explore their options to avoid liability and prosecution.

Here is a contribution from Ann:

For full Deposition transcripts of Robot Signers, go to
http://www.scribd.com and put their name on the search.

Many interesting foreclosure legal pleadings and info
at
http://www.scribd.com/83jjmack http://www.scribd.com/winston2311
http://www.scribd.com/foreclosure fraud

October 3, 2010

Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis

04mortgage.html?_r=1&hp

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

As some of the nation’s largest lenders have conceded that their foreclosure procedures might have been improperly handled, lawsuits have revealed myriad missteps in crucial documents.

The flawed practices that GMAC Mortgage, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America have recently begun investigating are so prevalent, lawyers and legal experts say, that additional lenders and loan servicers are likely to halt foreclosure proceedings and may have to reconsider past evictions.

Problems emerging in courts across the nation are varied but all involve documents that must be submitted before foreclosures can proceed legally. Homeowners, lawyers and analysts have been citing such problems for the last few years, but it appears to have reached such intensity recently that banks are beginning to re-examine whether all of the foreclosure papers were prepared properly.

In some cases, documents have been signed by employees who say they have not verified crucial information like amounts owed by borrowers. Other problems involve questionable legal notarization of documents, in which, for example, the notarizations predate the actual preparation of documents — suggesting that signatures were never actually reviewed by a notary.

Other problems occurred when notarizations took place so far from where the documents were signed that it was highly unlikely that the notaries witnessed the signings, as the law requires.

On still other important documents, a single official’s name is signed in such radically different ways that some appear to be forgeries. Additional problems have emerged when multiple banks have all argued that they have the right to foreclose on the same property, a result of a murky trail of documentation and ownership.

There is no doubt that the enormous increase in foreclosures in recent years has strained the resources of lenders and their legal representatives, creating challenges that any institution might find overwhelming. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, the percentage of loans that were delinquent by 90 days or more stood at 9.5 percent in the first quarter of 2010, up from 4 percent in the same period of 2008.

But analysts say that the wave of defaults still does not excuse lenders’ failures to meet their legal obligations before trying to remove defaulting borrowers from their homes.

“It reflects the hubris that as long as the money was going through the pipeline, these companies didn’t really have to make sure the documents were in order,” said Kathleen C. Engel, dean for intellectual life at Suffolk University Law School and an expert in mortgage law. “Suddenly they have a lot at stake, and playing fast and loose is going to be more costly than it was in the past.”

Attorneys general in at least six states, including Massachusetts, Iowa, Florida and Illinois, are investigating improper foreclosure practices. Last week, Jennifer Brunner, the secretary of state of Ohio, referred examples of what her office considers possible notary abuse by Chase Home Mortgage to federal prosecutors for investigation.

The implications are not yet clear for borrowers who have been evicted from their homes as a result of improper filings. But legal experts say that courts may impose sanctions on lenders or their representatives or may force banks to pay borrowers’ legal costs in these cases.

Judges may dismiss the foreclosures altogether, barring lenders from refiling and awarding the home to the borrower. That would create a loss for the lender or investor holding the note underlying the property. Almost certainly, lawyers say, lawsuits on behalf of borrowers will multiply.

In Florida, problems with foreclosure cases are especially acute. A recent sample of foreclosure cases in the 12th Judicial Circuit of Florida showed that 20 percent of those set for summary judgment involved deficient documents, according to chief judge Lee E. Haworth.

“We have sent repeated notices to law firms saying, ‘You are not following the rules, and if you don’t clean up your act, we are going to impose sanctions on you,’ ” Mr. Haworth said in an interview. “They say, ‘We’ll fix it, we’ll fix it, we’ll fix it.’ But they don’t.”

As a result, Mr. Haworth said, on Sept. 17, Harry Rapkin, a judge overseeing foreclosures in the district, dismissed 61 foreclosure cases. The plaintiffs can refile but they need to pay new filing fees, Mr. Haworth said.

The byzantine mortgage securitization process that helped inflate the housing bubble allowed home loans to change hands so many times before they were eventually pooled and sold to investors that it is now extremely difficult to track exactly which lenders have claims to a home.

Many lenders or loan servicers that begin the foreclosure process after a borrower defaults do not produce documentation proving that they have the legal right to foreclosure, known as standing.

As a substitute, the banks usually present affidavits attesting to ownership of the note signed by an employee of a legal services firm acting as an agent for the lender or loan servicer. Such affidavits allow foreclosures to proceed, but because they are often dubiously prepared, many questions have arisen about their validity.

Although lawyers for troubled borrowers have contended for years that banks in many cases have not properly documented their rights to foreclose, the issue erupted in mid-September when GMAC said it was halting foreclosure proceedings in 23 states because of problems with its legal practices. The move by GMAC followed testimony by an employee who signed affidavits for the lender; he said that he executed 400 of them each day without reading them or verifying that the information in them was correct.

JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America followed with similar announcements.

But these three large lenders are not the only companies employing people who have failed to verify crucial aspects of a foreclosure case, court documents show.

Last May, Herman John Kennerty, a loan administration manager in the default document group of Wells Fargo Mortgage, testified to lawyers representing a troubled borrower that he typically signed 50 to 150 foreclosure documents a day. In that case, in King County Superior Court in Seattle, he also stated that he did not independently verify the information to which he was attesting.

Wells Fargo did not respond to requests for comment.

In other cases, judges are finding that banks’ claims of standing in a foreclosure case can conflict with other evidence.

Last Thursday, Paul F. Isaacs, a judge in Bourbon County Circuit Court in Kentucky, reversed a ruling he had made in August giving Bank of New York Mellon the right to foreclose on a couple’s home. According to court filings, Mr. Isaacs had relied on the bank’s documentation that it said showed it held the note underlying the property in a trust. But after the borrowers supplied evidence indicating that the note may in fact reside in a different trust, the judge reversed himself. The court will revisit the matter soon.

Bank of New York said it was reviewing the ruling and could not comment.

Another problematic case involves a foreclosure action taken by Deutsche Bank against a borrower in the Bronx in New York. The bank says it has the right to foreclose because the mortgage was assigned to it on Oct. 15, 2009.

But according to court filings made by David B. Shaev, a lawyer at Shaev & Fleischman who represents the borrower, the assignment to Deutsche Bank is riddled with problems. First, the company that Deutsche said had assigned it the mortgage, the Sand Canyon Corporation, no longer had any rights to the underlying property when the transfer was supposed to have occurred.

Additional questions have arisen over the signature verifying an assignment of the mortgage. Court documents show that Tywanna Thomas, assistant vice president of American Home Mortgage Servicing, assigned the mortgage from Sand Canyon to Deutsche Bank in October 2009. On assignments of mortgages in other cases, Ms. Thomas’s signatures differ so wildly that it appears that three people signed the documents using Ms. Thomas’s name.

Given the differences in the signatures, Mr. Shaev filed court papers last July contending that the assignment is a sham, “prepared to create an appearance of a creditor as a real party in interest/standing, when in fact it is likely that the chain of title required in these matters was not performed, lost or both.”

Mr. Shaev also asked the judge overseeing the case, Shelley C. Chapman, to order Ms. Thomas to appear to answer questions the lawyer has raised.

John Gallagher, a spokesman for Deutsche Bank, which is trustee for the securitization that holds the note in this case, said companies servicing mortgage loans engaged the law firms that oversee foreclosure proceedings. “Loan servicers are obligated to adhere to all legal requirements,” he said, “and Deutsche Bank, as trustee, has consistently informed servicers that they are required to execute these actions in a proper and timely manner.”

Reached by phone on Saturday, Ms. Thomas declined to comment.

The United States Trustee, a unit of the Justice Department, is also weighing in on dubious court documents filed by lenders. Last January, it supported a request by Silvia Nuer, a borrower in foreclosure in the Bronx, for sanctions against JPMorgan Chase.

In testimony, a lawyer for Chase conceded that a law firm that had previously represented the bank, the Steven J. Baum firm of Buffalo, had filed inaccurate documents as it sought to take over the property from Ms. Nuer.

The Chase lawyer told a judge last January that his predecessors had combed through the chain of title on the property and could not find a proper assignment. The firm found “something didn’t happen that needed to be fixed,” he explained, and then, according to court documents, it prepared inaccurate documents to fill in the gaps.

The Baum firm did not return calls to comment.

A lawyer for the United States Trustee said that the Nuer case “does not represent an isolated example of misconduct by Chase in the Southern District of New York.”

Chase declined to comment.

“The servicers have it in their control to get the right documents and do this properly, but it is so much cheaper to run it through a foreclosure mill,” said Linda M. Tirelli, a lawyer in White Plains who represents Ms. Nuer in the case against Chase. “This is not about getting a free house for my client. It’s about a level playing field. If I submitted false documents like this to the court, I’d have my license handed to me.”

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

Forensic Analysis: Unions Amass Armory of Research on Foreclosures of Securitized Mortgages

Posted on March 30, 2010 by Neil Garfield
“We did not service the loan,” Mr. Dale said. “We did not originate the loan, and we were not the financial entity that placed it into foreclosure. Do you understand what a trustee does?”
Editor’s Note: Well, Yes Mr. Dale, we do understand what a trustee does and can do —- nothing. So why are you initiating foreclosures if you say that a trustee doesn’t do that?
Mr. Dale is reading from the end of the enabling documents instead of the first page where it looks like Trustee is really a trustee and that there really is a trust and that the trust holds assets. But by the time you read to the end of the document, the trustee is not a trustee, there is no trust and even if there was, there is nothing in the trust.
It is all an illusion. The “Trustee” is a “contingent agent” for a “conduit” (REMIC) that holds nothing. The enabling document is nothing more than the equivalent of an operating agreement in an LLC.
The “pool of loans” is owned by the investors who, as creditors, purchased mortgage backed derivative securities whose value is derived SOLELY from the promise to pay executed by the homeowners.
March 24, 2010

Unions Make Strides as They Attack Banks

By STEVEN GREENHOUSE and LOUISE STORY

When the city of Los Angeles started looking into its complex financial contracts with banks earlier this year, some council members turned to an unusual corner for financial advice: labor unions.

Turns out that union leaders had amassed an armory of research on derivatives, mortgage foreclosures and even Wall Street pay as part of their effort to hold bankers accountable for the economic pain they helped cause in Los Angeles and across the country.

Unions have criticized Wall Street before. But their attacks have taken on a new shape, both in ferocity and style, over the last 18 months, ever since the federal government doled out billions of dollars in bank bailouts.

Why? Labor leaders say the fortunes of banks and unions are linked more than people realize. Wall Street manages union pension portfolios worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Much of that is invested in financial institutions, giving unions a loud voice as shareholders.

Then there are all the unionized workers whose fates are indirectly shaped by the world of high finance. The jobs of hundreds of thousands of union members, like police officers and teachers, have been threatened by municipal budget cuts, made worse in some cases by exotic investments gone bad.

More abstractly, union leaders are framing their fight against Wall Street as a symbolic one, underscoring America’s large disparities in wealth and wages.

“Many unions see that they need to be responsible for not just members’ needs at the bargaining table, but other hardships in their lives, like foreclosures and high mortgage costs,” said Peter Dreier, a political science professor at Occidental College in Los Angeles.

Unions are holding up many of their own members as victims of the banks’ bad bets, like subprime mortgages, and are providing a steady stream of research in an effort to demystify the exotic financial products that they say are harming dozens of cities. Unions have also helped underwrite Americans for Financial Reform, a prominent group pushing for further bank regulation.

Labor leaders were among the first to call for the resignation of Bank of America’s chief executive, who did retire months later. Unions issued a scathing report on bank bonuses, months before the federal pay czar presented his findings, and they criticized Goldman Sachs’s bonus pool just before the bank said its chief would receive only stock.

This month, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the nation’s main labor federation, has organized 200 protests nationwide to publicly shame bankers, calling for new taxes on bankers’ bonuses and on speculative short-term financial transactions — in the hope of collecting tens of billions of dollars to finance a job creation program.

“They played Russian roulette with our economy, and while Wall Street cashed in, they left Main Street holding the bag,” Richard L. Trumka, the A.F.L.-C.I.O.’s president, said last Friday at a rally in Philadelphia. “They gorge themselves in a trough of taxpayers’ dollars, while we struggle to make ends meet.”

Labor is directly at odds with Wall Street on unionization drives and many other matters. Banks and private equity firms own stakes in many businesses that unions would like to unionize, like nursing home chains and food service companies. Labor groups like the Service Employees International Union and the A.F.L.-C.I.O. are pressuring financial companies not to oppose union membership drives.

It is hard to know for certain whether the unions’ efforts have affected decisions made by Wall Street firms. But for cities like Los Angeles, feeling the squeeze of lower tax receipts, the service employees’ pressure campaign seemed to have had an impact.

“They knew more about our own water deal than I knew,” said Richard Alarcón, a Los Angeles councilman, referring to an interest-rate swap between the city’s water system and the Bank of New York Mellon that converted the system’s variable-rate bonds into bonds with a fixed rate. “They also knew the dynamics of swap deals, and they were very helpful.”

As the city faces a deficit of nearly $500 million, the council was unhappy that Los Angeles would have to pay Bank of New York millions of dollars a year.

“Our members don’t like it any more than other Americans when cities have less firefighters, less teachers or less police officers,” said Andy Stern, president of the service employees’ union.

The labor protests against the banks sometimes have murky targets. This month, service employees joined community leaders on the City Hall steps in Oakland, Calif., to denounce Goldman Sachs for arranging interest-rate swaps that have the city paying the bank millions a year.

After that rally, union leaders led a march to a local Citigroup branch. Goldman declined to comment, but a Citigroup representative scoffed.

“We weren’t even involved in those deals,” said Alex Samuelson, a Citigroup spokesman. “We were just a symbolic place to go and rail against Wall Street. You can’t go to a Goldman Sachs branch.”

Many bankers criticize the protests, saying they make lots of noise but often accomplish little. Steve Bartlett, president of the industry’s Financial Services Roundtable, who has been the target of several union-led protests, including one outside his home on a Sunday morning, said, “Protests can be misguided or even damaging to your cause.”

While union leaders say they are championing the concerns of Main Street, their antibank campaign has certainly advanced some of labor’s longtime objectives, like unionizing workers.

For instance, the S.E.I.U. has pressed several banks and private equity firms to agree to allow card check — a process that makes unionization easier — at companies in which they own stakes.

Service employees officials say they urged Goldman Sachs, which owns part of the food service company Aramark, to get Aramark to accept card check and not oppose an organizing drive. In December, the union’s president, Mr. Stern, even met with Goldman’s chief executive, Lloyd C. Blankfein, about universal health care and other labor-related issues.

Labor unions are using some of their members’ hard-luck stories to frame their battle as one between the haves and the have-nots, and in some cases that tactic is advancing the unions’ traditional goals in contract talks.

In February, for example, the service employees’ union publicized that one of its members cleaned the office of U.S. Bank’s chief in Minneapolis. That janitor, Rosalina Gomez, was facing foreclosure, and the union publicized that U.S. Bank had purchased her home in the foreclosure.

Steve Dale, a spokesman for the bank, said the union was attacking U.S. Bank even though JPMorgan Chase was the bank servicing Ms. Gomez’s mortgage. U.S. Bank, he said, was just the trustee, holding the loan for a mortgage bond.

“We did not service the loan,” Mr. Dale said. “We did not originate the loan, and we were not the financial entity that placed it into foreclosure. Do you understand what a trustee does?”

That aside, when the union threatened to have Ms. Gomez approach U.S. Bank’s chief, Richard K. Davis, at an awards luncheon, the bank rushed to set up a meeting between Ms. Gomez and JPMorgan. Fifty union supporters were at the site of the luncheon to conduct a silent vigil, with several reporters on hand.

Also at that time, the union was in contract negotiations with Ms. Gomez’s employer, the janitorial company that cleans U.S. Bank’s headquarters. Javier Morillo-Alicea, a leader of the union’s Minneapolis local, said its effort to embarrass the bank helped persuade the cleaning company to reach a contract that raised wages and provided better health insurance for the janitors.

“We put a lot of pressure on the bank,” he said, “and that led to a really good contract settlement in a tough economy.”

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Principal Reduction: A Step Forward by BofA, Wells Fargo

Posted on March 29, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Editor’s Note: Better late than never. It is a step in the right direction, but 30% reduction is not likely to do the job, and waiting for mortgages to become delinquent is simply kicking the can down the road.

The political argument of a “gift” to these homeowners is bogus. They are legally entitled to the reduction because they were defrauded by false appraisals and predatory loan practices — fueled by the simple fact that the worse the loan the more money Wall Street made. For every $1,000,000 Wall Street took from investors/creditors they only funded around $650,000 in mortgages. If the borrowers performed — i.e., made their payments, Wall Street would have had to explain why they only had 2/3 of the investment to give back to the creditor in principal. If it failed, they made no explanation and made extra money on credit default swap bets against the mortgage.

For every loan that is subject to principal reduction, there is an investor who is absorbing the loss. Yet the new mortgage is in favor of the the same parties owning and operating investment banks that created the original fraud on investors and homeowners. THIS IS NO GIFT. IT IS JUSTICE.

—-EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE (FULL ARTICLE BELOW)—–

New York Times

Policy makers have been hoping the housing market would improve before any significant principal reduction program was needed. But with the market faltering again, those wishes seem to have been in vain.

Substantial pressure came from Massachusetts, which won a significant suit last year against Fremont Investment and Loan, a subprime lender. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that some of Fremont’s loans were “presumptively unfair.” That gave the state a legal precedent to pursue Countrywide.
The threat of a stick may be helping banks to realize that principal write-downs are in their ultimate self-interest. The Bank of America program was announced simultaneously with the news that the lender had reached a settlement with the state of Massachusetts over claims of predatory lending.

The percentage of modifications that included some type of principal reduction more than quadrupled in the first nine months of last year, to 13.2 percent from 3.1 percent, according to regulators.

Wells Fargo, for instance, said it had cut $2.6 billion off the amount owed on 50,000 severely troubled loans it acquired when it bought Wachovia.

March 24, 2010

Bank of America to Reduce Mortgage Balances

By DAVID STREITFELD and LOUISE STORY

Bank of America said on Wednesday that it would begin forgiving some mortgage debt in an effort to keep distressed borrowers from losing their homes.

The program, while limited in scope and available by invitation only, signals a significant shift in efforts to deal with the millions of homeowners who are facing foreclosure. It comes as banks are being urged by the White House, members of Congress and community groups to do more to stem the tide.

The Obama administration is also studying whether to provide more help to people who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth.

Bank of America’s program may increase the pressure on other big banks to offer more help for delinquent borrowers, while potentially angering homeowners who have kept up their payments and are not getting such aid.

As the housing market shows signs of possibly entering another downturn, worries about foreclosure are growing. With the volume of sales falling, prices are sliding again. When the gap increases between the size of a mortgage and the value that the home could fetch in a sale, owners tend to give up.

Cutting the size of the debt over a period of years, however, might encourage people to stick around. That could save homes from foreclosure and stabilize neighborhoods.

“Banks are willing to take some losses now to avoid much greater losses later if the housing market continues to spiral, and that’s a sea change from where they were a year ago,” said Howard Glaser, a housing consultant in Washington and former government regulator.

The threat of a stick may be helping banks to realize that principal write-downs are in their ultimate self-interest. The Bank of America program was announced simultaneously with the news that the lender had reached a settlement with the state of Massachusetts over claims of predatory lending.

The program is aimed at borrowers who received subprime or other high-risk loans from Countrywide Financial, the biggest and one of the most aggressive lenders during the housing boom. Bank of America bought Countrywide in 2008.

Bank of America officials said the maximum reduction would be 30 percent of the value of the loan. They said the program would work this way: A borrower might owe, say, $250,000 on a house whose value has fallen to $200,000. Fifty thousand dollars of that balance would be moved into a special interest-free account.

As long as the owner continued to make payments on the $200,000, $10,000 in the special account would be forgiven each year until either the balance was zero or the housing market had recovered and the borrower once again had positive equity.

“Modifications are better than foreclosure,” Jack Schakett, a Bank of America executive, said in a media briefing. “The time has come to test this kind of program.”

That was the original notion behind the government’s own modification program, which was intended to help millions of borrowers. It has actually resulted in permanently modified loans for fewer than 200,000 homeowners.

The government program, which emphasizes reductions in interest rates but not in principal owed, was strongly criticized on Wednesday by the inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program for overpromising and underdelivering.

“The program will not be a long-term success if large amounts of borrowers simply redefault and end up facing foreclosure anyway,” the inspector general, Neil M. Barofsky, wrote in his report. One possible reason is that even if they get mortgage help, many borrowers are still loaded down by other kinds of debt like credit cards.

Bank of America said its new program would initially help about 45,000 Countrywide borrowers — a fraction of the 1.2 million Bank of America homeowners who are in default. The total amount of principal reduced, it estimated, would be $3 billion.

The bank said it would reach out to delinquent borrowers whose mortgage balance was at least 20 percent greater than the value of the house. These people would then have to demonstrate a hardship like a loss of income.

These requirements will, the bank hopes, restrain any notion that it is offering easy bailouts to those who might otherwise be able to pay. “The customers who will get this offer really can’t afford their mortgage,” Mr. Schakett said.

Early reaction to the program was mixed.

“It is certainly a step in the right direction,” said Alan M. White, an assistant professor at Valparaiso University School of Law who has studied the government’s modification program.

But Steve Walsh, a mortgage broker in Scottsdale, Ariz., who said he had just abandoned his house and several rental properties, called the program “another Band-Aid. It probably would not have prevented me from walking away.”

Even before Bank of America’s announcement, reducing loan balances was growing in favor as a strategy to deal with the housing mess. The percentage of modifications that included some type of principal reduction more than quadrupled in the first nine months of last year, to 13.2 percent from 3.1 percent, according to regulators.

Few of these mortgages were owned by the government or private investors, however. Banks tended to cut principal only on mortgages they owned directly. Wells Fargo, for instance, said it had cut $2.6 billion off the amount owed on 50,000 severely troubled loans it acquired when it bought Wachovia.

Bank of America said it would be offering principal reduction for several types of exotic loans. Some of the eligible loans are held in the bank’s portfolio, but the program will also apply to some loans owned by investors for which Bank of America is merely the manager.

The bank developed the program partly because of “pressure from everyone,” Mr. Schakett said. Even the investors who owned the loans were saying “maybe we should be doing more,” he said.

Substantial pressure came from Massachusetts, which won a significant suit last year against Fremont Investment and Loan, a subprime lender. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that some of Fremont’s loans were “presumptively unfair.” That gave the state a legal precedent to pursue Countrywide.

“We were prepared to bring suit against Bank of America if we had not been able to reach this remedy today, which we have been looking for for a long time,” said the Massachusetts attorney general, Martha Coakley.

Bank of America agreed to a settlement on Wednesday with Ms. Coakley that included a $4.1 million payment to the state.

Reducing principal is widely endorsed, in theory, as a cure for foreclosures. The trouble is, no one wants to absorb the costs.

When the administration announced a housing assistance program in the five hardest-hit states last month, officials explicitly opened the door to principal forgiveness. Despite reservations expressed by the Treasury, the White House and Housing and Urban Development officials have continued to study debt forgiveness in areas with lots of so-called underwater homes, according to two people with knowledge of the matter.

On a national scale, such a program risks a political firestorm if the banks are unable to finance all the losses themselves. Regulators like the comptroller of the currency and the Federal Reserve have been focused on maintaining the banks’ capital levels, which could be hurt by large-scale debt forgiveness.

“You have to be very careful not to design a program that would change people’s fundamental behavior across the country in a destabilizing way or would be widely perceived as unfair to people who are continuing to pay,” Michael S. Barr, an assistant secretary of the Treasury, said early this year.

Policy makers have been hoping the housing market would improve before any significant principal reduction program was needed. But with the market faltering again, those wishes seem to have been in vain.

Bank of America’s announcement came within hours of a fresh report that underscored the renewed weakness. Sales and prices are dropping, leaving even more homeowners underwater.

Sales of new homes fell in February to their lowest point since the figures were first collected in 1963, the Commerce Department said. Sales are about a quarter of what they were in 2003, before the housing boom began in earnest.

“It’s shocking,” said Brad Hunter, an analyst with the market researcher Metrostudy. “No one would ever have imagined it would go this low.”

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 14 Comments »

U.S. Plans Big Expansion in Effort to Aid Homeowners

Posted on March 28, 2010 by Neil Garfield
March 25, 2010

U.S. Plans Big Expansion in Effort to Aid Homeowners

By DAVID STREITFELD

The Obama administration on Friday will announce broad new initiatives to help troubled homeowners, potentially refinancing several million of them into fresh government-backed mortgages with lower payments.

Another element of the new program is meant to temporarily reduce the payments of borrowers who are unemployed and seeking a job. Additionally, the government will encourage lenders to write down the value of loans held by borrowers in modification programs.

The escalation in aid comes as the administration is under rising pressure from Congress to resolve the foreclosure crisis, which is straining the economy and putting millions of Americans at risk of losing their homes. But the new initiatives could well spur protests among those who have kept up their payments and are not in trouble.

The administration’s earlier efforts to stem foreclosures have largely been directed at borrowers who were experiencing financial hardship. But the biggest new initiative, which is also likely to be the most controversial, will involve the government, through the Federal Housing Administration, refinancing loans for borrowers who simply owe more than their houses are worth.

About 11 million households, or a fifth of those with mortgages, are in this position, known as being underwater. Some of these borrowers refinanced their houses during the boom and took cash out, leaving them vulnerable when prices declined. Others simply had the misfortune to buy at the peak.

Many of these loans have been bundled together and sold to investors. Under the new program, the investors would have to swallow losses, but would probably be assured of getting more in the long run than if the borrowers went into foreclosure. The F.H.A. would insure the new loans against the risk of default. The borrower would once again have a reason to make payments instead of walking away from a property.

Many details of the administration’s plan remained unclear Thursday night, including the precise scope of the new program and the number of homeowners who might be likely to qualify.

One administration official cautioned that the investors might not be willing to volunteer any loans from borrowers that seemed solvent. That could set up a battle between borrowers and investors.

This much was clear, however: the plan, if successful, could put taxpayers at increased risk. If many additional borrowers move into F.H.A. loans, a renewed downturn in the housing market could send that government agency into the red.

The F.H.A. has already expanded its mortgage-guarantee program substantially in the last three years as the housing crisis deepened. It now insures more than six million borrowers, many of whom made minimal down payments and are now underwater.

Sources said the agency would use $14 billion in funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, some of which it could dangle in front of financial institutions as incentives to participate.

Another major element of the program, according to several people who described it, will be to encourage lenders to write down the value of loans for borrowers in modification programs. Until now, the government’s modification efforts have focused on lowering interest rates.

Lenders began offering principal forgiveness last year on loans they held in their own portfolios. In the fourth quarter, however, this process abruptly reversed itself, for reasons that are unclear. The number of modifications that included principal reduction fell by half.

Bank of America, the country’s biggest bank, announced this week that it would forgive principal balances over a period of years on an initial 45,000 troubled loans.

Another element of the White House’s housing program will require lenders to offer unemployed borrowers a reduction in their payments for a minimum of three months.

An administration official declined to speak on the record about the new programs but said they would “better assist responsible homeowners who have been affected by the economic crisis through no fault of their own.”

The new initiatives would expand the government’s current mortgage modification plan, announced a year ago with great fanfare. It has resulted in fewer than 200,000 people getting permanent new loans. As many as seven million borrowers are seriously delinquent on their loans and at risk of foreclosure.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , | 13 Comments »

Want to Buy Your Loan?: Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors

Posted on March 27, 2010 by Neil Garfield
To start the program, Treasury will ask banks, like Citigroup or JPMorgan Chase, to identify pools of residential and commercial real estate loans that they will be willing to sell through an auction. Private investors will bid against each other, setting a market price. No bank will be required to participate.
Editor’s Note: it’s starting. Principal reductions are coming. The original plan I proposed in which everyone shares the loss is falling into place. Make sure you get a judgment quieting title as part of your mortgage modification or settlement.
March 21, 2009

Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors

This article is by Edmund L. Andrews, Eric Dash and Graham Bowley.

WASHINGTON — The Treasury Department is expected to unveil early next week its long-delayed plan to buy as much as $1 trillion in troubled mortgages and related assets from financial institutions, according to people close to the talks.

The plan is likely to offer generous subsidies, in the form of low-interest loans, to coax investors to form partnerships with the government to buy toxic assets from banks.

To help protect taxpayers, who would pay for the bulk of the purchases, the plan calls for auctioning assets to the highest bidders.

The uproar over the American International Group’s bonuses has not stopped the Obama administration from plowing ahead. The plan is not expected to impose restrictions on the executive pay of private investors or fund managers who participate.

The three-pronged approach is perhaps the most central component of President Obama’s plan to rescue the nation’s banking system from the money-losing assets weighing down bank balance sheets, crippling their ability to make new loans and deepening the recession.

Industry analysts estimate that the nation’s banks are holding at least $2 trillion in troubled assets, mostly residential and commercial mortgages.

The plan to be announced next week involves three separate approaches. In one, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will set up special-purpose investment partnerships and lend about 85 percent of the money that those partnerships will need to buy up troubled assets that banks want to sell.

In the second, the Treasury will hire four or five investment management firms, matching the private money that each of the firms puts up on a dollar-for-dollar basis with government money.

In the third piece, the Treasury plans to expand lending through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, a joint venture with the Federal Reserve.

The goal of the plan is to leverage the dwindling resources of the Treasury Department’s bailout program with money from private investors to buy up as many of those toxic assets as possible and free the banks to resume more normal lending.

But the details have been treacherously difficult, politically and financially, and some of the big decisions are the same as those that bedeviled the Treasury Department under President George W. Bush last year.

Timothy F. Geithner, the Treasury secretary, provoked scathing criticism from investors in February by announcing the broad outlines of the plan without addressing the tough questions, like how the government planned to share the risk with investors or arrive at a fair price for the assets that would neither cheat taxpayers nor harm the banks.

Although the details of the F.D.I.C. part were still being completed on Friday, it is expected that the government will provide the overwhelming bulk of the money — possibly more than 95 percent — through loans or direct investments of taxpayer money.

The hope is that such a generous taxpayer subsidy will attract private investors into the market and accelerate the recovery of the country’s banks.

The key protection for taxpayers, according to people briefed on the plan, is that the private investors will bid in auctions against each other for the assets. As a result, administration officials contend, the government will be buying the troubled loans of the banks at a deep discount to their original face value.

Because the government can hold those mortgages as long as it wants, officials are betting the government will be repaid and that taxpayers may even earn a profit if the market value of the loans climbs in the years to come.

To entice private investors like hedge funds and private equity firms to take part, the F.D.I.C. will provide nonrecourse loans — that is, loans that are secured only by the value of the mortgage assets being bought — worth up to 85 percent of the value of a portfolio of troubled assets.

The remaining 15 percent will come from the government and the private investors. The Treasury would put up as much as 80 percent of that, while private investors would put up as little as 20 percent of the money, according to industry officials. Private investors, then, would be contributing as little as 3 percent of the equity, and the government as much as 97 percent.

The government would receive interest payments on the money it lent to a partnership and it would share profits and losses on the equity portion of the investment with the private investors.

Ever since last fall, industry analysts and policy makers in Washington have argued that the banking system’s biggest problem was the huge pile of troubled mortgages and other loans on bank balance sheets.

Risk-taking institutional investors, like hedge funds and private equity funds, have refused to pay more than about 30 cents on the dollar for many bundles of mortgages, even if most of the borrowers are still current. But banks holding those mortgages, not wanting to book huge losses on their holdings, have often refused to sell for less than 60 cents on the dollar.

The result has been a paralyzing impasse. Banks, unwilling to sell their loans at fire-sale prices, have had less capital available to make new loans. Mortgage investors, unable to leverage their investments with borrowed money, have been unwilling to pay more than fire-sale prices.

To break that impasse, the government’s crucial subsidy is meant to provide investors with the kind of low-cost financing that has been utterly unavailable in today’s credit markets.

Administration officials refused to comment on the details of the plan, and refused to say what kind of interest rates the government would be charging investors. But government officials have long maintained that they could charge slightly more than the Treasury’s own cost of money and still offer rates far less than the private markets would demand.

To start the program, Treasury will ask banks, like Citigroup or JPMorgan Chase, to identify pools of residential and commercial real estate loans that they will be willing to sell through an auction. Private investors will bid against each other, setting a market price. No bank will be required to participate.

Analysts worry whether the prices investors offer will be high enough to induce the banks to sell assets. The hope is that high valuations at the auctions will increase the price of assets that remain on the books of banks, bolstering confidence in the sector.

Still, the Treasury Department’s biggest obstacle may be the current political environment in Washington, where Democratic lawmakers are furious about the pay packages and bonuses received by executives at companies being rescued by taxpayers.

Many investment executives said they were worried that participating in any bailout program would expose them to political wrath and potentially steep new restrictions on their own pay.

Treasury and Fed officials have remained firmly against imposing any restrictions on pay for companies investing money in the rescue effort rather than receiving money from it.

The plan comes as financial institutions continue to fail. Federal regulators Friday seized control of the two largest wholesale credit unions — U.S. Central Federal Credit Union and Western Corporate Federal Credit Union — which together had $57 billion in assets. They provide financing, check-clearing and other tasks for retail credit unions.

Michael J. de la Merced contributed reporting from New York.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 19 Comments »

“uncertain line between hope and despair”

Posted on March 27, 2010 by Neil Garfield

The entities foreclosing don’t have ANYTHING at stake. They have no stake and yet they are still getting homes for nothing

Editor’s Note: The federal plan is good as to its intent but unnecessary if the law was applied. Sure the bailout SHOULD apply to anyone who got stuck with one of these securitized mortgages. it clouded their title and stuck them with loan products that were unworkable while they were told by the experts at the table that everything was fine.
People have the question wrong: If the reality of the situation is not addressed SOMEBODY is going to get a free house — either the homeowner or some corporation set up by Wall Street that never lent a dime. It isn’t about why should a reckless homeowner get a free house, it is about why should a player who gambled with other people’s money get a free house. At least the homeowner has something at stake even if they had no down payment.
The entities foreclosing don’t have ANYTHING at stake. They have no stake and yet they are still getting homes for nothing. People are mad about he federal bailout. Now the same players are getting a foreclosure bailout, or better stated, a gift courtesy of the taxpayer and a reluctant judicial system.
March 22, 2010

Microcosm of Housing Crisis on an Arizona Street

By LOUISE STORY

CAVE CREEK, Ariz. — The uncertain line between hope and despair divides this exurb of Phoenix, where the trim stucco houses used to sell so briskly.

It winds around the swimming pools and the pebbled yards of East Montgomery Road like a slow-burning fuse.

On one side are people like the Setbackens, Gary and Cissie, who moved here from Washington State and, with prudence, have managed to pay their mortgage bill month after month. On the other side are those like Kelley Carter, who never dreamed that home prices would fall so hard, and got in over their heads.

Two in five homeowners in this sprawling development 30 miles northeast of Phoenix are underwater on their mortgages. And that reality is wearing away household budgets and people’s patience.

Arizona is one of five states that, with money from Washington, hopes to help at least some of these people hold on to their homes. Under a new, federally financed pilot program for the hardest-hit housing markets, state officials will decide who will get a homeowner bailout, and who will not.

The idea is as controversial in Washington as it is here. Do the neighbors next door who lived beyond their means — the ones who, say, bought that house they could not afford, or who binged on home equity loans to buy new cars and flat-panel TVs — really deserve to be bailed out with taxpayer dollars? Do they deserve to have some of their debts forgiven? And is that fair to the cautious ones who paid their mortgages?

For the people of Cave Creek, the answers will fall to state officials like Michael Trailor, the director of the Arizona housing department.

A former real estate developer, Mr. Trailor knows firsthand about the perils of the property market.

“I feel for all of them,” Mr. Trailor said of the struggling homeowners. “But we do not have the funds to help all of them. If we can help 6,000 people, which ones should we help?”

The federal government will pay for pilot programs in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan and Nevada with $1.5 billion from the federal banking rescue. That figure is a small fraction of the funds that would be needed to help all of the people at risk. Arizona, for instance, received $125 million. If it allocates $30,000 of aid for each residence, 4,166 homeowners would benefit. But the Phoenix area is bracing for as many as 50,000 foreclosures this year alone.

Mr. Trailor said he was reluctant to help homeowners with “self-inflicted wounds,” like those who overspent or cashed out the equity in their homes during the bubble years. He wants the banks to match the public money being used for debt forgiveness, and he is focusing on people whose incomes have fallen but who still hold jobs.

He is considering an approach known as “earned forgiveness,” where the state and the banks promise to forgive mortgage debt later on, but only if the homeowners stay in their homes and keep making their payments.

The question of who deserves help rouses neighbors here. Not long ago, home values seemed to reach relentlessly toward the bright blue sky.

Then the boom went bust. Home prices in the Phoenix area have collapsed by 50 percent since mid-2006, leaving many owners with mortgages that are higher than their property values. One in 10 homes in this development in Cave Creek have moved through foreclosure since 2008, according to Netvaluecentral, a real estate tracking company in Glendale, Ariz. Half of the homes here are owned by banks or are being sold for less than the value of their mortgages.

“Underwater homes make it highly likely people will walk away, and if they do, these foreclosures are going to push everyone’s prices down,” said Brett Barry, a real estate agent here. “People need to realize that we’re in this together.”

The new reality is evident on East Montgomery Road, where the bust is playing out in a variety of ways.

There are the Setbackens, at 4355, who arrived in 1993 and paid down their mortgage even as home prices skyrocketed.

Across the street are the Chatburns, Tim and Leslie. They also arrived in the 1990s, before prices exploded, but struggled recently to keep up with the bills after an injury kept Mr. Chatburn out of work.

Mr. Chatburn, an air-conditioning repairman, used to say that bailing out his neighbors would be unfair, but he changed his mind after watching news programs about the rescues of big financial companies like the American International Group.

“I started thinking about all this money we paid as taxpayers to the banks,” he said, “and I thought, ‘Why don’t we take care of our own a little bit?’ ”

Ms. Carter, at 4344, arrived in 2005, as the bubble was inflating. She took out tens of thousands of dollars in home equity for repairs and other items, and by this year, she was underwater on her mortgage by $86,000. A single mother, she moved out this month, days before her home was sold in a short sale, which meant her mortgage lender allowed her to sell for less than the value of her mortgage and the lender took the loss.

And then there is the young couple with a toddler, at 4343. They moved out on the same day as Ms. Carter, before a scheduled foreclosure of their home that was $115,000 underwater. The couple, who asked not to be named, also bought near the peak and took out a home equity loan to pay off their student loans and other debts. Then, a year ago, they stopped paying their mortgage, after both of them lost their jobs for a time. They now have office jobs again.

Mr. Setbacken, a salesman, said he had warned his neighbors not to get in over their heads but they did not listen. He and his wife might have stepped up to a bigger house if they, like so many of their neighbors, had gambled recklessly on the housing market, he said.

“Everybody that I know that got themselves in trouble was because of one word: greed,” said Mr. Setbacken, 63, a former Marine who remains in tip-top physical condition. “I have no sympathy for any of them, on the financial end. When I hear about dropping the amount you actually owe, I could stick my finger down my throat.”

Then the doorbell rang. It was a young girl bearing Girl Scout cookies. “My adopted granddaughter,” Mr. Setbacken announced.

The 8-year-old is Ms. Carter’s daughter, Ava. Across the street, Ms. Carter was packing up the house.

Ms. Carter said she felt guilty about leaving. With her short sale, the price of the home went down to the benefit of the new homeowner. But it dragged down prices in the neighborhood, she said.

Ms. Carter, a mother of two and a real estate agent who poses as an angel with wings on her Web site, has been through hard times before. Years ago, she considered filing for bankruptcy but then changed her mind. She said she was accountable for her actions and was making what amounted to a business decision to leave her home.

“I had to take emotion out of it,” said Ms. Carter, 36. “If I had a business, and every single month I was losing money, would I keep on paying? No, I wouldn’t.”

Sitting at her dining room table, before a large tank of fish, she recalled how she had made this a perfect home. It is one of the few on East Montgomery Road with grass in the yard, an expensive proposition in the desert. A Mercedes sits in the driveway.

She said she did not feel she deserved to have her debts forgiven, but added that if her mortgage had been lowered, she would have tried harder to stay. The worst part, she said, is that her decision will hurt Mr. Setbacken, who has watched out for her over the years. “For Gary, he’s going to have to deal with the ramifications of what I’m doing because I’m bringing his property value down,” she said. “I pray at church. I feel horrible for what I’m doing to my neighbors.”

Later, after Mr. Setbacken talked to Ms. Carter — she “cried and cried and cried,” he said — he had a change of heart. In an e-mail message, he said that perhaps wealthy Americans could donate money to aid homeowners. If he had more money himself, he might help some neighbors pay their mortgage bills.

“I have focused on the financial issues during these times and overlooked what was more important, the emotional stress that my neighbors are feeling,” Mr. Setbacken wrote. He walked down East Montgomery Road and gave a bottle of wine to the young couple facing foreclosure. It was, he said, “to help them pack.”

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

Do NOT Prepay Your Mortgage

Posted on March 24, 2010 by Neil Garfield

As pointed out in the article below there are many good reasons for prepaying your mortgage on a monthly basis. But if you are in a securitized mortgage and you are either underwater or facing payments that are resetting, be aware that any prepayments will take you far out of the running for any modification. Yours will be a super-performing mortgage that doesn’t “qualify” for even a first look at modification. In addition, if there is a new mortgage, or elimination of the mortgage, note or obligation in store for you, you will have sent the money down a rabbit hole.

March 19, 2010

When Not to Pay Down a Mortgage

By RON LIEBER

New York Times

This week, the Federal Reserve reaffirmed its intention to stop buying mortgage-backed securities, signaling the likelihood that the mortgage rates you can get today are as good as they’re going to be for a long while. Once the Fed stops buying, after all, rates are likely to go up.

And current rates are quite good. At about 5 percent, in fact, they’re so good that they’ve helped change the age-old debate over whether homeowners should make extra mortgage payments to pay off their debt well before their loan periods are up.

Back when rates ran at 7 or 8 percent, making extra payments offered what amounted to a guaranteed return on your money. When you’re ridding yourself of debt that costs you much less, however, it’s easier to imagine a future when you could more easily earn a higher return by investing those potential extra mortgage payments someplace else.

Meanwhile, at a time when just about everyone knows someone who is unemployed or who owes more on a home loan than the house is worth, keeping extra cash someplace more liquid than a mortgage seems like a safer approach.

So is the case against extra payments closed for good, given that so many people have locked in rock-bottom mortgage rates for the long haul?

The answer depends on two things: how likely you are to leave the extra money in savings and how good it would feel to wipe your debt out years earlier than your mortgage requires.

THE BASICS First, let’s dispense with the standard boilerplate. Don’t even think about making extra mortgage payments unless you’ve paid off higher-interest debt. Credit card debt is the easiest win here.

Also, if you’re not saving enough to get the full match from your employer in a 401(k) or similar account, increase your savings there first. And don’t make extra mortgage payments if you don’t already have a decent emergency fund set aside.

YOUR REAL INTEREST RATE Now, take a look at the interest rate on your mortgage. That 5 percent? It’s not your real rate if you get some of the interest back each year in the form of a tax deduction.

Let’s say you have a household income of $175,000 and are paying 35 percent of that in total to the state and federal tax collectors. If you pay $20,000 in mortgage interest each year on a loan that charges 5 percent, the deduction effectively brings your taxable income down to $155,000.

As a result, you’re paying $7,500 (35 percent of $20,000) less in taxes than you would have without the deduction. So ultimately, you’re not really paying $20,000 in interest at all; your net cost is $12,500 after you subtract the $7,500 tax savings.

And that makes your effective, after-tax interest rate on your loan just 3.25 percent, which is simply 35 percent (your tax rate) less than the original 5 percent.

BETTER RETURNS? So any money you set aside in lieu of making extra mortgage payments would need to earn more than 3.25 percent annually. That seems like a reasonable possibility in the future.

In fact, you could have done that well during the supposedly lost decade we just finished. Vanguard Wellington, for instance, a popular low-cost mutual fund that holds about 65 percent stocks and 35 percent bonds and other short-term securities, earned an average annual return of 6.15 percent in the 10 years ended Dec. 31, 2009.

The Vanguard Balanced Index Fund would not have outperformed our 3.25 percent benchmark, however, as it only returned 2.64 percent over the same 10-year period.

STORING THE SAVINGS Wouldn’t taxes eat into the returns from the money you’d save instead of making extra mortgage payments? Not if you place it into an account shielded from taxes. A Roth individual retirement account would fit the bill here, as would a 529 college savings account or health savings account.

Bruce Primeau, whose note to his financial planning clients at Wide Financial Group in Minneapolis on this topic inspired me to re-examine it, adds that this isn’t simply about keeping more assets under his watch so he can earn a better living. “I’m not telling them that the money has to come to me,” he said. “A 401(k) match beats the return on paying a mortgage off automatically. There’s real estate and buying employer stock through a purchase plan at a 15 percent discount and all kinds of things.”

Then you need to preserve those savings. When extra money goes toward a mortgage, it’s hard to get at it when the urge strikes to flee to an Asian beach for a few weeks of playtime. If the money is not locked up in retirement or college savings, however, you may be tempted to spend it.

THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM Capital-gains taxes might eventually come due with some of these investments, and the rate could well rise above the current 15 percent long-term rate before too long. Still, having some of your savings in a taxable account makes sense for several reasons.

If you hit a stretch of long-term unemployment after having plowed most of your extra cash into paying down your mortgage, your bank probably won’t pat you on the back for being a good saver and give the money back to you. Nor is it likely to let you borrow it through a home equity loan if you have no income with which to repay it.

Elaine Scoggins, who had the mortgage department chief reporting to her at a bank before she became a financial planner, suggests imagining a situation where you need to move quickly but can’t sell your home or extract equity to use as a down payment in your new town. Given that possibility, why create more home equity through extra mortgage payments than you have to?

“The whole housing debacle has reminded us all, including me, that real estate is not liquid,” said Ms. Scoggins, who is the client experience director for Merriman, a planning firm in Seattle. “And it takes cash to support it.”

Those who have used their cash in an attempt to be conscientious have learned some tough lessons, meanwhile. Imagine people who scraped together a 5 percent down payment and bought a home in Florida or Arizona in 2005 and then made extra mortgage payments the first two years to try to increase their equity. Now, post-collapse, they owe, say, 30 percent more than their homes are worth and need to seriously consider walking away from the loan — and all of those extra payments.

REASON AND EMOTION So the reasoned case for making no extra payments is very strong. But there’s one counterpoint that almost always carries the day, even when there’s only a mild risk with the financial strategy of putting extra money elsewhere.

And it’s this: I need to be able to sleep at night.

Even Mr. Primeau concedes here. “Emotionally, you’re right, and financially I’m right, and emotionally, you win,” he said. “If emotionally, people want to pay down their debt, than that’s what I help them to do.”

If you’ve just started paying down your mortgage, any extra payments should go toward principal (make sure your mortgage company is applying it properly). That will have the effect of shortening the term of your loan from, say, 30 to 25 years, depending on how many extra payments you make. The extra payments won’t lower your monthly payment, but they will reduce your balance.

Many people who are years into their mortgages — and perhaps paying less in interest and getting less of a tax break as a result — tend to develop stronger feelings about making extra payments. Those feelings are often even more acute as retirement approaches and homeowners become determined to quit work with no debt to their names.

Those who do retire their debt rarely regret it or wring their hands over the big gains they might have scored by investing the money elsewhere. Tim Maurer, a financial planner and co-author of “The Financial Crossroads,” describes the feeling that washes over people who have paid their last mortgage bill as “beholden to no one.”

So he doesn’t feel as if it’s his business to separate people from their emotions if they feel strongly about working toward a debt-free existence. “The whole point of planning is to make life better,” he said. “It’s not to have more dollars at the end of the day.”

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If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant?

Posted on March 21, 2010 by Neil Garfield

SEE ALSO BOE PAPER ON ABS DISCLOSURE condocmar10

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant? NOTE: BOE defines investors as note-holders.
information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.
Editor’s Note: As Gretchen Morgenstern points out in her NY Times article below, the Bank of England is paving the way to transparent disclosures in mortgage backed securities. This in turn is a guide to discovery in American litigation. It is also a guide for questions in a Qualified Written Request and the content of a forensic analysis.
What we are all dealing with here is asymmetry of information, which is another way of saying that one side has information and the other side doesn’t. The use of the phrase is generally confined to situations where the unequal access to information is intentional in order to force the party with less information to rely upon the party with greater information. The party with greater information is always the seller. The party with less information is the buyer. The phrase is most often used much like “moral hazard” is used as a substitute for lying and cheating.
Quoting from the Bank of England’s “consultative paper”: ” [NOTE THAT THE BANK OF ENGLAND ASSUMES ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION AND, SEE BELOW, THAT THE INVESTORS ARE CONSIDERED “NOTE-HOLDERS” WITHOUT ANY CAVEATS.] THE BANK IS SEEKING TO ENFORCE RULES THAT WOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
borrower details (unique loan identifiers); nominal loan amounts; accrued interest; loan maturity dates; loan interest rates; and other reporting line items that are relevant to the underlying loan portfolio (ie borrower location, loan to value ratios, payment rates, industry code). The initial loan portfolio information reporting requirements would be consistent with the ABS loan-level reporting requirements detailed in paragraph 42 in this consultative document. Data would need to be regularly updated, it is suggested on a weekly basis, given the possibility of unexpected loan repayments.
42 The Bank has considered the loan-level data fields which
it considers would be most relevant for residential mortgage- backed securities (RMBS) and covered bonds and sets out a high-level indication of some of those fields in the list below:
• Portfolio, subportfolio, loan and borrower unique identifiers.
• Loan information (remaining life, balance, prepayments).
• Property and collateral (current valuation, loan to value ratio
and type of valuation). Interest rate information (current reference rate, current rate/margin, reset interval).
• Performance information (performing/delinquent, number and value of payments in arrears, arrangement, litigation or
bankruptcy in process, default or foreclosure, date of default,
sale price, profit/loss on sale, total recoveries).
• Credit bureau score information (bankruptcy or IVA flags,
bureau scores and dates, other relevant indicators (eg in respect of fraudulent activity)).

The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility requirement that each issuer provides a summary of the key features of the transaction structure in a standardised format.
This summary would include:
• Clear diagrams of the deal structure.
• Description of which classes of notes hold the voting rights and what proportion of noteholders are required to pass a resolution.
• Description of all the triggers in the transaction and the consequences of them being breached.
• What defines an event of default.
• Diagramatic cash-flow waterfalls, making clear the priority
of payments of principal and interest, including how these
can change in consequence to any trigger breaches.
52 The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility
requirement that cash-flow models be made available that
accurately reflect the legal structure of an asset-backed security.
The Bank believes that for each transaction a cash-flow model
verified by the issuer/arranger should be available publicly.
Currently, it can be unclear as to how a transaction would
behave in different scenarios, including events of default or
other trigger events. The availability of cash-flow models, that
accurately reflect the underlying legal structure of the
transaction, would enable accurate modelling and stress
testing of securities under various assumptions.

March 19, 2010, NY Times

Pools That Need Some Sun

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

LAST week, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sued a throng of Wall Street companies that sold the agency $5.4 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities during the height of the mortgage melee. The suit, filed March 15 in state court in California, seeks the return of the $5.4 billion as well as broader financial damages.

The case also provides interesting details on what the Federal Home Loan Bank said were misrepresentations made by those companies about the loans underlying the securities it bought.

It is not surprising, given the complexity of the instruments at the heart of this credit crisis, that it will require court battles for us to learn how so many of these loans could have gone so bad. The recent examiner’s report on the Lehman Brothers failure is a fine example of the in-depth investigation required to get to the bottom of this debacle.

The defendants in the Federal Home Loan Bank case were among the biggest sellers of mortgage-backed securities back in the day; among those named are Deutsche Bank; Bear Stearns; Countrywide Securities, a division of Countrywide Financial; Credit Suisse Securities; and Merrill Lynch. The securities at the heart of the lawsuit were sold from mid-2004 into 2008 — a period that certainly encompasses those giddy, anything-goes years in the home loan business.

None of the banks would comment on the litigation.

In the complaint, the Federal Home Loan Bank recites a list of what it calls untrue or misleading statements about the mortgages in 33 securitization trusts it bought. The alleged inaccuracies involve disclosures of the mortgages’ loan-to-value ratios (a measure of a loan’s size compared with the underlying property’s value), as well as the occupancy status of the properties securing the loans. Mortgages are considered less risky if they are written against primary residences; loans on second homes or investment properties are deemed to be more of a gamble.

Finally, the complaint said, the sellers of the securities made inaccurate claims about how closely the loan originators adhered to their underwriting guidelines. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank asserts that the companies selling these securities failed to disclose that the originators made frequent exceptions to their own lending standards.

DAVID J. GRAIS, a partner at Grais & Ellsworth, represents the plaintiff. He said the Federal Home Loan Bank is not alleging that the firms intended to mislead investors. Rather, the case is trying to determine if the firms conformed to state laws requiring accurate disclosure to investors.

“Did they or did they not correspond with the real world at the time of the sale of these securities? That is the question,” Mr. Grais said.

Time will tell which side will prevail in this suit. But in the meantime, the accusations illustrate a significant unsolved problem with securitization: a lack of transparency regarding the loans that are bundled into mortgage securities. Until sunlight shines on these loan pools, the securitization market, a hugely important financing mechanism that augments bank lending, will remain frozen and unworkable.

It goes without saying that after swallowing billions in losses in such securities, investors no longer trust what sellers say is inside them. Investors need detailed information about these loans, and that data needs to be publicly available and updated regularly.

“The goose that lays the golden eggs for Wall Street is in the information gaps created by financial innovation,” said Richard Field, managing director at TYI, which develops transparency, trading and risk management information systems. “Naturally, Wall Street opposes closing these gaps.”

But the elimination of such information gaps is necessary, Mr. Field said, if investors are to return to the securitization market and if global regulators can be expected to prevent future crises.

While United States policy makers have done little to resolve this problem, the Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, is forging ahead on it. In a “consultative paper” this month, the central bank argued for significantly increased disclosure in asset-backed securities, including mortgage pools.

The central bank is interested in this debate because it accepts such securities in exchange for providing liquidity to the banking system.

“It is the bank’s view that more comprehensive and consistent information, in a format which is easier to use, is required to allow the effective risk management of securities,” the report stated. One recommendation is to include far more data than available now.

Among the data on its wish list: information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.

The Bank of England recommended that investor reports be provided on “at least a monthly basis” and said it was considering making such reports an eligibility requirement for securities it accepts in its transactions.

The American Securitization Forum, the advocacy group for the securitization industry, has been working for two years on disclosure recommendations it sees as necessary to restart this market. But its ideas do not go as far as the Bank of England’s.

A group of United States mortgage investors is also agitating for increased disclosures. In a soon-to-be-published working paper, the Association of Mortgage Investors outlined ways to increase transparency in these instruments.

Among its suggestions: reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies by providing detailed data on loans well before a deal is brought to market, perhaps two weeks in advance. That would allow investors to analyze the loans thoroughly, then decide whether they want to buy in.

THE investors are also urging that loan-level data offered by issuers, underwriters or loan servicers be “accompanied by an auditor attestation” verifying it has been properly aggregated and calculated. In other words, trust but verify.

Confidence in the securitization market has been crushed by the credit mess. Only greater transparency will lure investors back into these securities pools. The sooner that happens, the better.

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Obama Considering Expansion of Cash for Keys With Taxpayer Money

Posted on March 13, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Editor’s Note: It seems to me that this concedes the battle to Wall Street. It encourages homeowners to take the loss that at the very least should be shared with ALL the players in the securitization scheme and creates more problems in housing and social services.

Excerpt from NYT – do not buy into this –

Program Will Pay Homeowners to Sell at a Loss
By DAVID STREITFELD
Published: March 7, 2010

“In an effort to end the foreclosure crisis, the Obama administration has been trying to keep defaulting owners in their homes. Now it will take a new approach: paying some of them to leave.

This latest program, which will allow owners to sell for less than they owe and will give them a little cash to speed them on their way, is one of the administration’s most aggressive attempts to grapple with a problem that has defied solutions.

More than five million households are behind on their mortgages and risk foreclosure. The government’s $75 billion mortgage modification plan has helped only a small slice of them. Consumer advocates, economists and even some banking industry representatives say much more needs to be done.

For the administration, there is also the concern that millions of foreclosures could delay or even reverse the economy’s tentative recovery — the last thing it wants in an election year.

Taking effect on April 5, the program could encourage hundreds of thousands of delinquent borrowers who have not been rescued by the loan modification program to shed their houses through a process known as a short sale, in which property is sold for less than the balance of the mortgage. Lenders will be compelled to accept that arrangement, forgiving the difference between the market price of the property and what they are owed.

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Monster From Below, Not from Above — Appraisal Fraud

Posted on February 15, 2010 by Neil Garfield
Editor’s Comment: Again, myth prevails.
The monster that gobbled our home equity and the value of our pension funds came from the waters beneath the market not from some economic disaster or sudden migration of population to Australia. The “loss of value” was nothing of the sort. Prices were going up during a decade when median income was going down. Prices at best should have been level. This disaster is from a lack of support on the fundamentals of economics — the houses were never worth what the money that appeared on appraisals.
Most pundits, reporters and “experts” talk about the decline in housing prices as the result of some mysterious downward market pressure — like a lack of demand. Demand for housing is no lower or higher than it ever was.
The truth is that there never was any increased demand for housing to support the huge price jumps over the last decade. THAT was caused by an increase of what economists call liquidity and the rest of us now know as phoney money pumped in by Wall Street who paid appraisers to render a report that conformed to contracts instead of market conditions.
Those contracts went through not because of public demand or population increases or even migration. They came from the fact that Wall Street paid or created “lenders” to pretend they were “underwriting” loans and assessing risk the way banks normally perform their duties as lenders. But since they had no money at risk, these “lenders” as straw men in a complex securitization chain, dropped their underwriting function altogether and merely pretended to “qualify” borrowers and approve contracts to purchase or refinance.
February 15, 2010

U.S. Housing Aid Winds Down, and Cities Worry

ELKHART, Ind. — Over the next six months, the federal government plans to wind down many of its emergency programs for housing. Then it will become clear if the market can function on its own.

People here are pretty sure the answer will be no.

President Obama has traveled twice to this beleaguered manufacturing city to spotlight the government’s economic stimulus program. The employment picture here has indeed begun to improve over the last nine months.

But Elkhart also symbolizes the failure of federal efforts to turn around the housing slump at the heart of the economic crisis. Housing in this community has become almost entirely dependent on a string of federal support programs, which are nonetheless failing to prevent a fall in prices and a rise in mortgage delinquencies.

More than one in 10 mortgage holders in Elkhart is seriously behind on payments. The median sales price has plunged to the level of a decade ago. Many homeowners owe more than their home is worth, freezing them in place for years. Foreclosures recently hit a record.

To the extent that the real estate market is functioning at all, people here say, it is doing so only because of the emergency programs, which have pushed down interest rates on mortgages and offered buyers a substantial tax credit.

Equally important is an expanded mortgage insurance program run by the Federal Housing Administration, which encourages private lenders to accept borrowers with small down payments. The government takes the risk of default.

A few years ago, only one in 10 buyers in Elkhart used the housing agency program. Now about half do. Across the country, the agency has greatly expanded its reach so that it now insures six million mortgages.

“There has been all kinds of help for housing. I’m not unappreciative,” said Barb Swartley, president of the Elkhart County Board of Realtors. “But you can’t turn real estate into a government-sponsored operation forever.”

Many in Washington agree. With worries about the deficit intensifying, the government is eager to start withdrawing some of its support programs.

The first step could happen as early as next month, when the Federal Reserve has said it will end its trillion-dollar program to buy up mortgage securities. That program has driven mortgage interest rates to lows not seen since the 1950s.

Yet it is uncertain whether the government can really pull back without sending housing markets into another tailspin. “A rise in rates would kill us all by itself,” Ms. Swartley said.

The Obama administration has offered few ideas about reforming the housing market. Proposals for the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage holding companies taken over by the government at the height of the crisis, were supposed to be introduced with the president’s budget this month. They were not.

The government programs, however crucial, are distorting the market. The tax credit produced sales last fall, but some lenders here say it has troubling implications.

“People are buying to get that tax credit, to get some reserve money. They’re saying, ‘If something happens, I will have a little bit of money to fall back on,’ ” said Denny Davis of Horizon Bank in Elkhart. “That’s not healthy.”

The programs favor first-time buyers, who have the fewest resources to bring to a deal. Heather Stevens, a 23-year-old nurse here, is closing on a three-bedroom house this week. Since her loan was insured by the Federal Housing Administration, she had to put down only 3.5 percent of the $74,900 purchase price.

“It was a breeze to get approved,” she said.

The sellers are covering her closing costs, which agents say is often the case here. That meant Ms. Stevens had to come up with only the $2,600 down payment, which still took all her savings.

But the best part is the $7,500 tax credit. She will use that to remodel the kitchen. “If it wasn’t for the credit, we would have waited to buy,” said Ms. Stevens, who is getting married this year.

Buying houses with no money down was a feature of the latter stages of the housing bubble. It gave prices a final push into the stratosphere. But buyers with no equity were the first to abandon their properties as the market turned south.

With housing prices stagnant, bolstering the market by again letting people buy with hardly any money down is viewed in some quarters as a bad bet.

Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general for the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program, wrote in his most recent report to Congress that “the federal government’s concerted efforts to support” housing prices “risk reinflating” the bubble.

He noted one difference from the last bubble: taxpayers, rather than banks, are now directly at risk in these new mortgages.

In Elkhart, the worries are less about the risks of doing too much and more about the perils of doing too little. If the Federal Reserve really ends its $1.25 trillion program of buying mortgage-backed securities, economists say, mortgage rates could rise as much as one percentage point. In recent weeks, rates on 30-year fixed mortgages have drifted below 5 percent.

The tax credit requires home buyers to make a deal by April 30, the middle of the prime spring selling season.

For now, the F.H.A. is modestly tightening the requirements on some of its programs, trying to strike a balance between stabilizing the market with qualified buyers and overwhelming it with unqualified borrowers.

John Katalinich, chief lending officer at the Inova Federal Credit Union in Elkhart, says there is danger in letting buyers get into properties with so little at stake, but those risks are minimal compared to the alternative.

“If the government were not to continue the same level of support, it would be very detrimental, like cutting the legs off a wobbling child and expecting it to run a marathon,” he said. “It’s very possible we’ll still be at this level of need five years from now.”

Elkhart, in the northeast corner of Indiana, became a symbol of distressed Middle America after Mr. Obama chose it as the place to introduce his stimulus plan last February. The region is a hub of recreational vehicle manufacturing, one of the first industries to falter in the recession. In less than a year, the unemployment rate tripled, peaking at 18.9 percent last March.

Mr. Obama returned in August to promote the effectiveness of the stimulus program and of government grants for the manufacture of battery-powered electric vehicles. Several companies have announced they are hiring. Unemployment in December was down to 14.8 percent.

No such improvement is visible with housing. In the last 18 months, the F.H.A increased its loans in Elkhart by 40 percent even as its defaults rose 174 percent.

As these troubled loans become foreclosures, the government takes over the property and tries to sell it. On Saturday, Gina Martin, an administrative assistant, examined a three-bedroom government house for sale southeast of Elkhart.

In late 2003, the house sold for $115,000, but in these depressed times the government was willing to let it go for $75,000.

Ms. Martin’s agent, Dean Slabach, thought the government would eventually have to take a much lower bid, substantially increasing its loss. Most of the F.H.A. properties on the market in Elkhart carry notations like “significant price reduction” and “all reasonable offers considered.”

“They’ll end up selling this for $60,000 or less,” Mr. Slabach said.

But Ms. Martin, a 47-year-old renter who has approval for an F.H.A. loan, said she was not tempted at any price.

“We’ll see what else is out there,” she said.

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No Help in Sight, More Homeowners Walk Away

Posted on February 3, 2010 by Neil Garfield

New research suggests that when a home’s value falls below 75 percent of the amount owed on the mortgage, the owner starts to think hard about walking away, even if he or she has the money to keep paying.

See the whole article in New York Times. Extensive discussion of the issue. It’s beginning to look like a parade. There is no question that without principal reduction, the bottom has yet to be reached in home values. Strategic Defaults are on the rise and may well dominate the housing market for years to come.

No Help in Sight, More Homeowners Walk Away

By DAVID STREITFELD
NY Times

In 2006, Benjamin Koellmann bought a condominium in Miami Beach. By his calculation, it will be about the year 2025 before he can sell his modest home for what he paid. Or maybe 2040.
“People like me are beginning to feel like suckers,” Mr. Koellmann said. “Why not let it go in default and rent a better place for less?”

After three years of plunging real estate values, after the bailouts of the bankers and the revival of their million-dollar bonuses, after the Obama administration’s loan modification plan raised the expectations of many but satisfied only a few, a large group of distressed homeowners is wondering the same thing.

New research suggests that when a home’s value falls below 75 percent of the amount owed on the mortgage, the owner starts to think hard about walking away, even if he or she has the money to keep paying.

In a situation without precedent in the modern era, millions of Americans are in this bleak position. Whether, or how, to help them is one of the biggest questions the Obama administration confronts as it seeks a housing policy that would contribute to the economic recovery.

“We haven’t yet found a way of dealing with this that would, we think, be practical on a large scale,” the assistant Treasury secretary for financial stability, Herbert M. Allison Jr., said in a recent briefing.

The number of Americans who owed more than their homes were worth was virtually nil when the real estate collapse began in mid-2006, but by the third quarter of 2009, an estimated 4.5 million homeowners had reached the critical threshold, with their home’s value dropping below 75 percent of the mortgage balance.

They are stretched, aggrieved and restless. With figures released last week showing that the real estate market was stalling again, their numbers are now projected to climb to a peak of 5.1 million by June — about 10 percent of all Americans with mortgages.

“We’re now at the point of maximum vulnerability,” said Sam Khater, a senior economist with First American CoreLogic, the firm that conducted the recent research. “People’s emotional attachment to their property is melting into the air.”

Suggestions that people would be wise to renege on their home loans are at least a couple of years old, but they are turning into a full-throated barrage. Bloggers were quick to note recently that landlords of an 11,000-unit residential complex in Manhattan showed no hesitation, or shame, in walking away from their deeply underwater investment.

“Since the beginning of December, I’ve advised 60 people to walk away,” said Steve Walsh, a mortgage broker in Scottsdale, Ariz. “Everyone has lost hope. They don’t qualify for modifications, and being on the hamster wheel of paying for a property that is not worth it gets so old.”

x_http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/business/03walk.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted=all

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