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EDITORIAL NOTES: The principal problem I see is that while the Fed and other agencies are still getting their heads wrapped around what occurred in the mortgages mess, they still barely notice the elephant in the living room because if you remove the distraction it will reveal basic flaws and defects in the debts, the notes and security instruments (mortgages and deeds of trust) that are present in the system. It will also reveal the fact that the transfer documents, even if they were real, are in conflict with (a) the provisions of the enabling documents that were meant to create the blueprint of securitizing residential mortgage debt and specifically (b) the transfer of non-performing loans into the alleged pools — an event that no investor would approve.

The focus on all these proposals and white papers is to preserve the integrity of the mortgage lending process that was employed and to preserve the integrity of the foreclosures that followed. These premises are false and they cannot be made true by saying so, or by establishing a national registry for lien (in violation of states rights under the U.S. Constitution) or otherwise.

The reality is that nearly all the mortgages, whether declared delinquent or not, involve debts that have not been liquidated or determined by a full accounting. Further each debt is subject to third party payments that either cured any alleged default or reduced the principal due, or both. Thus the “credit bid” at the auction was defective unless the bid was reduced by payments received but unaccounted for previously by the creditor. The absence of the creditor from the courtroom or at any part of the process prevents the court, the trustee on the deed of trust, and the borrower to determine where the money went and why.

The second problem clearly evident in its absence, is that the debt arose between the borrower and the lender, which is to say the party who took the money (or the benefit) and the party who paid the money (the source of funding on the loan). Everyone else is a intermediary with no right to claim otherwise. This fact alone accounts for the corruption of the state and county title registries, which, contrary to the assertions in the white paper, have operated perfectly regardless of volume, thus negating the use of a national registry that is being attempted to paper over the property rights of individuals, and local taxing authorities.

The third problem is the assumption that it is difficult for the investors to fire the services and replace them with others who will perform in the interests of the real parties, thus reducing the huge unnecessary deflation in home values caused by forcing them into foreclosure. Investors can easily set up their own operations (announcement from livinglies coming shortly) wherein they can either purchase clear title from the homeowners effected or enter into meaningful modifications and settlements without the use of the existing servicers who are marching to the tune played by banks. It is well known and well established that most homeowners would give up many claims and defense if they settle the issue with their home. For those who have left they could be induced to either return or be paid a small fee for clearing title.

The solution is evading the regulatory authorities because they are presuming the mantra from Wall Street is true. There is nothing to support the mantra other than the persistent drumbeat of the same lies.

The central thesis of the white paper is true, however. Negative equity will destroy the housing market and the economy will be dragged down with it. Converting properties to rentals assumes the parties renting the properties own them. Not even Fannie Mae of Freddie have any clear right to claim title to these “REO” properties. But its equally true that a trusted portal could provide a method of settling, mediating and modifying the mortgages such that the recovery would be multiples of what are current being reserved for investors. And it is equally true and well-established that most homeowners will accept principal due and payments that exceed the current value of the collateral which is artificially deflated by the incessant pressure of ever-expanding supply inventory.

The ONLY obstacle to resolution is our commitment to using realism and practicality instead of ideology and an unswerving loyalty to those who trashed the system.

NOTABLE QUOTES:

Federal Reserve Jan 4 2011 housing-white-paper-20120104

The ongoing problems in the U.S. housing market continue to impede the economic recovery. House prices have fallen an average of about 33 percent from their 2006 peak, resulting in about $7 trillion in household wealth losses and an associated ratcheting down of aggregate consumption. At the same time, an unprecedented number of households have lost, or are on the verge of losing, their homes. The extraordinary problems plaguing the housing market reflect in part the effect of weak demand due to high unemployment and heightened uncertainty. But the problems also reflect three key forces originating from within the housing market itself: a persistent excess supply of vacant homes on the market, many of which stem from foreclosures; a marked and potentially long-term downshift in the supply of mortgage credit; and the costs that an often unwieldy and inefficient foreclosure process imposes on homeowners, lenders, and communities.

Finally, foreclosures inflict economic damage beyond the personal suffering and dislocation that accompany them.1    In particular, foreclosures can be a costly and inefficient way to resolve the inability of households to meet their mortgage payment obligations because they can result in “deadweight losses,” or costs that do not benefit anyone, including the neglect and deterioration of properties that often sit vacant for months (or even years) and the associated negative effects on neighborhoods.2    These deadweight losses compound the losses that households and creditors already bear and can result in further downward pressure on house prices. Some of these foreclosures can be avoided if lenders pursue appropriate loan modifications aggressively and if servicers are provided greater incentives to pursue alternatives to foreclosure. And in cases where modifications cannot create a credible and sustainable resolution to a delinquent mortgage, more-expedient exits from homeownership, such as deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure or short sales, can help reduce transaction costs and minimize negative effects on communities.

Housing Market Conditions
House Prices and Implications for Household Wealth
House prices for the nation as a whole (figure 1) declined sharply from 2007 to 2009 and remain about 33 percent below their early 2006 peak, according to data from CoreLogic. For the United States as a whole, declines on this scale are unprecedented since the Great Depression. In the aggregate, more than $7 trillion in home equity (the difference between aggregate home values and mortgage debt owed by homeowners)–more than half of the aggregate home equity that existed in early 2006–has been lost. Further, the ratio of home equity to disposable personal income has declined to 55 percent (figure 2), far below levels seen since this data series began in 1950.4

This substantial blow to household wealth has significantly weakened household spending and consumer confidence. Middle-income households, as a group, have been particularly hard hit because home equity is a larger share of their wealth in the aggregate than it is for low-income households (who are less likely to be homeowners) or upper-income households (who own other forms of wealth such as financial assets and businesses). According to data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, the decline in average home equity for middle-income homeowners from 2007 through 2009 was about 66 percent of the average income in 2007 for these homeowners. In contrast, the decline in average home equity for the highest-income homeowners was only about 36 percent of average income for these homeowners.5
For many homeowners, the steep drop in house prices was more than enough to push their mortgages underwater–that is, to reduce the values of their homes below their mortgage balances (a situation also referred to as negative equity). This situation is widespread among borrowers who purchased homes in the years leading up to the house price peak, as well as those who extracted equity through cash-out refinancing. Currently, about 12 million homeowners are underwater on their mortgages (figure 3)–more than one out of five homes with a mortgage.6    In states experiencing the largest overall house price declines–such as Nevada, Arizona, and Florida–roughly half of all mortgage borrowers are underwater on their loans.

Negative equity is a problem because it constrains a homeowner’s ability to remedy financial difficulties. When house prices were rising, borrowers facing payment difficulties could avoid default by selling their homes or refinancing into new mortgages. However, when house prices started falling and net equity started turning negative, many borrowers lost the ability to refinance their mortgages or sell their homes. Nonprime mortgages were most sensitive to house price declines, as many of these mortgages required little or no down payment and hence provided a limited buffer against falling house prices. But as house price declines deepened, even many prime borrowers who had made sizable down payments fell underwater, limiting their ability to absorb financial shocks such as job loss or reduced income.7

Loan Modifications and the HAMP Program
Loan modifications help homeowners stay in their homes, avoiding the personal and economic costs associated with foreclosures. Modifying an existing mortgage–by extending the term, reducing the interest rate, or reducing principal–can be a mechanism for distributing some of a homeowner’s loss (for example, from falling house prices or reduced income) to lenders, guarantors, investors, and, in some cases, taxpayers. Nonetheless, because foreclosures are so
costly, some loan modifications can benefit all parties concerned, even if the borrower is making reduced payments.

Negative equity is a problem, above and beyond affordability issues, because it constrains the ability of borrowers to refinance their mortgages or sell their homes if they do not have the means or willingness to bring potentially substantial personal funds to the transaction. An inability to refinance, as discussed previously, blocks underwater borrowers from being able to take advantage of the large decline in interest rates over the past years. An inability to sell could force underwater borrowers into default if their mortgage payments become unsustainable, and may hinder movement to pursue opportunities in other cities.

Mortgage Servicing: Improving Accountability and Aligning Incentives
Mortgage servicers interact directly with borrowers and play an important role in the resolution of delinquent loans. They are the gatekeepers to loan modifications and other foreclosure alternatives and thus play a central role in how transactions are resolved, how losses are ultimately allocated, and whether deadweight losses are incurred.
Thus far in the foreclosure crisis, the mortgage servicing industry has demonstrated that it had not prepared for large numbers of delinquent loans. They lacked the systems and staffing needed to modify loans, engaged in unsound practices, and significantly failed to comply with regulations. One reason is that servicers had developed systems designed to efficiently process large numbers of routine payments from performing loans. Servicers did not build systems, however, that would prove sufficient to handle large numbers of delinquent borrowers, work that requires servicers to conduct labor-intensive, non-routine activities. As these systems became more strained, servicers exhibited severe backlogs and internal control failures, and, in some cases, violated consumers’ rights. A 2010 interagency investigation of the foreclosure processes at servicers, collectively accounting for more than two-thirds of the nation’s servicing activity, uncovered critical weaknesses at all institutions examined, resulting in unsafe and unsound practices and violations of federal and state laws.40    Treasury has conducted compliance reviews since the inception of HAMP, and, beginning in June 2011, it released servicer compliance reports on major HAMP servicers. These reports have shown significant failures to comply with the requirements of the MHA program.41    In several cases, Treasury has withheld MHA incentive payments until better compliance is demonstrated.

These practices have persisted for many reasons, but we focus here on four factors that, if addressed, might contribute to a more functional servicing system in the future. First, data are not readily available for investors, regulators, homeowners, or others to assess a servicer’s performance. Second, even despite this limitation, if investors or regulators were able to determine that a servicer is performing poorly, transferring loans to another servicer is difficult. Third, the traditional servicing compensation structure can result in servicers having an incentive to prioritize foreclosures over loan modifications.42    Fourth, the existing systems for registering liens are not as centralized or as efficient as they could be.

A third potential area for improvement in mortgage servicing is in the structure of compensation. Servicers usually earn income through three sources: “float” income earned on cash held temporarily before being remitted to others, such as borrowers’ payments toward taxes and hazard insurance; ancillary fees such as late charges; and an annual servicing fee that is built into homeowners’ monthly payments. For prime fixed-rate mortgages, the servicing fee is usually 25 basis points a year; for subprime or adjustable-rate mortgages, the fee is somewhat higher. From an accounting and risk-management perspective, the expected present value of this future income stream is treated as an asset by the servicer and accounted for accordingly.
The value of the servicing fee is important because it is expected to cover a variety of costs that are irregular and widely varying. On a performing loan, costs to servicers are small–especially for large servicers with highly automated systems. For these loans, 25 basis points and other revenue exceed the cost incurred. But for nonperforming loans, the costs associated with collections, advancing principal and interest to investors, loss mitigation, foreclosure, and the maintenance and disposition of REO properties might be substantial and unpredictable and might easily exceed the servicing fee.

A final potential area for improvement in mortgage servicing would involve creating an online registry of liens. Among other problems, the current system for lien registration in many jurisdictions is antiquated, largely manual, and not reliably available in cross-jurisdictional form. Jurisdictions do not record liens in a consistent manner, and moreover, not all lien holders are required to register their liens. This lack of organization has made it difficult for regulators and policymakers to assess and address the issues raised by junior lien holders when a senior mortgage is being considered for modification. Requiring all holders of loans backed by residential real estate to register with a national lien registry would mitigate this information gap and would allow regulators, policymakers, and market participants to construct a more comprehensive picture of housing debt.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: bankruptcy, borrower, countrywide, disclosure, Federal Reserve White Paper, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, foreclosures, fraud, LOAN MODIFICATION, modification, negative equity, quiet title, rescission, RESPA, securitization, TILA audit, trustee, underwater, WEISBAND | 9 Comments »