Discovery Changes and Broadens After Hawaii Supreme Court Decision

Based on questions that greeted me when I got to my desk this morning, here are just some of the thoughts that apply — a case review and analysis for each case being necessary to actually draft the right questions and to close any trap doors.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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NOTE: Procedural questions should be posed to local counsel who knows local discovery rules and court procedure. My answer is based upon general knowledge and not based upon any experience in litigating discovery issues in your state.
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The effect of the new decision in the link above is most probably (a) a broadening of existing discovery requests (b) rehearings on recent decisions denying discovery and (c) an opportunity and a reason to ask the questions you really want to ask.
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The first question is whether the questions you would ask now are already within the scope of the questions you have already asked. If so, generally speaking, there is nothing to do. In this scenario you could send a letter, I think, that clarifies your questions in view of the new Supreme Court ruling. The letter would specifically address certain issues that were raised in questions already asked and tells them the details you expect. This could be done in a supplemental request for discovery citing the new Supreme Court decision. Check with local counsel.
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Second, and this is more likely, your case should be analyzed within the context of the new decision. It seems to me that the decision opens up some broader scope of discovery than had previously been submitted. Your opposition will fight this tooth and nail. Pointing to the Hawaii Supreme Court decision is not going to be enough even if the property is in Hawaii. You need to have a very clear narrative that explains why you are asking for the answers to questions and the production of documents and answers to request for admissions. Without a clear defense narrative your first Motion to Compel them to respond will likely fail. The general rule is that discovery, with certain exceptions, can be any request that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. By “admissible” the meaning is evidence that is relevant and “probative” to the truth of the matter asserted. It isn’t relevant unless it ties into either the case against you or the defense narrative. Lack of clarity can be fatal.
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The opposition is going to claim privilege, privacy, and proprietary information. You should force them to be more specific as to how the identification of the creditor is proprietary, or an invasion of privacy or some privilege. Tactically I would let them paint themselves into a corner, so you need someone who knows how to litigate. Once it is established that they can’t or won’t disclose the matters into which you have inquired, then the question becomes how they will prove authority from the creditor without identification of the creditor from whom all authority flows.
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That could lead to a motion for summary judgment wherein you allege that they have failed and refused to make disclosure as to the most fundamental aspect of pleading a case. Since their authorization to initiate and maintain a foreclosure action must relate back to the authorization of the creditor (owner of the debt) and they now have not or will not identify that party(ies), the presumption of authority must be considered rebutted, thus requiring them to prove their case with facts and not with the benefit of legal presumptions.
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Since they have admitted on record that they cannot prove they are acting on behalf of the creditor, it follows that they cannot prove authority to initiate or maintain a foreclosure action. Hence, the outcome is certain. They will not be able to prove standing although they might have made certain assertions or allegations that might pass for standing such that they can withstand a motion to dismiss or demurrer. The essential assertion of standing is either rebutted or barred from proof. Hence judgment should be entered for the homeowner.
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Some of this might come out in a motion for sanctions which is virtually certain to come from you when they fail to properly respond to your requests for discovery. This is intricate litigation that should be handled by a local attorney.
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Again don’t start a second front in the battle if you have already covered it in your previously submitted requests for discovery. I think you have asked most of the right questions, although now with this decision it becomes more refined.Among the questions I would ask in view of the new decision from the Supreme Court of Hawaii are the following presented only as narrative draft, subject to improvement by local counsel:
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  1. Does the trust exist under the laws of any jurisdiction? If yes, describe the jurisdiction in which the trust is recognized as existing.
  2. Was the trust organized under the laws of any jurisdiction? If yes, when and where?
  3. Does the trust own the subject debt? If yes, please explain why the trust is not claimed as a holder in due course.
  4. Does the trust allow the beneficiaries an interest in the assets of the trust?
  5. Please describe the manner in which the certificate holders are beneficiaries of a trust.
  6. Does the named Trustee of the Trust have any rights or obligations to monitor trust assets?
  7. Does the named Trustee of the Trust engage in any activities in which it is administering the assets of the Trust.
  8. Describe the assets of the Trust.
  9. Please identify the Trustor or Settlor of the Trust.
  10. Please identify the date, place and parties involved in any transaction in which assets were entrusted to the named trustee for the benefit of named or described beneficiaries.
  11. Please identify the date, place and parties involved in any transaction in which assets were purchased by the Trust or in which a Trustor or Settlor purchased assets that were then entrusted to the named trustee of the Trust for the benefit of named or described beneficiaries.
  12. Is the named Trust a fictitious name being used by one or more other entities?
  13. Do the certificates contain provisions in which the holder of the certificate disclaims any right, title or interest to assets of the Trust or any right, title or interest to the subject loan? If yes, please describe the provision, in what document it is located, the date of the document, and where that document currently exists in the care, custody and/or control of the Trust or any party doing business as or on behalf of the named Trust.
  14. Please describe the owner of the debt, to wit: describe the party currently carrying a receivable on its books that includes the subject loan, wherein no other party is ultimately entitled to proceeds of payments, proceeds or recovery on the subject loan.
  15. Is it your contention that residential foreclosure is legally allowed without ownership of the underlying debt from the borrower? If so, describe the elements of a party who would be legally allowed to foreclose on a residential mortgage without ownership of the underlying debt.
  16. Does the Trust have a bank account in the name of the Trust?
  17. Does the Trust have a bank account in the name of the named Trustee as Trustee for the Trust.
  18. If the answer to either of the two preceding question is yes, please describe the account, its location and identify the signatories on said account.
  19. Please describe the retainer agreement between the named Trust and current counsel of record including all the parties thereto, the date(s) of execution and date that the agreement became effective, the names of the signatories, and their authority to execute the instrument.
  20. With respect to loans attributed to or allegedly owned by the Trust please describe the parties who make decisions, along with a description of their authority, with respect to the following relating to the subject loan:
    1. Whether to foreclose
    2. When to foreclose
    3. What documents are needed for foreclosure
    4. Applications for modification
    5. Terms of modification
    6. Terms for settlement of the debt

Hawaii Supreme Court: Yes to wrongful foreclosure counterclaim BEFORE foreclosure is completed and no to”plausible” pleading

Now that the courts are no longer in fear of precipitating an economic meltdown, it’s time to return to legal decisions instead of political decisions. The Hawaii Supreme Court has done just that in a common sense decision that sweeps aside most of the Wall Street arguments against allowing homeowners to raise the fraudulent foreclosure issue. The decision goes back decades in reaffirming the law and the intent of the rules of civil procedure.

The bottom line is that homeowners must be allowed an opportunity to prove their claim at the same time they are defending a foreclosure action. This levels the playing field and hopefully is a harbinger of future decisions from the high court in each of the states.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see Landmark Hawaii Supreme Court Case

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP FKA COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GRISEL REYES-TOLEDO, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

Remember that while this decision could be used as persuasive authority, it is not binding authority over the courts of any state other than Hawaii.

There are several parts to this decision each consistent with the others.

  1. On a motion to dismiss, plausibility of the allegations are now irrelevant. The homeowner must be given the opportunity to prove the allegations of the complaint. As the Court correctly points out, the plausibility test requires some consideration of some facts that have not been proven or disproven. Hence the plausibility test conflicts directly with the presumption, on a motion to dismiss, that all allegations are true. “Notice pleading” is the law in Hawaii and purportedly is so in many other states where plausibility tests are nonetheless applied. This opinion may go a long way to reversing that erroneous trend.
  2. Notice pleading requires only a short plain statement of ultimate facts upon which the relief sought could be granted. But I would add that the rules about fraud and deceit are still in play, i.e., I don’t believe that any state, including Hawaii would allow a count sounding in fraud without giving some examples in the pleading of the misleading and/or deceitful way that the defendant(s) acted. This decision basically addresses violation of statute and similar kinds of actions.
  3. The implication of this decision is that the pleading should be short and that the homeowner must be given a fair chance to prove his/her allegations.
    1. I am quite certain that this Court would insist on allowing discovery to penetrate far more deeply that is currently generally allowed.
    2. The arguments that the actual transactions and the actual creditor’s identities are private, proprietary and remote was silly to begin with.
    3. This decision will be used by practitioners in Hawaii to demand access to records and to get it through court orders. This alone will result in a landslide of settled cases under seal of confidentiality — if lawyers for homeowners insist on such discovery.
  4. Further moving the ball forward, this Court decided emphatically that claims of wrongful foreclosure can be filed in a counterclaim against the parties involved with the  initiation of wrongful or illegal foreclosure proceedings. That means that contrary to California law and other states, the homeowner does not need to wait to file the claim.
    1. This is a two edged sword. It virtually mandates the filing of the wrongful foreclosure claim because the clock is probably ticking on the statute of limitations the moment the foreclosure is initiated by either judicial or nonjudicial means.
    2. The California doctrine has always been ridiculous and anti-consumer. By denying access to the courts for what is already known to be a wrongful foreclosure based upon false documentation they tie both hands behind the backs of attorneys representing homeowners in foreclosure cases.
    3. Knowing this, most lawyers are now declining representation of homeowners despite clear defects, lies and fabrication of documents relied upon by the lawyers supposedly representing a foreclosing party that many times does not even exist.
    4. Hence the doctrine that wrongful foreclosure claims ONLY arise after the foreclosure is complete produces an absurd result. Once the homeowner proves his/her claims they shouldn’t have lost their home, their life-style and their credit reputation, all based upon illegal acts that were known at the outset, the only remedy under that doctrine is money damages.
  5. The decision also addresses the very important issue of standing. Simply stated, if some party is designated as the foreclosing party, it is the duty of that party and the attorney representing that party to perform sufficient due diligence as to
    1. whether the entity exists,
    2. whether it has possession of the note,
    3. whether the note is endorsed to them by a party who owned the debt,
    4. whether the mortgage or deed of trust was assigned to them by a party that owned the mortgage and the debt, and
    5. whether the debt was in fact transferred from a party who owned the debt to the party claiming the right to foreclose.
  6. If they fail or refuse to perform that due diligence they are violating the law in Hawaii and most likely in dozens of other states. In Hawaii that alone gives rise to a cause of action for damages if damages can be proven, which in most cases is fairly easy. So they are liable for damages if they didn’t perform due diligence.
  7. If they did perform the due diligence and filed knowing that the threshold markers of legal standing are absent, it is malicious abuse of process, it is breach of statutory duties, and it is fraud because the filing of the the lawsuit is a representation that the due  diligence was completed and showed legal standing. And it is probably RICO.

Summary: While it is difficult to predict how and when other states will react to this opinion, it seems likely that this decision in the State of Hawaii will make jurists in other states very uncomfortable. The bias to rule for the alleged foreclosing party just received a blow to any rationality supporting that bias.

Surviving a Motion to Dismiss: Submission of “Illustrative Materials” In Federal Court

If you want to show examples of what you are alleging and can prove at trial (after discovery) the recent rules and decisions of the federal courts may help, if you are careful.

Submission of illustrative materials is most probably advisable in federal practice. It might be allowed in state courts as well. The submission is used after complaint is filed and before hearing the motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On the other end of the stick, affirmative defenses or counterclaims may also be supplemented by illustrative materials as long as they are relevant and congruent with the facts alleged in the pleadings — complaint, affirmative defenses and/or counterclaims. The filing should not change anything, but rather elaborate on what the homeowner has already alleged and seeks to prove in court. It’s not an invitation to throw the kitchen sink at the judge.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can create a compelling defense narrative to foreclosures. If you have a foreclosure or a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER. THIS ARTICLE RELIES HEAVILY ON SUPREME COURT AND 7TH CIRCUIT DECISIONS. SCOTUS DECISIONS ARE THE LAW OF THE LAND. 7TH CIRCUIT DECISIONS ARE ONLY BINDING IN THAT CIRCUIT. TRIAL COURT DECISIONS CAN ONLY BE USED AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY.

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BOTTOM LINE: If a homeowner files a complaint (or affirmative defense) for relief, it must contain factual allegations that specifically address the cause of action (fraud, negligence, RICO etc). It is NOT enough in Federal court to allege facts that might result in a verdict. The old doctrines allowing the possibility of a case of action that might result in relief ordered by the court do not apply in Federal Court and are less likely to be used in state court proceedings. “Might” is not right.

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The pleading in federal courts must be plausible rising to the level of something like probable cause. There must be careful pleading, matching actual facts with the legal theory alleged in the complaint. And, after you file your pleading, you can add supplemental material to illustrate (not add) the context or events that you allege in the complaint, the affirmative defense or the counterclaim. As stated below, the pleading itself must “nudge” past conceivable to plausible. While this may prove challenging in pleading fraud (before opening discovery) there is the possibility of submitting illustrative materials to flesh out what could not be directly alleged in the complaint.

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These are my notes from an article Vol. 43 NO. 5 of the LawLetter from National Legal Research Group, Inc. by Paul Ferrer, Esq. If you don’t want your complaint, affirmative defense or counterclaim to be dismissed, read this carefully and see the punch line at the end of the article. Homeowners will like it.
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Up until about 10 years ago, pleading requirements for complaints, affirmative defenses and counterclaims were unclear. Now there is a revolution in Federal Pleading practice: Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed 2d 929 (2007) and Ashcraft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 544, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2209).
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Under the new (2007) standard, a claim is sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss [12(b)(6)] or motion for judgment on the pleadings [12(c)] ONLY WHEN accepting the allegations of fact as true (but not accepting legal conclusions) the claim has “facial plausibility.” That is, the court is able to draw “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbar, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 884. See also Twombly 550 U.S. 570, 127 S. Ct. 1974, 167 L. Ed 2d 949 (2007). (the Plaintiff must allege enough by way of factual [not legal] content to “nudge” her claim “across the line from conceivable to “plausible”).
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This requires the Plaintiff to allege more facts than before the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.
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It can be difficult for the plaintiff to have access to the facts needed to plead a plausible claim before the doors of discovery are unlocked. So the courts have recognized that in cases alleging fraud, the action will survive motions as long as the allegations are not vague and are sufficient to inform the defendant exactly what the fraud entailed. See 7th Circuit United States ex rel Lusby Rolls Royce Corp. 570 F. 3d 849 (2009).
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I think that this means you must still be specific as to when the fraud occurred, by whom (at least with a relevant description), what was misrepresented and misleading, and reasonable reliance especially if the court relied on it, I would argue that alone (court reliance) meets the threshold of reasonable reliance in wrongful foreclosures. And of course describing a plausible theory or statement of damage is essential. Without all of that the case will be dismissed.
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In wrongful foreclosure (fraud, misrepresentation) cases it might be wise to allege that the Defendants, individually and collectively conspired to allege and proffer that they knew or must have known were untrue, to wit: (1) that the alleged loan was not owned by the trust and therefore all allegations and proffers of proof relying upon the illusion of ownership by the trust were equally untrue, (2) that among the documents proffered to the court were instruments (fabricated by or on behalf of the Defendants) created solely for the purpose of foreclosure that contained or implied statements of fact that were untrue — i.e., the mortgage loan schedule, the power of attorney executed by a party without any right, title or interest in the subject loan, assignments of mortgage that were abandoned by Defendants at the foreclosure trial, the complaint alleging the “trust” to be plaintiff, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement creating the illusion of a trust and creating the illusion of either entrusting loans to the named trustee or the illusion of purchase of the loan by the alleged “trust.”
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If RICO or other statutes are invoked as the basis of a cause of action (violation of statute), you may  rely on your statements supporting fraud or misrepresentation but you must tie down each fact that fulfills the elements of RICO. The pleading practice of starting with a soup bowl of factual and legal allegations and expecting the judge to make the connections are over in federal court. The Plaintiff must connect the dots or risk a likelihood of dismissal. And the dots must be factual allegations about the factual events and the elements of the statute or duty that Plaintiff alleges has been violated.
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The 7th Circuit has gone further and introduced a practice hint, to wit: after presentation of the motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff may and probably ought to fill in the gaps caused by the defendant withholding vital information by submission of illustrative materials (not submitted to augment the complaint or exhibits).
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Unless you are very clear about why you are submitting your “illustrative materials” you might inadvertently find your complaint being read differently and the motion to dismiss being treated as a premature motion for summary judgment. Stating that the filing is not meant to change any of the allegations prevents the pending motion to being considered a motion for summary judgment. But showing the court other cases, especially cases or events that are subject to judicial notice, informs the court and the defendant on exactly what you alleged and what you expect a trial to yield as a finding of fact and verdict at law. See Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F. 3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
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I think that the 7th Circuit is right that there is nothing to prevent submitting illustrative materials on a pending motion. BUT like the previous discussion on the pleading itself, the “illustrative” materials should be submitted in an orderly fashion if you expect a judge to even look at them. A motion to take judicial notice is probably advised within the notice of filing of the submission of illustrative materials. Other cases involving the same defendants might be excellent examples of patterns of conduct IF the defendants lost those cases. Allegations in other cases might be useful but are problematic if there was no ruling in the case.
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The problem with judicial notice and illustrative notice has been that people have widely relied on accusations in complaints rather than the ultimate decision of the court. In cases where the case settled, if the pleader wants to include similar allegations in other cases, the pleader should exercise caution. But if you want to track the “national settlements” and then settlements on the national settlements showing that the servicers and banks continued to act illegally, you might be on more solid ground.
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So in short, the submission of illustrative materials must be “consistent with the pleadings.” The reason is simple — anything else would be irrelevant to the case at bar. see Heng v Heavner, Beyers and Mihlar, LLC, 849 F. 3d 348, 354 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus if the submission of illustrative materials is an attempt to show that the defendants are simply bad characters and ugly too, the court will at best ignore the submissions and potentially strike the submissions as irrelevant and prejudicial.
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But here is the “punchline” for homeowners who are in federal court either defending foreclosure or suing under the general category of “Wrongful Foreclosure.” Illustrative materials includes forensic reports and becomes part of the record. see Marion Healthcare v. S. Ill. Healthcare, No. 12-cv-871-SCW, 2018 WL 1318054 (S.D. ILL Mar 14, 2018. So the typical admonition against trying to use the report as evidence without foundation testimony from the author is softened considerably in federal court and potentially in state courts many of whom follow the federal standards. Note that being part of the record does not make it evidence. But whereas before you might not have been able to get the judge to even look at the report, you have a fighting chance if it is submitted as “illustrative materials.”
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But here is the caveat: while the court might allow its submission, if the report is not very specific and direct about what is wrong, and what is missing from the fact pattern upon which the defendants rely, it will carry no weight. Similarly if the report is argumentative and contains legal conclusions it will most likely be ignored.
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On the other hand an expert opinion (from someone with real education and licensing credentials) that clearly states what facts and what resources serve as basis for the opinion, can get a little argumentative as long as it is clear that the writer is not an advocate for the homeowner.
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My general rule of thumb is to treat your witness as a forensic analyst rather than an expert witness unless the witness has specific credentials and letters signifying degrees and licensing after their name. Doing that makes the witness more credible and less susceptible to attack. The opposition must try to attack the facts reported rather than the “opinion” rendered.
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Remember this about expert witnesses. The question is not whether the “expert” knows more than the homeowner or an attorney. The question, for the testimony or affidavit to be given any weight at all, is whether the expert knows more than the judge. BUT you can still use the report to the extent that it offers and reports ultimate facts upon which relief can be granted to the Plaintiff homeowner. Proffering the witness as a fact witness instead of an expert witness avoids several pitfalls.

About Those PSA Signatures

What is apparent is that the trusts never came into legal existence both because they were never funded and because they were in many cases never signed. Failure to execute and failure to fund the trust reduces the “trust” to a pile of ashes.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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From one case in which I am consulting, this is my response to the inquiring lawyer:

I can find no evidence that there is a Trust ever created or operational by the name of “RMAC REMIC Trust Series 2009-9”. In my honest opinion I don’t think there ever was such a trust. I think that papers were drawn up for the trust but never executed. Since the trusts are phantoms anyway, this was consistent with the facts. The use of the trust as a Plaintiff in a court action is a fraud upon the court and the Defendants. The fact that the trust does not exist deprives the court of any jurisdiction. We’ll see when you get the alleged PSA, which even if physically hand-signed probably represents another example of robo-signing, fabrication, back-dating and forgery.

I think it will not show signatures — and remember digital or electronic signatures are not acceptable unless they meet the terms of legislative approval. Keep in mind that the Mortgage Loan Schedule (MLS) was BY DEFINITION  created long after the cutoff date. I say it is by definition because every Prospectus I have ever read states that the MLS attached to the PSA at the time of investment is NOT the real MLS, and that it is there by way of example only. The disclosure is that the actual loan schedule will be filled in “later.”

 

see https://livinglies.me/2015/11/30/standing-is-not-a-multiple-choice-question/

also see DigitalSignatures

References are from Wikipedia, but verified

DIGITAL AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

On digital signatures, they are supposed to be from a provable source that cannot be disavowed. And they are supposed to have electronic characteristics making the digital signature provable such that one would have confidence at least as high as a handwritten signature.

Merely typing a name does nothing. it is neither a digital nor electronic signature. Lawyers frequently make the mistake of looking at a document with /s/ John  Smith and assuming that it qualifies as digital or electronic signature. It does not.

We lawyers think that because we do it all the time. What we are forgetting is that our signature is coming through a trusted source and already has been vetted when we signed up for digital filing and further is backed up by court rules and Bar rules that would reign terror on a lawyer who attempted to disavow the signature.

A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or documents. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender, that the sender cannot deny having sent the message (authentication and non-repudiation), and that the message was not altered in transit (integrity).

Digital signatures are a standard element of most cryptographic protocol suites, and are commonly used for software distribution, financial transactions, contract management software, and in other cases where it is important to detect forgery or tampering.

Electronic signatures are different but only by degree and focus:

An electronic signature is intended to provide a secure and accurate identification method for the signatory to provide a seamless transaction. Definitions of electronic signatures vary depending on the applicable jurisdiction. A common denominator in most countries is the level of an advanced electronic signature requiring that:

  1. The signatory can be uniquely identified and linked to the signature
  2. The signatory must have sole control of the private key that was used to create the electronic signature
  3. The signature must be capable of identifying if its accompanying data has been tampered with after the message was signed
  4. In the event that the accompanying data has been changed, the signature must be invalidated[6]

Electronic signatures may be created with increasing levels of security, with each having its own set of requirements and means of creation on various levels that prove the validity of the signature. To provide an even stronger probative value than the above described advanced electronic signature, some countries like the European Union or Switzerland introduced the qualified electronic signature. It is difficult to challenge the authorship of a statement signed with a qualified electronic signature – the statement is non-reputable.[7] Technically, a qualified electronic signature is implemented through an advanced electronic signature that utilizes a digital certificate, which has been encrypted through a security signature-creating device [8] and which has been authenticated by a qualified trust service provider.[9]

PLEADING:

Comes Now Defendants and Move to Dismiss the instant action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and as grounds therefor say as follows:

  1. The named plaintiff in this action does not exist.
  2. After extensive investigation and inquiry, neither Defendants nor undersigned counsel nor forensic experts can find any evidence that the alleged trust ever existed, much less conducted business.
  3. There is no evidence that the alleged trustee ever ACTUALLY conducted any business in the name of the trust, much less a purchase of loans, much less the purchase of the subject loan.
  4. There is no evidence that the Trust exists nor any evidence that the Trust’s name has ever been used except in the context of (1) “foreclosure” which has, in the opinion, of forensic experts, merely a cloak for the continuing theft of investor money and assets to the detriment of both the real parties in interest and the Defendants and (2) the sale of bonds to investors falsely presented as having been issued by the “trust”, the proceeds of which “sale” was never received by the trust.
  5. Upon due diligence before filing such a lawsuit causing the forfeiture of homestead property, counsel knew or should have known that the Trust never existed nor has any business ever been conducted in the name of the Trust except the sale of bonds allegedly issued by the Trust and the use of the name of the trust to sue in foreclosure.
  6. As for the sale of the bonds allegedly issued by the Trust there is no evidence that the Trust ever issued said bonds and there is (a) no evidence the Trust received any funds ever from the sale of bonds or any other source and (b) having no assets, money or bank account, there is no possible evidence that the Trust acquired any assets, business or even incurred any liabilities.
  7. Wells Fargo, individually and not as Trustee, has engaged in a widespread pattern of behavior of presenting itself as Trustee of non existent Trusts and should be sanctioned to prevent it or anyone else in the banking industry from engaging in such conduct.

WHEREFORE Defendants pray this Honorable Court will dismiss the instant complaint with prejudice, award attorneys fees, costs and sanctions against opposing counsel and Wells Fargo individually and not as Trustee of a nonexistent Trust for falsely presenting itself as the Trustee of a Trust it knew or should have known had no existence.

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Rhode Island Supreme Court Steps Forward for Borrowers

Slowly but surely it seems that the court system are now taking notice of the fact that there is something intrinsically wrong with both the mortgages and the foreclosure process. In this case the Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically found the grounds that could establish that the mortgage was not validly assigned. This case was about whether or not the homeowners case should have been dismissed. The Supreme Court decided that the homeowners case should not have been dismissed.

But in this case the court affirmatively stated that defects in the assignment process would void the assignment and thus defeat the foreclosure.

Paragraph 12 of the complaint alleges: “On or about September 10, 2010, MERS attempted to assign this Mortgage to Aurora. * * * Theodore Schultz signed. Theodore Schultz had no authority to assign.” Thus, the plaintiffs have alleged that the one person who signed the mortgage assignment did not have the authority to do so. This allegation is buttressed by other allegations in the complaint. Paragraph 13 states that “Theodore Schultz was an employee of Aurora, not a Vice-President or Assistant Secretary of MERS.” Paragraph 17 alleges that “MERS did not order the assignment to Aurora.” Finally, paragraph 19 contends that “[n]o power of attorney from MERS to either Theodore Schultz or Aurora is recorded and referenced in the subject assignment.” These allegations, if proven, could establish that the mortgage was not validly assigned, and, therefore, Aurora did not have the authority to foreclose on the property.(e.s.)

SEE Chhun v. Mortgage Elec Registration Sys Inc.

The court also addressed the issue of standing and of course the related issues of standards for review on appeal. In view of decisions like this that are becoming increasingly frequent, the new strategy of the banks is to file for foreclosure in the name of the originator or some remote controlled entity of the broker-dealers. Bank of America has spawned numerous new banks and other entities (e.g. EverBank and Urban Lending Solutions)  In order to put distance between BOA and the irregularities of both the mortgage closing and the foreclosure; and BOA has filed numerous actions where it initially stated that it was the servicer for an undisclosed third-party owner of the loan and then later retracted the allegations of its complaint stated that it was in fact the lender at all times material to the mortgage and the foreclosure.

 

2 Florida Cases Decided in Favor of Borrower

The Wadsworth case clearly shows that the appellate courts are requiring the trial court to scrutinize the claims and filings of would-be forecloser and that things like notice of acceleration and the right to cure are important enough to reverse summary judgment. This is directly contrary to the rulings of many judges who say that the lack of notice is NOT a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. It can be argued that if it is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment, it ought to be sufficient to dismiss the complaint that does not allege the existence of the loan, the financial injury and the compliance with paragraph 22, with a copy thereof.

Wadsworth

The Beaumont decision is especially interesting because it deals with a rather obvious alteration of documents by Bank of America or its “successors” or lawyers. Or I would not be surprised to learn that LPS was involved in this one. They changed the due date and foreclosed. The trial court disregarded the defense that the note was altered and said it wasn’t enough that they alleged these facts on information and belief.  The appellate court that might be true, but the documents of records clearly raise the issue themselves.

Beaumont

Quiet Title Claims Explained

see also http://livinglies.me/2013/04/29/hawaii-federal-district-court-applies-rules-of-evidence-bonymellon-us-bank-jp-morgan-chase-failed-to-prove-sale-of-note/
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Analysis: If you are thinking that with all the publicity surrounding the obvious fatal defects in the millions of foreclosures already completed, quiet title should be unnecessary, you are probably right. The fact is that the real world is more complicated and as Elizabeth Warren and several dozen bloggers and journalists have pointed out the average of $300 per homeowner being paid to settle the matter is not just inadequate it is stupid. No amount of money will actually cure the current title corruption on record in all 50 states due to practice of allowing complete strangers to the transaction to self-anoint themselves as creditors, foreclose on property and submit a credit bid at auction when they were not owed any money and there was no credit relationship between the homeowner and the bidder.

Quiet Title is an effective tool but it is not a silver bullet. It is about what is contained in the county records. If someone accidentally (or on purpose) records a lien against your property and they refuse to retract it, then you are forced to file an action with the Court that says I own the property and my title is clouded by documents that were recorded as liens against my title.

Those liens are not lawful, and they should be declared null and void or at a minimum the court should issue a declaratory statement based upon facts of the case that sets forth the stakeholders in the property and the nature of their claim.

In order to claim the latter, you would need to state that while the lien is unlawful, the party named on the lien, or the party claiming to hold the right to the lien, refuses to cooperate with clearing title or to explain the nature of their claim. Thus the homeowner is left with a lien which is unlawful and a claimant who insists that it is lawful. The homeowner is in doubt as to his rights and therefore asks the Court to quiet title or declare the rights of the parties.

In filing quiet title claims the mistake most often made is that it is being used defensively instead of offensively. The complaint that fails merely attacks the right of some pretender lender to foreclose. That is not a quiet title action. That is a denial of the debt, note, mortgage, default, notice etc.

And the Courts regularly and correctly dismiss such claims as quiet title claims. You can’t quiet tile because someone does not have a right to foreclose. You can only quiet title if you can assert and prove to the Court that the items on record do not apply to you or  your property and therefore should be removed.

AND you can’t get through a motion to dismiss a declaratory action if you don’t state that you are in doubt and give cogent reasons why you are in doubt. If you state that the other side has no right to do anything and end it there, you are using quiet title defensively rather than offensively in a declaratory action.

Stating that the pretender lender has no right to foreclose is not grounds for a declaratory action either. If you make a short plain statement of FACTS (not conclusions of law) upon which the relief sought could be granted you survive a motion to dismiss. If you only state the conclusions of law, you lose the motion to dismiss.

In such a declaratory action you must state that you have doubts because the pretender lender has taken the position and issued statements, letters or demands indicating they are the owner of the lien but you have evidence from expert analyses from title and securitization experts that they are not the owner of the line and they never were.

Remember in securitized transactions you would need to name the original named payee on the note and the secured party(ies) and state that they never should have recorded the lien because they did not perform as required by the agreement (i.e., they didn’t loan you money) and/or because they received loss mitigation payments in excess of the amount due. If you want to get more elaborate, you can say that they now claim to have nothing to do with the loan and refuse to apply loss mitigation payments to the loan even though they were received.

The problem in Florida is that such claims may be interpreted by the Clerk as claims relating to land and title which requires the ungodly amount of $1900 in filing fees alone, which I personally think is an unconscionable and unconstitutional denial of access to the court to all except people with a lot of money.

So you might want to go with slander of title seeking money damages or failure to refund over-payments received from sale or mitigation payments relating to your loan. That COULD be the basis of a claim in which the property is already sold at auction, short-sale, or resale. If the pretender lender received the payoff or the property illegally and then fraudulently executed a satisfaction of mortgage even though they were never the lender nor the purchaser of the loan, then you, as the owner of the property are probably entitled to that money plus interest and probably attorney fees.

PRACTICE NOTE: Strategically it seems like it is tough going if you attack the title under correct but unpalatable causes of action (i.e. actions that the judicial system already has decided they don’t like the outcome — a free house to the homeowner). So the other way of skinning the cat is to file actions for damages and that I think is the future of mortgage litigation. The basic action is simple breach of contract (the agreement to enter into the loan transaction and/or the note).

Filing suit for damages AFTER the sale gives you playing field without moving goal posts and allows fairly simple straightforward causes of action which many attorneys will soon realize they can take strictly on contingency or mostly on contingency. The net result may well be either the tender of money and/or the tender of the property back to the homeowner or former homeowner in lieu of payment for damages.It also opens the door to the possibility of punitive, treble, or exemplary damages or some combination of those.

At my firm we are looking hard at closings where the pretender lender took the money and ran on a short-sale or resale. It is clear-cut. They either had a right to the money or they didn’t. IF they didn’t have the right to execute the satisfaction of mortgage or if they fraudulently diverted the money to their own benefit in lieu of the creditor from whom they did receive authority, then you still have a right to refund of the money that unjustly enriched the pretender lender.  The money goes to the former owner/seller and to nobody else. If there is a claimant that wishes to step forward to attack the award, then we will deal with it, but based upon my information such claims will not be made.

More News:

Error Claims Cast Doubt on Bank of America Foreclosures in Bay Area
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/series/mortgage-mess/Error-Claims-Cast-Doubt-on-Bank-of-America-Foreclosures-in-Bay-Area-204764581.html

Number of homes entering foreclosure plunges in California
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-foreclosure-report-20130424,0,6017958.story

Politics: While Wronged Homeowners Got $300 Apiece in Foreclosure Settlement, Consultants Who Helped Protect Banks Got $2 Billion
http://m.rollingstone.com/?seenSplash=1&redirurl=/politics/blogs/taibblog/while-wronged-homeowners-got-300-apiece-in-foreclosure-settlement-consultants-who-helped-protect-banks-got-2-billion-20130426

Minnesota Supreme Court Affirms That Foreclosing Parties Must Record Mortgage Assignments Prior To Initiating Foreclosure By Advertisement
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/minnesota-supreme-court-affirms-that-for-50369/

Presenting: The Housing Bubble 2.0
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-29/presenting-housing-bubble-20

 

CA Trial Court Upholds Claims for Improper Assignment, Accounting, Unfair Practices

Editor’s Note: In an extremely well-written and well reasoned decision Federal District Court Judge M. James Lorenz denied the Motion to dismiss of US Bank on an alleged WAMU securitization that for the first time recognizes that the securitization scheme could be a sham, with no basis in fact.

Although the Plaintiff chose not to make allegations regarding false origination of loan documents, which I think is important, the rest of the decision breaks the illusion created by the banks and servicers through the use of documents that look good but do not meet the standards of proof required in a foreclosure.

  1. I would suggest that lawyers look at the claim and allegations that the origination documents were false and were procured by fraud.
  2. Since no such allegation was made, the court naturally assumed the loan was validly portrayed in the loan documents and that the note was evidence of the loan transaction, presuming that SBMC actually loaned the money to the Plaintiff, which does not appear to be the case.
  3. This Judge actually read everything and obvious questions in his mind led him to conclude that there were irregularities in the assignment process that could lead to a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for quiet title, accounting, unfair practices and other claims.
  4. The court recites the fact that the loan was sold to “currently unknown entity or entities.” This implicitly raises the question of whether the loan was in fact actually sold more than once, and if so, to whom, for how much, and raises the issues of whom Plaintiff was to direct her payments and whether the actual creditor was receiving the money that Plaintiff paid.  — a point hammered on, among others, at the Garfield Seminars coming up in Emeryville (San Francisco), 8/25 and Anaheim, 8/29-30. If you really want to understand what went on in the mortgage meltdown and the tactics and strategies that are getting traction in the courts, you are invited to attend. Anaheim has a 1/2 day seminar for homeowners. Call customer service 520-405-1688 to attend.
  5. For the first time, this Court uses the words (attempt to securitize” a loan as opposed to assuming it was done just based upon the paperwork and the presence of the the parties claiming rights through the assignments and securitization.
  6. AFTER the Notice of Sale was recorded, the Plaintiff sent a RESPA 6 Qualified Written request. The defendants used the time-honored defense that this was not a real QWR, but eh court disagreed, stating that the Plaintiff not only requested information but gave her reasons in some details for thinking that something might be wrong.
  7. Plaintiff did not specifically mention that the information requested should come from BOTH the subservicer claiming rights to service the loan and the Master Servicer claiming rights to administer the payments from all parties and the disbursements to those investor lenders that had contributed the money that was used to fund the loan. I would suggest that attorneys be aware of this distinction inasmuch as the subservicer only has a small snapshot of transactions solely between the borrower and the subservicer whereas the the information from the Master Servicer would require a complete set of records on all financial transactions and all documents relating to their claims regarding the loan.
  8. The court carefully applied the law on Motions to Dismiss instead of inserting the opinion of the Judge as to whether the Plaintiff would win stating that “material allegations, even if doubtful in fact, are assumed to be true,” which is another point we have been pounding on since 2007. The court went on to say that it was obligated to accept any claim that was “plausible on its face.”
  9. The primary claim of Plaintiffs was that the Defendants were “not her true creditors and as such have no legal, equitable, or pecuniary right in this debt obligation in the loan,’ which we presume to mean that the court was recognizing the distinction, for the first time, between the legal obligation to pay and the loan documents.
  10. Plaintiff contended that there was not a proper assignment to anyone because the assignment took place after the cutoff date in 2006 (assignment in 2010) and that the person executing the documents, was not a duly constituted authorized signor. The Judge’s decision weighed more heavily that allegation that the assignment was not properly made according to the “trust Document,” thus taking Defendants word for it that a trust was created and existing at the time of the assignment, but also saying in effect that they can’t pick up one end of the stick without picking up the other. The assignment, after the Notice of Default, violated the terms of the trust document thus removing the authority of the trustee or the trust to accept it, which as any reasonable person would know, they wouldn’t want to accept — having been sold on the idea that they were buying performing loans. More on this can be read in “whose Lien Is It Anyway?, which I just published and is available on www.livinglies-store.com
  11. The Court states without any caveats that the failure to assign the loan in the manner and timing set forth in the “trust document” (presumably the Pooling and Servicing Agreement) that the note and Deed of trust are not part of the trust and that therefore the trustee had no basis for asserting ownership, much less the right to enforce.
  12. THEN this Judge uses simple logic and applies existing law: if the assignment was void, then the notices of default, sale, substitution of trustee and any foreclosure would have been totally void.
  13. I would add that lawyers should consider the allegation that none of the transfers were supported by any financial transaction or other consideration because consideration passed at origination from the investors directly tot he borrower, due to the defendants ignoring the provisions of the prospectus and PSA shown to the investor-lender. In discovery what you want is the identity of each entity that ever showed this loan is a loan receivable on any regular business or record or set of accounting forms. It might surprise you that NOBODY has the loan posted as loan receivable and as such, the argument can be made that NOBODY can submit a CREDIT BID at auction even if the auction was otherwise a valid auction.
  14. Next, the Court disagrees with the Defendants that they are not debt collectors and upholds the Plaintiff’s claim for violation of FDCPA. Since she explicitly alleges that US bank is a debt collector, and started collection efforts on 2010, the allegation that the one-year statute of limitation should be applied was rejected by the court. Thus Plaintiff’s claims for violations under FDCPA were upheld.
  15. Plaintiff also added a count under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) which prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. Section 17200 of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code. The Court rejected defendants’ arguments that FDCPA did not apply since “Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the UCL by collecting payments that they lacked the right to collect, and engaging in unlawful business practices by violating the FDCPA and RESPA.” And under the rules regarding motions to dismiss, her allegations must be taken as absolutely true unless the allegations are clearly frivolous or speculative on their face.
  16. Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants had created a cloud upon her title affecting her in numerous ways including her credit score, ability to refinance etc. Defendants countered that the allegation regarding a cloud on title was speculative. The Judge said this is not speculation, it is fact if other allegations are true regarding the false recording of unauthorized documents based upon an illegal or void assignment.
  17. And lastly, but very importantly, the Court recognizes for the first time, the right of a homeowner to demand an accounting if they can establish facts in their allegations that raise questions regarding the status of the loan, whether she was paying the right people and whether the true creditors were being paid. “Plaintiff alleges facts that allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants may be liable for various misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Here are some significant quotes from the case. Naranjo v SBMC TILA- Accounting -Unfair practices- QWR- m/dismiss —

Judge Lorenzo Decision in Naranjo vs. SBMC Mortgage et al 7-24-12

No allegations regarding false origination of loan documents:

SBMC sold her loan to a currently unknown entity or entities. (FAC ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that these unknown entities and Defendants were involved in an attempt to securitize the loan into the WAMU Mortgage Pass-through Certificates WMALT Series 2006-AR4 Trust (“WAMU Trust”). (Id. ¶ 17.) However, these entities involved in the attempted securitization of the loan “failed to adhere to the requirements of the Trust Agreement

In August 2009, Plaintiff was hospitalized, resulting in unforeseen financial hardship. (FAC ¶ 25.) As a result, she defaulted on her loan. (See id. ¶ 26.)
On May 26, 2010, Defendants recorded an Assignment of Deed of Trust, which states that MERS assigned and transferred to U.S. Bank as trustee for the WAMU Trust under the DOT. (RJN Ex. B.) Colleen Irby executed the Assignment as Officer for MERS. (Id.) On the same day, Defendants also recorded a Substitution of Trustee, which states that the U.S. Bank as trustee, by JP Morgan, as attorney-in-fact substituted its rights under the DOT to the California Reconveyance Company (“CRC”). (RJN Ex. C.) Colleen Irby also executed the Substitution as Officer of “U.S. Bank, National Association as trustee for the WAMU Trust.” (Id.) And again, on the same day, CRC, as trustee, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell. (RJN Ex. D.)
A Notice of Trustee’s sale was recorded, stating that the estimated unpaid balance on the note was $989,468.00 on July 1, 2011. (RJN Ex. E.)
On August 8, 2011, Plaintiff sent JPMorgan a Qualified Written Request (“QWR”) letter in an effort to verify and validate her debt. (FAC ¶ 35 & Ex. C.) In the letter, she requested that JPMorgan provide, among other things, a true and correct copy of the original note and a complete life of the loan transactional history. (Id.) Although JPMorgan acknowledged the QWR within five days of receipt, Plaintiff alleges that it “failed to provide a substantive response.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Specifically, even though the QWR contained the borrow’s name, loan number, and property address, Plaintiff alleges that “JPMorgan’s substantive response concerned the same borrower, but instead supplied information regarding an entirely different loan and property.” (Id.)

The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cedars-Sanai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). Material allegations, even if doubtful in fact, are assumed to be true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the court need not “necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, the court does not need to accept any legal conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)

the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff’s primary contention here is that Defendants “are not her true creditors and as such have no legal, equitable, or pecuniary right in this debt obligation” in the loan. (Pl.’s Opp’n 1:5-11.) She contends that her promissory note and DOT were never properly assigned to the WAMU Trust because the entities involved in the attempted transfer failed to adhere to the requirements set forth in the Trust Agreement and thus the note and DOT are not a part of the trust res. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 20.) Defendants moves to dismiss the FAC in its entirety with prejudice.

The vital allegation in this case is the assignment of the loan into the WAMU Trust was not completed by May 30, 2006 as required by the Trust Agreement. This allegation gives rise to a plausible inference that the subsequent assignment, substitution, and notice of default and election to sell may also be improper. Defendants wholly fail to address that issue. (See Defs.’ Mot. 3:16-6:2; Defs.’ Reply 2:13-4:4.) This reason alone is sufficient to deny Defendants’ motion with respect to this issue. [plus the fact that no financial transaction occurred]

Moving on, Defendants’ reliance on Gomes is misguided. In Gomes, the California Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff does not have a right to bring an action to determine a nominee’s authorization to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure on behalf of a noteholder. 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1155. The nominee in Gomes was MERS. Id. at 1151. Here, Plaintiff is not seeking such a determination. The role of the nominee is not central to this action as it was in Gomes. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of rights to the WAMU Trust is improper, thus Defendants consequently lack the legal right to either collect on the debt or enforce the underlying security interest.

Plaintiff requests that the Court “make a finding and issue appropriate orders stating that none of the named Defendants . . . have any right or interest in Plaintiff’s Note, Deed of Trust, or the Property which authorizes them . . . to collect Plaintiff’s mortgage payments or enforce the terms of the Note or Deed of Trust in any manner whatsoever.” (FAC ¶ 50.) Defendant simplifies this as a request for “a determination of the ownership of [the] Note and Deed of Trust,” which they argue is “addressed in her other causes of action.” (Defs.’ Mot. 6:16-20.) The Court disagrees with Defendants. As discussed above and below, there is an actual controversy that is not superfluous. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.

Defendants argue that they are not “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA. (Defs.’ Mot. 9:13-15.) That argument is predicated on the presumption that all of the legal rights attached to the loan were properly assigned. Plaintiff responds that Defendants are debt collectors because U.S. Bank’s principal purpose is to collect debt and it also attempted to collect payments. (Pl.’s Opp’n 19:23-27.) She explicitly alleges in the FAC that U.S. Bank has attempted to collect her debt obligation and that U.S. Bank is a debt collector. Consequently, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim under the FDCPA.
Defendants also argue that the FDCPA claim is time barred. (Defs.’ Mot. 7:18-27.) A FDCPA claim must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Defendants contend that the violation occurred when the allegedly false assignment occurred on May 26, 2010. (Defs.’ Mot. 7:22-27.) However, Plaintiff alleges that U.S. Bank violated the FDCPA when it attempted to enforce Plaintiff’s debt obligation and collect mortgage payments when it allegedly had no legal authority to do so. (FAC ¶ 72.) Defendants wholly overlook those allegations in the FAC. Thus, Defendants fail to show that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is time barred.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s letter does not constitute a QWR because it requests a list of unsupported demands rather than specific particular errors or omissions in the account along with an explanation from the borrower why she believes an error exists. (Defs.’ Mot. 10:4-13.) However, the letter explains that it “concerns sales and transfers of mortgage servicing rights; deceptive and fraudulent servicing practices to enhance balance sheets; deceptive, abusive, and fraudulent accounting tricks and practices that may have also negatively affected any credit rating, mortgage account and/or the debt or payments that [Plaintiff] may be obligated to.” (FAC Ex. C.) The letter goes on to put JPMorgan on notice of
potential abuses of J.P. Morgan Chase or previous servicing companies or previous servicing companies [that] could have deceptively, wrongfully, unlawfully, and/or illegally: Increased the amounts of monthly payments; Increased the principal balance Ms. Naranjo owes; Increased the escrow payments; Increased the amounts applied and attributed toward interest on this account; Decreased the proper amounts applied and attributed toward the principal on this account; and/or[] Assessed, charged and/or collected fees, expenses and miscellaneous charges Ms. Naranjo is not legally obligated to pay under this mortgage, note and/or deed of trust.
(Id.) Based on the substance of letter, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the letter is not a QWR.
California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This cause of action is generally derivative of some other illegal conduct or fraud committed by a defendant. Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the UCL by collecting payments that they lacked the right to collect, and engaging in unlawful business practices by violating the FDCPA and RESPA.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegation regarding a cloud on her title does not constitute an allegation of loss of money or property, and even if Plaintiff were to lose her property, she cannot show it was a result of Defendants’ actions. (Defs.’ Mot. 12:22-13:4.) The Court disagrees. As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges damages resulting from Defendants’ collection of payments that they purportedly did not have the legal right to collect. These injuries are monetary, but also may result in the loss of Plaintiff’s property. Furthermore, these injuries are causally connected to Defendants’ conduct. Thus, Plaintiff has standing to pursue a UCL claim against Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owe a fiduciary duty in their capacities as creditor and mortgage servicer. (FAC ¶ 125.) She pursues this claim on the grounds that Defendants collected payments from her that they had no right to do. Defendants argue that various documents recorded in the Official Records of San Diego County from May 2010 show that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for accounting. (Defs.’ Mot. 16:1-3.) Defendants are mistaken. As discussed above, a fundamental issue in this action is whether Defendants’ rights were properly assigned in accordance with the Trust Agreement in 2006. Plaintiff alleges facts that allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants may be liable for various misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED: FRAUD ALLEGED V MORGAN STANLEY

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It is interesting how the same allegations made by an institution are taken more seriously. In fact, the Court leaves in the prayer for punitive, consequential and future damages. Here MBIA is suing Morgan Stanley for lying about the risks and the nature of what they were buying. It’s all about the mortgages. Below I’ve selected some of the more interesting passages from the order denying Morgan Stanley’s Motion to Dismiss. While Judges routinely dismiss or otherwise are dismissive of homeowner complaints about the exact same thing by the exact same parties, they tend to take it more seriously when another institution says the same thing.

I remind the readers that we have repeatedly predicted the ankle-biting complaints amongst the giants that participated in the Ponzi scheme, whether knowingly or not. The obvious move by MBIA raises the question of why the same move has not been vigorously prosecuted by AIG, which played such a central role in funding the ill-gotten escape hatch for bankers.

“a vast number of of mortgage loans were made to borrowers who could not reasonably be expected to be able to repay their mortgage debt.”

As to MBIA Third PArty Guarantee and Payment: “This guarantee of repayment of principal and interest for the RMBS notes increased their marketability.”

“MBIA contends that these misrepresentations and failures ‘fundamentally distorted the risk profile represented to MBIA and raised the likelihood of losses’. Had MBIA known the truth it would not have issued the certificate insurance policy.” [Editor’s Note: Had ANYONE known the truth there would have been no mortgage bonds to  sell, no loans to make, no borrowers signing on the dotted line. Even here, the Judge assumes the Morgan acquired the loans when all indications are that it never did so. The Judge’s assumption is most likely the result of a bad assumption by the writer’s of the complaint for MBIA. The truth is that the loans never made it into the pools, there was nothing to insure, and the entire proposition is “all or nothing” with the emphasis on the NOTHING.]

“Morgan Stanley argues in essence that MBIA’s fraud claim must be dismissed because it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim. It is not. A fraudulent inducement claim may be sustained when it is alleged that misrepresentations contained in documents collateral to the contract were made to induce the Plaintiff to enter into the contract in the first place…” [Editor’s comment: Applying exactly this logic to the borrower, the “contract” was fraudulently induced by misrepresenting the appraised value of the property, misrepresenting the underwriting of the loan including parties and terms and viability, and misrepresenting the risk that the “lender” was taking (none). Thus our assertion on these pages that the primary claim is fraud in the inducement, as to damages, and quiet title, as to the lien, is corroborated by these simple statement of obvious black letter law by this Judge.]

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May 23-24, 2010 2 days. 9am-5pm. Neil F Garfield. CLE credits pending but not promised. Register Now. Seating limited to 18. INCLUDES LUNCH AND EXTENSIVE MANUAL OF FORMS, NARRATIVE AND CASES. An in-depth look at securitized residential mortgages and deeds of trust. Latest cases on standing, nominees, splitting note from security instrument, bankruptcy strategies, expert declarations, forensic analysis reports.

Lawyers, paralegals, experts, forensic analysts will all benefit from this. This workshop includes monthly follow-up teleconferences and continuing on-going support with advance copies of articles, cases and analysis.

  1. STRATEGIC REVIEW: WHY THESE CASES ARE BEING WON AND LOST IN MOTION PRACTICE.
  2. SECURITIZATION REVIEW
  3. USE OF FORENSIC REPORTS AND EXPERT DECLARATIONS
  4. RAISING QUESTIONS OF FACT IN CREDIBLE MANNER
  5. SETTING UP AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
  6. FOLLOW THE MONEY
  7. OBLIGATION, NOTE, BOND, MORTGAGE, DEED OF TRUST ANALYSIS
  8. TILA, RESPA, QWR, DVL AND RESCISSION — WHY JUDGES DON’T LIKE TILA RESCISSION AND HOW TO OVERCOME THEIR RESISTANCE.
  9. NOTICE OF DEFAULT, TRUSTEE, STANDING, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST EXAMINED AND REVIEWED
  10. INVESTORS, REMICS, TRUSTS, TRUSTEES, BORROWERS, CREDITORS, DEBTORS, HOMEOWNERS
  11. FACT EVIDENCE ON MOTIONS
  12. FORENSIC EVIDENCE ON MOTION
  13. EXPERT EVIDENCE ON MOTION
  14. ORAL ARGUMENT
  15. WHAT TO FILE
  16. WHEN TO FILE
  17. EMERGENCY MOTIONS — MOTION TO LIFT STAY, MOTION TO DISMISS, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
  18. DISCOVERY: INTERROGATORIES, WHAT TO ASK FOR, HOW TO ASK FOR IT AND HOW TO ENFORCE IT. REQUESTS TO PRODUCE. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS. DEPOSITIONS UPON WRITTEN QUESTIONS.
  19. FEDERAL PROCEDURE
  20. STATE PROCEDURE
  21. BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
  22. ETHICS, BUSINESS PLANS, AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Padget v OneWest – IndyMac Provides some insight into RESPA remedies

The Ocwen Court provided an example for clarity: “Suppose an S & L signs a mortgage agreement with a homeowner that specifies annual interest rate of 6 percent and a year later bills the homeowner at a rate of 10 percent and when the homeowner refuses to pay institutes foreclosure proceedings. It would be surprising for a federal regulation to forbid the homeowner’s state to give the homeowner a defense based on the mortgagee’s breach of contract.” Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643-44.

Padget-One west bank dba Indymac

Editor’s Note: The assumption was made that One West owned the loan when it was clearly securitized. One West used the fact that Plaintiff admitted that One West was the owner of the loan and therefore undermined Plaintiff’s case against One West as a debt collector which requires the actor to be collecting for the benefit of a third party.

This is where the rubber meets the road. either you are going to master the nuance introduced by securitization or you are going to let the other side have a field day with misrepresentations that you have admitted are true.

PADGETT, Plaintiff,
v.
ONEWEST BANK, FSB, d/b/a INDYMAC

Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-08
United States District Court, Northern District of West Virginia, Martinsburg

parties filed an Agreed Order in the bankruptcy court resolving IndyMac’s motion to lift the automatic stay. (Id. at ¶ 14). Pursuant to this Agreed Order, the plaintiff’s mortgage was deemed current as of May 1, 2008, and the one payment for which the plaintiff was in arrears was added onto the end of the mortgage. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-
16). The first payment due under the Agreed Order was due in May 2008. (Id. at ¶ 17). The plaintiff made the May 2008 payment in a timely fashion and has made his monthly mortgage payment each month after May 2008, up to and including the date of the filing of the plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19).

In March 2009, Defendant OneWest Bank, F.S.B. (“OneWest”) purchased IndyMac, whereupon IndyMac Mortgage Services (“IndyMac MS”) became a division of OneWest. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21). On July 16, 2009, OneWest, doing business as IndyMac MS, sent the plaintiff a letter claiming he was one month behind on his payments. (Id. at ¶ 22). In response, on July 28, 2009, the plaintiff wrote to OneWest, enclosing a copy of the Agreed Order from his bankruptcy proceeding and requesting that OneWest supply him with documentation that he nevertheless remained one month behind. (Id. at
¶¶ 24-26). Again, on August 3, 2009, and September 16, 2009, IndyMac MS sent letters to the plaintiff alleging he was behind on his mortgage payments. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29).

OneWest continues to assess monthly late fees against his account and has informed credit reporting agencies that the plaintiff’s mortgage is delinquent, though plaintiff alleges he is current on his monthly mortgage payments.

OneWest argued that all of the plaintiff’s claims for relief were preempted by the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1461, et seq. (“HOLA”). (Id. at 4).

Motion to Dismiss denied in part and granted in part. Motion to Strike denied. Plaintiff was allowed to proceed.

Court Denies Motion to Dismiss and Holds Backdated Mortgage Assignments May be Invalid

The bad news is that the Court mistakenly assumes that MERS must be the party to enforce because the MERS assignment was backdated. MERS specifically and publicly disclaims any interest in the mortgage, note or obligation. How can MERS assign something it disclaims? MERS internet site and promotional literature all say the same thing — use us to record your assignments and transfers, we promise we’ll never assert any interest or ownership in the property, loan, note or mortgage.

The court also mistakenly quotes statute saying that a beneficiary under a deed of trust need not record the assignment of the beneficial interest. That may be true, but if the assignment is of the DOT without concurrent assignment of the note (and notice to the Trustor/Homeowner) the assignment is of dubious quality.

It is also curious why anyone would assign the deed of trust or a beneficial interest, since the assignment of the note would incorporate all interests under the security instrument under NORMAL conditions. But this isn’t normal, is it. They split the note from the mortgage and both the note and mortgage are split from the original obligation because the actual creditor is not even mentioned in the closing documents.

On March 30, 2010, in the case of Ohlendorf v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing

, (2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31098) on Defendants’ 12(B)(6) Motion, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs wrongful foreclosure claim on grounds that the assignment of mortgage was backdated and thus may have been invalid.

“On or about June 23, 2009, defendant T.D. Service Company (a foreclosure processing service) filed a notice of default in Placer County, identifying Deutsche Bank as beneficiary and AHMSI as trustee. In an assignment of deed of trust dated July 15, 2009, MERS assigned the deed of trust to AHMSI. This assignment of deed of trust purports to be effective as of June 9, 2009. A second assignment of deed of trust was executed on the same date as the first, July 15, 2009, but the time mark placed on the second assignment of deed of trust by the Placer County Recorder indicates that it was recorded eleven seconds after the first. In this second assignment of deed of trust, AHMSI assigned the deed of trust to Deutsche.  This assignment indicates that it was effective as of June 22, 2009. Both assignments were signed by Korell Harp. The assignment purportedly effective June 9, 2009, lists Harp as vice president of MERS and the assignment purportedly effective June 22, 2009, lists him as vice president of AHMSI. Six days later, on July 21, 2009, plaintiff recorded a notice of pendency of action with the Placer County Recorder.  In a substitution of trustee recorded on July 29, 2009, Deutsche, as present beneficiary, substituted ADSI as trustee.”

The court stated that “while California law does not require beneficiaries to record assignments, see California Civil Code Section 2934, the process of recording assignments with backdated effective dates may be improper, and thereby taint the notice of default.”

Plaintiff’s argument was interpreted by the court to be that the backdated assignments were not valid or at least were not valid on June 23, 2009, when the notice of default was recorded. As such the court assumed Plaintiff argued that MERS remained the beneficiary on that date and therefore was the only party who could enforce the default.

Judge Lawrence K. Karlton invited Defendants to file a motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim insofar as it is premised on the backdated assignments of the mortgage.

Dean Mostofi

301-867-3887

WHAT NOT TO DO IN PLEADING AND MOTION PRACTICE

REGISTER NOW FOR DISCOVERY AND MOTION PRACTICE WORKSHOP

(2006) Here is a case that should not have been filed (entire text of opinion below) and was argued improperly. The homeowners clearly lost because they put their eggs in the wrong basket. Nonetheless, the opinion is a pretty good compilation of the various statutes, rules and regulations affecting mortgages and their enforcement.

An interest quote used against the “homeowner” which itself was a trust, is that the word “interest” should be interpreted to mean “Ownership interest”. This is precisely the argument I advance regarding the holders of of certificates or even non-certificated mortgage-backed securities whose indenture is the prospectus. Those investors received at the very least a “beneficial” interest in the loans. Thus either the prospectus, the certificate or both are starting points, in addition to the note signed by the borrower, as evidence of the terms and status of the obligation.

CAROL R. ROSEN, Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as TRUSTEE, EQUIFIRST CORP., AMERICAN MORTGAGE SPECIALISTS, INC., and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants.

CIV-06-0427 JH/LAM.

  1. DON’T TRY OUT NEW THEORIES IN PLEADINGS THAT SOUND LIKE THE CONSPIRACY THEORIES OF CRAZY PEOPLE, EVEN IF YOU THINK YOU ARE RIGHT. IF YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT THE THEORY IS OUT OF BOUNDS IN THE PERCEPTION OF MOST PEOPLE, USE SOMETHING ELSE — there are plenty of simpler basic principles of law that will enhance rather than reduce your credibility.
  2. Beware of companies that claim to have a magic bullet to end your mortgage problems. Securitization is complex, and you need to focus on breaking it down to its simplest elements.
  3. Don’t try to win your case on a knock-out punch in the first hearings. Plan your strategy around education of the judge as to what happened in YOUR loan, using published reports, expert declarations and forensic analysis as corroborative.
  4. Don’t even think the Judge will indict the entire financial industry for what happened in your case. This will diminish your credibility.
  5. Plead causes of action that are familiar to the Judge and make sure you know and plead all the elements of those causes of action.
  6. Focus in pleadings and hearings as much as possible on the premises with which nobody could disagree — like every case should be heard on the merits, that you have a right to the same presumptions as anyone else who is pleading a claim or defense, and that you need to conduct discovery because there are facts and documents known to the defendants for which it would be over-burdensome and hugely expensive for you to get any other way.
  7. Don’t expect the Judge to be sympathetic. In most cases Judges still look at securitized mortgages like any other mortgage. In most cases Judges see challanges to foreclosures as desperate attempts to stave of the inevitable. Lead and repeat your main message. Your main message is that it is indisputable that if the facts you are pleading are true, then you are entitled to the precise relief you have demanded. KEEP IT SIMPLE. Use each hearing to repeat the previous “lesson” and add new lessons for the Judge.
  8. Do not avoid arguments of opposing counsel. Challenge them in a direct manner showing the Judge that if the attorney was correct in what he is saying, then he would be right and his client would win (if that is the case) or showing that the if the attorney was correct he still would not win his case. THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK. PLAN BEFORE YOU APPEAR.
  9. DO NOT FALL INTO THE TRAP OF ALLOWING OPPOSING COUNSEL TO PROFFER FACTS AS THOUGH THEY WERE TRUE. Challenge that tactic by admitting that counsel has a right to put on evidence in support of what he/she is arguing but that the hearing is not the trial and you have evidence too, and you’ll have more evidence if you are allowed to proceeds on the merits of your claim. By all means, once opposing counsel has “testified” include in your remarks prepared script as to YOUR facts and YOUR conclusions. END WITH THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS OBVIOUSLY AN ISSUE OF FACT AND WHETHER THE JUDGE THINKS YOU WILL WIN OR NOT IS IMMATERIAL. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE HEARD ON THE MERITS AND A RIGHT TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY. If opposing counsel is so sure that what you are alleging is frivolous, then there are many remedies available including summary judgment. But it is not until the FACTS come out that any of those remedies arise.
  10. Do not characterize your opposition as part of an evil axis of power. They may well have contributed to the Judge’s campaign, or otherwise have indirect relationships that do not merit recusal. This is not about whether banks are evil, it is about why are all these entities necessary to simply foreclose on a mortgage? If it is as simple as THEY say, why don’t they have the paperwork to back it up?
  11. DO NOT SAY ANYTHING YOU CAN’T BACK UP. This does NOT mean you have all the proof you need to win your case when you file your first pleading. It means that you know that if you are allowed to proceed, and you actually get the disclosure and discovery of the true facts, you will win.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

November 8, 2006.

Carol Rosen, Albuquerque, NM, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Rhodes & Salmon, P.C., William C. Salmon, Albuquerque, NM, Attorney for Defendant U.S. Bank.

Karla Poe, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, Kimberly Smith Rivera, McGlinchey Staford, PLLC, Cleveland, OH, Attorney for Defendant EquiFirst.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JUDITH HERRERA, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant U.S. Bank National Association’s (“U.S. Bank”) Motion to Dismiss or Stay [Doc. 23, filed Aug. 7, 2006], and Defendant EquiFirst Corporation, Inc.’s (“EquiFirst”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 28, filed Sept. 15, 2006]. The Court has reviewed the motions, the record in this case, and the relevant law, and concludes that the motions are well-taken and should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Before turning to the facts presented in the pleadings in this case, the Court takes judicial notice of cases involving D. Scott Heineman and Kurt F. Johnson, who are the Trustees of the Rosen Family Trust, of which Plaintiff Carol R. Rosen is a beneficiary. See Doc. 17, Ex. B ¶ 4.A. Heineman and Johnson

were the proprietors of a business that claimed to help homeowners eliminate their mortgages. [Heineman and Johnson’s] business operated under the “vapor money” theory of lending, which holds that loans funded through wire transfers rather than through cash are unenforceable. [They] claimed that, through a complicated series of transactions, they could take advantage of this loophole and legally eliminate their clients’ mortgages.

In 2004, Johnson and Heineman filed a series of lawsuits against mortgage companies on behalf of their clients, seeking, among other things, a declaration that any mortgages on their clients’ properties were void. All fifteen cases were . . . found. . . to be “frivolous and . . . filed in bad faith.”

. . . .

On September 22, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted [Heineman and Johnson] on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.

United States v. Heineman, 2006 WL 2374580, *1 (N. D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2006). The step-by-step method Heineman and Johnson advertised over the internet and used to attempt to eliminate mortgages is as follows. They would have

the homeowner prepare and sign a promissory note as well as a loan agreement for the encumbered property. The homeowner then sends these documents to [Heineman and Johnson] with a cashier’s check “of $3,000 [to eliminate a] 1st mortgage, and $1,500 [to eliminate] a second mortgage or home equity line of credit.” Once this initial fee is received, Heineman and Johnson set up a Family Estate Amenable Complex trust in the homeowner’s name, i.e., the Frances Kenny Family Trust. Heineman and Johnson name themselves the trustees. Title to the homeowner’s property is transferred to the trust.

Now in charge as trustees, Heineman and Johnson approach the bank or lending institution that lent the homeowner the money to purchase the property. They make a “Presentment” to the bank in the form of “a cash-backed bond in double-amount of the promissory note.” The “bond” is allegedly “a valid, rated instrument backed by a $120 Million Letter of Credit against the Assets of an 85-year old, $800 Million Swiss Trust Company.” This is essentially an offer to the lender to satisfy the borrower’s indebtedness. The alleged “bond,” however, is a ploy.

. . . .

In addition to the “bond,” Heineman and Johnson hire “Trustee lawyers” to “begin the legal process by sending out a legal complaint in the form of a CPA Report that outlines 40 or more different federal laws that have been violated in the ‘lending process.'” The lending institution thereafter has a certain time frame within which to respond to the complaint. Purportedly, the homeowner will be notified by plaintiffs’ legal team when the loan is “satisfied.” The homeowner’s “lender may or may not let [you] know or acknowledge this.”

Once the loan is satisfied, “re-financing begins.” The homeowner is told to “refinance [his] property at the maximum loan to value ratio possible” with a new lender. The alleged “purpose of this new re-financing is for you, the client, to compensate the Provider and CCR.” Heineman and Johnson are the “Provider.” They run CCR. The proceeds from this new loan are disbursed as follows: “The Provider receives 50%. CCR receives 25%. You, the client, receives the other 25%.” This entire process takes “5-7 months in most cases.” And, “[t]he end result is that the [homeowner] gets free and clear title to the home and a good amount of cash in hand.”

[Heineman and Johnson], however, perpetrate a fraud to “satisfy” the original indebtedness. One of the documents Heineman and Johnson present to the bank or lending institution is entitled a “power of attorney.” This document demands that the lender sign and thereby acknowledge that it has given the homeowner “vapor money” in exchange for an interest (via a deed of trust) in the subject property at the time of financing. A provision of this “power of attorney” provides that the lender’s “silence is deemed consent.” When the lender fails to respond, [Heineman and Johnson] execute the power of attorney. They then sign a deed of reconveyance reconveying the lender’s security interest in the property to Heineman and Johnson. The forged power of attorney and the deed of reconveyance are duly recorded at the county recorder’s office. The county’s records thus show a power of attorney from the lender granting Heineman and Johnson the right to sign the deed of reconveyance and the reconveyance from the original lender. The title seems clear and unencumbered. The lender is unaware of the maneuver.

[Heineman and Johnson] then turn around and from an unsuspecting new lender seek a loan to refinance the property. When the new lender conducts a preliminary title search, it discovers the power of attorney and deed of reconveyance, both of which appear to have been validly executed. From the new lender’s point of view, the property appears to be unencumbered. And it is thus willing to refinance the property.

. . . .

At the conclusion of this process, the borrower is in even worse condition than when he or she first looked to [Heineman and Johnson] for debt relief. Two lenders believe that they have valid security interests in the subject property. When the homeowner defaults on both loans, both lenders commence foreclosure proceedings. In response, Heineman and Johnson, as trustees, file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of the borrower or file suit alleging that no enforceable debt accrued from either lender because the loans were funded through wire transfers rather than cash. Fifteen such lawsuits were filed in [the Northern District of California] on such a “vapor money” theory.

Frances Kenny Family Trust v. World Sav. Bank FSB, 2005 WL 106792 at *1-*3 (N. D. Cal., Jan. 19, 2005).

The following facts are taken from Rosen’s Amended Complaint and from the exhibits attached to her complaint and to U.S. Bank’s Answer. They demonstrate a pattern strikingly and disturbingly similar to the one described above. In December 2004, Rosen quitclaimed her property located on Wellesley Drive in Albuquerque, NM to Heineman and Johnson, as Trustees of the Rosen Family Trust. See Doc. 17, Ex. B ¶ 4.A. Colonial Savings held a mortgage secured by the Wellesley property. On March 3, 2005, Heineman, acting as “Attorney-in-Fact” for Colonial Savings, executed and recorded a notarized “Discharge of Mortgage” purporting to release Rosen from her mortgage of $86,250. Id. Ex. A. The Discharge stated that the mortgage had been “fully paid, satisfied, and discharged” and that Heineman’s power of attorney to act on behalf of Colonial Savings was granted “through the doctrine of agency by estoppel.” Id. The Vice President of Colonial Savings, however, recorded an “Affidavit of Fraudulent Recording of Discharge of Mortgage,” disputing that Heineman had any authority to act on Colonial’s behalf or discharge the mortgage and attesting that the note and mortgage had not been paid. Id.

On April 27, 2005, Rosen submitted a loan application to Defendant American Mortgage Specialists, Inc. (“American Mortgage”), a mortgage broker located in Arizona, for the purpose of refinancing the Wellesley property. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 10-11 & Ex. A (Doc. 13). Rosen subsequently executed a note for $198,305 in favor of EquiFirst, secured by a Deed of Trust on the Wellesley property. See id. Ex. A, B. The mortgage provides that, if the note was sold or the Loan Servicer was changed, EquiFirst would give Rosen written notice, together with “any other information RESPA requires.” Id. Ex. B at 13.

Rosen signed the note and mortgage on May 17, 2005. See id. at 16. The loan was closed that same day, and proceeds were disbursed on May 23, 2005, including over $29,000 to third-party creditors. See Am. Compl. Ex. G. Colonial Savings is not included in the list of payoff recipients. See id.

Lines 801, 812, and 814 of the closing statement, under the heading “ITEMS PAYABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LOAN,” show that a 1% “loan origination fee” of $1983.05 as well as “OTHER BRK FEES” of $1762 were paid to American Mortgage from Rosen’s loan proceeds, and that a $940 “LENDER ORIGINATION” fee was paid to EquiFirst from Rosen’s loan proceeds. Id. at 2. In addition, line 813 of the closing statement states: “BROKER FEE PAID BY LENDER YSP $3,966.10 POC.[1]Id. This represented a yield spread premium that EquiFirst additionally paid to American Mortgage upon the loan closing.

On June 21, 2005, EquiFirst and Homecomings Financial notified Rosen that the servicing of her mortgage loan (i.e., the right to collect payment from her) had been transferred to Homecomings Financial and that the effective date of transfer would be June 29, 2005. See Am. Compl., Ex. C. The transfer of servicing did not affect the terms or conditions of the mortgage. See id. Further, during the 60 days following the effective date of transfer, timely loan payments made to EquiFirst could not be treated as late by Homecomings Financial. See id.

On July 11, 2005, Rosen executed a Grant Deed granting “to D. Scott Heineman and Kurt F. Johnson, Trustees of Rosen Family Trust, for a valuable consideration . . .” her Wellesley Drive property that secured her EquiFirst mortgage. Am. Compl. at ¶ 26, Ex. D. The complaint does not state whether Rosen gave Homecomings Financial or EquiFirst notice of her transfer of ownership of the property to the Trust. According to her “Affidavit of Sum Certain,” Rosen made only three mortgage payments between the time she closed the EquiFirst loan in May 2005 and August 7, 2006, when she filed the affidavit. See Doc. 22.

On January 23, 2006, EquiFirst granted, assigned, and transferred its beneficial interest in Rosen’s mortgage to Defendant U.S. Bank as Trustee. See Am. Compl., Ex. E. U.S. Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings on Rosen’s mortgage and the Wellesley Drive property on February 1, 2006, in state district court. See Am. Compl. ¶ 28. On May 11, 2006, Rosen mailed a “notice of rescission” to EquiFirst, U.S. Bank, and Homecomings Financial. See id. ¶ 42, Ex. I. She alleged a right to rescind her mortgage transaction based on her claim that, when she closed the loan in May 2005, “EquiFirst failed to meet the requirements to give me accurate material disclosures and the proper notice of the right to rescind.” Am. Compl., Ex. I ¶ 7. She also claimed that “[a] broker’s fee, in the form of a yield spread premium, was fraudulently assessed to the loan transaction, . . . [which] renders the HUD 1/Settlement Statement defective, inter alia, because it does not state to whom the fee was paid . . . [and because] the charge was encoded, to the extent that no consumer or most any other person could decipher [it] . . . .” Id. ¶ 10B. Rosen claimed that these failures extended her statutory right to rescind from the regular three-day period to a three-year period. See id. ¶ 10D. Homecomings Financial, through counsel, responded to Rosen’s May 11 letter on June 6, 2006. It sent Rosen a copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel she signed on May 17, 2005, in which she acknowledged receipt of two copies of the Notice. See Am. Compl., Ex. H. It asserted that the abbreviations of “YSP” and “POC” “are standard terms within the mortgage banking industry” and that, if she’d had any concerns about those terms, she should have addressed them at closing. Id. Finding no basis for rescission, it refused to rescind the loan transaction.

Rosen filed her initial complaint in federal court on May 19, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. See Doc. 1. She filed an amended complaint on July 17, 2006, that contains six claims. Count One is for rescission under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 and § 226.23 of Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 48. She claims that recission “extinguishes any liability Plaintiff may have had to Defendants for finance or other charges arising from the [loan] Transaction,” id. ¶ 49, and that “Defendants [sic] failure to take action to reflect the termination of the security interest in the property within twenty . . . days of [her] rescission. . . releases [her] from any liability whatsoever to Defendants.” Id. ¶ 50.

Count Two alleges damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1640 for Defendants’ failure to comply with § 1635 after Defendants received Rosen’s rescission letter. Id. ¶¶ 51-52. Count Three is for recoupment of a statutory penalty provided under § 1640. In support, Rosen lists twenty-eight alleged violations of various federal and state statutes and regulations. See id. ¶¶ 54(a)-(bb).

Count Four alleges violation of a right to Equal Credit Opportunity as described in 12 C.F.R. § 202.14. In support, Rosen alleges that the Defendants failed to make clear and conspicuous disclosures, and that various documents were confusing. See id. ¶ 55.

Count Five alleges violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17. Rosen claims that Defendants failed to give her fifteen days notice before the loan servicing contract was assigned from EquiFirst to Homecomings Financials in violation of § 2605(b), see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-59, and that EquiFirst’s payment of the yield-spread premium to American Mortgage constituted an illegal fee or “kickback” violating 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)[2], see id. ¶ 60. Additionally, she alleges that EquiFirst and American Mortgage engaged in “fee splitting” in violation of § 2607(d)[3]. Id. ¶ 61.

Court Six alleges violation of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, N.M.S.A. §§ 57-12-1 et seq., based on the same allegations that EquiFirst and American Mortgage engaged in illegal kickback and fee-splitting activities that caused her to pay a higher interest rate. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-68, 76.

Rosen seeks: (i) a judicial declaration that she validly rescinded the loan and is not liable for any finance or other charges and has no liability whatsoever to Defendants; (ii) an order requiring Defendants to terminate their security interest in her home; (iii) an injunction enjoining Defendants from maintaining foreclosure proceedings or otherwise taking steps to deprive her of ownership of the property; (iv) an award of statutory damages and penalties; and (v) attorney fees. See id. at 26-27.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It asserts that Rosen has failed to state claims under particular statutes and that other claims are time-barred. It urges the Court to abstain from asserting jurisdiction over any remaining claims that should be resolved in the pending state foreclosure action. EquiFirst moves for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (“Judgment on the Pleadings”), asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts One through Four and Count Six, and on part of Count Five of Rosen’s amended complaint. In resolving motions brought under either Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), the Court must

accept all facts pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the same. Judgment on the pleadings should not be granted “unless the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000). As with . . . motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), documents attached to the pleadings are exhibits and are to be considered in [reviewing] . . . [a] 12(c) motion. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

Park Univ. Enter., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006).

It is true that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice. It is also well established that dismissal of a complaint is proper only if it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.

Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).

In reviewing a pro se complaint, a court applies the same legal standards applicable to pleadings counsel has drafted, but is mindful that the complaint must be liberally construed. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But “[t]he broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.

[T]he [pro se] plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him, should be allowed to amend his complaint. Nevertheless, conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based. This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.

Id. (citations omitted). The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. See Moore, 438 F.3d at 1039.

III. ANALYSIS

A. ROSEN FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RESCISSION.

In transactions covered by the TILA, the borrower is entitled to rescind the transaction. See § 1635(a). The right to rescind lasts for three days, if the lender has given the borrower the disclosures required by the TILA and a notice of the right to rescind; the right lasts up to three years if the lender fails to give the requisite disclosures and notice, unless the borrower sells or transfers the property to someone else before the end of the three-year period[4]. See § 1635(f). EquiFirst asserts that Rosen’s right to rescind expired by operation of law upon her transfer of her ownership interest in the Wellesley Drive property to Heineman and Johnson as Trustees of the Rosen Family Trust. Rosen contends, however, that because she did not actually sell the Wellesley Drive property and maintains a beneficial interest in remaining in the house (apparently by the terms of the Trust, which is not part of the record), her right to rescind has not expired.

Congress gave the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System broad authority to promulgate extensive regulations implementing the TILA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a), which it calls Regulation Z, see 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a). In interpreting and implementing § 1635(f), Regulation Z specifically provides that the borrower’s right to rescind immediately expires not only “upon sale of the property,” but also “upon transfer of all of the [borrower’s] interest in the property.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). The parties do not point to anything within the TILA, Regulation Z, or case law that further defines the extent of the borrower’s interest that must be transferred in order to trigger expiration of the right to rescind, and the Court has found none in its own research.

But the Court concludes that the words “all of the [borrower’s] interest” means all of the borrower’s ownership or title interest for several reasons. First, the Board clarified through § 226.23(a)(3) that something less than an outright sale of the property triggers expiration of the right to rescind. Second, because TILA provides for penalties when a lender fails to comply with rescission requirements and gives the lender only twenty days to return earnest money, down payments, and accrued interest and payments and to remove the security interest after receiving notice of the recission letter, see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), the lender must be able to quickly ascertain whether the borrower still legally owns the property securing the loan and has a statutory right to rescind. The only way to timely accomplish this goal is to examine the real property records in the county where the real property title is recorded. If, as here, those records demonstrate that the borrower has transferred her ownership and legal interests in the property, for valuable consideration, to another entity controlled by someone other than the borrower, the lender can reasonably contest the borrower’s right to rescission without fear of penalty. Trust documents that may contractually grant various types of beneficial interests after the sale or transfer of all of a borrower’s ownership interest in property are not generally filed in the public records, and a lender should not be required to assume that a beneficial interest of some sort may secretly exist that would hypothetically extend the borrower’s right to rescission. It is therefore consistent with the TILA’s goals to interpret “interest” as “ownership interest. See Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that “another goal of § 1635(b) [‘s recission requirement] is to return the parties most nearly to the position they held prior to entering the transaction”).

“Although the right to rescind is statutorily granted [in the TILA], it remains an equitable doctrine subject to equitable considerations.. . . Thus, district courts are to consider traditional equitable notions in applying [the TILA’s] statutory grant of rescission.” Brown v. Nat’l Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 683 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see In re Ramirez, 329 B.R. 727, 738 (D. Kan. 2005) (stating that, “[r]escission, whether statutory or common law, is an equitable remedy. Its relief, in design and effect, is to restore the parties to their pre-transaction positions. The TILA authorizes the courts to apply equitable principles to the rescission process. . . . [W]ithin the context of the TILA, rescission is a remedy that restores the status quo ante.”). Because Rosen has transferred her ownership of the property to a third party, the parties cannot be returned to their pre-transaction positions, which would unfairly prejudice EquiFirst if she maintained the right to recission. Cf., e.g., Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221-22 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a court could condition the borrowers’ continuing right of rescission upon tender to the lender of all of the funds spent by the lender in discharging the earlier indebtedness of the borrowers as well as the value of the home improvements). Without legal ownership of the Wellesley property to use as security for another mortgage, Rosen most likely could not return the $198,305 EquiFirst gave to her and her creditors. Equity therefore requires that the Court interpret § 226.23(a)(3) to provide for expiration of the right to rescission upon the transfer of a borrower’s ownership interest in the property securing a loan. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411-12, 417-19 (1998) (noting that “a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure, [so] Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk” by “governing the life” of the right to rescission with absolute expiration provisions under § 1635(f), “while permitting recoupment damages regardless of the date a collection action may be brought,” and holding that a borrower may not assert the right to rescind as an affirmative defense in a collection action after the right has expired by operation of law).

Finally, TILA is a strict liability statute. See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”); Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 248 (3d Cir.1980) (noting that the TILA and its regulations mandate a standard of disclosure of certain information in financing agreements and enforce that mandate by “a system of strict liability in favor of consumers who have secured financing when this standard is not met”). There should, therefore, be a bright line delineating the borrower’s and lender’s rights and responsibilities. Interpreting § 226.23(a)(3) to mean that transfer of all of the borrower’s ownership interest in the property securing a loan triggers expiration of the right to rescission preserves an easily-ascertainable bright line.

The Court concludes that, when Rosen transferred her ownership interest in the Wellesley Drive property to a Trust with Trustees other than herself on July 11, 2005, her right to rescission expired that same date by operation of law. Her May 11, 2006, recission letter was untimely and ineffective. She therefore cannot state a cause of action for rescission, and Count One must be dismissed. Accordingly, her claims stated in Count Two for monetary damages and penalties arising from Defendants’ refusal to rescind the refinancing contract must also be dismissed.

B. CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER TILA ARE TIME BARRED.

“Section 1640 is a general ‘civil liability’ section in the TILA. In subsection (a) it provides for either actual and/or statutory damages for various TILA violations” set forth in parts B, D, and E of the subchapter. Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2003); § 1640(a) (providing liability for creditors who fail to comply with “any requirements imposed under this part, including any requirement under section 1635 of this title, or part D or E of this subchapter”). Count Three, for recoupment of a statutory penalty provided under § 1640 alleges violations of not only TILA, but also of various other non-TILA regulations and the New Mexico UCC. Insofar as Rosen attempts to recover damages for violation of statutes not listed in § 1640(a), she has failed to state a claim.

Further, her claims for failing to disclose information or otherwise violating subchapter B at the time of closing must be dismissed as time barred. As both U.S. Bank and EquiFirst point out, claims for damages under § 1640 of TILA have a one-year limitations period. See § 1640(e) (“Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation . . . .”). A review of Rosen’s complaint reveals that all alleged violations of subchapter B occurred at or before closing on May 17, 2005, but she did not file her complaint until more than one year later. Count Three must be dismissed.

D. ROSEN FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691(f), makes it unlawful for a creditor to discriminate “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); [] because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or [] because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under [TILA].” § 1691(a). Rosen’s amended complaint alleges no facts to support a claim for violation of the Act, and she made no argument in her response brief to support amendment. Count Four must be dismissed.

E. RESPA CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED.

Rosen attempts to assert two types of claims under RESPA in Count Five of the Amended Complaint. The first is for violation, on June 21, 2005, of a provision that requires creditors to give a borrower fifteen days notice before transferring an account to a different loan servicer. See § 2605(b)(2)(A) (“Except as provided under subparagraphs (B) and (C), the notice required under paragraph (1) shall be made to the borrower not less than 15 days before the effective date of transfer of the servicing of the mortgage loan.”). To recover under § 2605, the borrower must allege and show actual damages suffered “as a result of the failure.” § 2605(f)(1)(A). If the borrower also alleges and establishes that the violation is a “pattern or practice of noncompliance,” a court may additionally award statutory damages “not to exceed $1000.” § 2605(f)(1)(B). Although the Amended Complaint neither alleges that Rosen suffered any actual damages as a result of EquiFirst’s failure to give her a full 15-days notice of the change of loan servicer, nor alleges that EquiFirst engaged in a pattern or practice of not complying with the 15-day notice requirement, Rosen requests that the Court “reduce the amount owed by Plaintiff by the amount of statutory and actual damages available under RESPA.” Am. Compl. at 22.

Because she has not alleged she suffered actual damages, the Court concludes that Rosen has failed to state a claim for damages under § 2605 and that she should not be given an opportunity to amend her complaint because none of the Defendants have attempted, in this federal suit, to bring any claims for money Rosen owes them. Any claims for recoupment that Rosen may be able to bring are relevant to the state foreclosure action and should be litigated there. Cf. Demmler v. Bank One NA, 2006 WL 640499, *5 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 9, 2006) (alternatively holding that the plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to TILA and other federal statutes against lending bank and challenging validity of loan were barred because they were compulsory counterclaims that should have been raised in the foreclosure action in state court).

Rosen alleges that Defendants violated § 2607 by giving “kickbacks” or engaging in “fee-splitting” on May 17, 2005, when EquiFirst paid a broker’s fee to American Mortgage as a yield-spread premium. The statute of limitations for violations of § 2607 is one year from the date the violation is alleged to have occurred. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614. The Court concludes that Rosen’s claims for violation of § 2607 are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See Snow v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 332 F.3d 356, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The primary ill that § 2607 is designed to remedy is the potential for ‘unnecessarily high settlement charges,’ § 2601(a), caused by kickbacks, fee-splitting, and other practices that suppress price competition for settlement services. This ill occurs, if at all, when the plaintiff pays for the service, typically at the closing. Plaintiffs therefore could have sued at that moment, and the standard rule is that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.”) (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). Rosen’s argument that her claim survives the one-year statute of limitations because it is one for recoupment is unavailing because Defendants have not sued her by way of counter-claim in this federal suit. Again, any claims for recoupment should have been brought as a defense in the state foreclosure action. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); Beach, 523 U.S. at 417-19.

F. THE COURT WILL NOT TAKE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER POTENTIAL STATE-LAW CLAIMS.

The Tenth Circuit has instructed district courts that, when federal jurisdiction is based solely upon a federal question, absent a showing that “the parties have already expended a great deal of time and energy on the state law claims, . . . a district court should normally dismiss supplemental state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed, particularly when the federal claims are dismissed before trial.” United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002); see Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Because we dismiss the federal causes of action prior to trial, we hold that the state claims should be dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction.”). None of the factors identified in Thatcher Enterprises v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990) — “the nature and extent of pretrial proceedings, judicial economy, convenience, or fairness” — would be served by retaining jurisdiction over any potential state-law claim in this case. No discovery has been conducted in this case, and no energy has been expended on the potential state-law claims. The Court will dismiss Rosen’s state-law claims for violation of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act contained in Count Six of her amended complaint.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that all Counts of Rosen’s federal complaint are DISMISSED.

[1] “YSP” is an abbreviation for “yield spread premium” and “POC” is an abbreviation for “paid outside closing.” Am. Compl., Ex. H

[2] Although Rosen cites 12 U.S.C. § 1207(a) as the statute violated, there is no such statute and her citation to 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14 refers to violations of § 2607. The Court therefore construes her complaint to allege violations of § 2607.

[3] See footnote 2.

[4] Section 1635 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Disclosure of obligor’s right to rescind

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction . . . in which a security interest . . . is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, appropriate forms for the obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

. . . .

(f) Time limit for exercise of right

An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor . . . .

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