Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: 15 USC §1635 et seq, 20 days, 6th Circuit, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, jesinoski, Moral Hazard, operation of law, rescission, subject matter jurisdiction, VOID | 7 Comments »
Rescission and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
White Paper: Many Causes of Foreclosure Crisis
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Editor’s Comment:
I attended Darrell Blomberg’s Foreclosure Strategists’ meeting last night where Arizona Attorney General Tom Horne defended the relatively small size of the foreclosure settlement compared with the tobacco settlement. To be fair, it should be noted that the multi-state settlement relates only to issues brought by the attorneys general. True they did very little investigation but the settlement sets the guidelines for settling with individual homeowners without waiving anything except that the AG won’t bring the lawsuits to court. Anyone else can and will. It wasn’t a real settlement. But the effect was what the Banks wanted. They want you to think the game is over and move on. The game is far from over, it isn’t a game and I won’t stop until I get those homes back that were ripped from the arms of homeowners who never knew what hit them.
So this is the first full business day after AG Horne promised me he would get back to me on the question of whether the AG would bring criminal actions for racketeering and corruption against the banks and servicers for conducting sham auctions in which “credit bids” were used instead of cash to allow the banks to acquire title. These credit bids came from non-creditors and were used as the basis for issuing deeds on foreclosure, each of which carry a presumption of authenticity. But the deeds based on credit bids from non-creditors represent outright theft and a ratification of a corrupt title system that was doing just fine before the banks started claiming the loans were securitized.
Those credit bids and the deeds issued upon foreclosure were sham transactions — just as the transactions originated with borrowers were based upon the lies and false pretenses of the acting lenders who were paid for their acting services. By pretending that the loan came from these thinly capitalised sham companies (all closed with no forwarding address), the banks and servicers started the lie that the loan was sold up the tree of securitization. Each transaction we are told was a sale of the loan, but none of them actually involved any money exchanging hands. So much for, “value received.”
The purpose of these loans was to create a process that would cover up the theft of the investor money that the investment bank received in exchange for “mortgage bonds” based upon non-existent transactions and the title equivalent of wild deeds.
So the answer to the question is that borrowers did not make bad decisions. They were tricked into these loans. Had there been full disclosure as required by TILA, the borrowers would never have closed on the papers presented to them. Had there been full disclosure to the investors, they never would have parted with a nickel. No money, no lender, no borrower no transactions. And practically barring lawyers from being hired by borrowers was the first clue that these deals were upside down and bogus. No, they didn’t make bad decisions. There was an asymmetry of information that the banks used to leverage against the borrowers who knew nothing and who understood nothing.
“Just sign everywhere we marked for your signature” was the closing agent’s way of saying, “You are now totally screwed.” If you ask the wrong question you get the wrong answer. “Moral hazard” in this context is not a term anyone knowledgeable uses in connection with the borrowers. It is a term used to express the context in which unscrupulous Bankers acted without conscience and with reckless disregard to the public, violating every applicable law, rule and regulation in the process.
Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis
Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-2
by Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen
This paper presents 12 facts about the mortgage market. The authors argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from financial industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, they argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and logical given their ex post overly optimistic beliefs about house prices. The authors then show that neither institutional features of the mortgage market nor financial innovations are any more likely to explain those distorted beliefs than they are to explain the Dutch tulip bubble 400 years ago. Economists should acknowledge the limits of our understanding of asset price bubbles and design policies accordingly.
To ready the entire paper please go to this link: www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1202.htm
Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: AG Horne, asset price bubbles, asymmetry of information banks used to leverage against borrowers, attorney general, AZ AG Tom Horne, borrower, bostonfed.org, Christopher L Foote, compare the tobacco settlement to the foreclosure settlement, corrupt title system, credit bids, credit bids from non-creditors, criminal actions against banks and services, Darrell Blomberg, deeds on foreclosure, design policies, Economists, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, Foreclosure Strategist, foreclosures, homeowners tricked, Kristopher S Gerardi, Moral Hazard, Mortgage, mortgage bonds, mortgage fraud, mortgage meltdown, mortgages, Paul S Willen, predatory lending, public policy discussion paper no. 12-2, racketeering of banks and services, reckless disregard, securitized loans, settlement, sham auctions, sham transactions, The causes of the foreclosure crisis, theft of investor money, TILA, Tom Horne, uninformed mortgage borrowers, unscrupulous bankers, wild deeds | 23 Comments »
SEPARATION OF DEED OF TRUST FROM NOTE: Bellistri Opinion
There is a lot of conflicting opinions about this. My opinion is that the confusion arises not from the law, not from application of the law and not from what is written on the note or deed of Trust. If you look at the Bellistri Missouri case the issue is well settled. And the problem is not what is written, it is what is assumed to be written. The Bellistri case, 284SW 3d 619, (Missouri Appeal, cert. reportedly denied) coupled with its quote from Restatement 3rd is simple: put one name on the note and another on the DOT as beneficiary (particularly when the beneficiary is MERS and therefore an undisclosed principal) and you have direct evidence that the intention of the parties was to separate the note from the mortgage. The burden of proof thus shifts to the alleged creditor.
Conflict comes not from the law or the wording on the instruments but from the inherent question of “why would anyone want to do that?” There are of course many answers to that question in a securitized mortgage context. But it is the existence of the question that causes people to lean toward the idea that no reasonable person would have intended that and to assume that the parties, including the borrower, would never have intended WHAT WAS WRITTEN.
I think the point of the Bellistri case is simple: factually, the note and DOT are split and according to the Restatement 3rd, they can never be put back together again. The note, while still enforceable as an instrument by itself, is no longer secured by an encumbrance on the property. The “mistake” is that of the drafter of the instruments. They want to say, much later in time, what we NOW mean is that the beneficiary is X, who is not the payee on the note,, but X has received an assignment of the note. Thus NOW the beneficiary and the payee are the same which means we can foreclose.
So the question put to the Judge is can a note and security instrument, initially made out to two different parties be LATER joined and if so, what does that mean for enforcement. My first comment is that once you have established that facially the note and DOT were split, your prima facie case is met and the burden goes to the “lender” to prove they are the creditor along with a whole bunch of other things that are not unlike the elements of proving up a lost or destroyed note. You can’t just say it happened. You must explain and prove HOW it happened.
But the simple answer to the question as per the Restatement 3rd, is “NO.” The reason why they cannot be joined later is not just because Restatement 3rd says so, it is the reason Restatement 3rd says that, to wit: if you allowed, particularly in a non-judicial setting, parties not named on the note and not named as beneficiary to later act because of a claim as being both, you are introducing uncertainty into the marketplace which is the precise reason we have the law of contracts, property records and such. The moral hazard is raised from possibility to near certainty when you KNOW from the beginning that the payee and the beneficiary are two different parties and the beneficiary is not the real party so the knowledge includes, from the beginning, that there is at least one additional undisclosed party.
Let’s take the simplest example we can given the complexity of securitized residential mortgages. ABC is named the Payee on the note. MERS is named the beneficiary. MERS obviously has some understanding with a third party DEF not to make a claim on the loan (according to their website). So we must presume that they have that understanding and that maybe it is in writing in some general type of contract which was neither disclosed nor revealed to exist at the time of the closing with the borrower. DEF defaults in its payment obligations to MERS. MERS now says we refuse to perform under our contract with DEF. Borrower knows nothing of DEF nor of DEF’s payment default to MERS. Borrower pays the note in full to ABC. ABC returns the note as paid in full. Borrower wants a release and reconveyance (satisfaction) so the title record is clear.
Now it MIGHT be that DEF=ABC. But we don’t know that. So for purposes of your case, you MUST assume that DEF is simply an undisclosed third party. Borrower asks MERS for the release and reconveyance. MERS refuses because it wasn’t paid by DEF and because it has no idea whether you paid the right person. With MERS refusing to execute a document releasing the lien, Borrower now has a defect in title that is unmarketable.
Borrower files a quiet title suit against MERS. MERS says it was named as beneficiary but that the DOT clearly states it serves only as nominee and therefore has no power to do anything. Now you have, on record, that the beneficiary is not MERS but the undisclosed third party DEF. The court MIGHT grant the final judgment, but it would then be adjudicating the rights of other parties who are not present in court, thus leaving the title clouded and possibly still unmarketable.
Another possibility is that the Court would inquire or allow discovery to allow the identification of DEF. Assuming MERS wishes to comply, there is still a problem. Data entry is NOT performed by MERS employees. Data entry is performed by “members” with passwords and user ID’s. Thus all MERS can say is that at a particular point in time MERS computer records show DEF, which was assigned to ABC or perhaps yet another party. The assignment is executed by Jane Jones as “limited signing officer” for MERS. MERS can’t say they know Jane Jones or anything about her because she doesn’t work for MERS. Therefore the only competent evidence from MERS is the data in fields populated by unknown sources of data input, and references to documents that were never seen or kept by MERS. The evidence from MERS thus has little or no probative value.
So now the Court or borrower goes to DEF and says “Who is Jane Jones?” DEF replies they don’t know because the assignment document was prepared by a foreclosure processing firm in Jacksonville, Florida named DOCX. DOCX has no contract with ABC or DEF or MERS. They were just following orders from yet a fourth party who is unidentified, and whose instructions were relayed through a fifth firm that serves as the correspondent or document manager once the loan goes into foreclosure (perhaps ordered by the servicer, BAC).
Thus the reason that a note and DOT can never be joined at any time other than the creation of those documents and executed contemporaneously with the funding of the obligation is that the contract and its performance is not based upon a condition subsequent (because such a condition would render the contract inchoate until the condition subsequent arrived or which would extinguish the obligation, note and mortgage). For there to be enforceability there must be certainty in the contract. Certainty can only be achieved if the terms and parties who are expected to perform are identified with sufficient clarity that any reasonable person would say they are known.
A borrower who signs papers without having a known party who is required by law to execute a satisfaction (release and reconveyance) has in effect executed documentation without a counterparty. The document is therefore void. Since the document (note, DOT, etc.) is only evidence of the obligation that arose because the borrower did in fact receive a benefit from the funding of the loan, the obligation survives while the note and/or DOT do not. However, in order to achieve certainty in the marketplace, the obligation is not secured unless and until some party identifies itself as the creditor and establishes a subsequent encumbrance through judgment lien, equitable or constructive trust or some other means.
Such a creditor action would be subject to rigorous requirements of pleading and proof. In the context of a securitized residential mortgage, the creditor can only be the party(ies) who advanced actual money, from which money the borrower’s loan was funded. In the context of mortgage-backed securities, a creditor who pleads that he expected a secured loan, must also plead all the documents and transactions that gave rise to advancing the money. This would mean that the creditor would be required to disclose and account for credit enhancements, insurance, credit default swaps, over-collateralization, cross-collateralization, and payments received from all sources pursuant to the terms under which the creditor advanced said funds.
Those terms are included in the prospectus and bond indenture which incorporate the pooling and service agreement, Depositor Agreement, Assignment and Assumption Agreements etc. In other words, the actual terms upon which the creditor advanced money were different from the actual terms accepted by the borrower. A court in equity would thus be required to allocate equity and liability for the various unpaid and paid obligations of multiple parties whose existence was unknown to borrower at the time of the loan closing, and whose existence even now would be at best dimly understood by the borrower or any other person who was not extremely well-versed in the securitization of credit.
Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, workshop | Tagged: Bellistri case, Bellistri v Ocwen Loan Servicing, beneficiary, borrower, Certainty, creditor, DEED OF TRUST, defect in title, DOT, enforceability, HERS, MERS, Moral Hazard, multiple parties, nominee, note, Obligation, Ocwen, Payee, quiet title suit, release and reconveyance, Restatement 3rd, SEPARATION OF DEED OF TRUST FROM NOTE, unmarketable | 26 Comments »
Magnetar Echoes Livinglies call for Alignment of Investors, Servicers and Borrowers
see Magnetar%20Mortage%20Recovery%20Backstop%20Whitepaper%20Jun09.pdf
Magnetar Mortage Recovery Backstop Whitepaper Jun09
Two things jump out at me with this paper from June, 2009.
First it is obvious that the “real money” investors are defined as those seeking low risk and willing to take lower yield. The fact that they are called “Real Money Investors” underscores my point about the identity of the creditor. Those “traditional” investors are no longer available to buy the mortgage backed securities or any other resecuritized derivative package based upon mortgage backed securities. Legal restrictions requiring the securities to be investment grade would prevent them from jumping back in even if they wanted to do so, which they obviously don’t.
Thus the inevitable conclusion drawn almost a year ago and borne out by history, is that the fair market value of the securities, trading as pennies on the dollar, is reflective of a lack of demand for mortgage backed securities no matter how high the yield (i.e., no matter how low the price).
Second there is a growing realization that the interests of the investor and the borrowers are actually aligned in many ways and that the solution to mortgage modification, principal reduction, and other aspects of the mortgage mess and the foreclosure crisis lies in recognizing certain realities and then dealing with them in an equitable manner. The properties were never worth the amount of the appraisal in most instances and now they are worth even less than they were when the loan deals were closed. The securities were also “appraised” far too high thus creating a giant yield spread premium for the investment bank-created seller of mortgage backed securities.
In my opinion, based upon a sampling of the data available, it is entirely possible that the “true” fair market value of those securities in the best of circumstances is probably less than 40% of the initial offering price. It is this well-hidden analysis that is not getting the attention of the Obama administration and which completely explains why servicers are obstructing modifications under instruction from investment banking intermediaries like the “Trustee”.
Leaving the servicers and other parties as the middlemen “in the middle” to sort this out is another license to steal creating another mark-up applied against both borrowers and investors as the “real money” parties. The status quo is what is causing the stagnation in lieu of recovery. Until everyone accepts basic notions of “real party in interest” and eliminates those who don’t fit that description, the moral hazards will remain and escalate.
As concluded in this paper, either judicial or executive intervention is required to kick the middlemen out of the way and let the light in. When investors and borrowers are able to compare notes and work with each other the figures for both will be enhanced, foreclosures will decline, losses will be taken, and yes it is highly probable that the number of investor lawsuits will proliferate against those who defrauded them.
The lender is identified as the investor in this paper (indirectly) and the party who defrauded them is not some greedy borrower with stars in his eyes, it was the usual suspect — a financial wizard making a sales pitch that was so complex, the buyer basically was forced to rely upon the integrity of the investment banking house for appropriate pricing. That is where the system fell apart. Moral hazard escalated to moral mess.
Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, credit unions, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, trustee, workshop | Tagged: "true" fair market value, borrower, creditor, DEBTOR, fair market value, HERS, identity of the creditor, infrastructure, Investor, Magnetar, Moral Hazard, mortgage backed securities, mortgage modification, principal reduction, real money, real money investors, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, recovery, risk, status quo, whitepaper, yield | 4 Comments »
Moral Hazard in Non-Judicial Sale: Trustee commits violations of FDCPA and other statutes!
From Eaine B
Editor’s Note: I have long advocated sending letters, objections to sale and complaints against “trustees” named (or substituted) on deeds of trust who initiate foreclosure proceedings. Indeed, it is highly probable that because of statutes attempting to protect the trustee from liability, the trustee is at best usually named only as a nominal party in a lawsuit challenging the legality of the non-judicial sale, demanding the identity and contact information of the creditor and getting a full accounting from the real creditor.
I would argue that this reader’s comment is more on target than they even know. Because that is the point — knowledge. If the “trustee” knowingly proceeds when it KNOWS there is a question of title, a question of who is the creditor, and knows that this loan was sold to third parties that have not been disclosed to the Trustor nor the Trustee, then the trustee is more than a nominal party, to wit: they are a co-venturer in a fraudulent scheme.
Typically non-judicial action commences under a “substitute trustee”. One would ask why it was necessary to call in a “substitute trustee” from the bullpen, when the current one is just fine. The only possible answer is that the old trustee either doesn’t want any part of this, or won’t do it without following industry standards to confirm ownership etc. It would seem fairly obvious that if the existing trustee is still in business and continues to qualify as a trustee, the only rational reason to change trustees is because the actors wish to do business with people who won’t ask questions.
Often the “substitution of trustee” is backdated, undated or dated after the notice of sale, notice of default etc., so there is a simple procedural angle to set back the sale if you are actually reading the documents, and getting a title report.
More substantively, the “substitute trustee” is granted that position by a party who in all probability does not have the power to grant it — but that requires a forensic analysis, title report, and probably a lawsuit to establish. For example, if some person unknown to MERS assumes the title of “assistant Vice president of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems” and signs the substitution of trustee or any other document, they probably lack the power to do so, or they lack the documentation showing they have the power to do so.
This actually runs to the core of moral hazard in non-judicial states. Anyone who knows you have missed payments, could file a “substitution of Trustee” document in the county records, send you a notice of default, notice of sale and sell your property to the highest bidder — all BEFORE your real servicer (who we know is only a pretender lender) even knows about it. It is a scam waiting to happen. The scammer then takes the money and runs. Meanwhile you have most likely given up and left the house so it is now abandoned. This scenario can only happen in non-judicial states, where the statute authorizing a non-judicial foreclosure sale ASSUMES that the right party is doing the right thing under proper authority.
When mortgages were simple, and securitization was only an idea, the opportunity for abuse in non-judicial states was present but generally controllable because your true lender had control of the loan, they knew when you were delinquent, and they would be in touch with you, during which time it might come out that you had already received a notice of sale from a “substitute trustee.”
In the world of securitization where the potential real parties in interest are almost infinite in number, where the credit report is used rather than the title report, and where various layers of companies are used to create plausible deniability, insulation from liability and the ability to move things around “off-balance sheet” or “off record” at the county recorder’s office, the potential for abuse is practically infinite. And true to form, my experience is that virtually every foreclosure in a non-judicial state contains at least the taint of this abuse and often facially shows the failure to use proper documentation.
Comment submitted by Eaine B—–
Trustee commits violations of Fair Debt Collections Practice Act!
A good cause of action against Northwest Trustee Services Inc, Routh Crabtree Olsen PS is that I have found they sell your private information to the public. Go to http://www.usa-foreclosoure.com and find your foreclosure….then buy for $39.00 a copy of the title report that is supposed to be private between the trustee and the beneficiary. Any public person can order your report online. This is mail and interstate violations. Make a complaint to the Bar association, and the FTC and your state Attorney General.
Call the title company on the top of the form and ask them. Then perhaps you can file a suit against Routh Crabtree Olsen and Northwest Trustee Services Inc for violations of 15 USC 1692 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violation. It’s triple damages. Most likely they will have sent you a letter from Routh Crabtree Olsen. One I got even quotes the 15 USC 1692. So obviously THEY know about it. The owner of Routh, Crabtree and Olsen is Stephen Routh and Lance Olsen. Routh has various companies in AK, MT, AZ, CA etc. Just look at the list on the various web sites. http://www.usa-foreclosure.com has the same address as Routh Crabtree Olsen and Northwest Trustee Services and as Routh in AK.
Also, the process serving company that they use is owned by them.
Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, securities fraud, Servicer | Tagged: 15 USC 1692, accounting, backdated, county records, credit report, creditor, Eaine B, Fair Debt Collections Practice Act, FDCPA, Foreclosure scams, forensic analysis, fraudulent scheme, HERS, Lance Olsen, MERS, Moral Hazard, Mortgage Electronic registration Systems, nominal party, non-judicial states, Northwest Trustee Services Inc, objections to sale, pretender lender, procedural, process serving company, Routh Crabtree Olsen, servicer, Stephen Routh, Substitute Trustee, Substitution of Trustee, title, title report, triple damages, TRUSTEES, undated, usa-foreclosoure.com, violation | 50 Comments »
If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant?
SEE ALSO BOE PAPER ON ABS DISCLOSURE condocmar10
If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant? NOTE: BOE defines investors as note-holders.
information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.Editor’s Note: As Gretchen Morgenstern points out in her NY Times article below, the Bank of England is paving the way to transparent disclosures in mortgage backed securities. This in turn is a guide to discovery in American litigation. It is also a guide for questions in a Qualified Written Request and the content of a forensic analysis.What we are all dealing with here is asymmetry of information, which is another way of saying that one side has information and the other side doesn’t. The use of the phrase is generally confined to situations where the unequal access to information is intentional in order to force the party with less information to rely upon the party with greater information. The party with greater information is always the seller. The party with less information is the buyer. The phrase is most often used much like “moral hazard” is used as a substitute for lying and cheating.
Quoting from the Bank of England’s “consultative paper”: ” [NOTE THAT THE BANK OF ENGLAND ASSUMES ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION AND, SEE BELOW, THAT THE INVESTORS ARE CONSIDERED “NOTE-HOLDERS” WITHOUT ANY CAVEATS.] THE BANK IS SEEKING TO ENFORCE RULES THAT WOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OFborrower details (unique loan identifiers); nominal loan amounts; accrued interest; loan maturity dates; loan interest rates; and other reporting line items that are relevant to the underlying loan portfolio (ie borrower location, loan to value ratios, payment rates, industry code). The initial loan portfolio information reporting requirements would be consistent with the ABS loan-level reporting requirements detailed in paragraph 42 in this consultative document. Data would need to be regularly updated, it is suggested on a weekly basis, given the possibility of unexpected loan repayments.42 The Bank has considered the loan-level data fields which
it considers would be most relevant for residential mortgage- backed securities (RMBS) and covered bonds and sets out a high-level indication of some of those fields in the list below:
• Portfolio, subportfolio, loan and borrower unique identifiers.
• Loan information (remaining life, balance, prepayments).
• Property and collateral (current valuation, loan to value ratio
and type of valuation). Interest rate information (current reference rate, current rate/margin, reset interval).
• Performance information (performing/delinquent, number and value of payments in arrears, arrangement, litigation or
bankruptcy in process, default or foreclosure, date of default,
sale price, profit/loss on sale, total recoveries).
• Credit bureau score information (bankruptcy or IVA flags,
bureau scores and dates, other relevant indicators (eg in respect of fraudulent activity)).The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility requirement that each issuer provides a summary of the key features of the transaction structure in a standardised format.
This summary would include:
• Clear diagrams of the deal structure.
• Description of which classes of notes hold the voting rights and what proportion of noteholders are required to pass a resolution.
• Description of all the triggers in the transaction and the consequences of them being breached.
• What defines an event of default.
• Diagramatic cash-flow waterfalls, making clear the priority
of payments of principal and interest, including how these
can change in consequence to any trigger breaches.
52 The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility
requirement that cash-flow models be made available that
accurately reflect the legal structure of an asset-backed security.
The Bank believes that for each transaction a cash-flow model
verified by the issuer/arranger should be available publicly.
Currently, it can be unclear as to how a transaction would
behave in different scenarios, including events of default or
other trigger events. The availability of cash-flow models, that
accurately reflect the underlying legal structure of the
transaction, would enable accurate modelling and stress
testing of securities under various assumptions.
Pools That Need Some Sun
By GRETCHEN MORGENSON
LAST week, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sued a throng of Wall Street companies that sold the agency $5.4 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities during the height of the mortgage melee. The suit, filed March 15 in state court in California, seeks the return of the $5.4 billion as well as broader financial damages.
The case also provides interesting details on what the Federal Home Loan Bank said were misrepresentations made by those companies about the loans underlying the securities it bought.
It is not surprising, given the complexity of the instruments at the heart of this credit crisis, that it will require court battles for us to learn how so many of these loans could have gone so bad. The recent examiner’s report on the Lehman Brothers failure is a fine example of the in-depth investigation required to get to the bottom of this debacle.
The defendants in the Federal Home Loan Bank case were among the biggest sellers of mortgage-backed securities back in the day; among those named are Deutsche Bank; Bear Stearns; Countrywide Securities, a division of Countrywide Financial; Credit Suisse Securities; and Merrill Lynch. The securities at the heart of the lawsuit were sold from mid-2004 into 2008 — a period that certainly encompasses those giddy, anything-goes years in the home loan business.
None of the banks would comment on the litigation.
In the complaint, the Federal Home Loan Bank recites a list of what it calls untrue or misleading statements about the mortgages in 33 securitization trusts it bought. The alleged inaccuracies involve disclosures of the mortgages’ loan-to-value ratios (a measure of a loan’s size compared with the underlying property’s value), as well as the occupancy status of the properties securing the loans. Mortgages are considered less risky if they are written against primary residences; loans on second homes or investment properties are deemed to be more of a gamble.
Finally, the complaint said, the sellers of the securities made inaccurate claims about how closely the loan originators adhered to their underwriting guidelines. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank asserts that the companies selling these securities failed to disclose that the originators made frequent exceptions to their own lending standards.
DAVID J. GRAIS, a partner at Grais & Ellsworth, represents the plaintiff. He said the Federal Home Loan Bank is not alleging that the firms intended to mislead investors. Rather, the case is trying to determine if the firms conformed to state laws requiring accurate disclosure to investors.
“Did they or did they not correspond with the real world at the time of the sale of these securities? That is the question,” Mr. Grais said.
Time will tell which side will prevail in this suit. But in the meantime, the accusations illustrate a significant unsolved problem with securitization: a lack of transparency regarding the loans that are bundled into mortgage securities. Until sunlight shines on these loan pools, the securitization market, a hugely important financing mechanism that augments bank lending, will remain frozen and unworkable.
It goes without saying that after swallowing billions in losses in such securities, investors no longer trust what sellers say is inside them. Investors need detailed information about these loans, and that data needs to be publicly available and updated regularly.
“The goose that lays the golden eggs for Wall Street is in the information gaps created by financial innovation,” said Richard Field, managing director at TYI, which develops transparency, trading and risk management information systems. “Naturally, Wall Street opposes closing these gaps.”
But the elimination of such information gaps is necessary, Mr. Field said, if investors are to return to the securitization market and if global regulators can be expected to prevent future crises.
While United States policy makers have done little to resolve this problem, the Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, is forging ahead on it. In a “consultative paper” this month, the central bank argued for significantly increased disclosure in asset-backed securities, including mortgage pools.
The central bank is interested in this debate because it accepts such securities in exchange for providing liquidity to the banking system.
“It is the bank’s view that more comprehensive and consistent information, in a format which is easier to use, is required to allow the effective risk management of securities,” the report stated. One recommendation is to include far more data than available now.
Among the data on its wish list: information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.
The Bank of England recommended that investor reports be provided on “at least a monthly basis” and said it was considering making such reports an eligibility requirement for securities it accepts in its transactions.
The American Securitization Forum, the advocacy group for the securitization industry, has been working for two years on disclosure recommendations it sees as necessary to restart this market. But its ideas do not go as far as the Bank of England’s.
A group of United States mortgage investors is also agitating for increased disclosures. In a soon-to-be-published working paper, the Association of Mortgage Investors outlined ways to increase transparency in these instruments.
Among its suggestions: reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies by providing detailed data on loans well before a deal is brought to market, perhaps two weeks in advance. That would allow investors to analyze the loans thoroughly, then decide whether they want to buy in.
THE investors are also urging that loan-level data offered by issuers, underwriters or loan servicers be “accompanied by an auditor attestation” verifying it has been properly aggregated and calculated. In other words, trust but verify.
Confidence in the securitization market has been crushed by the credit mess. Only greater transparency will lure investors back into these securities pools. The sooner that happens, the better.
Filed under: brad keiser, bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, workshop | Tagged: ABS Disclosure, arrangement, asymmetry of information, balance, Bank of England, bankruptcy, BEAR STEARNS, cash-flow waterfalls, countrywide, Credit Suisse, current rate, current valuation, David J. Grais, default, delinquent, descriptions, Deutsch Bank, diagrams, discovery, event, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, foreclosure, fraudulent activity, Grais and Ellsworth, Gretchen Morgenstern, interest rate, levels, LITIGATION, loan-to-value ratio, loss on sale, Merrill Lynch, Moral Hazard, mortgage backed bonds, mortgage backed securities, New York Times, noteholders, performing, portfolio, prepayments, profit on sale, qualified written request, remaining life, RMBS, sale price, subportfolio, total recoveries, triggers, value of payments in arrears | 5 Comments »
Mortgage Meltdown: Fed Lacker Says “Moral Hazard Ahead”
Insider Joins Critics of the Fed,
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Filed under: CDO, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Mortgage | Tagged: bailout, Dow Jones, Fed, Lacker, Moral Hazard, WSJ | Leave a comment »