Trustees on REMICs Face a World of Hurt

DID YOU EVER WONDER WHY TRUSTEES INSTRUCTED THE INVESTMENT BANKS TO NOT USE THEIR NAME IN FORECLOSURES?

Editor’s Comment: Finally the questions are spreading over the entire map of the false securitization of loans and the diversion of money, securities and property from investors and homeowners. Read the article below, and see if you smell the stink rising from the financial sector. It is time for the government to come clean and tell us that they were defrauded by TARP, the bank bailouts, and the privileges extended to the major banks. They didn’t save the financial sector they crowned it king over all the world.

Nowhere is that more evident than when you drill down on the so-called “trustees” of the so-called “trusts” that were “backed” by mortgage loans that didn’t exist or that were already owned by someone else. The failure of trustees to exercise any power or control over securitization or to even ask a question about the mortgage bonds and the underlying loans was no accident. When the whistle blowers come out on this one it will clarify the situation. Deutsch, US Bank, Bank of New York accepted fees for the sole purpose of being named as trustees with the understanding that they would do nothing. They were happy to receive the fees and they knew their names were being used to create the illusion of authenticity when the bonds were “Sold” to investors.

One of the next big revelations is going to be how the money from investors was quickly spirited away from the trustee and directly into the pockets of the investment bankers who sold them. The Trustee didn’t need a trust account because no money was paid to any “trust” on which it was named the trustee. Not having any money they obviously were not called upon to sign a check or issue a wire transfer from any account because there was no account. This was key to the PONZI scheme.

If the Trustees received money for the “trust” then they would be required under all kinds of laws and regulations to act like a trustee. With no assets in a named trustee they could hardly be required to do anything since it was an unfunded trust and everyone knows that an unfunded trust is no trust at all even if it exists on paper.

Of course if they had received the money as trustee, they would have wanted more money to act like a trustee. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. If they had received the money from investors then they would have spent it on acquiring mortgages. And if they were acquiring mortgages as trustee they would have peeked under the hood to see if there was any loan there. to the extent that the loans were non-confirming loans for stable funds (heavily regulated pension funds) they would rejected many of the loans.

The real interesting pattern here is what would have happened if they did purchase the loans. Well then — and follow this because your house depends upon it — if they HAD purchased the loans for the “trust” there would have no need for MERS, no trading in the mortgages, and no trading on the mortgage bonds except that the insurance would have been paid to the investors like they thought it would. The Federal Reserve would not be buying billions of dollars in “mortgage bonds” per month because there would be no need — because there would be no emergency.

If they HAD purchased the loans, then they would have a recorded interest, under the direction as trustees, for the REMIC trusts. And they would have had all original documents or proof that the original documents had been deposited somewhere that could be audited,  because they would not have purchased it without that. Show me the note never would have gotten off the ground or even occurred to anyone. But most importantly, they would clearly have mitigated damages by receipt of insurance and credit default swaps, payable to the trust and to the investment banker, which is what happened.

No, Reynaldo Reyes (Deutsch bank asset manager in control of the trustee program), it is not “Counter-intuitive.” It was a lie from start to finish to cover up a PONZI scheme that failed like all PONZI schemes fail as soon as the “investors” stop buying the crap you are peddling. THAT is what happened in the financial crisis which would have been no crisis. Most of the loans would never have been approved for purchase by the trusts. Most of the defaults would have been real, most of the debts would have been real, and most importantly the note would be properly owned by the trust giving it an insurable interest and therefore the proceeds of insurance and credit default swaps would have been paid to investors leaving the number of defaults and foreclosures nearly zero.

And as we have seen in recent days, there would not have been a Bank of America driving as many foreclosures through the system as possible because the trustee would have entered into modification and mitigation agreements with borrowers. Oh wait, that might not have been necessary because the amount of money flooding the world would have been far less and the shadow banking system would be a tiny fraction of the size it is now — last count it looks like something approaching or exceeding one quadrillion dollars — or about 20 times all the real money in the world.

At some point the dam will break and the trustees will turn on the investment banks and those who are using the trustee’s name in vain. The foreclosures will stop and the government will need to fess up tot he fact that it entered into tacit understandings with scoundrels. When you sleep with dogs you get fleas — unless the dog is actually clean.

Stay Tuned for more whistle blowing.

In Countrywide Case, Trustees Failed to Provide Oversight on Mortgage Pools

Insurance, Credit Default Swaps, Guarantees: Third Party Payments Mitigate Damages to “Lender”

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Editor’s Analysis: The topic of conversation (argument) in court is changing to an inquiry of what is the real transaction, who were the parties and did they pay anything that gives them the right to claim they suffered financial damages as a result of the “breach” by the borrower. And the corollary to that is what constitutes mitigation of those damages.

If the mortgage bond derives its value solely from underlying mortgage loans, then the risk of loss derives solely from those same underlying mortgages. And if those losses are mitigated through third party payments, then the benefit should flow to both the investors who were the source of funds and the borrowers balance must be correspondingly and proportionately adjusted. Otherwise the creditor ends up in a position better than if the debtor had paid off the debt.

If your Aunt Sally pays off your mortgage loan and the bank sues you anyway  claiming they didn’t get any payment from YOU, the case will be a loser for the bank and a clear winner for you because of the defense of PAYMENT. The rules regarding damages and mitigation of damages boil down to this — the alleged injured party should not be placed in a position where he/she/it is better off than if the contract (promissory) note had been fully performed.

If the “creditor” is the investor lender, and the only way the borrower received the money was through intermediaries, then those intermediaries are not entitled to claim part of the money that the investor advanced, nor part of the money that was intended for the “creditor” to offset a financial loss. Those intermediaries are agents. And the transaction,  while involving numerous intermediaries and their affiliates, is a single contemporaneous transaction between the investor lender and the homeowner borrower.

This is the essence of the “Single transaction doctrine” and the “step transaction doctrine.” What the banks have been successful at doing, thus far, is to focus the court’s attention on the individual steps of the transaction in which a borrower eventually received money or value in exchange for his promise to pay (promissory note) and the collateral he used to guarantee payment (mortgage or deed of trust). This is evasive logic. As soon as you have penetrated the fog with the single transaction rule where the investor lenders are identified as the creditor and the homeowner borrower is identified as the debtor, the argument of the would-be forecloser collapses under its own weight.

Having established a straight line between the investor lenders and the homeowner borrowers, and identified all the other parties as intermediary agents of the the real parties in interest, the case for  damages become much clearer. The intermediary agents cannot foreclose or enforce the debt except for the benefit of an identified creditor which we know is the group of investor lenders whose money was used to fund the tier 2 yield spread premium, other dubious fees and profits, and then applied to funding loans by wire transfer to closing agents.

The intermediaries cannot claim the house because they are not part of that transaction as a real party in interest. They may have duties to each other as it relates to handling of the money as it passes through various conduits, but their principal duty is to make sure the transaction between the creditor and debtor is completed.

The intermediaries who supported the sale of fake mortgage bonds from an empty REMIC trust cannot claim the benefits of insurance, guarantees or the proceeds of hedge contracts like credit default swaps. For the first time since the mess began, judges are starting to ask whether the payments from the third parties has relevance to the debt of the borrower. To use the example above, are the third parties who made the payments the equivalent of Aunt Sally or are they somehow going to be allowed to claim those proceeds themselves?

The difference is huge. If the third parties who made those payments are the equivalent of Aunt Sally, then the mortgage is paid off to the extent that actual cash payments were received by the intermediary agents. Aunt Sally might have a claim against the borrower or it might have been a gift, but in all events the original basis for the transaction has been reduced or eliminated by the receipt of those payments.

If Aunt Sally sues the borrower, it would  be for contribution or restitution, unsecured, unless Aunt sally actually bought the loan and received an assignment along with a receipt for her funds. If there was another basis on which Aunt Sally made the payment besides a gift, then the money should still be credited to the benefit of the investor lenders who have received what they thought was a bond payable but in reality was still the note payable.

In no event are the intermediary agents to receive those loss mitigation payments when they had no loss. And to the extent that payments were received, they should be used to reduce the receivable of the investor lender and of course that would reduce the payable owed from the homeowner borrower to the investor lender. To do otherwise would be to allow the “creditor” to end up in a much better position than if the homeowner had simply paid off the loan as per the promissory note or faked mortgage bond.

None of this takes away from the fact that the REMIC trust was not source the funds used to pay for the mortgage origination or transfer. That goes to the issue of the perfection of the mortgage lien and not to the issue of how much is owed.

Now Judges are starting to ask the right question: what authority exists for application of the third party payments to mitigate damages? If such authority exists and the would-be foreclosures used a false formula to determine the principal balance due, and the interest payable on that false balance then the notice of delinquency, notice of default, and foreclosure proceedings, including the sale and redemption period would all be incorrect and probably void because they demanded too much from the borrower after having received the third party payments.

If such authority does not exist, then the windfall to the banks will continue unabated — they get the fees and tier 2 yield spread premium profits upfront, they get the payment servicing fees, they get to sell the loan multiple times without any credit to the investor lender, but most of all they get the loss mitigation payments from insurance, hedge, guarantee and bailouts for a third party loss — the investor lenders. This is highly inequitable. The party with the loss gets nothing while a party who already has made a profit on the transaction, makes more profit.

If we start with the proposition that the creditor should not be better off than if the contract had been performed, and we recognize that the intermediary investment bank, master servicer, trustee of the empty REMIC trust, subservicer, aggregator, and others did in fact receive money to mitigate the loss on those certificates and thus on the loans supposedly backing the mortgage bonds, then the only equitable and sensible conclusion would be to credit or allocate those payments to the investor lender up to the amount they advanced.

With the creditor satisfied or partially satisfied the mortgage loan, regardless of whether it is secured or not, is also satisfied or partially satisfied.

So the question is whether mitigation payments are part of the transaction between the investor lender and the homeowners borrower. While this specific application of insurance payments etc has never been addressed we find plenty of support in the case law, statutes and even the notes and bonds themselves that show that such third party mitigation payments are part of the transaction and the expectancy of the investor lender and therefore will affect the borrower’s balance owed on the debt, regardless of whether it is secured or unsecured.

Starting with the DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES, we can assume that if there is such a duty, and there is, then successfully doing so must be applicable to the loan or contract and is so treated in awarding damages without abridgement. Keep in mind that the third party contract for mitigation payments actually refer to the borrowers. Those contracts expressly waive any right of the payor of the mitigation loss coverage to go after the homeowner borrower.

To allow all these undisclosed parties to receive compensation arising out of the initial loan transaction and not owe it to someone is absurd. TILA says they owe all the money they made to the borrower. Contract law says the payments should first be applied to the investor lender and then as a natural consequence, the amount owed to the lender is reduced and so is the amount due from the homeowner borrower.

See the following:

Pricing and Mitigation of Counterparty Credit Exposures, Agostino Capponi. Purdue University – School of Industrial Engineering. January 31, 2013. Handbook of Systemic Risk, edited by J.-P. Fouque and J.Langsam. Cambridge University Press, 2012

  • “We analyze the market price of counterparty risk and develop an arbitrage-free pricing valuation framework, inclusive of collateral mitigation. We show that the adjustment is given by the sum of option payoff terms, depending on the netted exposure, i.e. the difference between the on-default exposure and the pre-default collateral account. We specialize our analysis to Interest Rates Swaps (IRS) and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as underlying portfolio, and perform a numerical study to illustrate the impact of default correlation, collateral margining frequency, and collateral re-hypothecation on the resulting adjustment. We also discuss problems of current research interest in the counterparty risk community.” pdf4article631

Whether this language  makes sense to you or not, it is English and it does say something clearly — it is all about risk. And the risk of the investor lender was to have protected by Triple A rating, insurance, and credit default swaps, as well as guarantees and provisions of the pooling and servicing agreement, for the REMIC trust. Now here is the tricky part — the banks must not be allowed to say on the one hand that the securitization documents are real even if there was no money trail or consideration to support them on the one hand then say that they are not real for purposes of receiving loss mitigation payments, which they want to keep even if it leaves the real creditor with a net loss.

To put it simply — either the parties to the underwriting of the bond to investors and the loan to homeowners were part of the the transaction (loan from investor to homeowner) or they were not. I fail to see any logic or support that they were not.

And the simple rule of measure of how these parties fit together is found under the single transaction doctrine. If the step transaction under scrutiny would not have occurred but for the principal transaction alleged, then it is a single transaction.

The banks would argue they were trading in credit default swaps and other exotic securities regardless of what lender fit with which borrower. But that is defeated by the fact that it was the banks who sold to mortgage bonds, it was the banks who set up the Master Servicer, it was the banks who purchased the insurance and credit default swaps and it was the underwriting investment bank that promised that insurance and credit default swaps would be used to counter the risk. And it is inescapable that the only risk applicable to the principal transaction between investor lender and homeowner borrower was the risk of non payment by the borrower. These third party payments represent the proceeds of protection from that risk.

Would the insurers have entered into the contract without the underlying loans? No. Would the counterparties have entered into the contract without the underlying loans? No.

So the answer, Judge is that it is an inescapable conclusion that third party loss mitigation payments must be applied, by definition, to the loss. The loss was suffered not by the banks but by the investors whose money they took. The loss mitigation payments must then be applied against the risk of loss on the money advanced by those investors. And the benefit of that payment or allocation is that the real creditor is satisfied and the real borrower receives some benefit from those payments in the way of a reduction of the his payable to the investor.

It is either as I have outlined above or the money — all of it — goes to the borrower, to the exclusion of the investor under the requirements of TILA and RESPA. While the shadow banking system is said to be over $1.2 quadrillion,  we must apply the same standards to ourselves and our cases as we do to the opposing side. Only actual payments received by the participants in the overall obscured investor lender transaction with the homeowner borrower.

Hence discovery must include those third parties and review of their contracts for the court to determine the applicability of third party payments that were actually received in relation to either the subject loan, the subject mortgage bond, or the subject REMIC pool claiming ownership of the subject loan.

The inequality between the rich and not-so-rich comes not from policy but bad arithmetic.

As the subprime mortgage market fell apart in late 2007 and early 2008, many financial products, particularly mortgage-backed securities, were downgraded.  The price of credit default swaps on these products increased.  Pursuant to their collateral agreements, many protection buyers were able to insist on additional collateral protection.  In some cases, the collateral demanded represented a significant portion of the counterparty’s assets.  Unsurprisingly, counterparties have carefully evaluated, and in some cases challenged, protection buyers’ right to such additional collateral amounts.  This tension has generated several recent lawsuits:

• CDO Plus Master Fund Ltd. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 07-11078 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007) (dispute over demand     for collateral on $10,000,000 protection on collateralized debt obligations).

• VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 08 1563 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008) (same).

• UBS AG v. Paramax Capital Int’l, No. 07604233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (dispute over demand for $33 million additional capital from hedge fund for protection on collateralized debt obligations).

Given that the collateral disputes erupting in the courts so far likely represent only a small fraction of the stressed counterparties, and given recent developments, an increase in counterparty bankruptcy appears probable.

http://www.capdale.com/credit-default-swaps-the-bankrupt-counterparty-entering-the-undiscovered-country

WHAT IS THE FED BUYING?

CHECK OUT OUR EXTENDED DECEMBER SPECIAL!

What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).

EDITOR’S NOTE:

WHAT IS THE FED BUYING? IF THE LOANS WERE ORIGINATED CONTRARY TO INDUSTRY PRACTICE, IF THE MONEY USED TO FUND THE LOANS CAME FROM INVESTORS, WHAT COULD THE FED BE BUYING FROM THE BANKS WHO ARE ONLY INTERMEDIARIES. AND IF THE FED IS BUYING THESE SECURITIES THEN WHY ARE THEY NOT THE PRINCIPAL NAMED IN FORECLOSURES? ANSWER: THE FEDS BOUGHT NOTHING AND THEY KNOW IT. IT IS MERELY A RUSE TO GIVE THE BANKS MORE MONEY.

AND let’s assume that the Fed is really buying bona fide mortgage backed securities (MBS) issued from a well-funded pool into which investor money was contributed and used to purchase loans. Which loans? Where is the transparency here? Are these actual purchase with schedules of loans attached? Why can’t we see all the loans that are “owned” by investment pools that issued mortgage backed securities.

One more question: If the mortgage bonds were issued to investors in exchange for money, then how the investment bank become the seller? Are the investors joining in on the sale? If so, what happens to the SPV, REMIC, Trust or whatever you want to call the investment pool?

Does the transfer of an invalid note issued without consideration and a mortgage securing the note give anything more to the Fed than the banks which is nothing on top of nothing?

The obvious scenario here is a shell game designed to confuse investors, borrowers, regulators, lawyers and judges. And it is working — except in those cases where we employ the Deny and Discover strategy.

Fed likely to continue MBS purchases to secure housing recovery
http://www.housingwire.com/news/2013/01/30/fed-likely-continue-mbs-purchases-secure-housing-recovery

MERS WHITE PAPER…National Association of Independent Land Title Agents (NAILTA) White Paper on MERS, H.R. 6460

The National Association of Independent Land Title Agents (NAILTA) has released a white paper on the recent troubles with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) mortgage registry and a position statement in favor of the premise behind a bill sponsored by Representative Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) known as H.R. 6460, or the “Transparency and Security Mortgage Registration Act of 2010″.

MERS WHITE PAPER…National Association of Independent Land Title Agents (NAILTA) White Paper on MERS, H.R. 6460

National Association of Independent Land Title Agents (NAILTA) White Paper on MERS, H.R. 6460

Mortgage Securities It Holds Pose Sticky Problem for Fed

STICKIER THAN THEY THINK: These are not the only mortgage securities they hold and they all amount to ownership of the risk on every loan they purchased. The purchase of course was accomplished in one of many ways — direct and indirect.
But when you come down to it, between the GSE’s (which are now departments of the Federal Government), TARP, and the outright purchase by the Fed, SOMEONE received 100 cents on the dollar for every loan, whether in default or otherwise.
Add in insurance, credit default swaps and credit “enhancements” (i.e., commingling of money contrary to the explicit terms of the borrowers’ promissory notes) like over-collateralization and cross collateralization, it would be a fair statement to say that everyone of the mortgages CLAIMED to be in pools that were subject to various securitization instruments, have been paid in whole or in part.
THAT IS WHAT I MEAN BY THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS. The legal issue is who got the money and why? The practical impact is that if those payments were related to individual mortgages, which indeed they must have been, then they were received into what should have been an escrow account and allocated to each loan.
Now add the fact that very nearly NONE of the loans were in fact the subject of an actual assignment, recorded instrument, endorsement or delivery while they were performing and before the cutoff date in the securitization enabling documentation, and you really have an interesting conclusion: the loans never made it into the pool, which makes securitization a giant Ponzi scheme that paid investors long enough out of their own money to lend credibility to the scheme.
But it is also true that borrowers made payments and where those went, and in what amounts is a clouded mystery because every lawsuit I know of that has asked for the accounting is stalled. So with nothing in the pools, nothing in the mortgage bonds, and the CDO’s based upon the mortgage bonds, and the credit default swaps referencing the mortgage bonds, and the synthetic CDOs consisting of CDS instruments referring to the mortgage bonds, they were all worthless from beginning to end. In short, the government bought nothing from bankers who had already made a ton of money, most of it parked off-shore.
The real reason the government can’t sell these securities is that nobody will pay for them. Any due diligence down to the loan level will reveal that the loans were never subject to legally required execution, delivery and recording of transfer or assignment documents, together with indorsements etc. In some cases, this is correctable — at considerable legal expense. In most cases, they are not correctable. The bottom line is really simple: the obligation was created, the note was extinguished, and the security instrument became unenforceable, and separated from the note. The illusion that it is otherwise is what is keeping us in stagnation, preventing a solution.
July 22, 2010

Mortgage Securities It Holds Pose Sticky Problem for Fed

By BINYAMIN APPELBAUM

WASHINGTON — The Federal Reserve provided most of the money for new mortgages in the United States last year, effectively lending more than $1 trillion to American homeowners.

Now the legacy of that extraordinary intervention is hanging over the central bank as it faces growing demands for an encore to help revive the flagging economy.

While officials and economists generally regard the program as successful in supporting the housing market, it has left the Fed holding a vast pile of mortgage securities — basically i.o.u.’s from homeowners — that it does not want and cannot sell.

Holding the securities could cost the Fed a lot of money and hamper its ability to fight inflation, while selling the securities could drain needed money from the still-weak economy.

Fed officials have expressed confidence that they can finesse the dilemma by gradually selling the securities as the economy starts to recover. But they are not eager to expand the challenge they face by beginning a new round of asset-buying, one tool the Fed could use to try to stimulate growth.

“In my view, any judgment to expand the balance sheet further should be subject to strict scrutiny,” Kevin M. Warsh, a Fed governor, said in a speech last month in Atlanta. He warned that new purchases could undermine the Fed’s “most valuable asset”: its credibility.

Some Democrats want the Fed to pump more money into the economy to help reduce unemployment, one of the central bank’s basic responsibilities. In testimony before Congress this week, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said that the Fed retained that option, but did not now plan to expand on the steps it had already taken.

In part, Bernanke and other Fed officials say they believe that new asset purchases would be less effective now that private investors have returned to the market.

The Fed became one of the world’s largest mortgage investors because no one else was interested. During the fall 2008 financial crisis, investors stopped buying the mortgage securities issued by the housing finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The two companies buy mortgages made by banks and other lenders, providing money for new rounds of lending, then package those loans into securities for sale to investors, replenishing their own coffers.

Two days before Thanksgiving 2008, the Fed announced that it would buy $500 billion in securities issued by the two companies. By the time the program wound down in March 2010, it had spent more than twice that amount. The central bank now owns mortgage securities with a face value of $1.1 trillion.

A wide range of economists say the Fed’s program — so big that purchases outstripped the issuance of new securities in some months — helped to preserve the availability of mortgage loans and helped to hold interest rates near record lows. Rates that exceeded 6 percent in late 2008 remain below 5 percent today.

But the Fed now must deal with the cleanup.

The central bank could hold the securities until the borrowers repaid or refinanced their loans. Brian P. Sack, an executive at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, estimated in March that borrowers would repay $200 billion by the end of 2011. And in the meantime, the Fed is collecting regular interest payments.

  • HOW IS THIS MONEY REACHING THE FED? WHO IS GETTING PAID FOR HANDLING IT?

    WHY IS NOT THE FED’S INTEREST RECORDED IN THE PROPERTY RECORDS OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED (ANSWER — BECAUSE THEY DON’T HOLD THE SECURITY, JUST THE RECEIVABLE, CALLED “SPLITTING NOTE FROM MORTGAGE”).

  • IF THE FED OWNS THESE LOANS WHY DON’T THEY SHOW UP AS A PARTY IN FORECLOSURES?

  • WHO IS THE TRUSTEE ON DEEDS OF TRUST?

  • WHO ARE THE BENEFICIARIES?

  • WHO ARE THE MORTGAGEES ON MORTGAGE DEEDS?

“We’ve been earning a fairly high income from our holdings and remitting that to the Treasury,” Mr. Bernanke told Congress on Wednesday.

But holding the securities could make it harder to control inflation as the economic recovery gains strength, said Vincent Reinhart, the former head of the Fed’s monetary policy division, now a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

The Fed bought the securities by pumping new money into the economy, stimulating growth. It could be difficult to reverse that effect without draining the money from the economy by selling the securities, Mr. Reinhart said.

“They created reserves, and those reserves ultimately can be inflationary,” Mr. Reinhart said. “The chief risk of keeping the balance sheet big and raising rates is that you might not be able to raise rates successfully” because the impact would be mitigated by the effect of the extra money still sloshing around the system.

Holding the securities also could cost the Fed a lot of money.

The Fed paid some of the highest prices on record for mortgage securities, basically accepting very low rates of interest on its investments. As the economy recovers and interest rates rise, the Fed will need to accept increasingly large discounts to make the securities attractive to other investors.

David Zervos, head of global fixed-income strategy at the investment bank Jefferies & Company, estimates that the value of the portfolio will drop almost $50 billion each time interest rates increase by one percentage point.

Selling the securities at a loss would reduce the Fed’s ability to transfer profits to the Treasury Department. Large enough losses could reduce the amount of capital held by the Fed, although it can always create more money.

But perhaps the greatest risk is that investors will begin to doubt the Fed’s willingness to raise interest rates, knowing that each increase will damage its own balance sheet.

“It compromises their integrity and their inflation-fighting mandate, because fighting inflation would be a direct detriment to their portfolio,” Mr. Zervos said.

The Fed could avoid these problems by selling the securities now, before interest rates start to rise. But doing so would reverse the benefits of the original program, draining money from the economy while it still is weak. It would also fly in the face of the demands for the Fed to do more for the economy.

A fire sale also could damage the banking industry by driving down the value of the comparable mortgage securities that banks hold in large quantities.

So far the Federal Open Market Committee, comprising the board of governors and a rotating selection of presidents from the regional reserve banks, has chosen to wait.

The approach favored by most of the committee, according to the minutes of its June meeting, is to start raising interest rates before beginning to sell the securities. By waiting “until the economic recovery was well established,” the minutes said, the Fed would limit the impact of the asset sales on the broader market.

WORLD HUNGER PROVIDES PROOF OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES INFLATING PRICES

One of the hardest things for people to get their minds around is how borrowers were defrauded. The nagging question keeps coming to mind “But you DID sign the loan and take the money, didn’t you?” Yes you did, but you did it because of a representation and virtual guarantee from several parties at the closing table who knew the appraisal was a lie, that you were believing it, that you relied on it, and that you never would have done a deal where the real appraised fair market value was far less than the amount of the loan.

So then the question becomes “How can you be sure the appraisal was inflated? Were all appraisals inflated? How do you know that?” Answers: Read on, YES, Read On, in that order.

I start with the proposition that the only legitimate factors that cause changes in housing prices (up or down) are changes in supply and demand, rising costs or labor and materials and related services. Anything else is a manipulation UNLESS it is thoroughly disclosed in language that a normal reasonable person would understand. Even if such disclosure is made and the deal goes through BOTH parties would be defrauding someone by definition, to wit: they are agreeing that the stated price or value of the property is inflated but they are doing the deal anyway.

How could anyone inflate the price of a house without everyone knowing it? ANSWER: By inflating the entire market in that geographical area. Note that during the securitization era, ONLY the places that were targeted had sharply rising prices, sometimes from one month to the next. Other places, like Seneca Falls, NY (highlighted in NY Times article) were not not affected by either the boom or bust except indirectly where they are dealing with decreased services from the state and county resulting from budget deficits resulting from an expectation of rising revenues based upon the apparent rise in tax appraised value.

How does one inflate values of any commodity or property in the entire relevant marketplace? ANSWER: By creating false liquidity (i.e, availability of money) and by speculation pushing up the “value” of the derivatives and other hedge products which in turn raises the value of the actual commodity, or in our case, the actual house. Since the cost of the money decreases, despite government attempts to raise interest rates, and speculation is allowed without supervision, the speculators control the market on the way up and on the way down. They win on both sides because they are controlling the events. That is not a free market. That is a privately controlled market.

So the reason I am sure that false appraisals were the rule, not just the norm are as follows:

  1. There was no abnormal trends or changes in demand, supply, or costs — except that supply actually outpaced demand by a factor of at least 200%. Thus prices should have probably dropped as developers increased competition for buyers. There is no observable reason for prices to rise, much less at the pace seen in the period 2002-2007. By all public accounts it will be at least 2030 before the current inventory of houses are sold. This level of overbuilding is unprecedented and cannot be tied to an expectation of increased demand but rather an expectation that the seller controlled the transaction and collectively with loan brokers, originators, aggregators, and investment bankers would do anything to close the deal even if it meant having the borrower sign for a loan that called for NO PAYMENTS.
  2. 8,000 certified licensed appraisers signed a petition to Congress in 2005 complaining they were being coerced into justifying the deal rather than actually estimating fair market value. They feared they would be blacklisted from all the deals because an honest appraisal would have slowed down sales of homes and sales of financial products to borrowers.
  3. This was a complete reversal of practices existing before the securitization era. The value of the collateral was the Lender’s only guarantee of repayment. hence the tendency was to minimize the estimate of fair market value. Once the risk of repayment was eliminated “lenders” (i.e., mortgage brokers and originators) were under pressure to close loan transactions dollar volumes. The easiest way of doing that was to increase the value of the properties. The more this practice took hold of meeting the contract terms  which were always disclosed to the appraiser (contrary to prior practice) the easier it became, since the “comparables” used by the appraisers were produced by the same practice, incentives and pressures. As the mortgage bonds were sold in increasing dollar volumes, the pressure to place investment dollars increased exponentially. Incentives for mortgage brokers and originators to close deals at any level of risk or terms increased proportionately. Marketing and selling of loan products became big business, with large fees and apparently no risk as the managers of such companies perceived it. The upward pressure to increase the size of loans directly resulted in an upward pressure on sale prices and the perception of “value” in the marketplace. A snowball effect was thus created producing a spike in housing prices that is completely unprecedented in the history of housing since the 1870’s when such measurements began to  be recorded. No other boom or bust cycle in any part of the country had ever experienced spikes of this magnitude.
  4. Starting 3-4 loan products in the 1970’s, the number of possible loan products has skyrocketed to over 400 different kinds of loans — a bewildering array that increases asymmetry of information — causing the buyer to depend and rely upon the more sophisticated side (“lender”) for information about the loan product they were steered into.
  5. The number of loan originating companies masquerading as actual lenders went from 1 (Household Finance, now HSBC) to hundreds during the entire securitization period (circa 1990-2008) and then back down again as most of them went out of business, liquidated, or went bankrupt. New business start-ups would not  have flooded the market but for the virtual certainty of high fees without regard to whether the product worked or not (i.e., whether the loan was repaid or not).
  6. The amount of money attributable to derivatives that increased availability of loans increased from zero in 1983 to more than $30 trillion in 2007 — twice the Gross National Product of this country.
  7. I see no reason for price increases other than the flood of money into certain marketplaces, which in turn gave some color of verification of an appraisal that was plainly wrong, inflated, and where fees for such appraisals increased geometrically.

Yes they were virtually all inflated. That was the requirement. Just as the rating agencies falsely inflated the value and risk of the mortgage bonds that were used to attract the $30 trillion in capital used to flood the marketplace, the appraisers likewise inflated the appraisals of the value and thus the risk to the borrowers AND investors. The proof is simply in the present situation where prices have fallen by as much as 80%. This is further corroborated by the price levels before the flood of money into the marketplace. The final verification is that median income was flat during this period. Most economists and housing experts agree that ultimately median income is the main determinant in housing prices.

How do I know this is true? It is the only workable explanation that is being offered, even including comments, reports and statements issued by the financial services industry.

For an example of how this has worked against the poorest, starving people of the world, see the following, which demonstrates that the Wall Street process, if unregulated, leads to bizarre social and financial consequences.

//

Johann Hari: How Goldman gambled on starvation

Speculators set up a casino where the chips were the stomachs of millions. What does it say about our system that we can so casually inflict so much pain?

Friday, 2 July 2010

Is Your Bank In Trouble?
Free list Of Banks Doomed To Fail.The Banks and Brokers X List.

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By now, you probably think your opinion of Goldman Sachs and its swarm of Wall Street allies has rock-bottomed at raw loathing. You’re wrong. There’s more. It turns out that the most destructive of all their recent acts has barely been discussed at all. Here’s the rest. This is the story of how some of the richest people in the world – Goldman, Deutsche Bank, the traders at Merrill Lynch, and more – have caused the starvation of some of the poorest people in the world.

It starts with an apparent mystery. At the end of 2006, food prices across the world started to rise, suddenly and stratospherically. Within a year, the price of wheat had shot up by 80 per cent, maize by 90 per cent, rice by 320 per cent. In a global jolt of hunger, 200 million people – mostly children – couldn’t afford to get food any more, and sank into malnutrition or starvation. There were riots in more than 30 countries, and at least one government was violently overthrown. Then, in spring 2008, prices just as mysteriously fell back to their previous level. Jean Ziegler, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, calls it “a silent mass murder”, entirely due to “man-made actions.”

Earlier this year I was in Ethiopia, one of the worst-hit countries, and people there remember the food crisis as if they had been struck by a tsunami. “My children stopped growing,” a woman my age called Abiba Getaneh, told me. “I felt like battery acid had been poured into my stomach as I starved. I took my two daughters out of school and got into debt. If it had gone on much longer, I think my baby would have died.”

Most of the explanations we were given at the time have turned out to be false. It didn’t happen because supply fell: the International Grain Council says global production of wheat actually increased during that period, for example. It isn’t because demand grew either: as Professor Jayati Ghosh of the Centre for Economic Studies in New Delhi has shown, demand actually fell by 3 per cent. Other factors – like the rise of biofuels, and the spike in the oil price – made a contribution, but they aren’t enough on their own to explain such a violent shift.

To understand the biggest cause, you have to plough through some concepts that will make your head ache – but not half as much as they made the poor world’s stomachs ache.

For over a century, farmers in wealthy countries have been able to engage in a process where they protect themselves against risk. Farmer Giles can agree in January to sell his crop to a trader in August at a fixed price. If he has a great summer, he’ll lose some cash, but if there’s a lousy summer or the global price collapses, he’ll do well from the deal. When this process was tightly regulated and only companies with a direct interest in the field could get involved, it worked.

Then, through the 1990s, Goldman Sachs and others lobbied hard and the regulations were abolished. Suddenly, these contracts were turned into “derivatives” that could be bought and sold among traders who had nothing to do with agriculture. A market in “food speculation” was born.

So Farmer Giles still agrees to sell his crop in advance to a trader for £10,000. But now, that contract can be sold on to speculators, who treat the contract itself as an object of potential wealth. Goldman Sachs can buy it and sell it on for £20,000 to Deutsche Bank, who sell it on for £30,000 to Merrill Lynch – and on and on until it seems to bear almost no relationship to Farmer Giles’s crop at all.

If this seems mystifying, it is. John Lanchester, in his superb guide to the world of finance, Whoops! Why Everybody Owes Everyone and No One Can Pay, explains: “Finance, like other forms of human behaviour, underwent a change in the 20th century, a shift equivalent to the emergence of modernism in the arts – a break with common sense, a turn towards self-referentiality and abstraction and notions that couldn’t be explained in workaday English.” Poetry found its break with realism when T S Eliot wrote “The Wasteland”. Finance found its Wasteland moment in the 1970s, when it began to be dominated by complex financial instruments that even the people selling them didn’t fully understand.

So what has this got to do with the bread on Abiba’s plate? Until deregulation, the price for food was set by the forces of supply and demand for food itself. (This was already deeply imperfect: it left a billion people hungry.) But after deregulation, it was no longer just a market in food. It became, at the same time, a market in food contracts based on theoretical future crops – and the speculators drove the price through the roof.

Here’s how it happened. In 2006, financial speculators like Goldmans pulled out of the collapsing US real estate market. They reckoned food prices would stay steady or rise while the rest of the economy tanked, so they switched their funds there. Suddenly, the world’s frightened investors stampeded on to this ground.

So while the supply and demand of food stayed pretty much the same, the supply and demand for derivatives based on food massively rose – which meant the all-rolled-into-one price shot up, and the starvation began. The bubble only burst in March 2008 when the situation got so bad in the US that the speculators had to slash their spending to cover their losses back home.

When I asked Merrill Lynch’s spokesman to comment on the charge of causing mass hunger, he said: “Huh. I didn’t know about that.” He later emailed to say: “I am going to decline comment.” Deutsche Bank also refused to comment. Goldman Sachs were more detailed, saying they sold their index in early 2007 and pointing out that “serious analyses … have concluded index funds did not cause a bubble in commodity futures prices”, offering as evidence a statement by the OECD.

How do we know this is wrong? As Professor Ghosh points out, some vital crops are not traded on the futures markets, including millet, cassava, and potatoes. Their price rose a little during this period – but only a fraction as much as the ones affected by speculation. Her research shows that speculation was “the main cause” of the rise.

So it has come to this. The world’s wealthiest speculators set up a casino where the chips were the stomachs of hundreds of millions of innocent people. They gambled on increasing starvation, and won. Their Wasteland moment created a real wasteland. What does it say about our political and economic system that we can so casually inflict so much pain?

If we don’t re-regulate, it is only a matter of time before this all happens again. How many people would it kill next time? The moves to restore the pre-1990s rules on commodities trading have been stunningly sluggish. In the US, the House has passed some regulation, but there are fears that the Senate – drenched in speculator-donations – may dilute it into meaninglessness. The EU is lagging far behind even this, while in Britain, where most of this “trade” takes place, advocacy groups are worried that David Cameron’s government will block reform entirely to please his own friends and donors in the City.

Only one force can stop another speculation-starvation-bubble. The decent people in developed countries need to shout louder than the lobbyists from Goldman Sachs. The World Development Movement is launching a week of pressure this summer as crucial decisions on this are taken: text WDM to 82055 to find out what you can do.

The last time I spoke to her, Abiba said: “We can’t go through that another time. Please – make sure they never, never do that to us again.”

Bank of America to Pay $108 Million in Countrywide Case

GET LOAN SPECIFIC RECORDS PROPERTY SEARCH AND SECURITIZATION SUMMARY

FTC v Countrywide Home Loans Incand BAC Home Loans ServicingConsent Judgment Order 20100607

Editor’s Comment: This “tip of the iceberg”  is important for a number of reasons. You should be alerted to the fact that this was an industry-wide practice. The fees tacked on illegally during delinquency or foreclosure make the notice of default, notice of sale, foreclosure all predicated upon fatally defective information. It also shows one of the many ways the investors in MBS are being routinely ripped off, penny by penny, so that there “investment” is reduced to zero.
There also were many “feeder” loan originators that were really fronts for Countrywide. I think Quicken Loans for example was one of them. Quicken is very difficult to trace down on securitization information although we have some info on it. In this context, what is important, is that Quicken, like other feeder originators was following the template and methods of procedure given to them by CW.Of course Countrywide was a feeder to many securities underwriters including Merrill Lynch which is also now Bank of America.

Sometimes they got a little creative on their own. Quicken for example adds an appraisal fee to a SECOND APPRAISAL COMPANY which just happens to be owned by them. Besides the probability of a TILA violation, this specifically makes the named lender at closing responsible for the bad appraisal. It’s not a matter for legal argument. It is factual. So if you bought a house for $650,000, the appraisal which you relied upon was $670,000 and the house was really worth under $500,000 they could be liable for not only fraudulent appraisal but also for the “benefit of the bargain” in contract.

Among the excessive fees that were charged were the points and interest rates charged for “no-doc” loans. The premise is that they had a greater risk for a no-doc loan but that they were still using underwriting procedures that conformed to industry standards. In fact, the loans were being automatically set up for approval in accordance with the requirements of the underwriter of Mortgage Backed Securities which had already been sold to investors. So there was no underwriting process and they would have approved the same loan with a full doc loan (the contents of which would have been ignored). Thus thee extra points and higher interest rate paid were exorbitant because you were being charged for something that didn’t exist, to wit: underwriting.
June 7, 2010

Bank of America to Pay $108 Million in Countrywide Case

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON (AP) — Bank of America will pay $108 million to settle federal charges that Countrywide Financial Corporation, which it acquired nearly two years ago, collected outsized fees from about 200,000 borrowers facing foreclosure.

The Federal Trade Commission announced the settlement Monday and said the money would be used to reimburse borrowers.

Bank of America purchased Countrywide in July 2008. FTC officials emphasized the actions in the case took place before the acquisition.

The bank said it agreed to the settlement “to avoid the expense and distraction associated with litigating the case,” which also resolves litigation by bankruptcy trustees. “The settlement allows us to put all of these matters behind us,” the company said.

Countrywide hit the borrowers who were behind on their mortgages with fees of several thousand dollars at times, the agency said. The fees were for services like property inspections and landscaping.

Countrywide created subsidiaries to hire vendors, which marked up the price for such services, the agency said. The company “earned substantial profits by funneling default-related services through subsidiaries that it created solely to generate revenue,” the agency said in a news release.

The agency also alleged that Countrywide made false claims to borrowers in bankruptcy about the amount owed or the size of their loans and failed to tell those borrowers about fees or other charges.

Mortgage Insurer Asks Court to Bless Claim Denials

Lawsuits like this one have been on the rise as ever more mortgages default. It is no secret that the housing market boom fostered poorly underwritten mortgages, in which it was common that a borrower’s income was inflated or never documented. Insurers are denying the claims on many loans, asserting they are not liable to pay claims because, they allege, the loans were originated fraudulently.

It would be funny if it wasn’t so damned serious. The ankle-biters are proving the borrower’s case that the loans were fraudulently procured. And they are making the case for borrower’s rescission under TILA. The “rescission” remedy that insurance companies are so fond of is now being used by Big Insurance against Big Banks.

You might remember during the health care debate this came out when the heads of each major health insurer were asked by a congressional panel if they would pledge to give up rescission, they said no. That’s because rescission is their ace in the hole.

If they don’t like the claim they rescind the policy and give you back your premiums. That’s it. Meanwhile you checked into the hospital expecting an operation that costs say, half a million dollars, and now you find out you are either going to die or you have to come up with the half million bucks yourself.

That’s the situation here. The Insurance company comes up with some erroneous statement of fact on which they can hang their rescission hat. Like in health care where they suddenly find that you didn’t disclose a pre-existing condition that you didn’t know you had. Here they are saying that they won’t pay off on the mortgage loans because the loans were bad to begin with and that they were deceived by the failure to disclose the absence of underwriting standards being applied.

Let’s see. You have insurance companies issuing policies for more than they could ever pay and the insured party is the one who committed fraud? AIG, Republic and the rest of them were as complicit in this financial tragedy as anyone else. Believe me, if a guy like me sitting in retirement in Arizona was able to figure it out then any of these financial knuckleheads could have done the same and most assuredly looked the other way when the figures didn’t add up — except for the figures used to compute their bonuses.

Mortgage Insurer Asks Court to Bless Claim Denials

Insurance Networking News, February 16, 2010

Sara Lepro

The game of hot potato between lenders and mortgage insurers continues.

The mortgage insurance unit of Old Republic International Corp. is asking a court to back its refusal to pay claims on soured mortgages originated by Countrywide Financial Corp.

In a suit filed Dec. 31 in New York State Supreme Court, Republic Mortgage Insurance Co. said it has discovered more than 1,500 delinquent Countrywide loans with “material misrepresentations … , in some cases by Countrywide or with its knowing participation.”

Republic said that, because Countrywide, now a unit of Bank of America Corp., disputes the insurer’s investigation and its refusal to pay the claims, it is seeking a declaratory judgment that its procedures were consistent with the law and are not a basis for the lender to challenge the rescissions, or policy cancellations.

Old Republic disclosed the suit in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing Feb. 5.

Lawsuits like this one have been on the rise as ever more mortgages default. It is no secret that the housing market boom fostered poorly underwritten mortgages, in which it was common that a borrower’s income was inflated or never documented. Insurers are denying the claims on many loans, asserting they are not liable to pay claims because, they allege, the loans were originated fraudulently.

Moody’s Investors Service Inc. has estimated that in recent quarters private mortgage insurers have rejected about 25% of claims, up from a historical average of about 7%.

In another recent case, Bank of America sued MGIC Investment Corp. over its rescission practices. B of A has also stopped sending new business to the Milwaukee insurer.

What is different about the Republic case is that the insurer is being proactive in seeking validation of its rescission practices.

“Some courts are better than others for insurers, and they wanted to make sure Countrywide didn’t jump them,” said David Goodwin, a partner in the policyholder insurance practice at Covington & Burling LLP in San Francisco. Goodwin is not involved in the Republic case.

Neither Republic nor B of A would discuss the suit. (The lender is trying to get the case moved to arbitration.)

However, Al Zucaro, the chairman and chief executive officer of Old Republic, the Chicago parent of Republic Mortgage Insurance, said that, with the increasing volume of rescissions, it is natural for the number of disagreements between lenders and insurers to rise.

“There’ve always been rescissions in the business,” he said. “They’ve just not in the past been at the same high level as they seem to be currently.”
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which buy most of the loans covered by private mortgage insurers, compound the problem by forcing lenders to buy back a lot of these loans, he said.

“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac themselves have been rescinding a lot of loans as well,” he said. “So whenever that happens, it creates obvious pressures and stresses in the system.”

Mortgage Meltdown: Fed Knew 4-5 years Ago — and Told Lenders

If you dig deep enough you will find that it wasn’t hard for regulators to figure out that we were heading for a “shock.” It wasn’t hard to figure out that there were abuses traveling downline to borrowers and upline to investors. And it wasn’t hard to figure out that the securities issued at both ends of the mortgage meltdown — the notes issues by borrowers and the bonds issued by SPV’s were over-rated and over-priced just as the underlying real property was over-appraised.

CDO managers were inventing derivatives on derivatives using “embedded leverage” to create new CDOs (CDO2, CDO3 etc) for the riskiest part of portfolios to make them look safer than they were and to get higher ratings than what they were worth. This pattern of dark matter being infused into the financial system created inevitable pressure on all facilitators including “lenders” to produce “product. And it was widely known that the argument being used was specious: first, they were spreading the risk they were mulltiplying it when these instruments came under pressure and second, the default rates used for ratings were average default rates when the CDO’s were composed of tranches heavily weighted with subprime loans. The real default rate was accordingly much higher than the projected default rate, giving the CDO managers room to wiggle on the value of the securities they were issuing. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IS THAT FED REGULATORS WERE BRINGING HEDGE FUND MANAGERS AND CDO MANAGERS IN FOR MEETINGS IN WHICH THEY WERE “ENCOURAGED” TO REIN IN THEIR ENTHUSIASM. ALL PARTIES KNEW THAT THE LOANS TO THE BORROWERS WERE HIGH RISK SECURITIES, AND ALL PARTIES KNEW THAT THE ABS INVESTMENTS AND THE DERIVATIVES OF THOSE ABS INSTRUMENTS WERE GOING TO FAIL. EVERYONE KNEW EXCEPT THE BUYERS OF THE ABS INSTRUMENTS AND THE BUYERS OF REAL ESTATE THAT WAS HYPER-INFLATED IN ORDER TO MOVE THE HUGE INVENTORY OF CASH THAT WAS CASCADING THROUGH WALL STREET.

The “lenders’ were being advised by regulators to hold back on these increasingly risky loans, to return to normal loan underwriting standards. But the “lenders” were encouraged, compensated and they thought protected by the securitization process. Thus their perception of risk (zero) coupled with their greed for fees, kept the process going and they in turn passed on the pressure to mortgage brokers and appraisers. THUS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE LENDER DID NOT KNOW FOR SURE, THAT THE LENDER CAN HIDE BEHIND PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IS A SHAM. 

Witness this article written in January, 2007 reflecting more than 3 years of Fed concern over the direction the financial markets were taking and showing that financial institutions were well aware of the Fed’s displeasure with what they were doing. 

FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR

 

Central banks can’t determine how much leverage is out there

 Section:    

After the Flood:
How Central Banks Fret
About Failures
Once Liquidity Dries Up

By John Plender
Financial Times, London
Tuesday, January 30, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/539c92d0-b006-11db-94ab-0000779e2340.html

In September 1998 Bill McDonough, the then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, corralled representatives of 14 leading banks into the Fed’s offices at 33 Liberty Street in Manhattan’s financial district and urged them to bail out the ailing Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund. It was a classic central banker’s response to a potential systemic crisis.

“Gentle pressure” is the euphemism often employed to describe such central bank bullying to persuade competing banks to collaborate in the common interest. The interesting question, in the light of huge structural upheavals in financial markets since 1998, is whether the nature of systemic risk has changed and whether a central bank could pull off the same trick today.

In the period between the break-up of the Bretton Woods semi-fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s and the near-collapse of LTCM in 1998, financial crises were frequent. Yet for the best part of a decade an eerie stability has prevailed. Big financial institutions have collapsed, notably Refco, the derivatives dealer, and the Amaranth hedge fund. Yet neither initiated a systemic shock, even though Amaranth’s $6bn losses were greater than those of LTCM.

Many private sector bankers believe that the newer markets in credit default swaps, which investors use as insurance against corporate default, and collateralised debt obligations, packages of debt instruments used to back the issue of new securities, are inherently stabilising. That is because they spread risk more widely around the system. At the same time technology, which facilitates trading in complex new financial instruments, serves to make markets more efficient.

This, together with a big surge in global liquidity, has contributed to a dramatic decline in financial institutions’ concern about risk to the point where some companies are issuing securities at a zero or negative risk premium. The risk premium is the additional return over the return on risk-free government bonds that investors normally require as a reward for taking risk.

The credit euphoria in the markets, which has caused the yields of riskier bonds to move closer to the risk-free bond yield, is partly driven by the prime brokerage divisions of investment banks competing ferociously for hedge fund business. They have loosened lending standards and margin requirements relating to the amount of collateral they require to support a given amount of hedge fund debt.

Even central bankers, traditionally cautious about the consequences of financial innovation, see some advantages in the new world of high-octane derivatives trading. Tim Geithner, president of the New York Fed, points out that past crises would cause less damage today if they were to recur because of the greater dispersion of credit risk, the improvements in risk management, the size of the capital cushions maintained by banks and the improvements in many parts of the payment and settlements infrastructure.

That said, neither he nor any other leading central banker believes that we are witnessing the end of volatility or the demise of the credit cycle, though some youthful bankers in the private sector are prepared to argue that case.

According to Gerald Corrigan, a former president of the New York Fed who is now a partner in Goldman Sachs, there is a virtual consensus among leading practitioners and central bankers that “the statistical probability of a major financial shock with systemic features has got lower over time”. But there is also agreement that another major shock is likely and that the potential damage could be greater. Mr Corrigan gives three reasons for this increased toxicity: speed, complexity and tighter linkages across institutions and markets, as the system has become more integrated thanks to financial innovation.

“The trouble,” he adds, “is that we do not have the capacity to anticipate the timing and triggers of such a shock — every now and then stuff happens. And if we could anticipate the timing and triggers, the shocks wouldn’t happen.”

There is no shortage of potential accidents, ranging from an over-abrupt unwinding of global financial imbalances to a dollar collapse. A particular concern, raised at the World Economic Forum at Davos by Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, is the likelihood that credit spreads – the gap between the yield on risky bonds and the risk-free rate – could widen sharply if perceptions of risk change, inflicting large losses on traders. The collapse of a hedge fund or bank might then cause widespread disruption in the markets.

In the euphoria that has accompanied the explosive growth of credit derivatives and collateralised debt instruments, there is not just a possibility that risk is being seriously underpriced. Much trading in credit derivatives assumes that liquidity — the ready availability of funds — will remain when any adjustment in credit markets takes place. Liquidity permits traders to close positions rapidly when risks and potential losses are escalating.

Christopher Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics, a consultancy, argues that, given the lower risk premiums in credit markets, it may no longer be prudent to assume credit default swap contracts will be liquid when the adjustment comes. In other words, traders may be unable to escape from positions where losses are ballooning because nobody will be willing to deal. He notes that a hedge fund that sells insurance protection against default may depend indirectly upon another under-regulated hedge fund having the resources to meet that guarantee.

Maintaining confidence in counterparties, adds Mr. Whalen, is absolutely required for the game to continue; and the stability of the entire credit derivatives market rests on the notion that hedge funds will somehow have access to sufficient liquidity to meet their obligations. For some, that looks a dangerously optimistic assumption.

Jim O’Neill, head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs, recently remarked that “liquidity is there until it is not — that is the reality of modern markets.” The liquidity glut, he thinks, could reverse at any time. So much for what some claim is a secular increase in liquidity.

Optimists downplay the risk to the system of the potentially problematic credit derivatives, which are still only 7 percent of estimated total notional over-the-counter (that is, unquoted) derivatives contracts. Yet the New York Fed’s Tim Geithner emphasises that despite this underwhelming percentage, credit risk in the OTC derivatives market is large relative to more traditional forms of credit and is also quite large relative to the capital cushions and earnings of the major banks and investment banks.

He adds that these exposures are harder to measure because investments in credit derivatives contain “embedded leverage” where one’s exposure to profit or loss is multiplied many times compared to the same investment in the underlying conventional security.

The problem for central bankers is that “embedded leverage” has expanded phenomenally and does not appear on balance sheets, so it is impossible to quantify embedded leverage across the financial system.

In other words, no one can be sure how much capital to set aside as insurance against these leveraged bets going wrong. While risk management techniques have improved, they remain flawed in fundamental respects.

It is widely acknowledged, for example, that mathematical models of risk, which are used to stress-test derivatives, give too much weight to the low volatility of recent times. In other words, they use the recent past as a guide to predicting the future. In financial markets this is the one sense in which history is bunk, since financial shocks have a habit of coming from unexpected quarters.

These risk models can ignore the potential occurrence of very low-probability scenarios with potentially extreme outcomes, in which one big loss can wipe out several years of positive returns. Statistically driven models and risk metrics are poor at capturing these low-probability financial blow-outs. If stress-testing does throw up an outcome that looks scary, people in financial institutions tend to declare the result “unrealistic” because a conservative assessment of risk would put them at a competitive disadvantage to more “realistic” competitors.

Academics such as Harry Kat of the Cass Business School at the City University in London have produced evidence that many hedge funds are, in fact, pursuing trading strategies that can be relied on to produce positive returns most of the time as compensation for a very rare negative return. They are encouraged to do this by a fee structure that does not require the fund managers to pay back their earlier profit share to investors if an extreme event strikes and wipes out the fund.

At the same time, big financial institutions have no incentive to incorporate the potential costs and risks to the system of their own collapse in their market pricing. They prefer others to incur the costs of providing the “public good” of financial stability, while under-insuring against the risk of failure and under-investing in systems to enhance financial stability. So central banks and governments pick up the tab in the event of a systemic collapse.

Considerable work has been done by banking authorities and private sector institutions to address these problems, notably through the work of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II headed by Gerald Corrigan. He characterises the objective as being to strengthen the shock-absorbers of the global financial system. The group’s recommendations were aimed primarily at the private sector, ranging from strengthening corporate governance to improvements in transaction processing.

Meantime, US and European financial watchdogs launched a probe before Christmas into lending to hedge funds and margin practices. This involves looking at risk-management in individual firms and telling them where they stand in relation to best practice, but without necessarily being prescriptive.

In essence, the goal of the authorities in dealing with potential shocks is damage-control and containment. As far as the co-ordination of bailouts is concerned, persuading bankers that they have a collective interest in rescuing competing financial institutions has never been easy, since most central banks have no legal powers to enforce such action. In a very different environment from that of 1998, it is a moot point whether a rescue would work when an institution deemed too big to fail finds itself in trouble.

Sir John Gieve, deputy governor of the Bank of England, has publicly questioned whether it would now be possible to put a failing firm’s bankers into a room and persuade them to do their stuff. He points out that firms nowadays often do not know who holds their shares and debt, and many investors are looking to take the hit and get out as quickly as possible. Others add that some banks’ proprietary trading desks might have short positions in a failing firm as well as outstanding loans, which could dilute their interest in joining a rescue.

Yet this is not something on which all central bankers agree. Tim Geithner acknowledges the difficulties of putting the lending banks in a room, but points out that we are now several decades into the securitisation of bank loans and dispersion of credit risk and there is no general increase in bankruptcies or decline in average recovery rates, though he adds that there are many other factors that may help explain this.

As for the conflicting interests within banks in relation to a failing firm, he adds that structurally, the banks have long positions in credit overall. It is worth noting too, that the New York Fed also has a big advantage in lender-of-last-resort operations relative to many European countries, including the UK, in that monetary policy decision-making and banking supervision are in the same institution, which minimises problems of communication and co-ordination.

Whoever is right, the one certainty is that lightning will eventually strike. The systemic crisis could arise in a conventional corner of the markets. But given the novelty, opacity and complexity of derivatives trading, and challenges that central banks face in trying to understand the risks involved, there is a high chance that the lightning will go there.

Investment Advice

  • Several people have emailed me regarding what to do with their investments. I am not Warren Buffett and I don’t have a crystal ball so what I say here should be checked against other knowledgeable analyses. Keep in mind that most people are full of s–t. Everyone thinks they are a genius in an up market. In a down market, everyone still thinks they are a genius, like gamblers because they count their successes and don’t count their losses. Most economists, securities analysts (I used to be one), institutional traders (I used to be one), fund managers (I used to be one) etc are ill-trained, poorly educated, not well-rounded, and basically go with the herd. They sound good but they don’t know a thing about real economic behavior. Account representatives are even worse. Their job is to get you to do something without concern to wether you make or lose money (if you find one that doesn’t fit the mold, hold onto him or her for dear life).
  • First any investment in money market, CD, US Treasury, or other strictly dollar denominated assets including actual cash or deposits on hand should be converted to non-cash assets or non-dollar denominated assets. There are several internet banks and other companies that will allow you to keep accounts in dual currencies or more. My assumption is that the dollar is in for a crash. My theory is that if I am right, then you will make a lot of money. If I am wrong, there is little to suppose that the Euro or Canadian dollar or the Yen or Yuan will do badly. Either way you are probably pretty well protected.
  • Precious metals are always an inflation hedge but you are depending, again, on perception of value as opposed to real value. It is not likely that Gold ever again be “money.” hence it will always be a commodity and thus subject to the rules and trends of the commodity trading marketplace. The same holds true for corn, oil, and other commodities. yes they are likely to increase in value (and they present an inflation hedge as well) but you probably should not venture into commodities now unless you are already a successful commodity trader. Pick an ETF or other fund and let someone else make the trading decisions.
  • Stocks are not necessarily bad particularly if the company does not depend upon US consumer spending, and if the company does not hold or depend upon receiving US dollars. If it is getting Euros in payment for goods and services or other currencies around the world that are not pegged (i.e. a currency whose value is derived from whatever the value of the U.S. dollar is — BE CAREFUL),  then if it is a good company it will do well in the intermediate term even if it gets hit with the usual over-selling that occurs when an economy fails. 
  • Don’t stop looking at fundamentals just because it is in another currency. It is true that you “make money” if the dollar dives and the foreign stock dives less, but that is not a very safe strategy. Find even financial institutions that are oversold because of the general fear of bank failures. Avoid Citi, BOA, Lehman, and all of the other major national banking groups. They are all at risk. Think about the firms that figured out the crash months or years ago, like Goldman Sachs and see how they are doing now. 
  • Bonds are not necessarily bad either for the same reason, and the same with CD equivalents etc. As long as principal interest, dividends etc are paid in Euros or some other currency not tied to the dollar, you should do OK, if you pick right on the company or mutual fund.
  • Keep in mind that most people are unwilling to accept the coming crash and that they may be right and that I may be wrong.
  • Why Euros? Because it is the ONLY currency of consensus. 2 dozen countries are involved in the Euro, thus giving you immediate diversification of risk. 
  • Real estate: Avoid bargain locations — they might never come back, avoid locations that might be affected by flooding from rising sea levels, use leverage if you can afford the staying power, and stay in for the long haul (3-5 years minimum). This is a non-cash asset whose value will rise proportionately to the decline in the value of the dollar. If the dollar does not decline, and you have avoided problematic locations, you will still be OK. 
  • Jewelry: For short term trading and turnovers in the marketplace there are probably some profits to be made. I don’t recommend it. There are a lot of people who know more at a glance than you would with an electron microscope and a handbook.
  • Lending Money: Tie the interest payments and the principal to the real rate of inflation and use an index like oil rather than the CPI which at this point has been rearranged so many times the tires are worn out. 
  • Borrowing Money: Avoid borrowing at ridiculously high rates (in case I am wrong) and avoid if possible, the imposition of indexing on inflation. If indexing is going to occur, argue for the CPI, which the government will keep at the lowest possible levels in order to keep social security and other payment increases to a minimum. A reasonable loan will put you in the position of tremendous leverage and profit if I am right and still give you ordinary returns on investment if I am wrong.

Credit Crisis, Mortgage Meltdown, Economy Short Circuit: ACTION NOW PLEASE!

It is as though everyone has their head stuck in the ground, which is the most polite way of putting it.

Look at the figures coming out — even PRIME borrowers are going delinquent. Lenders are struggling to regain capital requirements for lending, The Federal Reserve is essentially having no effect on the downslide, retail spending is at a forty (40) year low, and the U.S. dollar has never been worth less than it is now. Housing prices are trending lower for at least another 15% drop and inflation is on the way up each month. Real unemployment and underemployment is at an all time high, and regardless of employment status at least 2/3 of the country’s citizens can’t make it on their current standard of living. All of these indicators are still trending down in a reverse hockey stick if you want to graph it.

My point is not just that the sky is falling, my point is that this crisis must be treated as seriously as it presents itself.

Extreme measures must be put in place NOW to mitigate or prevent tens of millions of American citizens from being displaced from their homes, jobs, and way of life.

The entire foreclosure scheme must be frozen. All debt must be restructured to a level that borrowers can pay with money left over to buy consumer goods. That includes subprime, prime and all other debt. Failing loans must be restored to a status that provides relief to financial insitutions seeking to comply with capital requirements for lending. The holders of CDOs must be given some of the relief to restore some measure of confidence in the U.S. financial markets, and the players who sold these securities should be given immunity if necessary in exhange for their complete cooperation in achieving these objectives.

This issue is not “who gets the bailout”, the issue is how do we get all the players back in equilibrium. The issue is NOT who is to blame. The issue is who is needed to fix the situation. The answer is everyone.  

Fundamentally there are a number of obvious regulatory, monetary, legislative and enforcement issues that need to be visited and corrected. But let’s get serious. These corrections will fix nothing in the current crisis. The “stimulus package” represents a tiny fraction of a tiny percent of the crisis we are in. We need bold actions now not by candidates who will hold public office in the future but by those with the power and authority to do it. We need leadership by people of courage who are willing to take risks to stem the incoming tide of inflation, foreclosures, bankruptcies, delinquencies, bank failures, business failures and the further decline of the U.S. dollar.

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