UCC Hierarchy of Rights to Enforce Note and Mortgage

HAPPY NEW YEAR to readers who celebrate Rosh Hashanah! To all others, have a HAPPY DAY. This is a prescheduled article.

ABOUT LIVINGLIES AND LENDINGLIES

I have assembled a partial list of various possible claimants on the note and various possible claimants on the mortgage. Which one of these scenarios fits with your case? Once you review them you can see why most law students fall asleep when taking a class on bills and notes. Some of these students became practicing attorneys. Some even became judges. All of them think they know, through common sense, who can enforce a note and under what circumstances you can enforce a mortgage.

But common sense does not get you all the way home. It works, once you understand the premises behind the laws that set forth the rights of parties seeking to enforce a note or the parties seeking to enforce a mortgage. The only place to start is (1) knowing the fact pattern alleged as to the note (2) knowing the fact pattern alleged as to the mortgage and (2) looking at the laws of the state in which the foreclosure is pending to see exactly how that state adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as the law of that state.

I don’t pretend that I have covered every base. And it is wise to consider the requirements of law, as applied to the note, and the requirements of equity as applied to the mortgage.

In general, the UCC as adopted by all 50 states makes it fairly easy to enforce a note if you have possession (Article 3).

And in general, the UCC as adopted by all 50 states, increases the hurdles if you wish to enforce a mortgage through foreclosure. (Article 9).

The big one on mortgages is that the foreclosing party must have paid value for the mortgage which means the foreclosing party must have purchased the debt. But that is not the case with notes — except in the case of someone claiming to be a holder of the note in due course. A holder in due course does not step into the lender’s shoes — but all other claimants listed below do step into the lender’s shoes.

The other major issue is that foreclosing on a mortgage invokes the equitable powers of the court whereas suing on the note is simply an action at law. In equity the court takes into consideration whether the outcome of foreclosure is correct in the circumstances. In suits on notes the court disregards such concerns.

Knowing the differences means either winning or losing.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

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Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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UCC Hierarchy 18-step Program – Notes and Mortgages

The following is a list of attributes wherein a party can seek to enforce the note and mortgage if they plead and prove their status:

  1. Payee with possession of original note and mortgage.
  2. Payee with lost or destroyed original note but has original mortgage.
  3. Payee with lost or destroyed original note and lost or destroyed original mortgage.
  4. Holder in Due Course with original note endorsed by payee and original mortgage and assignment of mortgage by mortgagee.
  5. Holder in due course with lost or destroyed note but has original mortgage.
  6. Holder in due course with lost or destroyed original note and lost or destroyed original mortgage.
  7. Holder with rights to enforce with possession of original note and original mortgage.
  8. Holder with rights to enforce with lost or destroyed original note but has original mortgage.
  9. Holder with rights to enforce with lost or destroyed original note but does not have original mortgage.
  10. Possessor with rights to enforce original note and original mortgage
  11. Former Possessor with rights to enforce lost or destroyed note and original mortgage
  12. Former Possessor with rights to enforce lost or destroyed note but does not have original mortgage.
  13. Non-possessor with rights to enforce original note and original mortgage (3rd party agency)
  14. Non-possessor with rights to enforce lost or destroyed note (3rd party agency) and rights to enforce original mortgage
  15. Non-Possessor with rights to enforce lost or destroyed note (3rd party agency) but does not have the original mortgage.
  16. Assignee of purchased original mortgage with possession of original mortgage but no rights to enforce note.
  17. Assignee of purchased original mortgage without possession of original mortgage and no rights to enforce note.
  18. Purchaser of debt but lacking assignment of mortgage, endorsement on the note, and now has learned that the loan was purchased in the name of a third party and lacking privity with said third party. [This category is not directly addressed in the UCC. It is new, in the world of claims of securitization]

Facts matter. It is only by careful examination of the fact pattern and comparing the facts with the attributes listed in the UCC that you can determine the strategy for a successful foreclosure defense strategy. For example if the XYZ Trust is named as the foreclosing party and 123 Servicing is holding the original note and perhaps even the original mortgage, who has the right to foreclose and under what lawful scenario — and why?

Head spinning? GET HELP!

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Beware of the new lending bubble

What is clear to me is that nothing has changed except the government complicity in predatory lending practices is increasing despite the passage of Dodd Frank. A fact that keeps getting buried here is that Federal Law (Truth in Lending Act) puts the burden of determining affordability of an alleged loan product on the lender, not the borrower. That is the whole point of the Act — to avoid mistakes that borrowers might make with sales pitches that will result in financial ruin for borrowers and extreme wealth for underwriters on Wall Street.

When you see “CashCall” offering loans to people who have a FICO score of 585, we all should ask “how can they make money on alleged loans that are going to fail.” Legally the question becomes one that scares the hell out of the banks: having given a loan to someone who needed their help in making the down payment and who have a bad credit history, is the defense to the foreclosure action properly stated if “assumption of risk” or some other related defense is asserted?

The additional question is who is putting up the money for national advertisements on TV, radio and written media to get as many people as possible to take a loan they cannot pay. This is especially true when an alleged adjustable rate mortgage is involved with negative amortization and a teaser payment.

If the burden of affordability is on the lender and not the borrower and the loan resets to a payment higher than the entire household income the outcome is guaranteed to produce a “loss” that will be covered by multiple levels of derivative and hedge products that will turn the loss into a windfall for the intermediaries.

The effect of the foreclosure is that it rubber stamps plainly illegal behavior. The good faith estimate is completely  fictitious. The term of the loan is not 30 years; it is 3 years or whenever the loan resets. That means whatever fees are amortized over the life of the loan should be amortized over 3 years, not 30. So the cost of credit is falsely stated.

And of course the primary directive of TILA that the lender be disclosed is being completely overlooked. CashCall is not lending the money in the sense that they have no risk of loss. The value of the loan to CashCall must be in the fees it receives for acting as a sham conduit.

I also doubt if the promissory notes executed by borrowers in such a situation are negotiable instruments, especially when you consider the possibility of TILA rescission, which is a condition not stated on the face of the note.Shows how securitization worked. Partially correct. BEST IN CLASS

I give the following video a 90%+ rating. It doesn’t cover the sham conduit originator but otherwise it appears totally correct.

Shows how securitization worked. Partially correct. BEST IN CLASS

Check this out:

No Savings? No Problem. These Companies Are Helping Home Buyers With Down Payments
The Wall Street Journal

Lenders are coming up with novel ways for buyers to cobble together down payments. Read the full story

Rescission: Equitable Tolling Extends Statute of Limitations

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Important Message: This blog should NEVER be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from an attorney licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located.

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see http://openjurist.org/784/f2d/910/king-v-state-of-california-d-m

The most popular question I get here on the blog and on my radio show is what happens when the three year statute has run? The answers are many. First is the question of whether it ever started running. If the transaction was not actually consummated with anyone in the chain of parties claiming rights to collect or enforce the loan it would be my opinion that the three day right of rescission has not begun to run. That would be a remedy to an event in which the note and mortgage (or deed of trust) has been signed and delivered but the loan was never funded by the originator any creditor in the chain of “ownership.” The benefit of the three day rescission is that you don’t need a reason to do it. But in order to do that you need to be careful that you are not stating that there was a closing because that would be consummation and therefore the right to rescind unconditionally ran three days after that “Closing.”

Second is the three year statute of limitations. The same reasoning applies.  But it also raises the question of non-disclosure and withholding information. The rather obvious delays in prosecuting foreclosures on alleged “defaults” are clearly a Bank strategy for letting the 3 year statute run out and then claim the homeowner cannot rescind because the closing was more than 3 years ago. That is where the doctrine of equitable tolling comes into play. A party who violates TILA and fails to disclose material facts and continues to hide them from the borrower should not be permitted to benefit from continuing the violation beyond the apparent statute of limitations. People keep asking why the banks wait so long to prosecute foreclosures. The answer is that it is because they have no right to do so and they are running out the apparent statute of limitations on rescission and TILA disclosure actions.

Third is a procedural issue. According to TILA the “lender” who receives such a notice of rescission is (1) obligated to send it to the “real” lender and (2) must file a declaratory action against the borrower within 20 days in order to avoid the rescission. If they don’t file the 20 day action, they waive the objections they could have raised. So far I have not heard of one case in which such an action has been filed. I think the reason for that is that nobody can file an action in which they establish standing. Such a party would be obliged to allege that they are the “lender” or “creditor” as defined by TILA. That means they either loaned the money or bought the loan for “valuable consideration” just like it says in Article 9 of the UCC. Then they would have to prove that allegation before any burden shifted to the borrower to answer or file affirmative defenses against the action filed by this putative “lender.”

CAVEAT: The doctrine of equitable tolling is remedial as is the statute, but it is fairly strictly construed. I’m am quite confident that the best we will get from the courts is that the 3 day and 3 year rules and other limitations in TILA starts running the moment you knew or should have known the facts that had been withheld from you at “closing.” The fact that you are not a lawyer and did not realize the significance of this will not allow you to delay the start of the statute running after the date of discovery of the facts, whether you understood them or not.  But this is a two-edged sword. The current practice of objecting to any QWR, DVL or discovery question without answering the truth about the claimed chain of ownership or servicers on the loan corroborates the borrowers allegation that the parties are continuing to withhold this information. So a well-framed TILA defense might serve as the basis for enforcing your rights of discovery and rights to answers on your Qualified Written Request or Debt Validation Letter.

Additional Caveat: The doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied with respect to the one year statute of limitations on TILA disclosures but it remains open as to whether it would be otherwise applied. From the 9th Circuit —

“Section 1640(e) provides that “[a]ny action under this section may be brought within one year from the date of the occurrance of the violation.” We have not yet determined when a violation occurs so as to commence the one-year statutory period. See Katz v. Bank of California, 640 F.2d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 314, 70 L.Ed.2d 157 (1981). Three theories have been used by other circuits to determine when the statutory period commences: (1) when the credit contract is executed; (2) when the disclosures are actually made (a “continuing violation” theory); (3) when the contract is executed, subject to the doctrines of equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment (limitations period runs from the date on which the borrower discovers or should reasonably have discovered the violation). See Postow v. OBA Federal S & L Ass’n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1379 (D.C.Cir.1980) (adopting “continuing violation” theory in some situations); Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874, 94 S.Ct. 161, 38 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973) (rejecting “continuing violation” theory, statutory period commences upon execution of loan contract); Stevens v. Rock Springs National Bank, 497 F.2d 307, 310 (10th Cir.1974) (rejecting “continuing violation” theory); Jones v. TransOhio Savings Ass’n., 747 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir.1984) (applying equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment).”

Hats off to James Macklin who sent me this email:

Hang on to your hats fella’s…in Sargis’ ruling … back in 2012…he confirms the equitable tolling principles of TILA as I had argued…just saw this again while reviewing…to wit:
“The Ninth Circuit applies equitable tolling to TILA’s … statute of limitations (King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1986).
“Equitable Tolling is applied to effectuate the congressional intent of TILA.”, Id.
Courts have construed TILA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer.” (Id. Citing Riggs v. Gov’t Emps. Fin. Corp., 623 F.2d 68, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1980).
 Specifically the 9th Circuit held: “[T]he limitations period in section 1640(e) runs from the date of consummation of the transaction but that the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or had the reasonable to discover the fraud or non-disclosures that form the basis of the TILA action.” 
Gentlemen…I give you proof positive that the statute tolls and the fact that the term “consummation” is also subject to broad interpretation as we know…the loan could not have consummated if what we allege is found to be true… However, the non-disclosures language used by the 9th Circuit gives rise to possible myriad rescissions upon discovery of those non-disclosures…
James L. Macklin, Managing Director
Secure Document Research(Paralegal Services/Legal Project Management)

How “Standing” Is Causing the Longest Economic Recovery Since the Great Depression

THE PERFECT CRIME: THE VICTIMS DON’T KNOW ANYTHING

WHY INVESTORS AND BORROWERS SHOULD GET RID OF THE SERVICERS AND REPLACE THEM WITH SERVICING COMPANIES THEY CAN TRUST TO MITIGATE THE LOSSES CAUSED BY INVESTMENT BANKS

HOW? It is simple: since the perpetrators ignored the REMIC trust, didn’t fund them and never intended to actually have the REMIC trusts own the loans, the investors can go directly to homeowners or through their own servicers to settle and modify mortgages. This would leave the investors with claims against the investment banks for the balance of the losses, plus punitive damages, interest and court costs. It is the same logic as piercing the corporate veil — if you pay your grocery bills using the account of your limited liability corporation, the corporate entity is ignored.

Vasquez v Saxon (Arizona supreme Court) revisited

Assume the following facts for purposes of analogy and analysis:

  1. John Jones is a Scammer, previously found to have operated outside the law several times. He conceives of yet another PONZI scheme, but with the help of lawyers he has obscured the true nature of his next scheme. He creates a convoluted scheme that ultimately was never understood by regulators.
  2. The first part of his scheme is to offer shares in a company where the money will be held in trust. The money will be disbursed based upon standards that are promised to incoming investors.
  3. The new company will issue the shares based upon the receipt of money from investors who are buying those shares.
  4. Jones approaches Jason Smartguy, who manages a pension fund for 3,000 employees of ABC Company, a Fortune 500 company.
  5. Jason Smartguy manages the pension funds under strict restrictions. A pension fund is a “stable managed fund” whose investments must be at the lowest risk possible and whose purpose is capital preservation.
  6. John Jones promises Jason Smartguy that the new company will invest in assets that are valuable and stable, and that these investments will pay a return on investment higher than what Jason Smartguy is getting for the pension fund under his management. Jason likes the idea because it gives him employment security and probably bonuses for increasing the rate of return on the funds managed for the pension fund.
  7. The lawyers for John Jones have concealed the PONZI nature of the scheme (paying back investors with their own money and with money from new investors) by disclosing the existing of a reserve fund — consisting entirely of money from Jason Smartguy.
  8. Jason advances $100 Million to John Jones who says he is acting as a broker between the new Company (the one issuing the shares) and the Pension fund managed by Jason Smartguy.
  9. The new Company never receives the money. Instead the money is placed in accounts controlled by people who have no relationship with the new Company.
  10. The new Company never receives title or any documentation showing they own shares of the money pool now controlled by John Jones when it should be controlled by the new Company.
  11. John Jones uses the money to bet against the new Company, insurance on the value of the shares of the new Company, and the proceeds of other convoluted transactions — mostly based on the assumption that John Jones owns the money in the pool and based entirely on the assumption that any assets of the pool therefore belong to John Jones — not the new Company as promised.
  12. John Jones also uses the money to buy assets, so everything looks right as long as you don’t get too close.
  13. The assets Jones buys are designed to look good on paper but are pure trash — which is why John Jones bet against the pool and shares in the pool.
  14. Everyone is fooled. The investors get monthly statements from John Jones along with a check showing that the investment is working just as was planned. They don’t know that the money they are receiving comes entirely from the reserve pool and the meager actual returns from the assets. The insurance company believes that Jones is the owner of the money and the assets purchased with money from the pool created by Jason Smartguy’s advance from the pension fund.
  15. John Jones goes further. He pretends to own the shares of the new Company that actually belong to the pension fund managed by Jason Smartguy. He insures those shares naming himself as the insurance beneficiary and naming himself as the receiver of proceeds from his bets that the shares in the new Company would crash, just as he planned.
  16. While the assets are proving as worthless as John Jones had planned, Jason Smartguy receives payments to the pension fund exactly as outlined in the Prospectus and the Operating Agreement for the New Company. Unknown to Jason, the assets are increasingly proving worthless, as a whole and the income is declining. So Jason buys more shares in the new Company, thus providing Jason with a larger “reserve” fund and more “assets” to bet against and more “shares’ to bet against.
  17. John Jones sets out to “acquire” assets that will fail, so his bets will pay off. He buys assets whose value is low (and getting worse) and he creates fictitious transactions in which it appears as though the new Company has bought the assets at a much higher price than their value. The “sales” to the Company are a sham. The Company has no money because Jason Smartguy’s pension money never was made to the new Company in exchange for the new Company issuing shares of the company to Jason’s pension fund.
  18. The difference between the real value of the assets and the price “sold” to the pool is huge. In some cases it is 2-3 times the actual value of the asset. John Jones treats these sales as “proprietary trading profits” for John Jones,when in fact it is an immediate loss to Jason’s pension fund. The shares of the new Company are worthless because it never received any money nor title to any assets. John Jones as “broker” took all the money and assets.
  19. Meanwhile John Jones continues to pay Jason’s pension fund along with distribution reports showing the assets are in great shape and the income is just fine. In reality the assets are virtually worthless and the income is declining just as John Jones planned. John Jones is taking money hand over fist and calling it his own. His bets on the whole thing crashing are paying off handsomely and he is not reporting to Jason how much he is making by taking Jason’s managed money and calling part of it proprietary profits.
  20. The beauty of John Jones PONZI scheme is in the BIG LIE told not only to Jason Smartguy but also to Henry Homebody, who owns a home in Tucson Arizona. Henry is easier to sell on a stupid scheme than Jason Smartguy because Jason requires proof of independent appraisals (ratings), proof of insurance and various other aspects of the investment. Henry Homebody trusts the “lenders” and considers them to be banks, some with reputations and brands that go back 150 years.
  21. Henry Homebody’s house has been in the family for 6 generations and is fully paid off. He pays only insurance and taxes. Unknown to him, he is a special target for scammers like Merendon Mining, whose operators are now in jail. Merendon got homeowners with unencumbered houses to “invest” in a mirage (gold shares) thus putting the fantastic equity in their homes to work. Henry is flown to Canada, wined and dined, and has a very good time, just before he agrees to take out a loan using his family home as collateral, which will provide an income to him of $16,000 over month (which is about ten times his current income).
  22. Henry is approved for a loan equal to twice the value of the property and in which the mortgage broker (now on the run from the law) used projected income from the speculative investment in Merendon mining. This act by the mortgage broker was illegal but worth the risk because the broker was part of the Merendon Mining scam. (look up Merendon Mining and First Magnus Funding).
  23. Henry makes Payments on the mortgage principal, interest, taxes and insurance (all higher because of the false appraisal that was used for the property). He is able to do this because some of the money from the “loan” was given to him and he was able to make payments until the magnificent returns started to come in from his Merendon Mining shares. But those shares were worded in such a way that they were not exactly the ownership of gold that Henry thought he was getting. In fact, it was another pool with options on gold. And of course the money never materialized and neither did the gold. (Note 1996-2014: more than 50% of all loans were “refi’s” in which the home was fully paid or nearly so).
  24. Henry’s lender turned out to be a party pretending to lend him money, using MERS as a nominee for trading purposes, and naming the originator as lender when in fact they were also just a nominee.
  25. Henry’s mortgage and note recite terms that are impossible to meet unless Merendon Mining pays off.
  26. Henry believes at closing that First Magnus was the lender and that some entity called MERS is hanging in the background. Nobody explains anything to him about the lender or MERS. And of course he was told not to get an attorney because nothing can be changed anyway.
  27. Henry did not know that John Jones had spread out Jason’s money into several entities and then used Jason’s money to fund the origination of Henry’s loan.
  28. Jason does not know that the note and mortgage were never executed in the name of the pension fund or the new Company that was supposed to own the loan as an asset.
  29. Eventually the truth starts coming out, the market crashes and prices of homes return to actual value. Merendon Mining is of course a bankrupt entity as is First Magnus, whose operator appears to be on the run.
  30. Henry can’t make the payments after the extra money they gave him runs out. He has $2 million in loans and the “guaranteed” investment in Merendon Mining has left him penniless.
  31. John Jones fabricates and forges dozens of documents to piece together a narrative wherein an “independent” company would claim ownership of Henry’s loan despite the complete absence of any real transactions between any of the companies because the loan was fully funded using Jason Smartguy’s pension money.
  32. Henry knows nothing about the scam John Jones pulled on Jason Smartguy and certainly doesn’t know that the new Company was involved in his loan (because it wasn’t). Henry doesn’t understand that First Magnus and MERS never loaned him any money and that he never owed them money. And Henry knows nothing about John Jones, whose name appears on nothing.
  33. John Jones, the PONZI operator goes about the business of finishing the deal and making sure that the multiple people who bought into Henry’s loan (without knowing of the other sales and bets placed by John Jones) don’t start asking for refunds.
  34. John Jones MUST get a foreclosure or there will be auditing and reporting requirements that most everyone will overlook as long as this looks like just another loan gone bad. His PONZI scheme will be revealed if the true facts become known so he makes sure that nobody sees the actual money trail except him. He might go to jail if the truth is discovered.
  35. The lawyers for John Jones have told him that even fabricated, forged, non-authentic, falsely signed, and falsely notarized documents carry a presumption of validity. Thus the lawyers and Jones concocted a PONZI scheme that would most likely succeed because even the borrower, Henry, still thinks he owes money to First Magnus or its “successors”, whose identity he doesn’t really care about because he knows he took the loan. He doesn’t know that First Magnus and several other entities were involved in collecting fees and making profits the moment he signed the papers, and possibly before.
  36. Meanwhile Jason Smartguy, manager of the pension fund is starting to get disturbing reports about the assets that were purchased. Jason still doesn’t know that the money he gave John Jones never went into the New Company, that the Company never engaged in any transactions, and that John Jones was claiming “losses” that were really Jason’s losses (the pension fund).
  37. John Jones was collecting money from multiple sources without any of them knowing about each other and that he had no losses, he had only profits, and even got the government to lend him more money so he wouldn’t go out of business which might ruin the economy.
  38. Most of all John Jones never made a loan to Henry Homeowner; but that didn’t stop him from saying he did make the loan, and that the paperwork between John Jones and Jason Smartguy’s pension fund was irrelevant — the borrower got a loan and stopped paying. Thus judicial or non judicial process was available to sell the home that had been in Henry’s family for 6 generations.
  39. But the weakness in John Smith’s PONZI scheme is that his entire strategy is based upon presumptions of validity of his false documentation. If courts start applying normal rules and require Jones to disclose the money trail, he is cooked. There can be no foreclosure if a non-creditor initiates it by simply declaring that they are the creditor and that they have rights to enforce the debt — when the only proof of that is that Jason Smartguy, manager of the pension fund, has not yet put the pieces together and demanded ownership of the loan, settled the cases with modifications and went after John Jones for the balance of the money that was skimmed off the deal.
  40. And since Henry’s house is in Tucson, Az, he is subject to non-judicial foreclosure and he is in big trouble. He has no reason to believe the “servicer” is unauthorized, that the debt that is subject to correspondence and monthly statements does not exist, nor that the mortgage or deed of trust was void for lack of consideration — none of the “lenders” at closing ever loaned him a dime. The money came from Jason but Henry didn’t, and possibly still doesn’t know it.
  41. John Jones files a document called “Substitution of Trustee.” In this false document Jones declares that one of his many entities is the “new beneficiary” (mortgagee). Jones holds his breath. If Henry objects to the substitution of trustee he might have to reveal that the new trustee is not independent, it is a company controlled by John Jones.
  42. John Jones has made himself the new trustee. If the substitution of trustee is nullified in a court proceeding, NOTHING can be done by John Jones or his controlled companies.
  43. If the old trustee realizes that they have received no information on the validity of the claim and might still be the trustee, they might file an “interpleader” action in which they say they have received competing claims, demand attorney fees and costs along with their true statement that as the trustee named on the deed of trust, they have no stake in the outcome.
  44. If that happens Jones is cooked, broiled and boiled. He would be required to allege and prove that the “new beneficiary” is in fact the creditor in the transaction by succession, purchase or otherwise. he can’t because it was Jason who gave the money, it was Jason who was supposed to get evidence of ownership of the loan, and it is Jason who should be deciding between foreclosure (which John Jones MUST have to escape enormous civil and criminal liability).
  45. Jones doesn’t file documents for recording unless and until the case goes into foreclosure. That is because he continuing to trade and make claims of losses on “bad loans.”
  46. In fact, just to be on the safe side, he doesn’t file the fabricated, forged perjurious assignment of the loan at all if nobody makes him. He only files the assignment when he absolutely must do so, because he knows each filing is false and potentially proof of identity theft from the pension fund and from the homeowner.
  47. So it often happens that despite laws in each state requiring the filing of any transfer of an interest in real property for recording, Jones files the assignment when there is the least probability and least likelihood that the PONZI scheme will be revealed. Jones knows the mortgage is void and should never have been recorded, as a matter of law.
  48. Henry brings suit against Jones seeking justice and relief. But he really doesn’t know enough to get traction in court. Jones filed the assignment after the notice of default, after the notice of sale, and after the notice of substitution of trustee.
  49. The Judge who knows nothing about the presence of Jason, who still does not know this is going on, rules for Jones saying that it is irrelevant when the assignment was recorded because it is still a valid assignment between the parties to the assignment.
  50. Jason knows nothing about how the money from his pension fund was handled.
  51. Jason knows nothing about how each foreclosure seals the doom and affirms the illegal windfall to intermediaries who were always playing with OPM (other people’s money).
  52. The Court doesn’t know that that the assignment was just on paper, that there was no business reason for it to be executed, that there was no purchase of the loan from Jason’s pension fund, to whom the actual loan was payable. Thus the Judge sees this as much ado about nothing.
  53. Starting from the premise that Henry owed the money anyway, that there were no real defenses, and that since nobody else was making a claim it was obvious that Jones was the creditor, the Arizona Supreme Court says that anyone can can foreclose on an undated, backdated fabricated assignment forged and robo-signed with no real transaction; and they can execute a substitution of trustee even if they are complete strangers to the loan transaction and once they file that, they can foreclose on property that was never used as collateral for the real loan.

Because there are hundreds of John Jones characters in this tragedy, the entire marketplace has been decimated. The middle class is permanently stalled because their only net worth has been stolen from them The borrowers would gladly execute a real mortgage for real value with real terms that make sense 95% of the time, but they need to do it with the owner of the debt — the pension fund. The pension fund the borrower need to be closely aligned on the premise that the loans can be modified for better terms that forced sales, the housing market could recover, and money would start flowing back to the middle class who drives 70% of our consumer based economy.

They are all wrong and are opening the door for more PONZI schemes and even better ways to steal money and get away with it. The Arizona Supreme Court in Vasquez as well as all other decisions from the trial bench, appellate courts, regulators and law enforcement are all wrong. The burden of proof in due process is on the party seeking affirmative relief. Anyone who wants the death penalty equivalent in civil litigation (forfeiture of homestead), should be required to prove beyond all reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence that the mortgage was valid and should have been recorded.

If they didn’t make the loan they had no right to record the mortgage or do anything with the note or mortgage except give it back to the borrower for destruction. If they didn’t make disclosure of the real nature of the loan and all the profits that would arise from the borrower signing an application and the loan documents, those profits are due back to the borrower.

Each time the assumption is made that there are no valid defenses for the borrower, we are cheating investors and screwing the homeowners. And as for the windfall proposition we know who gets it — the John Jones PONZI operating banks that started all of this. Exactly how can this lead anyway other than a continued drag on our economy?

Vasquez v saxon Az S Ct CV110091CQ

For more information call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Banks Won’t Take the Money: Insist on Foreclosure Even When Payment in Full is Tendered

Internet Store Notice: As requested by customer service, this is to explain the use of the COMBO, Consultation and Expert Declaration. The only reason they are separate is that too many people only wanted or could only afford one or the other — all three should be purchased. The Combo is a road map for the attorney to set up his file and start drafting the appropriate pleadings. It reveals defects in the title chain and inferentially in the money chain and provides the facts relative to making specific allegations concerning securitization issues. The consultation looks at your specific case and gives the benefit of litigation support consultation and advice that I can give to lawyers but I cannot give to pro se litigants. The expert declaration is my explanation to the Court of the findings of the forensic analysis. It is rare that I am actually called as a witness apparently because the cases are settled before a hearing at which evidence is taken.
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our South Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. In Northern Florida and the Panhandle call 850-765-1236. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services. Get advice from attorneys licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located. We do provide litigation support — but only for licensed attorneys.
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We have seen a number of cases in which the bank is refusing to cooperate with a sale that would pay off the mortgage completely, as demanded, and at least one other case where the homeowner deeded the property without any agreement to the foreclosing party on the assumption that the foreclosing party had a right to foreclose, enforce the note or mortgage. There is a reason for that. They don’t want the money, they don’t even want the house — what they desperately need is a foreclosure judgment because that caps the liability on that loan to repay insurers and CDS counterparties, the Federal Reserve and many other parties who paid in full over and over again for the bonds of the REMIC trust that claimed to have ownership of the loan.

This should and does alert judges that something is amiss and some of their basic assumptions are at least questionable.

I strongly suggest we all read the Renuart article carefully as it contains many elements of what we seek to prove and could be used as an attachment to a memorandum of law. She does not go into the issue of their being actual consideration in the actual transactions because she is unfamiliar with Wall Street practices. But she does make clear that in order for the sale of a note to occur or even the creation of a note, there must be consideration flowing from the payee on the note to the maker. In the absence of that consideration, the note is non-negotiable. Thus it is relevant in discovery to ask for the the proof of the the first transaction in which the note and mortgage were created as well as the following alleged transactions in which it is “presumed” that the loan was sold because of an endorsement or assignment or allonge. To put it simply, if they didn’t pay for it, then it didn’t happen no matter what the instrument or endorsement says.

The facts are that in many if not most cases the origination of the loan, the execution of the note and mortgage and the settlement documents were all created and recorded under the presumption that the payee on the note was the source of consideration. It was easy to make that mistake. The originator was the one stated throughout the disclosure and settlement documents. And of course the money DID appear at the closing. But it did not appear because of anything that the originator did except pretend to be a lender and get paid for its acting service. Lastly, the mistake was easy to make, because even if the loan was known or suspected to be securitized, one would assume that the assignment and assumption agreement for funding would have been between the originator or aggregator (in the predatory loan practice of table funding) and the Trust for the asset pool. Instead it was between the originator and an aggregator who also contributed no consideration or value to the transaction. The REMIC trust is absent from the agreement and so is the ivnestor, the borrower, the isnurers and the counterparties to credit default swaps (CDS).

If the loan had been properly securitized, the investors’ money would have funded the REMIC trust, the Trust would have purchased the loan by giving money, and the assignment to the trust would have been timely (contemporaneous) with the creation of the trust and the sale of the the loan — or the Trust would simply have been named as the payee and secured party. Instead naked nominees and disinterested intermediaries were used in order to divert the promised debt from the investors who paid for it and to divert the promised collateral from the investors who counted on it. The servicer who brings the foreclosure action in its own name, the beneficiary who is self proclaimed and changes the trustee on deeds of trust does so without any foundation in law or fact. None of them meet the statutory standards of a creditor who could submit a credit bid. If the action is not brought by or on behalf of the creditor there is no jurisdiction.

Add to that the mistake made by the courts as to the accounting, and you have a more complete picture of the transactions. The Banks and servicers do not want to reveal the money trail because none exists. The money advanced by investors was the source of funds for the origination and acquisition of residential mortgage loans. But by substituting parties in origination and transfers, just as they substitute parties in non-judicial states without authority to do so, the intermediaries made themselves appear as principals. This presumption falls apart completely when they ordered to show consideration for the origination of the loan and consideration for each transfer of the loan on which they rely.

The objection to this analysis is that this might give the homeowner a windfall. The answer is that yes, a windfall might occur to homeowners who contest the mortgage or who defend foreclosure. But the overwhelming number of homeowners are not seeking a free house with no debt. They would be more than happy to execute new, valid documentation in place of the fatally defective old documentation. But they are only willing to do so with the actual creditor. And they are only willing to do so on the actual balance of their loan after all credits, debits and offsets. This requires discovery or disclosure of the receipt by the intermediaries of money while they were pretending to be lenders or owners of the debt on which they had contributed no value or consideration. Thus the investor’s agents received insurance, CDS and other moneys including sales to the Federal reserve of Bonds that were issued in street name to the name of the investment bankers, but which were purchased by investors and belonged to them under every theory of law one could apply.

Hence the receipt  of that money, which is still sitting with the investment banks, must be credited for purposes of determining the balance of the account receivable, because the money was paid with the express written waiver of any remedy against the borrower homeowners. Hence the payment reduces the account receivable. Those payments were made, like any insurance contract, as a result of payment of a premium. The premium was paid from the moneys held by the investment bank on behalf of the investors who advanced all the funds that were used in this scheme.

If the effect of these transactions was to satisfy the account payable to the investors several times over then the least the borrower should gain is extinguishing the debt and the most, as per the terms of the false note which really can’t be used for enforcement by either side, would be receipt of the over payment. The investor lenders are making claims based upon various theories and settling their claims against the investment banks for their misbehavior. The result is that the investors are satisfied, the investment bank is still keeping a large portion of illicit gains and the borrower is being foreclosed even though the account receivable has been closed.

As long as the intermediary banks continue to pull the wool over the eyes of most observers and act as though they are owners of the debt or that they have some mysterious right to enforce the debt on behalf of an unnamed creditor, and get judgment in the name of the intermediary bank thus robbing the investors, they will continue to interfere with investors and borrowers getting together to settle up. Perhaps the reason is that the debt on all $13 trillion of mortgages, whether in default or not, has been extinguished by payment, and that the banks will be left staring into the angry eyes of investors who finally got the whole picture.

READ CAREFULLY! UNEASY INTERSECTIONS: THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE AND THE UCC by Elizabeth Renuart, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School — Google it or pick it off of Facebook

 

W VA Court Says Directions to Stop Making Payments and Refusing to Apply Payments is Breach of Contract

BANK OF AMERICA TAKES ANOTHER HIT:
BANKS MISLEAD BORROWERS WHEN THEY INSTRUCT THEM TO STOP MAKING PAYMENTS AND REFUSE PAYMENTS
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Note: We’ve all heard it a million times. “The bank told me to stop making payments in order to get modification or other relief.” It was a blatant lie and it was intended to get the borrower in so deep they couldn’t get out, leading inevitably to foreclosure.

Why would the “bank” want foreclosure? Because they took far more money from investors than they used to fund loans. If the deal fails and dissolves into foreclosure the investors are less likely to probe deeply into the transaction to find out what really happened. The fact is that the banks were all skimming off the top taking as much as 50% f the money from investors and sticking it in their own pockets, using it to gamble and keeping the proceeds of gambling.

If the banks really went the usual route of workouts, deed in lieu, modifications and other relief to borrowers, there would be an accounting night mare for them as eventually the auditing the firms would pick up on the fact that the investment banks were taking far more money than was actually intended to be used for investing in mortgages.

They covered it up by creating the illusion of a mortgage closing in which the named payee on the note and security instrument were neither lenders nor creditors and eventually they assigned the loan to a REMIC trust that had neither received the loan nor paid for it.

In this case the Court takes the bank to task for both lying to the borrower about how much better off they would be if they stopped making payments, thus creating a default or exacerbating it, and the refusal of the bank to accept payments from the borrower. It is a simple breach of contract action and the Court finds that there is merit to the claim, allowing the borrower to prove their case in court.

Another way of looking at this is that if everyone had paid off their mortgages in full, there would still be around $3 trillion owed to the investors representing the tier 2 yield spread premium that the banks skimmed off the top plus the unconscionable fees and costs charged to the accounts.  Where did that money go? See the previous post

This well-reasoned well written opinion discusses the case in depth and represents a treasure trove of potential causes of action and credibility to borrowers’ defenses to foreclosure claims.

 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35320, * MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED

JASON RANSON, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-5616
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA, HUNTINGTON DIVISION
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35320

March 14, 2013, Decided
March 14, 2013, Filed 

CORE TERMS:modification, foreclosure, borrower, citations omitted, mitigation, misrepresentation, servicer, consumer, lender, cause of action, contractual, guaranteed, mortgage, estoppel, contract claim, default, special relationship, reinstatement, collection, quotation, breached, notice, factual allegations, breach of contract, force and effect, indebtedness, thereunder, foreclose, veteran’s, manual

COUNSEL: [*1] For Jason Ranson, Plaintiff: Daniel F. Hedges 1, Jennifer S. Wagner, LEAD ATTORNEYS, MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, INC., Charleston, WV.

For Bank of America, N.A., Defendant: Carrie Goodwin Fenwick, Victoria L. Wilson, LEAD ATTORNEYS, GOODWIN & GOODWIN, Charleston, WV.

JUDGES: ROBERT C. CHAMBERS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

OPINION BY: ROBERT C. CHAMBERS

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). ECF No. 4. Plaintiff Jason Ranson opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES, in part, and GRANTS, in part, Defendant’s motion.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 19, 2012, Defendant removed this action from the Circuit Court of Putnam County based upon diversity of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he took out a mortgagewith Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. to purchase a house in 2007. The loan was originated pursuant to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Home Loan Guaranty Program. Plaintiff alleges the loan “contained a contractual guarantee by the . . . (VA), which requires—as incorporated into the contract—that Defendant comply with regulations and [*2] laws governing VA guaranteed loans, including those regulations governing Defendant’s actions in the event of the borrower’s default” as he was, and continues to be, on active duty with the United States Army. Compl. at ¶5, in part. Defendant is the current servicer and holder of the loan.

In 2009, Plaintiff became two months behind on the loan. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant informed him he was eligible for a loan modification and requested he submit certain documentation to have the modification finalized. Plaintiff claims that Defendant also told him to stop making any payments as they would interfere with the finalization process. Plaintiff states he had the means to make the two delinquent payments at that time or he could have sought refinancing or taken other actions to save his house and credit. However, he relied upon Defendant’s statements and stopped making payments, pending its assurance that he was eligible for a modification. In fact, Plaintiff states that Defendant returned his last payment without applying it to his account.

Over the next several months, Plaintiff asserts he repeatedly submitted the documentation requested by Defendant for the modification process. [*3] Plaintiff also contacted Defendant on a weekly basis for updates. Plaintiff claims he was assured by Defendant it would not foreclose, and Defendant discouraged him from calling by stating it would delay finalization of the modification. Approximately eight months after the process began, Plaintiff contends that Defendant informed him the loan would not be modified because VA loans do not qualify for assistance. According to Plaintiff, Defendant nevertheless requested that he submit documentation for another modification. Plaintiff states he complied with the request but, approximately six months later, Defendant again told him the modification was denied because he had a VA loan. Defendant further told him he should vacate the property because it was going to foreclose. Plaintiff asserts he asked Defendant if he could short sell the house, but Defendant said no and stated the only way he could save his house would be by full reinstatement. As fourteen months had passed since he was told to stop making payments, Plaintiff states that he could not afford to pay the full amount owed.

As a result of these alleged activities, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging five counts of action. [*4] Count I is for breach of contract, Count II is for negligence, Count III is for fraud, Count IV is for estoppel, and Count V is for illegal debt collection. Defendant now moves to dismiss each of the counts.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the United States Supreme Court disavowed the “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), which was long used to evaluate complaints subject to 12(b)(6) motions. 550 U.S. at 563. In its place, courts must now look for “plausibility” in the complaint. This standard requires a plaintiff to set forth the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to relief” that is more than mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true (even when doubtful), the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). If the allegations in the complaint, assuming their truth, do “not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . .be exposed [*5] at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court explained the requirements of Rule 8 and the “plausibility standard” in more detail. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 8 does not demand “detailed factual allegations[.]” 556 U.S. at 678(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a mere “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists when a claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court continued by explaining that, although factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements [*6] of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a plausible claim is stated in a complaint requires a court to conduct a context-specific analysis, drawing upon the court’s own judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. If the court finds from its analysis that “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. (quoting, in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The Supreme Court further articulated that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.

III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Breach of Contract

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the Deed of Trust and the VA Guaranteed Loan and Assumption Policy Rider provide that “Defendant’s rights upon the borrower’s default are limited by Title 38 of the United States Code and any regulations issued thereunder.” [*7] Compl., at ¶22. According to Plaintiff, the contract also provides that Defendant must apply all payments to his account. Plaintiff asserts Defendant breached the contract by (1) discouraging him from making payments, (2) returning his payments, (3) allowing the accumulation of arrears until it was impossible for him to reinstate the loan, (4) initiating foreclosure and failing to grant a modification after assuring him it would be granted, and (5) “failing to comply with VA regulations and guidance requiring, inter alia, that the Defendants [sic] consider Plaintiff for a variety [of] loss mitigation options, and provide notice of such rejection(s) in writing, prior to foreclosure.” Id. at ¶24(d).

To avoid dismissal of a breach of contract claim under Rule 12(b)(6), West Virginia law requires: “the existence of a valid, enforceable contract; that the plaintiff has performed under the contract; that the defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract; and that the plaintiff has been injured as a result.” Executive Risk Indem., Inc. v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 F. Supp.2d 694, 714 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (citations omitted). For a claim of breach [*8] of contract to be sufficient, “a plaintiff must allege in his complaint ‘the breach on which the plaintiffs found their action . . . [and] the facts and circumstances which entitle them to damages.'” Id. In this case, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a breach of contract because he has not specified what specific VA regulations purportedly were violated and, in any event, the regulations only require the foreclosure be conducted in accordance to West Virginia law. As Defendant maintains it complied with the West Virginia law, Defendant asserts it has not breached the contract.

Plaintiff does not dispute that neither the contracts nor West Virginia law require a loan modification. However, Plaintiff argues that the VA has promulgated regulations to limit foreclosures of loans it has guaranteed and Defendant did not comply with those requirements. Plaintiff quotes from the VA Guaranteed Loan and Assumption Policy Rider, which provides, in part:

If the indebtedness secured hereby be guaranteed or insured under Title 38, United States Code, such Title and Regulations issued thereunder and in effect on the date hereof shall govern the rights, duties and liabilities [*9] of Borrower and Lender. Any provisions of the Security Instrument or other instruments executed in connection with said indebtedness which are inconsistent with said Title or Regulations, including, but not limited to, the provision for payment of any sum in connection with prepayment of the secured indebtedness and the provision that the Lender may accelerate payment of the secured indebtedness pursuant to Covenant 18 of the Security Instrument, are hereby amended or negated to the extent necessary to confirm such instruments to said Title or Regulations.

VA Guar. Loan and Assumption Policy Rider, at 2, ECF No. 4-1, at 15. Specifically, Plaintiff cites 38 U.S.C. § 36.4350(f), (g), and (h), which requires, inter alia, Defendant to send Plaintiff a letter outlining his loss mitigation options after he fell behind on his payments and, under certain circumstances, have a face-to-face meeting with Plaintiff. Likewise, 38 C.F.R. § 36.4319 provides incentives to servicers to engage in loss mitigation options in lieu of foreclosure, and 38 C.F.R. § 36.4315expressly allows a loan modification under certain circumstances if it is in veteran’s and the Government’s best interest. Plaintiff also [*10] cites a Servicer Guide for VA guaranteed loans, which contains similar loss mitigation considerations. 1 Plaintiff states that all these requirements are incorporated into the contract, and Defendant violated the contract by stating he could not receive a loan modification because he had a VA loan; by telling him to stop making payments rather than placing him on a repayment plan; by not timely evaluating the loan and considering him for loss mitigation and, instead, placing him in foreclosure; and by refusing to allow Plaintiff to apply for a compromise sale because Defendant had started foreclosure. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts Defendant violated his right to reinstate and failed to exercise its discretion in good faith by refusing his payment; telling him to stop making payments; informing he was qualified for loan modification, and then denying the modification; providing him conflicting, inconsistent, and inaccurate information about his account; refusing to consider a short sale; and never providing him a written explanation of why loss mitigation was denied.

FOOTNOTES

1 U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, VA Servicer Guide 6 (July 2009), available at http:www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/docs/va_servicer_guide.pdf.

Defendant [*11] responds by asserting that the VA regulations and the handbook are permissive in nature, not mandatory, and the VA Servicer Guide is not binding. See VA Servicer Guide, at 4 (“This manual does not change or supersede any regulation or law affecting the VA Home Loan Program. If there appears to be a discrepancy, please refer to the related regulation or law.”); see also 38 C.F.R. § 36.4315(c)(stating “[t]his section does not create a right of a borrower to have a loan modified, but simply authorizes the loan holder to modify a loan in certain situations without the prior approval of the Secretary” 38 U.S.C. § 36.4315(c)). Thus, Defendant argues they establish no affirmative duty for it to act. In support of its position, Defendant cites several older cases which held certain regulations issued by the VA and other governmental agencies do not have the force and effect of law. 2

FOOTNOTES

2 See First Family Mortg. Corp. of Fl. v. Earnest, 851 F.2d 843, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1988)(finding that mortgagors could not state a cause of action based on VA publications against the VA for allegedly failing to monitor lender servicing of VA-backed loans); Bright v. Nimmo, 756 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) [*12] (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that he has an implied cause of action against the VA or lender based upon the VA’s manual and guidelines); United States v. Harvey, 659 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1981)(finding that the VA manual did not have the force and effect of law by itself and it was not incorporated into the promissory notes or deeds to support a contract claim); Gatter v. Cleland, 512 F. Supp. 207, 212 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(holding “that the decision to implement a formal refunding program is one that squarely falls within the committed to agency discretion exception [of the VA] and is not subject to judicial review” (footnote omitted)); and Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 720 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1983)(finding a pamphlet issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, referred to as a Grant Application Manual, was not the product of formal rule-making and did not have the force and effect of law).

However, upon review of those cases, the Court finds that they generally involve situations in which the plaintiffs were attempting to assert a cause of action based upon the regulation itself, rather than as a breach of contract [*13] claim. An action based on a contract involves a much different legal theory than one based solely on enforcement of a regulation apart from a contractual duty. Indeed, Plaintiff cites a number of comparable mortgagecases in which courts permitted homeowners to pursue claims against lenders based upon regulations issued by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) where it was alleged that the parties contractually agreed to comply with those regulations. As explained by the Court in Mullins v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 1:09-cv-00704, 2011 WL 1298777, **2-3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2011), plaintiffs, who allege a straightforward breach of contact claim, “are not, as defendants would have the court believe, suing to enforce HUD regulations under some vague and likely non-existent cause of action allowing a member of the public to take upon himself the role of regulatory enforcer. These two theories of recovery are distinct and unrelated,” and the Court held the plaintiffs could proceed on their express breach of contract claim. 2011 WL 1298777, *3. 3Upon review, this Court is persuaded that the same reasoning controls here. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s contract claim based [*14] upon Defendant’s argument that the regulations and handbook do not have full force and effect of law because Plaintiff has alleged the contract incorporates the limitations set by the regulations. See Compl., at ¶22 (“The contract provides that Defendant’s rights upon the borrower’s default are limited by Title 38 of the United States Code and any regulations issued thereunder.”).

FOOTNOTES

3 See also Kersey v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 682 F. Supp.2d 588, 596-97 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 2010 WL 3222262 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2010) (finding, in part, that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim that the defendant breached an FHA regulation which was incorporated in a Deed of Trust); Sinclair v. Donovan, Nos. 1:11-CV-00010, 1:11-CV-00079, 2011 WL 5326093, *8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2011) (“find[ing] that the HUD-FHA regulations concerning loss mitigation are enforceable terms of the mortgagecontract between the parties and that Plaintiffs cannot be denied the benefit of these provisions by virtue of the fact of simple default”); and Baker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 3:08-CV-0916-B, 2009 WL 1810336, **5-6 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2009) (stating that a “failure to comply with the [HUD] regulations [*15] made part of the parties’ agreement may give rise to liability on a contact theory because the parties incorporated the terms into their contact”).

Defendant further argues, however, that some of the regulations cited by Plaintiff are irrelevant to this case because, for instance, a face-to-face meeting with a borrower is required only under certain circumstances which do not exist in this case. See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4350(g)(iii). In addition, Defendant asserts that, in any event, it did not breach the contract because it had no duty to engage in loss mitigation and it otherwise complied with the contract’s terms. The Court finds, however, that whether or not Defendant violated any of the terms of the contract is a matter best resolved after discovery. Therefore, at this point, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a breach of contract claim and, accordingly, DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim. 4

FOOTNOTES

4Plaintiff obviously disagrees with Defendant’s argument and filed a “Notice of Additional Authority” disputing Defendant’s position that the VA regulations require holders to evaluate borrowers for loss mitigation. Plaintiff cites the Veterans Benefits Administration, [*16] Revised VA Making Home Affordable Program, Circular 26-10-6 (May 24, 2010), which states, in part: “Before considering HAMP-style modifications, servicers must first evaluate defaulted mortgages for traditional loss mitigation actions cited in Title 38, Code of Federal Regulations, section 36.4819 (38 CFR § 36.4819); i.e., repayment plans, special forbearances, and traditional loan modifications. . . . If none of the traditional home retention loss mitigation options provide an affordable payment, the servicer must evaluate the loan for a HAMP-style modification prior to deciding that the default is insoluble and exploring alternatives to foreclosure.” (Available at http://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/circulars/26_10_6.pdf).

B.

Negligence and Fraud

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s claim for negligence and fraud in Counts II and III, respectively, are duplicative of his illegal debt collection claim in Count V under the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA) and cannot survive because Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant owed him a special duty beyond the normal borrower-servicer relationship. Therefore, Defendant asserts Counts II and III should be dismissed.

In Bailey [*17] v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Civ. Act. No. 3:10-0969, 2011 WL 2517253 (S.D. W. Va. June 23, 2011), this Court held that the West Virginia Supreme Court in Casillas v. Tuscarora Land Co., 412 S.E.2d 792 (W. Va. 1991), made it clear a plaintiff can pursue claims under the WVCCPA and common law at the same time. 2011 WL 2517253, *3. The Court reasoned that “[i]t would be contrary to both the legislative intent of the WVCCPA and the whole crux of Casillas if the Court were to preclude consumers from bringing actions for violations of the WVCCPA and common law merely because the claims are based upon similar facts.” Id. The Court found that “[n]either the WVCCPA nor Casillasmakes a consumer choose between the two options. A consumer clearly can choose to pursue both avenues provided “separate” claims are set forth in a complaint.” Id.

However, under West Virginia law, a plaintiff “cannot maintain an action in tort for an alleged breach of a contractual duty.” Lockhart v. Airco Heating & Cooling, 567 S.E.2d 619, 624 (W. Va. 2002)(footnote omitted). Rather, “[t]ort liability of the parties to a contract arises from the breach of some positive legal duty imposed by law because of the relationship [*18] of the parties, rather than a mere omission to perform a contract obligation.” Id. (emphasis added). Whether a “special relationship” exists between the parties beyond their contractual obligations is “determined largely by the extent to which the particular plaintiff is affected differently from society in general.” Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000). “In the lender-borrower context, courts consider whether the lender has created such a ‘special relationship’ by performing services not normally provided by lender to a borrower.” Warden v. PHH Mortgage Corp., No. 3:10-cv-00075, 2010 WL 3720128, at *9 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 16. 2010 (citing Glascock v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., 576 S.E.2d 540, 545-56 (W. Va. 2002) (other citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is quite simple. He alleges that, where “Defendant engaged in significant communications and activities with Plaintiff[] and the loan, Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to provide him with accurate information about his loan account and its obligations and rights thereunder.” Compl., at ¶27. Next, Plaintiff asserts “Defendant[] breached that duty by instructing Plaintiff not to make payments, advising [*19] Plaintiff that he would receive a loan modification, and then instead allowing arrears to accrue for months and ultimately denying Plaintiff[] assistance and pursuing foreclosure.” Id. at ¶28. Upon review of these allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege any positive legal duty beyond Defendant’s purported contractual obligations. There is nothing about these allegations that creates a “special relationship” between the parties. Indeed, a duty to provide accurate loan information is a normal service in a lender-borrower relationship.

In support of their claim Plaintiff relies, inter alia, on Glasock v. City National Bank of West Virginia, 576 S.E.540 (W. Va. 2002), where the West Virginia Supreme Court found that a special relationship existed between a lender and the borrowers. In Glascock, the bank maintained oversight and was significantly involved in the construction of the borrowers’ house. The bank possessed information that there were substantial problems with the house, but it failed to reveal those problems to the borrowers. 576 S.E.2d at 545. The West Virginia Supreme Court found that the bank’s significant involvement in the construction created a special [*20] relationship between the parties which carried “with it a duty to disclose any information that would be critical to the integrity of the construction project.” Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).

To the contrary, Plaintiff’s negligence claim in this case rests merely on the fact Defendant had a duty to provide him accurate information about the loan and failed to do so. Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege any facts which support a special relationship between the parties as existed in Glascock. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim in Count II.

Turning next to Plaintiff’s fraud claim, Defendant argues the claim must be dismissed because it fails to meet the heightened pleading standard found in Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b)provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Under this heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff is required to “at a minimum, describe the time, place, and contents of the false [*21] representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999))(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the plaintiffs must describe the “‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the alleged fraud.” Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 384 (5th Cir. 2003) (other citation omitted)).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he had trouble making his mortgage payments around 2009. Compl, at ¶6. When he was approximately two months behind on his payments, Defendant informed him that he qualified for a loan modification, but he needed to complete the necessary paperwork to have it finalized. Id. at ¶7(a). “At this time,” Defendant also informed Plaintiff not to make any more payments until the modification was finalized. Id. at ¶7(b). About eight months later, Defendant told Plaintiff that he did not qualify for a modification, but Defendant instructed him to submit documentation for another modification. Id. at [*22] ¶13. After approximately six more months passed, Plaintiff was notified again that he was being denied assistance. Id. at ¶14. Plaintiff further alleges that, before May of 2012, Defendant never gave him “a written decision on his loan modification applications or any explanation for why he had denied him for assistance, other than its statements by telephone that he did not qualify for assistance because he had a VA loan.” Id. at ¶18.

In addition to these alleged facts, Plaintiff specifically states in his cause of action for fraud that “[i]n or around 2009,” Defendant told him to stop making payments and it would modify his loan rather than pursue foreclosure. Id. at ¶31. Plaintiff asserts these “representations were false and material,” and they were made knowingly, recklessly, and/or intentionally. Id. at ¶¶32-33. Plaintiff further claims he detrimentally relied upon these misrepresentations by stopping his payments and not attempting reinstatement, after which Defendant sought foreclosure. Id. at ¶¶34-35.

In considering these allegations, the Court is mindful of the fact it should be hesitant “to dismiss a complaint under Rule 9(b) if the court is satisfied (1) that the defendant [*23] has been made aware of the particular circumstances for which she will have to prepare a defense at trial, and (2) that plaintiff has substantial prediscovery evidence of those facts.” Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alerts Defendant as to “the time, place, and contents of the false representation[.]” U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 525 F.3d at 379(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff clearly alleges the fraudulent activity consisted of Defendant instructing him to stop making payments and assuring him he would receive a loan modification instead of foreclosure. He also asserts the representations were made over the telephone and occurred in 2009, when his payments were two months in arrears, and before Defendant returned his payment. In addition, Plaintiff states that he continued to call Defendant approximately once a week and was assured that it would not proceed with foreclosure. Compl., at ¶12(a), (b), and (c). Given this information, Defendant should be able to prepare its defense based upon the allegations made. In addition, the allegations provide enough information that [*24] Defendant also should be able to identify and review its customer service notes, call logs, account records, and any phone recordings it may have during the specified time period. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for fraud.

C.

Estoppel

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s claim in Count IV for estoppel must be dismissed. To maintain a claim for estoppel in West Virginia, a plaintiff must show:

[(1)] a false representation or a concealment of material facts; [(2)] it must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive of the facts; [(3)] the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; [(4)] it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted on; and [(5)] the party to whom it was made must have relied on or acted on it to his prejudice.

Syl. Pt. 3, Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 655 S.E.2d 143 (W. Va. 2007) (quoting Syl. Pt. 6, Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 92 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1956)). Defendant asserts Plaintiff had actual knowledge via correspondence it sent to Plaintiff that he was not guaranteed loan assistance and loan assistance would not impact Defendant’s [*25] right to foreclose. Defendant attached the correspondence to its Motion to Dismiss as Exhibit D. In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff admits to missing two payments before the alleged misrepresentations occurred so he cannot state he relied upon those alleged misrepresentations in failing to make his payments.

“[W]hen a defendant attaches a document to its motion to dismiss, ‘a court may consider it in determining whether to dismiss the complaint [if] it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and [if] the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity.’ ” Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999)). In this case, Plaintiff asserts that, “at this point there is no evidence that the letter was actually sent to or received by Plaintiff, nor has Plaintiff had the opportunity to present mailings, call logs, or testimony supporting his claim.” Pl.’s Res. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dis., ECF No. 7, at 16. 5Therefore, the Court will not consider the letter. Likewise, the Court finds no merit to the argument that Plaintiff’s admission that he was two months [*26] behind on his loan extinguishes his estoppel claim. It is clear from the Complaint that Plaintiff’s claim is that he relied upon the alleged misrepresentations after he was two months delinquent. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss the estoppel claim.

FOOTNOTES

5In addition, the Court notes that the letter appears undated and Defendant sometimes refers to it as a 2009 letter and sometimes as a 2010 letter. At the top right-hand side of the letter, there is a statement providing: “Please complete, sign and return all the enclosed documents by December 5, 2009.” Exhibit D, ECF No. 4-4, at 1.

D.

WVCCPA

Finally, Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s claim under the WVCCPA in Count V must be dismissed because it fails to meet the requirements of Rules 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2)provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to meet this requirement because he merely pled a legal conclusion that Defendant engaged in illegal debt collection and he does not plead sufficient [*27] factual content to support that conclusion. In addition, Defendant states it had a contractual right to return Plaintiff’s partial payment so returning the payment cannot support a WVCCPA claim.

Plaintiff, however, argues that his claims under the WVCCPA are based on three grounds. First, Plaintiff asserts Defendant used fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations to collect the debt or get information about him, in violation of West Virginia Code § 46A-2-127. 6 Second, he claims that Defendant used unfair or unconscionable means to collect the debt, in violation of West Virginia Code § 46A-2-128. 7 Third, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s refusal to apply payments to his account violated West Virginia Code § 46A-2-115. Plaintiff then argues that the first two claims are sufficiently supported in opposition to a motion to dismiss based upon his allegations that (1) Defendant told him he qualified for loan modification and would receive one if he completed the requested financial information; (2) Defendant told him to stop making payments because it would interfere with the modification process, but in reality it increased the likelihood of foreclosure; (3) Defendant assured [*28] Plaintiff it would not foreclose on his home during the time the loan modification application was being processed; (4) Defendant ultimately represented it could not modify the loan because it was a VA loan; and (5) Defendant would not consider a short sale of the house and, instead, proceeded with foreclosure. Plaintiff argues that each of these misrepresentations made by Defendant were intended to collect financial information about him through the modification process or collect the debt via foreclosure. He also states the delay and improper refusal of payments greatly increased the amount he was in arrears, which allowed Defendant to attempt to collect the debt through foreclosure.

FOOTNOTES

6Section 127 provides, in part: “No debt collector shall use any fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representation or means to collect or attempt to collect claims or to obtain information concerning consumers.” W. Va. Code § 46A-2-127, in part.

7Section 128 states, in part: “No debt collector shall use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any claim.” W. Va. Code §46A-2-128, in part.

Upon consideration of these allegations, the Court finds they are sufficient to state a claim [*29] under the WVCCPA. As stated by the Honorable Thomas E. Johnston stated in Koontz v. Wells Fargo, N.A., Civ. Act. No. 2:10-cv-00864, 2011 WL 1297519 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2011), West Virginia “§ 46A-2-127applies to both ‘misrepresentations made in collecting a debt’ and ‘misrepresentations . . . [made] when obtaining information on a customer.'” 2011 WL 1297519, at *6. Therefore, allegations that a financial institution misrepresented to the borrower that it would reconsider a loan modification and, thereby, obtained additional financial information from the borrower, are sufficient to state a claim. Id. Likewise, the Court finds the allegations are sufficient to state a claim that Defendant used “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any claim” pursuant to West Virginia Code §46A-2-128, in part. Cf. Wilson v. Draper v. Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006)(stating “Defendants’ actions surrounding the foreclosure proceeding were attempts to collect that debt” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (citations omitted)). 8

FOOTNOTES

8 Defendant asserts that a debt collection does not give rise to a claim under the WVCCPA. Citing Spoor v. PHH Mortgage [*30] Corp., Civ. Act. No. 5:10CV42, 2011 WL 883666 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 11, 2011). The Court has reviewed Spoorand finds that it primarily focused only on the plaintiff’s request for a loan modification with respect to her WVCCPA claims. The district court in Spoor stated that the defendant’s consideration of the request is not an attempt to collect a debt. 2011 WL 883666, at *7. In the present case, however, the allegations Plaintiff argues supports his claim extend beyond a mere “request” for a modification. Moreover, the Court finds that, to the extent Spoor is contrary to the reasoning in Wilson and Koontz, the Court declines to apply it to this case.

With respect to Plaintiff’s third claim that Defendant illegally returned his payment pursuant to West Virginia Code § 46A-2-115(c), this provision states:

All amounts paid to a creditor arising out of any consumer credit sale or consumer loan shall be credited upon receipt against payments due: Provided, That amounts received and applied during a cure period will not result in a duty to provide a new notice of right to cure; and provided further that partial amounts received during the reinstatement period set forth in subsection (b) of this [*31] section do not create an automatic duty to reinstate and may be returned by the creditor. Defaultcharges shall be accounted for separately; those set forth in subsection (b) arising during such a reinstatement period may be added to principal.

W. Va. Code § 46A-2-115(c). Plaintiff argues that § 46A-2-115(b)defines the reinstatement period as the time “beginning with the trustee notice of foreclosure and ending prior to foreclosure sale,” and he made clear it clear in his Complaint that Defendant returned his payment prior to the requesting a trustee notice of the foreclosure sale. See Compl., at ¶¶7 & 10. Defendant responds by stating that it was within its contractual right to refuse the payment. However, West Virginia Code § 46A-1-107makes it clear that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, a consumer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under this chapter or under article two-a, chapter forty-six of this code.” W. Va. Code 46A-1-107. Therefore, upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count V for alleged violations [*32] of the WVCCPA.

V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, fraud, estoppel, and violations of the WVCCPA. However, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to all counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.

ENTER: March 14, 2013

/s/ Robert C. Chambers

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS, CHIEF JUDGE

Deny and Discover Strategy Working

For representation in South Florida, where I am both licensed and familiar with the courts and Judges, call 520-405-1688. If you live in another state we provide direct support to attorneys. call the same number.

Having watched botched cases work their way to losing conclusions and knowing there is a better way, I have been getting more involved in individual cases — pleading, memos, motions, strategies and tactics — and we are already seeing some good results. Getting into discovery levels the playing field and forces the other side to put up or shut up. Since they can’t put up, they must shut up.

If you start with the premise that the original mortgage was defective for the primary reason that it was unfunded by the payee on the note, the party identified as “Lender” or the mortgagee or beneficiary, we are denying the transaction, denying the signature where possible (or pleading that the signature was procured by fraud), and thus denying that any “transfer” afterwards could not have conveyed any more than what the “originator” had, which is nothing.

This is not a new concept. Investors are suing the investment banks saying exactly what we have been saying on these pages — that the origination process was fatally defective, the notes and mortgages unenforceable and the predatory lending practices lowering the value of even being a “lender.”

We’ve see hostile judges turn on the banks and rule for the homeowner thus getting past motions to lift stay, motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in the last week.

The best line we have been using is “Judge, if you were lending the money wouldn’t you want YOUR name on the note and mortgage?” Getting the wire transfer instructions often is the kiss of death for the banks because the originator of the wire transfer is not the payee and the instructions do not say that this is for benefit of the “originator.”

As far as I can tell there is no legal definition of “originator.” It is one step DOWN from mortgage broker whose name should also not be on the note or mortgage. An originator is a salesman, and if you look behind the scenes at SEC filings or other regulatory filings you will see your “lender” identified not as a lender, which is what they told you, but as an originator. That means they were a placeholder or nominee just like the MERS situation.

TILA and Regulation Z make it clear that even if there was nexus of connection between the source of funds and the originator, it would till be an improper predatory table-funded loan where the borrower was denied the disclosure and information to know and choose the source of a loan, thus enabling consumers to shop around.

In order of importance, we are demanding through subpoena duces tecum, that parties involved in the fake securitization chain come for examination of the wire transfer, check, ACH or other money transfer showing the original funding of the loan and any other money transactions in which the loan was involved INCLUDING but not limited to transactions with or for the fake pool of mortgages that seems to always be empty with no bank account, no trustee account, and no actual trustee with any powers. These transactions don’t exist. The red herring is that the money showed up at closing which led everyone to the mistaken conclusion that the originator made the loan.

Second we ask for the accounting records showing the establishment on the books and records of the originator, and any assignees, of a loan receivable together with the name and address of the bookkeeper and the auditing firm for that entity. No such entries exist because the loan receivable was converted into a bond receivable, but he bond was worthless because it was based on an empty pool.

And third we ask for the documentation, correspondence and all other communications between the originator and the closing agent and between each “assignor” and “assignee” which, as we have seen they are only too happy to fabricate and produce. But the documentation is NOT supported by underlying transactions where money exchanged hands.

The net goals are to attack the mortgage as not having been perfected because the transaction was and remains incomplete as recited in the note, mortgage and other “closing” documents. The “lender” never fulfilled their part of the bargain — loaning the money. Hence the mortgage secures an obligation that does not exist. The note is then attacked as being fatally defective partly because the names were used as nominees leaving the borrower with nobody to talk to about the loan status — there being a nominee payee, nominee lender, and nominee mortgagee or beneficiary.

The other part, just as serious is that the terms of repayment on the note do NOT match up to the terms agreed upon with the institutional investors that purchased mortgage bonds to which the borrower was NOT a party and did not issue. Hence the basic tenets of contract law — offer, acceptance and consideration are all missing.

The Deny and Discover strategy is better because it attacks the root of the transaction and enables the borrower to deny everything the forecloser is trying to put over on the Court with the appearance of reality but nothing to back it up.

The attacks on the foreclosers based upon faulty or fraudulent or even forged documentation make for interesting reading but if in the final analysis the borrower is admitting the loan, admitting the note and mortgage, admitting the default then all the other stuff leads a Judge to conclude that there is error in the ways of the banks but no harm because they were entitled to foreclose anyway.

People are getting on board with this strategy and they have the support from an unlikely source — the investors who thought they were purchasing mortgage bonds with value instead of a sham bond based upon an empty pool with no money and no assets and no loans. Their allegation of damages is based upon the fact that despite the provisions of the pooling and servicing agreement, the prospectus and their reasonable expectations, that the closings were defective, the underwriting was defective and that there is no way to legally enforce the notes and mortgages, notwithstanding the fact that so many foreclosures have been allowed to proceed.

Call 520-405-1688 for customer service and you will get guidance on how to get help.

  1. Do we agree that creditors should be paid only once?
  2. Do we agree that pretending to borrow money for mortgages sand then using it at the race track is wrong?
  3. Do we agree that if the lender and the borrower sign two different documents each containing different terms, they don’t have a deal?
  4. Can we agree that if you were lending money you would want your name on the note and mortgage and not someone else’s?
  5. Can we agree that banks who loaned nothing and bought nothing should be worth nothing when the chips are counted in mortgage assets?

 

Appraisal Fraud: Triaxx Inching Toward the Truth

Editor’s Comment: At the heart of the entire scam called securitization was the abandonment — in fact the avoidance of repayment of the loans. The idea was to make bigger and bigger loans without due any evidence of due diligence, so that the “lender” could claim plausible deniability and more importantly, make a claim for losses that were insured many times over. It was the perfect storm. Banks were using investor money to make bad loans on which the banks were raking in huge profits through multiple sales or insurance of the same loan portfolio. The only way the plan could fail was if the loans performed and the loan was in fact repaid.

For years, I have been pounding on the fact that the root of the method used was appraisal fraud, which as far as I can tell was present in nearly 100% of all loans subject to securitization, where loans were NOT bundled, and the securitization documents were ignored.

Now ICP Capital managing a vehicle called Triaxx, has countered the mountain of documents with real data sifted through algorithms on computers and they have come to the conclusion that loans were far outside the 80% LTV ratio that was presented to investors, that loans were never paid from the start (not even the first payment) and that probability of repayment was about zero on many loans. Soon, with some tweaking and investigation they will discover that repayment was never in the equation.

Thanks again to the learning curve of Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times and her excellent investigations and articulation of her findings, we are all catching up with the BIG LIE. Banks made loans to lose money because they the money they were losing was the money of investors — pension funds etc. And at the same time they bet against the loans that were guaranteed to fail and put the money in their own pockets.

In classic PONZI scheme methodology, they used the continuing sales of false mortgage bonds to pay investors until the inevitable collapse.

Once this is established 2 things are inevitable — the investors will prove their case that they the mortgage bonds were fabricated and based upon lies, deceit and cheating.

And the other inevitable conclusion is that the money came from the investors and not from the named payee, lender or secured party on the notes and mortgages that were executed in the tens of millions during the mortgage meltdown decade.

But did the investor money come to the closing through the REMIC? The answer appears to be a big fat “NO” based upon a big fat LIE. And THAT is where the problem is that caused the banks and servicer to fabricate, forge, robo-sign, lie, cheat and steal in court the same way they did when they sold the investors and sold the borrowers on a deal doomed from inception.

Legally and practically all that means that the borrowers were equally defrauded by the false appraisals that are legally the representation of the “lender” not the borrower. But even more importantly it means that Wall Street cannot show that the money for funding or purchase of the loans ever actually came from the investment pools.

It turns out that the Wall Street was telling the truth when it denied the existence of the pools and the switched to a lie which we forced on them because it never occurred to us that they would blatantly cheat huge institutions that could do their own digging and litigating. 

The legal and accounting effect of all this is enormous. The Payees, Lenders and Secured Parties named in the closing were not the source of funding and therefore the documents that were signed must be construed as referring to a transaction that has never been completed because it was never funded.

The deception was complete when Wall Street investment bankers sent money down to closing agents without regard to any pool, REMIC, SPV or other specific collection of investors. The funding arrived from Wall Street a the same time as the papers were signed.

But in order to prevent allegations of false appraisals and predatory and deceptive lending from moving up the ladder, Wall Street made sure that there was NO CONNECTION between the PAYEE, LENDER or SECURED PARTY and either the investment bank or the so-called unfunded pool into which no assets were placed other than the occasional purchase or sale of a credit default swap.

FREE HOUSE?: As Arthur Meyer is fond of pointing out in his history of banking every 5 years, bankers always manage to step on a rake. The banks had severed the connection between the funding and the documents.

If the court follows the documents a windfall goes to someone in the alleged securitization documents WHO HAS ALREADY BEEN PAID.

If he follows the money, the loan is not secured by a perfected mortgage lien, which means that (1) the unsecured debt can be wiped out in its entirety by bankruptcy AND/or (2) with investors slow on the uptake, there might not be a creditor left to make a claim.

THE ULTIMATE AND RIGHT APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL REDUCTION: But as pointed out previously, there is a Tax liability that would put the federal, state and local budgets back in balance due from homeowners who got their “free house.” It would be a small fraction of the balance claimed on the original loan, but it would reflect the real valuation of the house, the real terms that should have applied, and a deduction for the predatory and deceptive lending practices employed.

BOA ET AL DEATHWATCH: The political third rail here is that 5-6 million homeowners might well have a right to return to their old homes with no mortgage — an event that would put our economy on steroids, end joblessness and crush the mega banks whose accounting and reporting to the SEC and shareholders has omitted the huge contingent liability to pay back the ill-gotten funds from reselling the same portfolio AS THEIR OWN  loans dozens of times.

Too Big to Fail may well be amended to “Too Fat to Jail”, a notion with historical traction even in our own society corrupted by money, influence peddling and lying politicians.

See Gretchen Morgenson’s Article at How to Find the Weeds in the Mortgage Pool

How to Find Weeds in a Mortgage Pool
By GRETCHEN MORGENSON, NY Times

IT sounds like the Domesday Book of the housing bust. In fact, it is a computerized compendium of millions of housing transactions — a decade’s worth from across the country — that could finally help us get to the bottom of troubled mortgage investments.

The system is an outgrowth of work done by a New York investment manager, Thomas Priore. In the boom years, his investment firm, ICP Capital, navigated the dangerous waters of collateralized debt obligations via an investment vehicle called Triaxx. Buyers of Triaxx C.D.O.’s did better than most, but Triaxx still incurred losses when the bottom fell out.

Now Triaxx’s database could help its managers and other investors identify bad mortgages and, perhaps, learn who snookered whom when questionable home loans were bundled into investments that later went bad.

Triaxx’s technology came to light only last month, in court documents filed in connection with the bankruptcy of Residential Capital. ResCap was the mortgage lending unit of GMAC, now known as Ally Financial. As an investor in mortgage securities, Triaxx gained access to a lot of information about loans that were pooled, including when those loans were made, where the properties are and how big the mortgage was, relative to the property’s value. After Triaxx fed such details into its system, dubious loans popped out.

Granted, Mr. Priore is no stranger to controversy. He and ICP spent two years defending themselves against a lawsuit by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which accused them of improperly generating “tens of millions of dollars in fees and undisclosed profits at the expense of clients and investors.” On Friday, ICP and Mr. Priore settled the matter. As is typical in such cases, they neither admitted nor denied the accusations. Mr. Priore paid $1.5 million. He declined to discuss the settlement.

But he did say that, looking ahead, he believed that Triaxx’s technology would help its investors recover money they deserved. Many other investors, unable or unwilling to dig through such data, have settled for pennies on the dollar.

“Our hope is that the technology will level the playing field for mortgage-backed investors and provide a superior method to manage residential mortgage risk in the future,” Mr. Priore said.

A step in that direction is Triaxx’s recent objection to a proposed settlement struck last May between ResCap and a group of large mortgage investors. Triaxx, which invested in mortgage loans originated by ResCap, criticized that settlement because it was based in part on estimated losses. Triaxx said the estimates had assumed that all the trusts that invested in ResCap paper were the same. Triaxx argued that a settlement based on estimated losses, rather than one based on an analysis of actual misrepresentations, unfairly rewards investors who bought ResCap’s riskier mortgages.

ResCap replied that it would be a herculean task to examine the loans in the trusts to determine the validity of each investor’s claims. But Triaxx noted that it took only seven weeks or so to do a forensic analysis of the roughly 20,000 loans held by the trusts in which it is an investor. Of its investments in loans with an original balance of $12.8 billion, Triaxx has identified approximately $2.17 billion with likely breaches. A lawyer for ResCap did not return a phone call on Friday seeking comment about problem loans.

John G. Moon, a lawyer at Miller & Wrubel who represents Mr. Priore’s firm, said: “Large institutions have been able to hide behind the expense of loan file review to evade responsibility for this very important national problem that we now have. Using years of data and cross-referencing it, Triaxx has figured out where the bad loans are.”

Triaxx, for example, said it had found loans that probably involved inflated appraisals. Those appraisals led to mortgages far exceeding the values of the underlying properties. As a result, investors who thought they were buying mortgages that didn’t exceed 80 percent of the properties’ value were instead buying highly risky loans that totaled well over 100 percent of the value.

Triaxx identifies these loans by analyzing 50 property sales in the same vicinity during the same period that the original mortgage was given. Then it compares the specific mortgage to 10 others that are most similar. The comparable transactions must involve the same type of property — a single-family home, for example — of roughly the same size. They must also be within a 5.5-mile radius. If the appraisal appears excessive, the system flags it.

Phony appraisals in its ResCap loans likely resulted in $1.29 billion in breaches, Triaxx told the court. Triaxx cited 50 possible cases; one involved a mortgage written in November 2006 on a home in Miami. It was a 1,036-square-foot single-family residence, and was appraised at $495,000. That appraisal supported a $396,000 mortgage, reflecting a relatively conservative 80 percent loan-to-value ratio.

But an analysis of 10 similar sales around that time suggested that the property was actually worth about $279,000. If that was indeed the case, that $396,000 mortgage represented a 142 percent loan-to-value ratio.

Perhaps the home had gold-plated bathroom fixtures and diamond-encrusted appliances. Probably not.

Triaxx’s system also points to loans on properties that were not owner-occupied, a breach of what investors were told would be in the pool when they bought it, Triaxx’s filing said. Such misrepresentations in loans underwritten by ResCap amounted to $352 million, Triaxx said.

The technology also kicks out mortgages on which borrowers failed to make even their first payments, loans that should never have wound up in the pools to begin with.

Although Triaxx is using its technology to try to recover losses, that system could also help investors looking to buy privately issued mortgage securities. After all, investors’ inability to analyze the loans in these pools during the mania led to enormous losses in the collapse. Now, deeply mistrustful of such securities, investors have pretty much abandoned the market.

Lenders and packagers of mortgage securities will undoubtedly fight the use of any technology like Triaxx’s to identify questionable loans. That battle will be interesting to watch. But investors should certainly welcome anything that brings transparency to this dysfunctional market.

The Documents Fannie and Freddie Never Received

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Editor’s Comment:

Go to the link below which will take you to the article posted on StopForeclosureFraud where  you will see a list of documents (just like the Pooling and Servicing Agreements that everyone ignored) that should have been received by Freddie, Fannie, Ginnie, FHA et al.  Since we now know that the securitization chain of documents was nonexistent until the dealers were called upon to fabricate them for cases in litigation, we know that the absolute minimum requirements for Fannie and Freddie approval were absent. 

This means, contrary to the assertions of 99% of the securitization “auditors”, and contrary to the appearance of a loan on a Fannie or Freddie website, that the loan was never delivered to those agencies nor any of the documents required.  Just as the REMICs never received the loans, Freddie never received the loans.  And since Freddie never received the loans it became the master trustee of “trusts” that never received the loans and were therefore empty.

All this means is that we have to go back to the first day of the alleged transaction.  Investor lenders, operating through dealers, (investment banks) were advancing money for the “purchase” of residential mortgage loans.   The money was advanced to the closing agent who paid off the party claiming to be the prior mortgagee, giving the balance to the seller of the property or to the borrower (if the transaction was supposedly a refinance).  The nightmare for the banks is that if we go back to that first day the parties named as “lender”, “beneficiary”, “mortgagee” are the only parties of record with an apparent recorded interest in the property.  Their problem is that contrary to conventional foreclosure practice, those entities (many of which do not exist anymore) never funded nor even handled the money as a conduit for the loan.  Thus the note and mortgage are fatally defective and cannot be enforced. 

This would mean that the loan never made it into any pool.  That would mean that all of the deals made by the dealers (investment banks) based on the existence of that loan would fall apart leaving them with an enormous liability since they had sold the same deal dozens of times.  And that is the sole reason why the bailout, insurance, credit default swaps, guarantees and other credit enhancements were so large.  The banks used their ability to control the people with their hands on the levers of power within our government to pay for the malfeasance of the banks that have wrecked our economy and our society.

As Iceland has already proven and Europe is in the process of proving, the only answer is to take the stolen money back from the banks, put it back into the private sector, and put it back into government budgets. 

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Bankers Using Foreclosure Judges to Force Investors into Bad Deals

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“Foreclosure judges don’t realize that they are entering orders and judgments on cases that are not in front of them or in which they have any jurisdiction. Foreclosure Judges are forcing bad loans down the throat of investors when the investor signed an agreement (PSA and prospectus) excluding that from happening. The problem is that most lawyers and pro se litigants don’t know enough to make that argument. The investor bought exclusively “good” loans. Foreclosure judges are shoving bad loans down their throats without notice or an opportunity to be heard. This is a classic case of necessary and indispensable parties being ignored.”

— Neil F Garfield, www.livinglies.me

Editor’s Comment:  About three times per week, something occurs to me about what is going on here and then I figure it out or get the information from someone else. The layers of the onion are endless. But this one is a showstopper. When I started blogging in October 2007 I thought the issue of necessary and indispensable parties John Does 1-1000 and Jane Roes 1-100 were important enough that it would slow if not stop foreclosures. The Does are the pension funds and other investors who thought that they were buying mortgage bonds and the Roes were the dozens of intermediaries in the securitization chain.

Of course we know that the Does never got their bond in most cases, and even if they did they received it issued from a “REMIC” vehicle that wasn’t a REMIC and which did not have any money or bonds before, during or after the transaction. Instead of following the requirements of the Prospectus and Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the investment banker ignored the securitization documents (i.e., the agreement that induced the investor to advance the funds on a forward sale — i.e., sale of something the investment bank didn’t have yet). The money went from the investor into a Superfund escrow account. It is unclear as to whether the gigantic fees were taken out before or after the money went into the Superfund (my guess is that it was before). But one thing is clear — the partnership with other investors far larger than anything disclosed to the investors because the escrow account was from all investors and not for investors in each REMIC, which existed only in the imagination of the CDO manager at the investment bank that cooked this up.

We now know that in all but a scant few cases, the loan was (1) not documented properly in that it identified not the REMIC or the investor as the lender and creditor, but rather a naked straw-man that was a thinly capitalized or bankruptcy remote relationship and (2) the loan that was described in the documentation that the homeowner signed never occurred. The third thing, and the one I wish to elaborate on today, is that even if the note and mortgage were valid (i.e., referred to any actual transaction in which money exchanged hands between the parties to the agreements and documents that borrower signed) they never made it into the “pools” a/k/a REMICs, a/k/a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a/k/a/ Trust (of which there were none according to my research).

The fact that the loan never made it into the pool is what caused all the robo-signing, fabrication of documents, fraudulent documents, forgeries, misrepresentations and corruption of both the title system and the court system. Because if the loan never made it into the pool, the investment banker and all the intermediaries that were used were depending upon a transaction that never took place at the level of the investor, to wit: the loan was not in the pool, the originator didn’t lend the money and therefore was not the lender, and the “mortgage” or “Deed of trust” was useless because it was the tail of a tiger that did not exist — an enforceable note. This left the pools empty and the loan from the Superfund of thousands of investors who thought they were in separate REMICS (b) subject to nothing more than a huge general partnership agreement.

But that left the note and mortgage unenforceable because it should have (a) disclosed the lender and (b) disclosed the terms of the loan known to the lender and the terms of the loan known to the borrower. They didn’t match. The answer was that those loans HAD to be in those pools and Judges HAD to be convinced that this was the case, so we ended up with all those assignments, allonges, endorsements, forgeries, improper notarizations etc. Most Judges were astute enough to understand that the documents were fabricated. But they felt that since the loan was valid, the note was real, the mortgage was enforceable, the issues of where the loan was amounted to internal bookkeeping and they were not about to deliver to borrowers a “free house.”  In a nutshell, most Judges feel that they are not going to let the borrower off scott free just because a document was created or executed improperly.

What Judges did not realize is that they were adjudicating the rights of persons who were not in the room, not in the building, and in fact did not even know the city in which these proceedings were being prosecuted much less the fact that the proceedings even existed. The entry of an order presuming or stating that the loan was in fact in the pool was the Judge’s stamp of approval on a major breach of the Prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement. It forced bad loans down the throat of the investors when their agreement with the investment banker was quite the contrary. In the agreements the cut-off was 90 days after closing and required a fully performing mortgage that was originated utilizing industry standards for due diligence and underwriting. None of those things happened. And each time a Judge enters an order in favor of for example U.S. Bank, as trustee for JP Morgan Chase Bank Trust 1234, the Judge is adjudicating the essential deal between the investor and the investment banker, forcing the investor to accept bad loans at the wrong time.

Forcing the investors to accept bad loans into their pools, probably to the exclusion of the good loans, created a pot of s–t instead of a pot of gold. It isn’t that the investor was not owed money from the investment banker and that the money from the investment banker was supposed to come from borrowers. It is that the pool of actual money sidestepped the REMIC document structure and created a huge general partnership, the governance of which is unknown.

By sidestepping the securitization document structure and the agreements, terms, conditions and provisions therein, the investment banker was able, for his own purposes, to claim ownership of the loans for as long as it took to buy insurance making the investment banker the insured and payee. But the fact is that the investment banker was at all times in an agent/fiduciary relationship with the investor and ALL the proceeds of ALL insurance, Credit Default Swaps, guarantees, and credit enhancements were required to be applied FIRST to the obligation to the investor. In turn the investor, as the real creditor, would have reduced the amount due from the borrower on each residential loan. This means that the accounting from the Master Servicer is essential to knowing the actual amount due, if any, under the original transaction between the borrower and the investors.

Maybe “management” would now be construed as a committee of “trustees” for the REMICs each of whom was given the right to manage at the beginning of the PSA and prospectus and then saw it taken away as one reads further and further into the securitization documents. But regardless of who or what controls the management of the pool or general partnership (majority of partners is my guess) they must be disclosed and they must be represented in each and every foreclosure and Trustees on deeds of trust are creating huge liability for themselves by accepting assignments of bad loans after the cut-off date as evidence of ownership fo the loan. The REMIC lacked the authority to accept the bad loan and it lacked the authority to accept a loan that was assigned after the cutoff date.

Based upon the above, if this isn’t a case where necessary and indispensable parties is the key issue, I do not know of one — and I won the book award in procedure when I was in law school besides practicing trial law for over 30 years.

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Arizona Supreme Court Hogan Case Holds that Note is Not required to Start Foreclosure

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the trustee owes the trustor a fiduciary duty, and may be held liable for conducting a trustee’s sale when the trustor is not in default. See Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 476, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (1978).” Hogan Court

Editor’s Comment: Here is another example of lawyers arguing out of a lack of understanding of the securitization process and trying to compress an elephant into a rabbit hole. They lost, unsurprisingly.

If you loaned money to someone, you want the money repaid. You DON’T want to be told that because you don’t have the note you can never enforce the loan repayment. You CAN start enforcement and you must prove why you don’t have the note in a credible way so that the court has footprints leading right up to the point that you don’t have the note. But the point is that you can start without the note. 

The Supreme Court apparently understood this very well and they didn’t address the real issue because nobody brought it up. The issue before them was whether someone without the note could initiate the foreclosure process. Nobody mentioned whether the same party could submit a credit bid at the auction which is what I have been pounding upon for months on end now.

Apparently, right or wrong, the feeling of the courts is that there is a very light burden on the right to initiate a foreclosure whether it is judicial or non-judicial. It is very close to the burden of the party moving to lift stay in a bankruptcy procedure. Practically any colorable right gives the party enough to get the stay — because the theory goes — whether it is a lift stay or starting the ball rolling on a foreclosure there is plenty the borrower can do to  oppose the enforcement procedure. I don’t agree with either standard or burden of proof in the case of securitized mortgages but it is about time we got real about what gets traction in the courtroom and what doesn’t.

In the Hogan case the Court makes a pretty big deal out of the fact that Hogan didn’t allege that WAMU and Deutsch were not entitled to enforce the note. From the court’s perspective, they were saying to the AG and the borrowers, “look, you are admitting the debt and admitting this is the creditor, what do you want from us, a free pass?”

This is why you need real people with real knowledge and real reports that back up and give credibility to deny the debt, deny the default, deny that WAMU and/or Deutsch are creditors, plead payment and force WAMU and Deutsch to come forward with pleadings and proof. Instead WAMU and Deutsch skated by AGAIN because nobody followed the money. They followed the document trail which led them down that rabbit hole I was referencing above.

In order to deny everything without be frivolous, you need to have concrete reasons why you think the debt does not exist, the debt does not exist between the borrower and these pretender lenders, the debt was paid in full, and deny that the loan was NOT secured (i.e. that the mortgage lien was NOT perfected when filed).

For anyone to do that without feeling foolish you must UNDERSTAND how the securitization model AS PRACTICED turned the entire lending model on its head. Then everything makes sense, which is why I wrote the second volume which you can get by pressing the appropriate links shown above. But it isn’t just the book that will get you there. You need to give rise to material, relevant issues of fact that are in dispute. For that you need a credible report from a credible expert with real credentials and real experience and training.

I follow the money. In fact the new book has a section called “Show Me the Money”. To “believe” is taken from an ancient  language that means “to be willing”. I want you to believe that the debt that the “enforcers” doesn’t exist and never did. I want you to believe that the declarations contained in the note, mortgage (deed of trust), substitution of trustee etc. are all lies. But you can’t believe that unless you are willing to consider the the idea it might be true. That I might be right.

At every “Securitized” closing table there were two deals taking place — one perfectly real and the other perfectly unreal, fake and totally obfuscated. The deal everyone is litigating is the second one,  starting with the documents at closing and moving up the chain of securitization. Do you really think that some court is going to declare that everyone gets a free house because some i wasn’t dotted or t crossed on the back of the wrong piece of paper when you admit the debt, the default and the amount due?

It is the first deal that is real because THAT is the one with the money exchanging hands. The declarations contained in the note, mortgage and other documents all refer to money exchanging hands between the named payee and secured party on one side and the borrower on the other. The deal in those documents never happened. The REAL DEAL was that money from investor lenders was poured down a pipe through which the loans were funded. The parties at the closing table with the borrower had nothing to do with funding; acquiring, transferring the receivable, the obligation, note or the mortgage or deed of trust.

Every time you chase them down the rabbit hole of the document trail you miss the point. The REAL DEAL had no documents and couldn’t possibly be secured. And if you read the wording from the Hogan decision below you can see how even they would have considered the matter differently if the simple allegation been made that the borrower denied that WAMU and Deutsch had any right to enforce the note either as principals or as agents. They were not the creditor. But Hogan and its ilk are not over — yet.

There is still a matter to be determined as to whether the party who initiated the foreclosure is in fact a creditor under the statute and can therefore submit a credit bid in lieu of cash. THAT is where the rubber meets the road — where the cash is supposed to exchange hands. And THAT is where nearly all the foreclosures across the country fail. The failure of consideration means the sale did not take place. If the borrower was there or someone for him was there and bid a token amount of money it could be argued in many states that the other bid being ineligible as a credit bid, the only winning bidder is the one who offered cash.

————————————————————

Hogan argues that a deed of trust, like a mortgage, “may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4(c) (1997); see Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 568-69, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (1938).

-6-
We agree. (e.s.) But Hogan has not alleged that WaMu and Deutsche Bank are not entitled to enforce the underlying note; rather, he alleges that they have the burden of demonstrating their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure may proceed. Nothing in the non-judicial foreclosure statutes, however, imposes such an obligation. See Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citing A.R.S. § 33-807 and observing that “Arizona’s [non-]judicial foreclosure statutes . . . do not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings”); In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (stating that non-judicial foreclosures may be conducted under Arizona’s deed of trust statutes without presentation of the original note).

———————AND SPEAKING OF  DEUTSCH BANK: READ THIS AS GRIST FOR THE ABOVE ANALYSIS——-

Disavowal by-DEUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY-AS-TRUSTEE-NOTICE-TO-CERTIFICATE-HOLDERSForeclosure-Practice-Notice-10-25[1]

Pandemic Lying Admission: Deutsch Bank Up and Down the Fake Securitization Chain

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Editor’s Comment:

One problem with securitization in practice even under the academic model is the effect on potential enforcement of the obligation, even assuming that the “lender” is properly identified in the closing documents with the buyer of the loan product and the closing papers of the buyer of the mortgage bonds (and we’ll assume that the mortgage bonds are real and valid, as well as having been issued by a fully funded REMIC in which loans were properly assigned and transferred —- an assumption, as we have seen that is not true in the real world). Take this quote from the glossary at the back of this book and which in turn was taken from established authoritative sources used by bankers, securities firms and accountants:

cross guarantees and credit default swaps, synthetic collateralized asset obligations and other exotic equity and debt instruments, each of which promises the holder an incomplete interest in the original security instrument and the revenue flow starting with the alleged borrower and ending with various parties who receive said revenue, including but not limited to parties who are obligated to make payments for shortfalls of revenues.

Real Property Lawyers spot the problem immediately.

First question is when do these cross guarantees, CDS, Insurance, and other exotic instruments arise. If they are in existence at the time of the closing with the borrower homeowner then the note and mortgage are not properly drafted as to terms of repayment nor identity of the lender/creditor. This renders the note either unenforceable or requiring the admission of parole evidence in any action to either enforce against the borrower or enforce the cross obligations of the new cross creditors who supposedly are receiving not just rights to the receivable but to the actual note and the actual mortgage.

Hence even a truthful statement that the “Trustee” beings this foreclosure on behalf of the “trust” as creditor (assuming a Trust existed by law and that the Trustee, and beneficiaries and terms were clear) would be insufficient if any of these “credit enhancements” and other synthetic or exotic vehicles were in place. The Trustee on the Deed of Sale would be required to get an accounting from each of the entities that are parties or counterparties whose interest is effected by the foreclosure and who would be entitled to part of the receivable generated either by the foreclosure itself or the payment by counterparties who “bet wrong” on the mortgage pool.

The second question is whether some or any or all of these instruments came into existence or were actualized by a required transaction AFTER the closing with the homeowner borrower. It would seem that while the original note and mortgage (or Deed of Trust) might not be affected directly by these instruments, the enforcement mechanism would still be subject to the same issues as raised above when they were fully actualized and in existence at the time of the closing with the homeowner borrower.

Deutsch Bank was a central player in most of the securitized mortgages in a variety of ways including the exotic instruments referred to above. If there was any doubt about whether there existed pandemic lying and cheating, it was removed when the U.S. Attorney Civil Frauds Unit obtained admissions and a judgment for Deutsch to pay over $200 million resulting from intentional misrepresentations contained in various documents used with numerous entities and people up and down the fictitious securitization chain. Similar claims are brought against Citi (which settled so far for $215 million in February, 2012) Flagstar Bank FSB (which settled so far for $133 million in February 2012, and Allied Home Mortgage Corp, which is still pending. Even the most casual reader can see that the entire securitization model was distorted by fraud from one end (the investor lender) to the other (the homeowner borrower) and back again (the parties and counterparties in insurance, bailouts, credit default swaps, cross guarantees that violated the terms of every promissory note etc.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Recovers $202.3 Million From Deutsche Bank And Mortgageit In Civil Fraud Case Alleging Reckless Mortgage Lending Practices And False Certifications To HUD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                  Thursday May 10, 2012

Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Stuart F. Delery, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, Helen Kanovsky, General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and David A. Montoya, Inspector General of HUD, announced today that the United States has settled a civil fraud lawsuit against DEUTSCHE BANK AG, DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS, INC., DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES, INC. (collectively “DEUTSCHE BANK” or the “DEUTSCHE BANK defendants”) and MORTGAGEIT, INC. (“MORTGAGEIT”). The Government’s lawsuit, filed May 3, 2011, sought damages and civil penalties under the False Claims Act for repeated false certifications to HUD in connection with the residential mortgage origination practices of MORTGAGEIT, a wholly-owned subsidiary of DEUTSCHE BANK AG since 2007. The suit alleges approximately a decade of misconduct in connection with MORTGAGEIT’s participation in the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA’s”) Direct Endorsement Lender Program (“DEL program”), which delegates authority to participating private lenders to endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. Among other things, the suit accused the defendants of having submitted false certifications to HUD, including false certifications that MORTGAGEIT was originating mortgages in compliance with HUD rules when in fact it was not. In the settlement announced today, MORTGAGEIT and DEUTSCHE BANK admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged in the Complaint, including that, contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations. MORTGAGEIT also admitted that it submitted certifications to HUD stating that certain loans were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance when in fact they were not; that FHA insured certain loans endorsed by MORTGAGEIT that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance; and that HUD consequently incurred losses when some of those MORTGAGEIT loans defaulted. The defendants also agreed to pay $202.3 million to the United States to resolve the Government’s claims for damages and penalties under the False Claims Act. The settlement was approved today by United States District Judge Lewis Kaplan.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara stated: “MORTGAGEIT and DEUTSCHE BANK treated FHA insurance as free Government money to backstop lending practices that did not follow the rules. Participation in the Direct Endorsement Lender program comes with requirements that are not mere technicalities to be circumvented through subterfuge as these defendants did repeatedly over the course of a decade. Their failure to meet these requirements caused substantial losses to the Government – losses that could have and should have been avoided. In addition to their admissions of responsibility, Deutsche Bank and MortgageIT have agreed to pay damages in an amount that will significantly compensate HUD for the losses it incurred as a result of the defendants’ actions.”

Acting Assistant Attorney General Stuart F. Delery stated: “This is an important settlement for the United States, both in terms of obtaining substantial reimbursement for the FHA insurance fund for wrongfully incurred claims, and in obtaining the defendants’ acceptance of their role in the losses they caused to the taxpayers.”

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www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  1/45/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

HUD General Counsel Helen Kanovsky stated: “This case demonstrates that HUD has the ability to identify fraud patterns and work with our partners at the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to pursue appropriate remedies. HUD would like to commend the work of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York in achieving this settlement, which is a substantial recovery for the FHA mortgage insurance fund. We look forward to continuing our joint efforts with the Department of Justice and the SDNY to combat mortgage fraud. The mortgage industry should take notice that we will not sit silently by if we detect abuses in our programs.”

HUD Inspector General David A. Montoya stated: “We expect every Direct Endorsement Lender to adhere to the highest level of integrity and accountability. When the combined efforts and attention of the Department of Justice, HUD, and HUD OIG are focused upon those who fail to exercise such integrity in connection with HUD programs, the end result will be both unpleasant and costly to the offending party.”

The following allegations are based on the Complaint and Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) filed in Manhattan federal court by the Government in this case:

Between 1999 and 2009, MORTGAGEIT was a participant in the DEL program, a federal program administered by the FHA. As a Direct Endorsement Lender, MORTGAGEIT had the authority to originate, underwrite, and endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. If a Direct Endorsement Lender approves a mortgage loan for FHA insurance and the loan later defaults, the holder of the loan may submit an insurance claim to HUD for the costs associated with the defaulted loan, which HUD must then pay. Under the DEL program, neither the FHA nor HUD reviews a loan before it is endorsed for FHA insurance. Direct Endorsement Lenders are therefore required to follow program rules designed to ensure that they are properly underwriting and endorsing mortgages for FHA insurance and maintaining a quality control program that can prevent and correct any deficiencies in their underwriting. These requirements include maintaining a quality control program, pursuant to which the lender must fully review all loans that go into default within the first six payments, known as “early payment defaults.” Early payment defaults may be signs of problems in the underwriting process, and by reviewing early payment defaults, Direct Endorsement Lenders are able to monitor those problems, correct them, and report them to HUD. MORTGAGEIT failed to comply with these basic requirements.

As the Complaint further alleges, MORTGAGEIT was also required to execute certifications for every mortgage loan that it endorsed for FHA insurance. Since 1999, MORTGAGEIT has endorsed more than 39,000 mortgages for FHA insurance, and FHA paid insurance claims on more than 3,200 mortgages, totaling more than $368 million, for mortgages endorsed for FHA insurance by MORTGAGEIT, including more than $58 million resulting from loans that defaulted after DEUTSCHE BANK AG acquired MORTGAGEIT in 2007.

As alleged in the Complaint, a portion of those losses was caused by the false statements that the defendants made to HUD to obtain FHA insurance on individual loans. Although MORTGAGEIT had certified that each of these loans was eligible for FHA insurance, it repeatedly submitted certifications that were knowingly or recklessly false. MORTGAGEIT failed to perform basic due diligence and repeatedly endorsed mortgage loans that were not eligible for FHA insurance.

The Complaint also alleges that MORTGAGEIT separately certified to HUD, on an annual basis, that it was in compliance with the rules governing its eligibility in the DEL program, including that it conduct a full review of all early payment defaults, as early payment defaults are indicators of mortgage fraud. Contrary to its certifications to HUD, MORTGAGEIT failed to implement a compliant quality control program, and failed to review all early payment defaults as required. In addition, the Complaint alleges that, after DEUTSCHE BANK acquired MORTGAGEIT in January 2007, DEUTSCHE BANK managed the quality control functions of the Direct Endorsement Lender business, and had its employees sign and submit MORTGAGEIT’s Direct Endorsement Lender annual certifications to HUD. Furthermore, by the end of 2007, MORTGAGEIT was not reviewing any early payment defaults on closed FHA-insured loans. Between 1999 and 2009, the FHA paid more than $92 million in FHA insurance claims for loans that defaulted within the first six payments.

***

Pursuant to the settlement, MORTGAGEIT and the DEUTSCHE BANK defendants will pay the United States $202.3 million within 30 days of the settlement.

As part of the settlement, the defendants admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for certain misconduct. Specifically,

MORTGAGEIT admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for the following:

www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  2/4

5/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

MORTGAGEIT failed to conform fully to HUD-FHA rules requiring Direct Endorsement Lenders to maintain a compliant quality control program;

MORTGAGEIT failed to conduct a full review of all early payment defaults on loans endorsed for FHA insurance;

Contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations;

MORTGAGEIT endorsed for FHA mortgage insurance certain loans that did not meet all underwriting requirements contained in HUD’s handbooks and mortgagee letters, and therefore were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance under the DEL program; and;

MORTGAGEIT submitted to HUD-FHA certifications stating that certain loans were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance when in fact they were not; FHA insured certain loans endorsed by MORTGAGEIT that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance; and HUD consequently incurred losses when some of those MORTGAGEIT loans defaulted.

The DEUTSCHE BANK defendants admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for the fact that after MORTGAGEIT became a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of DB Structured Products, Inc and Deutsche Bank AG in January 2007:

The DEUTSCHE BANK defendants were in a position to know that the operations of MORTGAGEIT did not conform fully to all of HUD-FHA’s regulations, policies, and handbooks;

One or more of the annual certifications was signed by an individual who was also an officer of certain of the DEUTSCHE BANK defendants; and;

Contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations.

***

The case is being handled by the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit. Mr. Bharara established the Civil Frauds Unit in March 2010 to bring renewed focus and additional resources to combating financial fraud, including mortgage fraud.

To date, the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit has brought four civil fraud lawsuits against major lenders under the False Claims Act alleging reckless residential mortgage lending.

Three of the four cases have settled, and today’s settlement represents the third, and largest, settlement. On February 15, 2012, the Government settled its civil fraud lawsuit against CITIMORTGAGE, INC. for $158.3 million. On February 24, 2012, the Government settled its civil fraud suit against FLAGSTAR BANK, F.S.B. for $132.8 million. The Government’s lawsuit against ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE CORP. and two of its officers remains pending. With today’s settlement, the Government has achieved settlements totaling $493.4 million in the last three months. In each settlement, the defendants have admitted and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged in the Government’s Complaint.

The Office’s Civil Frauds Unit is handling all three cases as part of its continuing investigation of reckless lending practices.

The Civil Frauds Unit works in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, on which Mr. Bharara serves as a Co-Chair of the Securities and Commodities Fraud Working Group. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

Mr. Bharara thanked HUD and HUD-OIG for their extraordinary assistance in this case. He also expressed his appreciation for the support of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Division in Washington, D.C.

www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  3/4

5/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Lara K. Eshkenazi, Pierre G. Armand, and Christopher B. Harwood are in charge of the case.

Az Statute on Mortgage Fraud Not Enforced (except against homeowners)

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Editor’s Comment:

With a statute like this on the books in Arizona and elsewhere, it is difficult to see why the Chief Law Enforcement of each state, the Attorney General, has not brought claims and prosecutions against all those entities and people up and down the fraudulent securitization chain that brought us the mortgage meltdown, foreclosures of more than 5 million people, suicides, evictions and claims of profits based upon the fact that the free house went to the pretender lender.

Practically every act described in this statute was committed by the investment banks and all their affiliates and partners from the seller of the bogus mortgage bond (sold forward, which means that the loans did not yet exist) all the way down to the people at the closing table with the homeowner borrower.

I’d like to see a script from attorneys who confront the free house concept head on. The San Francisco study and other studies clearly show that many if not most foreclosures resulted in a “sale” of property without any cash offered by the buyer who submitted a credit bid when they had not established themselves as creditors nor had they established the amount due. And we now know that they failed to establish themselves as creditors because they neither loaned the money nor purchased the loan in any transaction in which they parted with money. So the consideration for the sale was not present or if you want to put it in legalese that would effect those states that allow review of the adequacy of consideration at the auction.

I’d like to see a lawyer go to court and say “Judge, you already know it would be wrong for my client to get a free house. I am here to agree with you and state further that whether you rule for the borrower or this pretender lender here, you are going to give a free house to somebody.

“Because this party initiated a foreclosure proceeding without being the creditor, without spending a dime on the loan or purchase of the loan, and without any right to represent the multitude of people and entities that should be paid on this loan. This pretender, this stranger to this transaction stands in the way of a mediated settlement or HAMP modification in which the borrower is more than happy to do a traditional workout based upon the economic realities.

“And they they maintain themselves as obstacles to mediation or modification because they have too much to hide about the origination of this loan.

“All I seek is that you recognize that we deny the loan on which this party is pursuing its claims, we deny the default and we deny the balance. That puts the matter at issue in which there are relevant and material facts that are in dispute.

“I say to you that as a Judge you are here to call balls and strikes and that your ruling can only be that with issues in dispute, the case must proceed.”

“The pretender should be required to state its claim with a complaint, attach the relevant documents and the homeowner should be able to respond to the complaint and confront the witnesses and documents being used. And that means the pretender here must be subject to the requirements of the rules of civil procedure that include discovery.

“Experience shows that there have been no trials on the evidence in all the foreclosures ever brought during this period and that the moment a judge rules on discovery in favor of the borrower, the pretender offers settlement. Why do you think that is?”

“If they had a good reason to foreclose and they had the authority to allege the required the elements of foreclosure and they had the proof to back it up they would and should be more than willing to put a stop to all these motions and petitions from borrowers. But they don’t allow any case to go to trial. They are winning on procedure because of the assumption that the legitimate debt is unpaid and that the borrower owes it to the party making the claim even if there never was transaction with the pretender in which the borrower was a party, directly or indirectly.”

“Neither the non-judicial powers of sale statutes nor the rules of civil procedure based upon constitutional requirements of due process can be used to thwart a claim that has merit or raises issues that have merit. You should not allow the statute and rules to be applied in a manner in which a stranger to the transaction who could not even plead a case in good faith would win a foreclosed house at auction without court review and a hearing on the merits.”

Residential mortgage fraud; classification; definitions in Arizona

Section 1. Title 13, chapter 23, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding section 13-2320, to read:
13-2320.

A. A PERSON COMMITS RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FRAUD IF, WITH THE INTENT TO DEFRAUD, THE PERSON DOES ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:

  1. KNOWINGLY MAKES ANY DELIBERATE MISSTATEMENT, MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL OMISSION DURING THE MORTGAGE LENDING PROCESS THAT IS RELIED ON BY A MORTGAGE LENDER, BORROWER OR OTHER PARTY TO THE MORTGAGE LENDING PROCESS.
  2. KNOWINGLY USES OR FACILITATES THE USE OF ANY DELIBERATE MISSTATEMENT, MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL OMISSION DURING THE MORTGAGE LENDING PROCESS THAT IS RELIED ON BY A MORTGAGE LENDER, BORROWER OR OTHER PARTY TO THE MORTGAGE LENDING PROCESS.
  3. RECEIVES ANY PROCEEDS OR OTHER MONIES IN CONNECTION WITH A RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOAN THAT THE PERSON KNOWS RESULTED FROM A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 1 OR 2 OF THIS SUBSECTION.
  4. FILES OR CAUSES TO BE FILED WITH THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF ANY COUNTY OF THIS STATE ANY RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOAN DOCUMENT THAT THE PERSON KNOWS TO CONTAIN A DELIBERATE MISSTATEMENT, MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL OMISSION.

Those convicted of one count of mortgage fraud face punishment in accordance with a Class 4 felony.  Anyone convicted of engaging in a pattern of mortgage fraud could be convicted of a Class 2 felony


CERVANTES OPINION CONTAINS ERROR ON MERS’ LEGAL TITLE

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SEE CERVANTES 9TH CIRCUIT OPINION

DISTINCTION BETWEEN LENDER AND BENEFICIARY ROOT OF MESS

DARREL BLOMBERG points out that the 9th Circuit might be just as confused as trial judges about MERS. The Court acknowledges in the opinion that MERS owns nothing and in fact is intended to own nothing, acting merely as a placeholder for whatever entity is eventually “designated” by unknown players in the securitization game. Yet at page 16985, the court’s opinion contains the following paragraph:

“At the origination of the loan, MERS is designated in the deed of trust as a nominee for the lender and the lender’s “successors and assigns,” and as the deed’s “beneficiary” which holds legal title to the security interest conveyed. If the lender sells or assigns the beneficial interest in the loan to another MERS member, the change is recorded only in the MERS database, not in county records, because MERS con- tinues to hold the deed on the new lender’s behalf. If the ben- eficial interest in the loan is sold to a non-MERS member, the transfer of the deed from MERS to the new lender is recorded in county records and the loan is no longer tracked in the MERS system.”

Darrel’s point is that the court is confused, if it is reporting that MERS or any actual beneficiary is the holder of any title. The Deed of Trust is signed by the homeowner and vests title in a Trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary. If the beneficiary were the actual recipient of title, the non-judicial power of sale would be inapplicable. In order for non-judicial sale to occur, there MUST be an intervening “objective” party that provides some assurance of due diligence to protect the interests of the homeowner and the beneficiary.

It is possible that the Court was merely reporting the scheme of the “lenders” rather than the actuality, but if that is the case, the opinion is unclear. As it stands,  the opinion appears to be saying that the actual title is vested in the named beneficiary. If so, besides the point raised above, the deed on foreclosure would need to be issued and executed by MERS or whatever party was named as beneficiary. Thus the chain of title would be further corrupted by  having an on-record transfer from homeowner to trustee followed by an on-record transfer of title from beneficiary to whomever submitted the “credit bid.”

Darrel is right, I think. And I don’t think it is merely some scrivener’s error. It demonstrates the confusion of even the higher courts of appeal with the entire process of non-judicial sale, a CHOICE that is selected by “lenders” which was intended to be a very narrow window but has now become the greatest escape hatch of all time. Through that window pretender lenders are throwing millions of homes that otherwise could not have been foreclosed because the pretenders were just that — pretenders, who had no interest in the loan, and who had no right to submit a credit bid because they were not the creditor. How could US Bank or BOA et al submit a credit bid on a loan where they were neither the holder nor the owner of the debt, much less both the holder and the owner?

These parties are using non-judicial foreclosure to side-step the due process requirements of Arizona law and the law of other states that allow non-judicial foreclosure. If they truly could prevail in a well-pleaded complaint and prove their case according to established rules of evidence, they undoubtedly would have done so, just to prove that the borrowers’ cries of “foul” were mere technicalities and not based upon the reality that they took out a loan and now don’t want to pay for it. A few cases in each state and the argument would be over. The pretenders are avoiding reality — the one in which THEY are seeking to get a free house.

The 9th Circuit was mistaken in its language quoted above. MERS, or for that matter ANY beneficiary holds an equitable interest, not legal title. They are the beneficiaries of a trust enabled by statute in which the home is the asset, the trustor is the homeowner and the trustee is a party who will hold title until the loan obligation is satisfied. The beneficiary does not hold legal title. It holds no title at all. It is the beneficiary of the trust and is entitled to receive the proceeds of sale should the house be sold to satisfy the loan.

The error quoted here is an example of how the courts are attempting to accommodate the banks and in so doing trying to put their left foot in their right pocket. Adding the name “MERS” adds nothing to the rights of a beneficiary, because to even entertain any other construction would be to violate the enabling non-judicial statute, and violate the due process clauses in the U.S. and State constitutions. Where MERS is named as beneficiary, it has the right to receive the proceeds of sale if the home is sold in foreclosure. The problem is that MERS was intentionally named only as a placeholder (nominee, straw-man) and the deed of trust says so, because it distinguishes between the “lender” and the “beneficiary.”

Nothing in legislative notes in any state that I have researched indicates that this dichotomy between “lender” and “beneficiary” was considered, nor is there anything to suggest it would have been permitted by any of the legislatures if it had been considered. Quite the reverse is true.

The legislative presumption was that the lender and beneficiary were one and the same. The presumption was that non-judicial sale applied in non-adversarial  situations in which it was necessary to conduct a foreclosure sale, the lender was the beneficiary and therefore was also the creditor, and therefore capable of submitting a credit bid and worthy of receiving, without objection from the homeowner, the deed from the foreclosure sale. It is only in this context that enabling statutes for non-judicial sales are constitutional in their construction and application.

Here we have a different situation. MERS specifically disclaims any rights to such proceeds even though it is named as beneficiary. It does so consistent with the new distinction, created outside the enabling statutes for the power of sale, in which there is a  difference between “lender” and beneficiary.” So the “lender” is actually the beneficiary even though MERS is named as beneficiary. Although awkward, this might fly if the lender actually made the loan and was the creditor. But in most cases, the “lender” is also a placeholder. See any of the bankruptcy schedules and orders entered for mortgage originators that were designated as “lenders.”

Thus Cervantes stands on a loose foundation: we have a beneficiary that admits it is not entitled to anything and a lender who in fact is not entitled to anything because it was also just a placeholder for an undisclosed principal. Neither one of them can submit a credit bid and neither one of them has ever possessed the power to instruct the Trustee on the deed of trust to issue the notice of default and notice of sale. The original trustee would obviously have no part of a foreclosure sale in which it was receiving instructions from parties that never appeared on the deed of trust or the chain of title. And that, my friends, is the reason why we have yet another new entry of new terms without meaning: the substitute trustee.

When you think about it, the securitizers were obviously making it up as they went along, which is why there were lawyers who refused to draft any of these documents, because in their own words, they thought it was not just illegal it was probably criminal. By inserting a nominee lender and nominee beneficiary into the transaction without disclosing the principal from whom the loan was obtained and by substituting their own people as trustees, they were assured of grabbing millions of properties while appearing to comply with statutes. They neither complied with statutes nor with the standards of good faith and fairness required under those statutes.

But here is the rub for them which the banks are desperately trying to avoid: in the vast majority of transactions in which a securitized debt was involved, the use of a placeholder, in lieu of a real party in interest, was not just part of the transaction — it was the whole transaction. At the time of execution of the mortgage, there was no real party in interest named or described in the mortgage — the very thing that the legislature of each state meant to avoid when they passed recording statutes.

Thus at the time of execution, the homeowner borrower was being intentionally kept in the dark about the identity of the creditor. In fact, when the mortgage was recorded, the general public was being intentionally kept in the dark about the identity of the creditor. There is no state in which that kind of document gives rise to a valid lien against the property, nor could it. Recording is intended to provide notice to the world that someone has a lien. In the case of nearly all transactions involving securitized debt, the “someone” that had a lien was a fictitious character, like Donald Duck. In all such instances, state law provides that the mortgage  does not attach as a lien.

The promissory note is another story entirely subject to its own problems. Suffice it to say, that if you check with an attorney who is competent and licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located, you will find that your mortgage, while it exists, is not a lien against your property. That might sound like a contradiction in terms, but it is nevertheless true. Thus the obligation you owe, if any, is unsecured. Do not act on this until you consult with counsel.

GAME OVER? VEAL CASE VINDICATES EVERY POINT REPORTED ON LIVINGLIES

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NEIL GARFIELD, GARFIELD CONTINUUM SEMINARS, LIVINGLIES VINDICATED IN FULL

NO MERIT TO FORECLOSURE ACTIONS, PAST PRESENT OR FUTURE UNLESS THE REAL CREDITOR IS PRESENT.

BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTS TO PRETENDERS

57568003-IN-RE-VEAL-w

  1. “IN THIS CASE, ONE COMPONENT OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING IS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE. IT IS THE DOCTRINE THAT A PLAINTIFF MUST ASSERT ITS OWN LEGAL RIGHTS AND MAY NOT ASSERT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS. SPRINT, 554 U.S. AT 589; WARTH, 422 AT 499; OREGON V LEGAL SERVS. CORP, 552 F. 3D 965, 971 (9TH CIR., 2009).

  2. “Civil Rule 17(a)(1) starts simply: “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest… The modern function  of the rule… is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the Judgement will have its proper effect as res judicata.”

  3. “The party asserting it has standing bears the burden of proof to establish standing. Sumers v Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)

  4. “Real party in interest analysis requires a determination of the applicable substantive law, since it is that law which defines and specifies the wrong, those aggrieved, and the redress they may receive. 6A Federal practice and Procedure sec 1543 at 480-481

ILLUSION OF SECURITIZATION IS FALLING APART

COLLATERAL BENEFIT TO HOMEOWNER

RESULTING FROM DEFECTS IN PRETENDER LENDER CASE

IS NOT A REASON TO RULE AGAINST THE HOMEOWNER-BORROWER

In a decision filed June 10, 2011 — one year after oral argument — the BAP carefully analyzed the position of the borrower and the alleged creditor and came up with nothing to support the allegations that there was a creditor in the room. Standing being a jurisdictional issue wiped out AHMSI and Wells Fargo.

This one is for publication, which means it is controlling precedent for all bankruptcy Judges in the Ninth Circuit. In a nutshells, the claim of “holder” is not enough, even for a motion to lift stay where the burden is extremely light. Thanks to a growing number of bankruptcy lawyers who understand these issues and thanks to their skill in presenting it, Bankruptcy Judges are realizing two things (1) lifting the stay is misused by the movant by creating the appearance that the merits of the case have already been heard and decided and therefore are engraved in stone under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and (2) nipping abuse of process in the bud is the proper way for the courts to handle the pretender lenders.

It is very clear that this represents a sea change in the judicial attitude toward the pretender lenders. The documents don’t add up. So if anyone wants to come in to a court alleging that they can foreclose on the property or collect on the debt, they need to have real evidence which means live witnesses testifying under oath that they have personal knowledge and can authenticate the documents and other evidence proffered by the pretenders. These people don’t exist.

The bottom line is that there is no claim, an objection to the proof of claim will obviously be upheld in view of this ruling, and the homeowner is going to get their home free and clear of any encumbrances or debts unless the real creditor shows up — which is unlikely since the investors are busy suing the investment banks that sold them the bogus mortgage bonds.

LAWYERS ARE SHARPENING UP THEIR PENCILS GETTING READY TO FILE MOTIONS FOR REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION IN AND OUT OF BANKRUPTCY COURT.

QUOTES FROM THE CASE:

“We hold that that a party has standing to seek relief from stay if it has a property interest in, or is entitled to enforce or pursue remedies related thereto, teh secured obligation that forms the basis of its motion.”

“We hold that a party has standing to prosecute a proof of claim involving a negotiable promissory note secured by real property if, under applicable law, it is a “person entitled to enforce the note” as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code.”

“The Dorchuck letter is just that; a letter, and nothing more. Mr. Dorchuck does not declare that his statements are made under penalty of perjury, nor does the document bear any other traditional elements of admissible evidence.”

“No basis was laid for authenticating or otherwise admitting the Dorchuck letter into evidence at any of the hearings in this matter.”

“Wells Fargo presented no evidence as to who possessed the note and no evidence regarding any property interest it held in the Note.”

“the purported assignment from Option One to Wells Fargo does not contain language affecting the assignment of the note. While the Note is referred to, that reference serves only to identify the mortgage. Moreover, the record is devoid of any indorsement of the Note from Option One to Wells Fargo. As a consequence, even had the second assignment been considered as evidence, it would not have provided any proof of the transfer of the note to Wells Fargo. At most, it would have been proof that only the mortgage, and all associated rights arising from it, had been assigned.”

“given the carve out of the Note at the beginning… the relative pronouns “therein”, “thereto” and thereon” more naturally refer back to the obligations contained in the mortgage, such as the the obligation to insure the property, and not to an external obligation such as the Note…. Although the clauses might be sufficiently vague to permit parol evidence to clarify their intended meaning, no such evidence was offered or requested.”
“STANDING  is a threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”

“Prudential standing ” ’embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'” Spring, 554 U.S. at 289 (quoting Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11); County of Kern F. 3d at 845.

“IN THIS CASE, ONE COMPONENT OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING IS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE. IT IS THE DOCTRINE THAT A PLAINTIFF MUST ASSERT ITS OWN LEGAL RIGHTS AND MAY NOT ASSERT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS. SPRINT, 554 U.S. AT 589; WARTH, 422 AT 499; OREGON V LEGAL SERVS. CORP, 552 F. 3D 965, 971 (9TH CIR., 2009).

“Civil Rule 17(a)(1) starts simply: “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest… The modern function  of the rule… is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the Judgement will have its proper effect as res judicata.”

“The party asserting it has standing bears the burden of proof to establish standing. Sumers v Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)

“Real party in interest analysis requires a determination of the applicable substantive law, since it is that law which defines and specifies the wrong, those aggrieved, and the redress they may receive. 6A Federal practice and Procedure sec 1543 at 480-481

GOLDMAN SACHS HIT WITH MORE SUBPOENAS ON ABACUS DEALS

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Investigations Launched on Wrongdoing Despite “Settlements”

EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: Maybe there actually is some understanding starting to surface at U.S. regulator’s offices. Certainly the activity in EURO-land shows that our friends across the pond don’t buy the excuses or spin that Goldman and others have been spitting out through their control of key government figures and the media. It is unusual for a case to get “settled” and then still be the subject of investigations. It indicates that regulators are coming into information from whistle-blowers and old-style investigation work that indicates that Goldman’s wrongdoing was not just a civil matter.

Anyone who can get a copy of these subpoenas should send them in to this blog as it will assist everyone in discovery and analysis of their own situation.

The inevitable conclusion here is that the moment pen was put to paper, and the moment that investors transferred funds to the investment bank for purchase of bogus mortgage bonds both the investment and the “loan” were absolutely intended to fail — it was the only way they could make the ungodly amounts of money that were drained out of the U.S. economy.

By process of elimination and recruiting whistle-blowers, the agencies are recognizing the signs of an intentional act, where the loan was intentionally created in defective and deceptive ways, and where the investor’s money was lost the moment he parted with it. The real parties in interest here are the investor-lenders and the homeowner-borrowers. They ALL lost money while the intermediary investment banks mysteriously made tons of money while claiming losses from bad mortgages.

Simple logic tells us that Wall Street’s story can’t be true. If the investment banks lost money from holding toxic assets then there was no securitization — i.e.., the loans were never actually sold, which is what we have been saying here. If that is true, then the investment banks were the lenders, which is exactly opposite from the truth, since we know the money came from investors. If the money came from investors then the investment banks were not the lenders and therefore could not have suffered any loss from unpaid mortgages.

The problem is compounded by the fact that the pools were never filled with assets because transfers were never made. And the transfers were never made because the paper was bad to begin with — the original loans documents described a loan transaction that never took place. And the original loan transaction that DID take place was undocumented in which the borrower was shown one set of documents while the lender was shown a completely different set of documents, neither of which actually described the relationship between the investor-lender and the homeowner-borrower.

As this unravels, Goldman, BOA, Citi, JPM, Chase et al are going to face some tough, unanswerable questions. Where’s the beef?

Goldman Discloses More Subpoenas

By SUSANNE CRAIG

7:02 p.m. | Updated

Goldman Sachs’s mortgage problems are far from over.

The Wall Street investment bank paid $550 million last year to settle a civil fraud suit brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which accused Goldman Sachs of creating a mortgage product that was intended to fail.

On Tuesday, the firm disclosed in a regulatory filing that it had received more subpoenas related to that mortgage product, Abacus 2007-AC1, and other collateralized debt obligations that it made during the housing boom.

Goldman has previously revealed that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and the Financial Services Authority in Britain are looking into Abacus. The firm said on Tuesday that it had received subpoenas from other unnamed regulators in connection to Abacus and other C.D.O.’s. In a filing in late March, the firm disclosed only that it had received requests for information from unnamed regulators. A subpoena is a more serious step.

The Abacus matter is one of the darkest chapters in Goldman’s 142-year history — the first time that the firm has been accused of fraud. Last July, the bank settled the S.E.C. charges without admitting or denying guilt.

News of the subpoena came in a quarterly filing in which Goldman cut its estimated losses from legal claims by 21 percent. The bank said its “reasonably possible” losses from lawsuits were $2.7 billion at the end of March, down from $3.4 billion at the end of 2010.

This number declined after a handful of major settlements. In one such case, Goldman was among several underwriters of securities offerings by Washington Mutual that were sued in 2008, accused of failing to accurately describe the bank’s exposure to the mortgage market.

Federal regulators seized Washington Mutual in September 2008, making it the biggest bank failure in American history.

Goldman also disclosed on Tuesday that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission was investigating the firm’s role as clearing broker for an unnamed S.E.C.-registered broker-dealer. The firm said it had been “orally advised” that regulators intended to “recommend that the C.F.T.C. bring aiding and abetting, civil fraud and supervision-related charges” against the Goldman unit related to its provision of clearing services to this broker-dealer.

According to the filing, the commission said Goldman knew or should have known that the client’s subaccounts maintained at the firm’s unit “were actually accounts belonging to customers of the broker-dealer client and not the client’s proprietary accounts.”

Neither Goldman nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission would comment on the case.

Wall Street clearing businesses often find themselves in the sights of regulators. The firms handle billions of dollars in trades and sometimes the clients turn out to be swindlers. Defrauded investors often demand that firms that clear trades for these companies be held accountable. The Wall Street banks assert that their job is simply to clear trades, not police the clients.

In its regulatory filing, Goldman also disclosed that it lost money on just one trading day in the first quarter. And the firm had 32 days when it posted trading revenue of more than $100 million, the filing shows. It is not known on which day Goldman lost money, but the loss was $25 million to $50 million.

After difficult markets took a bite out of profit in the fourth quarter, the first quarter was one of Goldman’s best for trading in a while.

In terms of trading days, it was the best since the first quarter of 2010, when there were no days where Goldman posted a negative trading day. In the period a year earlier, Goldman recorded 35 days when trading revenue exceeded $100 million and it had no day when trading revenue dipped below $25 million.

Shack; JPM, Trustee Lacks Standing, Vacates Foreclosure

The true answer is that securitization is a process that is still on going and not an event.The Real Party in Interest (and the real amount of principal due, if any) is in a state of flux hidden by obscure, hidden or “confidential documentation.” Don’t make it your problem to unravel it. Use your strength to force THEM to prove their claim whether it is in a judicial or non-judicial proceeding.

Editor’s Comment: In case you haven’t noticed, this case, along with some others I’ve heard about but not received, closes the loop. The Pretender Lenders have now tried to use all the major parties and some of the minor parties in foreclosures and when tested have failed to prove standing. standing is a jurisdictional matter and it basically boils down to “You don’t belong here, you have no rights to enforce, you have no interest in this litigation, so get out of here and don’t come back.”

They tried MERS, Servicers, Foreclosure Specialty processors, Trustees, originating “lenders” and they come up empty. why because they are all intermediaries and as Judge Holloway put it, the note is not payable to them, the mortgage does not secure them, the obligation is not due to them and therefore they can’t proceed. In non-judicial states they get around this requirement unless the homeowner brings suit.

So who is the real party in interest? See the Fordham Law Review article posted on this blog more than two years ago “Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand Up.”

The answer isn’t easy, but the strategy is very simple — don’t accept responsibility for the narrative or you will be taking on the burden of proof in THEIR case. They have the information and you don’t. The true answer is that securitization is a process that is still on going and not an event. The Real Party in Interest (and the real amount of principal due, if any) is in a state of flux hidden by obscure, hidden or “confidential documentation. Don’t make it your problem to unravel it. Use your strength to force THEM to prove their claim whether it is in a judicial or non-judicial proceeding.

The real reason for them NOT simply bringing in the investors who at least WERE parties in interest is multifold:

  • The meeting of the investor with the borrower will result in comparing notes and the fact that not all the money advanced by investors was actually invested in mortgages will be “problematic” for the investment bankers who put this scheme together.
  • The meeting of the investor and borrower could result in an alliance in litigation in which the shell game would be impossible.
  • The meeting of the investor and the borrower could result in a settlement that cuts the servicers and other intermediaries out of the gravy train of servicing fees, foreclosures with rigged bids, etc.
  • The conflict of interest between the intermediaries and the investors might become evident, and lead to further litigation both from the investors and the SEC, state attorneys general and Department of Justice.
  • The investment vehicle (the “trust” or Special Purpose Vehicle) might have been dissolved with the investors paid off and/or with the “assets” resecuritized into a new BBB rated vehicle. This could lead to the nuclear question: what if any, is the balance due in principal on this OBLIGATION. Warning: If you let the narrative shift to the NOTE (which is merely evidence of the obligation) you risk being entrapped by the simple question “Did you make your payments under this note?” This immediately puts you on the defensive BEFORE they have established THEIR case. Since THEY are the party seeking affirmative relief, THEY should establish the foundation first.
  • And the last thing that comes to my mind is the last thing anyone wants to hear — was this obligation satisfied in whole or in part by third party payments through credit enhancements or federal bailout?

Hon. Arthur M. Schack does it again!

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v George

2010 NY Slip Op 50786(U)
Decided on May 4, 2010

Supreme Court, Kings County
Schack, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 4, 2010
Supreme Court, Kings County

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-AR4, Plaintiff,

against

Gertrude George, IVY MAY JOHNSON, GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, DANIEL S. PERLMAN, et. al., Defendants.

10865/06

Plaintiff– JP Morgan Chase Bank
Steven J Baum, PC
Amherst NY

Defendant– Gertrude George
Edward Roberts, Esq.
Brooklyn NY

Defendant– Ivy Mae Johnson
Precious L. Williams, Esq.
Brooklyn NY

Arthur M. Schack, J.

_______________________________________________

Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the order to show cause of defendant IVY MAE JOHNSON, to vacate the January 16, 2008 judgment of foreclosure and sale for the premises located at 47 Rockaway Parkway, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4600, Lot 55, County of Kings), pursuant to CPLR Rule 5015 (a) (4), because plaintiff, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-AR4, lacked standing to commence the instant action and thus, the Court never had jurisdiction, is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, the instant complaint of plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-AR4 for the foreclosure on the premises located at 47 Rockaway Parkway, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4600, Lot 55, County of Kings) is dismissed with prejudice.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

ENTER

___________________________

Hon. Arthur M. SchackJ. S. C..

ID THEFT: Example of one person’s response

Editors’ Note: In response to my post on ID THEFT I received a number of comments and ideas. Here is one example of how someone stuck to the message and forced the issue using ID theft as a defensive tactic as well as preparing for an offensive response.

Are you reading my mind?
Out of the blue in Oct. Got a letter with my mortgage company letterhead stating “welcome to new mortgage company”. Said they changed their name. Separate letter said on Nov 6. stop making payments to them by their name and Nov. 7 start making payments to them by new name.
I know about contracts so I attempted to not contract with new name. It’s been a disaster.

1. No assignment 5 months out, in the Official Real Estate Records.
2. Real Trustee still holds title. I contacted him, but he only represents the beneficiary ‘who has the note and an interest secured in the home”.
3. Checked all three credit reports, 5 months out. Two show old name one show new name all have the same info. I disputed new name in the credit report that had it – stating I didn’t know them.
4. I disputed old name in another credit report since they are no longer exist to force identification of who is updating that report. Got copies of all.
4. Checked SEC filings. Investors bought the first name corporation in 2008. Then on Nov. 6, 2009 they merged the bank into their business. That explains why they said to stop paying one name.
5. Foreclosures under old name on file in Deed of Trust has been without assignment or transfer filings. Using Substitute Trustee. Three problems. Original Trustee still holds title. I already wrote him and know this. Deed of Trust on file has no provision for Substituting the Trustee. By virtue of the ‘merger’ they should have the original documents.
6. Spent 5 months asking them to validate their claim. They send a copy of the Certified copy of my Deed of Trust on file in the public (that does not name them), and a copy of a Certified copy of the Promissory note (that does not name them). Two problems They can’t attach to the Deed of Trust without assignment..name change or not…their name is ‘not’ the named Lender nor beneficiary in the Deed of Trust. And the Promissory Note was made out to a specific entity. You can’t possibly assume that I have to know that when you sell it, they can come up and say ‘pay me’ when the promissory note is supposed to be held by the person you promised to pay. If they sell it, that’s a different agreement between them and the other buyer, but I can’t be forced into their third party agreement as long as I agree to pay you..you stay right there and let me pay you..but don’t force me to pay someone I did not ‘promise to pay’.
7. They’ve hired a law firm (setting up for a substitute trustee situation). I contacted the firm. (not pro bono, not pro se, no attorney..just me and told them I don’t recognize the other company and I have asked them to validate and they respond with stronger demand for money.) Maybe that’s why I got the ‘copies’ I did get from the mortgage company that does not support their claim.
8. Informed the attorney of their violation of FDCPA by forwarding information to another party and by not disclosing the amount attempted to collect is in dispute.
9. I wouldn’t trust an attorney at this time. The United States is in Bankruptcy, China filed a lien for 45 Million dollars in December 2009.
10. Have a copy of a Substitute Trustee sale by this company. They never released the lien on the debtor they foreclosed on after the sale. If they had the papers they could have released the lien.
11. Once you admit there is a contract you can’t use Statue of Frauds which helps me because I have refused to contract and have refused to pay and requested validation of their claim of a debt owed to them.
Thinking seriously about filing SEC complaint and sending the ‘Communications, Notice and Order’ to the named person listed in their SEC filing and a copy of that to the law firm listed with the words “With a copy to” – in their SEC filing
My identity has been stolen by the company. When I establish an account with one firm, that does not give a right to another firm to step up and say I have the account, change the name, change the terms of your initial agreement and start paying me now because I have a ‘new name’. How can you have an account demanding payment when there is no agreement and you are really a new entity, not just a new name?
I’m learning about Statute of Frauds. It would also appear that Deceptive Trade Practices can be proven in this mess. A company who has no contract attaches to your credit report as if you’ve established business agreement with them? They have no definition in your Deed of Trust, yet they can get an attorney to represent their interest in your document and start nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. If they have the papers it takes to change the name on the credit report, they should have the papers it takes to file an assignment/transfer and change the name on the Deed of Trust.
I’ve not paid them any money, but I have filed FTC and Attorney General complaints. Not sure if I have to pay the 5 months in arrears as Threat, Duress, and Coercion to get some action done by these public resources I’m using to filing the compliant.

Berating the Raters and Appraisers

“of AAA-rated subprime-mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006, 93 percent — 93 percent! — have now been downgraded to junk status.”

Editor’s Note: What homeowners and their lawyers, forensic analysts, and experts need to realize is that the ratings scam on Wall street was only one-half of the equation in a scheme to defraud homeowners. If you don’t understand how an appraisal of a home is the same thing as the rating of the security that was sold to fund the home, then you are missing the point and the opportunity to do something meaningful for borrowers.

TILA and Reg Z make it clear that the LENDER is responsible for verification of the appraisal. The LENDER is responsible for viability of the loan, NOT THE BORROWER. IT’S THE LAW! Instead the media and Wall Street PR and lobbyists are drumming a myth into our heads — that 20 million homeowners with securitized loans cooked up a scheme to get a free house. Where did they meet?

We have ample evidence that the entire scheme depended upon reasonable reliance upon those who were in fact not reliable and who were lying to us. If you bought a house for $600,000, the odds are:

  • the house was actually worth less than $400,000
  • the appraiser put the value at $620,000
  • the rating agency called it a triple AAA loan
  • you thought the house was worth what you were paying
  • the house is now worth $300,000
  • your mortgage is at least $500,000
  • Even if you can afford the payments, you will not be able to sell your home for more than the amount owed on it until at least 15-18 years have passed.
  • You will not be able to sell your home for what you paid for at least another 25-30 years, and that is only with the help of inflation
  • Counting inflation, you will never sell your home for what you paid for it or the amount you thought it was worth when you refinanced it

Besides obvious violations of federal and state lending statutes it is pure common law fraud. You are now faced with options that go from bad to worse, UNLESS you sue the people who caused this and your lawyer understands the basic economics of securitization. Your opposition knows all of this. That is why the cases, for the most part ,never get to trial. These cases are won or lost in demanding discovery, enforcing your demands, and relentless pursuit of the truth.

REGISTER NOW FOR DISCOVERY AND MOTION PRACTICE WORKSHOP MAY 23-24

April 26, 2010
Op-Ed Columnist

Berating the Raters

Let’s hear it for the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Its work on the financial crisis is increasingly looking like the 21st-century version of the Pecora hearings, which helped usher in New Deal-era financial regulation. In the past few days scandalous Wall Street e-mail messages released by the subcommittee have made headlines.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that most of the headlines were about the wrong e-mails. When Goldman Sachs employees bragged about the money they had made by shorting the housing market, it was ugly, but that didn’t amount to wrongdoing.

No, the e-mail messages you should be focusing on are the ones from employees at the credit rating agencies, which bestowed AAA ratings on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of dubious assets, nearly all of which have since turned out to be toxic waste. And no, that’s not hyperbole: of AAA-rated subprime-mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006, 93 percent — 93 percent! — have now been downgraded to junk status.

What those e-mails reveal is a deeply corrupt system. And it’s a system that financial reform, as currently proposed, wouldn’t fix.

The rating agencies began as market researchers, selling assessments of corporate debt to people considering whether to buy that debt. Eventually, however, they morphed into something quite different: companies that were hired by the people selling debt to give that debt a seal of approval.

Those seals of approval came to play a central role in our whole financial system, especially for institutional investors like pension funds, which would buy your bonds if and only if they received that coveted AAA rating.

It was a system that looked dignified and respectable on the surface. Yet it produced huge conflicts of interest. Issuers of debt — which increasingly meant Wall Street firms selling securities they created by slicing and dicing claims on things like subprime mortgages — could choose among several rating agencies. So they could direct their business to whichever agency was most likely to give a favorable verdict, and threaten to pull business from an agency that tried too hard to do its job. It’s all too obvious, in retrospect, how this could have corrupted the process.

And it did. The Senate subcommittee has focused its investigations on the two biggest credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; what it has found confirms our worst suspicions. In one e-mail message, an S.& P. employee explains that a meeting is necessary to “discuss adjusting criteria” for assessing housing-backed securities “because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.” Another message complains of having to use resources “to massage the sub-prime and alt-A numbers to preserve market share.” Clearly, the rating agencies skewed their assessments to please their clients.

These skewed assessments, in turn, helped the financial system take on far more risk than it could safely handle. Paul McCulley of Pimco, the bond investor (who coined the term “shadow banks” for the unregulated institutions at the heart of the crisis), recently described it this way: “explosive growth of shadow banking was about the invisible hand having a party, a non-regulated drinking party, with rating agencies handing out fake IDs.”

So what can be done to keep it from happening again?

The bill now before the Senate tries to do something about the rating agencies, but all in all it’s pretty weak on the subject. The only provision that might have teeth is one that would make it easier to sue rating agencies if they engaged in “knowing or reckless failure” to do the right thing. But that surely isn’t enough, given the money at stake — and the fact that Wall Street can afford to hire very, very good lawyers.

What we really need is a fundamental change in the raters’ incentives. We can’t go back to the days when rating agencies made their money by selling big books of statistics; information flows too freely in the Internet age, so nobody would buy the books. Yet something must be done to end the fundamentally corrupt nature of the the issuer-pays system.

An example of what might work is a proposal by Matthew Richardson and Lawrence White of New York University. They suggest a system in which firms issuing bonds continue paying rating agencies to assess those bonds — but in which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the issuing firm, determines which rating agency gets the business.

I’m not wedded to that particular proposal. But doing nothing isn’t an option. It’s comforting to pretend that the financial crisis was caused by nothing more than honest errors. But it wasn’t; it was, in large part, the result of a corrupt system. And the rating agencies were a big part of that corruption.

Wells Fargo, Option One, American Home Mortgage Relationship

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. appears in many ways including as servicer (America Servicing Company), Trustee (although it does not appear to be qualified as a “Trust Company”), as claimed beneficiary, as Payee on the note, as beneficiary under the title policy, as beneficiary under the property and liability insurance, and it may have in actuality acted as a mortgage broker without getting licensed as such.

In most securitized loan situations, Wells Fargo appears with the word “BANK” used, but it acted neither as a commercial nor investment bank in the deal. Sometimes it acted as a commercial bank meaning it processed a deposit and withdrawal, sometimes (rarely, perhaps 3-4% of the time) it did act as a lender, and sometimes it acted as a securities underwriter or co-underwriter of asset backed securities.

It might also be designated as “Depositor” which in most cases means that it performed no function, received no money, disbursed no money and neither received, stored, handled or transmitted any documentation despite third party documentation to the contrary.

In short, despite the sue of the word “BANK”, it was not acting as a bank in any sense of the word within the securitization chain. However, it is the use of the word “BANK” which connotes credibility to their role in the transaction despite the fact that they are not, and never were a creditor. The obligation arose when the funds were advanced for the benefit of the homeowner. But the pool from which those funds were advanced came from investors who purchased certificates of asset backed securities. Those investors are the creditors because they received a certificate containing three promises: (1) repayment of principal non-recourse based upon the payments by obligors under the terms of notes and mortgages in the pool (2) payment of interest under the same conditions and (3) the conveyance of a percentage ownership in the pool, which means that collectively 100% of the ivnestors own 100% of the the entire pool of loans. This means that the “Trust” does NOT own the pool nor the loans in the pool. It means that the “Trust” is merely an operating agreement through which the ivnestors may act collectively under certain conditions.  The evidence of the transaction is the note and the mortgage or deed of trust is incident to the transaction. But if you are following the money you look to the obligation. In most  transactions in which a residential loan was securitized, Wells Fargo did not work under the scope of its bank charter. However it goes to great lengths to pretend that it is acting under the scope of its bank charter when it pursues foreclosure.

Wells Fargo will often allege that it is the holder of the note. It frequently finesses the holder in due course confrontation by this allegation because of the presumption arising out of its allegation that it is the holder. In fact, the obligation of the homeowner is not ever due to Wells Fargo in a securitized residential note and mortgage or deed of trust. The allegation of “holder” is disingenuous at the least. Wells Fargo is not and never was the creditor although ti will claim, upon challenge, to be acting within the scope and course of its agency authority; however it will fight to the death to avoid producing the agency agreement by which it claims authority. remember to read the indenture or prospectus or pooling and service agreement all the way to the end because these documents are created to give an appearance of propriety but they do not actually support the authority claimed by Wells Fargo.

Wells Fargo often claims to be Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-6, c/o American Home Mortgage, 4600 Regent Blvd., Suite 200, P.O. Box 631730, Irving, Texas 75063-1730. Both Option One and American Home Mortgage were usually fronts (sham) entities that were used to originate loans using predatory, fraudulent and otherwise illegal loan practices in violation of TILA, RICO and deceptive lending practices. ALL THREE ENTITIES — WELLS FARGO, OPTION ONE AND AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A SINGLE JOINT ENTERPRISE ABUSING THEIR BUSINESS LICENSES AND CHARTERS IN MOST CASES.

WELLS FARGO-OPTION ONE-AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE IS OFTEN REPRESENTED BY LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, more specifically Susana E. Lykins. They list their address as P.O. Box 5480, Cincinnati, Oh 45201-5480, Telephone 513-241-3100, Fax 513-241-4094. Their actual street address is 120 East Fourth Street, Suite 800 Cincinnati, OH 45202. Documents purporting to be assignments within the securitization chain may in fact be executed by clerical staff or attorneys from that firm using that address. If you are curious, then pick out the name of the party who executed your suspicious document and ask to speak with them after you call the above number.

Ms. Lykins also shows possibly as attorney for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. as well as Robert B. Blackwell, at 620-624 N. Main street, Lima, Ohio 45801, 419-228-2091, Fax 419-229-3786. He also claims an office at 2855 Elm Street, Lima, Ohio 45805

Kathy Smith swears she is “assistant secretary” for American Home Mortgage as servicing agent for Wells Fargo Bank. Yet Wells shows its own address as c/o American Home Mortgage. No regulatory filing for Wells Fargo acknowledges that address. Ms. Smith swears that Wells Fargo, Trustee is the holder of the note even though she professes not to work for them. Kathy Smith’s signature is notarized by Linda Bayless, Notary Public, State of Florida commission# DD615990, expiring November 19, 2010. This would indicate that despite the subject property being in Ohio, Kathy Smith, who presumably works in Texas, had her signature notarized in Florida or that the Florida Notary exceeded her license if she was in Texas or Ohio or wherever Kathy Smith was when she allegedly executed the instrument.

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