1099-C Received from “Servicer”

Posted on December 26, 2018 by Neil Garfield

My personal take on this is that borrowers who receive this form for “forgiveness of debt” should probably send a letter or form of contest to the IRS stating the objection to the filing of the 1099-C. The objection or contest should state, in most cases, that this has been filed by a party who had no right, title or interest in the loan and that the form is not indicative of any final resolution of the debt, which is owned by third parties unrelated to the filer.

One of  my favorite legal research firms just published a short blurb on the subject:

The Lawletter Vol 43 No 7 Charlene Hicks—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

To date, no consensus has been reached among courts throughout the United States on the question as to whether a creditor’s issuance of an IRS Form 1099-C results in the extinguishment of the reported debt in favor of the debtor. Form 1099-C bears the title “Cancellation of Debt,” and, according to the IRS, a creditor should issue this form to the debtor for any year in which a debt is cancelled. Depending on the state in which the debtor resides, a creditor’s issuance of a Form 1099-C may have the effect of barring further collection efforts and of completely discharging the reported debt.             The two divergent approaches taken by courts on this issue result in opposite outcomes. The majority approach is illustrated by the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2013).

Read more at: http://www.nlrg.com/legal-content/the-lawletter

My opinion is this: if the filer had no right to collect or enforce it follows that it had no right to cancel the debt. This ploy is enabling hundreds of companies to take tax deductions costing taxpayers billions of dollars. Meanwhile recipients of these fabricated forms with false information are stuck wondering whether they now owe tax on debt forgiveness. I think they don’t owe anything and that after they file a letter of protest or objection, the false income on the 1099-C should be ignored.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , | 9 Comments »

9th Circuit: Assignment in Breach of PSA is Voidable not Void. Here is why they are wrong

Posted on June 21, 2017 by Neil Garfield

The thousands of trial court and appellate decisions that have hung their hat on illegal assignments being “voidable” demonstrates either a lack of understanding of common law business trusts or an adherence to a faulty doctrine in which homeowners pay the price for fraudulent bank activities.

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see Turner v Wells Fargo

Some of the problems might be in the presentation of evidence, failures to object and failure to move to strike evidence or testimony. But most of it deals with the inability of lawyers and the Courts to pierce the veil of uncertainty and complexity with which the banks have covered their fraudulent tracks.

Here are the reasons the assignment might be void. No self-serving newly invented doctrine can overcome the failure of an illegal assignment.

  1. Common Law Trusts are almost always formed under New York State law that allows unregistered trusts to be created for business purposes. Any act in contravention of the express provisions of the trust instrument (usually the Pooling and Servicing Agreement) is void, not voidable. It cannot be revived through ratification — especially when there is nobody around to change the trust instrument, thus ratifying the void act.
  2. Many if not most assignments are fabricated for foreclosure and either nonexistent or backdated to avoid the fact that the assignment is void when it is fabricated — years after the so-called trust was described in a trust instrument that is rarely complete because no mortgage loan schedule at the time of the drafting of what is in most cases an incomplete trust instrument.
  3. Assignments are clearly void and not entitled to any presumptions under the UCC if they are dated after the loan was declared in default (albeit by a party who had no right to declare a default much less enforce the debt or obtain a forced sale of homestead and other residential properties) schedule existed at the time of the drafting of the trust instrument. The application of UCC presumptions after the alleged date of default is simply wrong.
  4. The fact that an instrument COULD be ratified does not mean that it WAS ratified. What is before the court is an illegal act that has not been ratified. The possibility that the parties to the trust instrument (trustor, trustee, beneficiaries) could change the instrument to allow the illegal act AND apply it retroactively is merely speculative — and against all legal doctrine and common sense. These courts are ruling on the possibility of a nonexistent act that without analysis of the trust instrument, is declared to be possibly subject to “ratification.”
  5. Assuming the trust even exists on paper does not mean that it ever entered into an actual transaction in which it acquired the “loan” which means the debt, note and mortgage.
  6. Any “waiver” or “ratification” would result in the loss of REMIC status under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code. No rational beneficiary would ratify the act of accepting even a performing loan after the cutoff period. To do so would change the nature of the trust from a REMIC vehicle entitled to pass through tax treatment. Hence even if the beneficiaries were entitled to change, alter, amend or modify the trust instrument they would be firing a tax bullet into their own heads.  Every penny received by a beneficiary would be then be taxed as ordinary income including return of principal.
  7. No rational beneficiary would be willing to change the trust instrument from accepting only properly underwritten performing loans to loans already declared in default.
  8. No Trustee, or beneficiary has the power to change the terms of the trust or to ratify an illegal act.
  9. In fact the trust instrument specifically prohibits the trustee and beneficiaries from knowing or even asking about the status of loans in the trust. Under what reasonable scenario could anyone even know that they were getting a non-performing loan outside the 90 day cutoff period.
  10. The very act of introducing the possibility of ratification where none exists under the trust instrument is the adjudication of rights of senior investors who are not present in court nor given notice of its proceeding. Such decisions are precedent for other defenses and claims in which the trust instrument could be changed to the detriment of the beneficiaries.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

Are Servicer Advances Deductible Expenses for Homeowners?

Posted on December 18, 2013 by Neil Garfield

Many homeowners get tax statements from entities claiming the right to file them, with an EIN that is problematic. We are having trouble linking the EIN with the name of the entity that sends the tax statement. More importantly or perhaps of equal importance is the question raised by individual homeowners and investors who have purchased multiple residential units and operate them as a business, renting them out as landlords.

Despite my degree and experience in taxation, my knowledge is out of date on this subject. Nobody should take any action based upon this article without consulting a qualified tax professional. This article is for information purposes only. However, I pose the issue for those who do know, to comment on the following scenarios:

First in the homeowner who owns his single family residence but who has stopped paying the monthly amount demanded by the Servicer. In those cases where there are Servicer or similar advances, the creditor keeps getting paid the interest due under the bond agreement even though the Servicer is not receiving the interest allegedly due from the alleged borrower under the alleged note. The interesting issue here is whether the homeowner still owes the money to the creditor under the original note and mortgage agreement. As I have previously outlined in recent days the answer is no, the homeowner does not owe that money to the creditor claiming rights under the original borrower loan agreement. That would seem to be a gain. But the party who made such payments appears to have a new claim against the homeowner for contribution or unjust enrichment even though THAT claim is not secured. Thus, it is asserted, the payments were made on behalf of the homeowner in exchange for a claim to recoup the amounts advanced. Hence the conclusion that since the payments were made, the homeowner may deduct the Servicer advances from his income before paying taxes.

Second is the company or person that bought multiple properties and created a business out of them. The same logic applies. They didn’t make payments to the Servicer but the payments of interest were obviously received by the trust beneficiaries like the scenario above. And like the homeowner they are subject to a claim to recoup the money advanced on their behalf producing a new debt, like the above, that is unsecured. That being the case, they ought to be able to deduct the Servicer advances as business expense deductions from the business (rental) income.

If the entities in the alleged securitization chain or cloud oppose this and want the deduction themselves, then they must pick up the other end of the stick — I.e, that the payments they made as Servicer advances are not collectible from the borrower. Hence all such payments would reduce the original debt due the creditor and would not create a new debt due to the party who funded the Servicer advances. That party might be the Servicer as the name implies or it might be actually paid by the broker dealer who sold the mortgage bonds. Either way the creditor would appear to have received the interest income it was expecting under its deal, as presented by the broker dealer. Hence the trust beneficiary would be getting a statement from SOMEBODY stating that they had received the income for tax reporting purposes.

An interesting litigation question is whether the creditors did receive such statements from one of the securitization parties, and whether it can be discovered which party sent the statement and what EIN they used. An interesting tax and discovery question is whether one of the securitization parties took the deduction after paying the creditor and must now have that deduction disallowed — especially if the Servicer advances were taken out of a pool of money supplied by the creditor, which is most probably the case. It seems unlikely that the Servicer would actually be making such advances in such large volumes (where would they get the money?) and it seems equally unlikely that any other party would be digging into their own pockets to make a payment for which they get a dubious claim against a defaulting homeowner.

Perhaps the most interesting point here is that if the party who actually paid the “servicer advances” contests, they are admitting that the creditor received the payments and if they don’t contest it, they might still be admitting to the receipt of payments by the creditor during the pendency of the foreclosure action. The failure to disclose this in the accounting rendered to the court could be argued as fraud and grounds to overturn the foreclosure action, giving rise to an action for damages for wrongful foreclosure. The argument would be along the lines of no default and the ultimate defense of payment.

Filed under: CORRUPTION, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, Servicer, STATUTES, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: , , , , | 8 Comments »

Whistle-Blower Has Anonymity Compromised by IRS Employee Against Large Bank

Posted on September 28, 2012 by Neil Garfield

Editor’s Comment and Analysis: So here we are with trillions in unreported profits resulting from illegal trades. The setting is almost identical to AL  Capone who went to jail for income tax evasion and died there from syphilis.

Based upon information in the public domain and those subject to disclosure through freedom of information laws, a clever guy went to the IRS, identified the bank and told them that the bank made a great deal of money without ever paying taxes, as was clear from their regulatory filings. The whistle-blower gets a percentage of the recovery and his/her name has always been kept strictly confidential. This is the first breach of confidentiality I ever heard of in connection with the IRS whistle-blower program.

The recipient of the information at the IRS was a 59 year old veteran employee who saw this as his “ticket” to a better life. He went to the bank and told them who, what, where and when and presumably collected a bunch of money for the information. The Bank then set out to make life miserable for the whistle-blower and the proceeds from the report might never have been subject to a legitimate claim because the crook or mole in the IRS killed or tried to kill the report.

Fortunately, the IRS as big and lumbering as it is, has checks and balances and the whistle-blower was not without some resources in the media. End result? Both the mole and the Bank are being charged with criminal conspiracy etc., the mole is getting paid and there is an opportunity for enterprising accountants or other people good with numbers to make such claims.

If you want my help in filing claims against any of the mega banks in connection with “trades” on which they profited ) by stealing the money and the house), just call customer service at 520-405-1688 and ask for Danielle. I’ll be happy to split the reward with you — IF you actually do the work. My role is edit, strategize and re-write the allegation. Your role is identify the target and the transactions about which you want to make a report, and to provide some indication that the Bank never reported the income much less paid the taxes.

The fascinating outgrowth of this development, which I have been suggesting for 4 years, is that upon finding that they didn’t report the money as income to the Bank their only possible defense is that they were making money for the investors, and as co-obligors, they had paid, in fact overpaid the mortgage bond and therefore overpaid the promissory notes for homeowners that thought they had a balance due.

So when the Master Servicer defends against your allegations saying that the transactions are none of your business because the insurance and credit default swaps and federal bailouts were for their own accounts they are admitting to tax evasion. When they defend by saying that they were only a conduit handling the money for the investors, they are admitting to receipt of payment of the obligations.

Former IRS Examiner Charged With Leaking Whistleblower’s Name To Big Bank Target
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/09/27/former-irs-examiner-charged-with-leaking-whistleblowers-name-to-big-bank-target/

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , | 10 Comments »

Turning the Tide Toward Borrowers

Posted on June 4, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

Nocera and several other responsible journalists have finally reached the point of taking a larger perspective than the narrow myths perpetuated by Wall Street. Wall Street would have us believe that they took bad risks and “made mistakes” causing the financial collapse. His point is the Justice Department has taken after “the smallest of smallest” and he believes that those prosecutions are in lieu of the prosecutions that ought to occur against those who are responsible for setting up a criminal enterprise with the appearance of a conventional business structure.

The problem is easy to describe and difficult to solve.  It is simply true that prosecutions of “small fry” are easier because they don’t have the resources or knowledge necessary to properly defend themselves.  It is equally true that the successful prosecution can be used for public relations purposes to show that a regulating agency or law enforcement is doing its job.

On the other hand prosecution of Jamie Dimon or Lloyd Blankfein would provoke a vigorous defense conducted by dozens of lawyers whose purpose would be to merely poke holes in the prosecutions case rather than proving their clients innocence.  In order to prosecute such people and those close to them, it would be necessary for the regulating agencies and law enforcement to acquire specialized knowledge so that they would know what to investigate and arrive at conclusions as to which violations to prosecute based upon their likelihood of success. 

The solution is obvious.  Since there is no likelihood that most regulatory agencies and most law enforcement agencies would ever be able to mount such a challenge to the Titans of Wall Street, and the political risk of losing such a case would be devastating, they simply must maintain the status quo, which is to say that they should continue the policy of going after “small fry”.  On the other hand if they really want to represent the citizens of their country or their state (or their county), they could appoint a special prosecutor whose payment would be relatively minimal in terms of getting the case started and largely dependent upon the actual payment of fines, penalties, interests, and restitution.  There are at present at least a dozen law firms in the country (including our very own GarfieldFirm.com) who could perform this service under the direction of the Attorney General or county attorney or both.

The only thing that the state would need to provide is space and facilities and perhaps some minimal capital.  To put this in perspective, I made an approach to the appropriate people in government in the state of Arizona in 2008 in that proposal it was my naïvely idealistic presumption that the state would be more than happy to collect taxes, fees, fines, penalties interest etc that were due from out of state residence residing on Wall Street in the state of New York.  Based upon existing AZ law I projected a 10 billion dollar recovery.  Their finance department looked over my analysis and decided I was wrong.  They projected a recovery of 3 billion dollars which as it turns out is exactly the amount of the budget deficit of the state. 

At this point it is fair to say that the risk reward ratio of prosecuting the Titans of Wall Street has reached a point where it is irresistible if it is performed by a special prosecutor who has no ambitions for public office.  In the process, the state would recover not only the taxes, fees, fines, penalties and interest, but the homeowners would be virtually guaranteed some form of restitution based upon the wrongful foreclosures and the trading of their loans and securities whose value was derived from their loans. 

It is well understood and known that we are only halfway through a contest of enormous consequence.  Without appropriate restraints on banking and financial service companies most of the liberties and rights set forth in the founding documents of our country will become meaningless.   Until now the investment banks have been able to control the narrative.  But the facts about their misdeeds and malfeasance are starting to drown out the gigantic Wall Street machine.  I’m not saying that the tide has already turned.  But with the help of readers like you who become proactive and write letters to their attorney generals, county attorneys, and the regulatory agencies demanding such action, the tide will turn earlier rather than later. 

The Mortgage Fraud Fraud

By JOE NOCERA

I got an e-mail the other day from Richard Engle telling me that his son Charlie would be getting out of prison this month. I was happy to hear it.

Charlie’s ordeal isn’t over yet, of course. When he leaves prison on June 20, Charlie, 49, will move temporarily to a halfway house, after which he will be on probation for another five years. And unless he can get the verdict overturned, he will have to spend the rest of his life with a felony on his record.

Perhaps you remember Charlie Engle. I wrote about him not long after he entered a minimum-security facility in Beaver, W.Va., 16 months ago. He’s the poor guy who went to jail for lying on a liar loan during the housing bubble.

There were two things about Charlie’s prosecution that really bothered me. First, he’d clearly been targeted by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service who seemed offended that Charlie was an ultramarathoner without a steady day job. The I.R.S. conducted “Dumpster dives” into his garbage and put a wire on a female undercover agent hoping to find some dirt on him. Unable to unearth any wrongdoing on his tax returns, the I.R.S. discovered he had taken out several subprime mortgages that didn’t require income verification. His income on one of them was wildly inflated. They don’t call them liar loans for nothing.

Charlie has always insisted that he never filled out the loan document — his mortgage broker did it, and he was actually a victim of mortgage fraud. (The broker later pleaded guilty to another mortgage fraud.) Indeed, according to a recent court filing by Charlie’s lawyer, the government failed to turn over exculpatory evidence that could have helped Charlie prove his innocence. For whatever inexplicable reason, prosecutors really wanted to nail Charlie Engle. And they did.

Second, though, it seemed incredible to me that with all the fraud that took place during the housing bubble, the Justice Department was focusing not on the banks that had issued the fraudulent loans, but rather on those who had taken out the loans, which invariably went sour when housing prices fell.

As I would later learn, Charlie Engle was no aberration. The current meme — argued most recently by Charles Ferguson, in his new book “Predator Nation” — is that not a single top executive at any of the firms that nearly brought down the financial system has spent so much as a day in jail. And that is true enough.

But what is also true, and which is every bit as corrosive to our belief in the rule of law, is that the Justice Department has instead taken after the smallest of small fry — and then trumpeted those prosecutions as proof of how tough it is on mortgage fraud. It is a shameful way for the government to act.

“These people thought they were pursuing the American dream,” says Mark Pennington, a lawyer in Des Moines who regularly defends home buyers being prosecuted by the local United States attorney. “Right here in Des Moines,” he said, “there was a big subprime outfit, Wells Fargo Financial. No one there has been prosecuted. They are only going after people who lost their homes after the bubble burst. It’s a scandal.”

The Justice Department has had a tough run recently. Last week, Eric Schneiderman, the New York attorney general — who was recently given a role by President Obama to investigate the mortgage-backed securities issued during the bubble — complained publicly that he wasn’t getting the resources he needed from the Justice Department. And, of course, on Thursday, a federal judge declared a mistrial on five charges of campaign finance fraud and conspiracy in the trial of the former presidential candidate John Edwards.

In the Edwards case, the Justice Department spent tens of millions of dollars, and trotted out novel legal theories, to prosecute a man who was essentially trying to keep people from discovering that he had had a mistress and an out-of-wedlock child. Salacious though it was, the case has zero public import. Yet this same Justice Department isn’t willing to use similar resources — and perhaps even trot out some novel legal theories — to go after the pervasive corporate wrongdoing that gave us the financial crisis and the Great Recession. (I should note that the Justice Department claims that it “will not hesitate” to prosecute any “institution where there is evidence of a crime.”)

Think back to the last time the federal government went after corporate crooks. It was after the Internet bubble. Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay of Enron were prosecuted and found guilty. Bernard Ebbers, the former chief executive of WorldCom, went to jail. Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco was prosecuted and given a lengthy prison sentence. Now recall which Justice Department prosecuted those men.

Amazing, isn’t it? George W. Bush has turned out to be tougher on corporate crooks than Barack Obama.

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Another Ruse: Realtors Gleeful over Equator Short Sale Platform

Posted on May 16, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

Banks have adopted a technology platform to process short sale applications. It is called Equator, presumably to imply that it equates one thing with another, and produces a result that either gives a pass or fail to the application. In theory it is a good thing for those people who want to save their homes, save their credit (up to a point) and move on. In practice it essentially licenses the real estate broker to take control over the negotiations and police the transactions so that the new “network” rules are not violated. This reminds me of VISA and MasterCard who control the payment processing business with the illusion of being a quasi governmental agency. Nothing could be further from the truth, but bankers react to net work threats as though the IRS was after them.

Equator is meant as another layer of illusion to the title problem that realtors and title companies are trying to cover up. The short sale is getting be the most popular form of real estate sale because it is a form of principal reduction where there is some face-saving by the banks and the borrowers. The problem is that while short sales are a legitimate form of workout,  they leave the elephant in the living room undisturbed — short sales approved by banks and servicers who have neither the authority nor the interest in the loan to even be involved except as an agent of Equator but NOT as an agent of the lenders,  if they even exist anymore.

So using the shortsale they get the signature of the borrower as seller which gives them a layer of protection if they are the bank or servicer approving the short-sale. But it fails to cure the title defect, especially in millions of transactions in which Nominees (like MERS and dummy originators) are in the chain of title. 

The true owner of the obligation is a group of investor lenders who appear to have only one thing in common— they all gave money to an investment bank or an affiliate of an investment bank, where it was divided up and put into various accounts, some of which were used to fund mortgages and others were used to pay fees and profits to the investment bank on the closing of the “deal” with the investor lenders. As far as the county recorder is concerned, those deposits and splits are nonexistent. 

The investor lenders were then told that their money was pooled in a “Trust” when no such entity ever existed or was registered to do business and no attempt was made to fund the trust. An unfunded trust is not a trust. This, the investor lenders were told was a REMIC entity.  While a REMIC could have been established it never happened  in the the real world because the only communications between participants in the securitization chain consisted of a spreadsheet describing “closed loans.” Such communications did not include transfer, assignment or even transmittal or delivery of the closing papers with the borrower. Thus as far as the county recorder’s office is concerned, they still knew nothing. Now in the shortsales, they want a stranger the transaction to take the money and run — with no requirement that they establish themselves as creditors and no credible documentation that they are the owner of the loan.

This is another end run around the requirements of basic law in property transactions. They are doing it because our government officials are letting them do it, thus implicitly ratifying the right to foreclose and submit a credit bid without any requirement of proof or even offer of proof.

It gets worse. So we have BOA agreeing to accept dollars in satisfaction of a loan that they have no record of owning. The shortsale seller might still be liable to someone if the banks and servicers continue to have their way with creating false chains of ownership. But the real tragedy is that the shortsale seller is probably getting the shaft on a false premise — I.e, that the mortgage or deed of trust had any validity to begin with. 

The shortsale Buyer is most probably buying a lawsuit along with the house. At some point, the huge gaps in the chain of title are going to cause lawyers in increasing numbers to object to title and demand that it be fixed or that the client be adequately covered by insurance arising from securitizatioin claims. Thus when the shortsale Buyer becomes a seller, that is when the problems will first start to surface.

Realtors understand this analysis whereas buyers from Canada and other places do not understand it. But realtors see shortsales as the salvation to their diminished incomes. Thus most realtors are incentivized to misrepresent the risk factors and the title issues in favor of controlling the buyer and the seller into accepting pre-established criteria published by the members of Equator. It is securitization all over again, it is MERS all over again, it is a further corruption of our title system and it is avoiding the main issue — making the victims of this fraud whole even if it takes every penny the banks have. Realtors who ignore this can expect that they and their insurance carriers will be part of the gang of targeted deep pockets when lawyers smell the blood on the floor and go after the perpetrators.

Latest Changes to The Bank of America Short Sale Process

by Melissa Zavala

When processing short sales, it’s important to know about how each of the lending institutions handles loss mitigation and paperwork processing. If you have done a few short sales in Equator with different lenders, you may see what while your same Equator account is used for all your short sales at all the lending institutions, each of the servicers uses the platforms in a different manner.

Using the Equator system

When processing short sales, it’s important to know about how each of the lending institutions handles loss mitigation and paperwork processing. Many folks already know that Equator is the online platform used by 5 major lenders (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Nationstar, GMAC, and Service One). If you have done a few short sales in Equator with different lenders, you may see what while your same Equator account is used for all your short sales at all the lending institutions, each of the servicers uses the platforms in a different manner.

And, my hat goes off to Bank of America for really raising the bar when it comes to short sale processing online. And, believe me, after processing short sales with Bank of America in 2007, this change is much appreciated.

New Bank of America Short Sale Process

Effective April 13, 2012, Bank of America made a few major changes that may make our short sale processing times more efficient.  The goal of these changes is to make short sale processing through Equator (the Internet-based platform) at Bank of America so efficient that short sale approval can be received in less than one month.

First off, Bank of America now requires their new third party authorization for all short sales being processed through the Equator system. Additionally, the folks at Bank of America will be working to improve task flow for short sales in Equator by making some minor changes to the process.

According to the Bank of America website,

Now you are required to upload five documents (which you can obtain at http://www.bankofamerica.com/realestateagent) for short sales initiated with an offer:

  • Purchase Contract including Buyer’s Acknowledgment and Disclosure
  • HUD-1
  • IRS Form 4506-T
  • Bank of America Short Sale Addendum
  • Bank of America Third-Party Authorization Form

And, now, you will have only 5 days to submit a backup offer if your buyer has flown the coop.

The last change is a curious one, especially for short sale listing agents, since it often takes awhile to find a new buyer after you learn that the current buyer has changed his or her mind.

Short sale listings agents should be familiar with these changes in order to assure that they are providing their client with the most efficient short sale experience possible.


Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 28 Comments »

REMIC VIOLATION: IRS PONDERS $TRILLIONS IN UNREPORTED MBS PROFITS

Posted on December 7, 2011 by Neil Garfield

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EDITOR’S COMMENT: There is little question in my mind that if the IRS persists in this inquiry they will discover $trillions in reported profits on which no tax was paid — intentionally by the persons and companies involved.

Just as importantly, the IRS at some point will thus announce that the REMICS don’t actually own the loans, that if the loans were transferred the investors own them via a taxable partnership rather than a REMIC, and that the handling of the money gave rise to trillions in unreported income — some of which is directly accountable as reductions against principal owed by borrowers but ignored by the banks in their quest to become America’s largest landowner.

The big surprise may come when and if the IRS determines that the partnership includes the intermediaries and not just the investors, which is what we have been saying all along here.

SEE FULL REUTERS ARTICLE AT IRS WEIGHS PENALTIES ON MBS TRUSTS

Exclusive: IRS weighs tax penalties on mortgage securities
By Scot J. Paltrow

WASHINGTON | Wed Apr 27, 2011 4:43pm EDT

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The Internal Revenue Service has launched a review of the tax-exempt status of a widely-held form of mortgage-backed securities called REMICs.

The IRS confirmed to Reuters that the review comes in response to mounting evidence that banks violated tax requirements by mishandling the transfer of mortgages to REMICs, short for Real Estate Mortgage Conduits.

Should the IRS find reason to take tough action, the financial impact could be enormous. REMIC investments are held by pension funds, in individual retirement plans such as 401(k)s and by state and local government entities.

As of the end of 2010, investments in REMICs totaled more than $3 trillion, according to data supplied by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.

In a brief statement in response to questions from Reuters, the agency said: “The IRS is aware of questions in the market regarding REMICs and proper ownership of the underlying mortgages as set out in federal tax law, and is actively reviewing certain aspects of this issue.”

The statement said the IRS would not make any further comment. An IRS spokesman declined to say anything about the extent of the review, or whether the agency is likely to take action.

The review, however, is a sign that the widespread bank misdeeds in home foreclosure cases are spilling over to threaten the interests of investors in mortgage-backed securities. The banks originated the mortgages and packaged them into securities.

These banks’ transgressions, confirmed in court decisions and through recent action by federal bank regulators, include the failure to formally transfer ownership of mortgages to the trusts that invested in them and the subsequent creation of fraudulent mortgage assignments and other false documents.

These investment trusts already have suffered big drops in income because of vast numbers of mortgage defaults after the housing boom collapse. They have been hurt too because in an increasing number of instances they have been blocked by courts from foreclosing on defaulted mortgages. The courts ruled that because the trusts never received the required documents establishing that they owned the mortgages, they have no standing to foreclose.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 36 Comments »

REMIC EVASION of TAXES AND FRAUD

Posted on July 6, 2010 by Neil Garfield

I like this post from a reader in Colorado. Besides knowing what he is talking about, he raises some good issues. For example the original issue discount. Normally it is the fee for the underwriter. But this is a cover for a fee on steroids. They took money from the investor and then “bought” (without any paperwork conveying legal title) a bunch of loans that would produce the receivable income that the investor was looking for.

So let’s look at receivable income for a second and you’ll understand where the real money was made and why I call it an undisclosed tier 2 Yield Spread Premium due back to the borrower, or apportionable between the borrower and the investor. Receivable income consists or a complex maze designed to keep prying eyes from understanding what theya re looking at. But it isn’t really that hard if you take a few hours (or months) to really analyze it.

Under some twisted theory, most foreclosures are proceeding under the assumption that the receivable issue doesn’t matter. The fact that the principal balance of most loans were, if properly accounted for, paid off 10 times over, seems not to matter to Judges or even lawyers. “You borrowed the money didn’t you. How can you expect to get away with this?” A loaded question if I ever heard one. The borrower was a vehicle for the commission of a simple common law and statutory fraud. They lied to him and now they are trying to steal his house — the same way they lied to the investor and stole all the money.

  1. Receivable income is the income the investor expects. So for example if the deal is 7% and the investor puts up $1 million the investor is expecting $70,000 per year in receivable income PLUS of course the principal investment (which we all know never happened).

  2. Receivable income from loans is nominal — i.e., in name only. So if you have a $500,000 loan to a borrower who has an income of $12,000 per year, and the interest rate is stated as 16%, then the nominal receivable income is $80,000 per year, which everyone knows is a lie.

  3. The Yield Spread premium is achieved exactly that way. The investment banker takes $1,000,000 from an investor and then buys a mortgage with a nominal income of $80,000 which would be enough to pay the investor the annual receivable income the investor expects, plus fees for servicing the loan. So in our little example here, the investment banker only had to commit $500,000 to the borrower even though he took $1 million from the investor. His yield spread premium fee is therefore the same amount as the loan itself.  Would the investor have parted with the money if the investor was told the truth? Certainly not. Would the borrower sign up for a deal where he was sure to be thrown out on the street? Certainly not. In legal lingo, we call that fraud. And it never could have happened without defrauding BOTH the investor and the borrower.

  4. Then you have the actual receivable income which is the sum of all payments made on the pool, reduced by fees for servicing and other forms of chicanery. As more and more people default, the ACTUAL receivables go down, but the servicing fees stay the same or even increase, since the servicer is entitled to a higher fee for servicing a non-performing loan. You might ask where the servicer gets its money if the borrower isn’t paying. The answer is that the servicer is getting paid out of the proceeds of payments made by OTHER borrowers. In the end most of the ACTUAL income was eaten up by these service fees from the various securitization participants.

  5. Then you have a “credit event.” In these nutty deals a credit event is declared by investment banker who then makes a claim against insurance or counter-parties in credit default swaps, or buys (through the Master Servicer) the good loans (for repackaging and sale). The beauty of this is that upon declaration of a decrease in value of the pool, the underwriter gets to collect money on a bet that the underwriter would, acting in its own self interest, declare a write down of the pool and collect the money. Where did the money come from to pay for all these credit enhancements, insurance, credit default swaps, etc? ANSWER: From the original transaction wherein the investor put up $1 million and the investment banker only funded $500,000 (i.e., the undisclosed tier 2 yield spread premium).

  6. Under the terms of the securitization documents it might appear that the investor is entitled to be paid from third party payments. Both equitably, since the investors put up the money and legally, since that was the deal, they should have been paid. But they were not. So the third party payments are another expected receivable that materialized but was not paid to the creditor of the mortgage loan by the agents for the creditor. In other words, his bookkeepers stole the money.

Very good info on the securitization structure and thought provoking for sure. Could you explain the significance of the Original Issue Discount reporting for REMICs and how it applies to securitization?

It seems to me that the REMIC exemptions were to evade billions in taxes for the gain on sale of the loans to the static pool which never actually happened per the requirements for true sales. Such reporting was handled in the yearly publication 938 from the IRS. A review of this reporting history reveals some very interesting aspects that raise some questions.

Here are the years 2007, 2008 and 2009:

2009 reported in 2010
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p938.pdf

2008? is missing and reverts to the 2009 file?? Don’t believe me. try it.
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p938–2009.pdf

2007 reported in 2008
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p938–2007.pdf

A review of 2007 shows reporting of numerous securitization trusts owned by varying entities, 08 is obviously missing and concealed, and 2009 shows that most reporting is now by Fannie/Freddie/Ginnie, JP Morgan, CIti, BofA and a few new entities like the Jeffries trusts etc.

Would this be simply reporting that no discount is now being applied and all the losses or discount is credited to the GSEs and big banks, or does it mean the trusts no longer exist and the ones not paid with swaps are being resecuritized?

Some of the tell tale signs of some issues with the REMIC status especially in the WAMU loans is a 10.3 Billion dollar tax claim by the IRS in the BK. It is further that the balance of the entire loan portfolio of WAMU transferred to JPM for zero consideration. A total of 191 Billion of loans transferred proven by an FDIC accounting should be enough to challenge legal standing in any event.

I believe that all of the securitized loans were charged back to WAMU’s balance sheet prior to the sale of the assets and transferred to JPM along with the derivative contracts for each and every one of them. [EDITOR’S NOTE: PRECISELY CORRECT]

The derivatives seem to be accounted for in a separate mention in the balance sheet implying that the zeroing of the loans is a separate act from the derivatives. Add to that the IRS claim which can be attributed to the gain on sale clawback from the voiding of the REMIC status and things seem to fit.

I would agree the free house claim is a tough river to row but the unjust enrichment by allowing 191 billion in loans to be collected with no Article III standing not only should trump that but additionally forever strip them of standing to ever enforce the contract.

The collection is Federal Racketeering at the highest level, money laundering and antitrust. Where are the tobacco litigators that want to handle this issue for the homeowners? How about an attorney with political aspirations that would surely gain support for saving millions of homes for this one simple case?

Documents and more info on the FDIC litigation fund extended to JPM to fight consumers can be found here:

http://www.wamuloanfraud.com

You can also find my open letter to Sheila Bair asking her to personally respond to my request here:

http://4closurefraud.org/2010/06/09/an-open-letter-to-sheila-bair-of-the-federal-deposit-insurance-corporation-fdic-re-foreclosures/

Any insight into the REMIC and Pub. 938 info is certainly appreciated

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Tax Impact of Principal Reduction

Posted on March 19, 2010 by Neil Garfield

With the Obama administration and private lenders actively considering mortgage-principal-reduction programs to help financially distressed homeowners, the Internal Revenue Service has issued an advisory to taxpayers who receive — or seek to receive — such assistance if it’s offered.

Editor’s Note: The only thing I would add to this, for the moment, is that any principal reduction is basically an admission that your property is not worth the amount of the mortgage. If you have made demand for damages or relief based upon appraisal fraud or other causes of action in or out of court, the taxpayer can take the position that the debt reduction is also in lieu of payment of damages which often is not taxable. Under this theory — which may or may not apply — you would NOT be limited to your principal residence to claim an exemption. Consulting with a licensed attorney or accountant familiar both with federal and state tax law would be strongly advisable.

The reason I mention state law is that the reduction of principal might be the basis for contesting the assessed valuation of your home for real estate taxes, property insurance etc.

IRS tells homeowners how to get tax relief if a lender forgives part of their debt

Reduction of mortgage principal, usually considered taxable income, is expected to become more prevalent as the Obama administration and banks seek ways to prevent foreclosures.

By Kenneth R. Harney

March 14, 2010

Reporting from Washington

With the Obama administration and private lenders actively considering mortgage-principal-reduction programs to help financially distressed homeowners, the Internal Revenue Service has issued an advisory to taxpayers who receive — or seek to receive — such assistance if it’s offered.

The IRS gets involved in mortgage principal write-downs because the federal tax code generally treats any forgiveness of debt by a creditor in excess of $600 as ordinary taxable income to the recipient.

However, under legislation that took effect in 2007, certain home mortgage debt cancellations — such as through loan modifications, short sales or foreclosures — may be exempted from tax treatment as income.

Sheila C. Bair, chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., recently confirmed that her agency was working on a new program to expand the use of principal mortgage reductions to keep underwater borrowers out of foreclosure.

Most major banks and mortgage companies have preferred monthly payment reductions and other loan modification techniques over cuts of principal balances, but a handful have made limited use of the concept.

One of the largest servicers of subprime home loans, Ocwen Financial Services of West Palm Beach, Fla., has strongly advocated principal reductions to keep people out of foreclosure, and claimed broad success with them. Ocwen President Ron Faris testified to a congressional subcommittee this month that borrowers with negative equity were as much as twice as likely to re-default after a standard payment-reduction loan modification than those who receive partial forgiveness on their principal debt.

But what are the tax implications when your lender essentially says: OK, we recognize that you’re underwater, maybe you’re thinking about walking away, and we’re going to write off some of what you owe to keep you in the house?

IRS guidance issued March 4 spelled out step by step how financially troubled and underwater borrowers can qualify for tax relief when a lender agrees to lower their debt. Here are the basics, should you be considering a short sale or loan modification involving principal reduction.

First, be aware that the federal tax exclusion only applies to mortgage balances on your principal residence — your main home — and not on second homes, rental real estate or business property. The maximum amount of forgiven debt eligible under the law is $2 million for married taxpayers filing jointly and $1 million for single filers.

But there are some potential snares: Your debt reduction can only be for loan amounts that you’ve used to “buy, build or substantially improve your principal residence.” This includes refinancings that increased your total mortgage debt attributable to renovations and capital improvements of your house. But if you used the proceeds for other personal purposes, such as to pay off credit card bills, buy cars or invest in stocks, the mortgage debt attributable to those expenditures is not eligible for tax exclusion.

When your lender forgives all or part of your mortgage balance, the lender is required by law to issue you an IRS Form 1099-C, a “Cancellation of Debt” notice, which is also sent to the IRS. The form shows not only the amount of debt discharged but the estimated fair market value of the house securing the debt as well.

A few other noteworthy features of the IRS rules: If you’ve been foreclosed upon or you do a short sale and lose money in the process, don’t claim a tax loss on your federal filing. The IRS will turn you down. However, if you go to foreclosure and your lender agrees to cancel all or part of the unpaid mortgage balance as part of the deal, then you can file for an exemption from the IRS.

What if your lender reduces the debt on your house but you continue to own the property and live in it? There’s a tax wrinkle in the fine print: The IRS will require you to reduce your “basis” in the house — your “cost” for tax purposes — by the amount of the forgiven debt. But that’s not likely to be a big concern for most homeowners digging their way out.

Finally, if you want to claim the debt-forgiveness exemption, download IRS Form 982 at www.irs.gov and attach it to your return for the year in which the debt was forgiven. And don’t assume that this tax code benefit to homeowners will be around forever. It expires at the end of 2012.

kenharney@earthlink.net.

Distributed by the Washington Post Writers Group

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