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Answering the Shell Game

Posted on November 29, 2019 by Neil Garfield

Most of the questions I get come from lawyers and homeowners who are totally confused by the array of names of companies that appear, disappeared and replaced by lawyers operating under instructions from command central — a group of lawyers who oversee the foreclosures of loans claimed to be securitized. They are the ones who give the orders to “servicers” and “foreclosure mills.”

The goal is to force the sale of homes and obtain the proceeds of sale for the benefit and account of a stockbroker who initiated a scheme of “securitization.”

Everything that happens in correspondence, statements and enforcement actions is specifically designed to make lawyers, homeowners and judges think that is not the case. Everything is designed to create the false impression that the parties involved have every legal right to originate, process and enforce residential loans when in fact no such authority exists.

The foreclosure process is just one step in many that results in unconscionable profits, fees and commissions distributed to a multitude of players whose livelihood depends upon successfully duping the courts into allowing foreclosure despite the fact that the money from the forced sale will never be paid to the investors who paid for the debt.

One such question came in from a reader regarding BONY Mellon as trustee of a supposedly REMIC trust. As with all things in the era of securitization fail (see Adam Levitin) even that is false. An entity that does not serve as a pass through vehicle for payment of principal and interest on residential loans is not a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit — so it isn’t a REMIC. A name that includes the word “trust” in it without a trust agreement in which something is entrusted to the “trustee” is not a trust.

So BONY Mellon is simply renting its name out for use by stockbrokers who call themselves “investment banks” in order to create the illusion of an institutional loan when nothing could be further from the truth. With only a few exceptions the same statement applies to all entities named as “trustees” of “REMIC” “trusts”.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Here is my reply to the reader:

They are playing a shell game and that is what you should say:

None of the BONY Mellon entities ever owned or paid for the debt, note or mortgage.

None of the BONY Mellon entities ever served as trustee for the benefit of certificate holders

None of the certificate holders ever received a conveyance of ownership in the debt, note or mortgage. The assignment is always void (see below).

None of the certificate holders hold any equitable interest in the debt, note or mortgage because they expressly waived any such interest.

None of the BONY Mellon entities ever received your loan to hold in trust for anyone.

The assignment of bare naked title without the debt is a legal nullity. The trust agreement says that BONY holds bare naked legal title for the investment bank, but it does not have legal title because the debt was not also transferred.

The appearance and disappearance of technical legal entities occurs for the sole purpose of creating the illusion of business transactions that never occurred.

None of the BONY Mellon entities will ever receive the proceeds of a forced sale of property in this case.

None of the BONY Mellon entities have ever received the proceeds of forced sale of any property related to the subject “trust” or trust name.

Filed under: burden of persuasion, burden of pleading, BURDEN OF PROOF, evidence, Fabrication of documents, foreclosure, Investor, originator, sham transactions, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: Bank of America, BoNY-MELLON, certificate holders, HSBC, investors, shell game, U.S. Bank | 1 Comment »

Older Forensic Title Analyses Need Updating — Even Ours

Posted on December 21, 2018 by Neil Garfield

A recent request from an old client brought to mind the changes that have occurred, as in her case, since 2011 — more than 7 years ago.

A quick review indicates that the facts were correct but the conclusions need tweaking. And the title record should be updated. Many new laws and case decisions have occurred since that report was finished and many new facts have been revealed about these older transactions.

For example it now appears that our assumption about the flow of payments was incorrect.

Your payments were being made to a subservicer who was forwarding money on a separate contract to a Master Servicer.
The Master Servicer then authorized, in its sole discretion, third parties to make certain payments to investors who had purchased certificates issued in the name of a trust, which turns out to not exist.
The trust name was being used as a fictitious name for the named underwriter of the certificate offering. But the actual transaction was not an underwriting; it was simply a sale by the party posing as underwriter (implying it was working for a third party, presumably the nonexistent trust).
By contract, the investors purchased their right to receive money arising out of a promise to pay issued by the named underwriter (i.e., seller) that was unrelated to the terms of repayment on any note.
And most importantly the investors waived any right, title or interest to the loans, debts, notes or mortgages.
Thus you can see that actions undertaken in the name of the holders of certificates or a REMIC Trust or the Trustee of a REMIC trust are all fabricated, to hide the fact that the obligation of the borrower has been transformed into an unsecured obligation to pay intermediaries who converted the investors’ money and thus claim to be principals entitled to enforce a debt in which they had no investment.
Most of the documents uploaded to SEC.gov, if at all, are either unsigned or incomplete (or both) lacking a mortgage loan schedule or any reference to a particular loan. Such documents are ONLY uploaded to SEC.GOV which has no power to charter or approve any entities nor their filings, as long as they have been granted access to upload documents. Their existence on SEC.GOV means nothing.
An assignment without actual transfer of the debt is without effect. In virtually all cases involving false claims of securitization no payment of any kind was ever made by any party in the chain for the origination or purchase of the loan. Our Case Analysis examines the issues arising from transfer of a promissory note which can cause legal presumptions to arise concerning ownership of the debt and transfers thereof.
Analysis of the fictitious “trust” documents reveals the absence of essential elements of a trust hence leading to the conclusion that no actual trust was intended notwithstanding the illusions and implications contained in the documents themselves and the representations of attorneys and representatives of “servicers” to the contrary. Upon case analysis (apart from title analysis contained in our TERA report) the following basic elements of a trust are usually absent.
1. Complete signed trust instrument
2. Trustee with powers to administer the affairs of the trust and the trust assets
3. Trustor/settlor creating the trust.
4. Beneficiaries of the trust
5. RES: anything that has been entrusted to the named trustee to manage on behalf of the beneficiaries

My suggestion, if the issues are still pending, is that you order the current TERA and the PDR PLUS, which includes a recorded CONSULT.

CLICK HERE TO ORDER TERA

CLICK HERE TO ORDER CONSULT (not if you order PDR)

CLICK HERE TO ORDER CASE ANALYSIS (not yet)

CLICK HERE TO ORDER PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT REVIEW (PDR BASIC or more probably the PDR PLUS, in your case — includes CONSULT)

Filed under: CORRUPTION, discovery, expert witness, Fabrication of documents, foreclosure, forensic investigation, forgery, Investor, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES | Tagged: forensic analysis, forensic report, investors, Master Servicer, REMIC TRUST, subservicer, Titile, TRUTH | 8 Comments »

Bank Fraud From the Top Down

Posted on October 21, 2016 by Neil Garfield

MERS is not, as its proponents claim, a device for eliminating the recording charges on legitimate purchases and sales of mortgage loans; instead it is a “layering” device (another Wall Street term) for creating the illusion of such transfers even though no transaction actually took place.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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I recently had the occasion to ghost write something for a customer in relation to claims based upon fraud, MERS, and “Successors.” Here is what I drafted, with references to actual people and entities deleted:

MERS was created in 1996 as a means for private traders to create the illusion of loan transfers. On its website MERS states emphatically that it specifically disclaims any interest in any debt and disclaims any interest in any documentation of debt (i.e., a promissory note) and specifically disclaims any interest in any agreement for collateralizing the obligations stated on the note.
There is no agreement in which MERS is authorized as an agent of any creditor. The statement on the note and/or mortgage that it is named as nominee for a “lender” is false. No agreement exists that sets forth the terms or standards of agency relationship between the Payee on the subject “note” or the mortgagee on the subject mortgage. MERS is merely named on instruments without any powers to exercise on behalf of any party who would qualify as a bona fide mortgagee or beneficiary.
No person in MERS actually performs ANY action in connection with loans and no officer or employee of MERS did perform any banking activity in relation tot he subject loan. MERS is a passive database for which access is freely given to anyone who wants to make an entry, regardless of the truth or falsity of that entry. It is a platform where the person accessing the MERS IT system appoints themselves as “assistant secretary” or some other false status in relation to MERS. MERS is not, as its proponents claim, a device for eliminating the recording charges on legitimate purchases and sales of mortgage loans; instead it is a “layering” device (another wall Street term) for creating the illusion of such transfers even though no transaction actually took place.
Hence there is no basis under existing law under which MERS, in this case, was either a nominee for a real creditor and no basis under existing law under which MERS, in this case, could possibly claim that it was either a mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust.
MERS has not claimed and never will claim that it is a mortgagee or beneficiary.
The lender, under the alleged “closing documents” was also a sham nominee. None of the parties in the alleged “chain” were at any times a creditor, lender, purchaser, mortgagee, beneficiary, or holder of any note. None of them have any financial interest or risk of loss in the performance of the alleged “loan” obligations.
Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representations at the “Closing” that the originator who was named as Payee on the note was lending her money. But in fact the originator was merely acting as a broker, conduit or sales agent whose job was to get the Plaintiff to sign papers — an event that triggered windfall compensation to all the participants (except the Plaintiff), equal to or even greater than the amount of principal supposedly due from the “loan.”
In fact, the originator and multiple other parties had entered into a scheme that was memorialized in an illegal contract violating public policy regarding the disclosure of the identity of the “lender” and the compensation by all parties who received any remuneration of any type arising out the “Closing of the transaction.” The name of the contract is probably a “Purchase and Assumption Agreement” — a standard agreement that is used in the banking industry after the loan has been underwritten, approved and funded. In the case at bar those parties entered into the Purchase and Assumption Agreement before the subject “loan” was closed”, before the Plaintiff even applied for a loan.
The source of the money for the alleged “loan” was a “dark pool” (a term used by investment bankers) consisting of the money advanced by investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds issued by a Trust, in which their money would be managed by the Trustee. In fact, the Trust is either nonexistent or inchoate having never been funded with the investors’ money. The dark pool contains money commingled from hundreds of investors in thousands of trusts.
The investors were generally stable managed funds including pension, retirement, 401K money for people relying upon said money for their living expenses after retirement. They are the unwitting, unknowing source of funds for the transaction described as a “closing.” Hence the loan contract upon which the Defendants rely is based upon fraudulent representations designed to mislead the court and mislead the Plaintiff and the byproduct of a broader scheme to defraud investors in “Mortgage backed securities” that were issued by a nonexistent trust that never owned the assets supposedly “backing” the “security” often described as a mortgage bond.
Thus the fraud starts with the misrepresentation to investors that the managed funds would be managed by a trustee and would be used to acquire existing loans rather than originate new loans. Instead their funds were used directly on the “closing” table by presumably unwitting “Closing agents.” The fact that the funds arrived created the illusion that the party named on the note and mortgage was actually funding the loan to the “borrower.” This was a lie. But it explains why the Defendants have continually refused to provide any evidence of the “purchase” of the loan by the parties they claim to form a “Chain.”
In the alleged “transfer” of the loan, there was no purchase and no payment of money because at the base of their chain, the originator, there was no right to receive the money that would ordinarily be a requirement for purchase of the loan. There also was no Purchase and Assumption Agreement, which is basic standard banking practice in the acquisition of loans, particularly in pools.
As Plaintiff as recently learned, the originator was not entitled to receive any payment from “successors” and not entitled to receive any money from the Plaintiff who was described as a “borrower.” In simple accounting terms there was no debit and so there could be no “corresponding” credit. And in fact, the originator never did receive any money for purchasing the loan nor any payments that were credited to a loan receivable account in its accounting records. Yet the originator executed or allowed instruments to be executed in which the completely fraudulent assertion that the originator had sold the loan was memorialized.
The “closing” was completely improper in which Plaintiff was fraudulently induced to execute a promissory note as maker and fraudulently induced to execute a mortgage as collateral for the performance under the note. Plaintiff was unaware that she had just created a second liability because the debt could not be legally merged into an instrument that named a party who was not the lender, not a creditor, and not a proper payee for a note memorializing a loan of money from the “lender” to the Plaintiff.
The purpose of the merger rule is to prevent a borrower from creating two liabilities for one transaction. The debt is merged into the note upon execution such that no claim can be made on the debt. None of these fine points of law were known to Plaintiff until recently. The reason she did not know is that the originator and the rest of the parties making claims based upon the fraudulent “loan” memorialized in the note all conspired to withhold information that was required to be disclosed to “borrowers” under Federal and State Law.
In the case at bar, the debt arises from the fact that Plaintiff did in fact receive money or the benefit of payments on her behalf — from third parties who have no contractual, constructive or other relationship with the source of funds for the transaction. The note is based upon a transaction that never existed — a loan from the originator to the Plaintiff. The debt is based upon the receipt of money from a party who was clearly not intending to make a gift to Plaintiff. The debt and the note are two different liabilities.
Assuming the original note exists, Plaintiff is entitled to its its cancellation and return, along with release and satisfaction of the mortgage that collateralizes the obligation set forth on the sham promissory note.
In the interim, as this case clearly shows, the Plaintiff is at risk of a second liability even if she prevails in her claim that the note was a sham, to wit: Under UCC Article 3, if an innocent third party actually purchases the mortgage or deed of trust, the statute shifts the risk of loss onto the maker of the instrument regardless of how serious and egregious the practices of the originator and the background “players” who engineered this scheme.
Further the financial identity and reputation of the Plaintiff was fraudulently used without her knowledge and consent to conduct “trades” based upon her execution of the above referenced false instruments in which many undisclosed players were reaping what they called “trading profits” arising from the “closing” and the illegal and unwanted misuse of her signatures on instruments in which she was induced to sign by fraudulent misrepresentations as to the nature and content of the documents.
Plaintiff suffered damages in that her title was slandered and emotional distress damages and damage to her financial identity and reputation. Further damages arising from violation of her right to quiet enjoyment of the property was violated by this insidious scheme.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: Article 3 UCC, fraud, investors, maker, MERS IT, mortgagee, originator, Payee | 4 Comments »

Freddie Mac Selling Toxic Loans: Do they really own those loans?

Posted on October 5, 2016 by Neil Garfield

The resulting case law is opening up Pandora’s box as the law of these foreclosure cases spills over into hundreds of other situations.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see http://4closurefraud.org/2016/10/05/freddie-mac-sells-1-billion-of-seriously-delinquent-loans/

So I have two questions that should be sufficiently annoying to the banksters: (1) what makes Freddie think it owns the loans? and (2) if the loans are in default doesn’t that make the notes non-negotiable paper?

As to the first, my guess is that Freddie paid somebody something. What they used as currency was MBS issued by private label trusts. The MBS were worthless because they were issued by an unfunded paper trust. Freddie paid somebody using those bonds. But that somebody didn’t own the loans because the money had already been advanced by ANOTHER party (the investors) under a false deposit scheme with the investment/commercial banks.

So the debt was at all times owned by an unidentified and perhaps unidentifiable group of investors/victims who to this day may not know that their money was hijacked to make toxic loans. That makes any sale or assignment to anyone void, including Freddie Mac. And whoever is getting paper executed by Freddie Mac is getting exactly what Freddie owns: NOTHING.

As to the second, if the loans in default are not negotiable paper, then the presumptions attendant to negotiable paper under Article 3 of the UCC do not apply. And if THAT is the case, the party in possession is not a holder, not a holder in due course and possibly not a possessor with rights to enforce. They would need to prove that they paid for the “loan” and they would need to show that there was a loan [not just from anyone. It must be an actual loan of money from the party identified as Payee on the note]. They would need to show that they not only bought the note but they also bought the debt.

As it turns out the note and the debt are owned by two different parties. The debt normally merges into the note so that when someone signs it they don’t have two liabilities. But what if the debt was owned by a third party at the time the maker signed the note? Assuming the maker did not know that a third party was involved, the maker is back in the position of two debts — the very problem that the merger rule was intended to prevent.

So far the courts have endeavored to deal with this tricky problem by pretending it does not exist. The resulting case law is opening up Pandora’s box as the law of these foreclosure cases spills over into hundreds of other situations.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: ARTICLE 3, foreclosure defense, Freddie Mac, investors, mortgage bonds, UCC | 11 Comments »

Deutsch Bank on Verge of Collapse?

Posted on July 12, 2016 by Neil Garfield

there is no such thing as a soft landing in a cornered marketplace

Despite claiming $52 TRILLION “notional” value in derivatives (nearly all the money in the world) DB has posted a shattering loss and according to the IMF poses the most serious systemic loss to the financial system. Reports indicate that 29 DB employees were at the root of manipulating the LIBOR index which is used as the primary index for variable rate loans. Nobody has addressed the issue of whether adjusted payments should be scrutinized even while knowing that the index was rigged.

see http://www.visualcapitalist.com/chart-epic-collapse-deutsche-bank/

Nothing equals nothing. The fact is that DeutschBank allowed itself to be window dressing on bogus REMIC Trusts as though the DB trust department was managing the money for investors. Other than ink on paper, the trusts did not exist and neither did any assets of the purported trusts. DB led the way as a principal party in creating the illusion of “something” when in fact there was nothing at all.

Then DB executives took highly leveraged risks in betting on the bogus mortgage bonds (and other “asset-backed” securities) issued by those bogus REMIC Trusts. Then they papered it over with all kinds of complex derivative products — all of which were based upon the nonexistent ownership of the primary asset — loans. DB claims over $52 Trillion in “value” for those derivatives as a tier 3 asset (i.e., it is worth what management says it is worth). The current leverage ratio for DB is reported at 40x, which is just 2 points lower than Bear Stearns before it toppled over. The leverage is disguised as “sales” for which DB has subsequent liability. All of this was predicted and described by Abraham Briloff in Unaccountable Accounting published by Harper and Rowe in 1972. Nearly all of these “trades” are merely devices to kick the can down the road, covering over losses that DB would rather not admit.

This situation reminds me of a scene long ago when I was working on Wall Street as a Trainee security analyst in the research department of a medium sized brokerage firm. One of the family partners came into our research department and told us confidently that despite all rumors to the contrary there would be no layoffs in our department. I think I had another job before he returned to his office just ahead of the layoff of the entire department 2 weeks later. My intuition told me that he was lying. On Wall Street it’s not the lying that is frowned upon, it is getting caught. My experience has taught me that the bigger the entity the bigger the lies and the more serious the systemic risk to the whole of society. That was in 1968-9.

At that time the crisis was the “paper crash” — meaning that Wall Street firms had “lost track” of the location and ownership of stock and bond certificates. Now they are filing “lost note” complaints like confetti. When you send a Qualified Written Request or Debt Validation Request, you get nothing unless you are already in litigation where suddenly “original” documentation pops up.

This time it is far more serious as the fortunes of many investors, banks and other institutions rely on the value of DB stock and promises to pay. The problem in 1968-1969 was addressed by “best guesses” and converting from a system where investors received actual certificates to a system where trades were recorded privately on the books and records of the brokerage houses and investors had to rely on the statements from their broker as evidence of their asset holdings.

But the systemic problem is the same. Today it is the notes and loan documents that are lost. The conversion to using a private record of transactions sounds like MERS today. And the claim to $52 Trillion in “notional value” is pure obfuscation. The total of all real money in the world is probably under $70 Trillion. So does DB own most or all of it? I don’t think so and neither does anyone else, which is why DB is in trouble. They got caught.

The report in the link above says that DB is in full crisis mode as DB tries to escape the death spiral that took down Lehman, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and others.

The importance of these events goes far beyond the significance of DB itself. DB, whose stock is selling at 8% of what it was selling at in 2007, is unfortunately only a symbol of an epic disaster that is slowly unfolding. The fundamentals have changed. Nearly all “debt” that was created over the past 15 years is fatally defective — leaving enforcement only to the good graces of judges who are willing to overlook centuries of law governing the purchase and sale of negotiable paper.

The reason for the continuing weakness in economic systems around the world is that most of the money was sucked out of those systems. The method of the banks in achieving this non-heroic status is responsible for the continuing recession that is creating so much disturbance around the world. Leaders of those countries have been sucking it up in order to create a soft landing.

But here is what we know from history — there is no such thing as a soft landing in a cornered marketplace. The banks converted our economies from 85% reliance on manufacturing and services to an economy where half of the economic activity consists of trading securities back and forth — i.e., trading the same securities over and over again. That means that actual economic activity in the production and delivery of goods and services has declined from 85% to 50% and it is still dropping. The rest is smoke and mirrors. It is the belief or entanglements with the banks that keeps us from moving on, clawing back, and restoring household wealth to the only place that will actually generate real economic activity — the middle class and lower economic tiers.

Henry Ford proved the point spectacularly about 100 years ago when he doubled the wages of his workers — to the astonishment and dismay of his competitors. It was clear to everyone but Ford that he had obviously lost his mind. Despite that clarity that everyone agreed was the true way of looking at things, Ford’s move created the middle class and thus created a stable demographic who continue to buy what he was selling. In a short time, Ford was the dominant player in the marketplace selling automobiles and the “realists” were gone.

Until the middle class is restored (i.e., it gets back the money that was distributed away from them into the hands of a handful of men who had used their positions of influence to corner the market on money), the “recovery” will continue to be smoke and mirrors, the society will be disrupted and eventually companies that do rely on people to purchase their goods and services won’t have anyone to sell them to. And creating debt to cover the shortfall doesn’t work anymore. The middle class must have a pathway to financial security, not to financial ruin.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: DEUTSCHE BANK, fraud, investors, Lender Liability, MERS, securitization, trustee | 25 Comments »

Ocwen: Investors and Borrowers Move toward Unity of Purpose!

Posted on March 3, 2015 by Neil Garfield

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Please consult an attorney who is licensed in your jurisdiction before acting upon anything you read on this blog.

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Anyone following this blog knows that I have been saying that unity of investors and borrowers is the ultimate solution to the falsely dubbed “Foreclosure crisis” (a term that avoids Wall Street corruption). Many have asked what i have based that on and the answer was my own analysis and interviews with Wall Street insiders who have insisted on remaining anonymous. But it was only a matter of time where the creditors (investors who bought mortgage backed securities) came to realize that nobody acting in the capacity of underwriter, servicer or Master Servicer was acting in the best interests of the investors or the borrowers.

The only thing they have tentatively held back on is an outright allegation that their money was NOT used by the Trustee for the Trust and their money never made it into the Trust and that the loans never made it into the Trust. That too will come because when investors realize that homeowners are not going to walk away, investors as creditors will come to agreements to salvage far more of the debts created during the mortgage meltdown than the money salvaged by pushing cases to foreclosure instead of the centuries’ proven method of resolving troubled loans — workouts. Nearly all homeowners would execute a new clean mortgage and note in a heartbeat to give investors the benefits of a workout that reflects economic reality.

Practice hint: If you are dealing with Ocwen Discovery should include information about Altisource and Home Loan Servicing Solutions, investors, and borrowers as it relates to the subject loan.

Investors announced complaints against Ocwen for mishandling the initial money, the paperwork and the subsequent money and servicing on loans created and a acquired with their money. The investors, who are the actual creditors (albeit unsecured) are getting close to the point where they state outright what everyone already knows: there is no collateral for these loans and every disclosure statement involving nearly all the loans violated disclosure requirements under TILA, RESPA, and Federal and state regulations.

The fact that (1) the loan was not funded by the payee on the note and mortgagee on the mortgage and (2) that the money from creditors were never properly channeled through the REMIC trusts because the trusts never received the proceeds of sale of mortgage backed securities is getting closer and closer to the surface.

What was unthinkable and the subject of ridicule 8 years ago has become the REAL reality. The plain truth is that the Trust never owned the loans even as a pass through because they never had had the money to originate or acquire loans. That leaves an uncalculated unsecured debt that is being diminished every day that servicers continue to push foreclosure for the protection of the broker dealers who created worthless mortgage bonds which have been purchased by the Federal reserve under the guise of propping up the banks’ balance sheets.

seehttp://www.gibbsbruns.com/certificateholders-issue-notice-of-non-performance-identifying-alleged-failures-by-ocwen-financial-corporation-as-servicer-or-master-servicer-to-perform-covenants-and-servicing-agreements-in-119-residential-mortgage-backed-securities-trusts-01-23-2015/

“HOUSTON, January 23, 2015 – Today, the Holders of 25% Voting Rights in 119 Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Trusts (RMBS) with an original balance of more than $82 billion issued a Notice of Non-Performance (Notice) to BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, US Bank, and Wells Fargo, as Trustees, Securities Administrators, and/or Master Servicers, regarding the material failures of Ocwen Financial Corporation (Ocwen) as Servicer and/or Master Servicer, to comply with its covenants and agreements under governing Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs).”

Use of Trust funds to “pay” Ocwen’s required “borrower relief” obligations under a regulatory settlement, through implementation of modifications on Trust- owned mortgages that have shifted the costs of the settlement to the Trusts and enriched Ocwen unjustly;

Employing conflicted servicing practices that enriched Ocwen’s corporate affiliates, including Altisource and Home Loan Servicing Solutions, to the detriment of the Trusts, investors, and borrowers;

Engaging in imprudent and wholly improper loan modification, advancing, and advance recovery practices;

Failure to maintain adequate records, communicate effectively with borrowers, or comply with applicable laws, including consumer protection and foreclosure laws; and,

Failure to account for and remit accurately to the Trusts cash flows from, and amounts realized on, Trust-owned mortgages.

As a result of the imprudent and improper servicing practices alleged in the Notice, the Holders further allege that their experts’ analyses demonstrate that Trusts serviced by Ocwen have performed materially worse than Trusts serviced by other servicers. The Holders further allege that these claimed defaults and deficiencies in Ocwen’s performance have materially affected the rights of the Holders and constitute an ongoing Event of Default under the applicable PSAs. The Holders intend to take further action to recover these losses and protect the Trusts’ assets and mortgages.

The Notice was issued on behalf of Holders in the following Ocwen-serviced RMBS: see link The fact that the investors — who by all accounts are the real parties in interest disavow the actions of Ocwen gives rise to an issue of fact as to whether Ocwen was or is operating under the scope of services supposedly to be performed by the servicer or Master Servicer.

I would argue that the fact that the apparent real creditors are stating that Ocwen is misbehaving with respect to adequate records means that they are not entitled to the presumption of a business records exception under the hearsay rule.

The fact that the creditors are saying that servicing practices damaged not only the investors but also borrowers gives rise to a factual issue which denies Ocwen the presumption of validity on any record including the original loan documents that have been shown in many cases to have been mechanically reproduced.

The fact that the creditors are alleging imprudent and wholly improper loan modification practices, servicer advances (which are not properly credited to the account of either the creditor or the borrower), and the recovery of advances means that the creditors are saying that Ocwen was acting on its own behalf instead of the creditors. This puts Ocwen in the position of being either outside the scope of its authority or more likely simply an interloper claiming to be a servicer for trusts that were never actually used to acquire or originate loans, this negating the effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. Hence the “servicer” for the trust is NOT the servicer for the subject loan because the loan never arrived in the trust portfolio.

The fact that the creditors admit against interest that Ocwen was pursuing practices and goals that violate laws and proper procedure means that no foreclosure can be supported by “clean hands.” The underlying theme here being that contrary to centuries of practice, instead of producing workouts in which the loan is saved and thus the investment of the creditors, Ocwen pursued foreclosure which was in its interest and not the creditors. The creditors are saying they don’t want the foreclosures but Ocwen did them anyway.

The fact that the creditors are saying they didn’t get the money that was supposed to go to them means that the money received from lost sharing with FDIC, guarantees, insurance, credit default swaps that should have paid off the creditors were not paid to them and would have reduced the damage to the creditors. By reducing the amount of damages to the creditors the borrower would have owed less, making the principal amounts claimed in foreclosures all wrong. The parties who paid such amounts either have or do not have separate unsecured actions against the borrower. In most cases they have no such claim because they explicitly waived it.

This is the first time investors have even partially aligned themselves with Borrowers. I hope it will lead to a stampede, because the salvation of investors and borrowers alike requires a pincer like attack on the intermediaries who have been pretending to be the principal parties in interest but who lacked the authority from the start and violated every fiduciary duty and contractual duty in dealing with creditors and borrowers. Peal the onion: the reason that their initial money is at stake is that these servicers are either acting as Master Servicers who are actually the underwriters and sellers of the mortgage backed securities,

I would argue that the fact that the apparent real creditors are stating the Ocwen is misbehaving with respect to adequate records means that they are not entitled to the presumption of a business records exception under the hearsay rule.

The fact that the creditors are alleging imprudent and wholly improper loan modification practices, servicer advances (which are not properly credited to the account of either the creditor or the borrower), and the recovery of advances means that the creditors are saying that Ocwen was acting on tis own behalf instead of the creditors. This puts Ocwen in the position of being either outside the scope of its authority or more likely simply an interloper claiming to be a servicer for trusts that were never actually used to acquire or originate loans, this negating the effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

The fact that the creditors are saying they didn’t get the money that was supposed to go to them means that the money received from lost sharing with FDIC, guarantees, insurance, credit default swaps that should have paid off the creditors were not paid to them and would have reduced the damage to the creditors. By reducing the amount of damages to the creditors the borrower would have owed less, making the principals claimed in foreclosures all wrong. The parties who paid such amounts either have or do not have separate unsecured actions against eh borrower. In most cases they have no such claim because they explicitly waived it.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: Altisource, borrower relief, Citibank, consumer protection, creditors, Deutsch Bank, discovery, foreclosure laws, Home Loans Servicing Solutions, HSBC, investors, Master Servicer, Mellon, Ocwen, Pooling and Servcing Agreements, PSA, Servicer advance recovery, Servicer advances, trust funds, US BANK, Wells Fargo | 37 Comments »

Rockwell P. Ludden, Esq. — A Lawyer who gets it on Securitization and Mortgages

Posted on February 25, 2015 by Neil Garfield

see FORECLOSURE, SECURITIZATION DON’T MIX ROCKY&#39S+ARTICLE+in+the+CAPE+COD+TIMES+February+21,+2015

As I write this, I have no recall of Mr. Ludden before today. BUT his article in of all places, the Cape Cod Times, struck me as astonishing in its concise description of the illegal foreclosures that are skimming past Judges desks with hardly a look much less the usually required judicial scrutiny. He says

No one should have the legal right to take your home merely by winking and nodding their way around a significant flaw in the securitization model and whatever burrs it may leave on the industry’s saddle. …

Is there anyone with a present contractual connection to you or the loan who has actually suffered a default? If not, any… foreclosure begins to bear an uncanny resemblance to double dipping.

It is time for Judges to dust off the principle of fundamental fairness that lies at the heart of our legal system, demand a level playing field, and stand behind alternatives to foreclosure that serve the legitimate interests of homeowner and industry alike.

His article is both insightful and concise, which is more than I can say for some of the things that I have written at length. And I guess if you are in the Cape Cod area it probably would be a good idea to contact him at rpl@luddenkramerlaw.com. He pierces through layers upon layers of subterfuge by the financial industry and comes up with the right conclusion — separation not just of note and mortgage — but more importantly the separation between the note and the ultimate certificate that spells out the rights of a creditor to repayment and the rights of anonymous individuals and entities to foreclose. In securitization practice the note ceases to exist.

He correctly concludes that the assignments (and I would add endorsements and powers of attorney) are a sham, designed to conceal basic flaws in the entire securitization model. The only thing I would add is something that has not quite made it to the surface of these chaotic waters — that the money from the investors never made it into the trust — something that is perfectly consistent with ignoring the securitization model and the securitization documents.

The ‘assignment’ creates the appearance of [the] missing connection. But it is all hogwash, the only discernible purpose of which is to grease the skids for an illegal foreclosure. It is done long after the Trust has closed its doors. [referring to both the cutoff date and the fact that the trust actually does not ever get to own the debt, loan, note or mortgage]

The banks kept the money and assigned the losses to the investors. Then they bet on the losses and kept the profits from their intentionally watered down underwriting practices. Then they stole the identity of the borrowers and the investors and bought insurance that covered “losses” that were never incurred by the named insured — the Banks. The family resemblance to Ponzi scheme seems closer than mere double dipping in an infinite scheme of dipping into the funds of thousands of institutional investors and into the lives of millions of homeowners.

posted by Adam Levitin

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: assignment, cutoff, default, investors, Mortgage, note, real default, securitization, servicer advacnes, street name nominee | 18 Comments »

Why Are the Banks Abandoning Homes? Hundreds of Thousands of Homes Bulldozed After Foreclosure

Posted on December 2, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For More Information and assistance please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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No reasonable person would abandon this many homes after taking the trouble to foreclose on them. There is an obvious preference for foreclosure over workouts, modifications, short sales, resales, and other tools. This shows clearly that loss mitigation is not one of the factors in the minds of those who say they represent investors or REMIC trusts.

So they must have a reason to force the sale of a home other than loss mitigation. The people initiating these foreclosures and subsequent abandonment are acting against the interest of the investors who actually put up the money for the “securitization fail” that I identified and Adam Levitin named.

Thus it must be concluded that those who control the foreclosure process at the big investment banks benefit in some way other than loss mitigation. That can only mean one of two things:

The people making the decision make more money foreclosing than in pursuing workouts, modifications, or other settlements and/or

The people making the decision are using the foreclosing process to institutionalize “securitization fail” and thus avoid trillions of dollars in liability owed to the investors, insurers, guarantors, counterparties on hedge products, the borrowers and local, state and federal government.

This can only mean that the purpose of the foreclosure is not to mitigate damages to the actual lender or creditor. They don’t want performing loans even if it means that the homeowner is paying off the entire balance of the loan. And they make it difficult if not impossible to get a correct figure for a payoff.

So if the money is not the issue, and the house is not really in issue why do they pursue foreclosures, fabricate documents to do it and use robo-signers and robo witnesses to force through foreclosures on homes they will only abandon at the end of the process?

Should we not be asking whether good faith and clean hands have been established to justify the equitable remedy of forfeiture of the home?

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In South Florida news this morning, local Sheriffs are banding together to board up more than 1,000 homes in Lake Worth. In each case the home was foreclosed. In most cases, the homeowner applied for a modification and was told they could not apply until they were 90 days in arrears. In most cases, all efforts at modification were turned down under the guise that the investors refused to modify or workout the loan. That was most probably a lie. Neither the servicer nor the Trustee or other “enforcer” ever went to the investors with a single workout plan.

Continuous allegations of fraudulent foreclosures on predatory and fraudulent loans have been “settled” but not with the effected homeowners nor with local governments and homeowner associations who are deeply effected by this tragic fraud on the courts, the borrowers, the governments, and the society at large — as millions of jobs were lost and hundreds of thousands of businesses closed down as their customers were displaced from their homes (around 16 Million people directly displaced by fraudulent foreclosures thus far).

As foreclosures continue to increase in number (despite news reports to the contrary) more homeowners are being forced out of their homes, including many that were in the family for generations. The houses, now empty, lay dormant sometimes for 6 years or more before the actual “auction” sale takes place. During that time, miscreants move in creating meth labs, crack houses, safe houses for gangs etc. In the end the property is abandoned, and it leads to more foreclosures and more abandonment. Eventually entire neighborhoods are converted to ghost towns reducing the property values to zero — perfect for an intermediary who wants to cheat investors. The foreclosure sale and abandonment show the recovery at zero. Investors are even told that they should be happy that they didn’t incur further liability than their investment in the property.

In most states, effort to reclaim the homes have failed because they were stripped of the vital mechanical systems and even building materials — a new industry resulting from this process of foreclosure and abandonment. The local property taxes are unpaid for years — leading to forever where the homes are completely abandoned and demolished. But the local government is stuck with the bill because with the new construction from the false boom created by the banks they expanded infrastructure and social services (police, fire, medical etc.).

Meanwhile the same local government is being told that their investment in mortgage bonds have produced losses. So they are stuck with the double whammy of non-payment of property and other taxes plus a direct loss incurred from the “securitization fail” scheme. I believe that attorneys ought to take cases on contingency where local government files suit against the banks. The allegation should be made that not only did the banks NOT act in good faith, they acted in BAD faith because they had no right to foreclose on false papers created at the closing of a loan wherein the borrower and investors were unaware of the true nature of the transaction.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: ABANDONMENT, foreclosure fraud, fraudulent loans, investors, local government, modifications, REMIC, WORKOUTS | 30 Comments »

A Foreclosure Judgment and Sale is a Forced Assignment Against the Interests of Investors and For the Interests of the Bank Intermediaries

Posted on September 15, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

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Successfully hoodwinking a Judge into entering a Judgment of Foreclosure and forcing the sale of a homeowner’s property has the effect of transferring the loss on that loan from the securities broker and its co-venturers to the Pension Fund that gave the money to the securities broker. Up until the moment of the foreclosure, the loss will fall on the securities brokers for damages, refunds etc. Once foreclosure is entered it sets in motion a legal cascade that protects the securities broker from further claims for fraud against the investors, insurers, and guarantors.

The securities broker was thought to be turning over the proceeds to the Trust which issued bonds in an IPO. Instead the securities broker used the money for purposes and in ways that were — according to the pleadings of the investors, the government, guarantors, and insurers — FRAUDULENT. Besides raising the issue of unclean hands, these facts eviscerate the legal enforcement of loan documents that were, according to those same parties, fraudulent, unenforceable and subject to claims for damages and punitive damages from borrowers.

There is a difference between documents that talk about a transaction and the transaction documents themselves. That is the essence of the fraud perpetrated by the banks in most of the foreclosure actions that I have reviewed. The documents that talk about a transaction are referring to a transaction that never existed. Documents that “talk about” a transaction include a note, mortgage, assignment, power of attorney etc. Documents that ARE the transaction documents include the actual evidence of actual payments like a wire transfer or canceled check and the actual evidence of delivery of the loan documents — like Fedex receipts or other form of correspondence showing that the recipient was (a) the right recipient and (b) actually received the documents.

The actual movement of the actual money and actual Transaction Documents has been shrouded in secrecy since this mortgage mess began. It is time to come clean.

THE REAL DEBT: The real debt does NOT arise unless someone gets something from someone else that is legally recognized as “value” or consideration. Upon receipt of that, the recipient now owes a duty to the party who gave that “something” to him or her. In this case, it is simple. If you give money to someone, it is presumed that a debt arises to pay it back — to the person who loaned it to you. What has happened here is that the real debt arose by operation of common law (and in some cases statutory law) when the borrower received the money or the money was used, with his consent, for his benefit. Now he owes the money back. And he owes it to the party whose money was used to fund the loan transaction — not the party on paperwork that “talks about” the transaction.

The implied ratification that is being used in the courts is wrong. The investors not only deny the validity of the loan transactions with homeowners, but they have sued the securities brokers for fraud (not just breach of contract) and they have received considerable sums of money in settlement of their claims. How those settlement effect the balance owed by the debtor is unclear — but it certainly introduces the concept that damages have been mitigated, and the predatory loan practices and appraisal fraud at closing might entitle the borrowers to a piece of those settlements — probably in the form of a credit against the amount owed.

Thus when demand is made to see the actual transaction documents, like a canceled check or wire transfer receipt, the banks fight it tooth and nail. When I represented banks and foreclosures, if the defendant challenged whether or not there was a transaction and if it was properly done, I would immediately submit the affidavits real witnesses with real knowledge of the transaction and absolute proof with a copy of a canceled check, wire transfer receipt or deposit into the borrowers account. The dispute would be over. There would be nothing to litigate.

There is no question in my mind that the banks are afraid of the question of payment and delivery. With increasing frequency, I am advised of confidential settlements where the homeowner’s attorney was relentless in pursuing the truth about the loan, the ownership (of the DEBT, not the “note” which is supposed to be ONLY evidence of the debt) and the balance. The problem is that none of the parties in the “chain” ever paid a dime (except in fees) and none of them ever received delivery of closing documents. This is corroborated by the absence of the Depositor and Custodian in the “chain”.

The plain truth is that the securities broker took money from the investor/lender and instead of of delivering the proceeds to the Trust (I.e, lending the money to the Trust), the securities broker set up an elaborate scheme of loaning the money directly to borrowers. So they diverted money from the Trust to the borrower’s closing table. Then they diverted title to the loan from the investor/lenders to a controlled entity of the securities broker.

The actual lender is left with virtually no proof of the loan. The note and mortgage is been made out in favor of an entity that was never disclosed to the investor and would never have been approved by the investor is the fund manager of the pension fund had been advised of the actual way in which the money of the pension fund had been channeled into mortgage originations and mortgage acquisitions.

Since the prospectus and the pooling and servicing agreement both rule out the right of the investors and the Trustee from inquiring into the status of the loans or the the “portfolio” (which is nonexistent), it is a perfect storm for moral hazard. The securities broker is left with unbridled ability to do anything it wants with the money received from the investor without the investor ever knowing what happened.

Hence the focal point for our purposes is the negligence or intentional act of the closing agent in receiving money from one actual lender who was undisclosed and then applying it to closing documents with a pretender lender who was a controlled entity of the securities broker. So what you have here is an undisclosed lender who is involuntarily lending money directly a homeowner purchase or refinance a home. The trust is ignored an obviously the terms of the trust are avoided and ignored. The REMIC Trust is unfunded and essentially without a trustee — and none of the transactions contemplated in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement ever occurred.

The final judgment of foreclosure forces the “assignment” into a “trust” that was unfunded, didn’t have a Trustee with any real powers, and didn’t ever get delivery of the closing documents to the Depositor or Custodian. This results in forcing a bad loan into the trust, which presumably enables the broker to force the loss from the bad loans onto the investors. They also lose their REMIC status which means that the Trust is operating outside the 90 day cutoff period. So the Trust now has a taxable event instead of being treated as a conduit like a Subchapter S corporation. This creates double taxation for the investor/lenders.

The forced “purchase” of the REMIC Trust takes place without notice to the investors or the Trust as to the conflict of interest between the Servicers, securities brokers and other co-venturers. The foreclosure is pushed through even when there is a credible offer of modification from the borrower that would allow the investor to recover perhaps as much as 1000% of the amount reported as final proceeds on liquidation of the REO property.

So one of the big questions that goes unanswered as yet, is why are the investor/lenders not given notice and an opportunity to be heard when the real impact of the foreclosure only effects them and does not effect the intermediaries, whose interests are separate and apart from the debt that arose when the borrower received the money from the investor/lender?

The only parties that benefit from a foreclosure sale are the ones actively pursuing the foreclosure who of course receive fees that are disproportional to the effort, but more importantly the securities broker closes the door on potential liability for refunds, repurchases, damages to be paid from fraud claims from investors, guarantors and other parties and even punitive damages arising out of the multiple sales of the same asset to different parties.

If the current servicers were removed, since they have no actual authority anyway (The trust was ignored so the authority arising from the trust must be ignored), foreclosures would virtually end. Nearly all cases would be settled on one set of terms or another, enabling the investors to recover far more money (even though they are legally unsecured) than what the current “intermediaries” are giving them.

If this narrative gets out into the mainstream, the foreclosing parties would be screwed. It would show that they have no right to foreclosure based upon a voidable mortgage securing a void promissory note. I received many calls last week applauding the articles I wrote last week explaining the securitization process — in concept, as it was written and how it operated in the real world ignoring the REMIC Trust entity. This is an attack on any claim the forecloser makes to having the rights to enforce — which can only come from a party who does have the right to enforce.

see http://livinglies.me/2014/09/10/securitization-for-lawyers-conflicts-between-reality-the-documents-and-the-concept/

Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CORRUPTION, discovery, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Neil Garfield Show, originator, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: investors, lenders, pretender lenders, REMIC, securitization, void note, voidable mortgage | 124 Comments »

The Logic of Wall Street “Securitization:” The transaction that never existed

Posted on August 14, 2014 by Neil Garfield

For more information on foreclosure offense and defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

The logic of Wall Street schemes is simple: Create the trusts but don’t use them. Lie to everyone and assure everyone that Trusts were used to “securitize” loans. The strategy is so successful and the lie is so big and has been going on for so long, that most people believe it.

You see it in the decisions of the appellate courts who render opinions like the recent 3rd district in California which expresses the premise that the borrower was loaned money by the originator. Once you start with THAT premise, the outcome is no surprise. But start with reverse premise — that the borrower was NOT loaned money BY THE ORIGINATOR and you end up with a very different result.

We could assume that Wall Street is reckless in lending money. They can afford to be reckless because they are using investor money. And, so the story goes, the boys on Wall Street got a little wild with loans that they would never have approved for themselves.

Without risk of any loss, Wall Street investment banks make money regardless of whether the loan succeeds or goes into default.

But Wall Street is not content with earning fees. The basic credo is a question: “How can we make YOUR money OUR money.” And they have successfully devised and followed that goal for many years. As one insider told me in an interview that must remain anonymous, “It is like a magic trick. You create a trust and everyone is looking at the trust and everyone is looking at transactions affecting the trust, when in fact all the action is occurring off record, off the books and away from scrutiny by investors, trustees, rating agencies, insurers, borrowers, and of course, the courts.”

So the question becomes “what happens to investor money after it is received by the investment bank?” If the money passes from the bank account of the managed fund (pension) fund to the bank account of the investment bank that sold bonds issued by a Trust then the Trust would receive the money. It didn’t.

The Trust would then issue funds for the origination or acquisition of loans. In return it would get the loan documents and they would be placed with the Depositor or Depository — pretty much the way ordinary loans are done. It didn’t. Instead we had millions of loan documents lost or destroyed and then re-created for litigation purposes. Why would an entire industry have engaged in that behavior? Was it really a “volume” problem where there was too much paper or was it something more sinister?

The problem is that the investment bank that acts as broker in selling the bonds is in control of the loans and investments of the Trusts. Since the fees of the investment bank are based on the existence of transactions in which the Trust issues money in exchange for investment certificates, the Wall Street bank is incentivized to make that Trust money move regardless of the quality of the investment. And since the Trust has no say in the actual underwriting decision to originate or acquire the loan, the investment bank is the only one in charge. That leaves the fox guarding the hen house.

But that doesn’t satisfy Wall Street either. They realized that they can create “proprietary profits” for the investment banks by creating a yield spread premium. A yield spread premium is the difference in value between two different loans to the same party for the same transaction — one is the honest one and the other is fictitious.

At closing the borrower is steered into the fictitious one which is far more risky and expensive than the one the borrower is actually qualified to receive.

At the investor level the “trust” is ordered to take loans that are far less valuable than they appear. This means that the Trust buys the investment bonds or shares that the investment bank has created with nobody checking the quality or ownership of the investment. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement contains provisions that effectively bars the Trustee or the investors from knowing or even inquiring about these transactions. Look at any PSA and you will see it.

The bottom line is that the worse the loan terms for the borrower and the more likely it is that the loan will fail, the lower the value of the loan. But if it is sold as though it was an ordinary conventional loan at 5%, then the price, charged for a crappy loan is much higher than its true value. Same scenario as the inflated appraisals of real property and homes.

So the investment bank inserts itself as the Seller of the loan to the trust. At their proprietary trading desk the investment bank sells its ownership interest in the loan to the trust for the higher “value” because the investment bank is making the decisions on what loans the trust will buy. Meanwhile they have created loans that are worth far less and even have principal due on the “notes” that is far less than what the trust is forced to “pay.”

Checking with informed sources, it is evident that those proprietary transactions were fictitious and allowed the investment banks to report huge “profits” while everyone else was losing their shirts trading bonds, equities and anything else. The transaction at the proprietary trading desk of the investment bank was fictitious because the trust did not issue any payment to the investment bank, who never formally owned the loan in the first place.

You don’t see investment banks anywhere in the chain of title whether you review public records or even MERS. So you have the investment bank selling a loan they don’t own to a trust that never paid for it. The entire transaction is recorded but does not exist.

In the case of a 15% $300,000 loan to a “borrower”, it is “SOLD” as a 5% conventional loan giving the investment bank a reason to declare that it made a profit on a “proprietary trade.” How much profit? Figure it out — on the back of a napkin you can see how the investment banks “sold” the $300,000 loan but “received” $900,000 from the Trust leaving the investors with an instant $600,000 loss and the probability of losing the rest of the $300,000 as well. This is exactly opposite to the provisions of the Prospectus and PSA.

Upon examination, my sources tell me, the money to cover that declared “trading” profit does exist at the investment bank. That is because the investment bank took the money from investors, never funded the trust, and pocketed the $600,000 in advance of the “proprietary trade, which they could cause to be recorded and reported at any time, since the investment bank was in total control.

Enter moral hazard.

The only incentive that the investment bank to stay honest is to report good results so the managed funds buy more bonds. But that does not protect investors. The investment bank creates a classic PONZI scheme in which it uses investor money to make the monthly payments on the bonds or shares and reports that “all is well.” The report disclaims reliability, credibility and authenticity. Wells Fargo has an especially strong disclaimer on the distribution report to investors. The disclaimers were ignored as “boiler plate” by fund managers who made the investment on behalf of the their pensioners or mutual fund shareholders.

All the fund managers needed to know was that they were getting paid — but they did not realize that a significant part of the payment came from their own investment dollars advanced to the investment bank, as broker for the purchase of trust bonds or shares.

So the investment bank makes much less money on good investments for the trust than on really bad investments. In fact they have the incentive to make certain the loan fails. Not only do they get the yield spread premium described above, the investment bank, is trading on inside information in which only the investment bank knows the truth. It places bets against the viability of the loan and bets further against the value of the mortgage bonds, and buys contracts for insurance, betting that the value of the bond will fall in a “credit event” without the necessity of an actual default.

SO IF THE INVESTMENT BANK DID NOT GIVE THE TRUST THE MONEY FROM INVESTORS, WHERE DID THE INVESTORS’ MONEY GO?

That is the trillion dollar question. And THIS is where the Courts have it completely wrong. Either we are a nation of laws or a nation governed by the financial industry. The banks bet on themselves, and so far, they were right to do so.

The money given to the investment banks was spread out over a long list of intermediaries owned or controlled by the investment bank. AND then SOME of it was spread out funding loans to borrowers. But the investment bank obviously could not name itself on the note and mortgage. That would have revealed that the tax advantages of a REMIC trust were nonexistent because the trust was not involved in the transaction.

So an elaborate, complicated, circuitous route was chosen for the “approval” of loans for origination or acquisition. First you have a nominee, which is often MERS plus a “lender” who was also a nominee even though they were called lender. The “lender” was subject to an assignment and assumption agreement that prohibited the “lender” from exercising any control over the closing on the loan that was being “originated.” In short, they were being paid to pretend to be a lender — hence the term pretender lender.

The closing agent, whose fee depends upon actually closing, and the mortgage broker, whose fee depends upon actually closing, and the title company, whose fee depends upon the actual closing, have no interest in protecting the borrower from what is about to transpire.

The closing agent gets money from any one of a variety of sources OTHER THAN THE “LENDER.” The closing agent applies those funds to the closing as though the “Lender” made the loan. As stated by one mortgage document specialist for a large “originator”, “We knew that table funded loans were predatory and illegal, but we didn’t take that seriously. And the borrowers didn’t know who the lender was — that was the point. We used table funded loans to conceal the actual lender.”

Those funds came from the investors, although the money did not come through the trust. It came from the investment bank which was acting in the capacity, as they tell it, as a depository bank — which is why the Federal government allowed them to become commercial banks able to act as depositories. And every effort was made to prevent any evidence as to whose money was actually involved in the loan. Since it was the investor money that was used to originate or acquire the loan, it should have been the investors who were named as owner of the loan and recorded as such in the public records.

If you look at the PSA, it requires funding of the trust, of course. But it also requires that its acquisition of loans contain all the elements of a holder in due course, thus barring any claims from borrowers about irregularities at the closing, violations of state and federal law, etc. In summary the only defenses a borrower could raise against a holder in due course is that they paid or that they never signed the note. So a person who pays money in good faith without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses is pretty well protected. In litigation with borrowers, borrowers would be told they must sue the intermediaries that caused the problems with their loans.

The fact that no foreclosure of a loan subject to “claims of securitization” alleges HDC (holder in due course) status is very substantial corroboration that the Trust did not pay for the loan in good faith without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses.

The banks have been betting on a lot of things and winning every bet. In court they are betting that they will be treated as holders in due course and not as simply holders either with or without any right to enforce where they might be required to prove the actual loan of money from the originator, or the payment of money for an assignment and endorsement. And THAT is why the appellate court is assuming that the loan actually occurred — you, know, the loan that is underlying the execution of the note and mortgage, because the borrower didn’t know the truth.

The factual problem is that the presumptions and assumptions relied upon by the courts are in direct conflict with the real facts. The legal problem is that starting with the original loan, many cases, and always with the assignment of loan, is that somewhere in the chain (and probably at more than one point in the “chain”) there is no underlying transaction for the paper upon which the bankers rely in foreclosure.

Some OTHER transaction occurred, which is why the note is evidence of a loan that does not exist between the “lender” and the “borrower” and why the assignment is evidence of a transaction that does not exist between the assignor and assignee. The mistake being made is basic law: the courts are confusing “evidence” of a transaction with the transaction itself. In so doing they are escalating the status of the forecloser from a mere holder to a holder in due course without any actual claim or allegation of HDC status. Once that is done, the borrower is doomed.

The doom should fall on the investment bank and all the intermediaries that participated in this scheme. They left the investors with no coverage — the investors money was used in ways that were expressly prohibited by the offering, the PSA, and even the rules governing investments by stable managed funds whose risk is required to be extremely low in any investment. The investors are the involuntary lenders with no note and no mortgage.

The good news is that nearly all borrowers would be happy to execute a note and mortgage to investors who actually funded their loan or even a trust that was identified by the investors to represent them. The terms would be based upon current economic reality and would thus mitigate the damages to both the investor lenders and the borrowers. The balance, as we have already seen, lies in lawsuits for damages against the investment banks and their intermediaries demanding refunds, damages and even punitive damages. Those lawsuits are being brought by investors, borrowers, insurers, and guarantors and in some cases by counterparties to credit default swaps.

Without the execution of a real note and real mortgage, the foreclosures are fatally defective. So the bad news is that as long as the courts assume and then presume and then enter judgment for the foreclosing party, the Judge is inadvertently sealing a greater loss applied against the investor lender, removing the tax advantages of a REMIC trust, and creating another bar to liability and accountability of the investment bank who effectively has been lying and cheating its way through the system — using legal “presumptions” that are directly contrary to the facts.

Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CORRUPTION, discovery, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, Motions, originator, Pleading, securities fraud, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: acquisition, borrowers, investment banks, investors, origination, PSA, REMIC, risk, trust | 30 Comments »

Relevance: THE FORECLOSER HAS NO RIGHT TO BE IN COURT WITHOUT THE SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS

Posted on June 27, 2014 by Neil Garfield

Courts and lawyers are continually ignoring the obvious. By zeroing in on the NOTE, they are ignoring the documents that allow the person in possession of the note to be in court. That results in elimination of critical elements of a prima facie case in which the Defendant borrower lacks the superior knowledge and resources of the Plaintiff and its co-venturers that would show the truth about his loan ownership and balance.

Premise:

Chronologically the document trail starts with the securitization documents. Without the securitization documents there is no privity or nexus between the borrowers and the lenders. Neither one of them signed the deal that the other signed. Without the Assignment and Assumption Agreement, the Prospectus and the Pooling And Servicing Agreement, the trust does not exist, the servicer has no powers, the trustee has no powers, and there is no right of representation or agency between any of those parties as it relates to either the lender investors or the homeowner borrowers.

The Assignment and Assumption Agreement between the originator and the aggregator sets forth all the rules and actions preceding, during and after the loan”closing”, including the underwriting by parties other than the originator and the ownership of the loan by parties other than the originator. It is a contract to violate public policy, the Federal Truth in Lending Law prohibiting table funded loans designed to withhold disclosure, and usually state deceptive and predatory lending statutes.

The Assignment and Assumption Agreement was an agreement to commit illegal acts that were in fact committed and which strictly governed the conduct of the originator, the closing agent, the document processing, the delivery of documents, the due diligence, the underwriting, the approval by parties other than the originator and the risk of loss on parties other than the originator. The Assignment and Assumption Agreement is essential to the Court’s knowledge of the intent and reality of the closing, intentionally withheld from the borrower at closing. It cannot be anything other than relevant in any action sought to enforce the documents produced at a loan closing that was conducted in strict adherence to the illegal Assignment and Assumption Agreement.

The other closing is with the investors who were accepting a proposed transaction to lend money for the origination or acquisition of loans through a trust. Those documents and records (Prospectus, Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Distribution reports, etc) provide for the creation and governance of the trust, the appointment of a trustee and the powers of the trustee, and the appointment and the powers of the Master Servicer and subservicers. Those documents also provide for there requirements of reporting and record keeping, including the physical location and custody of actual loan documents. Without those documents, there is no power or authority for the trustee, the trust, the Master Servicer, the subservicer, the Depository, the Securities Administrator the purchase of insurance, credit default swap trading, funding the origination or acquisition of loans, or collection and enforcement of loan documents. without those documents the Court cannot know what records should be kept and thus what records need to be produced to show the status of the obligation in the books and records of the creditor — regardless of whether the loan was actually securitized or just claimed to be securitized.

Procedure and UCC
In Judicial States, the Plaintiff is bringing suit alleging a default by the Defendant on a promissory note and for enforcement of a mortgage. The name of the payee on the note is different from the name of the Plaintiff in the lawsuit. The name of the mortgagee is different from the the name of the Plaintiff. The suit is bought by (a) a trustee on behalf of the holders of securities that make the holders of those securities (Mortgage Bonds) in a NY Trust (b) the “servicer” on behalf of the trust or the holders or (c) a company that alleges it is a holder or a holder with rights to enforce. None of them assert they are holders in due course which means they concede that the Plaintiff did not buy the loan in good faith without knowledge of the borrowers defenses. They assert they are holder in which case they are subject to all of the borrowers defense — which procedurally means the issues concerning the initial loan and any subsequent transfers can be in issue if the preemptive facts are denied and appropriate affirmative defenses and counterclaims are filed. These defenses are waived at trial if an objection is not timely raised.

In Non-Judicial States, the name of the “new” beneficiary is different from the name of the payee on the promissory note and the name of the beneficiary on the Deed of Trust. The “new beneficiary” files a “Substitution of Trustee”, the Trustee sends a notice of default, notice of sale and notice of acceleration based upon “representations” from the “new beneficiary.” This process allows a stranger to the transaction to assert its position outside of a court of law that it is the new beneficiary and even allows the new beneficiary to name a company as the “new trustee” in the Notice of Substitution of Trustee. The foreclosure is initiated by the new trustee on the deed of trust on behalf of (a) a trustee on behalf of the holders of securities that make the holders of those securities (Mortgage Bonds) in a NY Trust (b) the “servicer” on behalf of the trust or the holders or (c) a company that alleges it is a holder or a holder with rights to enforce. None of them assert they are holders in due course which means they concede that the Plaintiff did not buy the loan in good faith without knowledge of the borrowers defenses. They assert they are holder in which case they are subject to all of the borrowers defense — which procedurally means the issues concerning the initial loan and any subsequent transfers can be in issue if the preemptive facts are denied and appropriate affirmative defenses and counterclaims are filed. These defenses are waived at trial if an objection is not timely raised. In these cases it is the burden of the borrower to timely file a motion for Temporary Injunction to stop the trustee’s sale of the property.

Argument:
By failing to assert with clarity the identity of the creditor on whose behalf they are “holding” the note and mortgage (or deed of trust) and failing to assert the presence of the actual creditor (holder in due course) the parties initiating foreclosure have (a) failed to assert the essential elements to enforce a note and mortgage and (b) have failed to establish a prima facie case in which the burden should shift to the borrowers to defend. The present practice of challenging the defenses first is improper and contrary to the requirements of due process and the rules of civil procedure. If the Plaintiff in Judicial states or beneficiary in non-judicial states is unable to sustain their burden of proof for a prima facie case, then Judgment should be entered for the alleged borrower.

Evidence:
Virtually all loans initiated or originated or acquired between 1996 and the present are subject to claims of securitization, which is the first reason why the securitization documents are relevant and must be introduced as evidence along with proof of compliance with those documents because they are almost all governed by New York State law governing common law trusts. Any act not permitted by the trust instrument (Pooling and Servicing Agreement) is void, which means for purposes of the case narrative, the act or event never occurred.

If the Plaintiff or beneficiary is alleging that it is a holder and not alleging it is a holder in due course then there is a 96% probability that the creditor is either a trust or a group of investors who paid money to a broker dealer in an IPO where securities were issued by the trust and the investors money should have been paid to the trust. In all events, the assertion of “holder” status instead of “Holder in Due Course” means by definition that one of two things is true: (1) there is no holder in due course or (2) there is a Holder in Due Course and the party initiating the foreclosure and collection proceedings is asserting authority to represent the holder in due course. In all events, the representation of holder rather than holder in due course is an admission that the party initiating the foreclosure proceeding is there in a representative capacity.

THE FORECLOSER HAS NO RIGHT TO BE IN COURT WITHOUT THE SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS:

If the proceeding is brought by a named trust, then the existence of the trust, the authority of the trust, the manner in which the trust may acquire assets, and the authority of the servicer, Master servicer, trustee of the trust, depository, securities administrator and others all derive from the trust instrument. If there is a claim of securitization and the provisions of the securitization documents were not followed then in virtually all foreclosure cases the wrong parties are initiating the foreclosures — because the money of the investors went direct to the origination and purchase of loans rather than through the SPV Trust which for tax purposes was designed to be a REMIC pass through trust.

If the foreclosing party identifies itself as a servicer and as a holder it is admitting that it is there in a representative capacity. Their prima facie case therefore includes the documents and events in which acquired the right to represent the actual creditor. Those are only the securitization documents.

If the foreclosing party identifies itself as a holder but does not mention that it is a servicer, the same rules apply — the right to be there is a representative capacity must derive from some written instrument, which in virtually cases is the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

Representations that the loan is a portfolio loan not subject to securitization are generally untrue. In a true portfolio loan the UCC would not apply but the rules governing a holder in due course can be used as guidance for the alleged transaction. The “lender” must show that it actually funded the loan, in good faith (in accordance with the requirements of Federal and State law governing lending) and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. They would be able to show their underwriting committee notes, reports and correspondence, the verification of the loan, the property value, the ability of the borrower to repay and all other national standards for underwriting and appraisals. These are only absent when there is no risk of loss on the alleged loan, because if the borrower doesn’t pay, the money was never destined to be received by the originator anyway.

In addition, the Prospectus offering to the investors combined with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement constitute the “indenture” describing the manner in which the investment will be returned to the investors, including interest, insurance proceeds, proceeds of credit default swaps, government and non government guarantees, etc. This specifies the duties and records that must be kept, where they must be kept and how the investors will receive distributions from the servicer. Proof of the balance shown by investors is the only relevant proof of a dealt and the principal balance due, applicable interest due, etc. The provisions of the contract between the creditors and the trust govern the amount and manner of distributions to the creditor. Thus it is only be reference to the creditors’ records that a prima facie case for default and the right to accelerate can be made. The servicer records do not include third party payments but do include servicer advances. If records of servicer advances are not shown in court, and the provision for servicer advances is in the prospectus and/or pooling and servicing agreement, then the Court is unable to know the balance and whether any default occurred as a result of the borrower ceasing to make payments to the servicer.

In short, it is the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement that provide the framework for determining whether the creditors got paid as per their expectations pursuant to their contract with the Trust. It is only by reference to these documents that the distribution reports to the investors can be used as partial evidence of the existence of a default or “credit event.” Representations that the borrower did not pay the servicer are not conclusive as to the existence of a default. Only the records of the creditor, who by virtue of its relationships with multiple co-obligors, can establish that payments due were paid to the creditor. Servicer records are relevant as to whether the servicer received payments, but not relevant as to whether the creditor received those payments directly or indirectly. The servicer and creditors’ records establish servicer advance payments, which if made, nullify the creditor default. The creditors’ records establish the amount of principal or interest due after deductions from receipt of third party payments (insurance, credit default swaps, guarantees, loss sharing etc.).

For more information call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

Filed under: AMGAR, CORRUPTION, discovery, escrow agent, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, originator, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: Assignment and ASsumption Agreement, borrowers, credit default swaps, holders of certificates, homeowners, insurance, investors, Pooling and Servicing Agreement, predatory loan, Prospectus, Servicer advances, table funded loans, Truth in Lending Act | 76 Comments »

AMGAR

Posted on May 19, 2014 by Neil Garfield

After years of writing about the AMGAR program, people are finally asking about this program. So here is a summary of the program. As usual I caution you against using my articles as the final word on any subject. Before you make any decisions about your loans, whether you are in foreclosure, collection or otherwise you should seek competent legal counsel who is licensed in the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. Also for those who think they would invest in such a program, you should seek both legal advice and consult with a person qualified and licensed as a financial adviser. And for full disclosure, this plan does include an equity provision and fees to the livinglies team.

The AMGAR program was first developed by me when I was living in Arizona where, after the 2008-2009 crash, the state was facing a $3 Billion deficit. The Chairman of the Arizona House Judiciary Committee invited me to testify about possible solutions to the foreclosure crisis, which at that time was just ramping up. So I developed a program that I called the Arizona Mortgage Guarantee and Resolution plan, which was dubbed “AMGAR.” Now the acronym stands for American Mortgage Guarantee and Resolution program. In Arizona it was mostly a governmental program with some private enterprise components.

For a while it looked as though Arizona would adopt the program and pass the necessary legislation to do it. All departments of the legislative and executive branches of government had examined it carefully and concluded that I was right both as to its premises and its results.

The objective was to tax and fine the various entities that were “trading” in loans improperly, illegally and failing to report it as taxable income, as well as failing to pay the fees associated with filing such transfers in the County records of each county.

The State would essentially call the bluff of the banks, which was already obvious in 2008 — they did not appear to have any ownership interest in the loans upon which they initiated foreclosures.

Thus the State and private investors would offer to pay off the mortgage at the amount demanded if the foreclosing party could prove ownership and the balance (it was already known that the banks had received a lot of money from both public and private sources that reduced the loss and thus should have reduced the balances owed to investors, which in turn reduces the balance owed from borrowers).

The offer to pay off the the money claimed due by the forecloser was on behalf of the homeowner who would enter into an agreement with AMGAR for a new, real, valid mortgage at fair market value with industry standard terms instead of the exotic mortgages that borrowers were lured into signing when they understood practically nothing about the loan. The State would levy a tax or enforce existing taxes against the participants in the alleged securitization plan for the trading they had been doing. The State would foreclose on the tax liens thus opening the door to settlements that would reduce the amount expended on paying off the old loan.

The AMGAR program would receive a mortgage and note equal to what was actually paid out to the foreclosing parties, which was presumed to be discounted sharply because of their inability to prove ownership and balance. Hence the state would receive a valid note and mortgage for every penny they paid and it would receive the taxes and fees that were due and unpaid, and then sell these clean mortgages into the secondary market place. Both the legislative and executive branches of Arizona government — all relevant departments — concluded that the plan would erase the $3 Billion Arizona deficit and put a virtual halt on foreclosures that had already turned new developments into ghost towns.

But the plan went dark when certain influential Republicans in the state apparently received the word from the banks to kill the program.

Not to be deterred from what I considered to be a bold, innovative program aimed at the truth about the hundreds of thousands of wrongful foreclosures, I embarked on a persistent plan of to raise interest and capital to put the program into use. This time the offer to payoff the old loan would come from (1) homeowners who could afford to make the offer and (2) investors who were willing to assume the apparent risk of paying $700,000 as a payoff, only to receive a mortgage and note equal to a much lower fair market value. But the new plan had a kicker for investors to assume that risk.

The plan worked for the few people who were homeowners, in foreclosure and who had the resources to make the offer. Unlike the buyback issue raised by Martha Coakley last week, the plan avoided any possible rule prohibiting the homeowner from getting the house back and in fact employed existing laws permitting the borrower to pay off the loan rather than suffer the loss of the property.

The offer specifies what constitutes proof for purposes of the offer and thus avoids varying interpretations by judges who might think one presumption or another carries the day for the banks. This plan requires actual transactional proof of payments for the origination and acquisition of the loan, and actual disclosure of the loss mitigation payments received by or on behalf of the creditors (investors).

As expected, the banks tried to say that they didn’t have to accept the money. They wanted the foreclosure. But nobody bought that argument. The myth that the bank was “reclaiming” the property was just that — a myth. The bank never owned the property. It was interesting watching the bank back peddle on producing proof that it MUST have had if it brought foreclosure proceedings. But they didn’t have it because it didn’t exist.

Banks claimed to have loaned money to the homeowner and thus were entitled to payment first, or failing that, THEN foreclosure. And what has resulted is an array of confidential settlements in which I cannot reveal the contents without putting the homeowner in danger of losing their home. Suffice it to say they were satisfied.

The reason I am writing about this again is that the latest development is a series of investors have approached me with a request for development of a plan that would put AMGAR into effect. They are looking for profit so that is what I am giving them in the new plan. This has not yet been launched but there are several iterations of the plan that may be offered through one or more entities. You might say this plan is published for comment although we are already processing candidates for which the plan would be used.

If I am right, along with everyone else who says the mortgages, assignments, transactions are all fake with no canceled checks, wire transfer receipts or anything else showing that they funded the origination or acquisition of the loan, then it follows that at the very least the mortgage is an unenforceable document even if it is recorded.

If things go according to plan, then the bank will be forced to either put up or shut up in court — either providing the reasonable proof required by the commitment or offer or suffer a dismissal or judgment for the homeowner. It would not be up to the Judge to state what proof was required. Instead the Judge would only be called upon to determine that the bank had failed to properly respond — giving information they should have had all along. The debt might theoretically exist payable to SOMEONE, but it wouldn’t be secured debt and therefore not subject to foreclosure. The mortgage encumbrance in the public records could then be removed by a court order. Title would be cleared.

Investors would be taking what appears to be a giant risk but obviously perception of the risk is declining. If the bank comes up with verifiable proof of ownership and balance (according to the terms of the offer or commitment), then the investor pays the bank and gets back a note and mortgage for much less. If the bank loses and the mortgage encumbrance is removed as a result of the assumption of that risk, then the investor gets a fee — 30% of the original loan balance expressed in a new mortgage and note at market rates over 30 years.

So the payoff is quite large to the investors if their assumptions are correct. If they are incorrect they lose all the expenses advanced for the homeowner, all the expenses of selection and potentially the money they put in escrow or the court registry to show proof that the offer is real.

We are currently vetting potential candidates for this program both from the homeowner side and the investor side. This type of investment while potentially lucrative, poses a large risk of loss. People should not invest in such a program unless they do not rely on the money invested for their income or lifestyle. They should be qualified investors as specified by SEC rules even if the SEC rules don’t apply. No money will be accepted and no homeowner will be signed up for the program until we have concluded all registrations necessary for launching the program.

Homeowners who want to be considered as candidates for this program should acquire a title and securitization report, plus a review by our staff, including myself.

You should have a title and securitization report anyway, in my opinion. If you already have one then send it to neilfgarfield@hotmail.com. If you don’t have such a report but would like to obtain one call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688 to order the report and review. If you already know someone who does this work, then call them, but a review by a qualified person with a financial background is important as well as a review by a qualified, licensed attorney.

Filed under: AMGAR, CORRUPTION, discovery, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, McCain, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, originator, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, taxes, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: AMGAR, debt, foreclosure, homeowners, investors, Mortgage, note | 11 Comments »

Don’t Admit the Default

Posted on April 18, 2014 by Neil Garfield

Kudos again to Jim Macklin for sitting in for me last night. Excellent job — but don’t get too comfortable in my chair :). Lots of stuff in another mini-seminar packed into 28 minutes of talk.

A big point made by the attorney guest Charles Marshall, with which I obviously agree, is don’t admit the default in a foreclosure unless that is really what you mean to do. I have been saying for 8 years that lawyers and pro se litigants and Petitioners in bankruptcy proceedings have been cutting their own throats by stating outright or implying that the default exists. It probably doesn’t exist, even though it SEEMS like it MUST exist since the borrower stopped paying.

There is not a default just because a borrower stops paying. The default occurs when the CREDITOR DOESN’T GET PAID. Until the false game of “securitization started” there was no difference between the two — i.e., when the borrower stopped paying the creditor didn’t get paid. But that is not the case in 96% of all residential loan transactions between 2001 and the present. Today there are multiple ways for the creditor to get paid besides the servicer receiving the borrower’s payment. the Courts are applying yesterday’s law without realizing that today’s facts are different.

Whether the creditor got paid and is still being paid is a question of fact that must be determined in a hearing where evidence is presented. All indications from the Pooling and Servicing Agreements, Distribution Reports, existing lawsuits from investors, insurers, counterparties in other hedge contracts like credit default swaps — they all indicate that there were multiple channels for payment that had little if anything to do with an individual borrower making payments to the servicer. Most Trust beneficiaries get paid regardless of whether the borrower makes payment, under provisions of the PSA for servicer advances, Trustee advances or some combination of those two plus the other co-obligors mentioned above.

Why would you admit a default on the part of the creditor’s account when you don’t have access to the money trail to identify the creditor? Why would you implicitly admit that the creditor has even been identified? Why would you admit a payment was due under a note and mortgage (or deed of trust) that were void front the start?

The banks have done a good job of getting courts to infer that the payment was due, to infer that the creditor is identified, to infer that the payment to the creditor wasn’t received by the creditor, and to infer that the balance shown by the servicer and the history of the creditor’s account can be shown by reference only to the servicer’s account. But that isn’t true. So why would you admit to something that isn’t true and why would you admit to something you know nothing about.

You don’t know because only the closing agent, originator and all the other “securitization” parties have any idea about the trail of money — the real transactions — and how the money was handled. And they are all suing the broker dealers and each other stating that fraud was committed and mismanagement of the multiple channels of payments received for, or on behalf of the trust or trust beneficiaries.

In the end it is exactly that point that will reach critical mass in the courts, when judges realize that the creditor has no default in its business records because it got paid — and the foreclosure by intermediaries in the false securitization scheme is a sham.

In California the issue they discussed last night about choice of remedies is also what I have been discussing for the last 8 years, but I must admit they said it better than I ever did. Either go for the money or go for the property — you can’t do both. And if you elected a remedy or assumed a risk, you can’t back out of it later — which is why the point was made last night that the borrower was a third party beneficiary of the transaction with investors which is why it is a single transaction — if there is no borrower, there wold be no investment. If there was no investment, there would have been no borrower. The transaction could not exist without both the investor and the borrower.

Bravo to Jim Macklin, Dan Edstrom and Charles Marshall, Esq. And remember don’t act on these insights without consulting with a licensed attorney who knows about this area of the law.

Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CORRUPTION, discovery, escrow agent, evidence, foreclosure defenses, GTC | Honor, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, Mortgage, Pleading, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: appraisal fraud, bankruptcy, borrower, disclosure, foreclosure, foreclosure offense, investors, Lender Liability, securitization | 42 Comments »

The Banks: Consideration is Irrelevant, Really? Then so is payment!

Posted on March 24, 2014 by Neil Garfield

The issue is what are the elements of the loan contract? Who are the parties? And who can enforce it?

I would agree that an overpayment at closing from the source of funds is rare. What is not rare and in fact common is that the wire transfer instructions that accompany the wire transfer receipt often instructs the closing agent to refund any overpayment to the party who wired the money — not the originator. This leads to questions. If it is a true warehouse lender, such instructions could be explained without affecting the validity of the note or mortgage.

In truth, the procedures used usually prevent the originator from ever touching the flow of funds. Wall Street banks were afraid of fraud — that if the originators could touch the money, they might have faked a number of closings and taken the money. In short, the investment banks were afraid that the originators would not use the money the way it was intended. So instead of doing that, they created relationships by having the originators sign Assignment and Assumption agreements before they started lending. This agreement says the loan belongs to an “aggregator” that is merely a controlled entity of the broker dealer. But the money doesn’t come from either the originator or the aggregator. Thus they have an agreement that controls the loan closings but no consideration for that either.

But this is a lot like the insurance payments, proceeds of credit default swaps etc. The contracts almost always specifically waive subrogation or any other right of action against the borrowers or any other enforcement of the notes or mortgages. It has been presumed that these contracts were for the mitigation of losses and that is true. But they are payable to the broker dealers and not the trust or trust beneficiaries. The investment banks committed fraud when they represented to the insurers, FDIC, Fannie, Freddie and CDS counterparties that they had an insurable interest. Those parties presumed that the investment banks were creating these hedge products for the benefit of the owner of the mortgage bonds or the owner of the loans. But it was paid to the investment banks. That is why all those parties are claiming losses that resulted from fraud — all of which have resulted in settlements (except the Countrywide verdict for fraud).

The similarity is this: in both the closing with borrowers and the closings with investors the same fraud occurred. When dealing with the closing agent they interposed their nominee in the closing which resulted in no note and no mortgage in favor of the investors or the trust. Whether the closing agent is liable is another issue. The point is that the money came from a third party which was a controlled entity of the broker dealer. Thus the investor gets a promise from a trust that is not funded while their money is used to pay fees, create the illusion of trading profits for the broker dealer and funding mortgages.

The wire transfer is not a wire transfer from the originator, nor from the bank at which the originator maintains any account. The wire transfer instructions and the wire transfer receipt fail to identify the actual source of funds and fail to refer to the originator as a real party. If they did, there would not be a problem for the banks to enforce the note and mortgage. If they did, the banks would simply show the transaction record and there would be nothing to fight about.

The only occasion in which the banks appeared to be willing to provide adequate documentation for consideration appears to be in a merger or acquisition with the party that was named as the mortgagee in the mortgage document or the beneficiary in the deed of trust. And all the other transactions, the banks say that consideration is irrelevant or they quote the law that says that courts cannot question the adequacy of consideration. They are dodging the issue. We are not saying that consideration was not adequate; what we are saying is that there was no consideration at all. The banks are fighting this issue because when it comes out that there really was no consideration the entire house of cards could fall.

The issue is counterintuitive because everyone knows that there was money on the closing table. Unless the issue is argued and presented with clarity, it will appear to the judge that you are trying to say that there was no money on the closing table. And when a judge hears that, or thinks that he heard that, he or she will not take you seriously. There are three parts to every contract — offer, acceptance, and consideration. A few courts have started to deal with this question. In the context of foreclosure litigation all three elements are in question. If the lenders are investors who believed that their money was being put into a trust that they were beneficiaries of a trust, they are unaware of the fact that their money is being offered to borrowers on terms that are contrary to their instructions. And the loan is not made on behalf of the investors or the trust. It is made on behalf of some sham entity controlled by the broker dealer. Sometimes the origination is made by an actual bank that is acting in the capacity of a sham lender. Either way the money came from the investors.

So the issue is not whether there was money on the table but rather whether there was a meeting of the minds between the investors and lenders in the homeowners as borrowers. The lender documents (trust documents) reveal far different terms of repayment than the borrower documents. Each of them signed on to a deal that actually didn’t exist because neither of them had agreed to the same terms.

The fact that money was on the table at the time of the alleged closing of the loan can only mean that the homeowner owed money to repay the source of the money. This duty to repay arises by operation of law and extends from the homeowner to the investor despite the lack of any documentation that explicitly states that. The result is false documentation in which the homeowner was induced to sign under the mistaken belief that the payee on the note and the mortgagee on the mortgage was the source of funds.

If you receive funds from John Smith and the note and mortgage are drafted for the benefit of Nancy Jones as “lender” would that bother you? What would you do as closing agent? Why?

Filed under: CORRUPTION, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Pleading, Servicer, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: acceptance, borrowers, closing table, consideration, contract law, debt, documentation, homeowners, investors, lenders, Mortgage, note, offer | 67 Comments »

Is Donald Duck Your Lender?

Posted on March 14, 2014 by Neil Garfield

I was asked a question a few days ago that runs to the heart of the problem for the banks in enforcing false claims for foreclosure and false claims of losses that should really allocated to the investors so that the investor would get the benefits of those loss mitigation payments. This is the guts of the complaints by insurers, investors, guarantors et al against the investment banks — that there was fraud, not breach of contract, because the investment bank never intended to follow the plan of securitization set forth in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement. The question asked of me only reached the issue of whether borrowers could claim credit for third party payments to the creditor. But the answer, as you will see, branches much further out than the scope of the question.

If you look at Steinberger in Arizona and recent case decisions in other jurisdictions you will see that if third party payments are received by the creditor, they must be taken into account — meaning the account receivable on their books is reduced by the amount of the payment received. If the account receivable is reduced then it is axiomatic that the account payable from the borrower is correspondingly reduced. Each debt must be taken on its own terms. So if the reduction was caused by a payment from a third party, it is possible that the third party might have a claim against the borrower for having made the payment — but that doesn’t change the fact that the payment was made and received and that the debt to the trust or trust beneficiaries has been reduced or even eliminated.

The Court rejected the argument that the borrower was not an intended third party beneficiary in favor of finding that the creditor could only be paid once on the debt. I am finding that most trial judges agree that if loss-sharing payments were made, including servicer advances (which actually come from the broker dealer to cover up the poor condition of the portfolio), the account is reduced as to that creditor. The court further went on to agree that the “servicer” or whoever made the payment might have an action for unjust enrichment against the borrower — but that is a not a cause of action that is part of the foreclosure or the mortgage. The payment, whether considered volunteer or otherwise, is credited to the account receivable of the creditor and the borrower’s liability is corresponding reduced. In the case of servicer payments, if the creditor’s account is showing the account current because it received the payment that was due, then the creditor cannot claim a default.

A new “loan” is created when a volunteer or contractual payment is received by the creditor trust or trust beneficiaries. This loan arises by operation of law because it is presumed that the payment was not a gift. Thus the party who made that payment probably has a cause of action against the borrower for unjust enrichment, or perhaps contribution, but that claim is decidedly unsecured by a mortgage or deed of trust.

You have to think about the whole default thing the way the actual events played out. The creditor is the trust or the group of trust beneficiaries. They are owed payments as per the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements. If those payments are current there is no default on the books of creditor. If the balance has been reduced by loss- sharing or insurance payment, the balance due and the accrued interest are correspondingly reduced. And THAT means the notice of default and notice of sale and acceleration are all wrong in terms of the figures they are using. The insurmountable problem that is slowly being recognized by the courts is that the default, from the perspective of the creditor trust or trust beneficiaries is a default under a contract between the trust beneficiaries and the trust.

This is the essential legal problem that the broker dealers (investment banks) caused when they interposed themselves as owners instead of what they were supposed to be — intermediaries, depositories, and agents of the investors (trust beneficiaries). The default of the borrower is irrelevant to whether the trust beneficiaries have suffered a loss due to default in payment from the trust. The borrower never promised that he or she or they would make payment to the trust or the trust beneficiaries — and that is the fundamental flaw in the actual mortgage process that prevailed for more than a dozen years. There would be no flaw if the investment banks had not committed fraud and instead of protecting investors, they diverted the money, ownership of the note and ownership of the mortgage or deed of trust to their own controlled vehicles. If the plan had been followed, the trusts and trust beneficiaries would have direct rights to collect from borrowers and foreclose on their property.

If the investment banks had not intended to divert the money, income, notes and mortgages or deeds of trust from the creditor trust or trust beneficiaries, then there would have no allegations of fraud from the investors, insurers and government guarantee agencies.

If the investment banks had done what was represented in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements, then the borrower would have known that the loan was being originated for or on behalf of the trust or beneficiaries and so would the rest of the world have known that. The note and mortgage would have shown, at origination, that the loan was payable to the trust and the mortgage or deed of trust was for the benefit of the trust or trust beneficiaries, as required by TILA and all the compensation earned by people associated with the origination of the loan would have had to have been disclosed (or returned to the borrower for failure to disclose). That would have connected the source of the loan — the trust or trust beneficiaries — to the receipt of the funds (the homeowner borrowers).

Instead, the investment banks hit on a nominee strawman plan where the disclosures were not made and where they could claim that (1) the investment bank was the owner of the debt and (2) the note and mortgage or deed of trust were executed for the benefit of a nominee strawman for the investment bank, who then claimed an insurable interest as owner of the debt. As owner of the debt, the investment banks received loss sharing payments from the FDIC. As agents for the investors those payments should have been applied to the balance owed the investors with a corresponding reduction in the balance due from the borrower —- if the payments were actually made and received and were not hypothetical or speculative. The investment banks did the same thing with the bonds, collecting payments from insurers, counterparties to credit default swaps, and guarantees from government sponsored entities.

When I say nominee or strawman I do not merely mean MERS which would have been entirely unnecessary unless the investment banks had intended to defraud the investors. What I am saying is that even the “lender” for whom MERS was the “nominee” falls into the same trapdoor. That lender was also merely a nominee which means that, as I said 7 years ago, they might just as well have made out the note and mortgage to Donald Duck, a fictitious character.

Since no actual lender was named in the note and mortgage and the terms of repayment were actually far different than what was stated on the borrower’s promissory note (i.e., the terms of the mortgage bond were the ONLY terms applicable to the plan of repayment to the creditor investors), the loan contract (or quasi loan contract, depending upon which jurisdiction you are in) was never completed. Hence the mortgage and note should never have been accepted into the file by the closing agent, much less recorded.

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Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CORRUPTION, escrow agent, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Neil Garfield Show, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: and deed of trust, Donald Duck, investment banks, investors, loss mitigation, loss sharing, Mortgage, Pooling and Servicing Agreement, promissory note, Prospectus, third party payments | 61 Comments »

George W. Mantor Runs for Public Office on “No More Dirty Deeds”

Posted on February 25, 2014 by Neil Garfield

Mantor for Assessor/Recorder/Clerk of San Diego County

Editor’s note: I don’t actually know Mantor so I cannot endorse him personally — but I DO endorse the idea of people running for office on actual issues instead of buzz words and media bullets.

Mantor is aiming straight for his issue by running for the Recorder’s Position. I think his aim is right and he seems to get the nub of some very important issues in the piece I received from him. I’d be interested in feedback on this campaign and if it is favorable, I might give a little juice to his campaign on the blog and my radio show.

His concern is my concern: that within a few years, we will all discover that most of us have defective title, even if we didn’t know there was a loan subject to claims of securitization in our title chain. This is not a phenomenon that affects one transaction at a time. It affects every transaction that took place after the last valid loan closing on every property. It doesn’t matter if it was subject to judicial or non-judicial sale because real property is not to be settled by damages but rather by actual title.

Many investors are buying up property believing they have eliminated the risk of loss by purchasing property either at or after the auction sale of the property. They might not be correct in that assumption. It depends upon the depth and breadth of the fraud. Right now, it seems very deep and very wide.

Here is one quote from Mantor that got my attention:

Despite the fact that everyone knows, despite the fact that they signed consent decrees promising not to steal homes, they go right on doing it.

Where is law enforcement, the Attorneys General, the regulators? They all know but they only prosecute the least significant offenders.

Foreclosures spiked 57% in California last month. How many of those were illegal? Most, if not all.

An audit of San Francisco County revealed one or more irregularities in 99% of the subject loans. In 84% of the loans, there appear to be one or more clear violations of law.

Fortune examined the foreclosures filed in two New York counties (Westchester and the Bronx) between 2006 and 2010. There were130 cases where the Bank of New York was foreclosing on behalf of a Countrywide mortgage-backed security. In 104 of those cases, the loan was originally made by Countrywide; the other 26 were made by other banks and sold to Countrywide for securitization.

None of the 104 Countrywide loans were endorsed by Countrywide – they included only the original borrower’s signature. Two-thirds of the loans made by other banks also lacked bank endorsements. The other third were endorsed either directly on the note or on an allonge, or a rider, accompanying the note.

No_More_Dirty_Deeds

Filed under: AMGAR, CORRUPTION, escrow agent, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, GARFIELD KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Neil Garfield Show, originator, Pleading, politics, securities fraud, Servicer, Title, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: CALIFORNIA, corruption of title, DEED OF TRUST, foreclosure, foreclosure auction rigging, George W. Mantor, investors, Mortgage, note, POLITICS, Wall Street Corruption | 115 Comments »

Reuters: Credit Unions Fail As a Result of Buying Mortgage Bonds

Posted on October 2, 2013 by Neil Garfield

As regulators conclude their long investigation into the cloud of companies and the maze of paths of paperwork and money the real victims are being revealed. We know Pension funds got hit hard and are now underfunded strictly as a result of buying worthless mortgage bonds from investment bankers who promised them protection and transparency but instead proved to be the predator. Now regulators are suing Morgan Stanley for defrauding two credit unions that failed as a result of taking a loss on those bonds — a loss that was a gain to the investment banker.

But they still don’t have it exactly right. The regulators are now freely describing mortgages that were “faulty”, “defective”‘ or “non-conforming”. They are describing bonds whose indentures were violated. Yet the government still stands on the sidelines when we look at the damage caused to millions of homeowners who have been forced from their homes and lost everything. The guise is “personal responsibility” — meaning that homeowners are to blame for what happened to them. Meanwhile the question of ownership of who owns the loan and the balance of the loan are being circumvented through destructive litigation, led by judges who are ill-informed mostly because lawyers have failed to learn securitization of debt.

Thus the government has failed to lead the way to stopping Foreclosures. It is still a basic axiom in the offices of regulators, the courtrooms of the judiciary and in mainstream media that individual borrowers are the people who must take responsibility and pay for the fraud. They should have known better. They should have read the documents. But this “logic” flies in the face that two branches of government have already recognized is that the one party who is at a disadvantage in a mortgage loan transaction and credit generally is the borrower — not the lender.

This issue was officially decided by the Federal Government in The Federal Truth in Lending Act was enacted for just that purpose and reason. The Federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act was enacted for just that purpose. And the many states that have enacted deceptive lending statutes that freely borrow from TILA and RESPA. Lawyers need to include this in their pleadings, memorandums and oral arguments to start where we should start — at the beginning. If those mortgages are being settled with the creditors who loaned the money because the loans were defective, and they are being settled with shared risk of loss, then why should our attitude toward borrowers be any different as to the same defective mortgages?

A good starting point would be to find the list of defective mortgages to see if your mortgage is in the
list of mortgages claimed to have been securitized, where the mortgages were described as defective, and where the mortgage bonds were described as fraudulent. Fraudulent appraisals are being ignored in the courtroom despite the clear provisions TILA that makes the appraisal and the viability of the loan the responsibility of the lender. Foreclosure defense attorneys are missing an important part of their argument when they fail to start with the responsibilities of the lender, the reasons why those standards were not applied, and the fact that the real lenders in millions of table-funded (predatory per se– I.e. Presumptively predatory) were being defrauded in two ways — non-conforming defective loans and mortgage bonds.

Of course the agencies could make thing easy by forcing publication of a list of REMIC trusts that have been subject to settlements relating to fraudulent and deceptive lending, and fraudulent and deceptive sale of mortgage bonds. But the truth is that the false axioms of the cloud of companies acting under cover of false claims of securitization are settling in the minds of judges, lawyers and regulators that somehow tens of millions of mostly unsophisticated people conspired to defraud the system. How likely is that? Or is it more likely that mortgage companies were pushing, coercing, lying, and deceiving the borrowers — just as the the lawsuits against the investment banks state? And just as they have done in the past?

Those lawsuits frequently allege that the underlying mortgages were non-compliant and unenforceable. If the investment bankers and investors, insurers and government agencies can agree that those mortgages were not enforceable, why is it that lawyers have not brought that message with them into the courtroom? And when they do, why are judges ignoring the argument. It has already been decided at the highest levels of government that the homeowner is hopelessly outgunned at closing. Why assume anything different? When those laws were passed , the number of loan options was 4 or 5. During this period of mortgage madness and meltdown, the number of mortgage products climbed to over 400 options. Borrowers didn’t do that. It was the mortgage originator who had no risk of loss because the money of the investor was what ended up on the table at closing.

Morgan Stanley
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/24/us-morganstanley-creditunion-lawsuit-idUSBRE98N02E20130924

Filed under: CDO, community banks, CORRUPTION, evidence, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, investment banking, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer | Tagged: credit unions, defective mortgages, investors, Morgan Stanley, regulators, unenforceable mortgages | 13 Comments »

Tempest Over Servicer Advances to Investors After Borrower Stops Payment

Posted on October 1, 2013 by Neil Garfield

It seems I stirred up a tempest with my blog this morning. My position is that applying generally accepted accounting principles and the accounting standards promulgated by the FASB, you must accept that Servicer advances are either a third party payment that reduces the account receivable of the creditor, or the advances are without effect because of the agency relationship between the investor and the Servicer. You will notice that the Banks are not arguing the agency relationship because if they did that, they would be arguing for applying to the account receivable of the investor the insurance payments, credit default swaps, or sales of mortgage bonds to the Federal Reserve. The fact is that the underwriting banks received a lot of money betting against the mortgage bonds they were selling. If that is applied because it is all one big venture in a cloud, then the net receivable is zero. Then you go further and argue that the amounts received in excess of the loan should be refunded to the borrower to the extent of the borrower’s payments.

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, evidence, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, investment banking, Investor, Mortgage, Pleading, Servicer | Tagged: account payable, account receivable, FASB, gaap, generally accepted accounting principles, investors, Servicer advances | 16 Comments »

JPMorgan hit by U.S. bribery probe into Chinese hiring

Posted on August 20, 2013 by Neil Garfield

How did the banks get away with it? Bribery takes many forms. It doesn’t need to be a direct payment, but merely something of value to the regulator or law enforcement officer. In this case it is the hiring of children of banking regulators in China. There is no reason why we should think that couldn’t happen here. It did. The revolving door of regulators, law enforcement and the banks has long been known.

Even if it isn’t a bribe, the bank is hiring people and then designating them for important positions in government regulation. Jamie Dimon sits on the Board at the New York Federal Reserve. Being immersed in the bank culture, the people involved come to believe the myths repeated every day. It becomes part of their culture.

The reason why the decisions on banking have been so chaotic is that there is a direct conflict between the real world and the illusions created by the banks. Put another way, the difference is between truth and fiction.

The fact remains that practically no mortgage can be satisfied or released because the ownership is completely deranged. The correction can only come from the courts when they realize and learn that the origination of the loan was a sham transaction, not just a table funded loan, and that the intent was fraud on the investors and homeowners (who were also “investors”). The scheme unraveled precisely in concert with investors ceasing to buy the “mortgage bonds” issued by entities in “street name.” That is the red flag that alerts authorities that the securitization chain was in fact a fraudulent PONZI scheme. The issuers were designated asset pools that had nothing in them, and in most cases were not funded, directly or indirectly. So the mortgage bonds were worthless.

And now that the facts are being slowly revealed, the depth of malfeasance by the banks is being recognized for what it is — but the government is sticking with its policy of “no prosecution.” Until the government steps up to the mike and says outright that the scheme was a fraudulent scheme in which the borrowers were used as pawn to steal money from investors, most people are not going to believe it. Until respectable economists and legal scholars step up and say that the loan transaction described in the note never existed and was a strawman transaction that should have been revealed to the borrower, this tragedy will stop.

Study the Assignment and Assumption Agreements executed before the first loan application was ever accepted for review. Track the money from strangers showing up at closing as though it was the money of the designated payee on the note and mortgage. The rest will be easy. But until regulators see the public as their boss instead of the banks, don’t expect any help from outside the courtroom.

JPMorgan hit by U.S. bribery probe into Chinese hiring

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: Assignment and ASsumption Agreement, fraud, investors, JPMorgan bribery, Ponzi scheme, Wall Street Banks | 66 Comments »

Lies of the Banks Coming Back to Haunt Them

Posted on July 22, 2013 by Neil Garfield

Now that Federal Reserve is nearly done buying the worthless mortgage bonds, the banks have shown that they are in fact making money hand over fist and the government is feeling less fearful about toppling the financial system with financial regulation.

Based upon my interview with a highly placed well-informed source who prefers to remain anonymous, it appears as though the playing field and the goal posts have been moved.

The starting point is the sale of worthless mortgage bonds to investors under false pretenses. It isn’t just that the underwriting standards that were to be applied to the mortgages were not followed; the problem is really that the money from the investors was never deposited into an account that was legally or even apparently owned by the investors or the asset pool shares that they thought they were buying.

The banks were claiming the investment shares (mortgage-backed securities) to be their own despite the clear money trail and paper trail showing that at no time were the investors informed that they were lending their money or their right to the mortgage loans to the banks and their co-venturers.

Then the banks claimed losses on those investment shares and collected from insurance, credit default swaps, other hedge products, and the taxpayers.

Then the banks claimed insolvency that threatened the entire financial system despite having received money from investors, part of which was never invested in anything related to mortgages or mortgage bonds. The threat of insolvency and the threat to the entire financial system was taken seriously by people in government that should have known better and perhaps did know better.

Then it was decided that the Federal Reserve would cure the insolvency issue by purchasing the worthless mortgage bonds at full value. They purchased it from the banks who at no time actually owned close bonds nor did the banks own any of the loans that supposedly “backed” the mortgage-backed bonds.

Then it was revealed that the banks were making a lot of money while the rest of the economy went into a nosedive. Any economist who is questioned on this subject will respond that it is very unlikely for intermediaries who act as conduits for transactions to make money when economic activity is on the decline.

If they are reporting profits it is from fictitious transactions. In this case fictitious transactions are “trading profits.” In reality the banks are feeding part of their ill-gotten gains back into the bank, and claiming it as profits. When the chips were down and the banks had to show that they were strong enough to exist at their mega size, they came up with the capital without any problem.

Now that they came up with the capital and the profits, they have demonstrated that the extra restrictions that regulators want to put on the banks will neither damage the bank’s profitability nor threaten the financial system.

But the Banks know that their ability to come up with money all stems from the fact that they lied to everyone and stole trillions of dollars and that it did not come from ordinary banking activities. SO they are currently in a bed they made for themselves: they don’t want the restrictions to be too restrictive because it might have a negative effect on their legal earnings, but they have proven the opposite with their illegal earnings — which is precisely what the regulators were waiting for.

Hence the banks are stuck with whatever regulations are put on banks — especially those who claim ownership over transactions in which they acted only as intermediaries — or they must say that the regulations would be harmful because the truth is they didn’t really make the money that they reported as net income.

This doesn’t come as news to the Federal Reserve who knows that it is purchasing worthless bonds. But the Federal Reserve cannot say that the bonds are worthless because it would then be seen as quantitative easing which is inflationary. The whole reason the money supply was expanded so much without inflation going wild is that the Federal Reserve was merely “buying bonds” and not just giving out money. But the bonds were completely worthless. So the truth is that the Federal Reserve was and still is giving out money in quantitative easing.

This chain of events served to undercut the middle class portion of the economy completely, denuding them of jobs, houses and even prospects, creating blighted neighborhoods, declining tax revenues for municipalities and thus bankruptcies like the City of Detroit. If the law was applied as it is applied to everyone except the big banks, then they would be charged with mortgage fraud, securities fraud (because the exemption does not apply if you don’t follow the rules of issuance of a mortgage bond) and compensatory damages would be due to the following people with percentages of the total money advanced for each $1 of mortgage:

Investors: 125%
Insurers: 85%
Credit default swaps: 400%
Miscellaneous hedge products: 25%
Borrowers: 15% (100% of the payments and down payment)
Taxpayers: 5%
Federal reserve: 100%

Thus the situation was likened by my source to an old joke about lawyers, the punch line of which is that the dog screws everyone in the room and runs away with the steak.But the real problem is that by participating in this deceptive scheme, the Federal Reserve, put the burden of the loss on homeowners whose mortgages were paid in whole or in part by the financial sector including the Federal Reserve.

It isn’t just that the ownership of the loan has become completely convoluted; the real issue is money, to wit: the credit transaction with borrower has been long since extinguished by these devices used by the banks and the Federal Reserve, and vehicles like the Maiden Lane entities.

The amount of money owed on those mortgages is in reality far less than the the amount demanded by the banks — which means that modification is possible for nearly every loan, whether delinquent or not, because the principal has already been reduced by payment. THIS IS WHY I SAY FOLLOW THE MONEY TRAIL BEFORE YOU FOLLOW THE PAPER TRAIL. THE PAPER TRAIL IS ONLY RELEVANT IF IT MATCHES THE MONEY TRAIL. OTHERWISE IT IS IRRELEVANT.

In the marketplace where loans are being refinanced and where mortgages are being foreclosed, these facts are carefully kept out of the mainstream conversation. But more and more judges are starting to ask questions because the behavior of the banks is just not consistent with a creditor who wants their money.

They seem to want the foreclosure judgment or sale but they are not so interested in the property. AND THAT is because the foreclosure puts the seal of approval from the state on a bunch of lies that were proffered to the courts and to the recording offices. It is the foreclosure judgment and sale that starts the clock ticking on wrongful foreclosures. Once time has run out on those actions, the banks are home free and the Federal Reserve, the unwitting or witting accomplice goes on their merry way while more than ten million families lose their homes, jobs and prospects.

If the Courts start finding that the mortgages are invalid, that their enforcement is defective or impossible, and that the debt is in doubt because there is no proof of the account receivable and the loss must belong to SOMEBODY, the current plan collapses. As I stated in 2007 based upon my own direct knowledge and the knowledge of industry sources who were active in the bundling, selling and trading activity associated with mortgage loans, the entire crisis would have been averted if the banks were held to account because the accounts due from the borrowers had been reduced without their knowing it just as the account due to the investors had been reduced without them knowing it.

This brings us back to what seems like a quaint solution now. I said we should forget blame and just let bring everyone to the table and share the losses and risks. People get to stay in their homes, the investors get a return on their investment, the banks earn fees, and companies like AIG won’t be in danger of toppling. But then, the catastrophic shift in wealth inequality would also never have happened. And the super rich would have been revealed, if they were bankers, as common thieves with keys to the vault.

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/big-banks-flooded-in-profits-fear-flurry-of-new-safeguards/?src=dlbksb

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage | Tagged: account receivable, borrowers, credit default swaps, Federal reserve, foreclosure sale, investors, mortgage bond insurance, mortgage bonds | 48 Comments »

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