Since the times of ancient Greece and even before that, it has been a commonly used statement that before discussion of an issue each party should precisely define their terms. The obvious conclusion has been that without agreed definitions, it is highly probable that each side is talking about something different and making no point in the debate. Every generation since then has agreed with that premise.
This is exactly what is happening in the world of finance. Wall Street has its own definitions that are never disclosed to the marketplace, consumers, investors, the courts or government regulators.
Each of those entities or people have their own definitions based upon partial information and mostly blind faith in certain facts that appear to be axiomatically true. even the Federal reserve under the venerated Alan Greenspan made that error.
Wall Street capitalizes on that assymetric information to create a completely illegal place for itself in the economy — that of disguised principal while everyone else thinks they are merely acting in their assigned and proper role as broker.
What I find fascinating is the meaning of securitization of servicing advances. Remember that securitization means, by definition and by law, that an asset or group of assets has been sold for value to multiple investors in exchange for pro rata ownership of those assets. That is the essence of all securitization, including IPOs and existing common stock traded on national or international security exchange services or platforms.
*
Analyzing the data published by the firms promoting “securitization,” we see that no “loan” or debt has ever been purchased and sold by a grantor who owned the underlying obligation or a grantee who paid any value. “Securitization” exists — but not for the paper or the money trail (payments and collections). The securities issued are based upon a discretionary unsecured promise to make indefinite payments to buyers of certificates issued by the promisor (securities brokerage firm).
*
The terms of payments from securities brokerage firms to investors who purchased certificates have no direct relationship to the terms of payments scheduled from homeowners, who are unaware that the sale of the securities resulting from their signatures greatly exceeds the amount of their transaction, leaving a zero balance due and quite possibly opening the door for a claim for greater compensation as the essential party making the securitization scheme possible. This is discussed at length on my blog.
*
The securitization scheme has many subplots. One of them is “servicer advances.” A real servicer advance is one in which the company designated as the servicer receives, processes, accounts, and distributes money to the investors.
*
To my knowledge and my proprietary database, there is not one existing scenario that conforms to that description. In plain terms, servicers do not make advances mainly because they do not pay investors — ever. And as I have previously discussed on this blog, they don’t receive payments either.
*
So these falsely labeled “servicers” can’t and don’t create data entries reflecting the receipt of payments — but law firms seeking foreclosure argue or imply that they do receive such payments and that their “records” are business records — i.e., records of business conducted by the designated “servicer” who in fact performs no servicing duties.
*
The true meaning of a servicer advance under the current schemes of securitization claims is that some of the money paid to investors is labeled as a servicer advance even though the servicer paid nothing and had no duty to pay the investors anything (just like the homeowner had no duty to pay anything because securitization sales had eliminated the debt).
*
That duty (to pay investors) was reserved for the promisor, who we will remember is a securities brokerage company that is not a “servicer.” The label “servicer advance” comes from the reports issued (fabricated) by the company designated as “Master Servicer,” showing that some scheduled homeowner payments have not been paid or received. This disregards the obvious premise that there is no payment due.
*
The reader should understand that the sole reason investors would be paid regardless of the number or amount of incoming scheduled payments from homeowners is that the securities firm wants to keep selling unregulated securities (certificates). That is the point of the securitization scheme —- to sell securities.
*
While incoming payments from homeowners are a partial basis for payments to investors, the promise requires that new securities from new securitization schemes are being sold, producing revenues and the ability to say that certain “tranches” (that contain nothing) are “over-collateralized.”
*
The reader should also understand that the fact that homeowners are making payments is the sole factual support — in law and, in fact — that payments are due. In a twisted way, homeowners, through their ignorance of the actual events in which they are key players, are playing an active role in deceiving each other, the government, investors, and the courts.
*
The promissory note and mortgage role in this scenario are strictly symbolic. But they do raise the legal presumption that they are valid documents if they are facially valid according to the state statute. Nonetheless, the real reason anyone believes that payments are due when they’re not due is that homeowners make the scheduled payments to anyone who commands them to do so.
*
So the fact that the investors received their promised payment from the securities firm that controls the scheme (but does not own anything) is why they call it an “advance. The idea that it came from a “Servicer” is just a fabrication to imply that a third party was involved. But that is enough to raise the facial presumption from the self-serving documentation and claims prepared by the securities firm or on its behalf.
*
The prospectus for each securitization plan reveals the plot to claim “servicer advances” by labeling money not paid by homeowners (whether due or not) as a “servicer advance.” The prospectus shows that a fictional reserve account is created by selling certificates containing the investors’ money.
*
The prospectus discloses that investors would receive payments from a reserve pool, which is disclosed as a return of the money the investor paid. But that is exactly the money amount used to claim “servicer advances.” The reserve account may actually exist in some securitization schemes. Still, the “reserve account” is completely controlled by the securities brokerage firm that served as the bookrunner underwriter of the securities (certificates offered for sale).
*
And the money proceeds of the sale of derivatives (more unregulated securities traded in the shadow banking marketplace) based on the “servicer advances” go to the investment bank, not the servicer. This is yet another way to reduce any hypothetical (fictional) loan account below a zero balance.
*
Since the investors have contractually agreed to that arrangement, the fact that it is not an advance and only a return of capital make no legal difference. So they are converting false declarations of homeowner “defaults” into saleable assets, thus creating the foundation for securitization of false claims of “servicer advances.”
*
As you can see from the above explanation, the answers to almost every question dealing with securitization of debt are extremely convoluted. In fact, the vice president of asset management for Deutsche Bank described it as “counterintuitive.” The reason that it is counterintuitive is that it doesn’t make any sense, once you break it down into its component pieces.
*
The big stumbling block for everyone is the fact that money appears to have been paid to or paid on behalf of the homeowner. It is therefore assumed as axiomatically true that the money reported to have been paid to the homeowner or paid on behalf of the homeowner must have been alone, if for no other reason than the fact that the homeowner executed a note and mortgage and then started paying.
*
But even that apparent reality is not true in most cases. Nearly all existing transactions that have been labeled as mortgage loan transactions are directly or indirectly the product of supplemental securitization schemes.
*
That is to say that most of such transactions consist entirely of reports of payments that never occurred. To the extent that such transactions were presented as paying off a previously classified mortgage loan transaction, such reports were entirely untrue in most cases.
*
As long as both transactions resulted from a controlled securitization scheme by a common securities brokerage firm acting as the book runner underwriter of certificates offered for sale to investors, there was no need to transfer any money. Our investigation has revealed the absence of any evidence ingesting that any such money was transferred. This raises a basic defense for homeowners: lack of consideration and breach of the alleged contract.
*
If the homeowner received, for example, $30,000 from the “refinancing” of the property, but signed a note for $500,000, based upon the false premises of a payoff of the previous “mortgage loan,” the consideration for the note and the mortgage is either completely absent or at least mostly absent.
*
What most people do not understand is that the “refinancing” was just an opportunity to start another controlled securitization scheme with the new set of securities being sold without the retirement of the old securitization scheme or those securities.
*
PRACTICE NOTE: The presence of servicer advances described in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement provides a foundation for the homeowner’s defense based on standing. Since servicer advances have priority in the liquidation of property, the outcome of foreclosure results in payment to the investment bank rather than the designated creditor. Proper discovery and objections at trial are likely to successfully undermine the most basic element of the claim: legal standing.
*
There is a false premise implied in “servicer advances” that leads to false conclusions. The false premise is that the money is owed to the “Master Servicer,” and the debt is that of the investors on whose behalf the advances were presumably made. The fact that there were no such advances remains concealed, and the fact that the investors have absolutely no liability to the recipient of the “servicer advances” is also concealed. But this false premise that is always implied if the subject comes up, is usually sufficient to convince a judge that servicer advances are irrelevant. Upon proper scrutiny and analysis, the subject of servicer advances are highly relevant and even dispositive of the entire claim.
Like this:
Like Loading...
Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: bookrunner, investment bank, refinancing, securitization, servicer, Servicer advances, standing, Underwriter | 3 Comments »