Maine Case Affirms Judgment for Homeowner — even with admission that she signed note and mortgage and stopped paying

Posted on December 27, 2017 by Neil Garfield

While this case turned upon an  inadequate foundation for introduction of “business records” into evidence, I think the real problem here for Keystone National Association was that they did not and never did own the loan — something revealed by the usual game of musical chairs that the banks use to confuse and obscure the identity of the real creditor.

When you read the case it demonstrates that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was not at all sympathetic with Keystone’s “plight.” Without saying so directly the court’s opinion clearly reveals its doubt as to whether Keystone had any plight or injury.

Refer to this case and others like it where the banks treated the alleged note and mortgage as being the object of a parlor game. The attention paid to the paperwork is designed by the banks to distract from the real issue — the debt and who owns it. Without that knowledge you don’t know the principal and therefore you can’t establish authority by a “servicer.”

The error in courts across the country has been that the testimony and records of the servicer are admissible into evidence even if the authority to act as servicer did not emanate from the real party in interest — the debt holder (the party to whom the MONEY is due.

Note that this ended in judgment for the homeowner and not an involuntary dismissal without prejudice.

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Hat Tip to Bill Paatalo

Keybank – maine supreme court

Here are some meaningful quotes from the Court’s opinion:

KeyBank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting the loan servicing records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See M.R. Evid. 803(6).

KeyBank’s only other witness was a “complex liaison” from PHH Mortgage Services, which, he testified, is the current loan servicer for KeyBank and handles the day-to-day operations of managing and servicing loan accounts.

The complex liaison testified that he has training on and personal knowledge of the “boarding process” for loans being transferred from prior loan servicers to PHH and of PHH’s procedures for integrating those records. He explained that transferred loans are put through a series of tests to check the accuracy of any amounts due on the loan, such as the principal balance, interest, escrow advances, property tax, hazard insurance, and mortgage insurance premiums. He further explained that if an error appears on the test report for a loan, that loan will receive “special attention” to identify the issue, and, “[i]f it ultimately is something that is not working properly, then that loan will not . . . transfer.” Loans that survive the testing process are transferred to PHH’s system and are used in PHH’s daily operations.

The court admitted in evidence, without objection, KeyBank’s exhibits one through six, which included a copy of the original promissory note dated April 29, 2002;3 a copy of the recorded mortgage; the purported assignment of the mortgage by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., from KeyBank to Bank of America recorded on January9, 2012; the ratification of the January 2012 assignment recorded on March 6, 2015; the recorded assignment of the mortgage from Bank of America to KeyBank dated October 10, 2012; and the notice of default and right to cure issued to Kilton and Quint by KeyBank in August 2015. The complex liaison testified that an allonge affixed to the promissory note transferred the note to “Bank of America, N.A. as Successor by Merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP,” but was later voided.

Pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, M.R. Evid. 803(6), KeyBank moved to admit exhibit seven, which consisted of screenshots from PHH’s computer system purporting to show the amounts owed, the costs incurred, and the outstanding principal balance on Kilton and Quint’s loan. Kilton objected, arguing that PHH’s records were based on the records of prior servicers and that KeyBank had not established that the witness had knowledge of the record-keeping practices of either Bank of America or Countrywide. The court determined that the complex liaison’s testimony was insufficient to admit exhibit seven pursuant to the business records exception.

KeyBank conceded that, without exhibit seven, it would not be able to prove the amount owed on the loan, which KeyBank correctly acknowledged was an essential element of its foreclosure action. [e.s.] [Editor’s Note: This admission that they could not prove the debt any other way means that their witness had no personal knowledge of the amount due. If the debt was in fact due to Keystone, they could have easily produced a  witness and a copy of the canceled check or wire transfer receipt wherein Keystone could have proven the debt. Keystone could have also produced a witness as to the amount due if any such debt was in fact due to Keystone. But Keystone never showed up. It was the servicer who showed up — the very party that could have information and exhibits to show that the amount due is correctly proffered because they confirmed the record keeping of “Countrywide” (whose presence indicates that the loan was subject to claims of securitization). But they didn’t because they could not. The debt never was owned by Keystone and neither Countrywide nor PHH ever had authority to “service” the loan on behalf of the party who owns the debt.]

the business records will be admissible “if the foundational evidence from the receiving entity’s employee is adequate to demonstrate that the employee had sufficient knowledge of both businesses’ regular practices to demonstrate the reliability and trustworthiness of the information.” Id. (emphasis added).

 

With business records there are three essential points of reference when several entities are involved as “lenders,” “successors”, or “servicers”, to wit:

  1. The records and record keeping practices of the initial “lender.” [If there are none then that would point to the fact that the “lender” was not the lender.] Here you are looking for the first entries on a valid set of business records in which the loan and fees and costs were posted. Generally speaking this does not exist in most loans because the money came a third party source who knows nothing of the transaction.
  2. The records and record keeping practices of any “successors.” Note that this is a second point where the debt is separated from the paper. If a successor is involved there would correspondence and agreements for the purchase and sale of the debt. What you fill find, though, is that there is only a naked endorsement, assignment or both without any correspondence or agreements. This indicates that the paper transfer of any rights to the “loan” was strictly for the purpose of foreclosing and bore new relationship to reality — i.e., ownership of the debt.
  3. The records and record keeping practices of any “servicers.” In order for the servicer to be authorized, the party owning the debt must have directly or indirectly given authorization and come to an agreement on fees, as well as given instructions as to what functions the servicer was to perform. What you will find is that there is no valid document from an owner of the debt appointing the servicer or giving any instructions, like what to do with the money after it is collected from homeowners. Instead you find tenuous documentation, with no correspondence or agreements, that make assertions for foreclosure. The game of musical chairs has bothered judges for a decade: “Why do the servicers keep changing” is a question I have heard from many judges. The typical claims of authorization are derived from Powers of Attorney or a Pooling and Servicing agreement for an entity that neither e exists nor does it have any operating history.

Filed under: boarding process, BURDEN OF PROOF, CASES, CORRUPTION, discovery, evidence, foreclosure, Investor, Mortgage, originator, Servicer, sham transactions, Trail Objections | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

Investigator Bill Paatalo: A Plea To These Conspirators – You Have The Power To End This Nightmare.

Posted on April 25, 2017 by Neil Garfield

Bill Paatalo has written a heartfelt plea (see his post below) for at least one person to be relieved of stress that is about to literally kill her. In so doing he has again demonstrated his research and forensic skills as a private investigator and one more thing, his humanity.

The link to internal emails shows, without any reasonable doubt, both the conspiratorial linkage in creating fabricating documents AND the absence of any reference to any actual transaction in which money was paid or anything was purchased.

The lax audacity of these people is astonishing. Here they are actually conspiring to change the paper chain of title — which will be used for a foreclosure of property and the eviction of the owners of the property.

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By on Apr 25, 2017
 http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/a-plea-to-these-conspirators-you-have-the-power-to-end-this-nightmare/

I received an email yesterday morning that starts out with this:

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 9:18 AM, the author wrote:

Please help save longtime Sandy Oregon resident Robynne Fauley’s life. She had major cancer surgery less than two weeks ago is getting chemo and is VERY ill. She will be evicted from her home on May 1st if we don’t help.  She has nowhere to go. The ordeal is very likely to kill he[r;].
I happen to have some knowledge about this case, as I was called in as an expert last year to assist an ABC News investigative journalist in Dallas, TX. Unfortunately, after all the time spent conducting interviews and laying out the evidence of fraud on a platter, corporate counsel for ABC News quashed the story. I’m sure this surprises no one. The reality is that the media will continue to plug its ears, while law enforcement will continue to view and categorize crimes of counterfeiting, forgery, tax evasion, and mail/wire fraud as “civil matters” in the context of foreclosures.
So with the clock ticking, I thought I’d throw up a “Hail Mary” plea in the direction of “Diane Meistad” and the rest of these conspirators. Diane, Michael, and the rest of you –  if you’re out there and see this, fix it!
The following email strand (2008 Internal Emails – MGC – RFC – Quality Loan Servicing – Fauley Case) is a rare glimpse of bank employees conspiring to forge, back-date, and fraudulently produce a chain of title.
July 11, 2008
From: Monica Hadley – MGC Mortgage
To: Chris Malapit – (Trustee) Quality Loan Service of Washington
Hadley: Chris, Does this loan have title issues? I was going through the original documents and the chain of title seems to be missing some assignments. It could have been that this was missed in the file and all is well. I want to make sure.
July 11. 2008
From: Chris Malapit
To: Monica Hadley
Subject: *12125 Se Laughing Water, Sandy, OR 97055* Robynne Fauley
The DOT was assigned to WAMU,FA as of 5/3/2007 by instrument#2007-038181. Once we are able to proceed we will then need an assignment from WAMU, FA in LNV Corporation.
July 14, 2008
From: Monica Hadley
To: Chris Malapit
Chris, That is what I see too. We received the loan from Residential Funding Company, LLC and have an AOM from RFC to LNV Corporation. Why did RFC assign the loan to WAMU? Do you have a contact at WAMU who will assign the file to LNV Corporation?
July 14, 2008
From: Chris Malapit
To: Monica Hadley
Doing more research I don’t think Residential Funding Co, LLC had the authority to transfer the interest as the last bene of record per our title report was Deutsche Bank Trust not Residential Funding Co.
July 16, 2008
From: Monica Hadley – MGC Mortgage
To: Chris Malapit – (Trustee) Quality Loan Service of Washington
Subject: Subject: *12125 Se Laughing Water, Sandy, OR 97055* Robynne Fauley
Here is a copy of the most recent title update from the attorney office and the email chain from our attorney.
[FAST FORWARD]
October 17, 2008
From: Michael Barnett (MGC Mortgage, Inc.)
To: Shanda Foreman (entity unknown)
Cc: Carissa Golden (entity unknown)
Subject: Intervening Assignments to Deutsche Bank
 
Shanda, I have 2 RFC loans that are needing assignments from Deutsche Bank to RFC. Please check to see if they are on the list you sent to RFC. See the loan numbers below.
 
17103058/Robynne Fauley, Oregon
17102692/Stuart Berg, New Jersey
 
 
October 24, 2008
From: Michael Barnett
To: ‘Meistad, Diane’ (entity unknown)
 
Diane, this loan was last assigned to Washington Mutual from RFC but, prior to this assignment was assigned from Washington Mutual to Deutsche Bank and recorded in Clackamas County, Oregon. We need an assignment from Deutsche Bank to RFC and from Washington Mutual to LNV Corp. I have templates for both assignments. We will be re-recording the assignment from RFC to Washington Mutual to correct the chain of title with both of these assignments. Also, please find Note Allonge from Deutsche Bank to RFC as well. Please forward these signed assignments back to me via our federal express account #252870180. Thanks Michael.
 
(Assignments & Allonge attached)
[Note: WAMU no longer existed on October 24, 2008. This is a huge problem! But this doesn’t stop MGC from creating the necessary “templates” to solve this problem. Furthermore, Diane Meistad is believed to have been employed by RFC. Yet, MGC creates an “Alonge” from Deutsche Bank to RFC seeking RFC’s execution, not Deutsche Bank.]
October 27, 2008
From: Diane Meistad
To: Michael Barnett
Subject: RE: Default Assignment Request loan #7889719/17103058 (Fauley, Robynne)
 
Michael, If the assignment was recorded from WAMU to DB and another assignment f/RFC to WAMU – technically the second assignment is ‘invalid’ because RFC was not in title to record the second assignment and it should not effect title.
 
Because of the assignment was invalid technically it didn’t transfer ownership.
 
October 27, 2008
From: Michael Barnett
To: Diane Meistad
 
Diane, since the assignment from RFC to WAMU is of record we have to correct the chain of title. At this point the county recorder’s office shows that WAMU is the assignee of record for this loan (which is wrong), right? RFC did assign this loan and shouldn’t have but, in order to fix this one the correct chain should be from Deutsche to RFC, then from RFC to WAMU, then WAMU to LNV Corp, which will correct the chain of title. Litton Loan Servicing LP prepared and recorded the assignment from RFC to WAMU, which should not have been recorded. We still need to get this loan from RFC to LNV to properly convey this property, since we purchased it from RFC. Please call me if you still concerns about the chain of assignments. Borrower loan #7889719/17103058 – Robynne Fauley. Thanks Michael.
 
[NOTE: This was a WAMU originated loan. WAMU sold this loan in a number of undocumented transactions that wound up in the hands of “Deutsche Bank as Trustee.” This means that the Fauley loan was securitized into some trust years prior, to which Deutsche Bank was acting as Trustee. MGC is claiming they purchased this loan when they clearly do not have clear title. They admit in this email that in order to correct the chain of title, they need the final transfer from WAMU to LNV Corp, which at this point in time is an impossibility. The next responsive email shows that Diane Meistad disagrees with MGC’s position / request.]
October 27, 2008
From: Diane Meistad
To: Michael Barnett
Subject: RE: Default Assignment Request loan (Fauley, Robynne)
 
I disagree since RFC was not in position (title position) to transfer the asset.
 
I will need to refer your request for this assignment to our Records Services team in Iowa to begin the process. Diane
[NOTE: Meistad, who is believed to work for RFC, does not believe RFC was in title position to transfer the Deed of Trust. The reference to the “Records Services team in Iowa” means it is likely that Wells Fargo was involved as a master servicer / custodian for the unidentified trust for which Deutsche Bank was Trustee.]
October 27, 2008
From: Michael Barnett
To: Diane Meistad
Subject: RE: Default Assignment Request loan (Fauley, Robynne)
 
Okay Diane, I had my manager look at this file with me and we have determined that we need the following assignments to correct the chain of assignments:
 
1) Corrective Assignment from WAMU TO Deutsche Bank (to correct the assignment from RFC to WAMU, which was recorded in error) & Note Allonge
2) Assignment from Deutsche Bank to RFC & Note Allonge
3) Assignment from RFC to LNV Corp (Note allonge in file already)
 
The assignment from RFC to WAMU was recorded in error so it is not needed. We also have 2 endorsements on the original Note WAMU to RFC to Deutsche Bank which should be cancelled, to correct the Endorsement chain on the Note. We will just need the okay from you via email to cancel these endorsements. Will this work for you? Thanks Michael.
[NOTE: MGC has decided what was done right and wrong in prior transactions for which it has no knowledge, and what now needs to be done in its own best interest to steal and harvest the home. The transfers to and from WAMU as described above would be fraud due to WAMU being defunct. Then there is the request to have RFC cancel out the endorsements and replace with allonges. The third request in the sequence states that an allonge is already in the file from RFC to LNV Corp even though there are no assignments, yet, to support that allonge. That allonge created by MGC is fraudulent, and represents yet another broken sequence in the chain of title.]
Four days after this last email on October 27, 2008, the following two attached assignments are recorded simultaneously in Clackamas County, Oregon (Recorded Assignments – October 31 2008 – Fauley). The first assignment (and I call it the “first” because of its fraudulently back-dated) is executed on “March 10, 2008″ and notarized as such by “Diane Meistad” – Notary Public – State of Minnesota.” The assignor is “Residential Funding Company, LLC fka Residential Funding Corporation” with no Assignee named. NO ASSIGNEE! However, the second assignment is executed on October 27, 2008 with the Assignor named as “Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (formerly known as Bankers Trust Company) and the Assignee – “Residential Funding Company, LLC.” This assignment is also notarized by “Diane Meistad.” As admitted by Meistad above, RFC was not in title position to transfer the asset as of October 27, 2008. Yet, she acquiesced to MGC’s fraudulent conspiracy to forge, fabricate, and alter documents.
So, Diane Meistad, Michael Barnett, and all the rest of you who where involved in this deceit, this one’s on you. You are the only ones who can put a stop to this injustice. Robynne Fauley, who is elderly and very sick, has suffered immensely from your actions. In six-days she is scheduled to be evicted from her home. Fix this!
Bill Paatalo
Private Investigator – OR PSID$ 49411
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
(406) 328-4075
bill.bpia@gmail.com

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Danielle Kelley, Esq. Swings Back at Separation of Note and Mortgage

Posted on September 5, 2013 by Neil Garfield

If the banks lose the application of the UCC, which they should, they are dead in the water because they have no way to prove the transactions upon which they rely in collection and foreclosure.

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Danielle Kelley, Esq. whom I admired before she became my law partner has again broke some old/new ground in compelling fashion. This is not legal advice and nobody should use it without consulting an attorney who is properly licensed in good standing in the jurisdiction in which the property is located and who is competent on the subject of bills and notes.

The bottom line: if the note and mortgage were intended by the law to be considered one instrument, they would be one instrument. But they are not because all the conditions in the mortgage would render the note non-negotiable under the UCC and that would be true even if the loan was actually sold, for real, with payment and an assignment. The conditions expressed in the mortgage or deed of trust render the mortgage non-negotiable. Hence an alleged transfer of the note separates the note from the mortgage because the mortgage is by definition non-negotiable. If the banks lose the application of the UCC, which they should, they are dead in the water because they have no way to prove the transactions upon which they rely in collection and foreclosure.

All of this leads us back to the “sale” of the loan because the presumption arising out of being a holder or holder in due course does not exist where the paper is non-negotiable. The Banks must allege and prove the origination and sale the old fashioned way — by alleging that on the ___ day of ___, in the year ___ XYZ loaned the homeowner $____________. Pursuant to that transaction the defendant executed a note and mortgage (or deed of trust), attached hereto and incorporated by reference. On the ___ day of ________ in the year ________, Plaintiff acquired said loan by payment of valuable consideration and received an assignment that was recorded in the public records at page ___, Book ____ of the public records of ____ County. Defendant failed or refused to make payment commencing the ___ day of ____ in the year ____. Plaintiff gave notice of the delinquency and default, provided the Defendant with an opportunity to reinstate as required by the mortgage and applicable law (copy of said notices attached). Defendant will suffer financial loss without collection of the debt for which it owns the account receivable. Pursuant to the terms of the mortgage which is attached hereto, Defendant agreed that the subject property was pledged as collateral for the faithful performance of the duties under the note, to wit: payment.

Of course the Banks refuse to do that because it opens the door to discovery to exactly what money was paid, to whom and why. AND it would show that there were no actual transactions — just shuffling of paper.

Affirmative defense

Non-negotiability of Subject Note Prohibits Plaintiff from Enforcing it Pursuant to Fla. Stat. §673, et seq and Failure to Attach Documents Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130

With regard to all counts of the Complaint, the Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part because the subject note that the Plaintiff may produce is not a negotiable instrument and therefore the Plaintiff cannot claim enforcement of the note pursuant to Fla. Stat. §673, et seq.  In order for an instrument to be negotiable it must not, amongst other things, “state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money.”  §673.1041(1)(c).  While there is no appellate case law in Florida (and precious little in the entire country) which has ever interpreted this portion of the statute to mortgage promissory notes, the Second District has interpreted this section with respect to retail installment sales contracts in GMAC v. Honest Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., et al., 933 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).  There, the Second District held that clauses in the RISC such as the requirement for late fees and NSF charges rendered the contract non-negotiable.  This Court should be mindful that the GMAC case was recently applied to a mortgage foreclosure in the Sixth Judicial Circuit.  See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Christopher J. Chesney, Case No. 51-2009-CA-6509-WS/G (6th Judicial Circuit/Hon. Stanley R. Mills February 22, 2010).

The note attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint contains the following obligations other than the payment of money

1.      The obligation that the borrower pay a late charge if the lender has not received payment by the end of a certain period of days after the payment is due.  Defendants assert this defense although Section 7(a) of the Note attached states “See Attached Rider”.  The only riders attached to the Complaint are a “Prepayment Rider to Note” and an “Adjustable Rate Rider”, the latter of which deals with the interest change, not late fees.  Therefore there are documents potentially missing from the Complaint which runs afoul of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130 that such documents be attached as they are a document upon which a defense can be made.  Defendants are asserting the defense without the applicable rider; however, if Plaintiff is in possession of the original note, as they should be in order to foreclose, Plaintiff would have had said document to file.   

2.      The obligation that the borrower to tell the lender, in writing, if borrower opts to may prepay in clause 5 of the Note and the Prepayment Rider to the Note. 

3.      The obligation that the lender send any notices that must be given to the borrower pursuant to the terms of the subject note by either delivering it or mailing it by first class mail in clause 8; and

4.       The obligation of the borrower to waive the right of presentment and notice of dishonor in clause 9.

Because the subject note contains undertakings or instructions other than the payment of money, the subject note is not negotiable and therefore the Plaintiff cannot claim that it is entitled to enforce same pursuant to Fla. Stat. §673, et seq.

In addition to, or in alternative of, the following argument, even if the subject note is deemed negotiable, Fla. Stat. §673, et seq. (and therefore negotiation) cannot be utilized to transfer the non-negotiable mortgage, which is a separate transaction.  See in Sims v. New Falls Corporation, 37 So. 3d 358, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (providing that a note and mortgage were two separate transactions).  The terms of the mortgage are expressly not incorporated into the terms of the note; rather, they are merely referenced by the note.  See clause 11 of the note.  Indeed, nowhere in the subject note is the right to foreclose the mortgage a remedy for default under the note.  It is clause 22 of the mortgage, on the other hand, which allows this.  Clause 22 of the mortgage, however, cannot be transferred to Plaintiff by negotiation as the mortgage is not negotiable.  

 

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 54 Comments »

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN NOTES AND MORTGAGES

Posted on June 27, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Notes:  

When I was on Wall Street, we had an expression “Bears make money, bulls make money but pigs never make money.” It means that people who think the market is going down have a number of ways to bet in that direction and protect their risks. People who think the market is going up have the same options. But those who seek to overreach and get all the money going both ways will lose.

In this case, National Bank is the pig. After invoking the power of sale in a non-judicial foreclosure, they sued for a deficiency they created by submitting a low bid at the “auction.” If the loan was securitized, (which presumably it was not or it was not brought to the attention of the trial court and therefore was not in the record on appeal) there is a good chance that the auction was rigged and faked because the trustee would have been a controlled or owned entity and the credit bid was false because it was not submitted by a party who was “the beneficiary in full or partial satisfaction of the contract secured by the trust deed. A.R.S. § 33-801(5) (2007). Bank asserted $675,000 was the fair market value at the time of the sale.”

In virtually ALL cases, the credit bid accepted by the trustee was from a party that was not, at the time the bid was submitted, a party whose description conformed to the definition of a beneficiary (creditor) in the statute. Thus the bid was an empty bid, void from inception, and should have been disregarded by the trustee (which of course was never done because they were taking their orders from the pretender lender instead of following the state statute. In this case the record on appeal is devoid of any evidence that National Bank was not the originator AND the lender at the time of the foreclosure, so you need to keep that in mind, if you are going to use this case for anything.

The Court appeals was completely perplexed by the action brought by National bank for a deficiency judgment against the “former” homeowners who probably have every right to reverse the foreclosure sale, remove or discredit the deed upon foreclosure and return to having full title and right of possession. The Court just didn’t understand why the deficiency action was ever filed, but was willing to rule on the arbitration clause, on the outside chance that there was something else besides a foreclosure invovled. IF not, the deficiency action should obviously be dismissed:

In the footnotes of the decision the Court makes it clear that the anti deficiency statutes apply, and hints that if the pretender lender sues for the deficiency they might be invalidating the foreclosure by their own actions because the Arizona statute gives a choice between foreclosure or suing on the note. Under no circumstances do the Arizona statutes allow the lender to pursue both remedies for the obvious reason that the so-called deficiency is artificially created by a self-serving “credit bid” and self serving statement as to the value of the property.

 

“1

A credit bid is a bid made by the beneficiary in full or partial satisfaction of the contract secured by the trust deed. A.R.S. § 33-801(5) (2007). Bank asserted $675,000 was the fair market value at the time of the sale.

2

The record is devoid of an explanation as to why the anti- deficiency statutes are inapplicable here. We are unable to discern if the property was too large or that the promissory note was not for purchase money or why the anti-deficiency statutes do not apply to homeowners.

We note that Arizona has two anti-deficiency statutes: (1) A.R.S. § 33–729(A), which applies to purchase money mortgages and purchase money deeds of trust that are judicially foreclosed, Baker v. Gardner, 160 Ariz. 98, 770 P.2d 766 (1988); and (2) A.R.S. § 33– 814(G), for deeds of trust foreclosed by trustee’s sale whether or not they secure purchase money obligations. And both anti- deficiency statutes prohibit the entry of a deficiency judgment after the forced sale of a parcel of “property of two and one-half acres or less which is limited to and utilized for either a single one-family or a single two-family dwelling.” A.R.S. §§ 33–729(A) and –814(G).

Arizona also has an election of remedies statute applicable to mortgages. Under A.R.S. § 33–722, a mortgagee can sue to judicially foreclose its mortgage or can sue on the note and waive the mortgage, but it cannot maintain both actions simultaneously. See Tanque Verde Anesthesiologists L.T.D. Profit Sharing Plan v. Proffer Group, Inc., 172 Ariz. 311, 313, 836 P.2d 1021, 1023 (App. 1992).”

The Appellate Court overruled the trial court as to its ruling on the deficiency action being “ancillary” to the foreclosure in order to reach its legal conclusion that if an action can be arbitrated it should be arbitrated:

“The Bank argues, as it has before3, that the deficiency action is “ancillary” to its statutory foreclosure action and therefore excepted from the arbitration agreement. Specifically stating:

‘Consequently, a deficiency action arises out of, relates to, and is dependent upon the non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. The deficiency action is thus an “ancillary remedy” necessarily related to the non- judicial foreclosures.’

The trial court adopted that reasoning, finding:

[t]here would be no deficiency without a foreclosure; deficiency arises from the foreclosure. Therefore, a deficiency action is excluded from arbitration under the terms of the Note.

We disagree.”

It is a challenge to interpret this decision. It swings one way and then it swings the other way, bat apparently only to preserve the right to binding arbitration if it has already been agreed between the parties. But it restates those statutes that are clearly intended to make Arizona an anti-deficiency state.

To read the entire opinion click here:  CV100772-opinion

 


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EFFECTIVE USE OF WHAT THE MORTGAGE GIANTS SAY ABOUT EACH OTHER

Posted on January 2, 2012 by Neil Garfield

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary CLICK HERE TO GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION REPORT

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) filed suit against 17 lead defendants. Lawyers and pro se litigants and anyone with a mortgage subject to a possible claim that the loan was securitized should be interested and follow the allegations AND the wrangling over discovery. There are forms in there that can and should be used by litigants. When counsel for pretender lenders proffers facts not in evidence then your objection should be coupled with “that’s not what they said when they were litigating with FHFA.” And then quote what they DID say in writing versus the oral proffers of counsel who can later say he was “mistaken.”
Complaints have been filed against the following lead defendants:

  1. Ally Financial Inc. f/k/a GMAC, LLC
  2. Bank of America Corporation
  3. Barclays Bank PLC
  4. Citigroup, Inc.
  5. Countrywide Financial Corporation
  6. Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc.
  7. Deutsche Bank AG
  8. First Horizon National Corporation
  9. General Electric Company
  10. Goldman Sachs & Co.
  11. HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.
  12. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
  13. Merrill Lynch & Co. / First Franklin Financial Corp.
  14. Morgan Stanley
  15. Nomura Holding America Inc.
  16. The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
  17. Société Générale

The following Reports to the Congress from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) present the findings of the agency’s annual examinations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises), the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), and the Office of Finance. This report meets the statutory requirements of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, as amended by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).  The views in this report are those of FHFA and do not necessarily represent those of the President.

To request hard copies of FHFA Reports to Congress, contact: FHFA’s Office of Congressional Affairs and Communications
Phone: (202) 414-6922 or send e-mail to:   FHFAinfo@FHFA.gov

 

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DALLAS D.A. CONSIDERS SUIT AGAINST MERS — MORE TO COME

Posted on August 11, 2011 by Neil Garfield

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE

EDITOR’S COMMENT: If he doesn’t get stepped on political heavyweights who accepted bank money for their campaigns, Watkins may well be leading the real charge against the banks that will end up real results. Fixing the budgets of state and local governments with money they were entitled to receive in the great securitization scheme is a high priority. It will save jobs, improve the economy and maintain social services — like police, fire, rescue, education, parks etc.

District Attorney Craig Watkins to Explore Possible Claims against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

Posted by shawnpwilliams on Aug 9th, 2011

Dallas South News Wire (Dallas County District Attorney’s Office)

Today Dallas County District Attorney (DA) Craig Watkins announced that the DA’s office is considering asserting claims against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) for the possible loss of millions in revenues to Dallas County.

MERS, a subsidiary of MERSCORP, Inc., was established and is owned by banks and members of the mortgage finance industry.  MERS was established to act as a shadow recording system for the millions of mortgages in the United States and facilitate the buying and selling of mortgage rights as commodities.

There are currently approximately 31 million active residential mortgage loans registered on the MERS System.  Since its inception, MERS has attempted to track more than 60 million mortgages nationwide and more than 250,000 in Dallas County alone.  However, due to the fact that reporting is not always required, the MERS electronic records of mortgages may or may not accurately reflect the millions of transfers of mortgage rights that have occurred over the past several years.

“While the DA’s office is traditionally only thought of as the prosecuting authority for crimes against individuals, in addition to handling those types of cases, we are also responsible for providing legal representation in civil matters such as this issue with MERS where Dallas County is the victim,” said District Attorney Craig Watkins.

“When I learned about this issue, my first reaction was we needed to explore possible remedies for getting MERS to reimburse the estimated tens of millions in uncollected filing fees that are potentially owed to Dallas County.  These possible remedies are in the process of being explored.  This is yet another issue that has gone unaddressed for years that we have discovered, are taking action to correct and put measures in place to prevent it from happening in the future.”

Lenders ordinarily file a record of their rights in the deed records of the county where the property is located.  The county clerk maintains those records as notice to the public of the identity of persons who loaned money for the purchase of the property and who have rights to foreclose upon the property if the loan is not repaid.

For a fee, MERS allows lenders to show MERS as the “beneficiary” of the lender’s rights to the property if the loan is not repaid, even though MERS is not actually the beneficiary.  MERS acts as a placeholder for the lender as to the lender’s mortgage rights, but not the lender’s rights to receive the loan payments.

In that way, the lender is able to sell its rights to receive the loan payments and MERS agrees to protect the purchaser of the loan by remaining on the deed records as the “beneficiary” of the mortgage.  So long as MERS remains on the deed records as the beneficiary, subsequent purchasers can avoid having to file their acquisition of the rights to the loan payments and pay the associated filing fees.

After extensive research on the issue of whether MERS and others acting with it improperly recorded hundreds of thousands of real estate records in Dallas County, and were thereby able to avoid paying filing fees on subsequent transfers of the properties that were involved, it was concluded that MERS and those acting with it have engaged in conduct which wrongfully deprived the citizens of millions of dollars in filing fees on property located in Dallas County.

MERS operates a national electronic registry that tracks beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights associated with residential mortgage loans and any transfer of or changes in those interests or rights.  There are approximately 5,000 participating members of MERS, of which 3,000 are residential mortgage servicers.

Members register loans and may report transfers, foreclosures, and other changes to the status of residential mortgage loans on the MERS System.  However, there is no requirement that all changes or transfers be reported to MERS.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 66 Comments »

Fed penalizes 10 banks on mortgage practices

Posted on April 17, 2011 by Neil Garfield

Fed penalizes 10 banks on mortgage practices

By Steve Goldstein
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The Federal Reserve said it’s taken enforcement action against 10 banks over “a pattern of misconduct and negligence related to deficient practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing. These deficiencies represent significant and pervasive compliance failures and unsafe and unsound practices at these institutions.” The banks are Bank of America /quotes/comstock/13*!bac/quotes/nls/bac (BAC 12.86, -0.27, -2.06%) , Citigroup /quotes/comstock/13*!c/quotes/nls/c (C 4.41, -0.03, -0.56%) , Ally Financial, the HSBC North America unit of HSBC Holdings /quotes/comstock/13*!hbc/quotes/nls/hbc (HBC 53.34, -0.22, -0.41%) , J.P. Morgan Chase /quotes/comstock/13*!jpm/quotes/nls/jpm (JPM 44.89, -0.08, -0.18%) , MetLife /quotes/comstock/13*!met/quotes/nls/met (MET 43.88, -0.25, -0.57%) , PNC Financial Services /quotes/comstock/13*!pnc/quotes/nls/pnc (PNC 61.87, -0.01, -0.02%) , SunTrust Banks /quotes/comstock/13*!sti/quotes/nls/sti (STI 28.15, -0.04, -0.14%) , U.S. Bancorp /quotes/comstock/13*!usb/quotes/nls/usb (USB 25.95, +0.11, +0.43%) and Wells Fargo /quotes/comstock/13*!wfc/quotes/nls/wfc (WFC 29.89, -0.26, -0.86%) . In addition to the actions against the banking organizations, the Federal Reserve on Wednesday announced formal enforcement actions against Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS), a domestic provider of default-management services and other services related to foreclosures, and against MERSCORP, Inc., which provides services related to tracking and registering residential mortgage ownership and servicing, acts as mortgagee of record on behalf of lenders and servicers, and initiates foreclosure actions

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ALL MAJOR FINANCIAL FEDERAL AGENCIES ENTER CEASE AND DESIST ORDER AGAINST MERS

Posted on April 13, 2011 by Neil Garfield

CLE SEMINAR: SECURITIZATION WORKSHOP FOR ATTORNEYS — REGISTER NOW

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary SEE LIVINGLIES LITIGATION SUPPORT AT LUMINAQ.COM

ALL MAJOR FEDERAL AGENCIES JOIN IN ORDERING MERS TO STOP CURRENT PRACTICES

Just released. Thanks to Dan Edstrom our senior securitization analyst for alerting me.

SEE MERS_Cease_and_Desist_2011_04_13

MERS AND MERSCORP ENTERED INTO A CONSENT CEASE AND DESIST ORDER FINDING DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES THAT POSE A RISK TO THE MEMBER BANKS.

ABSTRACT OF ORDER

The Agencies find, and MERS and MERSCORP neither admit nor deny, the following:
(1)    MERS is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MERSCORP. MERSCORP’s shareholders include federally regulated financial institutions that own and/or service residential mortgages, including Examined Members, and other primary and secondary mortgage industry participants.
(2)    MERSCORP operates a national electronic registry that tracks beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights associated with residential mortgage loans and any changes in those interests or rights. There are approximately 5,000 participating Members, of which 3,000 are residential mortgage servicers. Members register loans and report transfers, foreclosures, and other changes to the status of residential mortgage loans on the MERS System. There are currently approximately 31 million active residential mortgage loans registered on the MERS System. Examined Members receive a substantial portion of the services provided by MERSCORP and MERS.
(3)    MERS serves as mortgagee of record and nominee for the participating Members in local land records. MERS takes action as mortgagee through documents executed by “certifying officers” of MERS. MERS has designated these individuals, who are officers or employees of Members or certain third-parties who have contractual relationships with Members, as officers of MERS. By virtue of these designations, the certifying officers execute legal documents in the name of MERS, such as mortgage assignments and lien releases.
MERS Consent Order
-4-
(4)    In connection with services provided to Examined Members related to tracking, and registering residential mortgage loans and initiating foreclosures (“residential mortgage and foreclosure-related services”), MERS and MERSCORP:
(a)    have failed to exercise appropriate oversight, management supervision and corporate governance, and have failed to devote adequate financial, staffing, training, and legal resources to ensure proper administration and delivery of services to Examined Members; and
(b)    have failed to establish and maintain adequate internal controls, policies, and procedures, compliance risk management, and internal audit and reporting requirements with respect to the administration and delivery of services to Examined Members.
(5)    By reason of the conduct set forth above, MERS and MERSCORP engaged in unsafe or unsound practices that expose them and Examined Members to unacceptable operational, compliance, legal, and reputational risks.
Pursuant to the authority vested in them by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b), the Bank Service Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1867(c)-(d), and the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4631, the Agencies hereby ORDER that:
ARTICLE III COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE
(1)    Within twenty (20) days of this Order, the Boards of Directors of MERSCORP and MERS (the “Boards”) shall each establish and thereafter maintain a Compliance Committee of at least three (3) directors, of which at least two (2) may not be employees or officers of MERS or MERSCORP or any of their subsidiaries or affiliates. In the event of a change of the
MERS Consent Order
-5-
membership, the name of any new committee member shall be submitted to the OCC Deputy Comptroller for Large Bank Supervision (“Deputy Comptroller”). The Compliance Committee shall be responsible for monitoring and coordinating MERS’ and MERSCORP’s compliance with the terms and provisions of this Order. The Compliance Committee shall meet at least monthly and maintain minutes of its meetings.
(2)    Within ninety (90) days of this Order, and within thirty (30) days of the end of each calendar quarter thereafter, the Compliance Committee shall submit a written progress report to the Boards setting forth in detail its actions taken to comply with each Article of this Consent Order, and the results and status of those actions.
(3)    The Boards shall forward a copy of the Compliance Committee’s report, with any additional comments by the Boards, to the Deputy Comptroller and the OCC Examiner-in- Charge within ten (10) days of receiving such report.
ARTICLE IV ACTION PLAN
(1)    Within ninety (90) days of this Order, MERS and MERSCORP shall jointly develop and submit to the Deputy Comptroller an acceptable plan containing a complete description of the actions that are necessary and appropriate to achieve compliance with the terms and provisions of this Order (“Action Plan”), as well as the resources to be devoted to the planned actions, with respect to services provided to Examined Members. In the event the Deputy Comptroller requests MERS or MERSCORP to revise the Action Plan, they shall immediately make the requested revisions and resubmit the Action Plan to the Deputy Comptroller. Following acceptance of the Action Plan by the Deputy Comptroller, MERS and
MERS Consent Order
-6-
MERSCORP shall not take any action that would constitute a significant deviation from, or material change to the requirements of the Action Plan, or this Order, unless and until MERS or MERSCORP have received a prior written determination of no supervisory objection from the Deputy Comptroller.
(2)    The Boards shall ensure that MERS and MERSCORP achieve and thereafter maintain compliance with this Order, including, without limitation, successful implementation of the Action Plan. The Boards shall further ensure that, upon implementation of the Action Plan, MERS and MERSCORP achieve and maintain effective residential mortgage and foreclosure- related services on behalf of Examined Members, as well as associated risk management, compliance, quality control, audit, training, staffing, and related functions. In order to comply with these requirements, the Boards shall:
(a)    require the timely reporting by MERS and MERSCORP management of such actions taken to comply with this Order and/or directed by either Board to be taken pursuant to this Order;
(b)    follow-up on any compliance issues with such actions in a timely and appropriate manner; and
(c)    require corrective action be taken in a timely manner for any non- compliance with such actions.
(3)    The Action Plan shall address, at a minimum: (a)    the capability of the Boards and senior management to ensure that MERS
and MERSCORP are operated in a safe and sound manner in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and requirements of this Order;
MERS Consent Order
-7-
(b)    development and implementation of a strategic plan to include a comprehensive review of business operations, including the risks associated with each business line, and recommendations to implement the strategic plan;
(c)    consistent with the strategic plan, development and implementation of a financial plan to ensure that MERSCORP and MERS have adequate financial strength to support business operations related to Examined Members. The financial plan, at a minimum, shall address:
capital;
and liquidity risk; and
(i)
(ii)
any need for additional capital, including the amount and source of
the identification, measurement, monitoring and control of funding
(iii) discretionary expenses and improve and sustain earnings, as well as maintain adequate reserves for contingency risks and liabilities;
(d)    development and implementation of a comprehensive litigation strategy to effectively manage lawsuits and legal challenges involving MERS and MERSCORP, regardless of whether MERSCORP or MERS is a named party, including early identification and tracking of such lawsuits and challenges;
(e)    development and implementation of a communication plan to communicate effectively and in a timely manner with MERSCORP’s shareholders, Members including Examined Members, and relevant external parties;
(f)    development and implementation of a compliance and quality assurance program for ensuring that Examined Members implement and follow all of the Rules, including
MERS Consent Order
-8-
a profit and budget plan to include specific goals to reduce
adherence to the requirements set forth in MERS Announcement 2011-01, dated February 16, 2011;
(g)    development and implementation of a plan to ensure that MERS certifying officers are transitioned expeditiously onto the Corporate Resolution Management System (“CRMS”) in accordance with MERS’ current certifying officer policy and process;
(h)    development and implementation of appropriate standards to maintain separation of corporate functions between MERS and MERSCORP;
(i)    review of the effectiveness of the Rules, and related Procedures, Terms and Conditions to determine what, if any, additions, amendments, or deletions are appropriate;
(j)    development and implementation of enhanced information reporting practices to senior management from lower levels of each organization, and from senior management to the Boards to ensure that significant issues are properly identified and escalated, and that corporate actions are considered, taken in a timely fashion, and properly documented;
(k)    any Matter Requiring Attention in the OCC Supervisory Letter No. MERS 2011-01, dated January 19, 2011, that addresses an issue that is not otherwise covered by provisions of this Order; and
(l)    development of contingency plans to address issues that arise with respect to any of the foregoing elements of the Action Plan, including plans that address operational continuity issues in the normal course of business and in a stressed environment.
(4)    The Action Plan shall specify timelines for completion of each of the requirements of this Order. The timelines in the Action Plan shall be consistent with any deadlines set forth in this Order.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 33 Comments »

American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc WAS PAINE WEBBER SUBSIDIARY

Posted on April 10, 2011 by Neil Garfield

SUBMITTED BY BRIAN TRACY

Here’s a goodie for Florida (and probably the rest of the country.. I was looking around in the Florida corporate registry …and saw something really odd ( see http://www.sunbiz.org ) ,, My servicing entity from WF/Option One was originally “American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc” and it continues to be so … However the company went BK and Wylbur Ross’s “shadow” version took over servicing with a new company using the same name … I do not recall ever getting the required official notices….

here’s a cut-and-paste of the answer from my inquiry to the Florida dept. of corporations … if there is anything actionable of usable here let me know… I REALLY want to QT …. THANKS ..

Good Afternoon,

We apologize for the delay in our reply.

F93000002976 was a Maryland Corporation originally qualified in Florida on 06/28/1993 under the name PAINEWEBBER MORTGAGE FINANCE, INC. On 09/28/1993 the name was changed to COLUMBIA NATIONAL, INCORPORATED. On 07/21/2004 the name was changed to AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. On 04/21/2008 the name was changed to AHM SV, INC. On 09/25/2009 the corporate status in the State of Florida was revoked due to non-filing of the 2009 Annual Report.

The corporation used the name AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. from 07/21/2004 to 04/21/2008.

F07000006151 was a Delaware Corporation originally qualified in Florida on 12/17/2007 under the name AH MORTGAGE ACQUISITION CO., INC. On 06/04/2008 the name was changed to AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC.

F07000006151 did not start using the name AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. until approximately 2 months after F93000002976 filed the amendment changing their name to AHM SV, INC.

When viewing the detail page online at http://www.sunziz.org just above the entity name you’ll find a link for “Name History”.

Lee Yarbrough

Internet Access Section

Florida Department of State

Division of Corporations

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 22 Comments »

MARY COCHRANE STRIKES AGAIN: INDYMAC AND COUNTRYWIDE

Posted on April 5, 2011 by Neil Garfield

10K 12/31/93 Indymac Bancorp Inc.
Filed 3/29/94 SEC File 1-08972 Accession Number 898430-94-223

IndyMac Bancorp Inc. (Registrant)
551 SEC Filings 3/18/94 to 8/7/08

Closely Related (4):
•Indymac Capital Trust I – SEC# 1157668 6/10/04
•Indymac Capital Trust II – SEC# 115670 6/30/06
•Indymac Capital Trust III – SEC# 1157671 – 6/30/06
•Indymac Capital Trust IV – SEC# 1157669 6/30/06
Formerly Assigned On
Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc 6/2/98
Inmc Mortgage Holdings Inc 8/13/97
CWM Mortgage Holdings Inc /25/94
Countrywide Mortgage Investments Inc/DE 7/3/92
Symbols
IDMC, IDMP, IDMCQ, IDMPQ, IMB, NDE

SIC Code – Souce: SEC EDGAR

6035 Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered
SEC 8/7/08
6798 Real Estate Investment Trusts
SEC 2/12/01

Office Address
888 East Walnut Street
Pasadena, California 91101-7211U.S.A.

SELLER

10K 12/31/93 Indymac Bancorp Inc. Filed 3/29/94 SEC File 1-08972 Accession Number 898430-94-223
Mortgage Loans Acquired:
The Company’s highest concentration of jumbo mortgage loans relates to properties in California because of the generally higher property values and mortgage loan balances prevalent there. Mortgage loans secured by California properties have accounted for approximately 69% of the mortgage loans purchased in 1993.

The Company generally purchases jumbo mortgage loans with original principal balances of up to $1 million. The Company’s loan purchase activities focus on those regions of the country where
higher volumes of jumbo mortgage loans are originated, including California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Washington, D.C.

Mortgage loans acquired by the Company are secured by first liens on single
(one-to-four) family residential properties with either fixed or adjustable
interest rates. Fixed-rate mortgage loans accounted for over 90% of the
mortgage loans purchased by the Company in 1993 primarily because of the desire of borrowers to lock in the low rates of interest prevailing in 1993. The Company anticipates that its adjustable-rate mortgage loan purchase volume as a percent of total loans purchased will grow as interest rates rise.

The Company also purchases adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”) loans which provide the borrower with the option to convert to a fixed rate of interest in the future. Although the Company sells or securitizes these ARM loans in connectionwith its mortgage conduit operations, it generally is obligated to repurchase the fixed-rate loans resulting from any such conversion. The Company generally has the right to require repurchase of any such converted mortgage loan by the servicer or seller of such loans.

Seller Eligibility Requirements:

The mortgage loans acquired pursuant to the Company’s mortgage conduit
operations are originated by various sellers, including savings and loan associations, banks, mortgage bankers and other mortgage lenders.

Sellers are required to meet certain regulatory, financial, insurance and performance
requirements established by the Company before they are eligible to participate
in the Company’s mortgage loan purchase program and must submit to periodic
reviews by the Company to ensure continued compliance with these requirements.

The Company’s current criteria for seller participation generally include a
tangible net worth of at least $1 million, a servicing portfolio of at least $25
million and loan production aggregating at least $50 million during the last
three years.

In addition, sellers are required to have comprehensive loan origination quality control procedures. In connection with their qualification, each seller enters into an agreement that provides for recourse by the Company against the seller in the event of any material breach of a representation or warranty made by the seller with respect to mortgage loans sold to the Company
or any fraud or misrepresentation during the mortgage loan origination process.

Servicing Retention
Sellers of mortgage loans to the Company are generally expected to retain the rights to service the mortgage loans purchased by the Company.

Servicing includes:
• collecting and remitting loan payments,
• making required advances,
• accounting for principal and interest,
• holding escrow or impound funds for payment of taxes and insurance,
• if applicable, making required inspections of the mortgaged property,
• contacting delinquent borrowers and
• supervising foreclosures and property dispositions in the event of unremedied defaults in accordance with the Company’s guidelines.
• The servicer receives fees generally ranging from 1/4% to 1/2% per annum on the declining principal balances of the loans serviced.
• Under certain circumstances, sellers have the right to require the Company to purchase such servicing rights at a previously determined price.
• If a seller/servicer breaches certain of its representations and warranties made to the Company, the Company may terminate the servicing rights of such seller/servicer and assign such servicing rights to another servicer.

Sale of Loans

The Company, similar to other mortgage conduits, customarily sells all loans that it purchases.

When a sufficient volume of mortgage loans with similar characteristics has been accumulated, generally $100 million to $500 million, the loans are securitized through the issuance of mortgage-backed securities in the form of real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMICs”) or collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”) or resold in bulk whole loan sales.

The length of time between the Company’s commitment to purchase a mortgage loan and when it sells or securitizes such mortgage loan generally ranges from ten to 90 days depending on certain factors, including the length of the purchase commitment period and the securitization process.

The Company’s decision to form REMICs or CMOs or to sell the loans in bulk is
influenced by a variety of factors. REMIC transactions are generally accounted
for as sales of the mortgage loans and can eliminate or minimize any long-term
residual investment in the loans. REMIC securities consist of one or more
classes of “regular interests” and a single class of “residual interest.” The
regular interests are tailored to the needs of investors and may be issued in
multiple classes with varying maturities, average lives and interest rates.
These regular interests are predominately senior securities but, in conjunction
with providing credit enhancement, may be subordinated to the rights of other
regular interests. The residual interest represents the remainder of the cash
flows from the mortgage loans (including, in some instances, reinvestment
income) over the amounts required to be distributed to the regular interests.
In some cases, the regular interests may be structured so that there is no
significant residual cash flow, thereby allowing the Company to sell its entire
interest in the mortgage loans. As a result, in some cases the capital
originally invested in the mortgage loans by the Company may be redeployed in
the mortgage conduit operations. The Company generally retains any residual
interests for investment. Management believes that because of the current low
level of interest rates, investments in residual interest or “excess master
servicing fees” are prudent, and if interest rates rise, the income from
investments will mitigate declines in income that may occur in the Company’s
purchase operations.

As an alternative to REMIC sales, the Company may issue CMOs to finance mortgage
loans to maturity. For accounting and tax purposes, the mortgage loans financed
through the issuance of CMOs are treated as assets of the Company and the CMOs
are treated as debt of the Company. The Company earns the net interest spread
between the interest income on the mortgage loans and the interest and other
expenses associated with the CMO financing. The net interest spread is directly
impacted by the levels of prepayment of the underlying mortgage loans. The
Company is required to retain a residual interest in its issued CMOs.

Substantially all of the Company’s loans and mortgaged-backed securities (“MBS”)
are sold at prices that are determined based on the cash market for MBS. As
such, the Company’s interest-rate risk is directly correlated to the risk that
the price of MBS changes between the date on which a loan is purchased by the
Company and the date on which the mortgage loan is settled with the ultimate
investor. In addition, the Company is exposed to the risk that the value of the
loans that it has committed to purchase, but has not yet closed, will decline
between the commitment date and the date of the settlement with the investor.

In order to offset the risk that a change in interest rates will result in a
decrease in the value of the Company’s current mortgage loan inventory, or its
commitments to purchase mortgage loans (“Committed Pipeline”) the Company enters
into hedging transactions. The Company’s hedging policies generally require that
all of its inventory of loans and the expected portion of its Committed Pipeline
that may close be hedged with forward contracts for the delivery of MBS or whole
loans. The Company hedges its inventory and Committed Pipeline of mortgage loans
by using whole-loan sale commitments to ultimate buyers, by using temporary
“cross hedges” with sales of government sponsored MBS since such loans are
ultimately sold based on a market spread to MBS or by selling forward private
label MBS. As such, the Company is not exposed to significant risk nor will it
derive any benefit from changes in interest rates on the price of the inventory
net of gains or losses of associated hedge positions. The correlation between
the price performance of the hedge instruments and the inventory being hedged is
generally high due to the similarity of the asset and the related hedge
instrument. The Company is exposed to interest-rate risk to the extent that the
portion of loans from the Committed Pipeline that actually closes at the committed price is less than the portion expected to
close in the event of a decline in rates and such decline in closings is not
covered by options to purchase MBS needed to replace the loans in process that
do not close at their committed price. The Company determines the portion of
its Committed Pipeline that it will hedge based on numerous factors, including
the composition of the Company’s Committed Pipeline, the portion of such
Committed Pipeline likely to close, the timing of such closings and anticipated
changes in interest rates.

“FHLMC Security” shall refer to a Mortgage Participation Certificate issued and guaranteed by FHLMC and backed by a pool of Agency Mortgage Loans.

“FHA” shall refer to the Federal Housing Administration.

“FHLMC” shall refer to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.

“FHLMC Guide” shall refer to the Freddie Mac Seller’s and Servicers’ Guide,

“FNMA” shall refer to the Federal National Mortgage Association.

“FNMA Guide” shall refer to the Fannie Mae Selling and Servicing Guide, as such Guide may hereafter from time to time be amended.

“GNMA” shall refer to the Government National Mortgage Association.

“GNMA Guide” shall refer to the GNMA Mortgage-Backed Securities Guide, as such Guide may hereafter from time to time be amended.

“GNMA Security” shall refer to a fully-modified pass-through mortgage-backed certificate guaranteed by GNMA and backed by a pool of Agency Mortgage Loans.

“MLGSI” shall refer to Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc.

“MLMCI” shall refer to Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital Inc.

“GEMICO” shall refer to General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation, a North Carolina stock insurance company.

“Securities” shall, in addition to the definition set forth in the Master Repurchase Agreement, refer to Mortgage Loans.

“Security Release Form” shall refer to (i) Freddie Mac Form 996 (Warehouse
Lender Release of Security Interest) in the case of a FHLMC Security, (ii)
Fannie Mae Form 2004 (Secu-rity Release Certification) in the case of a
FNMA Security and (iii) Form HUD 11711A (Release of Security Interest) in
the case of a GNMA Security.

“Mortgage Loans” shall refer to the residential mortgage loans secured by first liens delivered to the Custodian pursuant to the Custody Agreement
and shall include both Agency and Non-Agency Mortgage Loans.

“Non-Agency Mortgage Loans” shall refer to Mortgage Loans that are not intended to back an Agency Security or to be sold to an Agency under its
cash purchase program; Mortgage Loans may, however, conform to Agency securitization requirements and may, at a later date, become Agency Mortgage Loans.

“PMI” shall refer to PMI Mortgage Insurance Co.

“Qualified Insurer” shall refer to GEMICO, PMI or UGI.

“PMI” shall refer to PMI Mortgage Insurance Co.

“GEMICO” shall refer to General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation, a
North Carolina stock insurance company.

“Qualified Originator” shall refer to a correspondent of CMI that originates Mortgage Loans and subsequently assigns its rights thereto to
CMI pursuant to a warehouse lending agreement between CMI and such Qualified Originator.

“Seller’s Margin Amount” shall have the meaning set forth in the Master
Repurchase Agreement except that the percentage referred to therein for
each Transaction shall be specified in the related Confirmation/Funding
Request.

“Servicer” shall, with respect to any Mortgage Loan, refer to the related
Qualified Originator.

“Mortgage Loan Income” shall mean income payable with respect to a Mortgage Loan including all amounts payable on account of such Mortgage Loan whether principal, interest, partial prepayments, prepayments in full, penalties,
advance payments or expenses and whether payable by or from the mortgagor or the Servicer for such Mortgage Loan.

“Instruction Letters” refer to the irrevocable instructions to Servicers
substantially in the form of Exhibit A hereto

“Takeout Commitment” shall refer to a trade confirmation from the Takeout
Investor to a Qualified Originator, which trade confirmation has been
assigned by the Qualified Originator to CMI, confirming the details of a
forward trade between the Takeout Investor and such Qualified Originator
with respect to one or more Agency Securities, which trade confirmation
shall be valid, binding and in full force and effect and relate to pools of
Agency Mortgage Loans that satisfy the “good delivery standard” of the
Public Securities Association as set forth in the Public Securities Association Uniform Practices Guide.

“Trade Commitment” shall refer to a trade confirmation or similar document
from the Trade Investor to a Qualified Originator, which trade confirmation
has been assigned by the Qualified Originator to CMI, confirming the
details of a mandatory forward trade or similar arrangement reasonably
acceptable to MLMCI between the Trade Investor and such Qualified
Originator with respect to one or more Non-Agency Mortgage Loans, which
trade confirmation or similar document shall be valid, binding and in full
force and effect and relate to pools of Non-Agency Mortgage Loans that
satisfy the delivery standards of the related Trade Investor.

“Takeout Investor” shall refer to a securities dealer or other financial
institution, reasonably acceptable to MLMCI, who has made a Takeout
Commitment. A list of Takeout Investors that are acceptable to MLMCI as of
the date hereof is set forth at Exhibit F hereto, which list may be
modified from time to time by MLMCI in its reasonable discretion.

“Trade Investor” shall refer to a securities dealer or other financial
institution (other than an Agency), reasonably acceptable to MLMCI, who has
made a Trade Commitment. A list of Trade Investors that are acceptable to
MLMCI as of the date hereof is set forth at Exhibit F hereto, which list
may be modified from time to time by MLMCI in its reasonable discretion.

“Third Person” shall have the meaning set forth in the Custody Agreement.

“Transaction” shall, in addition to the definition set forth in the Master
Repurchase Agreement, refer to substitutions pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the
Master Repurchase Agreement.

“UGI” shall refer to United Guaranty Insurance Company.

“VA” shall refer to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

“Warehouse Lending Agreement” shall refer to a lending agreement between
CMI and a Qualified Originator substantially in the form of Exhibit E
hereto.

COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS, INC.
Jurisdiction DE, 95-3983415 IRS ID#
Exchange where registered:
New York Stock Exchange
Commission File# 1-8972

RSSDID 1616408 Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc. (was established as a Domestic Entity Other 5/5/1986)

Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc.
(“CMI” or the “Company”) was incorporated
in the State of Maryland on July 16, 1985 and reincorporated in the State of
Delaware on March 6, 1987.

References to “CMI” mean either the parent company alone or the parent company

Jeffrey F. Butler joined CCI in 1985 and became the Chief Information Officer in 1989 and Managing Director–Chief Information Officer in May 1991.

4.1* Indenture (the “Indenture”), dated as of December 1, 1985, between Countrywide Mortgage Obligations, Inc. (“CMO, Inc.”) and Bankers Trust Company, as Trustee (“BTC”) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to

CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 24, 1986

Definition:
CMOs are debt instruments secured by fixed pools of mortgage instruments in which investors hold multiple classes of interest.

A company’s residual interest of a CMO issued by Company or a qualifed real estate investment trust (REIT) trust subsidairy after 12/31/1991, pursuant to regulations yet to be published, may be “excess inclusion” income.

Some excess inclusion income generally is subject to federal income tax in all events.
See “Excess Inclusion”

The Company has elected to be taxed as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
(the “Code”).

Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc. (“CMI” or the “Company”) was incorporated
in the State of Maryland on July 16, 1985 and reincorporated in the State of
Delaware on March 6, 1987.

The Company has elected to be taxed as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
(the “Code”). As a result of this election, the Company will not, with certain
limited exceptions, be taxed at the corporate level on the net income
distributed to the Company’s stockholders.

Historically, the Company has been a long-term investor in single-family, first-
lien, residential mortgage loans and in mortgage securities representing
interests in such loans (the “CMO portfolio”). Under its new operating plan
commenced in 1993, the Company conducts mortgage conduit activities through a
newly formed subsidiary, Countrywide Mortgage Conduit, Inc. (“CMC”), which is
not a qualified REIT subsidiary and which is subject to applicable federal and
state income taxes. See “Certain Federal Income Tax Considerations.” As part
of its new operating plan, the Company also conducts warehouse lending
operations which provide short-term revolving financing to certain mortgage
bankers.

MORTGAGE CONDUIT OPERATIONS

On October 22, 1992, the Company’s Board of Directors approved a new operating
plan, implementation of which was begun in the first quarter of 1993.

Under the new plan, the Company established CMC, which principally operates as a jumbo and
nonconforming mortgage loan conduit. As a jumbo mortgage loan conduit, CMC is
an intermediary between the originators of mortgage loans which have outstanding
principal balances in excess of the guidelines of the government and government
sponsored enterprises that guarantee mortgage-backed securities (“jumbo
mortgage loans”) and permanent investors in mortgage-backed securities secured
by or representing an ownership interest in such mortgage loans. Sellers
generally retain the rights to service the mortgage loans purchased by the
Company. The Company’s principal sources of income from its mortgage conduit
operations are gains recognized on the sale of mortgage loans, the net spread
between interest earned on mortgage loans owned by the Company and the interest
costs associated with the borrowings used to finance such loans pending their
securitization and the net interest earned on its long-term investment
portfolio.

Production
———-

The Company’s mortgage conduit operations are designed to attract both large and
small sellers of jumbo mortgage loans by offering a variety of pricing and loan
underwriting methods designed to be responsive to such sellers’ needs. The
Company focuses on sellers that originate loans in regions of the United States
with generally higher property values and mortgage balances.

The Company has established three loan underwriting methods designed to be
responsive to the needs of jumbo mortgage loan sellers.

The Company’s first
method is designed to serve sellers who generally obtain mortgage pool insurance
commitments in connection with the origination of their loans.

The Company does
not perform a full underwriting review of such mortgage loans but instead relies
on the credit review and analysis of the mortgage pool insurer and its own
follow-up quality control procedures.

The second method established by the
Company offers a delegated underwriting program for those loan sellers who meet
higher financial and performance criteria than those applicable to sellers
generally.

Under the delegated underwriting program, loans are underwritten in
accordance with the Company’s guidelines by the seller and purchased on the
basis of the seller’s financial strength, historical loan quality and other
qualifications.

A sample of such loans is subsequently reviewed by the Company
in accordance with its expanded quality control guidelines.

Finally, sellers
may submit to the Company loans for which there is no pool insurance commitment
to be underwritten in accordance with the Company’s guidelines.

Under all three
methods, loans are purchased by the Company only after completion of a legal
documentation and eligibility criteria review.

See “Underwriting and Quality
Control.”

Underwriting and Quality Control
——————————–

Purchase Guidelines. The Company has developed comprehensive purchase
guidelines for its acquisition of mortgage loans. Subject to certain
exceptions, each loan purchased must conform to the Company’s loan eligibility
requirements specified in its Seller/Servicer Guide with respect to, among other
things, loan amount, type of property, loan-to-value ratio, type and amount of
insurance, credit history of the borrower, income ratios, sources of funds,
appraisal and loan documentation. The Company also performs a legal
documentation review prior to the purchase of any loan. For loans with mortgage
pool insurance commitments, the Company does not perform a full underwriting
review prior to purchase but instead relies on the credit review and analysis
performed by the mortgage pool insurer and its own post-purchase quality control
review. In contrast, for mortgage loans that have not been underwritten for
mortgage pool insurance and are not part of the delegated underwriting program,
the Company performs a full credit review and analysis to ensure compliance with
its loan eligibility requirements. This review specifically includes, among
other things, an analysis of the underlying property and associated appraisal
and an examination of the credit, employment and income history of the borrower.
For loans purchased pursuant to the delegated underwriting program, the Company
relies on the credit review performed by the seller and its own follow-up
quality control procedures.

Mortgage Loans Acquired
———————–

Substantially all of the mortgage loans purchased through the Company’s mortgage
conduit operations are nonconforming mortgage loans. Nonconforming mortgage
loans are loans which do not qualify for purchase by the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“FHLMC”) or the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“FNMA”) or for inclusion in a loan guarantee program sponsored by the
Government National Mortgage Association (“GNMA”). Nonconforming mortgage loans
generally consist of jumbo mortgage loans or loans which are not originated in
accordance with other agency criteria. Currently, the maximum principal balance
for a conforming loan is $203,150. The Company generally purchases jumbo
mortgage loans with original principal balances of up to $1 million. The
Company’s loan purchase activities focus on those regions of the country where
higher volumes of jumbo mortgage loans are originated, including California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Washington, D.C. The Company’s
highest concentration of jumbo mortgage loans relates to properties in
California because of the generally higher property values and mortgage loan
balances prevalent there. Mortgage loans secured by California properties have
accounted for approximately 69% of the mortgage loans purchased in 1993.

Mortgage loans acquired by the Company are secured by first liens on single
(one-to-four) family residential properties with either fixed or adjustable
interest rates. Fixed-rate mortgage loans accounted for over 90% of the
mortgage loans purchased by the Company in 1993 primarily because of the desire
of borrowers to lock in the low rates of interest prevailing in 1993. The
Company anticipates that its adjustable-rate mortgage loan purchase volume as a
percent of total loans purchased will grow as interest rates rise.

The Company also purchases adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”) loans which provide
the borrower with the option to convert to a fixed rate of interest in the
future. Although the Company sells or securitizes these ARM loans in connection
with its mortgage conduit operations, it generally is obligated to repurchase
the fixed-rate loans resulting from any such conversion. The Company generally
has the right to require repurchase of any such converted mortgage loan by the
servicer or seller of such loans.

Seller Eligibility Requirements
———————————

The mortgage loans acquired pursuant to the Company’s mortgage conduit
operations are originated by various sellers, including savings and loan
associations, banks, mortgage bankers and other mortgage lenders. Sellers are
required to meet certain regulatory, financial, insurance and performance
requirements established by the Company before they are eligible to participate
in the Company’s mortgage loan purchase program and must submit to periodic
reviews by the Company to ensure continued compliance with these requirements.
The Company’s current criteria for seller participation generally include a
tangible net worth of at least $1 million, a servicing portfolio of at least $25
million and loan production aggregating at least $50 million during the last
three years. In addition, sellers are required to have comprehensive loan
origination quality control procedures. In connection with their qualification,
each seller enters into an agreement that provides for recourse by the Company
against the seller in the event of any material breach of a representation or
warranty made by the seller with respect to mortgage loans sold to the Company
or any fraud or misrepresentation during the mortgage loan origination process.

Servicing Retention
———————

Sellers of mortgage loans to the Company are generally expected to retain the
rights to service the mortgage loans purchased by the Company. Servicing
includes collecting and remitting loan payments, making required advances,
accounting for principal and interest, holding escrow or impound funds for
payment of taxes and insurance, if applicable, making required inspections of
the mortgaged property, contacting delinquent borrowers and supervising
foreclosures and property dispositions in the event of unremedied defaults in
accordance with the Company’s guidelines. The servicer receives fees generally
ranging from 1/4% to 1/2% per annum on the declining principal balances of the
loans serviced. Under certain circumstances, sellers have the right to require
the Company to purchase such servicing rights at a previously determined price.
If a seller/servicer breaches certain of its representations and warranties made
to the Company, the Company may terminate the servicing rights of such
seller/servicer and assign such servicing rights to another servicer.

Sale of Loans
————-

The Company, similar to other mortgage conduits, customarily sells all loans
that it purchases. When a sufficient volume of mortgage loans with similar
characteristics has been accumulated, generally $100 million to $500 million,
the loans are securitized through the issuance of mortgage-backed securities in
the form of real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMICs”) or
collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”) or resold in bulk whole loan sales.
The length of time between the Company’s commitment to purchase a mortgage loan
and when it sells or securitizes such mortgage loan generally ranges from ten to
90 days depending on certain factors, including the length of the purchase
commitment period and the securitization process.

The Company’s decision to form REMICs or CMOs or to sell the loans in bulk is
influenced by a variety of factors. REMIC transactions are generally accounted
for as sales of the mortgage loans and can eliminate or minimize any long-term
residual investment in the loans. REMIC securities consist of one or more
classes of “regular interests” and a single class of “residual interest.” The
regular interests are tailored to the needs of investors and may be issued in
multiple classes with varying maturities, average lives and interest rates.
These regular interests are predominately senior securities but, in conjunction
with providing credit enhancement, may be subordinated to the rights of other
regular interests. The residual interest represents the remainder of the cash
flows from the mortgage loans (including, in some instances, reinvestment
income) over the amounts required to be distributed to the regular interests.
In some cases, the regular interests may be structured so that there is no
significant residual cash flow, thereby allowing the Company to sell its entire
interest in the mortgage loans. As a result, in some cases the capital
originally invested in the mortgage loans by the Company may be redeployed in
the mortgage conduit operations. The Company generally retains any residual
interests for investment. Management believes that because of the current low
level of interest rates, investments in residual interest or “excess master
servicing fees” are prudent, and if interest rates rise, the income from
investments will mitigate declines in income that may occur in the Company’s
purchase operations.

As an alternative to REMIC sales, the Company may issue CMOs to finance mortgage
loans to maturity. For accounting and tax purposes, the mortgage loans financed
through the issuance of CMOs are treated as assets of the Company and the CMOs
are treated as debt of the Company. The Company earns the net interest spread
between the interest income on the mortgage loans and the interest and other
expenses associated with the CMO financing. The net interest spread is directly
impacted by the levels of prepayment of the underlying mortgage loans. The
Company is required to retain a residual interest in its issued CMOs.

Substantially all of the Company’s loans and mortgaged-backed securities (“MBS”)
are sold at prices that are determined based on the cash market for MBS. As
such, the Company’s interest-rate risk is directly correlated to the risk that
the price of MBS changes between the date on which a loan is purchased by the
Company and the date on which the mortgage loan is settled with the ultimate
investor. In addition, the Company is exposed to the risk that the value of the
loans that it has committed to purchase, but has not yet closed, will decline
between the commitment date and the date of the settlement with the investor.

In order to offset the risk that a change in interest rates will result in a
decrease in the value of the Company’s current mortgage loan inventory, or its
commitments to purchase mortgage loans (“Committed Pipeline”) the Company enters
into hedging transactions. The Company’s hedging policies generally require that
all of its inventory of loans and the expected portion of its Committed Pipeline
that may close be hedged with forward contracts for the delivery of MBS or whole
loans. The Company hedges its inventory and Committed Pipeline of mortgage loans
by using whole-loan sale commitments to ultimate buyers, by using temporary
“cross hedges” with sales of government sponsored MBS since such loans are
ultimately sold based on a market spread to MBS or by selling forward private
label MBS. As such, the Company is not exposed to significant risk nor will it
derive any benefit from changes in interest rates on the price of the inventory
net of gains or losses of associated hedge positions. The correlation between
the price performance of the hedge instruments and the inventory being hedged is
generally high due to the similarity of the asset and the related hedge
instrument. The Company is exposed to interest-rate risk to the extent that the
portion of loans from the Committed Pipeline that actually closes at the committed price is less than the portion expected to
close in the event of a decline in rates and such decline in closings is not
covered by options to purchase MBS needed to replace the loans in process that
do not close at their committed price. The Company determines the portion of
its Committed Pipeline that it will hedge based on numerous factors, including
the composition of the Company’s Committed Pipeline, the portion of such
Committed Pipeline likely to close, the timing of such closings and anticipated
changes in interest rates.

Master Loan Servicing
———————

The Company acts as master servicer with respect to the mortgage loans it sells.
Master servicing includes collecting loan payments from seller/servicers of
loans and remitting loan payments, less master servicing fees and other fees,
to trustees. In addition, as master servicer, the Company monitors compliance
with its servicing guidelines and is required to perform, or to contract with a
third party to perform, all obligations not adequately performed by any
servicer.

In connection with REMIC issuances, the Company master services on a non-
recourse basis substantially all of the mortgage loans it purchases. Each series
of mortgage-backed securities is typically fully payable from the mortgage
assets underlying such series and the recourse of investors is limited to those
assets and any credit enhancement features, such as insurance. Generally, any
losses in excess of the credit enhancement obtained is borne by the security
holders. Except in the case of a breach of the standard representations and
warranties made by the Company when mortgage loans are securitized, the
securities are non-recourse to the Company. Typically, the Company has recourse
to the sellers of loans for any such breaches.

Master Loan Servicing
———————

The Company acts as master servicer with respect to the mortgage loans it sells.
Master servicing includes collecting loan payments from seller/servicers of
loans and remitting loan payments, less master servicing fees and other fees,
to trustees. In addition, as master servicer, the Company monitors compliance
with its servicing guidelines and is required to perform, or to contract with a
third party to perform, all obligations not adequately performed by any
servicer.

In connection with REMIC issuances, the Company master services on a non-
recourse basis substantially all of the mortgage loans it purchases. Each series
of mortgage-backed securities is typically fully payable from the mortgage
assets underlying such series and the recourse of investors is limited to those
assets and any credit enhancement features, such as insurance. Generally, any
losses in excess of the credit enhancement obtained is borne by the security
holders. Except in the case of a breach of the standard representations and
warranties made by the Company when mortgage loans are securitized, the
securities are non-recourse to the Company. Typically, the Company has recourse
to the sellers of loans for any such breaches.

Financing of Mortgage Conduit Operations
—————————————-

The Company’s principal financing needs are the financing of loan purchase
activities and the investment in excess master servicing rights. To meet these
needs, the Company currently relies on reverse-repurchase agreements
collateralized by mortgage loans held for sale and cash flow from operations.
In addition, in 1993 the Company has relied on proceeds from public offerings of
common stock. For further information on the material terms of the borrowings
utilized by the Company to finance its inventory of mortgage loans and mortgage-
backed securities, see “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations–Liquidity and Capital Resources.” The
Company continues to investigate and pursue alternative and supplementary
methods to finance its operations through the public and private capital
markets.

WAREHOUSE LENDING

As part of its new operating plan, the Company engages in warehouse lending
operations for small-and medium-size mortgage bankers. Warehouse lending
facilities typically provide short-term revolving financing to mortgage bankers
to finance mortgage loans during the time from the closing of the loan until its
settlement with an investor. The Company’s warehouse lending program offers
warehouse lending facilities up to a maximum aggregate amount of $20 million to
mortgage bankers who have a minimum audited net worth of $300,000 subject to a
maximum debt-to-adjusted-net-worth ratio of 20 to 1. The specific terms of any
warehouse line of credit, including the amount, are determined based upon the
financial strength, historical performance and other qualifications of the
mortgage banker. All such lines of credit are subject to the prior approval of
a credit committee comprised of senior officers and directors of the Company.
The Company finances this program through a combination of reverse repurchase
agreements and equity. The Company has a committed one-year reverse repurchase
agreement facility with an investment bank in an aggregate amount of up to $100
million for this warehouse lending program.

As a warehouse lender the Company is a secured creditor of the mortgage bankers
to which it extends credit and is subject to the risks inherent in that status,
including the risks of borrower default and bankruptcy.

In contrast to the Company’s new mortgage conduit and warehouse lending
operations, which establish the Company as a niche mortgage banker and lender to
mortgage companies, the Company historically has been a long-term investor in
single-family, first-lien, residential mortgage loans and in mortgage securities
representing interests in such loans.

In 1987, the Company
began to invest in Agency Securities representing undivided interests in pools
of adjustable-rate mortgages (“Agency ARMs”) purchased through various broker-
dealers and financed primarily through reverse repurchase agreements. During
1992, the Company sold substantially all of its portfolio of Agency ARMs,
resulting in a gain of approximately $9.0 million and the remainder of such
portfolio was sold during the first quarter of 1993 at its approximate carrying
value. At December 31, 1993, the Company’s assets included approximately $402.5
million of fixed-rate jumbo mortgage loans and Agency Securities which were
pledged to secure outstanding CMOs issued by the Company’s subsidiaries.

During 1993, long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, fell to their
lowest levels in over twenty years. The collateral for CMOs experienced
substantial prepayments, resulting in significantly decreased net earnings and,
as mortgage loan premiums, original issue discount and bond issuance costs were
required to be amortized, losses on the portfolio. If prepayments continue at
high levels, the performance of this CMO portfolio will continue to be adversely
impacted. Regardless of the level of interest rates or prepayments, the Company
anticipates no significant earnings from this CMO portfolio. Any continued
negative performance of this CMO portfolio will continue to adversely impact the
earnings of the Company to the extent of its investment in such portfolio.

EXHIBIT 10.52 MASTER REPURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital Inc. &
Countywide Mortgage Investments, Inc. 8/16/1993
Applicability Annex I (continued)
To the extent that these Supplemental Terms
conflict with the terms of the Master Repurchase Agreement, these
Supplemental Terms shall control.
Capitalized terms not otherwise defined have the meanings set forth in Master Repurchase Agreement.

Dated as of October 1, 1993

From time to time the parties hereto may enter into transactions in which one
party (“Seller) agrees to transfer to the other (“Buyer”) securities or
financial instruments (“Securities”) against the transfer of funds by Buyer,
with a simultaneous agreement by Buyer to transfer to Seller such Securities at
a date certain or on demand, against the transfer of funds by Seller. Each such
transaction shall be referred to herein as a “Transaction” and shall be governed
by this Agreement, including any supplemental terms or conditions contained in
Annex I hereto, unless otherwise agreed in writing.——————————-

As: Signatory (Director, Officer, Attorney, Accountant, Banker, Agent, etc.)
List All Filings as Signatory

Search Recent Filings (as Signatory) for “Angelo R. Mozilo”

“Angelo R. Mozilo” – President
a.k.a. “Angelo R.Mozilo”
Latest Filing: 7/3/08 as Registrant

“Angelo R. Mozilo” has been a Signatory for/with the following 16 Registrants:
• Countrywide Capital I
• Countrywide Capital II
• Countrywide Capital III
• Countrywide Capital IV
• Countrywide Capital V
• Countrywide Capital VI
• Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]
• Countrywide Home Loans Inc [ formerly Countrywide Funding Corp ]
• Home Depot Inc
• Indymac Bancorp Inc [ formerly Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc ]
• Mozilo Angelo R
• Paracelsus Healthcare Corp
• Pic Investment Trust
• Touchstone Investment Trust [ formerly Countrywide Investment Trust ]
• Touchstone Strategic Trust [ formerly Countrywide Strategic Trust ]
• Touchstone Tax Free Trust [ formerly Countrywide Tax Free Trust ]

Angelo R. Mozilo” has/had a Signatory interest in the following 2 Registrants:
• Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]
• Home Depot Inc

“Sandor E. Samuels” – Secretary
Latest Filing: 7/3/08 as Registrant
________________________________________
As: Registrant
• Samuels Sandor E
________________________________________
As: Signatory (Director, Officer, Attorney, Accountant, Banker, Agent, etc.)
List All Filings as Signatory

Search Recent Filings (as Signatory) for “Sandor E. Samuels”
“Sandor E. Samuels” has been a Signatory for/with the following 10 Registrants:
• Countrywide Capital III
• Countrywide Capital IV
• Countrywide Capital IX
• Countrywide Capital V
• Countrywide Capital VI
• Countrywide Capital VII
• Countrywide Capital VIII
• Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]
• Countrywide Home Loans Inc [ formerly Countrywide Funding Corp ]
• Indymac Bancorp Inc [ formerly Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc ]

“Sandor E. Samuels” has/had a Signatory interest in the following Registrant:
• Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]

73 “Issuer” Relationships (where the security “Owner” is…)
Filing or “Owner”
First Filing Last Filing Relationship Filed By Filer or Reporting Owner

6/4/03 2/20/08 4 Abernathy S Blair
9/17/03 2/20/08 4 Adarkar Ashwin
9/16/03 3 Adarkar Ashwin
3/28/07 3/19/08 4 Arredondo Canise Marie
1/9/07 3 Arredondo Canise Marie
4/9/07 3 Banks James M
1/10/06 5/10/07 SC 13G BlackRock Institutional Trust Company/N/A [ formerly Barclays Global Investors NA/CA ]
3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Caldera Louis E
12/10/99 2/12/08 SC 13G Capital Group International Inc
2/12/99 4/10/08 SC 13G Capital Guardian Trust Co
2/12/07 2/13/08 SC 13G Capital Research & Management Co
2/12/99 2/1/01 SC 13G Citigroup Inc [ formerly Travelers Group Inc ]
8/20/07 7/22/08 SC 13G Classic Fund Management Aktiengesellschaft
5/5/04 8/4/05 4 Del Ponti John D
5/3/04 3 Del Ponti John D
9/17/03 3/17/04 4 Dupont Sherry M
9/16/03 3 Dupont Sherry M
3/27/07 2/20/08 4 Ebers Anthony L
1/9/07 3 Ebers Anthony L
9/3/04 3/19/08 4 Gabriel Stuart A
9/3/04 3 Gabriel Stuart A
6/16/03 3/19/08 4 Gramley Lyle
3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Grant Hugh M
1/25/07 3/19/08 4 Greene Gabrielle E
1/24/07 3 Greene Gabrielle E
3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Haden Patrick C
7/31/03 3/19/08 4 Hodel Terrance G
2/5/07 5 Hodel Terrance G
7/31/03 3 Hodel Terrance G
8/6/03 3 Holroyd Charles T
8/4/05 3/27/07 4 Hughes Terrence O
7/26/05 3 Hughes Terrence O
3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Hunt Robert L II
2/20/08 3/19/08 4 Hymel Patrick A
12/12/07 1/17/08 3 Hymel Patrick A
2/5/04 3/17/06 4 Jackson R Patterson [ formerly Jackson Robert P ]
1/29/04 3 Jackson R Patterson [ formerly Jackson Robert P ]
3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Kennard Lydia H
3/17/04 2/20/08 4 Keys A Scott
2/14/08 SC 13G LMM LLC/MD
3/27/07 4 Mahoney James R
5/31/06 3 Mahoney James R
3/26/07 2/20/08 4 Mathoda Rayman K
1/9/07 3 Mathoda Rayman K
3/17/04 4 Matsumoto Raymond D
3/5/04 3 Matsumoto Raymond D
3/17/06 3/19/08 4 Melbourne Ruthann K
1/31/06 3 Melbourne Ruthann K
3/27/07 2/20/08 4 Minier Michelle
1/9/07 3 Minier Michelle
11/7/03 3/17/04 4 Molvar Roger H
6/6/03 4 Nelson Mark C
2/3/00 SC 13G Neuberger Berman Inc
2/10/97 2/11/99 SC 13G Neuberger Berman LLC/Adv [ formerly Neuberger & Berman LLC/Adv ]
8/7/08 25-NSE New York Stock Exchange LLC
6/17/03 3/17/04 4 Nichols Grosvenor G
3/21/03 7/11/08 SC 13G NWQ Investment Management Co LLC [ formerly NWQ Investment Management Co/CA ]
3/17/04 2/20/08 4 Olinski John D
11/14/03 2/20/08 4 Perry Michael W
3/17/04 4 Potts Thomas H
1/18/08 1/30/08 SC 13D Ramat Securities Ltd
9/24/07 2/14/08 SC 13G Second Curve Capital LLC
6/3/03 5/19/08 4 Seymour John/Senator
3/17/06 2/20/08 4 Sillman Frank M
2/13/06 5 Sillman Frank M
8/3/05 8/25/05 3 Sillman Frank M
8/24/94 SC 13D Smith Thomas W [ formerly Thomas W Smith ]
3/17/04 3/17/06 4 Ukropina James R
2/14/05 2/14/07 SC 13G Wellington Management Co LLP [ formerly Wellington Management Co ]
3/26/04 8/8/06 4 Williams Charles A
7/26/05 3/19/08 4 Willison Bruce G
7/26/05 3 Willison Bruce G
6/4/03 3/19/08 4 Wohl Richard H

——————————————————————————–

No “Owner” Relationships (where the security “Issuer” is…)

——————————————————————————–

42 Affiliate Relationships (based upon SEC Files: Parents / Subs., Directors / Officers, et al.)
Last Filing Registrant

2/20/08 Abernathy S Blair
2/20/08 Adarkar Ashwin
3/19/08 Arredondo Canise Marie
4/9/07 Banks James M
3/11/11 Caldera Louis E
8/4/05 Del Ponti John D
3/17/04 Dupont Sherry M
2/20/08 Ebers Anthony L
1/14/11 Gabriel Stuart A
3/19/08 Gramley Lyle
3/2/11 Grant Hugh M
2/11/11 Greene Gabrielle E
3/2/11 Haden Patrick C
3/19/08 Hodel Terrance G
8/6/03 Holroyd Charles T
3/27/07 Hughes Terrence O
3/19/08 Hunt Robert L II
3/19/08 Hymel Patrick A
6/10/04 Indymac Capital Trust I
6/30/06 Indymac Capital Trust II
6/30/06 Indymac Capital Trust III
6/30/06 Indymac Capital Trust IV
3/17/06 Jackson R Patterson [ formerly Jackson Robert P ]
1/3/11 Kennard Lydia H
2/20/08 Keys A Scott
3/27/07 Mahoney James R
2/20/08 Mathoda Rayman K
3/17/04 Matsumoto Raymond D
3/19/08 Melbourne Ruthann K
2/20/08 Minier Michelle
3/17/04 Molvar Roger H
6/6/03 Nelson Mark C
3/17/04 Nichols Grosvenor G
2/20/08 Olinski John D
2/20/08 Perry Michael W
6/21/04 Potts Thomas H
5/19/08 Seymour John/Senator
2/20/08 Sillman Frank M
12/21/10 Ukropina James R
8/8/06 Williams Charles A
3/22/11 Willison Bruce G
3/19/08 Wohl Richard H

25 SEC Files (as “Issuer”)
First Filing Last Filing SEC File Act Filings

3/18/94 8/7/08 001-08972 ’34 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, DEFM14A, PRE 14A, NT 11-K, 8-A12B, 10-K405, 5, 3, 3/A, 4/A, 10-K, DEF 14A, 10-Q, 4, 11-K, 8-K, 25-NSE [ * ]
– 10-K405/A
8/24/94 7/22/08 005-38368 ’34 SC 13D, SC 13D/A, SC 13G, SC 13G/A [ * ]
6/30/06 5/2/08 333-135542 ’33 S-3ASR, 424B5, 424B3 [ * ]
9/6/07 333-145905 ’33 S-8
12/8/06 333-139201 ’33 S-8
9/28/06 333-137632 ’33 S-8
4/26/06 333-133551 ’33 S-8
7/30/04 333-117797 ’33 S-8
8/20/01 6/10/04 333-67964 ’33 S-3, S-3/A, POS AM, 424B2, 424B3, 424B5 [ * ]
7/30/02 333-97339 ’33 S-8
10/20/00 333-48332 ’33 S-8
1/28/99 333-71329 ’33 S-3, POS AM [ * ]
8/17/98 11/3/98 333-61625 ’33 424B3, S-3
6/3/98 333-55907 ’33 S-8
12/2/97 5/18/98 333-41329 ’33 S-3, POS AM
3/4/98 333-47297 ’33 S-3
10/3/97 333-37149 ’33 S-3
9/22/97 333-36085 ’33 S-8
1/17/97 333-19975 ’33 S-3
8/9/96 10/9/96 333-09887 ’33 S-3/A, S-3
7/26/96 333-08905 ’33 S-8
2/16/96 3/11/96 333-01009 ’33 S-3, S-3/A
6/9/95 8/1/95 033-60137 ’33 S-3, S-3/A
11/22/94 2/2/95 033-56547 ’33 S-3, S-3/A, 424B1
11/1/94 033-56267 ’33 S-8
________
* There were multiple parties involved in these filings.
———————————————————–

3.1 Certificate of Incorporation for CMI, as amended.

3.2* Bylaws of CMI as amended (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to the
Company’s Form 10-Q, for the quarter ended June 30, 1993).

4.1* Indenture (the “Indenture”), dated as of December 1, 1985, between
Countrywide Mortgage Obligations, Inc. (“CMO, Inc.”) and Bankers Trust
Company, as Trustee (“BTC”) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to
CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 24, 1986).

4.2* Series A Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1985, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on January 24, 1986).

4.3* Series B Supplement, dated as of February 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on March 31, 1986).

4.4* Series C Supplement, dated as of April 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.4 to CMO, Inc.’s Amendment No. 1
to S-11 Registration Statement (No. 33-3274) filed with the SEC on May
13, 1986).

4.5* Series D Supplement, dated as of May 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.5 to the Company’s S-11
Registration Statement (No. 33-6787) filed with the SEC on June 26,
1986).

4.6* Series E Supplement, dated as of June 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.6 to the Company’s Amendment No.
1 to S-11 Registration Statement (No. 33-6787) filed with the SEC on July
30, 1986).

4.7* Series F Supplement, dated as of August 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on August 14, 1986).

4.8* Series G Supplement, dated as of August 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.8 to CMO, Inc.’s S-11
Registration Statement (No.33-8705) filed with the SEC on September 12,
1986).

4.9* Series H Supplement, dated as of September 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on October 7, 1986).

21

10-K/A 24th Page of 64 TOC 1st Previous Next Bottom Just 24th
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4.10* Series I Supplement, dated as of October 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.11 to CMO, Inc.’s Amendment No. 1
to S-11 Registration Statement (No. 33-8705) filed with the SEC on
October 27, 1986).

4.11* Series J Supplement, dated as of October 15, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on November 12, 1986).

4.12* Series K Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the
SEC on March 16, 1987).

4.13* Series L Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1986, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on March 16, 1987).

4.14* Series M Supplement, dated as of January 1, 1987, to the Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.3 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on March 16, 1987).

4.15* Indenture (the “SPNB Indenture”), dated as of December 1, 1986, between
CMO, Inc. and Security Pacific National Bank, as Trustee (“SPNB”)
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on January 9, 1987).

4.16* Series W-1 Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1986, to the SPNB
Indenture (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO, Inc.’s
Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 9, 1987).

4.17* Series N Supplement, dated as of February 1, 1987, to the SPNB Indenture
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
with the SEC on March 16, 1987).

4.18* Indenture, dated as of February 1, 1987, between Countrywide Mortgage
Trust 1987-I (the “1987-I Trust”) and SPNB (incorporated by reference to
Exhibit 4.18 to the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
1986).

4.19* Indenture, dated as of June 1, 1987, between Countrywide Mortgage Trust
1987-II (the “1987-II Trust”) and SPNB (incorporated by reference to
Exhibit 4.19 to the Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30,
1987).

4.20* Indenture Supplement, dated as of September 1, 1987, among Countrywide
Mortgage Obligations III, Inc. (“CMO III, Inc.”), CMO, Inc. and BTC
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO III, Inc.’s Form 8-K
filed with the SEC on October 9, 1987).

4.21* Indenture Supplement, dated as of September 1,1987, among CMO III, Inc.,
CMO, Inc. and SPNB (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO III,
Inc.’s. Form 8-K filed with the SEC on October 9, 1987).

4.22* Indenture dated as of November 20, 1990, between the Countrywide Cash
Flow Bond Trust (“CCFBT”) and BTC (incorporated by referenced to Exhibit
4.22 to the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1990).

4.23* Indenture dated as of March 30, 1993 between Countrywide Mortgage Trust
1993-I (the “1993-I Trust”) and State Street Bank and Trust Company (the
“Bond Trustee”) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to the
Company’s 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1993).

22

10-K/A 25th Page of 64 TOC 1st Previous Next Bottom Just 25th
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4.24* Indenture dated as of April 14, 1993 between Countrywide Mortgage Trust
1993-II (the “1993-II Trust”) and the Bond Trustee (incorporated by
reference to Exhibit 4.2 to the Company’s 10-Q for the quarter ended
March 31, 1993).

10.1* 1993 Amended and Extended Management Agreement, dated as of May 15, 1993,
between CMI and Countrywide Asset Management Corporation (the “Manager”)
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to the Company’s Amendment No.
3 to S-3 Registration Statement (No.33-63034) filed with the SEC on July
16, 1993).

10.2* 1987 Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement, dated as of May 15, 1987,
between CMI and Countrywide Funding Corporation (“CFC”) (incorporated by
reference to Exhibit 10.2 to the Company’s Form 10-Q filed for the
quarter ended June 30, 1987).

10.3* 1993 Amended and Extended Loan Purchase and Administrative Services
Agreement, dated as of May 15, 1993, between CMI and CFC (incorporated by
reference to Exhibit 10.9 to the Company’s 10-Q for the quarter ended
June 30, 1993).

10.4* 1988 Amended and Restated Submanagement Agreement, dated as of May 15,
1988, between CFC and the Manager (incorporated by reference to Exhibit
10.4 to CMI’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1988).

10.5* 1985 Stock Option Plan adopted August 26, 1985, as amended February 12,
1987 (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.6 to CMI’s Form 10-K for
the year ended December 31, 1986).

10.6* Form of Indemnity Agreement between CMI and CMI’s directors and officers
(incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.5 to CMI’s Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 1987).

10.7* Form of Guaranty of Indemnity Agreement made by Countrywide Credit
Industries, Inc. (“Countrywide Credit”) to CMI and CMI’s directors and
officers (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.6 to CMI’s Form 10-Q
for the quarter ended June 30, 1987).

10.9* Servicing Agreement, dated as of November 15, 1986, among CMO, Inc. SPNB
and CFC (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to CMO, Inc.’s For

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 18 Comments »

PNC Bank Suspends Foreclosures

Posted on October 9, 2010 by Neil Garfield

TOP READER PICKS FOR SERVICES AND PRODUCTS

Thought you might be interested in this too,

Foreclosure Fraud – Fighting Foreclosure Fraud by Sharing the Knowledge

False Statements

Posted by Foreclosure Fraud on October 8, 2010 · 1 Comment

False Statements

Bryan Bly
Green Tree Servicing, LLC
Bill Koch
Law Offices of Marshall Watson
Nationwide Title Clearing
PNC Bank
Richmond Monroe Group
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

Action Date: October 8, 2010
Location: Palm Harbor, FL

On October 7, 2010, PNC Bank reportedly announced that it was suspending foreclosures for 30 days. An examination of the Affidavits and Assignments filed by PNC shows why it may have decided on this action. For documents needed to foreclose, PNC relied heavily for the last two years on Nationwide Title Clearing in Palm Harbor, Florida and Select Portfolio Servicing in Salt Lake City, Utah. Nationwide Title Clearing (“NTC”) was one of the first companies to come under fire for using robo-signers.

Bryan Bly, the most famous robo-signer at NTC, signed thousands of Assignments and Affidavits as “Vice-President, PNC Bank, as successor by merger National City Bank, successor by merger Harbor Federal Savings Bank.” On many documents, an Ohio address appears underneath Bly’s signature. Bly, however, was never a Vice President of PNC. This was just one of the many titles Bly used so that NTC could produce documents needed for foreclosures.

On other documents, during the same time period, Bly claimed to be Assistant Vice President of Select Portfolio Services; Vice President of Citi Residential Lending; Vice President of Suntrust Mortgage; and Assistant Vice President of National City Bank. In interviews, Bly admitted that he did not have time to read the documents he signed. Despite claiming to be an officer of Select Portfolio Services, Bly is not listed as an officer on the records of the Florida Secretary of State.

Despite listing addresses in Ohio and Utah, Bly’s signature is always notarized in Pinellas County, Florida, the actual location of NTC. Bly’s many titles are often notarized by the same notary who claims to have personal knowledge that Bly is, in fact, an officer of these many companies. PNC also regularly used Select Portfolio Services (“SPS”) in Salt Lake City, Utah as a servicer.

Bill Koch of SPS has the same problems as Bly – using too many titles and signing thousands of documents each week. Bly also signs for Green Tree Servicing, LLC, but the Green Tree address is listed as c/o NTC in Palm Harbor, Florida.

In recent months, PNC has also regularly used Richmond Monroe Group in Missouri as its servicer. The frequent signer for Richmond Monroe Group is Renee Durham who is identified as “officer.” It is very unlikely that PNC can review all of the foreclosures with questionable documents in 30 days. In Florida, PNC has most often used The Law Offices of Marshall Watson, a law firm under investigation by the Florida Attorney General, to foreclose.

~
Lynn Szymoniak
http://www.FraudDigest.com

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 12 Comments »

More Investors Are Suing Chase: Cheer them on!

Posted on June 12, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Submitted by Beth Findsen, Esq. in Scottsdale, Az

Investors-suing-Chase-includes-list-of-mortgage-backed-securities-various-originators-like-New-Century-WAMU-Wells-Fargo-ResMae-Greenpoint-Coun

One of the many things I find interesting in this lawsuit is that FINALLY the pretender lenders are at least being referred to as originators and not banks, lenders or any of the other things that had most people believing.

Here too investors sue the rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P, Fitch paving the way for borrowers to make virtually the same allegations against the appraisers and the pretender lender who hired the appraiser.

The only thing left for the investors is to realize that the only way they are actually going to mitigate losses is by creating an entity that negotiates modifications directly with borrowers. Otherwise these intermediaries in the securitization chain are going to continue cleaning their clocks.


Here are some morsels you too might find interesting

7. The true facts that were misstated in or omitted from the Offering Documents
include:
(1) The Originators systematically disregarded their stated underwriting
standards when issuing loans to borrowers;
(2) The underlying mortgages were based on appraisals that overstated the
value of the underlying properties and understated the loan-to-value ratios
of the Mortgage Loans;
(3) The Certificates’ credit enhancement features were insufficient to protect
Certificate holders from losses because the underwriting deficiencies
rendered the Mortgage Loans far less valuable than disclosed and the
credit enhancement features were primarily the product of the Rating
Agencies’ outdated models. As such, the level of credit enhancement
necessary for the Certificates’ risk to correspond to the pre-determined
credit ratings was far less than necessary; and
(4) The Rating Agencies employed outdated assumptions, relaxed ratings
criteria, and relied on inaccurate loan information when rating the
Certificates. S&P’s models had not been materially updated since 1999
and Moody’s models had not been materially updated since 2002. These
outdated models failed to account for the drastic changes in the type of
loans backing the Certificates and the Originators’ systemic disregard for their underwriting standards. Furthermore, the Rating Agencies had conflicts of interest when rating the Certificates.
8. As a result, Lead Plaintiff and the Class purchased Certificates that were backed by collateral (i.e., the Mortgage Loans) that was much less valuable and which posed greater risk of default than represented, were not of the “best quality” and were not equivalent to other investments with the same credit ratings. Contrary to representations in the Offering Documents, the Certificates exposed purchasers to increased risk with respect to delinquencies, foreclosures and other forms of default on the Mortgage Loans.

Filed under: bubble, CASES, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, trustee, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 21 Comments »

CALIF ATTY GENERAL BROWN Goes After Bait and Switch Refi Fraudsters

Posted on June 11, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Submitted by Abby:

MORE FRAUDSTERS CAUGHT BY CALIF ATTY GENERAL BROWN!!!

News Release
June 09, 2010
For Immediate Release
Contact: (510) 622-4500
Contact: Christine Gasparac or Evan Westrup, (510) 622-4500
Christine.Gasparac@doj.ca.gov or Evan.Westrup@doj.ca.gov
Print Version

Three More Suspects Nabbed in Million-Dollar Bait-and-Switch Home Refinance Scam

LOS ANGELES – In a continuing probe into a defunct Southern California mortgage brokerage, Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced the arrests of president and co-owner Sean McConville and two associates who used “deceptive promises and forged documents” to steal almost $1 million from homeowners falsely guaranteed attractive home loan refinancing packages.

“These criminals employed a classic bait-and-switch in their refinance scheme,” Brown said. “With deceptive promises and forged documents, they maliciously cheated homeowners who trusted them and just wanted a fair deal.”

Brown’s office initiated its investigation in October 2008 in response to more than 70 complaints against the defendants and their mortgage brokerage business, ALG Capital, Inc. The brokerage operated out of Calabasas from early 2006 until late 2007 and then moved to Mission Hills until it shut its doors in 2008.

Brown’s investigation found that f! rom April 2007 to October 2008, the owners and their associates lured dozens of borrowers into refinancing home loans by falsely promising low interest rates, minimal broker fees and other attractive terms. The brokerage then negotiated different terms with lenders.

When homeowners were presented with closing documents, they bore the terms promised, but which the lenders never approved. After homeowners signed the closing documents, key pages were removed and replaced with pages bearing the terms that the lender had actually agreed to. The homeowners’ signatures were then forged on the replacement pages, and ALG forwarded the forged documents to the escrow company.

Homeowners only discovered they had been defrauded when they received the final loan documents with the true terms and their signatures forged on closing cost disclosures, Truth-in-Lending disclosures, loan applications and other documents.

Additionally, ALG collected al! most $1 million in undisclosed fees, charging homeowners up to! $57,000 in broker fees. In total, dozens of homeowners were locked into almost $30 million in loans with terms they did not agree to.

As a result of this scheme, many homeowners were forced to sell their homes, come out of retirement, or tap retirement savings. Others paid significant prepayment penalties, including over $21,000 in one case. Borrowers also rarely received the large cash-outs they were promised as part of the refinance.

Sean McConville, 30, of Austin, Texas, president and co-owner of the brokerage, was arrested early yesterday morning at his residence. He is being held at the Travis County Jail in Texas pending extradition. He was previously convicted of robbery in November 1997.

Matthew Bourgo, 27, of Thousand Oaks, who posed as a licensed notary for the brokerage, was arrested yesterday afternoon at his residence. He is being held in Ventura County Jail and will be transferred to Los Angeles County.
Joseph Nguyen, 37, of Woodland Hills, a former loan officer for the brokerage, was also arrested yesterday afternoon at his business, where he worked as a chiropractor. He is being held by authorities in Los Angeles County.

The suspects are each being held on $29.5 million bail.

In September 2009, Brown’s office arrested three others involved in the bait-and-switch scam, including Michael McConville, 32, of Simi Valley, Sean’s brother and co-owner of the brokerage, Alan Ruiz, 29, of Huntington Beach, a former loan officer and Garrett Holdridge, 24, of Palmdale, who was convicted of seven felonies in March for his involvement in the scam.

Investigators located victims in dozens of California cities, including: Auburn, Altadena, Arroyo Grande, Azusa, Bakersfield, Berkeley, Burbank, Calabasas, Castro Valley, Chino, Compton, Corona, Fairfield, Fontana, Fremont, Fresno, Garden Grove, Glendale, Hemet, Highland, Huntington Beach, La Habra! , La Mesa, La Mirada, La Quinta, Lancaster, Livermore , Los Angeles, Lo! ng Beach, Manteca, Martinez, Monterey, Murrieta, Nice, Northridge, Oakland, Ontario, Palmdale, Pasadena, Perris, Petaluma, Pomona, Quartz Hill, Rancho Cucamonga, Redlands, Reedley, Rialto, Sacramento, San Clemente, San Diego, San Jose, Santa Rosa, Sierra Madre, Spring Valley, Stanton, Temecula, Whittier, and Winnetka.

The complaint, filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court, includes the following charges: 38 counts of grand theft, 19 counts of forgery, three counts of elder abuse, and one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft.

Brown also filed suit against the McConville brothers in May 2009 for running a property tax reassessment scam which targeted Californians looking to lower their property taxes. The brothers billed tens of thousands of homeowners throughout California nearly $200 each for property tax reassessment services that were almost never performed and are available free of charge from local tax assessors.
# # #

You may view the full account of this posting, including possible attachments, in the News & Alerts section of our website at: http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1933

Filed under: bubble, CASES, CORRUPTION, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, STATUTES, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

NY Appeals: AG may pursue Banks for Fraudulent Appraisal

Posted on June 10, 2010 by Neil Garfield
Editor’s note: I think the standards used here apply to ALL private actions for appraisal fraud. With appraisal fraud proven, virtually all lending statutes are proven to have been violated. Appraisal fraud lies at the root of the mortgage mess with its sister, ratings fraud. Both are appraisals and both are ratings. Both were designed to track people into doing what they otherwise would never have done if they had the right information. If the either the investor to advanced the money or the borrower who took it knew that the appraisal was bogus and that there was going to be a hit virtually as fast as you drive a new car off the lot, they would not, as reasonable people, have completed the transaction or they would demanded more information.
From Jake Naumer: This goes to the root and branch of the problems we have today.The good news is that there is actually a TRUE and CORRECT VALUE for any property.It just seems that no one seems to know what it actually is.

Historically and emperically, true value has always been a fairly fixed relationship between total aggregate income and total aggregate property, with some deference for location and ammenities.All of the players with varying vested interests seek to distort the perception of value, through the use of manipulation and misinformation, in order to extract the profit that is created by the gap between true value and perceived value. Unfortunately, once the distortion machine was exposed by exacting market forces, robbery of the honorable rule abiding tax paying citizens was required to maintain the status quo.

It will not last.

Submitted by Jeff

People v First Am. Corp.
2010 NY Slip Op 04868
Decided on June 8, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
Gonzalez, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on June 8, 2010

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
First Judicial Department
Luis A. Gonzalez, P.J.
David B. Saxe
James M. Catterson
Rolando T. Acosta, JJ.
406796/07

1308

[*1]The People of the State of New York by Andrew Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v

First American Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Defendants appeal from the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Edward Ramos, J.), entered April 8, 2009, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied their motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of federal preemption.

DLA Piper LLP (US), New York (Richard F. Hans,
Patrick J. Smith, Kerry Ford
Cunningham and Jeffrey D.
Rotenberg of counsel), for
appellants.
Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York
(Richard Dearing, Benjamin
N. Gutman and Nicole
Gueron of counsel), for respondent. [*2]

GONZALEZ, P.J.

This appeal calls upon us to determine whether the regulations and guidelines implemented by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) pursuant to the Home Owner’s Lending Act of 1933 (HOLA) (12 USC § 1461 et seq.) and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (Pub L 101-73, 103 STAT 183 [codified in scattered sections of 12 USC]), preempt state regulations in the field of real estate appraisal.

The Attorney General claims that defendants engaged in fraudulent, deceptive and illegal business practices by allegedly permitting eAppraiseIT residential real estate appraisers to be influenced by nonparty Washington Mutual, Inc. (WaMu) to increase real estate property values on appraisal reports in order to inflate home prices. We conclude that neither federal statutes, nor the regulations and guidelines implemented by the OTS, preclude the Attorney General of the State of New York from pursuing litigation against defendants First American Corporation and First American eAppraiseIT, LLC. We further conclude that the Attorney General has standing to pursue his claims pursuant to General Business Law § 349.

In a complaint dated November 1, 2007, plaintiff, the People of the State of New York, commenced this action against defendants asserting claims under Executive Law § 63(12) and General Business Law § 349, and for unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that in Spring 2006, WaMu hired two appraisal management companies, defendant eAppraiseIT and nonparty Lender’s Service, Inc., to oversee the appraisal process and provide a structural buffer against potential conflicts of interest between WaMu and the individual appraisers. The gravamen of the Attorney General’s complaint asserts that defendants misled their customers and the public by stating that eAppraiseIT’s appraisals were independent evaluations of a property’s market value and that these appraisals were conducted in compliance with the Uniform Standards and Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), when in fact defendants had implemented a system allowing WaMu’s loan origination staff to select appraisers who would improperly inflate a property’s market value to WaMu’s desired target loan amount.[FN1]

Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, asserting that the Attorney General is prohibited from litigating his claims because HOLA and FIERRA impliedly place the responsibility for oversight of appraisal management companies on the OTS, and asserting a failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied defendants’ motion, finding that HOLA and FIRREA do not occupy the entire field with respect to real estate appraisal regulation and that the enforcement of USPAP standards under General Business Law § [*3]349 neither conflicts with federal law, nor does it impair a bank’s ability to lend and extend credit. We affirm.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that Federal laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding” (US Const, art VI, cl [2]), and it “vests in Congress the power to supersede not only State statutory or regulatory law but common law as well” (Guice v Charles Schwab & Co., 89 NY2d 31, 39 [1996], cert denied 520 US 1118 [1997]). Indeed, “[u]nder the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (US Const, art VI, cl 2), the purpose of our preemption analysis is . . . to ascertain the intent of Congress” (Matter of People v Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 NY3d 105, 113 [2008], cert denied
_ US _, 129 S Ct 999 [2009]).

Congressional intent to preempt state law may be established “by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law” (Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 356 [2006], quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). Express preemption occurs when Congress indicates its “pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose” (Altria Group, Inc. v Good, 555 US __, __, 129 S Ct 538, 543 [2008]). Absent explicit preemptive language, implied preemption occurs when “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it . . . [o]r the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” (Rice v Santa Fe El. Corp., 331 US 218, 230 [1947]). Further, when “[a] conflict occurs either because compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or because the State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the State law is preempted (City of New York v Job-Lot Pushcart, 213 AD2d 210, 210 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 163 [1996], cert denied 519 US 871 [1996] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Here, defendants do not argue, nor have they directed this Court’s attention to any language within HOLA or FIRREA that establishes, that Congress expressly created these statutes to supersede state law governing the causes of actions asserted in the Attorney General’s complaint. Defendants also have not argued that there exists a conflict between federal and State laws or regulations. Rather, defendants assert that because Congress has legislated so comprehensively, and that federal law so completely occupies the home lending field, the Attorney General is precluded from bringing claims against them under the theory of field preemption. Thus, the necessary starting point is to determine whether HOLA and FIRREA so occupy the field that these two statutes preempt any and all state laws speaking to the manner in which appraisal management companies provide real estate appraisal services.

In 1933, Congress enacted HOLA “to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness at a time when as many as half of all home loans in the country were in default” (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v De la Cuesta, 458 US 141, 159 [1982] [internal [*4]quotation marks and citations omitted]). HOLA
created a general framework to regulate federally chartered savings associations that left the regulatory details to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB’s authority to regulate federal savings and loans is virtually unlimited and “[p]ursuant to this authorization, the [FHLBB] has promulgated regulations governing the powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave” (id. at 145 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).

When Congress passed FIRREA in 1989, it restructured the regulation of the savings association industry by abolishing the FHLBB and vested many of its functions into the newly-created OTS (see FIRREA § 301 [12 USCA § 1461 et seq.] [establishing OTS], § 401 [12 USCA § 1437] [abolishing the FHLBB]). According to FIRREA’s legislative history

“[t]he primary purposes of the [FIRREA] are to provide affordable housing mortgage finance and housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income individuals through enhanced management of federal housing credit programs and resources; establish organizations and procedures to obtain and administer the necessary funding to resolve failed thrift cases and to dispose of the assets of these institutions . . . and, enhance the regulatory enforcement powers of the depository institution regulatory
agencies to protect against fraud, waste and insider abuse” (HR Rep 101-54 [I], at 307-308, reprinted in 1989 US Code Cong to Admin News, at 103-104).

FIRREA was also designed
“to thwart real estate appraisal abuses, [by] establish[ing] a system of uniform national real estate appraisal standards. It also requires the use of state certified or licensed appraisers for real estate related transactions with the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mac), the RTC, or certain real estate transaction [sic] regulated by the federal financial institution regulatory agencies” (HR Rep 101-54 (I), at 311, reprinted in 1989 US Code Cong to Admin News, at 107).

Further, 12 USCS § 3331, which was enacted as part of FIRREA, states that the general purpose of this statute, is
“to provide that Federal financial and public policy interests in real estate related transactions will be protected by requiring that real estate appraisals utilized in connection with federally related [*5]transactions are performed in writing, in accordance with uniform standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated and whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision.”

The uniform standards described in 12 USCS § 3331, are defined in 12 USCS § 3339 which requires that the OTS, as a
“Federal financial institution[] regulatory agency . . . shall prescribe appropriate standards for the performance of real estate appraisals in connection with federally related transactions [FN2] under the jurisdiction of each such agency or instrumentality. These rules shall require, at a minimum — (1) that real estate appraisals be performed in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards as evidenced by the appraisal standards promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation; and (2) that such appraisals shall be written appraisals.”
The Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) of the Appraisal Foundation promulgates the appraisal standards mandated by 12 USC § 3339 and are called USPAP. The Appraisal Foundation is a private “not-for-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of professional valuation [and] was established by the appraisal profession in the United States in 1987″ (Welcome to The Appraisal Foundation [The Appraisal Foundation], https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/StartPage.aspx?Site=TAF [accessed May 27, 2010]). The ASB is responsible for “develop[ing], interpret[ing] and amend[ing]” USPAP (Welcome to The Appraisal Foundation, https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/
DynamicPage.aspx?Site=TAF & WebCode=ASB [accessed May 27, 2010]). However, “[e]ach U.S. State or Territory has a State appraiser regulatory agency, which is responsible for certifying and licensing real estate appraisers and supervising their appraisal-related activities, as required by Federal law” (State Regulatory Information [The Appraisal Foundation], https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=taf & WebCode=RegulatoryInfo [accessed May 27, 2010]; see also State Appraiser Regulatory Programs > State Contact Information [Appraisal Subcommittee], https://www.asc.gov/State-Appraiser- Regulatory-Programs/StateContactInformation.aspx [accessed May 27, 2010] [listing each State appraiser regulatory agency’s website]). Further, the OTS itself has determined that

“[i]t does not appear that OTS is required by title XI of FIRREA to [*6]implement an appraisal regulation that reaches all the activities of savings and loan holding companies, at least to the extent that those activities are unrelated to the safety and soundness of savings associations or their subsidiaries. Neither the language of Title XI nor its legislative history indicate that Congress intended title XI to apply to the wide range of activities engaged in by savings and loan holding companies and their non-saving association subsidiaries” (55 Fed Reg 34532, 34534-34535 [1990], codified at 12 CFR 506, 545, 563, 564 and 571).

Indeed, the OTS encourages financial institutions
“to make referrals directly to state appraiser regulatory authorities when a State licensed or certified appraiser violates USPAP, applicable state law, or engages in other unethical or unprofessional conduct. Examiners finding evidence of unethical or unprofessional conduct by appraisers will forward their findings and recommendations to their supervisory office for appropriate disposition and referral to the state, as necessary” (OTS, Thrift Bulletin, Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines at 10 [November 4, 1994], http://files.ots.treas. gov/84042.pdf [accessed May 27, 2010]).
In looking at the legislative history it becomes clear that Congress intended to establish

“a system of uniform real estate appraisal standards and requires the use of State certified and licensed appraisers for federally regulated transactions by July 1, 1991. . . The key . . . lies in the creation of State regulatory agencies and a Federal watchdog to monitor the standards and to oversee State enforcement. . . It is this combination of Federal and State action . . . that . . . assur[es] . . . good standards are properly enforced (135 Cong Rec S3993-01, at S4004 [April 17, 1989], 1989 WL 191505 [remarks of Senator Christopher J. Dodd]).

Thus, we conclude that neither HOLA or FIRREA preempts or precludes the Attorney General from pursuing his claims.
Having rejected defendants’ general arguments for preemption under HOLA and FIRREA, “[t]he Court’s task, then, is to decide which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the common law side” (Cedeno v IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., 2008 WL 3992304, *7, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337, *22 [SD NY 2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Defendants assert that the Attorney General is preempted from pursuing his claims because subsequent to FIRREA’s passage, the OTS issued extensive [*7]regulations specifically addressing the composition and construction of appraisal programs undertaken by federal savings and loans.

It is well settled that “[a]gencies delegated rulemaking authority under a statute . . . are afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer” (Rapanos v United States, 547 US 715, 758 [2006]). Indeed, the OTS regulations “have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes” (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 458 US at 153). 12 CFR 545.2, states that regulations promulgated by the OTS are “preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal saving association.” However, 12 CFR 560.2(a) limits the language of 12 CFR 545.2 by setting parameters to the OTS’ authority to promulgate regulations that

“preempt state laws affecting the operations of federal savings associations when deemed appropriate to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal savings associations, to enable federal savings associations . . . to conduct their operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States, or to further other purposes of the HOLA” (12 CFR 560.2[a]).
12 CFR 560.2(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of the types of state laws preempted by 12 CFR 560.2(a). Further, 12 CFR 560.2(c) states that the following types of State law are not preempted

“to the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations . . . (1) Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any other law that OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.”
The OTS advises that when a court is

“analyzing the status of state laws under § 560.2, the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will end there; the law is preempted. If the law is not covered by paragraph (b), the next question is whether the law affects lending. If it does, then, in accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is preempted. This presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c). For these purposes, paragraph (c) is intended to be interpreted narrowly. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption” (61 Fed Reg 50951-01, 50966-50967 [1996]).
[*8]
Defendants argue that the Attorney General’s challenges to defendants’ business practices are preempted because the conduct falls within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(5), which provides examples of loan-related fees “including without limitation, initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and overlimit fees.” Defendants also assert that their alleged conduct is within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(9), which provides

“[d]isclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants” (id.).

Lastly, defendants assert that their alleged conduct falls within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(10) which states that “[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages” is preempted.
The Attorney General’s complaint asserts that defendants engaged in conduct proscribed by Executive Law § 63(12)[FN3] and General Business Law § 349 [FN4]. It further alleges that defendants unjustly enriched themselves by repeated use of fraudulent or illegal business practices, in that they allowed WaMu to pressure eAppraiseIT appraisers to compromise their USPAP-required independence and collude with WaMu to inflate residential appraisal values so that the appraisals would match the qualifying loan values WaMu desired.

Under the first prong of the preemption analysis, we find that this action brought pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12), General Business Law § 349(b) and on the theory of unjust [*9]enrichment is not preempted by 12 CFR 560.2(b)(5) because it involves no attempt to regulate bank-related fees. We also find, under the first prong of the preemption analysis, that there is no preemption pursuant to 12 CFR 560.2(b)(9) because these claims do not involve a state law seeking to impose or require any specific statements, information or other content to be disclosed. Although at least one case has held that claims similar to those asserted here were preempted (see Spears v Washington Mut., Inc., 2009 WL 605835 [ND Cal 2009]), we find
under the first prong of the preemption analysis that 12 CFR 660.2(b)(10) does not preclude the Attorney General’s complaint because prosecution of the alleged conduct will not affect the operations of federal savings associations (FSA) in how they process, originate, service, sell or purchase, or invest or participate in, mortgages.

The question then becomes whether the Attorney General is nevertheless precluded from litigating his claims under the second prong of the preemption analysis. Because enjoining a real estate appraisal management company from abdicating its publicly advertised role of providing unbiased valuations is not within the confines of 12 CFR 560.2(c), we answer it in the negative.

Defendants argue the OTS’s authority under HOLA and FIRREA is not limited to oversight of a FSA and that its authority under these two statues extends over the activity regulated and includes the activities of third party agents of a FSA. Defendants assert that providing real estate appraisal services is a critical component of the processing and origination of mortgages and represents a core component of the controlling federal regime. Defendants cite 12 USC § 1464(d)(7)(D) and State Farm Bank, FSB v Reardon (539 F3d 336 [6th Cir 2008]) for
support. 12 USC § 1464(d)(7) states, in pertinent part, that

“if a savings association . . . causes to be performed for itself, by contract or otherwise, any service authorized under [HOLA] such performance shall be subject to regulation and examination by the [OTS] Director to the same extent as if such services were being performed by the savings association on its own premises . . .”
Here, it is alleged eAppraiseIT and Lender’s Service, Inc., were hired by WaMu to provide appraisal services. However, defendants are incorrect in asserting that providing real estate appraisal services is an authorized banking activity under HOLA. In an opinion letter dated October 25, 2004, OTS concluded that it had the authority to regulate agents of an FSA under HOLA because

“[i]nherent in the authority of federal savings associations to exercise their deposit and lending powers and to conduct deposit, lending, and other banking activities is the authority to advertise, market, and solicit customers, and to make the public aware of the banking products and services associations offer. The authority to conduct deposit and lending activities, and to offer banking products and services, is accompanied by the power to advertise, market, and solicit customers for such products and services . . . A state may not put operational restraints on a federal savings [*10]association’s ability to
offer an authorized product or service by restricting the association’s ability to market its products and services and reach potential customers . . . Thus, OTS has authority under the HOLA to regulate the Agents the Association uses to perform
marketing, solicitation, and customer service activities” (2004 OTS Op No. P-2004-7, at 7, http://files.ots.treas.gov/560404.pdf, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6, at *15 [accessed May 27, 2010]).
State Farm Bank, FSB v Reardon (539 F3d 336 [6th Cir 2008]) follows this principle. In Reardon, the plaintiff, a FSA chartered by the OTS under HOLA, decided to offer, through its independent contractor agents, first and second mortgages and home equity loans in the State of Ohio. The Sixth Circuit concluded that although the statute at issue

“directly regulates [the plaintiff FSA’s] exclusive agents rather than [the FSA] itself . . . the activity being regulated is the solicitation and origination of mortgages, a power granted to [the FSA] by HOLA and the OTS. This is also a power over which the OTS has indicated that any state attempts to regulate will be met with preemption . . . [T]he practical effect of the [statute] is that [the FSA] must either change its structure or forgo mortgage lending in Ohio. Thus, enforcement of the [statute] against [the FSA’s] exclusive agents would frustrate the purpose of the HOLA and the OTS regulations because it indirectly prohibits [the FSA] from exercising the powers granted to it under the HOLA and the OTS regulations” (Reardon, 539 F3d at 349 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Since appraisal services are not authorized banking products or services of a FSA, defendants have failed to show that the Attorney General is preempted from pursuing his claims under 12 USC § 1464(d)(7)(D). Consequently, under the second prong of the preemption analysis, the result of the Attorney General litigating his claims against a company that independently administers a FSA’s appraisal program would “only incidentally affect the lending operations of [the FSA]” (12 CFR 560.2[c]). Thus, defendants have failed to show that OTS’s regulations and guidelines preempt or preclude the Attorney General from pursuing his claims.

Defendants assert that Cedeno v IndyMac Bancorp, Inc. (2008 WL 3992304, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337 [SD NY 2008]) provides this Court with persuasive authority that the federal government and its regulators alone regulate the mortgage loan origination practices of FSAs including all aspects of the appraisal programs they utilize. In Cedeno, the Southern District found preemption precluded a private individual from maintaining a cause of action against a bank. It was alleged that the bank failed to disclose to the plaintiff that it selected appraisers, appraisal companies and/or appraisal management firms who would inflate the value of [*11]residential properties in order to allow the bank to complete more real estate transactions and obtain greater profits. This practice resulted in the plaintiff being misled as to the true
equity in her home. The Southern District found that the conduct of the bank was

“directly regulated by the OTS: the processing and origination of mortgages, a loan-related fee, and the accompanying disclosure. The appraisals are a prerequisite to the lending process, and are inextricably bound to it. Because the plaintiff’s claim is not a simple breach of contract claim, but asks the Court to set substantive standards for the Associations’ lending operations and practices, it is preempted” (Cedeno, 2008 WL 3992304, *9, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337, at *28 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Contrary to defendants’ assertions, we find that Cedeno is not applicable here because Cedeno does not reach the question as to whether HOLA, FIRREA or OTS’s regulations and guidelines are intended to regulate the conduct of real estate appraisal companies.
Annexed to the OTS’s October 25, 2004 opinion letter is a document entitled Appendix A – Conditions. In this document, OTS requires FSAs that wish to use agents to perform marketing, solicitation, customer service, or other activities related to the FSA’s authorized banking products or services to enter into written agreements that “(4) expressly set[] forth OTS’s statutory authority to regulate and examine and take an enforcement action against the agent with respect to the activities it performs for the association, and the agent’s acknowledgment of OTS’s authority” (2004 OTS Op No. P-2004-7, at 16, http://files.ots. treas.gov/560404.pdf, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6, at *37 [accessed May 27, 2010]). We note that defendants have neither asserted that such written agreements exist nor produced such documents. Thus, we conclude that the Attorney General may proceed with his claims against defendants because his challenge to defendants’ allegedly fraudulent and deceptive business practices in providing appraisal services is not preempted by federal law and regulations that govern the operations of savings and loan associations and institution-affiliated parties.

Defendants assert that the Attorney General cannot rely upon a substantive violation of a federal law to support a claim under General Business Law § 349 because this is an improper attempt to convert alleged violations of federal law into a violation of New York law. Defendants claim that where a plaintiff seeks to rely upon a substantive violation of a federal law to support a claim under General Business Law § 349, the federal law relied upon must contain a private right of action.

However, the Attorney General is statutorily charged with the duty to “[p]rosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested, and have charge and control of all the legal business of the departments and bureaus of the state, or of any office thereof which requires the services of attorney or counsel, in order to protect the interest of the state” (Executive Law § 63[1]). Indeed, when the Attorney General becomes aware of allegations of persistent fraud or illegality of a business, he [*12]

“is authorized by statute to bring an enforcement action seeking an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, [and] directing restitution and damages’ (Executive Law § 63 [12]). He is also authorized, when informed of deceptive acts or practices affecting consumers in New York, to bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained’ thereby (General Business Law § 349 [b])” (People v Coventry First LLC, 13 NY3d 108, 114 [2009]).
It is well settled that “[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’” (Wiesen v New York Univ., 304 AD2d 459, 460 [2003], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The Attorney General’s complaint alleges that defendants publicly claimed on their eAppraiseIT website that eAppraiseIT provides a firewall between lenders and appraisers so that customers can be assured that USPAP and FIRREA guidelines are followed and that each appraisal is being audited for compliance. The Attorney General charges that defendants deceived borrowers and investors who relied on their proclaimed independence by allowing WaMu’s loan production staff to select the appraiser based upon whether they would provide high values.

We find defendants’ assertions that the Attorney General lacks standing under General Business Law § 349 and that his complaint fails to state a cause of action are without merit. Indeed, the Attorney General’s complaint references misrepresentations and other deceptive conduct allegedly perpetrated on the consuming public within the State of New York, and “[a]s shown by its language and background, section 349 is directed at wrongs against the consuming public” (Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 24 [1995]). Therefore, we find that the Attorney General’s complaint articulates a viable cause of action under General Business Law § 349, and that this statute provides him with standing.

Consequently, we conclude that defendants have failed to demonstrate that HOLA, FIRREA or the OTS’s regulations and guidelines preempt or preclude the Attorney General from pursuing the causes of action articulated in his complaint. We additionally find that the Attorney General has standing under General Business Law § 349. We have reviewed defendants’ remaining contentions and we find them without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Edward Ramos, J.), entered April 8, 2009, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, [*13]denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of federal preemption, should be affirmed, without costs.

All concur.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Edward Ramos, J.), entered April 8, 2009, affirmed, without costs.

Opinion by Gonzalez, P.J. All concur.
Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, Catterson, Acosta, JJ.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JUNE 8, 2010

CLERK

Footnotes

Footnote 1: USPAP is incorporated into New York law and it prohibits a State-certified or State licensed appraiser from accepting a fee for an appraisal assignment “that is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined estimate, analysis, or opinion or is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion or valuation reached, or upon the consequences resulting from the appraisal assignment” (NY Exec Law § 160-y; 19 NYCRR 1106.1).

Footnote 2: 12 USC § 3350(4) states that “[t]he term federally related transaction’ means any real estate-related financial transaction which—(A) a federal financial institutions regulatory agency or the Resolution Trust Corporation engages in, contracts for, or regulates; and (B) requires the services of an appraiser.”

Footnote 3: Executive Law § 63(12) states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York . . . for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages. . .”

Footnote 4: General Business Law § 349(b) states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever the attorney general shall believe from evidence satisfactory to him that any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is about to engage in any of the acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by any such unlawful acts or practices.”

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WEISBAND Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH. BKR Tucson Judge HOLLOWELL Denies MLS for Lack of Standing

Posted on May 6, 2010 by Neil Garfield

GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved.

IN RE WEISBAND

In re: BARRY WEISBAND, Chapter 13, Debtor.

Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Arizona.

March 29, 2010.

Barry Weisband, Tucson, AZ, Ronald Ryan, Ronald Ryan, P.C., Tucson, AZ, Attorney for Debtor.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The debtor, Barry Weisband (“Debtor”), has challenged the standing of creditor, GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor’s home loan, lacks standing to seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this decision.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Creation of Debtor’s Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers

On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GreenPoint”) an adjustable rate promissory note in the principal sum of $540,000 (“Note”) secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on real property located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 85718 (“Property”).

On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC (“Endorsement”). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13, 2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary of the DOT “solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns.”

Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10, 2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement (“FISA”) (Exhibit D)[ 1 ] with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Lehman”), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential, fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman. According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the FISA.

On November 1, 2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement (“MLSAA”) with Structured Asset Securities Corporation (“SASC”) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the transferred mortgages — GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust (“Trust”). The MLSAA also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust.

Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F) with Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”) as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1, 2006, GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement (“SSA”) (Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust. GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT.

Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1, 2006, the Note and DOT had been transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10, 2009, pp. 44, 47, 75.)

B. Bankruptcy Events

As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note. Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19, 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim (“POC”), which attached the Note and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC’s proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its interest in the DOT to GMAC (“MERS Assignment”). The MERS Assignment was recorded on July 16, 2009.

GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay (“Motion”) on May 29, 2009, on the grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate protection payments to protect GMAC’s alleged interest in the Property. GMAC attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion.

The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC’s standing to seek relief from stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009, to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT. (Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the “subject loan” to Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the “subject loan” to SASC under the MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the “subject loan,” and, that GMAC was the servicer of the “subject loan” under the SSA. According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had standing to bring the Motion.

On November 10, 2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing and admitted into evidence a copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the FISA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA, where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the words “Intentionally Omitted” on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word “None.” (Exhibit F, pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled “Mortgage Loan Schedule,” is blank. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee. The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000.

III. ISSUE

Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion?

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with “protection against hungry creditors” and to assure creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not “racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor’s assets.” In re Tippett,Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 2737-4 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits. 542 F.3d 684, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a “party in interest,” to grant relief from the stay, “such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection.” Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009); Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are limited in scope — the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, “[s]tay relief hearings do not involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim.” In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).

Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, a movant for relief from stay bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both “constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns whether the plaintiff’s personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to have a “case or controversy” to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).

Additionally, the “prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'” Pershing Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in stay relief motions by Rule 9014, “generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine.” In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398.

B. GMAC’s Standing

GMAC advances three different arguments in support of its claim to be a “party in interest” with standing to seek relief from stay. First, GMAC asserts it has standing because the Note was endorsed to GMAC and GMAC has physical possession of the Note. Second, GMAC asserts that by virtue of the MERS Assignment, it is a beneficiary of the DOT and entitled to enforce and foreclose the DOT under Arizona law. Third, GMAC asserts it has standing because it is the servicer of the Note. The court addresses each of GMAC’s claims in turn.

1. GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Holder Of The Note

If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the Debtor’s failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement. GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under ARIZ. REV. STAT. (“A.R.S.’) § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.[ 2 ] However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note.

Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” A.R.S. § 47-1201(B)(21)(a).[ 3 ] GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it must be on “a paper affixed to the instrument.” A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was not affixed to the Note.[ 4 ]

In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the defendant’s possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC’s fixation requirement. Id. at 168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. § 47-3204]: “An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Id. at 165. Since the endorsement page, indicating that the defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67. Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly affixed special endorsement.

While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention that the note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261.

In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it, such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be affixed to the instrument to be valid.

GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.[ 5 ] As a result, because GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note.

2. The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With Standing

GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS.[ 6 ] In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the “nominee” of GreenPoint, holding only “legal title” to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS “collect[s] no money from [d]ebtors under the [n]ote, nor will it realize the value of the [p]roperty through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [t]rust in the event the [n]ote is not paid.” 2009 WL 631355 at *4.

Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS’ assignee of the DOT, “stands in the shoes” of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, Trust No. 3496, 187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v. Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414, 417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS’ assignee, it cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing either.[ 7 ]

3. GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note

(a) Servicer’s Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages

Securitization of residential mortgages is “the process of aggregating a large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages.” Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to the funding entity. “This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool.” Id. at 538.

The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity, which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”,) whose sole role is to hold the pool of mortgages. Id. at 539. “The transfer to the special purpose trust must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash.” Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at 539.

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It “does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of trust are held by the SPV.” Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able to collect its servicing fees.[ 8 ]In re O’Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009) . In this case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that GMAC is the servicer of the Note.

(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman And Became Part Of The Trust

When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint, allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term “mortgage loans” is not defined in the FISA and GMAC’s documents regarding the securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be “true sales,” they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term, GMAC has failed “to connect the dots” to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust.

C. Debtor’s Other Arguments

1. Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a “Securitized” Mortgage

The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the funds for a borrower’s loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator, does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g., DCM Ltd. P’ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (2009).

Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280, cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor’s argument that the Note is unenforceable because the funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law.

2. Proof Of A Note’s Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay Relief

A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a colorable claim — not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every movant for relief from stay has to provide a complete chain of a note’s assignment to obtain relief.

Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale. Blau v. Am.’s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009); Mansour v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009); Diessner v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009). It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer instrument. See In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore, this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of a note’s entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so.

3. The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011

The Debtor argues that GMAC “violated Rule 7011” by presenting insufficient and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). As noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often conflicting, decisions on the issues of “real party in interest” and constitutional standing, and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions.

VI. CONCLUSION

GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing or is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay.

Accordingly, its motion is DENIED without prejudice.

Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 23 Comments »

Notarized MERS Assignment of DOT as Nominee: Forensic Analysis and Motion Practice

Posted on April 8, 2010 by Neil Garfield

I was looking at an assignment signed by Margaret Dalton, “Vice President”, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) “as nominee” for “Hoecomings” (sic) Financial Network, Inc. with an execution date of March 5, 2010 and a notarization date of the same date, notarized by D. Pakusic in Duval County, Florida, naming United Independent Title as Trustee under the Deed of Trust and purporting to assign the Deed of Trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association.

A forensic analysis report would or should state as follows:

  1. The title chain reveals the property is located in the County of Los Angeles, State of California and contains a purported assignment signed by Margaret Dalton, “Vice President”, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) “as nominee” for “Hoecomings” (sic) Financial Network, Inc. with an execution date of March 5, 2010 and a notarization date of the same date, notarized by D. Pakusic in Duval County, Florida, naming United Independent Title as Trustee under the Deed of Trust and purporting to assign the Deed of Trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association. in public records book ____, at page ____ of the County of _________, in the State of Florida. The document appears on its face to have been prepared by Malcolm-Cisneros, a Law Corporation located at 2112 Business Center Dr., Irvine, California 92612. Given the location of the property in California, the location of the law firm that prepared it in California and the location of of the other parties, the fact that it was “notarized” in Florida raises numerous forensic questions requiring production of additional documentation and facts.
  2. Location Issues: The property is located in the State of California, as are the Trustors under the Deed of Trust (DOT). Margaret Dalton is believed to be located in Irvine, California, possibly employed by or on the premises of the above-referenced Law Corporation. The Notary is located in Duval County, Florida which has no known connection with any of the parties. MERS offices are reported to be located in states other than California and the IT platform is reported to be located in the Midwest. Homecoming Financial Network, Inc. (which undersigned believes was intended by the referenced instruments and title chain) is authorized to do business in the State of California, but upon research does not appear to be a chartered bank, financial institution or lender. HFN is a mortgage originator acting on behalf of unknown sources of funds who may be located anywhere, since they are neither disclosed nor described in the closing documentation nor any document on record. Accordingly there is a question as to the identity of the creditor at the time of the origination of the loan, the identity of the creditor at the current time, and the identity of the creditor at all times between the origination of the loan and the present. There are also questions requiring additional documentation and fats to reveal whether the purported assignment was executed by or on behalf of anyone in Duval County, Florida where the instrument was notarized or in Irvine, California where the instrument may have been executed.
  3. Margaret Dalton’s employment is unknown but it does not appear that she has ever been an employee of MERS, nor that MERS is located where Margaret Dalton apparently signed the document. Previous investigations by the undersigned indicate that MERS is an electronic database privately owned and operated by fewer than 17 employees, which do not include Ms. Dalton. According to information received from MERS, the database platform operated by MERS for its members, has an access procedure consisting of a user ID and password. With such information any person could enter, alter or amend any entry in the MERS database. The procedure also provides access to an automated procedure wherein the user may name a person to serve as “vice-president” or “limited signing officer” for MERS. No record has been produced for this analysis indicating that Ms. Dalton was named as “vice-president” or whether she did so herself, nor whether she was authorized to do so or from whom said authority would be claimed. There is accordingly a question as to whether the document was in fact signed by Ms. Dalton, and if so whether she had authority to sign a document that conveyed an interest in real property.
  4. Given the above information, there is also a question as to whether the notarization was valid or void. Florida law provides that if the Notary knows that the person signing does not possess authority to sign or knows that the person is ignorant of their authority, that the oath administered is invalid and that the instrument is construed to be not notarized, despite the signature and stamp. Recording laws require notarization. Thus there is a question as to whether the document is or would be construed as a recorded instrument despite its obvious appearance in the title record. If it is not construed as a recorded instrument, then the chain of title should be amended to remove this document.
  5. The chain of title, as stated above, reveals a Deed of Trust (DOT) in favor of MERS as nominee. No issues are readily apparent as to the execution of the Deed of Trust. However, the content of the DOT raises factual issues that require further examination and the production of additional documents and information. Since MERS is an IT platform operated for the purposes of its private owners, it is not authorized by Florida Statutes nor California Statutes to serve as the equivalent of a recording record for instruments in the public records. It is a data entry and retrieval system that is private, not public. Since MERS was named as nominee and the MERS documentation available on the internet clearly state that under no circumstances will MERS ever claim an interest in the real property, the DOT, the note, nor will ever be the actual lender, beneficiary or mortgagee in any transaction, the effect of naming MERS raises factual issues since there are questions regarding title raised by the conflict between naming MERS and MERS disclaiming any such interest. There is no record of MERS accepting the position as nominee and if so under what circumstances. Those terms exist in agreements executed between members of MERS and one of the MERS corporations and are unavailable to the undersigned forensic analyst.
  6. The DOT and the above-referenced purported assignment refer to MERS as nominee for HFN, which was neither the creditor nor the lender at the time of the origination of the loan. Thus the DOT appears to name MERS (who disclaims any interest in the loan) on behalf of HFN (who served as a conduit for a table-funded loan transaction, probably as part of the securitization of the subject loan transaction) both of whom served principals that were not disclosed at the time of the origination of the loan nor, to the knowledge of the undersigned, to the present. The effect of misspelling the name of HFN on the purported assignment is unknown, but based upon advice from title agents consulted, it would be ordinarily required in any subsequent transaction, that the document be re-executed with the proper spelling. Whether this affects the legality of the instrument is unknown to the undersigned analyst.
  7. The purported assignment refers only to the DOT, which raises several questions. It is unknown whether an assignment of the note, as evidence of the underlying obligation, was executed at the same time as the purported assignment of the DOT. It is unknown whether all the necessary parties executed instruments required to authorize the assignments, and if so when this was accomplished. If there were no such other assignments then there is a question as to whether the instrument was effective, and if so, whether it intended to provide ownership of the security instrument (DOT) to one party while the ownership of the note remained or was transferred to another party, while at the same time the underlying obligation to yet another party may have existed between the Trustor as debtor and the source of funds for the origination of the loan, as creditor. Additional documentation and facts would be required to make these determinations.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 34 Comments »

MOTION PRACTICE: US Bank Tossed Out for Fabrication of Documents, Failure to Respond to Discovery and Fraud Upon the Court

Posted on April 7, 2010 by Neil Garfield

harpster US BAnk Tossed Out for Failure to Respond to Discovery and Fraud Upon the Court

Plaintiff has failed to produce answers to the Interrogatories for a period of 26 months, between the time the Interrogatories and the Request for Production were served on January 8, 2008 and the date of the hearing on the Motion to Compel took place on March 1,2010. Additionally, the court finds that the Plaintiff failed to produce responses to the Request for Production propounded in July 2009.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike was based on an allegation that the Assignment of Mortgage was created after the tiling of this action, but the document date and notarial date were purposely backdated by the Plaintiff to a date prior the filing of this foreclosure action.

The court specifically finds that the purported Assignment did not exist at the time of filing ofthis action; that the purported Assignment was subsequently created and the execution date and notarial date were fraudulently backdated, in a purposeful, intentional effort to mislead the Defendant and this Court. The Court rejects the Assignment and finds that is not entitled to introduction in evidence for any purpose. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does not have standing to bring its action. (See BAC Funding Consortium, Inc. ISOAIATIMA v. Genelle Jean-Jacques, Serge Jean-Jacques, Jr. and U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee fo rthe C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2006-CBS (2nd DCA Case No. 2f)~08-3553) Feb. 12,2012.)

The Assignment, as an instrument of fraud in this Court intentionally perpetrated upon this court by the Plaintiff, was made to appear as though it was created and notarized on December 5, 2007. However, that purported creation/notarization date was facially impossible: the stamp on the notary was dated May 19,2012. Since Notary commissions only last four years in Florida (see F .S. Section 117.01 (l )), the notary stamp used on this instrument did not even exist until approximately five months after the purported date on the Assignment.

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, Servicer | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments »

WHAT NOT TO DO IN PLEADING AND MOTION PRACTICE

Posted on April 7, 2010 by Neil Garfield

REGISTER NOW FOR DISCOVERY AND MOTION PRACTICE WORKSHOP

(2006) Here is a case that should not have been filed (entire text of opinion below) and was argued improperly. The homeowners clearly lost because they put their eggs in the wrong basket. Nonetheless, the opinion is a pretty good compilation of the various statutes, rules and regulations affecting mortgages and their enforcement.

An interest quote used against the “homeowner” which itself was a trust, is that the word “interest” should be interpreted to mean “Ownership interest”. This is precisely the argument I advance regarding the holders of of certificates or even non-certificated mortgage-backed securities whose indenture is the prospectus. Those investors received at the very least a “beneficial” interest in the loans. Thus either the prospectus, the certificate or both are starting points, in addition to the note signed by the borrower, as evidence of the terms and status of the obligation.

CAROL R. ROSEN, Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as TRUSTEE, EQUIFIRST CORP., AMERICAN MORTGAGE SPECIALISTS, INC., and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants.

CIV-06-0427 JH/LAM.

  1. DON’T TRY OUT NEW THEORIES IN PLEADINGS THAT SOUND LIKE THE CONSPIRACY THEORIES OF CRAZY PEOPLE, EVEN IF YOU THINK YOU ARE RIGHT. IF YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT THE THEORY IS OUT OF BOUNDS IN THE PERCEPTION OF MOST PEOPLE, USE SOMETHING ELSE — there are plenty of simpler basic principles of law that will enhance rather than reduce your credibility.
  2. Beware of companies that claim to have a magic bullet to end your mortgage problems. Securitization is complex, and you need to focus on breaking it down to its simplest elements.
  3. Don’t try to win your case on a knock-out punch in the first hearings. Plan your strategy around education of the judge as to what happened in YOUR loan, using published reports, expert declarations and forensic analysis as corroborative.
  4. Don’t even think the Judge will indict the entire financial industry for what happened in your case. This will diminish your credibility.
  5. Plead causes of action that are familiar to the Judge and make sure you know and plead all the elements of those causes of action.
  6. Focus in pleadings and hearings as much as possible on the premises with which nobody could disagree — like every case should be heard on the merits, that you have a right to the same presumptions as anyone else who is pleading a claim or defense, and that you need to conduct discovery because there are facts and documents known to the defendants for which it would be over-burdensome and hugely expensive for you to get any other way.
  7. Don’t expect the Judge to be sympathetic. In most cases Judges still look at securitized mortgages like any other mortgage. In most cases Judges see challanges to foreclosures as desperate attempts to stave of the inevitable. Lead and repeat your main message. Your main message is that it is indisputable that if the facts you are pleading are true, then you are entitled to the precise relief you have demanded. KEEP IT SIMPLE. Use each hearing to repeat the previous “lesson” and add new lessons for the Judge.
  8. Do not avoid arguments of opposing counsel. Challenge them in a direct manner showing the Judge that if the attorney was correct in what he is saying, then he would be right and his client would win (if that is the case) or showing that the if the attorney was correct he still would not win his case. THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK. PLAN BEFORE YOU APPEAR.
  9. DO NOT FALL INTO THE TRAP OF ALLOWING OPPOSING COUNSEL TO PROFFER FACTS AS THOUGH THEY WERE TRUE. Challenge that tactic by admitting that counsel has a right to put on evidence in support of what he/she is arguing but that the hearing is not the trial and you have evidence too, and you’ll have more evidence if you are allowed to proceeds on the merits of your claim. By all means, once opposing counsel has “testified” include in your remarks prepared script as to YOUR facts and YOUR conclusions. END WITH THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS OBVIOUSLY AN ISSUE OF FACT AND WHETHER THE JUDGE THINKS YOU WILL WIN OR NOT IS IMMATERIAL. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE HEARD ON THE MERITS AND A RIGHT TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY. If opposing counsel is so sure that what you are alleging is frivolous, then there are many remedies available including summary judgment. But it is not until the FACTS come out that any of those remedies arise.
  10. Do not characterize your opposition as part of an evil axis of power. They may well have contributed to the Judge’s campaign, or otherwise have indirect relationships that do not merit recusal. This is not about whether banks are evil, it is about why are all these entities necessary to simply foreclose on a mortgage? If it is as simple as THEY say, why don’t they have the paperwork to back it up?
  11. DO NOT SAY ANYTHING YOU CAN’T BACK UP. This does NOT mean you have all the proof you need to win your case when you file your first pleading. It means that you know that if you are allowed to proceed, and you actually get the disclosure and discovery of the true facts, you will win.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

November 8, 2006.

Carol Rosen, Albuquerque, NM, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Rhodes & Salmon, P.C., William C. Salmon, Albuquerque, NM, Attorney for Defendant U.S. Bank.

Karla Poe, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, Kimberly Smith Rivera, McGlinchey Staford, PLLC, Cleveland, OH, Attorney for Defendant EquiFirst.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JUDITH HERRERA, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant U.S. Bank National Association’s (“U.S. Bank”) Motion to Dismiss or Stay [Doc. 23, filed Aug. 7, 2006], and Defendant EquiFirst Corporation, Inc.’s (“EquiFirst”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 28, filed Sept. 15, 2006]. The Court has reviewed the motions, the record in this case, and the relevant law, and concludes that the motions are well-taken and should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Before turning to the facts presented in the pleadings in this case, the Court takes judicial notice of cases involving D. Scott Heineman and Kurt F. Johnson, who are the Trustees of the Rosen Family Trust, of which Plaintiff Carol R. Rosen is a beneficiary. See Doc. 17, Ex. B ¶ 4.A. Heineman and Johnson

were the proprietors of a business that claimed to help homeowners eliminate their mortgages. [Heineman and Johnson’s] business operated under the “vapor money” theory of lending, which holds that loans funded through wire transfers rather than through cash are unenforceable. [They] claimed that, through a complicated series of transactions, they could take advantage of this loophole and legally eliminate their clients’ mortgages.

In 2004, Johnson and Heineman filed a series of lawsuits against mortgage companies on behalf of their clients, seeking, among other things, a declaration that any mortgages on their clients’ properties were void. All fifteen cases were . . . found. . . to be “frivolous and . . . filed in bad faith.”

. . . .

On September 22, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted [Heineman and Johnson] on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.

United States v. Heineman, 2006 WL 2374580, *1 (N. D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2006). The step-by-step method Heineman and Johnson advertised over the internet and used to attempt to eliminate mortgages is as follows. They would have

the homeowner prepare and sign a promissory note as well as a loan agreement for the encumbered property. The homeowner then sends these documents to [Heineman and Johnson] with a cashier’s check “of $3,000 [to eliminate a] 1st mortgage, and $1,500 [to eliminate] a second mortgage or home equity line of credit.” Once this initial fee is received, Heineman and Johnson set up a Family Estate Amenable Complex trust in the homeowner’s name, i.e., the Frances Kenny Family Trust. Heineman and Johnson name themselves the trustees. Title to the homeowner’s property is transferred to the trust.

Now in charge as trustees, Heineman and Johnson approach the bank or lending institution that lent the homeowner the money to purchase the property. They make a “Presentment” to the bank in the form of “a cash-backed bond in double-amount of the promissory note.” The “bond” is allegedly “a valid, rated instrument backed by a $120 Million Letter of Credit against the Assets of an 85-year old, $800 Million Swiss Trust Company.” This is essentially an offer to the lender to satisfy the borrower’s indebtedness. The alleged “bond,” however, is a ploy.

. . . .

In addition to the “bond,” Heineman and Johnson hire “Trustee lawyers” to “begin the legal process by sending out a legal complaint in the form of a CPA Report that outlines 40 or more different federal laws that have been violated in the ‘lending process.'” The lending institution thereafter has a certain time frame within which to respond to the complaint. Purportedly, the homeowner will be notified by plaintiffs’ legal team when the loan is “satisfied.” The homeowner’s “lender may or may not let [you] know or acknowledge this.”

Once the loan is satisfied, “re-financing begins.” The homeowner is told to “refinance [his] property at the maximum loan to value ratio possible” with a new lender. The alleged “purpose of this new re-financing is for you, the client, to compensate the Provider and CCR.” Heineman and Johnson are the “Provider.” They run CCR. The proceeds from this new loan are disbursed as follows: “The Provider receives 50%. CCR receives 25%. You, the client, receives the other 25%.” This entire process takes “5-7 months in most cases.” And, “[t]he end result is that the [homeowner] gets free and clear title to the home and a good amount of cash in hand.”

[Heineman and Johnson], however, perpetrate a fraud to “satisfy” the original indebtedness. One of the documents Heineman and Johnson present to the bank or lending institution is entitled a “power of attorney.” This document demands that the lender sign and thereby acknowledge that it has given the homeowner “vapor money” in exchange for an interest (via a deed of trust) in the subject property at the time of financing. A provision of this “power of attorney” provides that the lender’s “silence is deemed consent.” When the lender fails to respond, [Heineman and Johnson] execute the power of attorney. They then sign a deed of reconveyance reconveying the lender’s security interest in the property to Heineman and Johnson. The forged power of attorney and the deed of reconveyance are duly recorded at the county recorder’s office. The county’s records thus show a power of attorney from the lender granting Heineman and Johnson the right to sign the deed of reconveyance and the reconveyance from the original lender. The title seems clear and unencumbered. The lender is unaware of the maneuver.

[Heineman and Johnson] then turn around and from an unsuspecting new lender seek a loan to refinance the property. When the new lender conducts a preliminary title search, it discovers the power of attorney and deed of reconveyance, both of which appear to have been validly executed. From the new lender’s point of view, the property appears to be unencumbered. And it is thus willing to refinance the property.

. . . .

At the conclusion of this process, the borrower is in even worse condition than when he or she first looked to [Heineman and Johnson] for debt relief. Two lenders believe that they have valid security interests in the subject property. When the homeowner defaults on both loans, both lenders commence foreclosure proceedings. In response, Heineman and Johnson, as trustees, file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of the borrower or file suit alleging that no enforceable debt accrued from either lender because the loans were funded through wire transfers rather than cash. Fifteen such lawsuits were filed in [the Northern District of California] on such a “vapor money” theory.

Frances Kenny Family Trust v. World Sav. Bank FSB, 2005 WL 106792 at *1-*3 (N. D. Cal., Jan. 19, 2005).

The following facts are taken from Rosen’s Amended Complaint and from the exhibits attached to her complaint and to U.S. Bank’s Answer. They demonstrate a pattern strikingly and disturbingly similar to the one described above. In December 2004, Rosen quitclaimed her property located on Wellesley Drive in Albuquerque, NM to Heineman and Johnson, as Trustees of the Rosen Family Trust. See Doc. 17, Ex. B ¶ 4.A. Colonial Savings held a mortgage secured by the Wellesley property. On March 3, 2005, Heineman, acting as “Attorney-in-Fact” for Colonial Savings, executed and recorded a notarized “Discharge of Mortgage” purporting to release Rosen from her mortgage of $86,250. Id. Ex. A. The Discharge stated that the mortgage had been “fully paid, satisfied, and discharged” and that Heineman’s power of attorney to act on behalf of Colonial Savings was granted “through the doctrine of agency by estoppel.” Id. The Vice President of Colonial Savings, however, recorded an “Affidavit of Fraudulent Recording of Discharge of Mortgage,” disputing that Heineman had any authority to act on Colonial’s behalf or discharge the mortgage and attesting that the note and mortgage had not been paid. Id.

On April 27, 2005, Rosen submitted a loan application to Defendant American Mortgage Specialists, Inc. (“American Mortgage”), a mortgage broker located in Arizona, for the purpose of refinancing the Wellesley property. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 10-11 & Ex. A (Doc. 13). Rosen subsequently executed a note for $198,305 in favor of EquiFirst, secured by a Deed of Trust on the Wellesley property. See id. Ex. A, B. The mortgage provides that, if the note was sold or the Loan Servicer was changed, EquiFirst would give Rosen written notice, together with “any other information RESPA requires.” Id. Ex. B at 13.

Rosen signed the note and mortgage on May 17, 2005. See id. at 16. The loan was closed that same day, and proceeds were disbursed on May 23, 2005, including over $29,000 to third-party creditors. See Am. Compl. Ex. G. Colonial Savings is not included in the list of payoff recipients. See id.

Lines 801, 812, and 814 of the closing statement, under the heading “ITEMS PAYABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LOAN,” show that a 1% “loan origination fee” of $1983.05 as well as “OTHER BRK FEES” of $1762 were paid to American Mortgage from Rosen’s loan proceeds, and that a $940 “LENDER ORIGINATION” fee was paid to EquiFirst from Rosen’s loan proceeds. Id. at 2. In addition, line 813 of the closing statement states: “BROKER FEE PAID BY LENDER YSP $3,966.10 POC.[1]” Id. This represented a yield spread premium that EquiFirst additionally paid to American Mortgage upon the loan closing.

On June 21, 2005, EquiFirst and Homecomings Financial notified Rosen that the servicing of her mortgage loan (i.e., the right to collect payment from her) had been transferred to Homecomings Financial and that the effective date of transfer would be June 29, 2005. See Am. Compl., Ex. C. The transfer of servicing did not affect the terms or conditions of the mortgage. See id. Further, during the 60 days following the effective date of transfer, timely loan payments made to EquiFirst could not be treated as late by Homecomings Financial. See id.

On July 11, 2005, Rosen executed a Grant Deed granting “to D. Scott Heineman and Kurt F. Johnson, Trustees of Rosen Family Trust, for a valuable consideration . . .” her Wellesley Drive property that secured her EquiFirst mortgage. Am. Compl. at ¶ 26, Ex. D. The complaint does not state whether Rosen gave Homecomings Financial or EquiFirst notice of her transfer of ownership of the property to the Trust. According to her “Affidavit of Sum Certain,” Rosen made only three mortgage payments between the time she closed the EquiFirst loan in May 2005 and August 7, 2006, when she filed the affidavit. See Doc. 22.

On January 23, 2006, EquiFirst granted, assigned, and transferred its beneficial interest in Rosen’s mortgage to Defendant U.S. Bank as Trustee. See Am. Compl., Ex. E. U.S. Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings on Rosen’s mortgage and the Wellesley Drive property on February 1, 2006, in state district court. See Am. Compl. ¶ 28. On May 11, 2006, Rosen mailed a “notice of rescission” to EquiFirst, U.S. Bank, and Homecomings Financial. See id. ¶ 42, Ex. I. She alleged a right to rescind her mortgage transaction based on her claim that, when she closed the loan in May 2005, “EquiFirst failed to meet the requirements to give me accurate material disclosures and the proper notice of the right to rescind.” Am. Compl., Ex. I ¶ 7. She also claimed that “[a] broker’s fee, in the form of a yield spread premium, was fraudulently assessed to the loan transaction, . . . [which] renders the HUD 1/Settlement Statement defective, inter alia, because it does not state to whom the fee was paid . . . [and because] the charge was encoded, to the extent that no consumer or most any other person could decipher [it] . . . .” Id. ¶ 10B. Rosen claimed that these failures extended her statutory right to rescind from the regular three-day period to a three-year period. See id. ¶ 10D. Homecomings Financial, through counsel, responded to Rosen’s May 11 letter on June 6, 2006. It sent Rosen a copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel she signed on May 17, 2005, in which she acknowledged receipt of two copies of the Notice. See Am. Compl., Ex. H. It asserted that the abbreviations of “YSP” and “POC” “are standard terms within the mortgage banking industry” and that, if she’d had any concerns about those terms, she should have addressed them at closing. Id. Finding no basis for rescission, it refused to rescind the loan transaction.

Rosen filed her initial complaint in federal court on May 19, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. See Doc. 1. She filed an amended complaint on July 17, 2006, that contains six claims. Count One is for rescission under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 and § 226.23 of Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 48. She claims that recission “extinguishes any liability Plaintiff may have had to Defendants for finance or other charges arising from the [loan] Transaction,” id. ¶ 49, and that “Defendants [sic] failure to take action to reflect the termination of the security interest in the property within twenty . . . days of [her] rescission. . . releases [her] from any liability whatsoever to Defendants.” Id. ¶ 50.

Count Two alleges damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1640 for Defendants’ failure to comply with § 1635 after Defendants received Rosen’s rescission letter. Id. ¶¶ 51-52. Count Three is for recoupment of a statutory penalty provided under § 1640. In support, Rosen lists twenty-eight alleged violations of various federal and state statutes and regulations. See id. ¶¶ 54(a)-(bb).

Count Four alleges violation of a right to Equal Credit Opportunity as described in 12 C.F.R. § 202.14. In support, Rosen alleges that the Defendants failed to make clear and conspicuous disclosures, and that various documents were confusing. See id. ¶ 55.

Count Five alleges violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17. Rosen claims that Defendants failed to give her fifteen days notice before the loan servicing contract was assigned from EquiFirst to Homecomings Financials in violation of § 2605(b), see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-59, and that EquiFirst’s payment of the yield-spread premium to American Mortgage constituted an illegal fee or “kickback” violating 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)[2], see id. ¶ 60. Additionally, she alleges that EquiFirst and American Mortgage engaged in “fee splitting” in violation of § 2607(d)[3]. Id. ¶ 61.

Court Six alleges violation of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, N.M.S.A. §§ 57-12-1 et seq., based on the same allegations that EquiFirst and American Mortgage engaged in illegal kickback and fee-splitting activities that caused her to pay a higher interest rate. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-68, 76.

Rosen seeks: (i) a judicial declaration that she validly rescinded the loan and is not liable for any finance or other charges and has no liability whatsoever to Defendants; (ii) an order requiring Defendants to terminate their security interest in her home; (iii) an injunction enjoining Defendants from maintaining foreclosure proceedings or otherwise taking steps to deprive her of ownership of the property; (iv) an award of statutory damages and penalties; and (v) attorney fees. See id. at 26-27.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It asserts that Rosen has failed to state claims under particular statutes and that other claims are time-barred. It urges the Court to abstain from asserting jurisdiction over any remaining claims that should be resolved in the pending state foreclosure action. EquiFirst moves for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (“Judgment on the Pleadings”), asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts One through Four and Count Six, and on part of Count Five of Rosen’s amended complaint. In resolving motions brought under either Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), the Court must

accept all facts pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the same. Judgment on the pleadings should not be granted “unless the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000). As with . . . motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), documents attached to the pleadings are exhibits and are to be considered in [reviewing] . . . [a] 12(c) motion. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

Park Univ. Enter., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006).

It is true that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice. It is also well established that dismissal of a complaint is proper only if it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.

Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).

In reviewing a pro se complaint, a court applies the same legal standards applicable to pleadings counsel has drafted, but is mindful that the complaint must be liberally construed. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But “[t]he broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.

[T]he [pro se] plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him, should be allowed to amend his complaint. Nevertheless, conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based. This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.

Id. (citations omitted). The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. See Moore, 438 F.3d at 1039.

III. ANALYSIS

A. ROSEN FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RESCISSION.

In transactions covered by the TILA, the borrower is entitled to rescind the transaction. See § 1635(a). The right to rescind lasts for three days, if the lender has given the borrower the disclosures required by the TILA and a notice of the right to rescind; the right lasts up to three years if the lender fails to give the requisite disclosures and notice, unless the borrower sells or transfers the property to someone else before the end of the three-year period[4]. See § 1635(f). EquiFirst asserts that Rosen’s right to rescind expired by operation of law upon her transfer of her ownership interest in the Wellesley Drive property to Heineman and Johnson as Trustees of the Rosen Family Trust. Rosen contends, however, that because she did not actually sell the Wellesley Drive property and maintains a beneficial interest in remaining in the house (apparently by the terms of the Trust, which is not part of the record), her right to rescind has not expired.

Congress gave the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System broad authority to promulgate extensive regulations implementing the TILA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a), which it calls Regulation Z, see 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a). In interpreting and implementing § 1635(f), Regulation Z specifically provides that the borrower’s right to rescind immediately expires not only “upon sale of the property,” but also “upon transfer of all of the [borrower’s] interest in the property.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). The parties do not point to anything within the TILA, Regulation Z, or case law that further defines the extent of the borrower’s interest that must be transferred in order to trigger expiration of the right to rescind, and the Court has found none in its own research.

But the Court concludes that the words “all of the [borrower’s] interest” means all of the borrower’s ownership or title interest for several reasons. First, the Board clarified through § 226.23(a)(3) that something less than an outright sale of the property triggers expiration of the right to rescind. Second, because TILA provides for penalties when a lender fails to comply with rescission requirements and gives the lender only twenty days to return earnest money, down payments, and accrued interest and payments and to remove the security interest after receiving notice of the recission letter, see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), the lender must be able to quickly ascertain whether the borrower still legally owns the property securing the loan and has a statutory right to rescind. The only way to timely accomplish this goal is to examine the real property records in the county where the real property title is recorded. If, as here, those records demonstrate that the borrower has transferred her ownership and legal interests in the property, for valuable consideration, to another entity controlled by someone other than the borrower, the lender can reasonably contest the borrower’s right to rescission without fear of penalty. Trust documents that may contractually grant various types of beneficial interests after the sale or transfer of all of a borrower’s ownership interest in property are not generally filed in the public records, and a lender should not be required to assume that a beneficial interest of some sort may secretly exist that would hypothetically extend the borrower’s right to rescission. It is therefore consistent with the TILA’s goals to interpret “interest” as “ownership interest.“ See Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that “another goal of § 1635(b) [‘s recission requirement] is to return the parties most nearly to the position they held prior to entering the transaction”).

“Although the right to rescind is statutorily granted [in the TILA], it remains an equitable doctrine subject to equitable considerations.. . . Thus, district courts are to consider traditional equitable notions in applying [the TILA’s] statutory grant of rescission.” Brown v. Nat’l Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 683 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see In re Ramirez, 329 B.R. 727, 738 (D. Kan. 2005) (stating that, “[r]escission, whether statutory or common law, is an equitable remedy. Its relief, in design and effect, is to restore the parties to their pre-transaction positions. The TILA authorizes the courts to apply equitable principles to the rescission process. . . . [W]ithin the context of the TILA, rescission is a remedy that restores the status quo ante.”). Because Rosen has transferred her ownership of the property to a third party, the parties cannot be returned to their pre-transaction positions, which would unfairly prejudice EquiFirst if she maintained the right to recission. Cf., e.g., Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221-22 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a court could condition the borrowers’ continuing right of rescission upon tender to the lender of all of the funds spent by the lender in discharging the earlier indebtedness of the borrowers as well as the value of the home improvements). Without legal ownership of the Wellesley property to use as security for another mortgage, Rosen most likely could not return the $198,305 EquiFirst gave to her and her creditors. Equity therefore requires that the Court interpret § 226.23(a)(3) to provide for expiration of the right to rescission upon the transfer of a borrower’s ownership interest in the property securing a loan. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411-12, 417-19 (1998) (noting that “a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure, [so] Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk” by “governing the life” of the right to rescission with absolute expiration provisions under § 1635(f), “while permitting recoupment damages regardless of the date a collection action may be brought,” and holding that a borrower may not assert the right to rescind as an affirmative defense in a collection action after the right has expired by operation of law).

Finally, TILA is a strict liability statute. See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”); Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 248 (3d Cir.1980) (noting that the TILA and its regulations mandate a standard of disclosure of certain information in financing agreements and enforce that mandate by “a system of strict liability in favor of consumers who have secured financing when this standard is not met”). There should, therefore, be a bright line delineating the borrower’s and lender’s rights and responsibilities. Interpreting § 226.23(a)(3) to mean that transfer of all of the borrower’s ownership interest in the property securing a loan triggers expiration of the right to rescission preserves an easily-ascertainable bright line.

The Court concludes that, when Rosen transferred her ownership interest in the Wellesley Drive property to a Trust with Trustees other than herself on July 11, 2005, her right to rescission expired that same date by operation of law. Her May 11, 2006, recission letter was untimely and ineffective. She therefore cannot state a cause of action for rescission, and Count One must be dismissed. Accordingly, her claims stated in Count Two for monetary damages and penalties arising from Defendants’ refusal to rescind the refinancing contract must also be dismissed.

B. CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER TILA ARE TIME BARRED.

“Section 1640 is a general ‘civil liability’ section in the TILA. In subsection (a) it provides for either actual and/or statutory damages for various TILA violations” set forth in parts B, D, and E of the subchapter. Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2003); § 1640(a) (providing liability for creditors who fail to comply with “any requirements imposed under this part, including any requirement under section 1635 of this title, or part D or E of this subchapter”). Count Three, for recoupment of a statutory penalty provided under § 1640 alleges violations of not only TILA, but also of various other non-TILA regulations and the New Mexico UCC. Insofar as Rosen attempts to recover damages for violation of statutes not listed in § 1640(a), she has failed to state a claim.

Further, her claims for failing to disclose information or otherwise violating subchapter B at the time of closing must be dismissed as time barred. As both U.S. Bank and EquiFirst point out, claims for damages under § 1640 of TILA have a one-year limitations period. See § 1640(e) (“Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation . . . .”). A review of Rosen’s complaint reveals that all alleged violations of subchapter B occurred at or before closing on May 17, 2005, but she did not file her complaint until more than one year later. Count Three must be dismissed.

D. ROSEN FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691(f), makes it unlawful for a creditor to discriminate “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); [] because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or [] because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under [TILA].” § 1691(a). Rosen’s amended complaint alleges no facts to support a claim for violation of the Act, and she made no argument in her response brief to support amendment. Count Four must be dismissed.

E. RESPA CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED.

Rosen attempts to assert two types of claims under RESPA in Count Five of the Amended Complaint. The first is for violation, on June 21, 2005, of a provision that requires creditors to give a borrower fifteen days notice before transferring an account to a different loan servicer. See § 2605(b)(2)(A) (“Except as provided under subparagraphs (B) and (C), the notice required under paragraph (1) shall be made to the borrower not less than 15 days before the effective date of transfer of the servicing of the mortgage loan.”). To recover under § 2605, the borrower must allege and show actual damages suffered “as a result of the failure.” § 2605(f)(1)(A). If the borrower also alleges and establishes that the violation is a “pattern or practice of noncompliance,” a court may additionally award statutory damages “not to exceed $1000.” § 2605(f)(1)(B). Although the Amended Complaint neither alleges that Rosen suffered any actual damages as a result of EquiFirst’s failure to give her a full 15-days notice of the change of loan servicer, nor alleges that EquiFirst engaged in a pattern or practice of not complying with the 15-day notice requirement, Rosen requests that the Court “reduce the amount owed by Plaintiff by the amount of statutory and actual damages available under RESPA.” Am. Compl. at 22.

Because she has not alleged she suffered actual damages, the Court concludes that Rosen has failed to state a claim for damages under § 2605 and that she should not be given an opportunity to amend her complaint because none of the Defendants have attempted, in this federal suit, to bring any claims for money Rosen owes them. Any claims for recoupment that Rosen may be able to bring are relevant to the state foreclosure action and should be litigated there. Cf. Demmler v. Bank One NA, 2006 WL 640499, *5 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 9, 2006) (alternatively holding that the plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to TILA and other federal statutes against lending bank and challenging validity of loan were barred because they were compulsory counterclaims that should have been raised in the foreclosure action in state court).

Rosen alleges that Defendants violated § 2607 by giving “kickbacks” or engaging in “fee-splitting” on May 17, 2005, when EquiFirst paid a broker’s fee to American Mortgage as a yield-spread premium. The statute of limitations for violations of § 2607 is one year from the date the violation is alleged to have occurred. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614. The Court concludes that Rosen’s claims for violation of § 2607 are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See Snow v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 332 F.3d 356, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The primary ill that § 2607 is designed to remedy is the potential for ‘unnecessarily high settlement charges,’ § 2601(a), caused by kickbacks, fee-splitting, and other practices that suppress price competition for settlement services. This ill occurs, if at all, when the plaintiff pays for the service, typically at the closing. Plaintiffs therefore could have sued at that moment, and the standard rule is that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.”) (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). Rosen’s argument that her claim survives the one-year statute of limitations because it is one for recoupment is unavailing because Defendants have not sued her by way of counter-claim in this federal suit. Again, any claims for recoupment should have been brought as a defense in the state foreclosure action. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); Beach, 523 U.S. at 417-19.

F. THE COURT WILL NOT TAKE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER POTENTIAL STATE-LAW CLAIMS.

The Tenth Circuit has instructed district courts that, when federal jurisdiction is based solely upon a federal question, absent a showing that “the parties have already expended a great deal of time and energy on the state law claims, . . . a district court should normally dismiss supplemental state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed, particularly when the federal claims are dismissed before trial.” United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002); see Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Because we dismiss the federal causes of action prior to trial, we hold that the state claims should be dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction.”). None of the factors identified in Thatcher Enterprises v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990) — “the nature and extent of pretrial proceedings, judicial economy, convenience, or fairness” — would be served by retaining jurisdiction over any potential state-law claim in this case. No discovery has been conducted in this case, and no energy has been expended on the potential state-law claims. The Court will dismiss Rosen’s state-law claims for violation of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act contained in Count Six of her amended complaint.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that all Counts of Rosen’s federal complaint are DISMISSED.

[1] “YSP” is an abbreviation for “yield spread premium” and “POC” is an abbreviation for “paid outside closing.” Am. Compl., Ex. H

[2] Although Rosen cites 12 U.S.C. § 1207(a) as the statute violated, there is no such statute and her citation to 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14 refers to violations of § 2607. The Court therefore construes her complaint to allege violations of § 2607.

[3] See footnote 2.

[4] Section 1635 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Disclosure of obligor’s right to rescind

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction . . . in which a security interest . . . is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, appropriate forms for the obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

. . . .

(f) Time limit for exercise of right

An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor . . . .

Filed under: CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

MERS Discovery Items

Posted on April 5, 2010 by Neil Garfield

From Eric Mesi

MERs has a manual and I included some of it below regarding foreclosures. But who would know if their manual is correct? Of course they will write it to protect their selves.
Section 2: (a) If a Member chooses to conduct foreclosures in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the note must be endorsed in blank and in possession of one of the Member’s MERS certifying officers. If the investor so allows, then MERS can be designated as the note-holder.
—————————————————————————–
Section 1. MERS shall within two (2) business days forward to the appropriate
Member or Members, in the form prescribed by and otherwise in accordance with the
Procedures, all properly identified notices, payments, and other correspondence received by MERS with respect to mortgage loans registered on the MERS® System for which Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. serves as mortgagee of record.
—————————————————————————–
Section 2. MERS shall provide to Members certain standard reports concerning
information contained on the MERS® System, as specified in the Procedures, and such other reports as MERS may determine from time to time.
—————————————————————————–
(b) In non-judicial foreclosure states, if the Member chooses to foreclose in MERS name under the power of sale provision in the security instrument and is not seeking a deficiency judgment, then the note does not need to be in the possession of the Member’s MERS Certifying Officer when commencing the foreclosure action; provided, however, that under no circumstances may the Member allege that the note is in their possession unless it so possesses.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

Discovery, Forensic Analysis and Motion Practice: The Prospectus

Posted on March 26, 2010 by Neil Garfield

USE THIS AS A GUIDE FOR DISCOVERY, FORENSIC ANALYSIS AND MOTION PRACTICE TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE

see for this example SHARPS%20CDO%20II_16.08.07_9347

Comments in Red: THIS IS A PARTIAL ANNOTATION OF THE PROSPECTUS. IF YOU WANT A FULL ANNOTATION OF THIS PROSPECTUS OR ANY OTHER YOU NEED AN EXPERT IN SECURITIZATION TO DO IT. THERE ARE THREE OBVIOUS JURISDICTIONS RECITED HERE: CAYMAN ISLANDS, UNITED STATES (DELAWARE), AND IRELAND WITH MANY OTHER JURISDICTIONS RECITED AS WELL FOR PURPOSES OF THE OFFERING, ALL INDICATING THAT THE INVESTORS (CREDITORS) ARE SPREAD OUT ACROSS THE WORLD.

Note that the issuance of the bonds/notes are “non-recourse” which further corroborates the fact that the issuer (SPV/REMIC) is NOT the debtor, it is the homeowners who were funded out of the pool of money solicited from the investors, part of which was used to fund mortgages and a large part of which was kept by the investment bankers as “profit.”There is no language indicative that anyone other than the investors own the notes from homeowner/borrowers/debtors. Thus the investors are the creditors and the homeowners are the debtors. Without the investors there would have been no loan. Without the borrowers, there would would have been no investment. Hence, a SINGLE TRANSACTION.

If you read carefully you will see that there is Deutsch Bank as “initial purchaser” so that the notes (bonds) can be sold to pension funds, sovereign wealth funds etc. at a profit. This profit is the second tier of yield spread premium that no TILA audit I have ever seen has caught.

The amount of the “LEVEL 2” yield spread premium I compute on average to be approximately 30%-35% of the total loan amount that was funded FOR THE SUBJECT LOAN on average, depending upon the method of computation used.Thus a $300,000 loan would on average spawn two yield spread premiums, “level 1” being perhaps 2% or $6,000 and “level 2” being 33% or $100,000, neither of which were disclosed to the borrower, a violation of TILA.

The amount of the yield spread premium is a complex number based upon detailed information about the what actually took place in the sale of all the bonds and what actually took place in the sale of all the loan products to homeowners and what actually took place in the alleged transfer or assignment of “loans” into a master pool and what actually took place in the alleged transfer or assignment of “loans” into specific SPV pools and the alleged transfer or assignment of “loans” into specific tranches or classes within the SPV operating structure.

Here is the beginning of the prospectus with some of the annotations that are applicable:

Sharps CDO II Ltd., (obviously a name that doesn’t show up at the closing with the homeowner when they sign the promissory note, mortgage (or Deed of Trust and other documents. You want to ask for the name and contact information for the entity that issued the prospectus which is not necessarily the same company that issued the securities to the investors) an exempted company (you might ask for the identification of any companies that are declared as “exempted company” and their contact information to the extent that they issued any document or security relating to the subject loan) incorporated with limited liability you probably want to find out what liabilities are limited) under the laws of the Cayman Islands (ask for the identity of any foreign jurisdiction in which enabling documents were created, or under which jurisdiction is claimed or referred in the enabling documentation) (the “Issuer”) (Note that this is the “issuer” you don’t see don’t find about unless you ask for it), and Sharps CDO II Corp., (it would be wise to check with Delaware and get as much information about the names and addresses of the incorporators) a Delaware corporation (the “Co-Issuer” and together with the Issuer, the “Co-Issuers”), pursuant to an indenture (don’t confuse the prospectus with the indenture. The indenture is the actual terms of the bond issued just like the “terms of Note” specify the terms of the promissory note executed by the borrower/homeowner at closing) (the “Indenture”), among the Co-Issuers and The Bank of New York, as trustee (Note that BONY is identified “as trustee” but the usual language of “under the terms of that certain trust dated….etc” are absent. This is because there usually is NO TRUST AGREEMENT designated as such and NOT TRUST. In fact, as stated here it is merely an agreement between the co-issuers and BONY, which it means that far from being a trust it is more like the operating agreement of an LLC) (the “Trustee”), will issue up to U.S.$600,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class A-1 Notes”), U.S.$100,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class A-2 Notes”), U.S.$60,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2046 (the “Class A-3 Notes” and, together with the Class A-1 Notes and the Class A-2 Notes, the “Class A Notes”), U.S.$82,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class B Notes”), U.S.$52,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class C Notes”), U.S.$34,000,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class D-1 Notes”) and U.S.$27,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class D-2 Notes” and, together with the Class D-1 Notes, the “Class D Notes”). The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are collectively referred to as the “Senior Notes.” The Class A-2 Notes, the Class A-3 Notes, the Class
B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes and the Subordinated Notes (as defined below) are collectively referred to as the “Offered Notes.” Concurrently with the issuance of the Senior Notes, the Issuer will issue U.S.$27,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (the “Class D-2 Notes” and, together with the Class D-1 Notes, the “Class D Notes pursuant to the Indenture and U.S.$45,000,000 Subordinated Notes due 2046 (the “Subordinated Notes”) pursuant to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Issuer (the “Issuer Charter”) and in accordance with a Deed of Covenant (“Deed of Covenant”) and a Fiscal Agency Agreement (the “Fiscal Agency Agreement”), among the Issuer, The Bank of New York, as Fiscal Agent (in such capacity, the “Fiscal Agent”) and the Trustee, as Note Registrar (in such capacity, the “Note Registrar”). The Senior Notes and the Subordinated Notes are collectively referred to as the “Notes.” Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft (“Deutsche Bank”), New York Branch (“Deutsche Bank AG, New York Branch” and, in such capacity, the “TRS Counterparty”) will enter into a total return swap transaction (the “Total Return Swap”) with the Issuer pursuant to which it will be obligated to purchase (or cause to be purchased) the Class A-1 Notes issued from time to time by the Issuer under the circumstances described herein and therein. (cover continued on next page)

It is a condition to the issuance of the Notes on the Closing Date that the Class A-1 Notes be rated “Aaa” by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) and “AAA” by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (“Standard & Poor’s,” and together with Moody’s, the “Rating Agencies”), that the Class A-2 Notes be rated “Aaa” by Moody’s and “AAA” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class A-3 Notes be rated “Aaa” by Moody’s and “AAA” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class B Notes be rated at least “Aa2” by Moody’s and at least “AA” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class C Notes be rated at least “A2” by Moody’s and at least “A” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class D-1 Notes be rated “Baa1” by Moody’s and “BBB+” by Standard & Poor’s, that the Class D-2 Notes be rated “Baa3” by Moody’s and “BBB-” by Standard & Poor’s.
This Offering Circular constitutes the Prospectus (the “Prospectus”) for the purposes of Directive 2003/71/EC (the “Prospectus Directive”). Application has been made to the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (the “Financial Regulator”) (you could ask for the identification and contact information of any financial regulator referred to in the offering circular, prospectus or other documents relating to the securitization of the subject loan), as competent authority under the Prospectus Directive for the Prospectus to be approved. Approval by the Financial Regulator relates only to the Senior Notes that are to be admitted to trading on the regulated market of the Irish Stock Exchange or other regulated markets for the purposes of the Directive 93/22/EEC or which are to be offered to the public in any Member State of the European Economic Area. Any foreign language text that is included within this document is for convenience purposes only and does not form part of the Prospectus.
Application has been made to the Irish Stock Exchange for the Senior Notes to be admitted to the Official List and to trading on its regulated market.
APPROVAL OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATOR RELATES ONLY TO THE SENIOR NOTES WHICH ARE TO BE ADMITTED TO TRADING ON THE REGULATED MARKET OF THE IRISH STOCK EXCHANGE OR OTHER REGULATED MARKETS FOR THE PURPOSES OF DIRECTIVE 93/22/EEC OR WHICH ARE TO BE OFFERED TO THE PUBLIC IN ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA.
SEE “RISK FACTORS” IN THIS OFFERING CIRCULAR FOR A DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN FACTORS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION
WITH AN INVESTMENT IN THE NOTES. THE SENIOR NOTES ARE NON-RECOURSE OBLIGATIONS OF THE CO-ISSUER AND THE NOTES ARE LIMITED
RECOURSE OBLIGATIONS OF THE ISSUER, PAYABLE SOLELY FROM THE COLLATERAL DESCRIBED HEREIN.
THE NOTES DO NOT REPRESENT AN INTEREST IN OR OBLIGATIONS OF, AND ARE NOT INSURED OR GUARANTEED BY, THE TRUSTEE, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., DEUTSCHE BANK OR ANY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AFFILIATES. Note that you have more than one trustee without any specific description of where one trustee ends and the other begins. It is classic obfuscation and musical chairs. NOTE ALSO THAT TRUSTEE DISCLAIMS ANY INTEREST IN THE BONDS BEING ISSUED [REFERRED TO AS “NOTES” JUST TO MAKE THINGS MORE CONFUSING].

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 14 Comments »

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