How the loan was sold multiple times.

 

THE CLAIM FOR HOMEOWNER ROYALTIES

It is like any hedge contract. The buyer of the hedge contract is the investment bank, sometimes working through sham conduits. It is saying it wishes to ensure stability of its “portfolio.” It provides triple agency rating and “insurance” from AIG for instance while at the same time buying insurance from  AIG based on the premise that hedge funds are selling hedge contracts. It looks like a safe bet as long as you don’t peek under the hood where you see that the debt, note and mortgage were split at inception and the enforcement of the debt, note and mortgage is at best a long shot if all the facts are revealed.

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The hedge funds and insurance companies make money because they are receiving fees from the investment bank for assuming the risk. It’s income pure and simple. The risk is seen as nonexistent. But in fact a small move in the value of the certificates whose value is entirely derived from the investment bank’s promise to pay certificate holders is a discretionary promise controlled exclusively by the vinestment bank. So Goldman can reduce payments and cause the certificates to decrease in value thus triggering the insurance and hedge contracts. Goldman can also, in its sole discretion declare that the value has reached the trigger point. And the counterparties expressly disclaim subrogation or any claims to the certificates, debts, notes or mortgages.
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In many cases the initial hedge contract was created for the highest tier of the tranches containing AAA rated mortgages. But the tier 1 tranche had received fees for issuing a hedge contract on the lowest tranche. The certificates were based upon the value of the tranche including the hedge contracts which investors thought were exclusively to protect the Tier 1 tranche but in fact contained a commitment to absorb losses for the Z tranche that contained 15% mortgages. So the modest but lucrative fees paid to hedge funds to assume the risk for stabilizing the Tier 1 tranche was in fact a guarantee of the entire Z tranche.
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When Z tranche failed as everyone knew it would, it took down the tier 1 tranche and through similar devices the entire issuance of that “trust” was reduced to rubble with investment bank getting the full amount of the investment (by certificate investors) paid to the investment bank (not the certificate investors) in mortgages that had (a) not failed and (b) did not have nearly the effect on perceived loss of value that was reported.
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Hence the investment bank sold, using the trust name as a fictitious name for the investment bank, to the investors who bought certificates whose value was perceived as derived from “underlying mortgages” and then sold again the same mortgages under guise of hedge fund and insurance contracts. In fact the value of the certificates was entirely derived from the value of the promise made by the  viestment bank with no right, title or interest to the indexed fictitious portfolio of debts, notes and mortgages arising out of the origination of or acquisition of residential mortgage loans.
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When the credit market collapsed (nobody was willing to trade in derivatives) Goldman and others had insurance contracts pending with AIG et al. The bailout was used to fund AIG so that GOldman could receive $150 Billion on losses never incurred by Goldman and which were never attributed to anyone who might be construed as having purchased the debt. Goldman was not lobbying to recover losses made from risky investments. Goldman was lobbying and did so successfully in protecting a windfall expectancy from hedge contracts and insurance procured through false pretenses. Losses on the loans had nothing to do with it.
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Goldman and Citi were successful at manipulating the story. TARP and FED and US Treasury and FDIC bailouts were at first predicated on losses caused by defaults on mortgages. But that is only part of the story. Mortgage Defaults actually were not a major cause of any collapse except in a few instances that Goldman PR seized on to make it appear that was what was happening marketwide. Most mortgage debt and all risk of loss had been sold multiple times. There simple was no owner of any debt in which the claimed “holder” had an pecuniary interest. Hence today we have no creditor — a proposition that virtually everyone finds unacceptable.
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So TARP evolved from Troubled mortgages to troubled Certificates. And when the promise was revealed to come not from homeowners but form the investment banks, TARP evolved again into a generic ill-defined “troubled asset ” classification that meant anything the banks decided. The stuff that simply could not be reconciled was put into the maiden lane entities and then later recycled out as new securitizations as though there was nothing wrong with the inherently defective and illegal nature of lending, servicing, selling and profiting from the sale of loan products that were guaranteed to fail in many instances and whose failure was central to the bank business model in which they would profit from the failure.
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What I am saying is that the infrastructure for all of that was established before the loans were made. That infrastructure and the expectancy of windfall revenues and profits from the origination or acquisition of loans was absolutely essential (condition precedent) to granting loans, whether they were viable or not. The funding of the loan was essential to getting the borrower’s name, signature and reputation as well as their house as collateral. Without that all the tranches, insurance contracts, hedge products and more advanced derivative products were never have been written, much less sold. This process did not, as was advertised, diversify risk. It concentrated it on borrowers, government and investors in that order.
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Note that the banks are left out of that equation because they were intermediaries as it relates to risk and they were principals as it relates to profits. It is my contention that this was an implied contract in which the homeowners should be compensated for their essential part and focal point, but for which the rest of the scheme, undisclosed to borrowers, could not have occurred.
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Consulting with insiders the average gross revenue from the loan of $1 was between $10 and $20 dollars. So for an average loan of $250,000 the gross revenue was in excess of $2, 500,000 and frequently topped $5,000,000. The average was $8,000,000. Royalties and license fees usually run from as low as 1.5% to an average of 6% and are applied to gross revenues. The implied contract that included the borrower and the investment bank thus computes as $480,000 plus statutory interest which at this point would average around 9% per year for an average of $43,200 per year for an average of 10 years or $432,000. Hence the value of the claim by each borrower is on average $900,000 for each $250,000 loan.
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In addition there exists a further claim for recovery of all undisclosed compensation as outlined above amounting to several times the above estimate. this presents an unparalleled profitable opportunities to good litigators. Pro se litigators are not invited. The theory is simple and if presented correctly will almost definitely survive a motion to dismiss and could be the subject of mass joinder, class action and even Qui Tam relief.
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While a DC group is forming I would be willing to help in the creation and development of a new group whose sole focus was on this theory.
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