REO PROPERTY FINANCE AND SALES UNDER A CLOUD OF PROBLEMS

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Now Banks are facing the consequences of their own wrongful actions in originating, servicing and foreclosing on homes. They are carrying property on their balance sheet as “real-estate owed” (REO) when in fact they don’t own it, they never financed it and they never bought any receivable coming out of it.

In turn, the inflated appraisals, defective mortgages have left homeowners with the need and desire to get or take what they can from the house before the “Bank” moves in. 

Instead of correcting the problem and enabling an economic recovery, the government is compounding the problems, essentially increasing leverage again through loan guarantee on homes that can’t support even today’s prices. Rolled into each 30 year loan under the 203(k) program are unrecoverable costs of replacement of appliances, carpeting and window treatments that the prior occupant took with him.

Same old Same old. Those that fight for  their homes will get, collectively, better results than those who don’t. But the majority of homeowners don’t know or don’t care whether they have remedies and real defenses to foreclosure, much less counterclaims for amounts that are multiples of the principal balance on the mortgage claimed to be enforceable.

The title problems that will come up over the years will also be an interesting show to watch as legislatures are pressed to reset the title chains artificially to make up for the fact that the mortgage before was invalid, the note was invalid, the obligation was not in default, and the owner of the obligation didn’t want to get involved in the messy foreclosure market.

The failure of a creditor to submit a credit bid combined with the fact that nobody paid cash means that the auction was conducted out of bounds and that any title derived from the  auction process is at best problematic and most probably fatally defective, meaning that the old homeowner still owns the property and the new buyer is sliding into den of snakes.

May 12, 2011

Financing Foreclosed Homes

By MARYANN HAGGERTY

FORECLOSED homes don’t show very well — financially strained borrowers may ignore maintenance; lenders turn off the water and power to cut the cost of letting the place sit. A poor appearance can complicate financing, but it doesn’t prevent sales.

Most of what people call foreclosed homes are being sold by lenders saddled with a property because there were no other takers at the foreclosure auction. The borrower on such a house owes more on it than the house is worth. These are known as R.E.O. houses, short for “real estate owned” on a bank’s balance sheet.

Distressed properties — those sold at a discount — made up 40 percent of resales in March, up from 35 percent a year earlier, according to the National Association of Realtors. (That includes not only R.E.O. but also short sales, in which a buyer pays less than the loan balance, once it gets the bank’s blessing.) Though not a record, it is a huge portion of sales compared with what used to be considered normal.

Where the money comes from depends on the buyer and the property. If a house was in relatively good physical shape — with water and power turned on — it could be eligible for standard financing.

Otherwise, right now, all-cash sales are at their highest level ever — 35 percent of total sales, according to the Realtors. Cash buyers, often investors who don’t plan to live in the home, “are a major player in the R.E.O. market,” said Tom McGiveron of Realty Connect in Hauppauge, N.Y., a real estate agent who specializes in foreclosures on Long Island. “Asset managers want to move their portfolios as fast as possible,” he added.

For would-be owner-occupants without cash, the federally insured 203(k) loan is key, said Mark Yecies, the president of SunQuest Funding in Cranford, N.J. Borrowers can roll projected rehab costs into the loan.

As Mr. McGiveron put it, “Since most R.E.O.’s are as is, and the heat, plumbing and electric are turned off frequently, a 203(k) loan is necessary to cover the borrower and the lender — a lender will not lend money on a home where the major heating and electrical systems are not operable.”

Buyers generally hire an independent consultant certified by the Federal Housing Administration to review contractor cost estimates and architectural plans for things like whether the work will bring the property up to minimum standards while not going overboard on improvements.

“In other words,” Mr. Yecies said, “if you’re buying a home in Newark and you want to put in a Viking range, it’s not going to happen.”

Yet in a higher-priced neighborhood like Short Hills, N.J., he added, you probably would be able to borrow for more upscale appliances. The F.H.A. appraiser takes the consultant’s report into account when reviewing a property and determining how big the loan can be.

Not all R.E.O. properties are eligible, Mr. Yecies pointed out. For instance, a partially built house that has never had a certificate of occupancy requires a construction loan of the kind that a commercial developer would use.

Mr. Yecies estimated that an F.H.A-certified consultant would cost $500 to $1,200, depending on the extent of the repairs and the number of units in a property.

The interest rate on a 203(k) loan is about a quarter of a percentage point higher than on a standard F.H.A.-insured loan, and a buyer also can expect to pay 1 or 2 points, he said. (A point is an upfront charge equivalent to 1 percent of the loan amount.)

As with other F.H.A.-backed loans, down payments may be as low as 3.5 percent, and loan limits apply. Currently, most F.H.A. loans in the area are capped at $729,750. (Energy-efficient rehabs may be eligible for more.)

Despite the extra steps, these loans work, Mr. Yecies said. “We’re doing a half dozen a month here,” he said. “They can be done in a normal period of time, as long as everyone cooperates.”

INVESTORS AND BORROWERS COULD SHARE COMMON INTERESTS AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM

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GET RID OF THE MIDDLEMEN

NOTE TO INVESTORS AND BORROWERS: IF YOU ARE SERIOUS ABOUT RESOLVING THE MORTGAGE CRISIS AND YOU WANT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT WRITE TO ME AT neilfranklingarfield@gmail.com.

EDITOR’S NOTE: For those of you who have followed the blog from the beginning in 2007, you know that I have pounded on the idea that investors ans borrowers had a common interest and that if they got rid of the middlemen, they could work things out. It’s not that anyone would get a windfall, but everyone with a real interest in the property and the loan would be treated as fairly as possible. The method I suggested was equity sharing wherein the principal is corrected back down to 80% of current fair market value, the resulting balance is amortized over 30 years, with a reasonable rate that could be adjusted every seven years or so. For the investor, they would have a bottom established, and they would keep their claims against the investment bankers, and they would get a share in any increase in equity that could be split 50-50 for the investor or some other acceptable number.

So far I have received nothing but silence, but now someone from the real estate industry is proposing something that is close to what I have been saying and it appeared in the New York Times which means that a lot of people have seen it. See article below. So I decided to try this experiment.

If you are an investor who would wants to pursue this further, then write to me and tell me so at

neilfranklingarfield@gmail.com

If you are a borrower who would like to explore this option then write to me and tell me so at

neilfranklingarfield@gmail.com

Let’s see what happens.

By ALEX PERRIELLO

THREE years after the mortgage crisis began, there are still 11 million to 15 million homeowners who owe more than their home is worth, meaning that about 25 percent of all mortgage holders are underwater. As a result, foreclosures continue to mount; many homeowners can’t make their payments and are tempted to simply walk away from their debt. Meanwhile, the lenders and investors who own the loans are unwilling to work out a deal if, as is usually the case, it means losing money.

Fortunately, there is a solution. Rather than be at odds, homeowners and investors should partner in long-term equity-sharing arrangements.

Here’s how it would work. Let’s say a homeowner purchased a house in 2004 for $300,000 with no money down, and the property is now worth $150,000 — a 50 percent drop in value.

In an equity-sharing arrangement, the lender would write a new loan for $150,000, retire the original $300,000 loan and, to make up for that loss, take a 50 percent deeded ownership interest in the property. The homeowner would also agree to split 50 percent of the net proceeds of any future sale of the property with the lender. The new arrangement would also include a buyout provision, so that if the homeowner ever wanted to take over the lender’s share, he would simply pay the lender a predetermined amount of cash.

Such a plan would be relatively easy to put in place, assuming the lender held the loan in its own portfolio. In most cases, however, lenders immediately sold their loans to investors and merely performed loan-servicing duties like collecting monthly payments and sending statements.

In those instances, the lender would have already made its money when the loan was originated, the proceeds from the new loan and the 50 percent deeded interest in the property would go to the investor, not the lender. The investor would also benefit from any future sale or when the homeowner exercised the buyout provision.

Equity-sharing would be a boon for everyone involved. Homeowners could stay in their houses and preserve their credit (assuming they stay current on the new loan). The neighborhood would avoid a foreclosure, which can depress property values. And the lender or investor could participate in the upside potential when the house eventually sells. Best of all, it wouldn’t cost taxpayers a dime.

A major reason the mortgage mess has gone on so long is that homeowners, lenders and investors assume their interests are at odds. An equity-sharing arrangement would bring all three onto the same side — and help solve America’s foreclosure crisis.

Alex Perriello is the president and chief executive of a real estate franchise organization.

PAYBACK TIME: $5.1 IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST SERVICER ON A $79K CASE

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“In short, loan servicing is a perfect setup for administrators who want to take advantage of both borrowers and lenders.” (Editor’s Note: Notice that the investors are referred to as lenders, hence the term “pretender lender” as to all others pretending to be lenders.)

“The investors also said that when borrowers tried to pay off or otherwise resolve defaulted loans, Compass/Silar refused to negotiate. In other cases when Compass/Silar urged the investors to modify troubled mortgages, the servicer reaped undisclosed fees in the deals.

The jury affirmed every claim the plaintiffs had brought against Compass/Silar, including conspiracy, as well as breach of contract, of fiduciary duty, and of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found improper actions by Compass/Silar on eight loans.”

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EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: For those slow learners out there practicing law, this might get your attention. The compensatory damages were $79,000. Punitive damages: $5,100,000. If the lawyers were on contingency, they just made over $2 million.

Besides the obvious importance of this case for investors and what is about to happen, you’ll notice that all the things we have been saying about the borrowers were alleged and proven against the servicer with respect to the investors. Thus you can understand why I have been saying that the interests of the investors and the interests of the borrowers are very similar and the factual basis of their claims are the same. The jury said GUILTY on breach of contract, of fiduciary duty, and of good faith and fair dealing. Sound familiar?

Borrowers take hope. The investors are doing some of your work for you. So is the SEC now and the attorney generals of all 50 states. But you have to take a stand if you want to play in this high stakes game. You can’t just wait for lightening to strike. Nobody is going to come knocking on the door handing you the deed to a home you thought you already lost and moved out of or satisfaction of mortgage or a check. It’s time for ALL homeowners who EVER had a loan (especially if originated after 1999) to go back to their paperwork and have it examined for potential claims. There’s probably gold in those mounds of paper.

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Opening the Bag of Mortgage Tricks

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

ALL the revelations this year about dubious practices in the mortgage servicing arena — think robo-signers and forged signatures — have rightly raised borrowers’ fears that companies handling their loans may not be operating on the up and up.

But borrowers aren’t the only ones concerned about potential mischief. Investors who hold mortgage securities are increasingly worried that servicers may be putting their interests ahead of those who own the loans.

A servicer might, for example, deny a loan modification to a borrower because it also owns a second mortgage on the same property and doesn’t want to write down that asset, as required in a modification. Levying outsize default fees is another tactic — the fees typically go to the servicer, not the lender, but they can still propel a property into foreclosure more quickly. And foreclosures aren’t a good outcome for investors.

Last week, a jury in federal district court in Reno, Nev., awarded a group of 50 mortgage investors $5.1 million in punitive damages against defendants in a loan servicing case. Although the numbers in the case aren’t large, its facts are fascinating. Indeed, the case exposed some of the tricks of the servicers’ trade.

The case is also notable because the main defendant, Silar Advisors, was one of the institutions that struck a deal in 2009 with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to buy the assets of a notorious failed bank, IndyMac. Of the $5.1 million in damages awarded in the case, Silar must pay $3 million.

John W. Bickel II, a co-founder of Bickel & Brewer in Dallas, represented the investors in the case. Because he represents an additional 1,450 investors whose loans were serviced by Silar, he said more suits like this one would follow soon.

Loan servicers act as intermediaries between borrowers and their lenders, collecting monthly payments and real estate taxes and forwarding them to the appropriate parties. As long as borrowers meet their payments, such operations typically run smoothly.

Defaults and foreclosures, however, complicate servicers’ duties. As the Silar matter shows, borrower difficulties also open the door to improprieties.

Because loan servicers operate behind the scenes, it’s hard for investors who own these mortgages to monitor fee-gouging. In addition, the servicing contracts make it difficult to fire administrators — under a typical arrangement, investors holding at least 51 percent of the loans must agree on termination.

In short, loan servicing is a perfect setup for administrators who want to take advantage of both borrowers and lenders.

Troubles for investors in the Silar matter began back in 2006 when the USA Commercial Mortgage Company went bankrupt. Founded in 1989, the company had underwritten and serviced short-term commercial real estate loans. It sold them to private investors, typically older people who hoped to live off the income generated by the loans. At the time of its bankruptcy, USA Commercial serviced 115 loans worth almost $1 billion.

After the company collapsed, a small firm called Compass Partners bought the servicing rights to these assets for $8 million. A short time later, Silar Advisors, a company overseen by Robert Leeds, a former Goldman Sachs executive, got involved by financing Compass. Compass/Silar began servicing the loans for the investors.

Almost immediately, the plaintiffs in the suit contended, Compass/Silar started siphoning off money owed to investors holding the loans. Among the servicer’s tactics, the plaintiffs said, were improperly charging default interest, late fees and loan origination fees that reduced amounts due to investors.

The investors also said that when borrowers tried to pay off or otherwise resolve defaulted loans, Compass/Silar refused to negotiate. In other cases when Compass/Silar urged the investors to modify troubled mortgages, the servicer reaped undisclosed fees in the deals.

THE jury affirmed every claim the plaintiffs had brought against Compass/Silar, including conspiracy, as well as breach of contract, of fiduciary duty, and of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found improper actions by Compass/Silar on eight loans.

A Silar spokesman said the firm was pleased that the jury awarded only $79,000 in compensatory damages to the plaintiffs but was disappointed by the punitive-damages assessment. “The jurors are to be commended for their careful consideration of the facts in a very lengthy trial,” the spokesman said. He declined to comment as to whether Silar was currently servicing any loans.

One loan history, on a defaulted asset known as Standard Property, indicates what these investors were up against with their servicer.

In March 2007, immediately after Compass/Silar took over administration of the investors’ loans, the Standard Property mortgage had a principal value of $9.64 million. The borrower wanted to repay the loan at that time, but instead of directing it to pay principal and the accrued interest to the holder of the loan, as required by the servicing agreement, Compass/Silar arranged for the borrower to refund only the principal.

At the same time, court papers show, Compass/Silar quietly took in almost $860,000 in late fees, default interest and other costs from the Standard Property borrower. This ran afoul of the servicing agreement governing the Standard Property mortgage. The agreement stated that such fees could go to the servicer only after investors had been paid principal and accrued interest on a loan.

“No one really knows what is in the black box known as loan servicing, and most investors don’t even think of their servicer taking advantage of them,” Mr. Bickel said in an interview. “There’s not a lot of transparency, and I think this case is going to bring to the forefront the potential for abuse.”

It is obvious that we are in the litigation stage of the financial debacle of 2008. That usually means shining the light on dark corners and watching what scurries away. The view may not be pretty, but at least in this case, investors got some recompense in addition to an education.

FORMS: Kentucky RICO Class Action v MERS, GMAC, DEUTSCH, Nationstar, Aurora, BAC, Citi, US Bank, LSR, DOCX, LPS, and attorneys

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“To the judges throughout the Commonwealth and to the homeowners, the foreclosing Plaintiff, a servicing company or “Trust” entity appears to be a bank or lender.    This falsity is due to its name in the style of the case.    They are not banks or lenders to the loan.    They are not a beneficiaries under the loan.    They do not possess a Mortgage in the property.    They will never have a right to posses a mortgage in the property.    It would have been a more honest representation for the foreclosing entity to called itself something like “Billy Bob’s Bill Collectors,”

10.03.10KENTUCKY RICOClassActionComplaint

Salient allegations in very well written complaint, although I still have some doubts about whether they will get the class certified. Kentucky is a non-judicial state”

“Come the Representative Plaintiffs, by counsel, on behalf of themselves and others so situated as putative class members pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.    and for their Class Action Complaint against the name Defendants and yet to be named Defendants, make their claim for treble and punitive damages, costs and attorneys fees under 18 U.S.C. 1962 and 1964, otherwise known as the “racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,” hereinafter (“RICO”) and for all violations of law heretofore claimed.

An ongoing criminal investigation has been in place in the state of Florida by both the Florida Attorney General and the Justice Department.    Upon information and belief, a parallel investigation is ongoing in the state of Kentucky and at least three other states.

Defendant Merscorp, Inc., is a foreign corporation created in or about 1998 by conspirators from the largest banks in the United States in order to undermine and eventually eviscerate long-standing principles of real property law, such as the requirement that any person or entity who seeks to foreclose upon a parcel of real property: 1) be in possession of the original note, 2) Have a publicly recorded mortage in the name of the party for whom the underlying debt is actually owed and who is the holder of the original Promissory Note with legally binding assignments, and 3) possess a written assignment giving he, she or it actual rights to the payments due from the borrower pursuant to both the mortgage and note.

MERS is unregistered and unlicensed to conduct mortgage lending or any other type of business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and has been and continues to knowingly and intentionally illegally and fraudulently record mortgages and conduct business in Kentucky on a large scale and systematic fashion..

LSR Processing LLC, is a document processing company, based in the state of Ohio to generate loan and mortgage documents.    Upon information and belief it is owned by one or more of the partners of LSR law firm.    LSR Processing was created in order to facilitate the conspiratorial acts of the Defendants in relation to the creation of fraudulent Promissory Notes, Note Assignments, Affidavits and Mortgage Assignments LSR Processing has a pattern and practice of drafting missing mortgage and loan documents and in turn, having them executed by their own employees.

This case arises due to the fact that for the Class Plaintiff and the members of this putative class, their Mortgages and in some cases, the foreclosures that followed, were and will be based upon a mortgage and a note in the mortgage that are not held by the same entity or party and are based upon a mortgage that was flawed at the date of origination of the loan because Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) was named as the beneficiary or nominee of the lender on the mortgage or an assignee and because the naming of MERS as the beneficiary was done for the purpose of deception, fraud, harming the borrower and the theft of revenue from in all one hundred (120) Kentucky Counties through the illegal avoidance of mortgage recording fees. (e.s.)

In the case where a foreclosure has been filed, the entity filing the foreclosure has no pecuniary in the mortgage loan.    The foreclosing entity is a third party.    The entity lacks standing, and most times, the capacity to foreclose.    The entity has no first hand knowledge of the loan, no authority to testify or file affidavits as to the validity of the loan documents or the existence of the loan. The entity has no legal authority to draft mortgage assignments relating to the loan.    The foreclosing entity and its agents regularly commit perjury in relation to their testimony.

The “lender,” on the original Promissory Note was not the lender. The originators of the loan immediately and simultaneously securitized the note.    The beneficial interest in the note was never in the lender.    MERS, acting as the mortgagee or mortgage assignee, was never intended to be the lender nor did it represent the true lender of the funds for the mortgage. The Servicer, like GMAC Mortgage, or some party has or is about to declare the default, is not in privity with the lender.    The true owner or beneficiary of the mortgage loan has not declared a default and usually no longer have an interest in the note. The Servicer is not in privity nor does it have the permission of the beneficial owners of the Note to file suit on their behalf.

The obligations reflected by the note allegedly secured by the MERS mortgage have been satisfied in whole or in part because the investors who furnished the funding for these loans have been paid to the degree that extinguishment of the debts has occurred with the result that there exists no obligations on which to base any foreclosure on the property owned by the Class Plaintiffs. Defendants have and will cloud the title and illegally collect payments and attempt to foreclose upon the property of the Plaintiffs when they do not have lawful rights to foreclose, are not holders in due course of the notes.
42.    Any mortgage loan with a Mortgage recorded in the name of MERS, is at most, an unsecured debt.    The only parties entitled to collect on the unsecured debt would be the holders in due and beneficial owners of the original Promissory Note.
43.    The loan agreements were predatory and the Defendants made false representations to the Class Plaintiffs which induced the Class Plaintiffs to enter into the loans and the Defendants knew the representations were false when they were made.

In these cases, the property could be foreclosed by default, sold and transferred without ANY real party in interest having ever come to Court and with out the name of the “Trust” or the owners of the mortgage loan, ever having been revealed. Many times the Servicer will fraudulently keep the proceeds of the foreclosure sale under the terms of a Pooling and Servicing Agreement as the “Trust” no longer exists or has been paid off.    The Court and the property owner will never know that the property was literally stolen.
52.    After the property is disposed of in foreclosure, the real owners of the mortgage loan are still free to come to Court and lay claim to the mortgage loan for a second time.    These parties who may actually be owed money on the loan are now also the victims of the illegal foreclosure.    The purchaser of the property in foreclosure has a bogus and clouded title, as well as all other unsuspecting buyers down the line.    Title Insurance would be impossible to write on the property.

Although the Plaintiffs attempting to foreclosure refer to themselves as “Trustees” of a “Trust,” the entities are not “Trustees” nor “Trusts” as defined by Kentucky law.    Neither are the entities registered as Business Trusts or Business Trustees as required by Kentucky law. In every case, where one of these MBS have come to a Kentucky Court the entity foreclosing lacked capacity sue to file suit in the State of Kentucky.    There is no “Trust Agreement” in existence.    The entity filing has utilized a Kentucky legal term it has no right to use for the sole purpose of misleading the Court.
55.    Although the “Trust” listed may be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”), more often than it is not properly registered in any state of the union as a Corporation, Business Trust, or any other type of corporate entity.    Therefore, the REMIC does not legally exist for purposes of capacity for filing a law suit in Kentucky or any other State.

The transfer of mortgage loans into the trust after the “cut off date” (in the example 2006), destroys the trust’s REMIC tax exempt status, and these “Trusts” (and potentially the financial entities who created them) would owe millions of dollars to the IRS and the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet as the income would be taxed at of one hundred percent (100%).
64.    Subsequent to the “cut off date” listed in the prospectus, whereby the mortgage notes and security for these notes had to be identified, and Note and Mortgages transferred,    and    thereafter, the pool is permanently closed to future transfers of mortgage assets.
65.    All Class members have mortgage loans which were recorded in the name of MERS and/or for which were attempted through a Mortgage Assignment to be transferred into a REMIC after that REMIC’s “cut off” and “closing dates.”
66.    In all cases, the lack of acquisition of the Class Members’ mortgage loans violates the prospectus presented to the investors and the IRS REMIC requirements.
67.    If an MBS Trust was audited by the IRS and was found to have violated any of the REMIC requirements, it would lose its REMIC status and all back taxes would be due and owing to the IRS as well as the state of Kentucky.    As previously stated, one hundred percent (100%) of the income will be taxed.

FORM: BAC ASSIGNMENT FRAUD ON THE COURT COMPLAINT‏

SERVICES YOU NEED

9.29.10Florida-Motion-Fraud-on-the-Court-Bank-of-America-vs-Julme-Case-CACE09-21933-05[1]

Editor’s Note: Matis Abravanel, practicing in South Florida has drafted and filed a motion that is a classic in its construction. The result was that BAC caved, which is good, but what really draws my attention to this work is its masterful presentation. Lawyers would do well to look carefully at this pleading. He carefully weaves the securitization facts into a language and context that any Judge can understand. And unlike the opposition he has the goods. So do you, if you know how to use them.


Matis H. Abravanel, Esq.

4closureFraud

A Smith Hiatt and Diaz case in Broward County Florida…

Some short background information on this pleading, it’s an emergency
motion to cancel a final sale based upon Fraud on the Court. This
client came to us a month before his final sale date, and already had
a default and a final summary judgment entered against him. Besides
non-compliance with the pooling and servicing agreement, we uncovered
notary fraud (see paragraphs 1-4 and attached exhibits) and a
fraudulent assignment and endorsement of a note that was dated in
January of 2006, to U.S. Bank National Association, as successor
Trustee to Bank of America, National Association as successor by
merger to LaSalle Bank, N.A.. However its interesting to note that
Bank of America didn’t take over LaSalle Bank until October of 2007,
over 1 and 1/2 years later! (see paragraph 17 and attached exhibits).
Once the ‘pretender lender’ received our motion they immediately
called us and canceled the sale, and we haven’t heard back from them
since. We are waiting to have our evidentiary hearing for Fraud on
the Court.

Matis H. Abravanel, Esq.

4closureFraud

Wells Fargo-Cendent-Cayman Connection Described

livinglies-newsletter-provides-more-strategic-info

Submitted by Mary Cachrane

Editor’s Note: This is where the original SIV’s stashed the illicit profits they received by taking more money from investors than the amount they intended to use to fund mortgages. We call that the tier two yield spread premium that is also undisclosed at the time of borrower’s closing and which is a ticking time bomb… waiting for some smart competent lawyer to look up the statutes and realize that there’s money in them thar hills. I’m talking gold here.

Your have to find all of the agreements for all of the third partys to show the relationship back to WFC HOLDINGS CORP who benefits (1) owner thru Cayman Islands – since purchase 11/1998 of Wells Fargo & Co. logo. Afterall its just an address of an entity registered in DE organized to appear American – it’s not America.

PHH core of secondary sub-servicing relationships pulled into WFC in 1998 thru over

Depository Trust Company
CeCE & Co.
55 Water Street, NY NY 10041
representing sole registra on behalf of brokers, dealers, banks and other participatns in the DTC system. Such participants may hold Certificates for their own accounts.
Filed on behalf of Cendant Mortgage Capital LLC,
by Cendant Mortgage Corporation as Master Servicer for
CDMC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-1.

Mortgage bond holders taking collective action

SHELL GAME CONTINUES. WHO HAS THE BOND? WHO HAS THE RECEIVABLE? WHO HAS THE SECURITY INTEREST? WHO IS GETTING PAID? WHERE ARE THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS GOING? FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC ARE BIG PLAYERS, AS IS THE FEDERAL RESERVE. ARE THEY THE ONES REALLY FORECLOSING UNDER COVER OF SECURITIZATION?

EDITOR’S NOTE: Another entry under the category of “I told you so.” Sooner or later the investors were going to figure out that they had real claims against the investment bankers and other intermediary entities in the illusion of the securitization chain, together with the servicers and other players at the loan closing. Not long ago investors would not talk with each other. Now they are banding together. Things change. This development will lead to further unraveling of the factual constipation that those players arrogantly thought they keep a lid on. The inevitable and only logical outcome here is the entry of real facts portraying the reality of these transactions.

The current reality is very simple: the investors were tricked, the borrowers were tricked, and the intermediaries took all the money. The ONLY way this can be fixed from a National perspective is to bring the borrowers and the investors together, realizing that they both have the same interests — recovery from their financial ruin. Investors need to bring certainty to what is left of their “investments.” They need to know the value of their investments and how best to recover that value. Without that they can’t bring a specific action for damages. Without that they can’t fire the intermediaries and get an honest deal launched with borrowers on property that just isn’t worth what was advertised.

There is no way to avoid principal reduction in some form because it is already there. The value is down to where it should have been at the beginning and it isn’t going up. Investors, sellers,, buyers and borrowers need to accept this fact and government, including the judiciary, need to realize that this wasn’t normal market movement, this was cornering the market and manipulating it. The investors will prove that in their own lawsuits.

A direct approach from investors to borrowers will eliminate the ridiculous fees being sucked out of what is left of these deals, and allow the investors to recoup far more than  what they are being offered. Most homeowners would be willing to accept a principal reduction that splits the loss fairly between the investors and borrowers if they were able to get fair terms.

The difference is night and day. What would have been zero recovery for the investor could be as much as $100,000 or more in a genuine modified or new mortgage. And with cooperation between borrower and investors the security interest, which is in my opinion completely invalid and unenforceable, could be perfected, title cleared and the marketplace renewed with confidence in contract , property laws and the rights of consumers and investors. Community banks could fund the new mortgages  giving the investors an immediate exist or the investors could hold the paper through REAL special purpose vehicles that were REALLY created and REALLY existing.

Mortgage bond holders get legal edge; buybacks seen

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Wed Jul 21, 2010 2:44pm EDT

By Al Yoon

NEW YORK July 21 (Reuters) – U.S. mortgage bond investors have quietly banded together to gain the long-sought power needed to challenge loan servicers over losses the investors claim resulted from violations in securities contracts.

A group holding a third of the $1.5 trillion mortgage bond market has topped the key 25 percent threshold for voting rights on 2,300 “private-label” mortgage bonds, said Talcott Franklin, a Dallas-based lawyer who is shepherding the effort.

Reaching that threshold gives holders the means to identify misrepresentations in loans, and possibly force repurchases by banks, Franklin said.

Banks are already grappling with repurchase demands from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S.-backed mortgage finance giants.

The investors, which include some of the largest in the nation, claim they have been unfairly taking losses as the housing market crumbled and defaulted loans hammered their bonds. Requests to servicers that collect and distribute payments — which include big banks — to investigate loans are often referred to clauses that prohibit action by individuals, investors have said.

Since loan servicers, lenders and loan sellers sometimes are affiliated, there are conflicts of interest when asking the companies to ferret out the loans that destined their private mortgage bonds for losses, Franklin said in a July 20 letter to trustees, who act on behalf of bondholders.

“There’s a lot of smoke out there about whether these loans were properly written, and about whether the servicing is appropriate and whether recoveries are maximized” for bondholders, Franklin said in an interview.

He wouldn’t disclose his clients, but said they represent more than $500 billion in securities managed for pension funds, 401(k) plans, endowments, and governments. The securities are private mortgage bonds issued by Wall Street firms that helped trigger the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.

Franklin’s effort, using a clearinghouse model to aggregate positions, is a milestone for investors who have been unable to organize. Some have wanted to fire servicers but couldn’t gather the necessary voting rights.

“Investors have finally reached a mechanism whereby they can act collectively to enforce their contractual rights,” said one portfolio manager involved in the effort, who declined to be named. “The trustees, the people that made representations and warranties to the trust, and the servicers have taken advantage of a very fractured asset management industry to perpetuate a circle of silence around these securities.”

Laurie Goodman, a senior managing director at Amherst Securities Group in New York, said at an industry conference last week, “Reps and warranties are not enforced.”

Increased pressure from bondholders comes as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been collecting billions of dollars from lender repurchases of loans in government-backed securities. With Fannie and Freddie also big buyers of Wall Street mortgage bonds, their regulator this month used its subpoena power to seek documents and see if it could recoup losses for the two companies, which have received tens of billions in taxpayer-funded bailouts.

Some U.S. Federal Home Loan banks and at least one hedge fund are looking to force repurchases or collect for losses.

Investors are eager to scrutinize loans against reps and warranties in ways haven’t been able to before. Where 50 percent voting rights are required for an action, the investors in the clearinghouse have power in more than 900 deals.

Franklin said the investors are hoping for a cooperative effort with servicers and trustees. While he did not disclose recipients of the letter, some of the biggest trustees include Bank of New York, US Bank and Deutsche Bank.

A Bank of New York spokesman declined to say if the firm received the trustee letter. US Bancorp and Deutsche Bank spokesmen did not immediately return calls.

“You have a trustee surrounded by smoke, steadfastly claiming there is no fire, and what the letter gets to is there is fire,” the portfolio manager said. “And we are now directing you … to take these steps to put out the fire and to do so by investigating and putting loans back to the seller.”

Servicers are most likely to spot a breach of a bond’s warranty, Franklin said in the letter.

Violations could be substantial, he said. In an Ambac Assurance Corp review of 695 defaulted subprime loans sold to a mortgage trust by a servicer, nearly 80 percent broke one or more warranties, he said in the letter, citing an Ambac lawsuit against EMC Mortgage Corp.

The investors are also now empowered to scrutinize how servicers decide on either modifying a loan for a troubled borrower, or proceed with foreclosure, Franklin said. Improper foreclosures may be done to save costs of creating a loan modification, he asserted. (Editing by Leslie Adler)

NON-DISCLOSURE DETAILS FROM THE OTHER SIDE

ONE MORE QUESTION TO ASK IN DISCOVERY: WHAT ENTITIES WERE CREATED OR EMPLOYED IN THE TRADING OF MORTGAGE BONDS, CDO’S, SYNTHETIC CDO’S OR TOTAL RETURN SWAPS (NEW TERM)?

EDITOR’S COMMENT: LOUISE STORY, in her article in the New York Times continues to dig deeper into the games played by Wall Street firms. You’ll remember that the executives of the major Wall Street firms were spouting off the message that the risks and consequences were unknown to them. They didn’t know anything was wrong. Maybe they were stupid or distracted. And maybe they were just plain lying. The risks to these fine gentlemen and their companies are now enormous. If the veil of non-disclosure (opaque, in Wall Street jargon) continues to be eroded, they move closer and closer to root changes in Wall Street and both criminal and civil liability. It also leads inevitably to the conclusion that the loans and the bonds were bogus.

Yes it is true that money exchanged hands — but not in any of the ways that most people imagine and not in any way that was disclosed as required by TILA, state law, Securities Laws and other applicable statutes, rules and regulations. They continue to pursue foreclosure principally for the purpose of distracting everyone from the truth — that the transactions were wrong in every conceivable way and they knew it.

If there was nothing wrong with these innovative financial products why were they “off-balance sheet.” If there isn’t any problem with them now, then why can’t they produce an accounting, like any other situation, and say “this person borrowed money and didn’t pay it back. We will lose money if they don’t — here is the proof.” If everything was proper and appropriate, then why are we seeing revealed new entities and new layers of deception as Ms. Story and other reporters dig deeper and deeper?

The answer is simple: they were hiding the truth in circular transactions that were partially off balance sheet and partially on. I wonder how many borrowers would be charged with fraud for doing that? Now, thanks to Louise Story, we have some new names to research — Pyxis, Steers, Parcs, and unnamed “customer trades. They all amount to the same thing.

The bonds and the loans claimed to be attached to the bonds were being bought and sold in and out of the investment banking firm that created them. If they produce the real accounting the depth and scope of their fraud will become obvious to everyone, including the Judges that say we won’t give a borrower a free house. What these Judges are doing is ignoring the reality that they are giving a free house and a free ride to companies with no interest in the transaction. And they are directly contributing to a title mess that will take decades to untangle.

August 9, 2010

Merrill’s Risk Disclosure Dodges Are Unearthed

By LOUISE STORY

It was named after a faint constellation in the southern sky: Pyxis, the Mariner’s Compass. But it helped to steer the mighty Merrill Lynch toward disaster.

Barely visible to any but a few inside Merrill, Pyxis was created at the height of the mortgage mania as a sink for subprime securities. Intended for one purpose and operated off the books, this entity and others like it at Merrill helped the bank obscure the outsize risks it was taking.

The Pyxis story is about who knew what and when on Wall Street — and who did not. Publicly, banks vastly underestimated their exposure to the dangerous mortgage investments they were creating. Privately, trading executives often knew far more about the perils than they let on.

Only after the housing bubble began to deflate did Merrill and other banks begin to clearly divulge the many billions of dollars of troubled securities that were linked to them, often through opaque vehicles like Pyxis.

In the third quarter of 2007, for instance, Merrill reported that its potential exposure to certain subprime investments was $15.2 billion. Three months later, it said that exposure was actually $46 billion.

At the time, Merrill said it had initially excluded the difference because it thought it had protected itself with various hedges.

But many of those hedges later failed, and Merrill, the brokerage giant that brought Wall Street to Main Street, soon collapsed into the arms of Bank of America.

“It’s like the parable of the blind man and the elephant: you had some people feeling the trunk and some the legs, and there was nobody putting it all together,” Gary Witt, a former managing director at Moody’s Investors Service who now teaches at Temple University, said of the situation at Merrill and other banks.

Wall Street has come a long way since the dark days of 2008, when the near collapse of American finance heralded the end of flush times for many people. But even now, two years on, regulators are still trying to piece together how so much went so wrong on Wall Street.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether banks adequately disclosed their financial risks during the boom and subsequent bust. The question has taken on new urgency now that Citigroup has agreed to pay $75 million to settle S.E.C. claims that it misled investors about its exposure to collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s.

As Merrill did with vehicles like Pyxis, Citigroup shifted much of the risks associated with its C.D.O.’s off its books, only to have those risks boomerang. Jessica Oppenheim, a spokeswoman for Bank of America, declined to comment.

Such financial tactics, and the S.E.C.’s inquiry into banks’ disclosures, raise thorny questions for policy makers. The investigation throws an uncomfortable spotlight on the vast network of hedge funds and “special purpose vehicles” that financial companies still use to finance their operations and the investments they create.

The recent overhaul of financial regulation did little to address this shadow banking system. Nor does it address whether banking executives should be required to disclose more about the risks their banks take.

Most Wall Street firms disclosed little about their mortgage holdings before the crisis, in part because many executives thought the investments were safe. But in some cases, executives failed to grasp the potential dangers partly because the risks were obscured, even to them, via off-balance-sheet programs.

Executives’ decisions about what to disclose may have been clouded by hopes that the market would recover, analysts said.

“There was probably some misplaced optimism that it would work out,” said John McDonald, a banking analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein & Company. “But in a time of high uncertainty, maybe the disclosure burden should be pushed towards greater disclosure.”

The Pyxis episode begins in 2006, when the overheated and overleveraged housing market was beginning its painful decline.

During the bubble years, many Wall Street banks built a lucrative business packaging home mortgages into bonds and other investments. But few players were bigger than Merrill Lynch, which became a leader in creating C.D.O.’s

Initially, Merrill often relied on credit insurance from the American International Group to make certain parts of its C.D.O.’s attractive to investors. But when A.I.G. stopped writing those policies in early 2006 because of concerns over the housing market, Merrill ended up holding on to more of those pieces itself.

So that summer, Merrill Lynch created a group of three traders to reduce its exposure to the fast-sinking mortgage market. According to three former employees with direct knowledge of this group, the traders first tried sell the vestigial C.D.O. investments. If that did not work, they tried to find a foreign bank to finance their own purchase of the C.D.O.’s. If that failed, they turned to Pyxis or similar programs, called Steers and Parcs, as well as to custom trades.

These programs generally issued short-term I.O.U.’s to investors and then used that money to buy various assets, including the leftover C.D.O. pieces.

But there was a catch. In forming Pyxis and the other programs, Merrill guaranteed the notes they issued by agreeing to take back any securities put in the programs that turned out to be of poor quality. In other words, these vehicles were essentially buying pieces of C.D.O.’s from Merrill using the proceeds of notes guaranteed by Merrill and leaving Merrill on the hook for any losses.

To further complicate the matter, Merrill traders sometimes used the cash inside new C.D.O.’s to buy the Pyxis notes, meaning that the C.D.O.’s were investing in Pyxis, even as Pyxis was investing in C.D.O.’s.

“It was circular, yes, but it was all ultimately tied to Merrill,” said a former Merrill employee, who asked to remain anonymous so as not to jeopardize ongoing business with Merrill.

To provide the guarantee that made all of this work, Merrill entered into a derivatives contract known as a total return swap, obliging it to cover any losses at Pyxis. Citigroup used similar arrangements that the S.E.C. now says should have been disclosed to shareholders in the summer of 2007.

One difficulty for the S.E.C. and other investigators is determining exactly when banks should have disclosed more about their mortgage holdings. Banks are required to disclose only what they expect their exposure to be. If they believe they are fully hedged, they can even report that they have no exposure at all. Being wrong is no crime.

Moreover, banks can lump all sorts of trades together in their financial statements and are not required to disclose the full face value of many derivatives, including the type of guarantees that Merrill used.

“Should they have told us all of their subprime mortgage exposure?” said Jeffery Harte, an analyst with Sandler O’Neill. “Nobody knew that was going to be such a huge problem. The next step is they would be giving us their entire trading book.”

Still, Mr. Harte and other analysts said they were surprised in 2007 by Merrill’s escalating exposure and its initial decision not to disclose the full extent of its mortgage holdings. Greater disclosure about Merrill’s mortgage holdings and programs like Pyxis might have raised red flags to senior executives and shareholders, who could have demanded that Merrill stop producing the risky securities that later brought the firm down.

Former Merrill employees said it would have been virtually impossible for Merrill to continue to carry out so many C.D.O. deals in 2006 without the likes of Pyxis. Those lucrative deals helped fatten profits in the short term — and hence the annual bonuses paid to its employees. In 2006, even as the seeds of its undoing were being planted, Merrill Lynch paid out more than $5 billion in bonuses.

It was not until the autumn of 2007 that Pyxis and its brethren set off alarm bells outside Merrill. C.D.O. specialists at Moody’s pieced together the role of Pyxis and warned Moody’s analysts who rated Merrill’s debt. Merrill soon preannounced a quarterly loss, and Moody’s downgraded the firm’s credit rating. By late 2007, Merrill had added pages of detailed disclosures to its earnings releases.

It was too late. The risks inside Merrill, virtually invisible a year earlier, had already mortally wounded one of Wall Street’s proudest names.

CLASS ACTION SUIT INVOLVING MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES OF WELLS FARGO & JP MORGAN ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

SOMEBODY SEND ME THE COMPLAINT PLEASE —> NGARFIELD@MSN.COM
Registration Statements omitted and/or misrepresented the fact that the sellers of the underlying mortgages to JP Morgan Acceptance were issuing many of the mortgage loans to borrowers who: (i) did not meet the prudent or maximum debt-to-income ratio purportedly required by the lender; (ii) did not provide adequate documentation to support the income and assets required for the lenders to approve and fund the mortgage loans pursuant to the lenders’ own guidelines; (iii) were steered to stated income/asset and low documentation mortgage loans by lenders, lenders’ correspondents or lenders’ agents, such as mortgage brokers, because the borrowers could not qualify for mortgage loans that required full documentation; and (iv) did not have the income required by the lenders’ own guidelines to afford the required mortgage payments which resulted in a mismatch between the amount loaned to the borrower and the capacity of the borrower.

Wells Fargo more than likely caloborated with J.P. Morgan . Look and see if your Trust is located below.

COUGHLIN STOIA GELLER RUDMAN & ROBBINS LLP FILES CLASS ACTION SUIT INVOLVING MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES OF JP MORGAN ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
January 21, 2009 – Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP (“Coughlin Stoia”) (http://www.csgrr.com/cases/jpmorgan/) today announced that a class action lawsuit is pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates and Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates (“Certificates”) of J.P. Morgan Acceptance Corporation I (“JP Morgan Acceptance” or the “Depositor”) pursuant and/or traceable to false and misleading Registration Statements and Prospectus Supplements issued between January 2006 and March 2007 by JP Morgan Acceptance (collectively, the “Registration Statements”). The class includes purchasers of Certificates in the following trusts:

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A1
J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A7

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A2
J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S1

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A3
J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S2

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A4
J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S3

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A5
J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S4

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A6
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-A3

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-A4
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-A5

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-A6
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-A7

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-ACC1
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH2

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-HE2
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-HE3

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC1
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-RM1

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-S2
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WF1

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WMC2
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WMC3

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WMC4
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-A1

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-A2
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH2
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-S1

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from today. If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff’s counsel, Samuel H. Rudman or David A. Rosenfeld of Coughlin Stoia at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at djr@csgrr.com. If you are a member of this class, you can view a copy of the complaint or join this class action online at http://www.csgrr.com/cases/jpmorgan/. Any member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

The complaint charges JP Morgan Acceptance, certain of its officers and directors and the issuers and underwriters of the Certificates with violations of the Securities Act of 1933. JP Morgan Acceptance was formed in 1988 for the purpose of acquiring, owning and selling interests in those assets. JP Morgan Acceptance is a subsidiary of J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (“JP Morgan”) and is engaged in mortgage lending and other real estate finance-related businesses, including mortgage banking, mortgage warehouse lending, and insurance underwriting.

The complaint alleges that on July 29, 2005 and February 8, 2006, JP Morgan Acceptance and the Defendant Issuers caused Registration Statements to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in connection with the issuance of billions of dollars of Certificates. The Certificates were issued pursuant to Prospectus Supplements, each of which was incorporated into the Registration Statements. The Certificates included several classes or tranches, which had various priorities of payment, exposure to default, interest payment provisions and/or levels of seniority. The Certificates were supported by large pools of mortgage loans. The Registration Statements represented that the mortgage pools would primarily consist of loan groups generally secured by first liens on residential properties, including conventional, adjustable rate and negative amortization mortgage loans.

The complaint alleges that the Registration Statements omitted and/or misrepresented the fact that the sellers of the underlying mortgages to JP Morgan Acceptance were issuing many of the mortgage loans to borrowers who: (i) did not meet the prudent or maximum debt-to-income ratio purportedly required by the lender; (ii) did not provide adequate documentation to support the income and assets required for the lenders to approve and fund the mortgage loans pursuant to the lenders’ own guidelines; (iii) were steered to stated income/asset and low documentation mortgage loans by lenders, lenders’ correspondents or lenders’ agents, such as mortgage brokers, because the borrowers could not qualify for mortgage loans that required full documentation; and (iv) did not have the income required by the lenders’ own guidelines to afford the required mortgage payments which resulted in a mismatch between the amount loaned to the borrower and the capacity of the borrower.

According to the complaint, by the summer of 2007, the amount of uncollectible mortgage loans securing the Certificates began to be revealed to the public. To avoid scrutiny for their own involvement in the sale of the Certificates, the Rating Agencies began to put negative watch labels on many Certificate classes, ultimately downgrading many. The delinquency and foreclosure rates of the mortgage loans securing the Certificates has grown both faster and in greater quantity than what would be expected for mortgage loans of the types described in the Prospectus Supplements. As an additional result, the Certificates are no longer marketable at prices anywhere near the price paid by plaintiffs and the Class and the holders of the Certificates are exposed to much more risk with respect to both the timing and absolute cash flow to be received than the Registration Statements/Prospectus Supplements represented.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of Certificates pursuant and/or traceable to the Registration Statements (the “Class”). The plaintiff is represented by Coughlin Stoia, which has expertise in prosecuting investor class actions and extensive experience in actions involving financial fraud.

Coughlin Stoia, a 190-lawyer firm with offices in San Diego, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Boca Raton, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia and Atlanta, is active in major litigations pending in federal and state courts throughout the United States and has taken a leading role in many important actions on behalf of defrauded investors, consumers, and companies, as well as victims of human rights violations. The Coughlin Stoia Web site (http://www.csgrr.com) has more information about the firm.

A.I.G. to Pay $725 Million in Ohio Case

July 16, 2010

A.I.G. to Pay $725 Million in Ohio Case

By MICHAEL POWELL and MARY WILLIAMS WALSH

The American International Group, once the nation’s largest insurance group before it nearly collapsed in 2008, has agreed to pay $725 million to three Ohio pension funds to settle six-year-old claims of accounting fraud, stock manipulation and bid-rigging.

Taken together with earlier settlements, A.I.G. will ladle out more than $1 billion to Ohio investors, money that will go to firefighters, teachers, librarians and other pensioners. The state’s attorney general, Richard Cordray, said Friday, that it was the 10th largest securities class-action settlement in United States history.

“No privileged few are entitled to play by different rules than the rest of us,” Mr. Cordray said during a news conference. “Ohio is determined to send a strong message to the marketplace that companies who don’t play by the rules will pay a steep price.”

A.I.G. disclosed the terms of the settlement in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

How A.I.G. will pay for this settlement is an open question. It has agreed to a two-step payment, in no small part to give it time to figure out how to raise the money.

Executives are well aware that taxpayers and legislators would cry foul if it paid the lawsuit with any portion of the $22 billion in federal rescue money still available from the United States Treasury.

Instead, the company intends to pay $175 million within 10 days of court approval of its settlement. It plans to raise $550 million through a stock offering in the spring of 2011. That prospect struck some market analysts as a long shot.

“There’s still a lot of question marks hanging over A.I.G.,” said Chris Whalen, a co-founder of Institutional Risk Analytics, a research firm. “How would you write a prospectus for it?

“The document,” he said, “would be quite appalling when it described the risks.”

A.I.G.’s former chief executive, Maurice R. Greenberg, and other executives agreed to pay $115 million in an earlier settlement with Ohio, which filed its lawsuit in 2004.

State attorneys general often have proved more aggressive than federal regulators in going after financial houses in the wake of the 2008 crisis. And A.I.G. could face new legal headaches. For instance New York’s attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo, has stepped up his investigation of the company in the last few weeks, according to a person with direct knowledge of the case.

The Ohio settlement allows “A.I.G. to continue to focus its efforts on paying back taxpayers and restoring the value of our franchise,” Mark Herr, a company spokesman, said in a news release.

The Ohio case was filed on behalf of pension funds in the state that had suffered significant losses in their holdings of A.I.G. when its share price plummeted after it restated results for years before 2004. Those restatements followed an investigation by Eliot L. Spitzer, Mr. Cuomo’s predecessor, into accounting irregularities at the company and the subsequent resignation of Mr. Greenberg.

But the company faces a long and uncertain road, say Wall Street analysts.

Its stock, after adjusting for a reverse split, once traded at $1,446.80 a share; it stands now at $35.64.

A.I.G. has become the definition of turmoil. Its chairman resigned this week after a fierce feud with the chief executive, who has referred dismissively to “all those crazies down in Washington.”

Those crazies presumably include the federal government, which over the last two years gave A.I.G. the largest bailout in United States history, making $182 billion available to the company.

And the company’s proposed stock offering next year is rife with uncertainties. Such an offering would by definition dilute the value of the government’s holdings.

A.I.G. has struggled of late to sell off subsidiaries to repay the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This year the company failed in its attempts to turn its Asian life insurance subsidiary over to Prudential of Britain. This week the company’s directors voted to proceed with an initial public offering of the same subsidiary, with the proceeds intended for the Federal Reserve.

Should the company fail to raise the $550 million, Ohio has the right to resume its litigation.

The fall of the world’s largest insurance company began in the autumn of 2008, when a sudden downgrade in its credit worthiness set off something like a bank run. It turned out that the company had sold questionable derivatives that were used to prop up the portfolios of other financial institutions.

Federal officials moved quickly to bail out the company, fearing that if A.I.G. toppled, dozens of financial institutions would quickly fall as well. Havoc seemed in the offing.

Federal investigators have since examined many aspects of the company’s behavior, even convening a grand jury in New York. But they have never brought charges against the company or its top officials.

“The states are too often the only ones to watch out for this misconduct,” Mr. Cordray said Friday. “For years, people have been asleep at the switch.”

Louise Story contributed reporting.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: July 17, 2010

An earlier version of this article misidentified the New York attorney general who began the investigation into A.I.G.’s accounting irregularities. It was Eliot L. Spitzer, not Andrew M. Cuomo.

REMIC EVASION of TAXES AND FRAUD

I like this post from a reader in Colorado. Besides knowing what he is talking about, he raises some good issues. For example the original issue discount. Normally it is the fee for the underwriter. But this is a cover for a fee on steroids. They took money from the investor and then “bought” (without any paperwork conveying legal title) a bunch of loans that would produce the receivable income that the investor was looking for.

So let’s look at receivable income for a second and you’ll understand where the real money was made and why I call it an undisclosed tier 2 Yield Spread Premium due back to the borrower, or apportionable between the borrower and the investor. Receivable income consists or a complex maze designed to keep prying eyes from understanding what theya re looking at. But it isn’t really that hard if you take a few hours (or months) to really analyze it.

Under some twisted theory, most foreclosures are proceeding under the assumption that the receivable issue doesn’t matter. The fact that the principal balance of most loans were, if properly accounted for, paid off 10 times over, seems not to matter to Judges or even lawyers. “You borrowed the money didn’t you. How can you expect to get away with this?” A loaded question if I ever heard one. The borrower was a vehicle for the commission of a simple common law and statutory fraud. They lied to him and now they are trying to steal his house — the same way they lied to the investor and stole all the money.

  1. Receivable income is the income the investor expects. So for example if the deal is 7% and the investor puts up $1 million the investor is expecting $70,000 per year in receivable income PLUS of course the principal investment (which we all know never happened).

  2. Receivable income from loans is nominal — i.e., in name only. So if you have a $500,000 loan to a borrower who has an income of $12,000 per year, and the interest rate is stated as 16%, then the nominal receivable income is $80,000 per year, which everyone knows is a lie.

  3. The Yield Spread premium is achieved exactly that way. The investment banker takes $1,000,000 from an investor and then buys a mortgage with a nominal income of $80,000 which would be enough to pay the investor the annual receivable income the investor expects, plus fees for servicing the loan. So in our little example here, the investment banker only had to commit $500,000 to the borrower even though he took $1 million from the investor. His yield spread premium fee is therefore the same amount as the loan itself.  Would the investor have parted with the money if the investor was told the truth? Certainly not. Would the borrower sign up for a deal where he was sure to be thrown out on the street? Certainly not. In legal lingo, we call that fraud. And it never could have happened without defrauding BOTH the investor and the borrower.

  4. Then you have the actual receivable income which is the sum of all payments made on the pool, reduced by fees for servicing and other forms of chicanery. As more and more people default, the ACTUAL receivables go down, but the servicing fees stay the same or even increase, since the servicer is entitled to a higher fee for servicing a non-performing loan. You might ask where the servicer gets its money if the borrower isn’t paying. The answer is that the servicer is getting paid out of the proceeds of payments made by OTHER borrowers. In the end most of the ACTUAL income was eaten up by these service fees from the various securitization participants.

  5. Then you have a “credit event.” In these nutty deals a credit event is declared by investment banker who then makes a claim against insurance or counter-parties in credit default swaps, or buys (through the Master Servicer) the good loans (for repackaging and sale). The beauty of this is that upon declaration of a decrease in value of the pool, the underwriter gets to collect money on a bet that the underwriter would, acting in its own self interest, declare a write down of the pool and collect the money. Where did the money come from to pay for all these credit enhancements, insurance, credit default swaps, etc? ANSWER: From the original transaction wherein the investor put up $1 million and the investment banker only funded $500,000 (i.e., the undisclosed tier 2 yield spread premium).

  6. Under the terms of the securitization documents it might appear that the investor is entitled to be paid from third party payments. Both equitably, since the investors put up the money and legally, since that was the deal, they should have been paid. But they were not. So the third party payments are another expected receivable that materialized but was not paid to the creditor of the mortgage loan by the agents for the creditor. In other words, his bookkeepers stole the money.

Very good info on the securitization structure and thought provoking for sure. Could you explain the significance of the Original Issue Discount reporting for REMICs and how it applies to securitization?

It seems to me that the REMIC exemptions were to evade billions in taxes for the gain on sale of the loans to the static pool which never actually happened per the requirements for true sales. Such reporting was handled in the yearly publication 938 from the IRS. A review of this reporting history reveals some very interesting aspects that raise some questions.

Here are the years 2007, 2008 and 2009:

2009 reported in 2010
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p938.pdf

2008? is missing and reverts to the 2009 file?? Don’t believe me. try it.
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p938–2009.pdf

2007 reported in 2008
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p938–2007.pdf

A review of 2007 shows reporting of numerous securitization trusts owned by varying entities, 08 is obviously missing and concealed, and 2009 shows that most reporting is now by Fannie/Freddie/Ginnie, JP Morgan, CIti, BofA and a few new entities like the Jeffries trusts etc.

Would this be simply reporting that no discount is now being applied and all the losses or discount is credited to the GSEs and big banks, or does it mean the trusts no longer exist and the ones not paid with swaps are being resecuritized?

Some of the tell tale signs of some issues with the REMIC status especially in the WAMU loans is a 10.3 Billion dollar tax claim by the IRS in the BK. It is further that the balance of the entire loan portfolio of WAMU transferred to JPM for zero consideration. A total of 191 Billion of loans transferred proven by an FDIC accounting should be enough to challenge legal standing in any event.

I believe that all of the securitized loans were charged back to WAMU’s balance sheet prior to the sale of the assets and transferred to JPM along with the derivative contracts for each and every one of them. [EDITOR’S NOTE: PRECISELY CORRECT]

The derivatives seem to be accounted for in a separate mention in the balance sheet implying that the zeroing of the loans is a separate act from the derivatives. Add to that the IRS claim which can be attributed to the gain on sale clawback from the voiding of the REMIC status and things seem to fit.

I would agree the free house claim is a tough river to row but the unjust enrichment by allowing 191 billion in loans to be collected with no Article III standing not only should trump that but additionally forever strip them of standing to ever enforce the contract.

The collection is Federal Racketeering at the highest level, money laundering and antitrust. Where are the tobacco litigators that want to handle this issue for the homeowners? How about an attorney with political aspirations that would surely gain support for saving millions of homes for this one simple case?

Documents and more info on the FDIC litigation fund extended to JPM to fight consumers can be found here:

http://www.wamuloanfraud.com

You can also find my open letter to Sheila Bair asking her to personally respond to my request here:

http://4closurefraud.org/2010/06/09/an-open-letter-to-sheila-bair-of-the-federal-deposit-insurance-corporation-fdic-re-foreclosures/

Any insight into the REMIC and Pub. 938 info is certainly appreciated

GMAC v Visicaro Case No 07013084CI: florida judge reverses himself: applies basic rules of evidence and overturns his own order granting motion for summary judgment

Having just received the transcript on this case, I find that what the Judge said could be very persuasive to other Judges. I am renewing the post because there are several quotes you should be using from the transcript. Note the intimidation tactic that Plaintiff’s Counsel tried on the Judge. A word to the wise, if you are going to use that tactic you better have the goods hands down and you better have a good reason for doing it that way.

Fla Judge rehearing of summary judgement 4 04 10

5035SCAN4838_000 vesicaro Briefs

Vesicaro transcript

Posted originally in April, 2010

RIGHT ON POINT ABOUT WHAT WE WERE JUST TALKING ABOUT

I appeared as expert witness in a case yesterday where the Judge had trouble getting off the idea that it was an accepted fact that the note was in default and that ANY of the participants in the securitization chain should be considered collectively “creditors” or a creditor. Despite the fact that the only witness was a person who admitted she had no knowledge except what was on the documents given to her, the Judge let them in as evidence.

The witness was and is incompetent because she lacked personal knowledge and could not provide any foundation for any records or document. This is the predominant error of Judges today in most cases. Thus the prima facie case is considered “assumed” and the burden to prove a negative falls unfairly on the homeowner.

The Judge, in a familiar refrain, had trouble with the idea of giving the homeowner a free house when the only issue before him was whether the motion to lift stay should be granted. Besides the fact that the effect of granting the motion to lift stay was the gift of a free house to ASC who admits in their promotional website that they have in interest nor involvement in the origination of the loans, and despite the obviously fabricated assignment a few days before the hearing which violated the terms of the securitization document cutoff date, the Judge seems to completely missed the point of the issue before him: whether there was a reason to believe that the movant lacked standing or that the foreclosure would prejudice the debtor or other creditors (since the house would become an important asset of the bankruptcy estate if it was unencumbered).

If you carry over the arguments here, the motion for lift stay is the equivalent motion for summary judgment.

This transcript, citing cases, shows that the prima facie burden of the Movant is even higher than beyond a reasonable doubt. It also shows that the way the movants are using business records violates all standards of hearsay evidence and due process. Read the transcript carefully. You might want to use it for a motion for rehearing or motion for reconsideration to get your arguments on record, clear up the issue of whether you objected on the basis of competence of the witness, and then take it up on appeal with a cleaned up record.

“KING” DEUTSCH CITED FOR DESTRUCTION OF CITIES

The article below was purloined from www.foreclosureblues.wordpress.com — the comments are mine. Neil Garfield

“According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Deutsche Bank now holds loans for American single-family and multi-family houses worth about $3.7 billion (€3.1 billion). The bank, however, claims that much of this debt consists of loans to wealthy private customers. (EDITOR’S NOTE: THUS ALL THE OTHER LOANS IT CLAIMS TO OWN, IT DOESN’T OWN)

The bank did not issue the mortgages for the many properties it now manages, and yet it accepted, on behalf of investors, the fiduciary function for its own and third-party CDOs. In past years, says mortgage expert Steve Dibert, real estate loans were “traded like football cards” in the United States. (Editor’s Note: This is why we say that the loan never makes it into the pool until litigation starts AND even if it was ever in the pool there is no guarantee it remained in the pool for more than a nanosecond). Sworn testimony from Deutsch employees corroborate that no assignments are done until “needed,” which means that in the mean time they are still legally owned by the loan originator. The loan originator therefore created an obligation that was satisfied simultaneously with the closing on the loan. The note is therefore evidence of an obligation that does not legally exist. Thus there are possible equitable theories under which investors could assert claims against the borrower, but the note and deed of trust or mortgage are only PART of the evidence and ONLY the investor has standing to bring that claim. Recent cases have rejected claims of “equitable transfer.”)

How many houses was he responsible for, Co was asked? “Two thousand,” he replied. But then he corrected himself, saying that 2,000 wasn’t the number of individual properties, but the number of securities packages being managed by Deutsche Bank. Each package contains hundreds of mortgages. So how many houses are there, all told, he was asked again? Co could only guess. “Millions,” he said.

The exotic financial vehicles are sometimes managed by an equally exotic firm: Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited, Boundary Hall, Cricket Square, Grand Cayman. In an e-mail dated Feb. 26, 2010, a Deutsche Bank employee from the Cayman Islands lists 84 CDOs and similar products, for which she identifies herself as the relevant contact person.

However, C-BASS didn’t just manage abstract securities. It also had a subsidiary to bring in all the loans that were subsequently securitized. By the end of 2005 the subsidiary, Litton Loan, had processed 313,938 loans, most of them low-value mortgages, for a total value of $43 billion.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Whether it is Milwaukee which is going the the way of Cleveland or thousands of other towns and cities, Deutsch Bank as a central player in more than 2,000 Special Purpose Vehicles, involving thousands more pools and sub-pools, is far and away the largest protagonist in the foreclosure crisis. This article, originally written in German, details just how deep they are into this mess, while at the same time disclaiming any part in it. It corroborates the article I wrote about the Deutsch Bank executive who said ON TAPE, which I have, that even though Deutsch is named as Trustee it knows nothing and does nothing.

SPIEGEL ONLINE
06/10/2010 07:42 AM
‘America’s Foreclosure King’
How the United States Became a PR Disaster for Deutsche Bank
By Christoph Pauly and Thomas Schulz

Deutsche Bank is deeply involved in the American real estate crisis. After initially profiting from subprime mortgages, it is now arranging to have many of these homes sold at foreclosure auctions. The damage to the bank’s image in the United States is growing.

The small city of New Haven, on the Atlantic coast and home to elite Yale University, is only two hours northeast of New York City. It is a particularly beautiful place in the fall, during the warm days of Indian summer.

But this idyllic image has turned cloudy of late, with a growing number of houses in New Haven looking like the one at 130 Peck Street: vacant for months, the doors nailed shut, the yard derelict and overgrown and the last residents ejected after having lost the house in a foreclosure auction. And like 130 Peck Street, many of these homes are owned by Germany’s Deutsche Bank.

“In the last few years, Deutsche Bank has been responsible for far and away the most foreclosures here,” says Eva Heintzelman. She is the director of the ROOF Project, which addresses the consequences of the foreclosure crisis in New Haven in collaboration with the city administration. According to Heintzelman, Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank plays such a significant role in New Haven that the city’s mayor requested a meeting with bank officials last spring.

The bank complied with his request, to some degree, when, in April 2009, a Deutsche Bank executive flew to New Haven for a question-and-answer session with politicians and aid organizations. But the executive, David Co, came from California, not from Germany. Co manages the Frankfurt bank’s US real estate business at a relatively unknown branch of a relatively unknown subsidiary in Santa Ana.

How many houses was he responsible for, Co was asked? “Two thousand,” he replied. But then he corrected himself, saying that 2,000 wasn’t the number of individual properties, but the number of securities packages being managed by Deutsche Bank. Each package contains hundreds of mortgages. So how many houses are there, all told, he was asked again? Co could only guess. “Millions,” he said.

Deutsche Bank Is Considered ‘America’s Foreclosure King’

Deutsche Bank’s tracks lead through the entire American real estate market. In Chicago, the bank foreclosed upon close to 600 large apartment buildings in 2009, more than any other bank in the city. In Cleveland, almost 5,000 houses foreclosed upon by Deutsche Bank were reported to authorities between 2002 and 2006. In many US cities, the complaints are beginning to pile up from homeowners who lost their properties as a result of a foreclosure action filed by Deutsche Bank. The German bank is berated on the Internet as “America’s Foreclosure King.”

American homeowners are among the main casualties of the financial crisis that began with the collapse of the US real estate market. For years, banks issued mortgages to homebuyers without paying much attention to whether they could even afford the loans. Then they packaged the mortgage loans into complicated financial products, earning billions in the process — that is, until the bubble burst and the government had to bail out the banks.

Deutsche Bank has always acted as if it had had very little to do with the whole affair. It survived the crisis relatively unharmed and without government help. Its experts recognized early on that things could not continue as they had been going. This prompted the bank to get out of many deals in time, so that in the end it was not faced with nearly as much toxic debt as other lenders.

But it is now becoming clear just how deeply involved the institution is in the US real estate market and in the subprime mortgage business. It is quite possible that the bank will not suffer any significant financial losses, but the damage to its image is growing by the day.

‘Deutsche Bank Is Now in the Process of Destroying Milwaukee’

According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Deutsche Bank now holds loans for American single-family and multi-family houses worth about $3.7 billion (€3.1 billion). The bank, however, claims that much of this debt consists of loans to wealthy private customers.

More damaging to its image are the roughly 1 million US properties that the bank says it is managing as trustee. “Some 85 to 90 percent of all outstanding mortgages in the USA are ultimately controlled by four banks, either as trustees or owners of a trust company,” says real estate expert Steve Dibert, whose company conducts nationwide investigations into cases of mortgage fraud. “Deutsche Bank is one of the four.”

In addition, the bank put together more than 25 highly complex real estate securities deals, known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, with a value of about $20 billion, most of which collapsed. These securities were partly responsible for triggering the crisis.

Last Thursday, Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackermann was publicly confronted with the turmoil in US cities. Speaking at the bank’s shareholders’ meeting, political science professor Susan Giaimo said that while Germans were mainly responsible for building the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, “Deutsche Bank is now in the process of destroying Milwaukee.”

As Soon as the Houses Are Vacant, They Quickly Become Derelict

Then Giaimo, a petite woman with dark curls who has German forefathers, got to the point. Not a single bank, she said, owns more real estate affected by foreclosure in Milwaukee, a city the size of Frankfurt. Many of the houses, she added, have been taken over by drug dealers, while others were burned down by arsonists after it became clear that no one was taking care of them.

Besides, said Giaimo, who represents the Common Ground action group, homeowners living in the neighborhoods of these properties are forced to accept substantial declines in the value of their property. “In addition, foreclosed houses are sold to speculators for substantially less than the market value of houses in the same neighborhood,” Giaimo said. The speculators, according to Giaimo, have no interest in the individual properties and are merely betting that prices will go up in the future.

Common Ground has posted photos of many foreclosed properties on the Internet, and some of the signs in front of these houses identify Deutsche Bank as the owner. As soon as the houses are vacant, they quickly become derelict.

A Victorian house on State Street, painted green with red trim, is now partially burned down. Because it can no longer be sold, Deutsche Bank has “donated” it to the City of Milwaukee, one of the Common Ground activists reports. As a result, the city incurs the costs of demolition, which amount to “at least $25,000.”

‘We Can’t Give Away Money that Isn’t Ours’

During a recent meeting with US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, representatives of the City of Milwaukee complained about the problems that the more than 15,000 foreclosures have caused for the city since the crisis began. In a letter to the US Treasury Department, they wrote that Deutsche Bank is the only bank that has refused to meet with the city’s elected representatives.

Minneapolis-based US Bank and San Francisco-based Wells Fargo apparently took the complaints more seriously and met with the people from Common Ground. The activists’ demands sound plausible enough. They want Deutsche Bank to at least tear down those houses that can no longer be repaired at a reasonable cost. Besides, Giaimo said at the shareholders’ meeting, Deutsche Bank should contribute a portion of US government subsidies to a renovation fund. According to Giaimo, the bank collected $6 billion from the US government when it used taxpayer money to bail out credit insurer AIG.

“It’s painful to look at these houses,” Ackermann told the professor. Nevertheless, the CEO refused to accept any responsibility. Deutsche Bank, he said, is “merely a sort of depository for the mortgage documents, and our options to help out are limited.” According to Ackermann, the bank, as a trustee for other investors, is not even the actual owner of the properties, and therefore can do nothing. Besides, Ackermann said, his bank didn’t promote mortgage loans with terms that have now made the payments unaffordable for many families.

The activists from Wisconsin did, however, manage to take home a small victory. Ackermann instructed members of his staff to meet with Common Ground. He apparently envisions a relatively informal and noncommittal meeting. “We can’t give away money that isn’t ours,” he added.

Deutsche Bank’s Role in the High-Risk Loans Boom

Apparently Ackermann also has no intention to part with even a small portion of the profits the bank earned in the real estate business. Deutsche Bank didn’t just act as a trustee that — coincidentally, it seems — manages countless pieces of real estate on behalf of other investors. In the wild years between 2005 and 2007, the bank also played a central role in the profitable boom in high-risk mortgages that were marketed to people in ways that were downright negligent.

Of course, its bankers didn’t get their hands dirty by going door-to-door to convince people to apply for mortgages they couldn’t afford. But they did provide the distribution organizations with the necessary capital.

The Countrywide Financial Corporation, which approved risky mortgages for $97.2 billion from 2005 to 2007, was the biggest provider of these mortgages in the United States. According to the study by the Center for Public Integrity, a nonprofit investigative journalism organization, Deutsche Bank was one of Countrywide’s biggest financiers.

Ameriquest — which, with $80.7 billion in high-risk loans on its books in the three boom years before the crash, was the second-largest subprime specialist — also had strong ties to Deutsche Bank. The investment bankers placed the mortgages on the international capital market by bundling and structuring them into securities. This enabled them to distribute the risks around the entire globe, some of which ended up with Germany’s state-owned banks.

‘Deutsche Bank Has a Real PR Problem Here’

After the crisis erupted, there were so many mortgages in default in 25 CDOs that most of the investors could no longer be serviced. Some CDOs went bankrupt right away, while others were gradually liquidated, either in full or in part. The securities that had been placed on the market were underwritten by loans worth $20 billion.

At the end of 2006, for example, Deutsche Bank constructed a particularly complex security known as a hybrid CDO. It was named Barramundi, after the Indo-Pacific hermaphrodite fish that lives in muddy water. And the composition of the deal, which was worth $800 million, was muddy indeed. Many securities that were already arcane enough, like credit default swaps (CDSs) and CDOs, were packaged into an even more complex entity in Barramundi.

Deutsche Bank’s partner for the Barramundi deal was the New York investment firm C-BASS, which referred to itself as “a leader in purchasing and servicing residential mortgage loans primarily in the Subprime and Alt-A categories.” In plain language, C-BASS specialized in drumming up and marketing subprime mortgages for complex financial vehicles.

However, C-BASS didn’t just manage abstract securities. It also had a subsidiary to bring in all the loans that were subsequently securitized. By the end of 2005 the subsidiary, Litton Loan, had processed 313,938 loans, most of them low-value mortgages, for a total value of $43 billion.

One of the First Victims of the Financial Crisis

Barramundi was already the 19th CDO C-BASS had issued. But the investment firm faltered only a few months after the deal with Deutsche Bank, in the summer of 2007. C-BASS was one of the first casualties of the financial crisis.

Deutsche Bank’s CDO, Barramundi, suffered a similar fate. Originally given the highest possible rating by the rating agencies, the financial vehicle stuffed with subprime mortgages quickly fell apart. In the spring of 2008, Barramundi was first downgraded to “highly risky” and then, in December, to junk status. Finally, in March 2009, Barramundi failed and had to be liquidated. (EDITOR’S NOTE: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE LOANS?)

While many investors lost their money and many Americans their houses, Deutsche Bank and Litton Loan remained largely unscathed. Apparently, the Frankfurt bank still has a healthy business relationship with the subprime mortgage manager, because Deutsche Bank does not play a direct role in any of the countless pieces of real estate it holds in trust. Other service providers, including Litton Loan, handle tasks like collecting mortgage payments and evicting delinquent borrowers.

The exotic financial vehicles are sometimes managed by an equally exotic firm: Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited, Boundary Hall, Cricket Square, Grand Cayman. In an e-mail dated Feb. 26, 2010, a Deutsche Bank employee from the Cayman Islands lists 84 CDOs and similar products, for which she identifies herself as the relevant contact person.

Trouble with US Regulatory Authorities and Many Property Owners

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is now investigating Deutsche Bank and a few other investment banks that constructed similar CDOs. The financial regulator is looking into whether investors in these obscure products were deceived. The SEC has been particularly critical of US investment bank Goldman Sachs, which is apparently willing to pay a record fine of $1 billion to avoid criminal prosecution.

Deutsche Bank has also run into problems with the many property owners. The bank did not issue the mortgages for the many properties it now manages, and yet it accepted, on behalf of investors, the fiduciary function for its own and third-party CDOs. In past years, says mortgage expert Steve Dibert, real estate loans were “traded like football cards” in the United States.

Amid all the deal-making, the deeds for the actual properties were often lost. In Cleveland and New Jersey, for example, judges invalidated foreclosures ordered by Deutsche Bank, because the bank was unable to come up with the relevant deeds.

Nevertheless, Deutsche Bank’s service providers repeatedly try to have houses vacated, even when they are already occupied by new owners who are paying their mortgages. This practice has led to nationwide lawsuits against the Frankfurt-based bank. On the Internet, angry Americans fighting to keep their houses have taken to using foul language to berate the German bank.

“Deutsche Bank now has a real PR problem here in the United States,” says Dibert. “They want to bury their head in the sand, but this is something they are going to have to deal with.”

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

INVESTORS SUE FOR INFLATED HOME APPRAISALS, WHY DON’T YOU?

The model concluded that roughly one-third of the loans were for amounts that were 105 percent or more of the underlying property’s value. Roughly 5.5 percent of the loans in the pools had appraisals that were lower than they should have been.

In one pool with 3,543 loans, for example, the CoreLogic model had enough information to evaluate 2,097 loans. Of those, it determined that 1,114 mortgages — or more than half — had loan-to-value ratios of 105 percent or more. The valuations on those properties exceeded their true market value by $65 million,

EDITOR’S NOTE:  POINTS TO BE MADE:

  • Investors’ are proving the case for appraisal fraud, aligning themselves with borrowers. They are doing the borrower’s work. Get yourself copies of these complaints, discovery etc., send them to me and use them in your own case.
  • The little guy is starting to get attention. The court’s are getting the point that these loans were fraudulent. In my surveys I have found that appraisal fraud accounts for nearly all the loans 2003-2008, and that the amount of the fraud was a s much as 150% in some cases with an average of around 35%. The moment you closed, whatever down payment you made was lost and you were underwater.
  • The obligation to present a proper appraisal is on the lender not the borrower.
  • Just like the investors, borrowers were deprived of vital information about their loan that would have prevented any reasonable person from closing. Thus whether the Court’s like it or not, rescission, is a proper remedy, if not under TILA then under fraud statues and common law doctrines of fraud. Combine that with damages available, and the prospect of getting loan reduction and adjustment of loan terms comes into clearer view.
  • THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INVESTOR’S ADVANCE OF FUNDS AND THE HOME APPRAISAL IS PRESUMED AND ALLEGED. THUS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE INVESTOR WAS THE CREDITOR AND THE BORROWER IS THE DEBTOR IS CORROBORATED BY THE PLEADINGS OF THE INVESTORS.
June 18, 2010

The Inflatable Loan Pool

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

AMID the legal battles between investors who lost money in mortgage securities and the investment banks that sold the stuff, one thing seems clear: the investment banks appear to be winning a good many of the early skirmishes.

But some cases are faring better for individual plaintiffs, with judges allowing them to proceed even as banks ask that they be dismissed. Still, these matters are hard to litigate because investors must persuade the judges overseeing them that their losses were not simply a result of a market crash. Investors must argue, convincingly, that the banks misrepresented the quality of the loans in the pools and made material misstatements about them in prospectuses provided to buyers.

Recent filings by two Federal Home Loan Banks — in San Francisco and Seattle — offer an intriguing way to clear this high hurdle. Lawyers representing the banks, which bought mortgage securities, combed through the loan pools looking for discrepancies between actual loan characteristics and how they were pitched to investors.

You may not be shocked to learn that the analysis found significant differences between what the Home Loan Banks were told about these securities and what they were sold.

The rate of discrepancies in these pools is surprising. The lawsuits contend that half the loans were inaccurately described in disclosure materials filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

These findings are compelling because they involve some 525,000 mortgage loans in 156 pools sold by 10 investment banks from 2005 through 2007. And because the research was conducted using a valuation model devised by CoreLogic, an information analytics company that is a trusted source for mortgage loan data, the conclusions are even more credible.

The analysis used CoreLogic’s valuation model, called VP4, which is used by many in the mortgage industry to verify accuracy of property appraisals. It homed in on loan-to-value ratios, a crucial measure in predicting defaults.

An overwhelming majority of the loan-to-value ratios stated in the securities’ prospectuses used appraisals, court documents say. Investors rely on the ratios because it is well known that the higher the loan relative to an underlying property’s appraised value, the more likely the borrower will walk away when financial troubles arise.

By back-testing the loans using the CoreLogic model from the time the mortgage securities were originated, the analysis compared those values with the loans’ appraised values as stated in prospectuses. Then the analysts reassessed the weighted average loan-to-value ratios of the pools’ mortgages.

The model concluded that roughly one-third of the loans were for amounts that were 105 percent or more of the underlying property’s value. Roughly 5.5 percent of the loans in the pools had appraisals that were lower than they should have been.

That means inflated appraisals were involved in six times as many loans as were understated appraisals.

David J. Grais, a lawyer at Grais & Ellsworth in New York, represents the Home Loan Banks in the lawsuits. “The information in these complaints shows that the disclosure documents for these securities did not describe the collateral accurately,” Mr. Grais said last week. “Courts have shown great interest in loan-by-loan and trust-by-trust information in cases like these. We think these complaints will satisfy that interest.”

The banks are requesting that the firms that sold the securities repurchase them. The San Francisco Home Loan Bank paid $19 billion for the mortgage securities covered by the lawsuit, and the Seattle Home Loan Bank paid $4 billion. It is unclear how much the banks would get if they won their suits.

Among the 10 defendants in the cases are Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch, Countrywide and UBS. None of these banks would comment.

As outlined in the San Francisco Bank’s amended complaint, it did not receive detailed data about the loans in the securities it purchased. Instead, the complaint says, the banks used the loan data to compile statistics about the loans, which were then presented to potential investors. These disclosures were misleading, the San Francisco Bank contends.

In one pool with 3,543 loans, for example, the CoreLogic model had enough information to evaluate 2,097 loans. Of those, it determined that 1,114 mortgages — or more than half — had loan-to-value ratios of 105 percent or more. The valuations on those properties exceeded their true market value by $65 million, the complaint contends.

The selling document for that pool said that all of the mortgages had loan-to-value ratios of 100 percent or less, the complaint said. But the CoreLogic analysis identified 169 loans with ratios over 100 percent. The pool prospectus also stated that the weighted average loan-to-value ratio of mortgages in the portion of the security purchased by Home Loan Bank was 69.5 percent. But the loans the CoreLogic model valued had an average ratio of almost 77 percent.

IT is unclear, of course, how these court cases will turn out. But it certainly is true that the more investors dig, the more they learn how freewheeling the Wall Street mortgage machine was back in the day. Each bit of evidence clearly points to the same lesson: investors must have access to loan details, and the time to analyze them, before they are likely to want to invest in these kinds of securities again.

Investigation Highlights Challenges to Foreclosure Docs

Got this off the “Mortgage Servicing News” newsletter:
June 16, 2010
Investigation Highlights Challenges to Foreclosure Docs

By Kate Berry

The backlash is intensifying against banks and mortgage servicers that try to foreclose on homes without all their ducks in a row.

Because the notes were often sold and resold during the boom years, many financial companies lost track of the documents. Now, legal officials are accusing companies of forging the documents needed to reclaim the properties.

Recently, the Florida Attorney General’s Office said it was investigating the use of “bogus assignment” documents by Lender Processing Services Inc. and its former parent, Fidelity National Financial Inc. And a state judge in Florida has ordered a hearing to determine whether M&T Bank Corp. should be charged with fraud after it changed the assignment of a mortgage note for one borrower three separate times.

“Mortgage assignments are being created out of whole cloth just for the purposes of showing a transfer from one entity to another,” said James Kowalski Jr., an attorney in Jacksonville, Fla., who represents the borrower in the M&T case.

“Banks got away from very basic banking rules because they securitized millions of loans and moved them so quickly,” Kowalski said.

In many cases, Kowalski said, it has become impossible to establish when a mortgage was sold, and to whom, so the servicers are trying to recreate the paperwork, right down to the stamps that financial companies use to verify when a note has changed hands.

Some mortgage processors are “simply ordering stamps from stamp makers,” he said, and are “using those as proof of mortgage assignments after the fact.”

Such alleged practices are now generating ire from the bench.

“The court has been misled by the plaintiff from the beginning,” Circuit Court Judge J. Michael Traynor said in a motion dismissing M&T’s foreclosure action with prejudice and ordering the hearing.

The Marshall Watson law firm in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., which represents M&T in the case, declined to comment and the bank said it could not comment.

In a notice on its website, the Florida attorney general said it is examining whether Docx, an Alpharetta, Ga., unit of Lender Processing Services, forged documents so foreclosures could be processed more quickly.

“These documents are used in court cases as ‘real’ documents of assignment and presented to the court as so, when it actually appears that they are fabricated in order to meet the demands of the institution that does not, in fact, have the necessary documentation to foreclose according to law,” the notice said.

Docx is the largest lien release processor in the United States working on behalf of banks and mortgage lenders.

Peter Sadowski, an executive vice president and general counsel at Fidelity National in Fort Lauderdale, said that more than a year ago his company began requiring that its clients provide all paperwork before the company would process title claims.

Lender Processing Services, which was spun off from Fidelity National two years ago, did not return calls seeking comment Tuesday. The company disclosed in its annual report in February that federal prosecutors were reviewing the business processes of Docx. The company said it was cooperating with the investigators.

“This is systemic,” said April Charney, a senior staff attorney at Jacksonville Area Legal Aid and a member of the Florida Supreme Court’s foreclosure task force.

“Banks can’t show ownership for many of these securitized loans,” Charney continued. “I call them empty-sack trusts, because in the rush to securitize, the originating lender failed to check the paper trail and now they can’t collect.”

In Florida, Georgia, Maryland and other states where the foreclosure process must be handled through the courts, hundreds of borrowers have challenged lenders’ rights to take their homes. Some judges have invalidated mortgages, giving properties back to borrowers while lenders appeal.

In February, the Florida state Supreme Court set a new standard stipulating that before foreclosing, a lender had to verify it had all the proper documents. Lenders that cannot produce such papers can be fined for perjury, the court said.

Kowalski said the bigger problem is that mortgage servicers are working “in a vacuum,” handing out foreclosure assignments to third-party firms such as LPS and Fidelity.

“There’s no meeting to get everybody together and make sure they have their ducks in a row to comply with these very basic rules that banks set up many years ago,” Kowalski said. “The disconnect occurs not just between units within the banks, but among the servicers, their bank clients and the lawyers.”

He said the banking industry is “being misserved,” because mortgage servicers and the lawyers they hire to represent them in foreclosure proceedings are not prepared.

“We’re tarring banks that might obviously do a decent job, and the banks are complicit because they hired the servicers,” Kowalski said.

TBW Taylor Bean Chairman Arrested On Fraud Charges

“The fraud here is truly stunning in its scale and complexity,” said Lanny A. Breuer, assistant attorney general in the criminal division of the Department of Justice. “These charges send a strong message to corporations and corporate executives alike that financial fraud will be found, and it will be prosecuted.”

Once they determined that that approach might be difficult to conceal, they started selling mortgage pools and other assets to Colonial Bank that they knew to be worthless, officials said. Mr. Farkas and his partners relied on this technique to sell more than $1 billion of fraudulent assets over the course of several years, even covering up the fraud by recycling old fake assets for new ones, according to the complaints.

Editor’s Note: TBW has been high on my list of incompetent fraudsters. I always thought it was a stupid risk to “sell” mortgages and “sell” the servicing rights (probably to their own entity), and then take the servicing back. Stupid maybe, but they had no choice. The entire Taylor Bean operation wreaks of fraud and inconsistencies.

Bottom Line: If you have a TBW as the originating “lender” this article indicates, as we have known all along, that they were using OPM (Other People’s Money) and they were NOT the lender even though they said they were. It is highly likely that few, if any, of the loans were actually “securitized” because the loans were either nonexistent as described, never accepted by any pool (even though there might be a pool out there that claims ownership) and that none of the assignments were ever completed.

Thus your claims against TBW (including appraisal fraud, predatory loan practices, deceptive loan practices, fraud etc.) are properly directed, to wit: TBW still owns the paper, although the obligation is subject to an equitable unsecured claim from investors who funded the loan.

June 16, 2010

Executive Charged in TARP Scheme

By ERIC DASH

Federal prosecutors on Wednesday accused the former chairman of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, once one of the nation’s largest mortgage lenders, of masterminding a fraud scheme that cheated investors and the federal government out of billions of dollars and led to last year’s sudden failure of Colonial Bank.

The executive, Lee B. Farkas, was arrested late Tuesday in Ocala, Fla., after a federal grand jury in Virginia indicted him on 16 counts of conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud. Separately, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought civil fraud charges against Mr. Farkas in a lawsuit filed on Wednesday.

Prosecutors said the fraud would be one of the biggest and most complex to come out of the housing collapse and the government’s huge bailout of the banking industry. In essence, they described an elaborate shell game that involved covering up the lender’s losses by creating fake mortgages and passing them along to private investors and government agencies.

Federal officials became suspicious after Colonial BancGroup, the main source of financing for Mr. Farkas’s company, tried to obtain $553 million in bailout money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The TARP application, filed in early 2009, was contingent on the bank first raising $300 million from private investors.

According to the S.E.C. complaint, Mr. Farkas and his partners said they would contribute $150 million, two private equity firms would each contribute $50 million, and a “friends and family” investor group would contribute another $50 million. “In truth, neither of the $50 million investors were private equity investors and neither ever agreed to participate,” the complaint said.

Mr. Farkas pocketed at least $20 million from the fraud, which he used to finance a private jet and a lavish lifestyle that included five homes and a collection of vintage cars, prosecutors said.

But the case is likely to expand beyond Mr. Farkas. The complaints cite the involvement of an unnamed Colonial Bank executive and other co-conspirators in the suspected fraud, and prosecutors said they might hold others accountable down the road.

“The fraud here is truly stunning in its scale and complexity,” said Lanny A. Breuer, assistant attorney general in the criminal division of the Department of Justice. “These charges send a strong message to corporations and corporate executives alike that financial fraud will be found, and it will be prosecuted.”

Officials said the many layers of the scheme resulted in more than $1.9 billion of losses to investors; a $3 billion loss to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which guaranteed many of the loans that Mr. Farkas’s company sold; and a $3.6 billion hit to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which had to take over Colonial Bank and pay its depositors after many of the bank’s assets were found to be worthless.

The complaints also list BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank, which provided financing to Mr. Farkas’s company, as victims of the suspected fraud. Together, they lost $1.5 billion.

According to the complaints, the fraud started as early as 2002 with an effort to conceal rising operating losses at Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, a mortgage lender founded by Mr. Farkas. The first stage involved an attempt to hide overdrafts on a credit line the company had with Colonial Bank. As those overdrafts grew, prosecutors contend, Mr. Farkas and his associates started selling fake mortgage assets to Colonial Bank in exchange for tens of millions of dollars.

Once they determined that that approach might be difficult to conceal, they started selling mortgage pools and other assets to Colonial Bank that they knew to be worthless, officials said. Mr. Farkas and his partners relied on this technique to sell more than $1 billion of fraudulent assets over the course of several years, even covering up the fraud by recycling old fake assets for new ones, according to the complaints.

The transactions were “designed to give the false appearance that the loans were being sold into the secondary mortgage market,” Mr. Breuer said. “In fact, they were not.”

By 2008, prosecutors contend, the scheme had entangled the federal government. Investigators in the Office of the Special Inspector General for TARP took notice of the size of Colonial Bank’s bailout application and became suspicious of the accuracy of the bank’s statements.

That led investigators to alert other federal officials and draw a connection between Colonial Bank and Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, whose offices were raided by federal agents in August 2009. Both companies would soon stop operating.

“We knew it was a longstanding and close relationship between Colonial and T.B.W., and we decided that we needed to take a much closer look,” Neil M. Barofsky, the TARP special inspector general, said at a news conference on Wednesday. Investigators also discussed the situation with Treasury officials to “make sure the money would not go out the door.”

Federal officials have conducted nearly 80 criminal and civil investigations into companies that accepted TARP money, but so far they have filed charges in only one other case. In March, the head of Park Avenue Bank in Manhattan was accused of trying to defraud the government bailout program.

Deutsch Bank: Peeling back the layers

submitted by Raja

Investor /Trustee on MERS Record

Please use this small sentence for these thieves who have multi roles,
“”You cannot be a Trustee or investor or own the note, lest it become a partnership with the certificate holders”

FOR ALL THOSE WHO HAVE DEUTSCHE BANK.
a). Investor and Trustee as per MERS member Org. ID # 1001425. Deutsche Bank cannot be a trustee and investor. If it has both then it has a partnership with the Certificate holders.
b).. Interim Funder and Trustee as per MERS member Org, ID # 1002959
c). Document Custodian, Trustee and Collateral Agent as per MERS member Org. ID # 1000649
d). Investor and Trustee as per MERS member ORG. ID # 1001426
e). Servicer, Subservicers, Investor, Document Custodian, Trustee, Collateral Agent as per MERS member Org. ID # 1000648

The address of Deutsche Bank from “ a-e” above is the same 1761 East St. Andrew Pl. Santa Ana CA 92705-4934

Deutsche Bank is also acting under the various layers 424(b) (5) Prospectus, Pooling & Servicing Agreement (PSA) filed by the THIEVES with the SEC.of Trustees, without any specific description, where One Trustee ends and other Trustee Begins. It is classic obfuscation and musical chairs Note that Deutsche Bank is identified “as trustee” but the usual language of “under the terms of that certain trust dated….etc” are absent. This is because there usually is NO TRUST AGREEMENT designated as such and NO TRUST. In fact, as stated here it is merely an agreement between the co-issuers and Deutsche Bank, which it means that far from being a trust it is more like the operating agreement of an LLC)

DEUTSCHE BANK cannot be a Trustee or investor or own the note, less, it becomes a partnership with the certificate holders(Who bought the certificates and invested money).

Finally, Borrowers Score Points

“The court certainly agrees that ‘mistakes happen,’ ” Judge Bohm wrote. “However, when mistakes happen not once, not twice, but repeatedly, and when actions are not taken to correct these mistakes within a reasonable period of time, the failure to right the wrong — particularly when the basis for the problem is a months-long violation of an agreed judgment — the excuse of ‘mistakes happen’ has no credence.”

Judge Bohm also punted Wells’s claim that its problems with the couple were anomalies. He cited three other federal cases — one in Florida and two in Louisiana — in which Wells improperly collected money from borrowers, applied payments inappropriately, overcharged borrowers or failed to keep accurate records. The judge imposed $11,825 in fines on Wells and required it to pay $4,544 in lawyer’s fees to the De La Fuentes.

Editor’s Note: Finally the ship is turning. Virtually every day I receive another trial court ruling or appellate decision that recognizes the fraudulent predatory practices of the nations largest financial institutions.

Whether it is fines, contempt, damages, title, striking pleadings, or just plain fury directed at these heretofore venerable institutions, one by one, Judges are starting to scrutinize what had been a ministerial clerk-like function of approving foreclosure. One by one they are seeing outright fraud — not just at the time of closing but during servicing, during foreclosure, and even during bankruptcy.

Lawyers who are making money hand over fist advocating for these institutions best be careful that their ankle-biting clients will point the finger at them and claim an “advice of counsel” defense. Law firms that have increased their profits a hundred fold by bringing document fabrication and forgery “in-house” are now up for criminal investigations, indictment, conviction and prison.

Pretender lenders who have been in a non-stop feeding frenzy for years are now seeing the walls close in around them. And the political capital they thought they had purchased on capital hill has depreciated. That is why they are concentrating their lobbying dollars on state legislatures.

At bottom is the sickening awareness that our nation’s finance companies betrayed the country and the world. This was not just fraud on the investors who bought mortgage backed securities and the homeowners who bought unworkable, incomprehensible loan products.

It was fraud upon the country and it worked. Instead of seeing the great wrong perpetrated upon 20 million homeowners and 300 million taxpayers, instead of seeing the storm and the victims for what it was, our leaders and our neighbors were convinced that the victims were to blame. That one assumption magnified the  loss and prevented a robust recovery.

Most of all it prevented justice.

Nobody would argue that a victim of fraud has rights in court. If the fraud is proven, then the object of the decision should be to restore the victims to the position they had before the fraud was committed.

Nobody would argue that if the crime was egregious against society that punitive damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages and jail should be the punishment.

Somehow this simple proposition that we all believe in has been turned on its head through the purchasing of favors in legislatures. The last bastion left to protect the country from a continuation of fraud in the courts and a perpetuation of fraud upon innocent victims is the judiciary. They are starting to get it right. Let’s hope it stays that way.

June 11, 2010

Finally, Borrowers Score Points

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

WHILE the wheels of justice have turned very slowly in the years since our nation’s financiers and regulators nearly cratered our economy, the Federal Trade Commission’s settlement last Monday with Countrywide Home Loans suggests that they haven’t entirely ground to a halt.

Countrywide, now a unit of Bank of America, was once led by Angelo Mozilo and was the nation’s largest mortgage lender in the glorious, pre-crisis days of the housing boom. But it was also a predatory institution, and the F.T.C., citing Countrywide’s serial abuse of troubled borrowers, extracted a $108 million fine from Bank of America last week.

That money will go back to some 200,000 customers whom Countrywide forced to pay outsized fees for foreclosure services. These included billing a borrower $300 to have a property’s lawn mowed and levying $2,500 in trustees’ fees on another borrower, when the going rate for that service was about $600.

Though Countrywide’s mortgage contracts specifically barred such practices, they served the company well by generating income during downturns when it was harder to keep making money off new mortgages. This “counter-cyclical diversification strategy,” as Countrywide called it, was designed to “extract the last dollar out of the pockets of the most desperate consumers,” said Jon Leibowitz, the F.T.C. chairman.

Mr. Leibowitz also said Countrywide made bogus claims about what homeowners owed during the resolution of bankruptcy cases and added fees to borrowers’ obligations without notice. His office’s investigation turned up cases in which Countrywide tried to collect improper fees years after a bankruptcy case was over.

In some cases, Mr. Leibowitz said, even after a distressed homeowner became up-to-date on all of his or her payments, Countrywide would start another foreclosure proceeding against the same borrower.

PRETTY shameful, all in all. But nothing new to lawyers who represent troubled borrowers. They say these kinds of abuses still occur.

“We’ve been screaming about these practices for I don’t know how many years now,” said David B. Shaev, a lawyer in New York City who represents consumers. “A lot of the fees seem like nickel-and-dime charges, but they add up to big money. The $108 million in the Countrywide case is the tip of the iceberg.”

The other dubious Countrywide actions identified by the F.T.C. — pursuing foreclosure improperly, adding fees without notice — also sound familiar to consumer lawyers across the country.

Consider a recent federal bankruptcy case in Houston involving Wells Fargo. The facts of the case were outlined last month in a harsh contempt ruling against the bank by Judge Jeff Bohm.

Back in 2003, Antoinette and Lenord De La Fuente filed for bankruptcy protection after they fell behind on their Washington Mutual mortgage. Court filings show they proposed a restructuring plan that called for 60 monthly payments to the bankruptcy trustee, who would in turn distribute the money to their creditors. The bankruptcy court agreed to the couple’s plan in June 2004.

The couple dutifully made their payments. Wells Fargo took over their loan in June 2007 and the next January sent the couple a letter accusing them of being delinquent by $8,400. Wells told them that they had until mid-February to come up with the money or the bank would start foreclosure proceedings.

The court documents show that the borrowers tried unsuccessfully to argue that Wells was wrong. But Wells refused to back down; afraid they would lose their home, the couple struck a forbearance agreement and received a loan modification in April 2008.

This loan modification violated the borrowers’ repayment plan. “Wells Fargo frightened the De La Fuentes into making payments to Wells Fargo in violation of the confirmation order,” Judge Bohm wrote.

In June 2008, the couple hired a lawyer to investigate the dispute with Wells; they filed a lawsuit against the bank that August. About a year later, Wells offered to settle with the couple. In a court-approved settlement, Wells stated that the couple were indeed current on their $66,572 mortgage and owed no outstanding fees or charges. Wells agreed to pay the couple about $30,000 for their legal fees.

With that, the couple thought their problem with Wells had been solved.

But in November 2009, Wells told them their mortgage balance had mysteriously increased to almost $71,000, even though they had made all of their payments. Two months later, Mrs. De La Fuente noticed that Wells had reversed several of the mortgage payments she and her husband had made. When she asked Wells why, she was told her loan was in bankruptcy status; if she wanted to resolve the problem, she would have to pay almost $9,000. Late fees were also accruing.

The couple and their lawyer went back to court and accused Wells of violating the settlement agreement. After hearing testimony, the court agreed. It also didn’t buy the argument of Wells that errors, including a computer glitch, caused the couple’s problems.

“The court certainly agrees that ‘mistakes happen,’ ” Judge Bohm wrote. “However, when mistakes happen not once, not twice, but repeatedly, and when actions are not taken to correct these mistakes within a reasonable period of time, the failure to right the wrong — particularly when the basis for the problem is a months-long violation of an agreed judgment — the excuse of ‘mistakes happen’ has no credence.”

Judge Bohm also punted Wells’s claim that its problems with the couple were anomalies. He cited three other federal cases — one in Florida and two in Louisiana — in which Wells improperly collected money from borrowers, applied payments inappropriately, overcharged borrowers or failed to keep accurate records. The judge imposed $11,825 in fines on Wells and required it to pay $4,544 in lawyer’s fees to the De La Fuentes.

Teri Schrettenbrunner, a Wells Fargo spokeswoman, said, “There is no doubt here that we didn’t handle this case well, but it is rare that you see a confluence of this many errors coming together as you did on this case.”

She contended that a vast majority of Wells’s mortgage customers are satisfied with it and that its operations are nothing like Countrywide’s. “There are significant contrasts between the way Countrywide did business and the way we do business,” she said.

NEVERTHELESS, for imperiled borrowers, the new scrutiny on foreclosure practices is long overdue. Thankfully, the United States Trustee, the Department of Justice unit that oversees the nation’s bankruptcy courts, is also investigating possible improprieties among lenders, mortgage servicers and the law firms that represent them in bankruptcy cases against homeowners. The trustee’s office assisted the F.T.C. in the Countrywide matter.

It’s a slow process, to be sure. But at least it is proceeding.

More Investors Are Suing Chase: Cheer them on!

Submitted by Beth Findsen, Esq. in Scottsdale, Az

Investors-suing-Chase-includes-list-of-mortgage-backed-securities-various-originators-like-New-Century-WAMU-Wells-Fargo-ResMae-Greenpoint-Coun

One of the many things I find interesting in this lawsuit is that FINALLY the pretender lenders are at least being referred to as originators and not banks, lenders or any of the other things that had most people believing.

Here too investors sue the rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P, Fitch paving the way for borrowers to make virtually the same allegations against the appraisers and the pretender lender who hired the appraiser.

The only thing left for the investors is to realize that the only way they are actually going to mitigate losses is by creating an entity that negotiates modifications directly with borrowers. Otherwise these intermediaries in the securitization chain are going to continue cleaning their clocks.


Here are some morsels you too might find interesting

7. The true facts that were misstated in or omitted from the Offering Documents
include:
(1) The Originators systematically disregarded their stated underwriting
standards when issuing loans to borrowers;
(2) The underlying mortgages were based on appraisals that overstated the
value of the underlying properties and understated the loan-to-value ratios
of the Mortgage Loans;
(3) The Certificates’ credit enhancement features were insufficient to protect
Certificate holders from losses because the underwriting deficiencies
rendered the Mortgage Loans far less valuable than disclosed and the
credit enhancement features were primarily the product of the Rating
Agencies’ outdated models. As such, the level of credit enhancement
necessary for the Certificates’ risk to correspond to the pre-determined
credit ratings was far less than necessary; and
(4) The Rating Agencies employed outdated assumptions, relaxed ratings
criteria, and relied on inaccurate loan information when rating the
Certificates. S&P’s models had not been materially updated since 1999
and Moody’s models had not been materially updated since 2002. These
outdated models failed to account for the drastic changes in the type of
loans backing the Certificates and the Originators’ systemic disregard for their underwriting standards. Furthermore, the Rating Agencies had conflicts of interest when rating the Certificates.
8. As a result, Lead Plaintiff and the Class purchased Certificates that were backed by collateral (i.e., the Mortgage Loans) that was much less valuable and which posed greater risk of default than represented, were not of the “best quality” and were not equivalent to other investments with the same credit ratings. Contrary to representations in the Offering Documents, the Certificates exposed purchasers to increased risk with respect to delinquencies, foreclosures and other forms of default on the Mortgage Loans.

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