US Bank Business: Rent-A-Name, Trustee

IF THE SERVICER IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH US BANK “IN ANY WAY” THEN EITHER US BANK HAS NO TRUST DUTIES OR THE SERVICER HAS NO SERVICING AUTHORITY

BOTTOM LINE: A trust without a trustee holding fiduciary duties and actual powers over trust assets is no trust at all. This signals corroboration for what is now well known in the public domain: the REMIC trustee has no powers or duties because there is no trust and there are no trust assets.

See below for why I am re-publishing this article.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Until now I knew about a letter sent out by US Bank until the TBTF banks in control of the mortgage mess realized that this was a dangerous letter. It provides proof and corroboration and opportunities for further corroboration that US Bank is a fictitious trustee even when named in a PSA/Trust.

I can’t give you a copy of the actual letter as that contains private information. But I now physically have in my possession of the wild card letter sent out by US Bank filled with factual misstatement, legal absurdities, fraud, and admissions against interest that show clearly that the  entire “securitization” game is but a rotating cloud of existing and non-existing entities blinking in and out such that finding the those in charge becomes impossible to detect.

The text in blue are direct unedited quotes from the letter answering a homeowner, in 2013, who was trying to figure out who is in charge. This is a short letter and the quotes essentially make up virtually the entire letter. They are not taken out of context. The rest are my comment and opinions.

NOTE: [FORECLOSURE BY PARTY CLAIMING TO BE THE CREDITOR OR HOLDER OR OWNER WITHOUT MENTION OF TRUST;]Where the Master Servicer or a subsidiary or affiliate of the Master Servicer names itself as Plaintiff (i.e., the foreclosing party) you may not realize that you are dealing with a securitization plan that went bad or was reconstituted, but either way the Master Servicer never funded (i. e., was the source) any loans within this class of loans that were falsely represented to be subject to claims of securitization. The goal is the same because internally the Master Servicer is attempting to seal the illegal record with a legal act or judgment and is attempting to get its hands on mislabeled “servicer advances.”

Here are the quotes (in blue0 from the letter with commentary (in black):

  • I have researched your mortgage and have determined that
    • Since he disclaims any authority or responsibility for the trust assets, what “research” did he perform?
    • Where did he get his information from when the authority and responsibility for the loans rests with a third party?
    • US Bank clearly could not have business records unless the Master Servicer was reporting to the NAMED Trustee. But we know that isn’t happening because the PSA expressly prevents the beneficiaries or the trustee from getting any information about the trust assets or in even seeking such information. 
    • This letter is clearly a carefully worded document to give false impressions.
    • Upon reading the PSAs it is obvious that neither the Trustee nor the beneficiaries have any permitted access to know how the money or assets is being managed
    • This opens the door to moral hazard: i.e., that the sole source of information is coming from third parties and thus neither the beneficiaries nor the putative “borrowers” have any information disclosed about who is actually performing which task. 
    • This could be concealment fraud in which the direct victims are the investors and the indirect victims are the homeowners.
  • US Bank is merely the Trustee for the pool of mortgages in which your loans sits.
    • “Merely the Trustee” is non descriptive language that essentially disclaims any actual authority or duties. It is apparently conceding that it is “merely” named as Trustee but the actual duties and authority rests elsewhere.
  • The Trustee does not have the authority to make any decisions regarding your mortgage loans.
    • So we have a Trustee with no powers over mortgage loans even if the “loans” were in a pool in which ownership was ascribed to the Trust. Again the statement does not specifically disclaim any DUTIES. 
  • The servicer is the party to the trust that has the authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding individual mortgage loans in the trust. It is the Servicer who has taken all action regarding your property.
    • “all action” would include the origination of the loan if the investors’ money was being used to originate loans rather than buying existing loans.
    • This statement concedes that it is the servicer (actually the Master servicer) that has all power and all responsibility for administration of the trust assets. 
    • In short he is probably conceding that while US Bank is NAMED as Trustee, the ROLE of Trustee is being performed by the Master Servicer, without any information or feedback to the named Trustee as a check on whether a fiduciary duty has been created between the Master Servicer and the trust or the Master Servicer and the trust beneficiaries. 
    • Hence the actual authority and duties with respect to the trust assets lies with the Master Servicer who hires subservicers to do whatever work is required, mainly enforcement of the note and mortgage, regardless of whether the loan ever made it into the Trust. 
    • It follows that the sole discretion of the Master Servicer creates an opportunity for the Master Servicer to gain illicit profits by handling or mishandling originations, foreclosures and liquidations of property. Taking fictitious servicer advances into account it is readily apparent that the sole basis for foreclosure instead of workouts is to “recover” money for which the Master Servicer never had a claim for recovery. 
      • Reporting in actuality is nonexistent except for the reports of “borrower payments” which are massaged through multiple subservicers each performing a “boarding process” in which in actuality they merely input new data into the subservicer system and claim it came from the old subservicer.
      • This “boarding process” is a charade as we have seen in the majority of cases where the knowledge and history of the payments and alleged delinquency or default has been challenged. In nearly all cases despite the initial representation from the robo-witness, it becomes increasingly apparent that neither the witness nor his company, the subservicer, have any original data nor have they performed any reviews to determine if the data is accurate.
      • In fact, upon inquiry it is readily apparent now that the “records” are created, kept and maintained by LPS/BlackKnight who merely assigns “ownership” of the records from one assigned subservicer to the next. LPS fabricates whatever data is necessary to allow an appointed “Plaintiff” to foreclose, including the fabrication adnfoqgery of documents.
        • This is why the parties to the 50 state settlement do not perform the reviews required under the settlement and under the Dodd-Frank law: they have no records to review. 
    • in this case the current subservicer is SLS — Specialized Loan Servicing LLC
  • While US Bank understands and wishes to assist you with this matter, the servicer is the only party with the authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding your mortgage and they are not affiliated with US Bank in any way.
    • Hence he concedes that the duties of a trustee (who by definition is accepting fiduciary responsibilities to the trust entity and the trust beneficiaries) is being performed by a third party, with absolute power and sole discretion, who has no affiliation with US Bank.
      • This concedes that US Bank is not a trustee even though it is named as Trustee in some trusts and otherwise “acquired the trust business” from Bank of America and others. 
        • A Trustee without powers or duties is no trustee. Disclaimer of fiduciary duties denotes non acceptance of being the Trustee of the Trust.
        • Acquiring the trust business is a euphemism for the continuation of the musical chair business that is well known in subservicers. 
        • Being the trustee is NOT a marketable commodity without amendment to the Trust document. Hence if a Trustee is named and has no power or duties, and which then “sells” its “trust business” to US Bank the “transfer” trust responsibility is void but damnum absque injuria. 
        • No action for breach of fiduciary exists because nobody assumed the fiduciary duty that must be the basis of any position of “trustee” of any trust.
  • BOTTOM LINE: A trust without a trustee holding fiduciary duties and actual powers over trust assets is no trust at all. This signals corroboration for what is now well known in the public domain: the REMIC trustee has no powers or duties because there is no trust and there are no trust assets. 

============================

Update: An identical letter (see below) has been sent to me from various sources all ostensibly from US Bank. My opinion is that

  • The letter is not from US Bank
  • US Bank Corporate Trust Services has nothing on the alleged loans
  • No business records are kept by US Bank in connection with alleged loans subject to alleged claims of securitization
  • The letter was not sent out by Bank of America either although one might surmise that. It was sent by LPS/Black Night
  • The letter is pure fabrication and forgery.
  • The cutting and pasting was done by persons who have no relationship with even the false claims of the banks
  • Goldade has no trust duties in connection with the alleged loan
  • And of course the alleged loan is not in the trust, making claims by or behalf of the “trustee” or the “Servicer” completely without merit or foundation.

Here is an example of one of the letters that I used for analysis : Note that the “:,F4” indicates that the signature was pasted not executed by a real person with a pen. You can examine your own letters like this by highlighting the letter contents and then pasting to text edit rather than Word or any other program that corrects and substitutes the command rather than just printing it. The “errors” in grammar and formatting occur in text edit.

The meta data from the letter shows the following, and I have the rest of it as well.

/Type /Metadata
/Subtype /XML
/Length 673
>>
stream
<?xpacket begin=”” id=”W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d”?><x:xmpmeta x:xmptk=”NitroPro 9.5″ xmlns:x=”adobe:ns:meta/”><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=”http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#”><rdf:Description rdf:about=”” xmlns:dc=”http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/&#8221; xmlns:pdf=”http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/&#8221; xmlns:pdfaExtension=”http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/extension/&#8221; xmlns:pdfaProperty=”http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/property#&#8221; xmlns:pdfaSchema=”http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/schema#&#8221; xmlns:pdfaid=”http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/id/&#8221; xmlns:xmp=”http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/”><xmp:ModifyDate>2016-11-04T18:28:42-07:00</xmp:ModifyDate&gt;
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<?xpacket end=”w”?>
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Note the reference to Nitro Pro 9.5 --- 
which is a program that allows one to edit pdf files
 and then print them out 
as though the new pdf was simply a printout 
of a pre-existing document.  
Here is how the letter appears in text edit:
I am writing in response to your Debt Elimination Scheme and complaint on the subject property sent to U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”). On behalf of U.S. Bank, I am happy to assist you with this matter to the extent I am able to provide information.
I have researched your mortgage and have determined that U.S. Bank is merely the trustee for the Trust that owns yourmortgageandnote. PleasenotetheTrustistheownerofyourmortgageandnote,notthetrustee. Theservicer is the party to the Trust that has the authority and responsibility to make decisions and take action regarding individual mortgage loans in the Trust. The trustee has no authority or responsibility to review and or approve or disapprove of these decisions and actions. It is the servicer who has taken all action regarding your property, and has the information you have requested.
As we stated in our response of July 27, 2016 you must work with Bank of America as the servicer of your loan, to have your request addressed. I have forwarded your correspondence to Bank of America and they have responded and stated you may utilize the following email – litigation.intake@bankofamerica.com.
While U.S. Bank understands and wishes to assist you with this matter, the servicer is the only party with the authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding this mortgage and they are not affiliated with U.S. Bank in anyw ay.
Please work with Bank of America to address your concerns using the information provided to you in this letter, so they may assist you in a more timely and efficient manner.

Sincerely  :,f4

Kevin Goldade Corporate Trust Services 60 Livingston Ave
St Paul, MN 55107
cc Bank of America
  •  IF THE SERVICER IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH US BANK “IN ANY WAY” THEN EITHER US BANK HAS NO TRUST DUTIES OR THE SERVICER HAS NO SERVICING AUTHORITY

 

SPECTRE OF FRAUD OF ALL TYPES HAUNTING BOFA, CITI, CHASE, WELLS ET AL

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New York AG Schneiderman Comes out Swinging at BofA, BoNY
Posted By igradman On August 5, 2011 (4:28 pm) In Attorneys General

This is big.  Though we’ve seen leading indicators over the last few weeks that New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman might get involved in the proposed Bank of America settlement over Countrywide bonds, few expected a response that might dynamite the entire deal.  But that’s exactly what yesterday’s filing before Judge Kapnick could do.

Stating that he has both a common law and a statutory interest “in protecting the economic health and well-being of all investors who reside or transact business within the State of New York,” Schneiderman’s petition to intervene takes a stance that’s more aggressive than that of any of the other investor groups asking for a seat at the table.

Rather than simply requesting a chance to conduct discovery or questioning the methodology that was used to arrive at the settlement, the AG’s petition seeks to intervene to assert counterclaims against Bank of New York Mellon for persistent fraud, securities fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

Did you say F-f-f-fraud?  That’s right.  The elephant in the room during the putback debates of the last three years has been the specter of fraud.  Sure, mortgage bonds are performing abysmally and the underlying loans appears largely defective when investors are able to peek under the hood, but did the banks really knowingly mislead investors or willfully obstruct their efforts to remedy these problems?  Schneiderman thinks so.  He accuses BoNY of violating:

Executive Law § 63(12)’s prohibition on persistent fraud or illegality in the conduct of business: the Trustee failed to safeguard the mortgage files entrusted to its care under the Governing Agreements, failed to take any steps to notify affected parties despite its knowledge of violations of representations and warranties, and did so repeatedly across 530 Trusts. (Petition to Intervene at 9)

By calling out BoNY for failing to enforce investors’ repurchase rights or help investors enforce those rights themselves, the AG has turned a spotlight on the most notoriously uncooperative of the four major RMBS Trustees.  Of course, all of the Trustees have engaged in this type of heel-dragging obstructionism to some degree, but many have softened their stance.

since investors started getting more aggressive in threatening legal action against them.  BoNY, in addition to remaining resolute in refusing to aid investors, has now gone further in trying to negotiate a sweetheart deal for Bank of America without allowing all affected investors a chance to participate.  This has drawn the ire of the nation’s most outspoken financial cop.

And lest you think that the NYAG focuses all of his vitriol on BoNY, Schneiderman says that BofA may also be on the hook for its conduct, both before and after the issuance of the relevant securities.  The Petition to Intervene states that:

Countrywide and BoA face liability for persistent illegality in:
(1) repeatedly breaching representations and warranties concerning loan quality;
(2) repeatedly failing to provide complete mortgage files as it was required to do under the Governing Agreements; and
(3) repeatedly acting pursuant to self-interest, rather than
investors’ interests, in servicing, in violation of the Governing Agreements. (Petition to Intervene at 9)

Though Countrywide may have been the culprit for breaching reps and warranties in originating these loans, the failure to provide loan files and the failure to service properly post-origination almost certainly implicates the nation’s largest bank.  And lest any doubts remain in that regard, the AG’s Petition also provides, “given that BoA negotiated the settlement with BNYM despite BNYM’s obvious conflicts of interest, BoA may be liable for aiding and abetting BNYM’s breach of fiduciary duty.” (Petition at 7) So much for Bank of America’s characterization of these problems as simply “pay[ing] for the things that Countrywide did.

As they say on late night infomercials, “but wait, there’s more!”  In a step that is perhaps even more controversial than accusing Countrywide’s favorite Trustee of fraud, the AG has blown the cover off of the issue of improper transfer of mortgage loans into RMBS Trusts.  This has truly been the third rail of RMBS problems, which few plaintiffs have dared touch, and yet the AG has now seized it with a vice grip.

In the AG’s Verified Pleading in Intervention (hereinafter referred to as the “Pleading,” and well worth reading), Schneiderman pulls no punches in calling the participating banks to task over improper mortgage transfers.  First, he notes that the Trustee had a duty to ensure proper transfer of loans from Countrywide to the Trust.  (Pleading ¶23).  Next, he states that, “the ultimate failure of Countrywide to transfer complete mortgage loan documentation to the Trusts hampered the Trusts’ ability to foreclose on delinquent mortgages, thereby impairing the value of the notes secured by those mortgages. These circumstances apparently triggered widespread fraud, including BoA’s fabrication of missing documentation.”  (Id.)  Now that’s calling a spade a spade, in probably the most concise summary of the robosigning crisis that I’ve seen.

The AG goes on to note that, since BoNY issued numerous “exception reports” detailing loan documentation deficiencies, it knew of these problems and yet failed to notify investors that the loans underlying their investments and their rights to foreclose were impaired.  In so doing, the Trustee failed to comply with the “prudent man” standard to which it is subject under New York law.  (Pleading ¶¶28-29)

The AG raises all of this in an effort to show that BoNY was operating under serious conflicts of interest, calling into question the fairness of the proposed settlement.  Namely, while the Trustee had a duty to negotiate the settlement in the best interests of investors, it could not do so because it stood to receive “direct financial benefits” from the deal in the form of indemnification against claims of misconduct.  (Petition ¶¶15-16) And though Countrywide had already agreed to indemnify the Trustee against many such claims, Schneiderman states that, “Countrywide has inadequate resources” to provide such indemnification, leading BoNY to seek and obtain a side-letter agreement from BofA expressly guaranteeing the indemnification obligations of Countrywide and expanding that indemnity to cover BoNY’s conduct in negotiating and implementing the settlement.  (Petition ¶16)  That can’t be good for BofA’s arguments that it is not Countrywide’s successor-in-interest.

I applaud the NYAG for having the courage to call this conflict as he sees it, and not allowing this deal to derail his separate investigations or succumbing to the political pressure to water down his allegations or bypass “third rail” issues.  Whether Judge Kapnick will ultimately permit the AG to intervene is another question, but at the very least, this filing raises some uncomfortable issues for the banks involved and provides the investors seeking to challenge the deal with some much-needed backup.  In addition, Schneiderman has taken pressure off of the investors who have not yet opted to challenge the accord, by purporting to represent their interests and speak on their behalf.  In that regard, he notes that, “[m]any of these investors have not intervened in this litigation and, indeed, may not even be aware of it.” (Pleading ¶12).

As for the investors who are speaking up, many could take a lesson from the no-nonsense language Schneiderman uses in challenging the settlement.  Rather than dancing around the issue of the fairness of the deal and politely asking for more information, the AG has reached a firm conclusion based on the information the Trustee has already made available: “THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS UNFAIR AND INADEQUATE.” (Pleading at II.A)  Tell us how you really feel.

[Author’s Note: Though the proposed BofA settlement is certainly a landmark legal proceeding, there is plenty going on in the world of RMBS litigation aside from this case. While I have been repeatedly waylaid in my efforts to turn to these issues by successive major developments in the BofA case, I promise a roundup of recent RMBS legal action in the near future.  Stay tuned…]

Article taken from The Subprime Shakeout – http://www.subprimeshakeout.com

 

FDIC SUES LPS AND CORELOGIC ON APPRAISAL FRAUD

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LINK BETWEEN APPRAISAL FRAUD AND HIDDEN 2D TIER YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM

EDITOR’S NOTE: Now the FDIC gets it too. THE WORSE THE LOAN THE MORE MONEY THEY MADE. In the convoluted logic of the mortgage mess the investment banks profits skyrocketed as they increased the likelihood that the the loan would fail. Going into the subprime market was only one way it was done. The same facts apply across the board. A loan destined to fail was far more likely to carry an inflated nominal rate of interest, albeit knowing that the payments would not be made at earliest time possible. Since these loans could not be closed with borrowers unless the initial payment (teaser etc.) was low enough that the borrower could be convinced they could afford it, and the borrowers were relying on the mortgage broker and the fact that a lender would not take the risk unless there was merit to the deal, they relied upon the lender’s appraisal and apparent confirmation of appraisal of the property. By increasing the “value”of the property they were able to close larger loans. By closing larger loans, they were able to move more money faster.

The higher nominal rate of interest was something everyone except the borrower and investor knew would never be paid. The principal was also skewed based upon a higher rate of principal payments based upon an unsustainable appraisal (which of course also increased the size of the loan and therefore the principal and interest payments). The life of the loan and the effect on the actual rate of interest moved many loans into usury territory. And before you tell me that banks are exempt in many states from usury laws, let me say that in many states they are not and even if they banks ARE exempt the originators of nearly all securitized loans either were not banks at all or were banks acting as mortgage brokers — i.e., not actually underwriting the loan nor funding it.

The net effect of this, from a TILA standpoint, is that the APR was misstated in the Good Faith Estimate (GFE) given to each borrower which did not reflect the reality of the actual loan life (obviously ending when the payments reset to a level that exceeded the borrower’s income), the inflated appraisal and the actual terms of compensation being received by intermediaries who were not disclosed to the borrower or the investors. RESCISSION is therefore most probably an available remedy even in old loans as a result of this. ANd the amount that would be required for tender back to the “Lender” (originator) would be reduced by the amount of the appraisal fraud and other causes of action attendant to this fraud.

The plot thickens: by using crappy loans and getting what on paper looked like high interest rates (nominal rates), the banks were able to create the illusion that the DOLLAR amount of return that the investor was expecting was satisfied by the loans “in the portfolio” which we now know never made into the “portfolio” or “pool.” Thus by jacking up at least part of the portfolio nominal rates the banks were able to REDUCE THE PRINCIPAL of the so-called “loan,” which we now know was a sham. This reduction in the amount of principal actually funded produced a spread between the amount of money advanced by the investors and the amount of money actually funded, which the investors knew nothing about.

This spread was caused by the difference between the rates that the investors were expecting (yield) and the rates that the borrowers were supposed to pay (yield), which is why I identified a second yield spread premium (YSP2) years ago. This premium taken by the banks was in the form of profit on sale of loans that were neither sold nor even transferred but nobody knew that back then, although I suspected it based upon the inability of the banks to produce documentation on any performing loan. The only time they came up with documentation was when the loan was in foreclosure and it was in litigation and it was close a hearing in which they had to either putup or shut up. Many simply shut up and moved on to more low hanging fruit. 

FDIC Sues LPS and CoreLogic Over Appraisal Fraud; Shows Investors Leaving Money on the Table

Posted By igradman On May 30, 2011 (10:43 pm)

In another sign that the Federal Government is turning its focus towards prosecuting the securitization players who may have contributed to the Mortgage Crisis, the FDIC filed separate lawsuits against LSI Appraisal (available here) and CoreLogic (available here) earlier this month.  In the suits, both filed in the Central District of California, the FDIC, as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank (“WAMU”), accuses vendors with whom WAMU contracted to provide appraisal services with gross negligence, breach of reps and warranties, and other breaches of contract for providing defective and/or inflated appraisals.  The FDIC seeks at least $154 million from LSI (and its parent companies, including Lender Processing Services and Fidelity, based on alter ego liability) and at least $129 million from CoreLogic (and its parent companies, including First American Financial, based on alter ego liability).

As we’ve been discussing on The Subprime Shakeout this past month, the U.S. Government has stepped up its efforts to pursue claims against originators, underwriters and other participants in mortgage securitization over irresponsible lending and underwriting practices that led to the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression.  This has included the DOJ suing Deutsche Bank over reckless lending and submitting improper loans to the FHA and the SEC subpoenaing records from Credit Suisse and JPMorgan Chase over so-called “double dipping” schemes.  The FDIC’s lawsuit is just the latest sign that much more litigation is on the horizon, as it focuses on yet another aspect of the Crisis that is ripe for investigation–appraisal fraud.

Granted, those familiar with the loan repurchase or putback process have long recognized that inflated or otherwise improper appraisals are a major category of rep and warranty violations that are found in subprime and Alt-A loans originated between 2005 and 2007.  In fact, David Grais, in his lawsuits on behalf of the Federal Home Loan Banks of San Francisco and Seattle, focused the majority of his allegations against mortgage securitizers on inflated appraisals (ironically, the data Grais used in his complaints was compiled by CoreLogic, which is now one of the subjects of the FDIC’s suits).

Grais likely zeroed in on appraisals in those cases because he was able to evaluate their propriety after the fact using publicly available data, as he had not yet acquired access to the underlying loan files that would have provided more concrete evidence of underwriting deficiences.  But, appraisals have been historically a bit squishy and subjective–even using retroactive appraisal tools–and absent evidence of a scheme to inflate a series of comparable properties, it can be difficult to convince a judge or jury that an appraisal that’s, say, 10% higher than you would expect was actually a negligent or defective assessment of value.

The reason that the FDIC/WAMU is likely focusing on this aspect of the underwriting process is because it’s one of the few avenues available to WAMU to recover its losses.  Namely, the FDIC is suing over losses associated with loans that it holds on its books, not loans that it sold into securitization.  Though the latter would be a much larger set of loans, WAMU no longer holds any ownership interest in those loans, and would not suffer losses on that pool unless and until it (or its new owner, JPMorgan) were forced to repurchase a significant portion of those loans (read: a basis for more lawsuits down the road).

Which brings me to the most interesting aspect of these cases.  As I mentioned, the FDIC is only suing these appraisal vendors over the limited number of loans that WAMU still holds on its books.  In the case against LSI, the FDIC only reviewed 292 appraisals and is seeking damages with respect to 220 of those (75.3%), for which it claims it found “multiple egregious violations of USPAP and applicable industry standards” (LSI Complaint p. 12).   Only 10 out of 292 (3.4%) were found to be fully compliant.  Yet, the FDIC notes earlier in that complaint that LSI “provided or approved more than 386,000 appraisals for residential loans that WaMu originated or purchased” (LSI Complaint p. 11).

In the case against CoreLogic, the FDIC says that it reviewed 259 appraisals out of the more than 260,000 that had been provided (CoreLogic Complaint pp. 11-12).  Out of those, it found only seven that were fully compliant (2.7%), while 194 (74.9%) contained multiple egregious violations (CoreLogic Complaint p. 12).  And it was the 194 egregiously defective appraisals that the FDIC alleges caused over $129 million in damages.

Can you see where I’m going with this?  If you assume that the rest of the appraisals looked very similar to those sampled by the FDIC, there’s a ton of potential liability left on the table.

Just for fun, let’s just do some rough, back-of-the-envelope calculations to provide a framework for estimating that potential liability.  I will warn you that these numbers are going to be eye-popping, but before you get too excited or jump down my throat, please recognize that, as statisticians will no doubt tell you, there are many reasons why the samples cited in the FDIC’s complaints may not be representative of the overall population.  For example, the FDIC may have taken an adverse sample or the average size of the loans WAMU held on its balance sheet may have been significantly greater than the average size of the loans WAMU securitized, meaning they produced higher than average loss severities (and were also more prone to material appraisal inflation). Thus, do not take these numbers as gospel, but merely as an indication of the ballpark size of this potential problem.

With that proviso, let’s project out some of the numbers in the complaints.  In the LSI/LPS case, the FDIC alleges that 75% of the appraisals it sampled contained multiple egregious violations of appraisal standards.  If we project that number to the total population of 386,000 loans for which LSI/LPS provided appraisal services, that’s 289,500 faulty appraisals.  The FDIC also claims it suffered $154 million in losses on the 220 loans with egregiously deficient appraisals, for an average loss severity of $700,000.  Multiply 289,500 faulty appraisals by $700,000 in losses per loan and you get a potential liability to LSI/LPS (on just the loans it handled for WAMU) of $202 billion.  Even if we cut the percentage of deficient appraisals in half to account for the FDIC’s potential adverse sampling and cut the loss severity in half to account for the fact that the average loss severity was likely much smaller (WAMU may have retained the biggest loans that it could not sell into securitizations), that’s still an outstanding liability of over $50 billion for LSI/LPS.

Do the same math for the CoreLogic case and you get similar results.  The FDIC found 74.9% of the loans sampled had egregious appraisal violations, meaning that at least 194,740 of the loans that CoreLogic handled for WAMU may contain similar violations.  Since the 194 egregious loans accounted for $129 million in losses according to the Complaint, that’s an average loss severity of $664,948.  Using these numbers, CoreLogic thus faces potential liabilities of $129 billion.  Even using our very conservative discounting methodology, that’s still over $32 billion in potential liability.

This means that somewhere out there, there are pension funds, mutual funds, insurance funds and other institutional investors who collectively have claims of anywhere from $82 billion to $331 billion against these two vendors of appraisal services with respect to WAMU-originated or securitized loans.  For how many other banks did LSI and CoreLogic provide similar services?  And how many other appraisal service vendors provided similar services during this time and likely conformed to what appear to have been industry practices of inflating appraisals?  The potential liability floating out there on just this appraisal issue alone is astounding, if the FDIC’s numbers are to be believed.

The point of this exercise is not to say that the FDIC necessarily got its numbers right, or even to say that WAMU wasn’t complicit in the industry practice of inflating appraisals.  My point is that these suits reveal additional evidence that investors are sitting on massive amounts of potential claims, about which they’re doing next to nothing.  Where are the men and women of action amongst institutional money managers (and for that matter, who is John Galt?)?  Are they simply passive by nature, and too afraid of getting sued to even peek out from behind the rock? Maybe this is why investors don’t want to reveal their holdings in MBS – they’re afraid that if unions or other organized groups of pensioners realized that their institutional money managers held WAMU MBS and were doing nothing about it, they would sue these managers and/or never run their money through them again.

The better choice, of course, would be to join the Investor Syndicate or one of the other bondholder groups that are primed for action, and then actually support their efforts to go after the participants in the largest Ponzi scheme in history (an upcoming article on TSS will focus on the challenges that these groups have faced in getting their members actually motivated to do something).  It seems that these managers should be focused on trying to recover the funds their investments lost for their constituents, rather than just acting to protect their own anonymity and their jobs.  If suits like those brought by the FDIC don’t cause institutional money managers to sit up and take notice, we have no other choice but to believe these individuals are highly conflicted and incapable of acting as the fiduciaries they’re supposed to be.  Of all the conflicts of interest that have been revealed in the fallout of the Mortgage Crisis, this last conflict would be the most devastating, because it would mean that the securitization participants who were instrumental in causing this crisis, and who were themselves wildly conflicted, will largely be let off the hook by those they harmed the most.

Article taken from The Subprime Shakeout – http://www.subprimeshakeout.com
URL to article: http://www.subprimeshakeout.com/2011/05/fdic-sues-lps-and-corelogic-over-appraisal-fraud-shows-investors-leaving-money-on-the-table.html


Jake Naumer
Resolution Advisors
3187 Morgan Ford
St Louis Missouri 63116
314 961 7600
Fax Voice Mail 314 754 9086

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