Bank Fraud News: The reason why banks and servicers should receive no presumption of reliability

The following is but a short sampling supporting the argument that any document coming from the banks and servicers is suspect and unworthy of any legal presumption of authenticity or validity. Judges are looking into self-serving fabricated documentation and coming to the wrong conclusion about the facts.

Chase following bank playbook: screw the customer

“Chase provided no prior notice to its cardholders that their crypto ‘purchases’ would be treated as ‘cash advances’ on a going forward basis,” according to the suit.

Tucker claims he was hit with about $140 in fees and a “sky-high” interest rate of 26 percent without warning after Chase reclassified his purchases as cash advances, a violation of the Truth in Lending act.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Stealth: Hiding the elephant in the living room

Its never been a secret that Freddie Mac’s business policy is to remain stealth in any chain of title if possible, and to rely on the servicers to keep its presence a secret in foreclosure proceedings. In fact, this PNC case which was overturned against PNC, involved the Defendant’s assertion that PNC was concealing Freddie Mac’s interest in the loan. Freddie Mac’s business policy appears to rely upon nothing more than handshakes with the originators and servicers. Here is some verbiage from a “Freddie Mac – Mortgage Participation Certificates” disclosure (See: Freddie Mac – Mortgage Participation Certificates):

Deutsch files lawsuit against private mailbox troller following the Deutsch playbook of foreclosure

“Defendants, and each of them initiated a malicious campaign to disrupt the chain of title to prevent Plaintiff from enforcing its contractual rights in the 2006 DOT by way of recording fraudulent documents to purportedly assign the rights under the 2006 DOT without the consent of Plaintiff, and otherwise thereafter fraudulently transfer all rights via a trustee deed upon sale, even though no trustee sale was ever conducted. All subsequently recorded or unrecorded transactions are therefore null, void, and of no effect.”

EDITOR COMMENT: So Deutsch is admitting that its practice of recording fraudulent documents are “null, void and of not effect.” In order to get to that point Deutsch is going to be required to prove standing — i.e., definitive proof that it paid for the debt, which it did not. Deutsch is on dangerous ground here and might deliver a bonus for homeowners. As for the defense, is it really a crime to steal a fraudulent deed of trust supported by fraudulent assignments and endorsements?

Barclays Bank settles for $2,000,000,000 for fraud on investors

Barclays’ offering documents “systematically and intentionally misrepresented key characteristics of the loans,” and more than half of the loans defaulted, federal officials said.

Additionally, the Department of Justice reached similar settlements with two Barclays’ employees involved with subprime residential mortgage-backed securities. They will pay $2 million collectively.

The agreements mark the latest in a string of U.S. settlements with major banks over sales of tainted mortgage securities from 2005 to 2007 that helped set the stage for the real estate crash that contributed to the financial crisis.

Deutsch Pays $7.2 Billion for Fraudulent securitizations

Confirming settlement details the bank disclosed in late December, federal investigators said Deutsche Bank will pay a $3.1 billion civil penalty and provide $4.1 billion in consumer relief to homeowners, borrowers, and communities that were harmed.

The federal penalty is the highest ever for a single entity involved in selling residential mortgage-backed securities that proved to be far more risky than Deutsche Bank led investors to believe. Nonetheless, the agreement represents relief of sorts for the bank and its shareholders, because federal investigators initially sought penalties twice as costly.

Credit Suisse‘s announcement said it would pay the Department of Justice a $2.48 billion civil monetary penalty. The bank will also provide $2.8 billion in consumer relief over five years as part of the deal, which is subject to negotiations over final documentation and approval by Credit Suisse’s board of directors. [Credit Suisse owns SPS Portfolio Servicing.]

Ocwen Settles with 10 States for Illegal Servicing

“The consent order provides that Ocwen will transition its servicing portfolio off of its current servicing platform to a platform better able to manage escrow accounts and establish a new complaint resolution process,” the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance said in a press release. “Ocwen shall hire a third-party firm to audit a statistically significant number of escrow accounts in high-risk areas of the portfolio to determine whether problems continue to exist around the management of escrow accounts and to identify the root cause of those problems.

“Ocwen has faced many legal and regulatory challenges in recent years. In December 2013 it reached a settlement over foreclosure and modification processes with the CFPB and state regulators. A year later, it made a separate agreement with New York regulators that removed company founder William Erbey as CEO.

Wells Fargo Whistleblower is Fired Among Others Who refused to Lie to Customers

In 2014, according to Mr. Tran, his boss ordered him to lie to customers who were facing foreclosure. When Mr. Tran refused, he said, he was fired. He worried that he wouldn’t be able to make his monthly mortgage payments and that he was about to become homeless.

Joining a cadre of former employees claiming they were mistreated for speaking out about problems at the bank, Mr. Tran sued. He argued in court filings that he had been fired in retaliation for blowing the whistle on misconduct at the giant San Francisco-based bank. Mr. Tran said he didn’t want his job back — he wanted Wells Fargo to admit that it had been wrong to fire him and wrong to mislead customers who were facing foreclosure.

 

 

 

Fannie and Freddie foreclose on almost 16,000 homes in May, almost 4 million since 2008

Fighting Off Foreclosures

http://www.dsnews.com/daily-dose/08-08-2017/fighting-off-foreclosures

Editor’s Note:  Fannie and Freddie have foreclosed on almost 4 million homes since the financial crisis of 2008.  The GSEs typically can’t prove they own the loan if it was securitized between 1999 and 2014.  Did you know that Fannie Mae and Freddie cannot accept a note that is not properly endorsed and assigned?  A note that is not properly endorsed or assigned is considered a ‘fail’.  See Document Custodian information here.

Avoid Foreclosure BHFannie Mae and Freddie Mac wrapped up 15,683 foreclosure prevention actions in May, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) May Foreclosure Prevention Report. This brings the total number of foreclosure prevention actions to 3,914,668 since the inception of the conservatorships back in September 2008. More than half of the actions reported for May—or 10,769—were permanent loan modifications, compared with 11,328 in April. All told, since September 2008, the Enterprises have granted permanent loan mods to 2,076,345 distressed homeowners.

Along those same lines, the share of modifications with principal forbearance accounted for 25 percent of all permanent modifications in May, according to the report. Modifications with extend-term only leapt to 45 percent during the month thanks to ongoing positive headwinds in house prices. Additionally, a combined 1,489 short sales and deeds-in-lieu sealed in May. There were 10 percent more—or 1,650—in April.

As for the Enterprises mortgage performance metrics, the serious delinquency rate spiraled down further, plunging from 1.01 percent at the close of April to 0.98 percent at the end of May. Loans 30–59 days’ delinquent charted at 402,780 in April; they stood at 348,141 in May. Continuing their downward trajectory, 60-plus-days’ delinquent loans hit 1.3 percent in May, decreasing from April’s 1.34 percent.

In terms of Fannie and Freddie foreclosures, third-party and foreclosure sales jumped 9 percent, from 5,523 in April to 6,042 in May. Foreclosure starts tumbled 13 percent from 17,056 in April to 14,905 in May.

The top five reasons for delinquency in May included curtailment of income (21 percent), excessive obligations (22 percent), unemployment (7 percent), illness of principal mortgagor or family member (6 percent), and marital difficulties (3 percent).

1st DCA CA: Not so Fast on Rubber Stamping Foreclosures

As we have seen for months there have been a steady stream of cases in which the courts have turned back to the fundamental requirements of due process and the rule of law. Here the court reminds (again) that judicial notice is not a substitute for foundation of facts in dispute AND that the homeowner’s right to sue for wrongful foreclosure is NOT to be dismissed even if it is poorly worded.

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—————-

See CUPP v FNMA 8/2/17

Cupp v. Fannie Mae

While once again we see the regretable tendency to keep essential decisions out of public records, we also see that the court now comprehends the basic fallacy behind “loans” subject to false claims of transfer, securitization, sale and purchase.

And once again the court states with clarity the basic elements of procedural law. The fact that you owe money doesn’t mean you owe it to anyone who sues you.  If the party initiates a nonjudicial sale they will subject to the same rigor as in judicial cases. Nonjudicial procedure was not meant to allow strangers to win cases they would lose if they were required to file suit.

Significant quotes:

The nonjudicial foreclosure system is designed to provide the lender- beneficiary with an inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting borrower, while protecting the borrower from wrongful loss of the property and ensuring that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 926 (Yvanova).)

The elements of a tort cause of action for wrongful foreclosure are: “`(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.'” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 408.) Grounds satisfying the first element include: when the trustee did not have the power to foreclose, when the borrower did not default, and when the deed of trust is void. (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104- 105.) “A foreclosure initiated by one with no authority to do so is wrongful” and satisfies the first element. (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 929.)

our Supreme Court observed that the trustee of a deed of trust “acts merely as an agent for the borrower- trustor and lender-beneficiary” and, under section 2924, subdivision (a)(1), may initiate nonjudicial foreclosure “only at the direction of the person or entity that currently holds the note and the beneficial interest under the deed of trust—the original beneficiary or its assignee—or that entity’s agent.” (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 927.) “[I]f the borrower defaults on the loan, only the current beneficiary may direct the trustee to undertake the nonjudicial foreclosure process.” (Id. at pp. 927-928.) However, the court also recognized that promissory notes and deeds of trust are negotiable instruments that may be sold by a lender without any notice to the borrower and “that a borrower can generally raise no objection to the assignment of the note and deed of trust.” (Id. at p. 927.) The Yvanova court concluded:

“If a purported assignment necessary to the chain by which the foreclosing entity claims that power is absolutely void, meaning of no legal force or effect whatsoever [citations], the foreclosing entity has acted without legal authority by pursuing a trustee’s sale,” and the borrower would have standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure in the case of such an unauthorized sale. (Id. at p. 935.)

The logic of defendants’ no-prejudice argument implies that anyone, even a stranger to the debt, could declare a default and order a trustee’s sale—and the borrower would be left with no recourse because, after all, he or she owed the debt to someone, though not to the foreclosing entity. This would be an `odd result’ indeed.” (Id. at p. 938.) “A homeowner who has been foreclosed on by one with no right to do so has suffered an injurious invasion of his or her legal rights at the foreclosing entity’s hands. No more is required for standing to sue.” (Id. at p. 939.) The court disapproved a line of Court of Appeal decisions that had reached contrary conclusions. (Yvanova, at p. 939, fn. 13; see Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497; Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 75; Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1495 (Herrera); Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256 (Fontenot).)

The trial court appears to have agreed with respondents’ contention they could conclusively establish that RTC did hold the beneficial interest at the time of the 1995 Assignment. In its preamble, the 1995 Assignment recites that, in June 1993, the Office of Thrift Supervision appointed RTC as receiver for WFSL. It further recites that, in September 1994, the Office of Thrift Supervision replaced the conservator of WFSB with RTC. Finally, the preamble states that RTC, as receiver for WFSB, “is the current beneficiary under the Deed of Trust.”

The trial court could properly take notice of the fact the 1995 Assignment was recorded, the date of its execution, the parties to the transaction, and its legal effect if that effect is undisputed and clear from the face of the document. (See Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1055; Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264-265.) However, contrary to respondents’ repeated assertion, we cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay recitations of fact contained within the 1995 Assignment. (See Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 924, fn. 1; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1369, 1375 [trial court improperly took judicial notice of truth of hearsay recitation, within assignment, that a particular entity held beneficial interest under deed of trust before its assignment]; Intengan, at pp. 1055, 1057; Fontenot, at p. 265.) Cupp clearly disputes the notion that RTC held the beneficial interest at the time of the 1995 Assignment. We conclude the trial court erred in taking judicial notice that RTC held the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust at the time of the 1995 Assignment.[8]

The Fannie Freddie Document Treasure Trove

Editor’s Note: Former Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geitner was instrumental in greasing the runways for HAMP so the GSEs could steal homes.  But he also engineered the theft of GSE investor profits while proclaiming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae to be on the verge of collapse.  Instead, the federal government, in an act of unconscionable bad faith, implemented net worth sweeps to steal money from investors.  These massive profits were also used to artificially prop up failing Obamacare.

The Libertarian Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

July 19, 2017 marked the release of the first set of much-awaited government documents that addressed the government knew and when, before the implementation of its net worth sweep on August 17, 2012, which gave the government all profits from the operation of those two Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  That deal was embodied in the Third Amendment to the original Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (SPSPAs) of September 2008.  Analytically, these documents are irrelevant: the case against the government is air tight without them. Practically, these documents should transform all phases of this complex litigation.  The best way to beat the government in litigation is to show its bad faith throughout.  It is important to see why both the propositions are true, and how they impact on the ongoing litigation.  I am offering this analysis, in my capacity as an advisor to institutional investors.

The Analytics.  A close look at the disclosed documents tell us nothing about the net worth sweep that is not apparent on the face of the published agreement that the Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA) and the Department of Treasury used to put the Net Worth Sweep (NWS) in place. These were expert lawyers and they meant what they said and said what they meant—namely, that the sole purpose of the deal was to make sure that all the future profits generated by Fannie and Freddie would end up in the pockets of the United States Treasury above and beyond the 10 percent dividend set in the original 2008 agreement.  It would have been, of course, imprudent for the two government agencies to announce their intention to collude publicly, so they engaged in a planned, but sham, transaction, that made it appear as if their joint action was the salvation of Fannie and Freddie.  The supposed benefit was that the enterprises were relieved of any obligation to pay money to Treasury when they did not have money to pay it.

Unfortunately, for the government, the enterprises and their private shareholders already had two airtight defenses against such an unhappy result.  First, if a company is insolvent it can’t pay any money to its shareholders as dividends or to its creditors anyhow.  So it is a simple sham to claim that consideration has been supplied by relieving parties of any obligation to pay amounts that could not pay in any event.  Second, as a legal matter, the SPSAs contained a so-called payment-in-kind clause, which allows Fannie and Freddie to not pay cash dividends so long as the deferred amounts accrue at a rate of 12 percent annually, two points higher than the 10 percent rate stipulated for cash dividends.

The ability to exercise this deferred option carries with it two unambiguous consequences. First, it meant that Treasury never had to make any further advances to the entities if it thought it imprudent to do so.  The GSE amounts due would just continue to accrue.  Accordingly, there could be no death spiral in which Treasury would have to make advances to prop up a worthless enterprise, and no exhaustion of Treasury’s financing commitments.  Second, this arrangement was not an open invitation for the conservators of the enterprises to squander money.  Any net distributions to the enterprises’ private shareholders, whether as dividends or distributions on liquidation, were subordinate to the government’s senior preferred stock.

It would therefore be unwise for any prudent trustee to incur higher rates of payment on the senior preferred if cash were available to make current cash dividends.  The initial deal had a built-in financial stability that worked well in all states of the world.  At no point in the documents did Treasury make reference to this decisive clause.

Similarly, the judicial treatment of the complete dividend arrangement on the motion to dismiss, no less, completely misunderstood these provisions.  That short cut is perfectly permissible if the opinions make an accurate assessment of the stated transaction.  But that was not to be had.  In the original 2014 trial court decision by judge Royce Lamberth in Perry Capital v. Lew, this additional shareholder option was perversely construed as a penalty for late payment, which therefore had to be ignored in deciding on the validity of the NWS.   Similarly, the clause was put to one side on the decision of the majority of the D.C. Circuit in Perry v. Mnuchin,  with the glib pronouncement that director of FHFA, as a fiduciary, did not have to avail himself of the one option that worked to the greatest advantage of his beneficiaries, but could instead fork over all that excess cash to the government knowing that it received nothing of value in return. Why this extreme statement? Because there is no state of the world in which the private shareholders were better off after the NWS than they were without it.  On the downside, the got no money either way.  On the upside, they got no money either, as all the cash above the standard 10 percent (or, if appropriate, 12 percent) dividend went to the government.  The government should have lost on the motion to dismiss.

The Documents.  The overall message from the published documents is in perfect sync with the basic structure of the underlying deal.  None of them are remotely privileged. The only damaging information that they contain is directly pertinent to the case, namely, on the state of mind of key government officials on the eve of the NWS. In order to best understand their impact, it is useful to examine the documents in reverse chronological order, starting with those that prepared just before the NWS was implemented.  The point is quite simple.  Whatever the earlier uncertainties, given the indications of the GSEs’ financial strength right before planned enactment, the government could have simply canceled the NWS without any public fanfare, knowing that the financial situation had stabilized.  By going forward with the NWS, the high government officials knew that the NWS was not a salvage operation to prevent the bailout from collapsing, but a calculated effort to strip all the profits from the GSEs in a no-risk transaction for the Treasury.

Thus, on the Monday, August 13, four days before the announcement of the NWS, an email from Jim Parrott to Brian Deese, takes the candid view that:

  • We are making sure that each of these entities pays the taxpayer back every dollar of profit they make, not just a 10% dividend. (emphasis in original)
  • The taxpayer will thus ultimately collect more money with the changes.
  • With the overall set of changes, we have removed any doubt about the long-term fate of these entities: they will NOT be allowed to return to profitable entities at the center of our housing finance system, but instead wound down and replaced with a system driven by private capital and lower risk to the taxpayer.

That of course is exactly what the NWS did.  The obvious reading of this document is that four days before the NWS all the relevant officials on the eve of the NWS knew that government stood to make profits in excess of the agreed 10 percent dividend rate, notwithstanding any earlier doubts Treasury and FHFA had several months prior about the expected financial performance of Fannie and Freddie.

Just before the NWS, these officials knew with certainty that there was no possibility of a death spiral in which the Treasury would constantly have to lend money to the GSEs in order to collect the required dividend from them. That result is confirmed by an earlier memo dated July 30, 2012, which announces the government’s intention to announce the changes on Friday, August 10 after the markets close.  (The actual launch date was a week later, still on a Friday in in August in order to avoid serious media attention.)  The memo’s stated rationale for the NWS was “GSEs will report very strong earnings on August 7, that will be in excess of the 10% dividend to be paid to Treasury.”  The relevant information had not changed from July 30 to the announcement of the NWS on August 17.

The next critical document was dated June 25, 2012 from Treasury official Mary Miller to Michael Stegman.  It relates that Ed DeMarco, the acting head of FHFA, had some doubts about how to proceed but no doubts about the increasing financial strength of Fannie and Freddie.  Its relevant portion reads:

  • Through weeks of negotiating terms of possible amendments to the PSPAs, he [DeMarco] never questioned the need to adjust the dividend schedule this year. Since the Secretary raised the possibility of a PR [principal reduction to benefit distressed homeowners] covenant, DeMarco no longer sees the urgency of amending the PSPAs this year.
  • He has raised two competing reasons for this new position: (1) the GSEs will be generating large revenues over the coming years, thereby enabling them to pay the 10% annual dividend well into the future even with the caps; and, (2) instituting a net worth sweep in place of the dividend will further extend the lives of the GSEs to such an extent that it would remove the urgency for Congress to act on long-term housing finance reform. He now sees the PSPA amendments as a backdoor way of keeping the GSEs alive-getting to an Option 3-type plan [calling for the separation of special purpose vehicles for good and bad assets] without the need for legislation.

For these purposes the most salient portion of the document is the acknowledgment of the large revenues that will be sufficient to cover the dividend payments in the future with the caps in place, which meant that Treasury understood that no additional advances would ever be needed.  The third option mentioned in the last paragraph refers to a position paper submitted to Secretary Timothy Geithner on December 12, 2011, or over eight months before the bailout took place. It contained a preliminary discussion of various policy options, the first of which called for restructuring “Treasury’s dividend payments from a fixed 10 percent annual rate to a variable payment based on available positive net worth (i.e. establish an income sweep). This will ensure that remaining PSPA funding capacity is not reduced in the future by draws to pay dividends.”  At the very least both Miller and Stegman knew that both Fannie and Freddie could turn profitable shortly, which came to pass to its knowledge when the NWS was put into effect in August, 2012.  This case is open and shut.

Commentaries on the released documents.  Most of the commentators who read the documents thought that they revealed that Treasury and FHFA had a full knowledge that the GSEs had turned the corner into positive territory when the NWS was adopted. Gretchen Morgenson’s article of July 23 was entitled “U.S. Foresaw a Better Return in Seizing Fannie and Freddie Profits.”  It was well understood”, she wrote “that decision to divert the profits knew that the change would most likely generate more revenue for the treasury.  She explicitly concluded that Treasury’s stated explanation, to protect the taxpayers from further losses, was contradicted by the documents which showed “as early as December 2011, high level treasury official knew that Fannie and Freddy would soon become profitable again.”

Her views were adopted wholesale by HousingWire, where once again the headline tells the whole story:  “Newly sealed documents reveal real reason for Fannie, Freddie Profit sweep:  Report:  Geithner knew in 2011 that GSEs would soon be profitable.”  Bloomberg News told the same story when it wrote “New Documents Give Hope to Fannie Shareholders seeking redress,” specifically pointing out that evidence undercut the key government claim that the NW was necessary to avert “a process known as a ‘circular draw’ or ‘death spiral.’”

The impact on litigation.  The last question is how these revelations will impact ongoing litigation.  The documents were released in connection with the Fairholme takings claim in the Federal Court of Claims.  The sound theory of that case is that government had confiscated shareholder property when it stripped them of their dividend rights, their liquidation preferences, and their voting rights—the three attributes that give shares their value. Similarly, Jerome Corsi at InfoWars stated: “New Docs Support Fannie Mae and Freddie mac Shareholders in Court: Apologist [John Carney] Ignores Evidence They Illegal Confiscated Fannie and Freddie Earnings.”

That claim is made out by an examination of the relevant documents. If these cases are treated as direct expropriation of funds, governed by the per se rule in Loretto v. Teleprompter  Manhattan CATV Corp.  the bad faith of the government should not matter.  But, if, as thus far has been the case, the NWS is evaluated under the more flexible doctrine of Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York this evidence fills any gap in the plaintiff’s case. Penn Central requires an explicit examination of the government reasons for imposing the sweep.

The Treasury’s bad faith of the government overrides any potential government justification for making these shareholders bear a disproportionate share of funding general government activities.  In the language of Penn Central, the NWS “has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” without reference to any traditional police power concerns with health and safety.  As Justice Holmes quipped in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”  The government has meet its financial needs from general revenues, not by picking the pocket of the private shareholders. The takings claim therefore should be solidified by the release of these documents.

The documents revealed in the takings litigation should also influence the treatment of the various breach of fiduciary and contract claims in Perry Capital v. Lew, and in Perry Capital v. Mnuchin.  Both the trial court in Lew and the D.C. Circuit on appeal in Mnuchin let the government win on summary judgment, without the benefit of any discovery at all.  A correct reading of these documents shows that they gave summary judgment for the wrong party, the government.  But now that Mnuchin is back to the District Court on remand, it should take those documents into account in making its decision on the validity of the plaintiff’s surviving contract claims.

The first time around, the Circuit Court badly mangled the proper tests for determining expectation damages. Its decision to divide outstanding shares into different subclasses destroys the underlying market, which can function only if all shares have identical attributes.  Hence it was a huge mistake to insist that shareholder claims be fractionated so that individual shareholder expectations somehow depend whether the shares were purchased before or after the NWS was into place.  The correct answer in all cases is that shareholder expectations are fixed at the time of initial issuance and purchase of these shares, such that any resales or other transfers of those shares do not affect the nature of the contract claims.

The D.C. Circuit’s revised opinion of July 17, 2017 backs off that categorical error.  Nonetheless it still goes astray because of its failure to affirmatively state as a matter of law the correct rule that treats all shares identically.   Instead its states the relevant inquiry on remand is “whether the Third Amendment violated the reasonable expectations of the parties.”  The government knew at the time of the NWS that it was claiming more than it was entitled to.  That fact should shape the reasonable expectations of the private parties who are entitled to think that the government will not consciously abuse its power by collusive transactions that were intended to strip the shareholders of all value in a sham transaction.

The NWS benefited the government, and only the government.  The District Court cannot decide this case in an informational vacuum, but must take this information into account in determining the reasonable shareholder expectations. The abuse of NWS is as relevant to the contract claims as it is to the takings claims.  Judge Lamberth should not ignore undisputed evidence, which points to the total viability of the contract claims that the D.C. Circuit has asked him to reevaluate on remand.

Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch professor of Law at NYU, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2017/08/02/the-fannie-freddie-document-treasure-trove/2/#98228f850ea9

Refinancing mortgage? Maybe you don’t need that appraisal after all

Editor’s Note:  The Fed is doing everything in its power to maintain the real estate bubble in order to maintain demand- by lowering credit score requirements, offering lower down payments (1 to 3%), and now removing the lender’s responsibility for home valuations.  What could go wrong?

http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article157002859.html

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article157002859.html#storylink=cpy

Fannie Mae eases credit requirements boosting purchasing power by 22%

WOW! BIG Housing & Mortgage Easing News: This Changes Thing

https://mhanson.com/6-2-hanson-wow-big-housing-mortgage-easing-news-changes-things/

by

Fannie Mae pulls a 2006-style credit ease…this changes things.

 

QUESTION:  How do you know you that you are past mid-stage in a housing bubble? 

QUESTION:  How do you know that the overlords are worried about a housing market correction?

QUESTION:  How do you know the keepers-of-the-economy are worried that the mortgage-refi-capital-conveyor-belt coming to a halt will drag the US into recession?

 

ANSWERBecause Fannie Mae just eased credit guidelines to such a degree — specifically, ratcheted higher Debt-to-Income Ratio tolerances from 43% to 50% of GROSS INCOME – purchasing/refinancing power was increased over 20% instantly.

 

Remember, counter-cycle credit guidelines – loosening credit guidelines to fight a tightening credit cycle — is exactly what created BUBBLE 1.0 from 2003 to 2007.

 

Additionally, Fannie made it much easier for self-employed borrowers and ratcheted higher the LTV/CLTV/HCLTC allowances to 95% on all their loans (including interest only) to match the current 30-year fixed guidelines.

 

Bottom line:  This changes things at the margin;  INCREASES PUCHASE & REFINANCE POWER good credits by 22% and requires less down/equity, in order to compete with FHA. Put another way, somebody can suddenly buy 22% more house, or refinance a much larger loan, than they could previously on the same income with less down, or equity respectively.

 

Then, again, based on data I gather and watch daily it may be too late to keep house prices in the green. In fact, major, core metro regions will be printing NEGATIVE YY house prices this year;  he bubbliest parts of the San Fran Bay Area already are.

Think about it…when has .gov or the Fed ever acted truly proactively?  Perhaps Fannie’s models show house prices rolling over in the nearer-term and these changes are a hail-Mary to try to counter that.

 

BUT, this will also make it so the ultimate reversion to the mean is that much more destructive.

 

ITEM 1)  MY CHART SHOWS THAT GOING FROM 43% TO 50% DTI INCREASES PURCHASING POWER BY 22%.

43% vs 50% DTI MEANS A LOT

  1. The 1st column shows you could buy a $370k house with an income of $66k under the OLD, 43% DTI guidelines.
  2. NOW, (2nd column) you can buy a $450k house with the same income under the NEW, 50% DTI guidelines.  

Note, this assumes 20%, which is rare. At 5% down, purchase prices decline substantially but the 20% increase remains intact.

ITEM 2)  FANNIE MAE EASES GUIDELINES TO COUNTER RATE INCREASES (JUST LIKE DURING BUBBLE 1.0)

RED HIGHLIGHTS ARE MY EMPAHSIS. mH

New Fannie Mae DU Version Eases DTI Requirements

by: Jann Swanson

May 31 2017, 10:55AM

Fannie Mae has announced changes in underwriting for loans submitted to its Desktop Underwriter (DU), Version 10.1.  The new DU version will be implemented on or after the weekend of July 29. The changes are outlined in release notes issued on Tuesday and will apply to new loan casefiles submitted to DU on or after the weekend of July 29, 2017. Loan casefiles created in DU Version 10.0 and resubmitted after the weekend of July 29 will continue to be underwritten through DU Version 10.0.

Among the more significant changes accompanying the new version are the following.

  1. The maximum allowable debt-to-income (DTI) ratio that can be submitted in DU will be 50%. For DTIs between 45 and 50 percent, certain additional compensating factors will no longer be required. Cases exceeding a 50 percent DTI will receive an “ineligible” recommendation.
  2. The criteria that determines the documentation required to verify a self-employed borrower’s income will be updated and the number of DU loan casefiles eligible for the one year of personal and business tax return documentation requirements will increase.
  3. The maximum allowable LTV, CLTV, and HCLTV ratios (LTV ratios) for adjustable-rate mortgages will be aligned with fixed-rate mortgage LTV ratios for all transaction, occupancy, and property types, up to a maximum of 95%. Additional information on the effective dates of this change will be available in the Selling Guide.
  4. A loan casefile with a disputed tradeline that is approved with that information will no longer require further action. If such a loan casefile does not receive an Approve recommendation, the lender must determine the accuracy and completeness of the tradeline information. If the borrower is responsible and the information accurately and completely reports the account, then the lender may manually underwrite the loan if it is eligible. Tradelines reported as medical debt will continue to be excluded from the disputed tradeline identification and lenders are not required to investigate disputes.
  5. DU is regularly reviewed to determine if its risk analysis is appropriate. Version 10.1 will include an update to this risk assessment and it is expected to increase the percentage of Approve/Eligible recommendations received by lenders, particularly those with DTI rations between 45 and 50 percent.

The new DU version will also contain changes in or will generate new messages about underwriting issues in the following areas:

  • Income and Employment Updates
  • Property Inspection Waivers
  • Student Loan Cash-Out Refinance
  • Employment Offers
  • Multiple Financed Properties
  • Site Condo Reviews
  • Timeshares
  • Homebuyer Education

Version 10.1 will also support the final Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rule implementing amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) which modified the reportable data requirements related to collection of information of borrower ethnicity, race, and gender.

Fannie Mae says that with the release of the DU Version 10.1, Version 9.3 will be retired.  Effective the weekend of July 29, resubmissions of loan casefiles to the old version will not be accepted although applications and Underwriting Findings reports will still be available for viewing. To obtain an updated underwriting recommendation after the retirement date customers must create a new loan casefile.

http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/05312017_fannie_mae_lending.asp

Fannie Mae to lower Consumer Financial requirements in July

https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/fannie-mae-will-ease-financial-standards-for-mortgage-applicants-next-month/2017/06/05/9b391866-4a0b-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.0a7cb4349a37
It’s the No. 1 reason that mortgage applicants nationwide get rejected: They’re carrying too much debt relative to their monthly incomes. It’s especially a deal-killer for millennials early in their careers who have to stretch every month to pay the rent and other bills.But here’s some good news: The country’s largest source of mortgage money, Fannie Mae, soon plans to ease its debt-to-income (DTI) requirements, potentially opening the door to home-purchase mortgages for large numbers of new buyers. Fannie will be raising its DTI ceiling from the current 45 percent to 50 percent as of July 29.DTI is essentially a ratio that compares your gross monthly income with your monthly payment on all debt accounts — credit cards, auto loans, student loans, etc., plus the projected payments on the new mortgage you are seeking. If you’ve got $7,000 in household monthly income and $3,000 in monthly debt payments, your DTI is 43 percent. If you’ve got the same income but $4,000 in debt payments, your DTI is 57 percent.

In the mortgage arena, the lower your DTI ratio, the better. The federal “qualified mortgage” rule sets the safe maximum at 43 percent, though Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Housing Administration all have exemptions allowing them to buy or insure loans with higher ratios.

Studies by the Federal Reserve and FICO, the credit-scoring company, have documented that high DTIs doom more mortgage applications — and are viewed more critically by lenders — than any other factor. And for good reason: If you are loaded down with monthly debts, you’re at a higher statistical risk of falling behind on your mortgage payments.

Using data spanning nearly a decade and a half, Fannie’s researchers analyzed borrowers with DTIs in the 45 percent to 50 percent range and found that a significant number of them actually have good credit and are not prone to default.

“We feel very comfortable” with the increased DTI ceiling, Steve Holden, Fannie’s vice president of single family analytics, told me in an interview. “What we’re seeing is that a lot of borrowers have other factors” in their credit profiles that reduce the risks associated with slightly higher DTIs. They make significant down payments, for example, or they’ve got reserves of 12 months or more set aside to handle a financial emergency without missing a mortgage payment. As a result, analysts concluded that there’s some room to treat these applicants differently than before.

Lenders are welcoming the change. “It’s a big deal,” says Joe Petrowsky, owner of Right Trac Financial Group in the Hartford, Conn., area. “There are so many clients that end up above the 45 percent debt ratio threshold” who get rejected, he said. Now they’ve got a shot.

That doesn’t mean everybody with a DTI higher than 45 percent is going to get approved under the new policy. As an applicant, you’ll still need to be vetted by Fannie’s automated underwriting system, which examines the totality of your application, including the down payment, your income, credit scores, loan-to-value ratio and a slew of other indexes. The system weighs the good and the not-so-good in your application, and then decides whether you meet the company’s standards.

Fannie’s change may be most important to home buyers whose DTIs now limit them to just one option in the marketplace: an FHA loan. FHA traditionally has been generous when it comes to debt burdens: It allows DTIs well in excess of 50 percent for some borrowers.

But FHA has a major drawback, in Petrowsky’s view. It requires most borrowers to keep paying mortgage insurance premiums for the life of the loan — long after any real risk of financial loss to FHA has disappeared. Fannie Mae, on the other hand, uses private mortgage insurance on its low-down-payment loans, the premiums on which are canceled automatically when the principal balance drops to 78 percent of the original property value. Freddie Mac, another major player in the market, also uses private mortgage insurance and sometimes will accept loan applications with DTIs above 45 percent.

The big downside with both Fannie and Freddie: Their credit-score requirements tend to be more restrictive than FHA’s. So if you have a FICO score in the mid-600s and high debt burdens, FHA may still be your main mortgage option, even with Fannie’s new, friendlier approach on DTI.

New products could increase the number of investors shorting U.S. home loans

A sluggish mortgage-bond market could be jump-started by a new service that allows investors to short home loans.

Skeptics say the rise of derivatives on credit-risk transfer notes sold by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has echoes of the 2008 credit crisis, when the market plunged under the weight of collapsing subprime securities.

Fannie and Freddie – the biggest guarantors of U.S. home loans –  started transferring mortgage-default risk to bond funds and other investors in 2013 to help reduce risks to taxpayers according to Bloomberg. But the program has been generating more traction in recent months, after New York-based Vista Capital Advisors rolled out a pilot program that would eventually allow investors to bet on U.S. homeowner defaults.

Craig Phillips, a former BlackRock executive serving as head of financial markets advisory and client solutions for the Treasury Department, said credit-risk transfers will be core to U.S. housing policy.

The madness begins again with creative new derivatives and credit risk transfers that put the risk on the taxpayer.

Fannie, Freddie cut mortgage modification interest rate for first time in 2017

After four months of leaving the benchmark interest rate for standard mortgage modifications (not including HAMP mods) at an 18-month high, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac recently announced that they are cutting the benchmark rate.

Back in January, Fannie and Freddie increased the standard mortgage modification benchmark rate from 3.875% to 4.25%. That level is the highest the benchmark rate has been since July 2015.

Now, Fannie and Freddie are cutting the benchmark rate slightly, but leaving it above 4%. The government-sponsored enterprises announced last week that they are cutting the benchmark rate to 4.125%.

The January hike marked the second straight month of an increase, after Fannie and Freddie dropped the benchmark rate throughout 2016, progressively decreasing it below 4%.

The increases also came after the GSEs dropped the standard mortgage modification benchmark interest rate to the lowest level ever, 3.5%, in August 2016.

Then, the GSEs increased the benchmark rate from 3.5% to 3.875% in December, before hiking it well above 4% in January.

And now, they’re cutting it back a bit.

The benchmark rate tracks with prevailing market rates, and the most recent data from Freddie Mac shows that interest rates have generally been the decline (with some slight modulation) over the last several months.

The standard modification program is “designed to help those borrowers who are ineligible for the Home Affordable Modification Program.”

According to the GSEs, the standard modification program is “designed to help those borrowers who are ineligible for the Home Affordable Modification Program.

Therefore, the new rate does not extend to HAMP borrowers.

The new 4.125% interest rate took effect on May 12, 2017.

CitiBank Whisteblower Richard Bowen: They’re Back! Fannie and Freddie Ride Again

By Richard Bowen

http://www.richardmbowen.com/theyre-back-fannie-and-freddie-ride-again/

It looks as if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not learned from their previous enabling of banks leading to the financial crisis. In fact, it looks as if the two are still using the same business model; they are lowering even further their underwriting standards to allow loans to be underwritten, ignoring student, credit card and auto loans supposedly “paid by others.” Didn’t this kind of tactic fail before? 

Their creativity now extends to former college students who are so heavily burdened with student and other debt, so why not excuse the debt? Why not change the rules and allow mortgage lenders to ignore the debt that would prevent many students out of school to not be able to buy homes, cars, etc? Why not put them into more debt, not less and oh, by the way, maybe cripple the economy as they helped do before?!

Fannie Mae has just released new rules allowing millennial borrowers to exclude student loans, credit cards and auto loans that are “paid by someone else” when they are applying for a new mortgage. To further incent, taxpayer subsidized mortgage loans can also now be used to repay student debt.

According to Jonathan Lawless, Vice President of Customer Solutions, Fannie Mae, ”We understand the significant role that a monthly student loan payment plays in a potential home buyer’s consideration to take on a mortgage, and we want to be a part of the solution, …. These new policies provide three flexible payment solutions to future and current homeowners and, in turn, allow lenders to serve more borrowers.”

And, ironically, the person in charge of cleaning up these Wall Street rules is Craig S. Phillips, a former top executive on Morgan Stanley’s trading desk, who is now in charge to head up the effort to reform the Government-Sponsored Entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. At Morgan Stanley, Mr. Phillips headed a division that sold billions of dollars of toxic mortgages and mortgage-backed securities to Fannie, Freddie, and others.

Just this last April, Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times wrote in an article that Mr. Phillips, then  leader of Morgan Stanley’s mortgage desk during the peak mortgage-mania years of 2004 and 2005, ran the operation that bundled loans and sold them to the two government-sponsored enterprises and many others. The loans blew up, the government sued Morgan Stanley and Mr. Phillips was a named defendant in the initial case — a case that resulted in the firm paying a $1.25 billion settlement. 

Discussing the financial crisis in December 2008 at the National Press Club, Phillips said he felt terrible about the level of government support of the financial system at that time, but government actions such as injecting capital were “critical because we can’t have systematic failure and a breakdown in all markets.” 

As I commented in a recent article, before the 2008 debacle the push was on to make housing affordable for everyone, and Congress gave directives to loosen the underwriting standards. And, although this was certainly one of the reasons Fannie and Freddie had such catastrophic losses, I strongly believe that the primary reason Fannie and Freddie had the huge losses was that they purchased many, many mortgages which did not even meet that lowered bar of creditworthiness. That is, they did not review the individual mortgages purchased but relied almost solely upon false certifications by the large bank sellers that the mortgages sold met the published standards. 

It was a perfect storm: a lack of controls, the implicit guarantee the government would stand by the loan, and the assumption that the institutions doing the lending wouldn’t go under and were providing true certifications. No one was checking. It was a circus! And still continues to be one!

The more mortgages were purchased, the more incentives went straight to Fannie and Freddie and their executives, until their collapse, when they were bailed out and placed into conservatorshipThen, in a move some have described as nationalizing the entities, the US Treasury started taking all of their profits, thus ensuring they would never be able to rebuild a capital base.

Our country is now faced with the dilemma of what to do with Fannie and Freddie. Should they be recapitalized and returned to private ownership, or should another path more favorable to the large banks be followed?

What to do with Fannie and Freddie is a huge decision now facing President Trump’s administration. Bad enough we’re encouraging – read enabling, those who may not be able to afford more debt to do so. Yet to appoint someone with Mr. Phillips’ less than clean hands to make this decision is a travesty.

H.R. 1694 Passes: Fannie and Freddie Open Records Act of 2017

Homeowners start preparing your Fannie and Freddie FOIA requests.  A brief window to submit your request may occur prior to the GSEs being privatized again.

Last week H.R. 1694  passed in the House of Representatives.

This bill will make Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subject to the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, which would make their records available to the public on request.

The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) are government-sponsored enterprises (private corporations with federal charters that confer special privileges) that buy mortgages from lenders and either hold those mortgages in their portfolios or package the loans into mortgage-backed securities that may be sold.

To stabilize the housing market in the aftershock of the financial crisis, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) used its authority in 2008 to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into its conservatorship. In conservatorship, the government takes control of a failing financial institution with the goal of returning it to financial health and stockholder control. Well into their eighth year in conservatorship, they have operated under government control for longer than initially expected.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. §552) allows any person—individual or corporate, citizen or not—to request and obtain existing, identifiable, and unpublished agency records on any topic. Pursuant to FOIA, the public has presumptive access to agency records unless the material falls within any of FOIA’s nine categories of exception. Disputes over the release of records requested pursuant to FOIA can be appealed administratively, resolved through mediation, or heard in court.

Source: Republican Policy Committee

FannieGate: Obamacare Looting Scheme by diverting Fannie and Freddie Funds

Steve Mnuchin stated Monday on Fox News that President Obama engineered the “Net Worth Sweep” (NWS) in August 2012 to divert funds from the two Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) to pay for Obamacare, after Congress refused to fund the low-income insurance subsidies critical to keep afloat the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

“There is a Twitter conversation going on, and it has been going on for some time, about how President Obama needed money for Obamacare and he took from Fannie and Freddie. Is that true?” Bartiromo asked Mnuchin.

“It is true,” Mnuchin replied.

“They [the Obama administration] used the profits of Fannie and Freddie to pay for other parts of the government while they kept taxpayers at risk,” Mnuchin answered.

An examination of the Treasury Department’s balance sheet for Fiscal Year 2013 documented how the Obama administration diverted billions of dollars into Obamacare that Treasury confiscated from Freddie and Fannie earnings.

On Aug. 17, 2012, the Obama administration amendment the Treasury Department’s Senior Preferred Stock Agreements with Fannie and Freddie that deprived private and institutional investors of their legally due dividend payments.

This enabled the Obama Treasury Department to confiscate billions of dollars in Fannie and Freddie earnings, in what is known as the “Net Worth Sweep,” or NWS.

The point is Congress never funded any taxpayer funds to pay the low-income insurance subsidies that are at the core of making the ACA work.

Section 1402 of the ACA – is written to provide federal subsidies to insurance companies for insurance purchased on state insurance exchanges to cover the difference between the capped maximum a low-income purchaser could be expected to pay and the amount the insurance cost.

Without funds provided by Congress to pay the low-income insurance subsidies under 1402, Obamacare would have collapsed immediately.

On May 12, 2016, U.S. District Judge Rosemary Collyer, in the case U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, ruled against Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Matthews Burwell.

Judge Collyer decided HHS Secretary Burwell had no constitutional authority to divert funds Congress appropriated to one section of the ACA to fund Obamacare subsidy payments to insurers under another section of the ACA, Section 1402 – the clause defining the insurer subsidies – when Congress specifically declined to appropriate any funds to Section 1402 for paying the insurance subsidy.

“Paying out Section 1402 reimbursements without an appropriation thus violates the Constitution,” Judge Collyer concluded.

“Congress authorized reduced cost sharing but did not appropriate monies for it, in the Fiscal Year 2014 budget or since,” she stressed.

The Obama administration appealed the District Court decision in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, deciding on its own authority that federal funds could continue to be diverted from other budgetary purposes to continue paying the insurance subsidies as long as the case was under appeal.

If the Trump administration wants to end Obamacare, all that is necessary is to drop the Circuit Court appeal in Burwell, and the result the District Court decision would become established law.

By dropping the appeal, the Trump administration would rule out any further diversion of federal funds to pay the ACA insurance subsidies, and Obama care would implode.

Mnuchin: GSEs Won’t Stay ‘As-is’ for Long

  http://www.themreport.com/daily-dose/05-01-2017/mnuchin-gses-wont-stay-long

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should prepare for change—and sooner rather than later. According to Steven Mnuchin, the Trump administration won’t keep the status quo for long.

Mnuchin discussed the GSEs and housing reform in general as part of an interview with reporter Maria Bartiromo on Fox Business’ “Mornings with Maria” on Monday. Though he didn’t go into too much detail, he did say that privatizing the two Enterprises wasn’t necessarily the plan.

“I haven’t said they’d be privatized,” Mnuchin said. “What I have said is I’m committed to housing reform. We’re committed to not leaving them as-is for the next four years.”

The main goal of reforming the system? Mnuchin said its to keep housing affordable without putting American taxpayers in harm’s way.

“We want to make sure that there is ample credit for housing,” Mnuchin told Bartiromo. “It’s a very, very important part of the economy, but we also want to make sure we don’t put the taxpayers at risk. And as you know, those two companies only exist because we have a giant line from the Treasury that supports them.”

Mnuchin also talked briefly about a recent bill introduced by Kevin McCarthy in the House that aims to eliminate Fannie and Freddie’s exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. This Act, according to Bartiromo, allowed the Obama administration to reallocate GSE funds toward other parts of the government—including the Affordable Care Act—without public knowledge.

“They used the profits of Fannie and Freddie for other parts of the government, while they kept taxpayers at risk,” Mnuchin said.

Bartiromo and Mnuchin also covered the recently proposed tax plan, which aims to lower taxes on middle-income earners and businesses. To see the full interview, visit FoxBusiness.com.

The Trump administration has been making waves in the housing and financial services industries as of late. Two weeks ago, President Trump issued two executive orders, calling for a review of “too big to fail” as well as oversight of these organizations.

Mnuchin also came out in support of the Financial CHOICE Act last week, which is proposed as an alternative to the controversial Dodd-Frank Act.

Fannie Introduces “Innovative Solutions” so Millennials Drowning in Student Debt can Buy a Home

http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/media/financial-news/2017/student-loan-debt-6546.html

The massive student loan bubble the Feds created has resulted in a generation that is unable to afford a home like previous generations.  Millenials are often not able to find a job that provides a living wage and the ones that bought into the hype that an over-priced college degree provides value often graduate with tens of thousands of dollars in debt.  In order to address this issue, the Feds have whipped up a faux-solution: Lenders can simply ignore student debt!!!

Fannie Mae  released new borrowing rules  to allow millennial borrowers to EXCLUDE student loans, credit cards and auto loans that are “paid by someone else” when applying for a new mortgage.  In addition taxpayer subsidized mortgage loans can be used to repay student debt!  Thank you American Taxpayers for subsidizing a solution that will result in an even larger real estate bubble!

“Fannie Mae announced new policies that will help more borrowers with student debt qualify for a home loan. These innovations address challenges and obstacles to homeownership due to a significant increase in student loan debt over the past decade and provide access to credit for qualified borrowers. The new solutions give homeowners the opportunity to pay down student debt with a mortgage refinance, allow borrowers to exclude non-mortgage debt paid by others as part of the loan application process, and make it more likely for borrowers with student debt to qualify for a mortgage loan by allowing lenders to accept student debt payments included on credit reports.”

“Solutions” include:

Student Loan Cash-Out Refinance: Offers homeowners the flexibility to pay off high interest rate student debt while potentially refinancing to a lower mortgage interest rate.

Debt Paid by Others: Widens borrower eligibility to qualify for a home loan by excluding from the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio non-mortgage debt, such as credit cards, auto loans, and student loans, paid by someone else.

Student Debt Payment Calculation: Makes it more likely for borrowers with student debt to qualify for a loan by allowing lenders to accept student loan payment information on credit reports.

Fannie justifies its irresponsible practices by stating that, “We understand the significant role that a monthly student loan payment plays in a potential home buyer’s consideration to take on a mortgage, and we want to be a part of the solution,” said Jonathan
Lawless, Vice President of Customer Solutions, Fannie Mae. “These new
policies provide three flexible payment solutions to future and current
homeowners and, in turn, allow lenders to serve more borrowers.”

Just what the millennial need- a way to take on more debt while being unable to earn a living wage.  These policies serve to decrease housing inventory, increase prices, and maintain interest rate increases until the entire deck of cards comes tumbling down.  The interesting question would be, what happens after millenials start defaulting on both home and student loans- can the debt be erased through bankruptcy or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure?  If so- this may be a great deal for millenials who are saddled with debt for a good percentage of their lives!  In effect, a millennial could buy a home, roll in the student debt through a refi (see www.sofi.com) and then file for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy thus extinguishing all debt.  Since student debt is not extinguishable through bankruptcy except through hardship, this may be a viable strategy.

The federal government in collusion with the big banks invariably finds a way to artificially inflate markets, put the tax payer on the hook when the market tanks, and then profits from faux-settlements because of a failure to enforce its own laws.

 

GSE Bill would allow Homeowners to submit FOIAs to Fannie and Freddie while under Federal Conservatorship

By K.K. MacKinstry/LendingLies

Anyone who is trying to find out information about the trust ownership of their loan, knows that if Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are involved- your research hits a stone wall.  Homeowners who have a mortgage not secured by the GSEs are better able to determine what trust their loan was allegedly assigned to.  The GSEs who operate as quasi-governmental agencies are still private companies but have been able to evade public disclosures by claiming to not be federal entities.

Under current law, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because, while they are under federal conservatorship, they are not federal agencies.

The days of the GSEs hiding behind an ambiguous status may come to an end.   H.R. 1694 was introduced by Rep. Jason Chaffetz R-UT last week.     Under the proposed  bill, the GSEs would be required to accept and process FOIA requests from the public and release information to satisfy those request for as long as they remain under federal conservatorship.  This would allow homeowners in litigation and foreclosure to have access to trust information and other loan information.  You can be assured that the GSEs and private investors will fight all attempts to bring transparency to these opaque entities.

On March 28, 2017, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform requested a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office. The CBO estimated the bill would increase spending for Fannie, Freddie and the Federal Housing Finance Agency by $10 million over the 2018 to 2027 period. Revenues, however, would not be affected.

All the net costs would be covered by Fannie and Freddie because FHFA would assess the fees on the two entities to cover its costs.  Both Fannie and Freddie are profitable operations and the government has fought to relinquish federal conservatorship.  However, it can be predicted that Fannie and Freddie will attempt to revert back to publicly held companies rather than hide the fact that a majority of the loans it guarantees were never properly delivered to the trusts.

The increase in administrative costs wasn’t the only increase the Congressional Budget Office discovered. The office estimates that administrative costs would increase by $40 million in 2018 in order to research and administer FOIA requests.

This bill would only apply to the GSEs while they are under federal conservatorship, and the administration could have solidified plans for GSE reform. The Mortgage Bankers Association recently released its GSE reform suggestions that analyze suggestions for the best option for reform.  Therefore, if this legislation is passed we highly suggest that readers immediately send FOIA requests immediately by certified mail to obtain the name of the trust that allegedly holds your mortgage.

Steve Mnuchin, has already stated that GSE reform is a priority of this administration.  The MBA’s “Task Force for a Future Secondary Mortgage Market,” was created by big lenders and insurers in the industry, to offer a specific vision of the end-state of the GSEs, as well as transition steps to a post-GSE system.  Predictably,  the White Paper benefits the banks at the expense of the homeowner.

The paper breaks down specific areas for reform. It includes:

  • Maintain the liquidity and stability of the primary and secondary mortgage markets through the establishment of a resilient and robust housing finance system, throughout the transition process to the end state.
  • Replace the implied government guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with an explicit guarantee at the mortgage-backed security (MBS) level only, supported by a federal insurance fund with “appropriately” priced premiums (whatever that means).
  • “Protect” taxpayers by putting more private capital at risk through expanded front- and back-end “credit enhancements” (requiring that the government and tax payer pay for the guarantee).

The chart below is a snapshot from the white paper and gives a quick view of keys factors in the MBA’s GSE reform plans, comparing how the GSEs operated before and after conservatorship.

The paper emphasizes the need for affordable-housing as a political requirement for bipartisan GSE reform.  But in reality, the paper emphasizes the ability of the big lenders to step in for the GSEs and monopolize the profits, while having the federal government act as a guarantor only.

History demonstrates that big banks don’t do anything altruistic for homeowners and the plan would require a mandatory housing fee charged against the guarantors.  Therefore, the banks would receive all of the financial benefits while saddling the government and homeowner with the risk and expense.  It sounds like the type of plan the big banks would attempt to push on to an unsuspecting public.

It is likely that e-lending and e-documents would become the new standard so that the big banks can attempt to electronically manipulate a decade of defective loan documents through this system.  This is disguised under the “preserve infrastructure” clause.  The government and big banks have proven they are unable to administer responsible housing policies without resorting to fraud or protecting homeowners.

Homeowners and borrowers should vehemently oppose using big lenders that securitize loans or use e-signature loan products that can easily be manipulated and fabricated.  Do yourself a favor and bypass the big banks.  Credit unions, local banks and lenders that offer portfolio loans are an excellent alternative to having your loan backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

 

 

Matt Levine: Mortgage Math and Sympathetic Sales

Please refer to Bloomberg news for article about the Goldman Sachs/Fannie Mae non-performing loan purchases at:

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-20/mortgage-math-and-sympathetic-sales

 

Why would Goldman Sachs buy Delinquent and Defective Mortgages?

By the Lending Lies Staff

Just last year Goldman Sachs entered into settlements with state and federal governments over the sale of toxic mortgage backed securities to investors while subsequently shorting the very same securities they were selling.  Goldman would agree to provide $1.8 billion in debt relief to delinquent borrowers.  However, since Goldman (and likely no other identifiable party) doesn’t owns the debt, Goldman cuts its losses by repackaging the toxic debt, assigning it an AAA rating and selling it to unsuspecting investors and pension funds for a fee, thus off-loading any liability.  Goldman knows the feds won’t do anything to stop its crimes spree- so why not sell mortgage backed securities you know are toxic?

Goldman has once again successfully masterminded a new strategy to satisfy the $1.8 billion settlement without having to fund a dollar of that outstanding obligation, and while also profiting on this RICO scheme.

Goldman’s plan includes buying up billions of dollars of non-performing and defective loans at massive discounts.  Goldman just announced they were purchasing 4.5 billion dollars in non-performing loans from Fannie Mae.  It would be interesting to research if Fannie Mae discloses that these loans have material defects that cannot be remedied.

Goldman then contacts the homeowners and negotiates loan modifications by incentivizing the homeowner to participate by reducing their principle balance.  Most desperate and unsuspecting homeowners have no idea that Goldman is acting as a debt collector and there is no underlying party that owns the debt or has a right to modify the mortgage contract in the first place.  Once the modification is signed, in theory, a “new” loan is issued that rectifies all past endorsement, assignment and trust issues, while whitewashing all prior fraud.

The homeowner is now making payments on a new loan that is less than Goldman’s initial discount on the original purchase.  Goldman than credits the principle forgiveness against its $1.8 billion dollar mortgage relief obligation while making money!  Goldman is able to skirt the punishment and the fine costs them nothing because the debt was acquired at an even larger discount.

Finally, the true ingenuity of this plan emerges.  Once the loan is modified and performing, the loans can be repackaged and resold as Triple-A paper once again to unsuspecting buyers.

The Wall Street Journal reports that the debt scavengers at Goldman Sachs are the largest buyer of Fannie Mae’s non-performing loans, having purchased $5.7 billion worth of unpaid loans over the past several months.  Goldman Sachs should have been barred from ever participating in mortgage backed securities transactions after its last criminal enterprise.

Over the past year-and-a-half, Goldman Sachs has become the largest buyer of severely delinquent home loans from Fannie Mae. In fact, Goldman has acquired nearly two-thirds of $9.6 billion in loans the agency has auctioned off, representing unpaid loan balances in excess of $5.7 billion, according to the Wall Street Journal’s review of government records.

In all, Goldman has spent roughly $4.5 billion on some 26,000 Fannie-owned loans, according to government records. It has also been buying mortgages, from private sellers and Freddie Mac.  Apparently while everyone is unloading zombie mortgage loans, Goldman Sachs is buying as much toxic sludge that is available.

According to the government-sponsored enterprise, the portfolio was split into four pools of loans and auctioned off.

The winning bidder of the smallest of the four pools is Igloo Series II Trust (Balbec Capital). That pool contained 1,465 loans that carry an aggregate unpaid principal balance of $246,748,844.

The pool has an average loan size of $168,429; a weighted average note rate of 4.51%; a weighted average delinquency of 29 months; and a weighted average broker’s price opinion loan-to-value ratio of 78.75%.

The remaining $1.43 billion in unpaid principal balance went to MTGLQ Investors, a “significant subsidiary” of Goldman Sachs.

MTGLQ Investors is now a fixture among the NPL sales from both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Last year, MTGLQ Investors bought billion-dollar pools of NPLs from Fannie and Freddie in several different sales.

In this latest sale, MTGLQ Investors bought the remaining three pools of NPLs.

The first pool contained 3,062 loans that carry an aggregate unpaid principal balance of $496,205,215.

Goldman has an excellent business plan.  By renegotiating and repackaging worthless mortgage loans it can polish high-risk loans into grade-A paper.  The pension funds take on all of the risk if the homeowners default, and Goldman will have kicked the can down the road to the newest suckers in the scheme.

On Tuesday Goldman won the majority of defective loans at Fannie Mae’s latest auction, its largest to date. The bank bought about 8,000 loans with unpaid balances of $1.4 billion.

Goldman has paid between 50 and 90 cents on the dollar for the loans, according to Fannie Mae, however, some (if not all) of these loans are likely not worth a dime until fraudulently modified.

Meanwhile, because Goldman is getting credit toward fulfilling the terms of its settlement, it can afford to pay more for the delinquent loans than other competing bidders, which essentially means they’ve not only created but they have cornered an entire market.

 

Fannie, Freddie Plunge After Court Rules Hedge Funds Can’t Sue

Editor’s Note: Although the hedge funds and investors can’t claw back lost profits, perhaps they can sue on the rampant fraud committed by the GSEs.
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-02-21/fannie-freddie-plunge-after-court-rules-hedge-funds-cant-sue
Moments ago, the stocks of the nationalized GSEs – Fannies and Freddie – tumbled by over 30%, after a federal appeals court upheld a ruling that barred hedge funds from suing to overturn the U.S. government’s 2012 decision to capture billions of dollars in the profits generated by the mortgage guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after their bailout.According to Bloomberg, which first reported the ruling, some Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac investors still have a shot at money damages, based on when they acquired their shares and whether they did so before or after the Federal Housing Finance Agency was created and then imposed its control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They can pursue breach of contract claims, the appeals panel said in a split 2-1 decision Tuesday.

“It’s a little too early for me to announce what our response will be other than to say what these breach of contract claims were always the central claims in this case,” said Hamish Hume, a Washington-based attorney with Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, who represented some of the prevailing shareholders.

In place since January 2013, the controversial net worth sweep allowed the U.S. to recapture all of the $187 billion in taxpayer money it spent to stave off the companies’ collapse during the global fiscal crisis and as of 2016, at least $56 billion more. All of that without reducing Treasury’s liquidation stake in either firm.

As Bloomberg adds, the court, which included two judges selected by Republican presidents and one picked by a Democrat, heard arguments on April 15. It later allowed additional friend-of-the-court briefs to be filed by allies on each side, solicited still more submissions concerning a jurisdictional question and permitted the investors’ filing of evidence produced in sweep-related cases pending before other courts. Their ruling may yet be subject to U.S. Supreme Court review.

The U.S. Treasury Department press office did not immediately reply to an e-mailed request for comment. David Thompson, an attorney for the suing Fairholme Funds Inc. did not immediately respond to a voice-mail message seeking comment.

The appellate decision follows Fannie Mae’s Nov. 3 report in which it said it made a $3.2 billion profit in the third quarter of 2016, the company’s 19th straight quarterly profit. Those profits were more than the $1.96 billion earned in the same quarter a year earlier. The company had said it would send $3 billion to the Treasury in December, bringing its total payments to $154.4 billion.

 

Two days earlier, the smaller Freddie Mac said it made a $2.3 billion profit during the third quarter of this year and would send the same amount to the U.S.

 

Sweep terms let the companies retain an annually diminishing capital buffer that phases out in 2018, meaning any losses later sustained will require one or both to draw on taxpayer funds.

Meanwhile, some prominent hedge funds investors – most notably Bill Ackman and Richard Perry –  have been actively pushing the government to revert to the GSE status quo, as existed prior to the 2008 bailouts, convinced it would unlock substantial stakeholder value. Today, however, that won’t be the case.

Fannie and Freddie Launch Flex Modification Program: No Paperwork Required in Some Cases

By the Lending Lies Team

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have launched a new loan modification program for troubled mortgages known as “Flex Modification.”  The GSE’s have an issue with rising defaults and questionable paperwork and the Flex Modification allows them to modify the underlying defective “loan” and gloss over the false endorsements, assignments and chain of title issues.  Brilliant!

The new flexible loss mitigation tool is a combination of the impotent HAMP,  the Standard Modification, and the Streamlined Modification, and will replace the trio as early as March 2017.

Loan servicers are beginning to implement the Flex Modification at that time, but will be required to participate starting October 1st, 2017.

The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) expired at the end of December.

How the Flex Modification Works

It is obvious that Fannie and Freddie are attempting to lure as many homeowners in or near default inot the Flex Modification program.  Unlike the original HAMP modifications that required burdensome amounts of paperwork (that was intentionally lost), the required borrower documentation needed to get a loan modification under this new program is surprisingly minimal.

A major problem with HAMP was the complicated paperwork and long, drawn out processes.  Not to mention that loan servicers who had little incentive to modify a loan when they could foreclose, typically threw the homeowner’s application into the trash.

HAMP has been revised to make it easier for borrowers to get relief, and it appears those lessons have been applied to the new Flex Modification, at least in theory.  However, the reality is that a servicer who illegally forecloses on a home receives a financial windfall, compared to a paltry fee for modifying.

Fannie and Freddie claim that the Flex Modification will aim to lower monthly housing payments to help at-risk, delinquent borrowers avoid foreclosure.

Those who are less than 90 days behind on their mortgage must submit a Borrower Response Package (BRP) in order to be evaluated for a Flex Modification, which will target a 20% monthly payment reduction and a 40% Housing Expense-to-Income (HTI) Ratio.  Why such aggressive measures when the previous HAMP program would rarely reduce principal or monthly payments?  The GSE’s have always been hostile to homeowners wishing to modify preferring to foreclose.  Less than 40% of all applicants were given loan modifications.

Freddie Mac noted that a “high percentage” of those at least 60 days delinquent would be eligible, and in some cases it could also be an option for those who are current on the mortgage or less than 60 days late.

However, that latter group would need to occupy their homes in order to get relief.

For those more than 90+ days delinquent, the program targets the same 20% payment reduction, but requires no “borrower documentation.”

Likely this program will be used to grease the runways, as Timothy Geitner of the Fed admitted back in 2008 when HAMP was devised.   It appears that the GSEs know they have MAJOR issues with the underlying loans they guarantee and they are resorting to issuing modifications to wipe the slate clean.  I predict that there is language in the agreement that states the homeowner will not sue their servicer or the GSE’s once the loan is modified.  The GSEs, Fed and OCC are not benevolent entities- they are cold, calculating bankers where profit is all that matters.

In other words, they realize you’re in imminent danger of foreclosure and that they have major legal liabilities so they’re going to make it easy for you to get assistance.   Without knowing more about the program I can already tell it doesn’t pass the sniff test.

Perhaps this program will actually provide relief by lowering monthly mortgage payments.  It is likely that borrowers will be incentivized to hit the 90 day plus delinquent status to take advantage of the easier modification option also.  Not that it matters because the entire program appears to be created to “fix” loans that are damaged beyond repair.

It is interesting that many loan servicers are exiting the market while the GSEs are attempting to paper over their fraudulent history.  There are unseen forces in the background that are influencing change.  It appears that servicers and faux lenders are running scared or do they know something we don’t?

In any case, the program will also allow for principal forbearance to an 80% mark-to-market loan-to-value ratio (MTMLTV), but this amount must not exceed 30% of the unpaid principal balance.

Some key changes from the Standard Modification include:

• Housing-to-income ratio for borrowers less than 90 days delinquent changed from less than/equal to 55% to 40%
• No amortization choice for borrowers with an MTMLTV ratio of less than 80%
• Must now forbear principal down to a 100% MTMLTV ratio rather than the prior 115%

Flex Modification Eligibility

– Mortgage must be owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (GSEs do not own loans)
– Must be 60 or more days delinquent unless owner-occupied and in imminent default
– Must submit a Borrower Response Package (will the servicer actually process the package when they have more incentive to foreclose than modify?)
– Must have an eligible hardship
– Must verify income
– Must have been originated 12 months prior to evaluation date
– Must target a 20% principal and interest payment reduction and 40% front-end DTI
*If 90 days+ delinquent, a Borrower Response Package is not required, and servicer is not required to confirm a borrower’s hardship or income.

Ineligible for Flex Modification

– FHA, VA, and USDA loans
– Mortgages subject to recourse
– Mortgages secured by second homes or investment properties less than 60 days late
– Mortgages that have been modified three or more times previously
– Mortgages approved for a short sale or deed-in-lieu
– Mortgages under a different modification program
– Mortgages that don’t make it through the trial period or aren’t brought current

Why the Banks Fabricate and Forge Documents

We all know that the banks committed wholesale fraud on the government, on investors, on the the court system and on borrowers. They fabricated documents, forged them, altered them, and even paid off employees of Government agencies to do things that in normal circumstances would never be tolerated.

The question is why did the banks go so far off the rails doing what they have done for millennia — making loans and documenting them? The answer is that they lied about the origination and the alleged “transfers” of servicing rights, of trustee rights, and of course the rights of their self proclaimed entities to own or enforce the “closing documents.”

The answer is that they didn’t just fabricate the paper; they also fabricated the illusion of transactions that never took place in the real world. In the real world the history of transactions was much different than what is set forth in the PR releases, government filings and pleadings in court. Every lie became another opportunity for those “support” companies that fabricated notes, mortgages, assignments, signatures, payment schedules etc.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Here is Bill Paatalo’s follow up article on the Visionet system for fabricating signatures and entire documents.

======================

Remember Harvey Keitel’s “fixer” character in Pulp Fiction?  “I’m Winston Wolf. I solve problems.” He is a no-nonsense, hard character who treats his subjects with no emotion, lives for work, and prescribes a solution to an issue that most would see as self-evident.

In my recent article involving the document reproduction mill “Visionet Systems, Inc.” (See: http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/automated-affidavit-verifications-and-lost-note-reproductions-for-bank-vendors-its-standard-business-practice/), I investigate an assignment produced by Visionet in which MERS, as nominee for defunct Greenpoint,  purports to transfer the mortgage directly to the “New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1.”

During my investigation, I located Moody’s rating for this trust from June 2015 which announced, New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1 (NRMLT 2015-1) is a securitization of seasoned performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, will purchase on the closing date, in connection with the termination of various securitization trusts.” (See: https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-provisional-ratings-to-New-Residential-Mortgage-Loan-Trust–PR_327931).

So, here we have an admission (I’ll start by calling it “admission number one”) that loans going into this trust were previously securitized in “various securitization trusts” even though there is no documentation of any previous securitization transactions per the Visionet assignment, the Note, nor the county records for this particular property.

Here are some additional admissions within Moody’s announcement:

“Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

American Mortgage Consultants (AMC), conducted a compliance and data integrity review on a random sample of 367 loans from the pool. The regulatory compliance review consisted of a review of compliance with Section 32/HOEPA, Federal Truth in Lending Act/Regulation Z (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Protection Act/Regulation X (TILA), and federal, state and local anti-predatory regulations. AMC ordered HDI values on all loans in the securitization in addition to an updated broker price opinions (BPOs) on 336 properties, from Clear Capital.

Upon the review of 367 loans, AMC found that 202 loans have exceptions. The majority of these exceptions were due to missing HUD and/or TIL documents, under disclosed finance charge, or missing right to cancel disclosures. 19 loans had missing original loan files. For the loans where the HUD documents, TIL documents and/or the original loan files are missing, AMC was unable to complete the testing. Although the TPR report indicated that the statute of limitations for many of these issues already passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. In addition, some of these missing documents could prevent or materially delay activities such as foreclosure, loss mitigation and processing title claim under the related title insurance policy.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, is providing a representation and warranty for mortgage files. In this R&W, and to the extent that the indenture trustee, the master servicer, the servicer, the depositor or the custodian has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage loan document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding the completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the Mortgage Loan documents, and such missing document, defect or breach is preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization against the related mortgaged property through foreclosure or similar loss mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title claim under the related title insurance policy, the party with such actual knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or missing document, as applicable, to the seller, the indenture trustee, the depositor, the master servicer, the servicer and the custodian. Upon notification of a missing or defective mortgage loan file, the seller will have 120 days from the date it receives such notification to deliver such missing document or otherwise cure such defect or breach. If it is unable to do so, it will be obligated to replace or repurchase the mortgage loan. In our analysis we assumed that 10% of the projected default will have missing documents’ breaches that will not be remedied and result in higher than expected loss severity.”

Admission number two reveals that a compliance review exposed that nearly 55% of the loans being re-securitized had regulatory and compliance issues, including missing loan files. Moody’s seems to downplay these issues due to its belief that the statute of limitations for all this chicanery has likely run its course. But then we have admission number three – 10% of the projected default will have missing documents’ breaches that will not be remedied and result in higher than expected loss severity.”

“Will not be remedied?” Time to call in the “fixer.”

So, I looked to see who is behind “NRZ Sponsor V, LLC;” the entity providing the representations and warranties for the files. Lo and behold, it’s none other than “New Residential Investment Corp.” and its CEO/President – Michael Neirenberg. (See 10-Q: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1556593/000155659315000011/nrz-2015630x10xq.htm#s262E0972E7E05C46ADEB9296D5C183F9).

From this Deadly Clear article,

(https://deadlyclear.wordpress.com/2013/08/05/where-are-bear-stearns-mortgage-executives-now/)

“Four of the executives, Thomas Marano, Jeffrey Verschleiser, Michael Nierenberg and Jeffrey Mayer, have been accused of making false statements in disclosures to federal regulators in a lawsuit brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees government-owned mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  They are among dozens of people and companies named in the lawsuit. [Click here for Complaint]

All four denied all the allegations in a 179-page response to the lawsuit.

The four “deny that the offering documents referenced contained material misstatements of fact or omissions of material facts,” according to the answer jointly filed by the Bear Stearns companies and the individual defendants from Bear.”

This is the guy who is going to vouch for the loan files? Yes, because his disclosures in the 10-Q state he is required to make these reps and warranties to appease his financing facilities, even though ultimately, the reps and warranties could be deemed inaccurate.

Per the 10-Q:

“Our borrowings collateralized by loans require that we make certain representations and warranties that, if determined to be inaccurate, could require us to repurchase loans or cover losses.

Our financing facilities require us to make certain representations and warranties regarding the loans that collateralize the borrowings. Although we perform due diligence on the loans that we acquire, certain representations and warranties that we make in respect of such loans may ultimately be determined to be inaccurate. In the event of a breach of a representation or warranty, we may be required to repurchase affected loans, make indemnification payments to certain indemnified parties or address any claims associated with such breach. Further, we may have limited or no recourse against the seller from whom we purchased the loans. Such recourse may be limited due to a variety of factors, including the absence of a representation or warranty from the seller corresponding to the representation provided by us or the contractual expiration thereof.”

Does anyone really believe that NRZ would repurchase these “hot potatoes” or cover losses on them? Time to call in the “fixer.”

So, here we have admission number five. NRZ will be making representations and warranties regarding loans it purchased from Sellers, who may not have had any documentation of the loans it was selling to NRZ.

This sounds like a “Fencing Operation.”

“A fence or receiver is an individual who knowingly buys stolen property for later resale, sometimes in a legitimate market. The fence thus acts as a middleman between thieves and the eventual buyers of stolen goods who may not be aware that the goods are stolen.”

So, where did NRZ buy this assigned loan, as well as all the others? Again, per the 10-Q:

“Representations and warranties made by us in our loan sale agreements may subject us to liability.

In March 2015, HLSS sold reperforming loans to an unrelated third party and transferred mortgages into a trust in exchange for cash. [THIRD-PARTY WHO? WHAT TRUST?] We may be liable to purchasers under the related sale agreement for any breaches of representations and warranties made by HLSS at the time the applicable loans are sold. Such representations and warranties may include, but are not limited to, issues such as the validity of the lien; the absence of delinquent taxes or other liens; the loans compliance with all local, state and federal laws and the delivery of all documents required to perfect title to the lien. If the purchaser is successful in asserting their claim for recourse, it could adversely affect the availability of financing under loan financing facilities or otherwise adversely impact our results of operations and liquidity. From time to time we sell residential mortgage loans pursuant to loan sale agreements. The risks describe in this paragraph relate to any such sale as well.”

Ah yes, HLSS and Bill Erbey. Need I say more?

(www.thedealnewsroom.tumblr.com/post/…/fortress-exploited-a-cayman-islands-loophole-)

“HLSS struck the deal under severe pressure from regulators, lenders, investors, and ratings agencies. A Dec. 19 settlement between Ocwen and the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) had upset a delicate ecosystem of five interrelated companies including Ocwen, HLSS, Altisource Portfolio Solutions (ASPS), Altisource Residential (RESI) and Altisource Asset Management (AAMC) Bill Erbey, Chairman and de facto leader of all five companies, was forced to resign from those positions. The California Department of Business Oversight was threatening to suspend Ocwen’s license in that state. That put pressure on HLSS because its business and Ocwen’s were so closely interrelated.”

This is a cesspool. When it comes to chain of title, it all sounds like a line from SpongeBob Squarepants:

“I knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy, who knew this guy’s COUSIN….”

One thing is crystal clear from all of this. The chain of title is so corrupted and fatally defective for these loans that it would be virtually impossible to legally prove ownership in a foreclosure action without first calling in a “fixer” such as Visionet Systems, Inc. to create the illusionary paper trail.

It is also crystal clear that at least 1 out of every 10 foreclosures being brought by the servicer for “New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1” will contain counterfeit documents, to which there will be a servicer witness raising his/her right hand, and swearing that this trust owns the loan and holds the “Original Note.”

 

Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID#49411

Bill.bpia@gmail.com

 

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