JUDICIAL NOTICE EXPOSED

Posted on March 6, 2017 by Neil Garfield
JUDICIAL NOTICE is just one more legal device by which Banks and Servicers introduce fake documents or documents they can’t get because they are “lost”.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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The use of Judicial notice is widespread. Banks attempt to use it in order to get something into evidence they could not otherwise prove. Homeowners use it for the same reason. Usually both are mistaken in the use of Judicial notice and the Court is in error for accepting it unless the other side fails to raise a proper objection. Like most things, if you fail to object the document or record will be in evidence. That still leaves the issue of how much weight to give the document as evidence.
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Generally Judicial Notice is meant to allow introduction of a document that is in the Public Domain and which is maintained by a government institution. Technically the only proof issue that is satisfied by granting judicial notice is that the document exists. What is written on the document or record introduced by way of Judicial Notice is NOT in evidence — only that the document exists. Thus when homeowners try to use judicial notice of something derogatory about the banks or servicers, all they have is a recognition that this document or report is in the public domain — not that the words themselves are true or even in evidence.
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The strategy of the Banks and servicers is to file something somewhere in the public domain and then ask for judicial notice without proper foundation for the documents or its contents. The banks and servicers extend this even further if they can get away with it — by getting the Court to take judicial notice of the note, mortgage or assignment. Or by getting the court to accept into evidence the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
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Objections raised on the basis of lack of notice, hearsay, hearsay on hearsay, lack of foundation, and other rules of evidence should be employed aggressively. However this is a two-edged sword. If the Banks get it in they will then argue that since the homeowner is not a party to the PSA the homeowner is barred from raising violations of the PSA as a trust instrument. If the Banks fail to proffer the PSA or fail to get the Court to accept judicial notice they will proceed anyway arguing that the provisions of the PSA are irrelevant anyway.
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In fact if you drill down in cross examination you will probably find that it is the self-proclaimed servicer who is the real party in interest with apparent possession of the original note and mortgage, but which in truth are newly minted, doctored or entirely fabricated, instruments that appear at trial.
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If you look at the Florida Rules (most states are the same or similar) you will see that even the SEC site is questionable as a source of documents because the documents are not certified. In truth ANYONE can file ANYTHING on the SEC site and then try to get it accepted into evidence — even though the document (PSA) is not even signed or is not even complete.
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But regardless of the action by the court the proponent of a document or record introduced by Judicial Notice must still prove the truth of the matter asserted in the document. it is no different than introducing the document using as foundation the testimony of a witness (usually a robo-witness). But there again the testimony of the witness is going to be that the document is some sort of business record. The actual source of the document is almost always guarded and concealed by the Banks and Servicers.
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The reason is that many or most of the Bank and Servicer documents are fabricated, forged, robo—signed instruments that are self-serving and not based upon anything that happened in real life. The truth, difficult to prove but nonetheless true, is that the document the so-called business records of the servicer are neither business records of the servicer nor of the alleged REMIC Trust but rather come into real life by way of a printer that prints records and documents fabricated and maintained by a third party “vendor” like LPS/Black Knight in Jacksonville, Florida.
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The change in servicer thus involves no actual “boarding” process, since LPS operates like MERS. Anyone can have access and the transfer of the records is really a transfer of access to the IT platforms of LPS where the data and documents are manipulated to create the illusion of generally accepted and facially valid records or documents.
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Florida Statute §90.202 Matters which may be judicially noticed.—A court may take judicial notice of the following matters, to the extent that they are not embraced within s. 90.201:
(1) Special, local, and private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the Florida Legislature.
(2) Decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of every other state, territory, and jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) Contents of the Federal Register.
(4) Laws of foreign nations and of an organization of nations.
(5) Official actions of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(6) Records of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(7) Rules of court of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(8) Provisions of all municipal and county charters and charter amendments of this state, provided they are available in printed copies or as certified copies.
(9) Rules promulgated by governmental agencies of this state which are published in the Florida Administrative Code or in bound written copies.
(10) Duly enacted ordinances and resolutions of municipalities and counties located in Florida, provided such ordinances and resolutions are available in printed copies or as certified copies.
(11) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
(12) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.
(13) Official seals of governmental agencies and departments of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 1, ch. 77-174; ss. 3, 22, ch. 78-361; ss. 1, 2, ch. 78-379.
Florida Statutes § 90.203 Compulsory judicial notice upon request.—A court shall take judicial notice of any matter in s. 90.202 when a party requests it and:
(1) Gives each adverse party timely written notice of the request, proof of which is filed with the court, to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request.
(2) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.
History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 22, ch. 78-361; s. 1, ch. 78-379.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Ocwen Employee admits she “Creates needed Documents”

Posted on June 25, 2016 by Neil Garfield
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Does Ms. Wilson know that fabricating securities is a federal crime?

By the Lending Lies Team

Those of us the foreclosure defense industry don’t experience much laughter. For hours each day we try to provide guidance to people who have been victimized by their servicer, attorney and/or the courts. Often, by the time they come to us, the homeowner is in emergency-mode.

Yesterday, we did have a good laugh. While doing some preliminary research on a “corrective” Assignment of Deed of Trust, we did a little background on an employee at Ocwen who had signed the assignment.  We discovered a profile for the document signer Amber K. Wilson on the Linked-in website.

It appears that Amber K. Wilson has been a Servicing Operations Specialist at Ocwen since May 2015. Located in Iowa, Amber was looking for an, “entry level position that offers internal growth potential” and requires that she, “be able to be a leader as well as follow instructions.” It looks like she may have landed her dream job as a Servicing Operations Specialist at Ocwen Loan Servicing. There is no doubt that she has job security in the burgeoning field of document fabrication, or that she can follow instructions by signing deceptive documents by the thousands.

According to her profile on Linked-in, Ms. Wilson says her current duties include, “Researching Mortgage Documents to verify a full Chain of Title is present. If it is not create the needed Documents (sic). Work from Excel Spread Sheet daily as well as several internal data programs.” Is Amber K. Wilson admitting on a public website that Ocwen Loan Servicing  creates documents to create a “proper Chain of Title” if there are errors?

It is fraudulent to recreate a chain of assignment with fabricated documents to create the appearance the current servicer has standing. As Neil Garfield has repeatedly pointed out- copies of the note and assignment don’t document an actual transaction (sale, transfer)- they are nothing but window dressing to create the illusion an event occurred.  Homeowners and their attorneys MUST obtain proof that a transaction actually occurred- not simply rely on documents that paint a story the service hopes to tell.

Amber began her job at Ocwen during March 2014 as a customer service representative where she “helped” homeowners with service issues. She is likely well versed in Ocwen’s documented practice of providing disinformation to ensure a default. Ocwen was recently forced to pony up $30 million to resolve lawsuits that claimed it didn’t properly include disclosures for loans it was servicing.

Amber operates a side business called Amber Wilson Imagery so she may have an eye for detail. Her background at Grainger (through Manpower), opening boxes at a Target distribution warehouse and assembling bathroom cabinetry likely provided excellent preparation for her current duties analyzing complex securitizations, real estate documentation and verifying they are accurate.

In this case, the Deed of Trust Amber K. Wilson signed is a complete sham and is referred to as a “corrective assignment” in an attempt to perfect two incorrect assignments filed 3 and 5 years before. The document in question lists a bankrupt Taylor, Bean, Whitaker/MERS assigning the Note to US Bank. Amber’s notarized signature witnesses a complete fictitious transaction.

Unfortunately for the homeowner who is a Vietnam Vet and the victim of these sham documents filed in the county records by Ocwen, he may become homeless unless he is able to find an attorney to stop this fraudulent foreclosure from proceeding. He served his country, is in poor health due to a dousing of Agent Orange, and his country does nothing to stop predatory servicers from taking advantage of our nation’s most vulnerable- our veterans, the elderly, and families who were offered predatory loans the lender knew would fail.

I wonder if Ms. Wilson, in pursuit of a glamorous career in the field of document fabrication realizes that she is verifying a legal document in which she has no personal knowledge, engaging in illegal practices, and assisting a corporation in stealing homes they don’t own.

The take away message from this post is that homeowners should research everyone listed on their loan documents. Who did they work for? Who do they work for now, and who did they work for when the note or assignment was signed?  Compare their signatures on different documents- do they match or it likely someone else has signed their name?  Is the signer named in other lawsuits?

 

I look forward to the judge reviewing Ms. Wilson’s job description on Linked-In. It would be great to depose Ms. Wilson.   It is a federal crime to forge or fabricate assignments, notes and file them in the country records.  Any falsified documents should result in sanctions for servicers and their attorneys.   This little fun fact on Ms. Wilson likely won’t result in a slam-dunk win to defeat foreclosure but it does demonstrate that Ocwen is engaging in fabricating documents and doesn’t bother to educate their employees not to broadcast this crime on a public website.

By the way, shame on you Ms. Wilson and shame on your employer.

 

Say Hello: https://www.linkedin.com/in/amber-wilson-18616b87

 

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , | 41 Comments »

What the Media is Missing About the “Securitization” of “Mortgage” Loans

Posted on March 21, 2016 by Neil Garfield

The Banks called it “The Hustle”. So why is anyone thinking it was anything other than a hustle?

Judges need to reconsider their positions. They need to make the choice between their false perception of a “free house” and a “get of jail free card.”

The plain facts are that those so-called REMIC Trusts do not and never have existed as operating entities. They exist on paper and have no legal significance because they never were in operation. It is not just that the paperwork was fabricated, back-dated and forged. It’s that the presumed transactions never happened. That is why Adam Levitin refers to it as “securitization Fail.”

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WE HAVE REVAMPED OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS TO MEET THE REQUESTS OF LAWYERS AND HOMEOWNERS. This is not an offer for legal representation. In order to make it easier to serve you and get better results please take a moment to fill out our FREE registration form https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1453992450583 
Our services consist mainly of the following:
  1. 30 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  2. 60 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  3. Case review and analysis
  4. Rescission review and drafting of documents for notice and recording
  5. COMBO Title and Securitization Review
  6. Expert witness declarations and testimony
  7. Consultant to attorneys representing homeowners
  8. Books and Manuals authored by Neil Garfield are also available, plus video seminars on DVD.
For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. You also may fill out our Registration form which, upon submission, will automatically be sent to us. That form can be found at https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1452614114632. By filling out this form you will be allowing us to see your current status. If you call or email us at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com your question or request for service can then be answered more easily.
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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Pennymac and CW

http://fortune.com/2012/10/02/countrywide-its-baaack/

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/business/an-unfinished-chapter-at-countrywide.html?_r=0

“High Speed Swim Lane,”<<< another term for “The Hustle” which was run by Rebecca Mairone .

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-30/bank-of-america-s-countrywide-ordered-to-pay-1-3-billion

Even investigative journalists are missing the obvious. Either they lack the knowledge to report correctly on the subject or they have been instructed to stay away from Wall Street corruption. The plain facts are that those so-called REMIC Trusts do not and never have existed as operating entities. They exist on paper and have no legal significance because they never were in operation. An empty trust has no legal significance.

It is not just that the paperwork was fabricated, back-dated and forged. It’s that the presumed transactions never happened. That is why Adam Levitin refers to it as “Securitization Fail.” And that is the whole reason for fabrication, forgery, backdating and robo-signing of documents. If the transactions were real, nobody would have needed to go to DOCx, LPS (now “Black Knight”) et al to create the documents that created the illusion of reality.

The questions that have NOT been asked include but certainly are not limited to the following:

1. How could the Big Banks be carrying bad loans on their balance sheet? AND the corollary question is how they could be the seller of those loans. The answer is that they cast themselves  as the seller of loans so they could book “trading profits” on loans where they were not the lender. In doing so they were asserting positions that were diametrically opposed to the positions taken in foreclosure actions — that the “lender” was whoever is on the note and mortgage. So on one hand the TBTF banks are asserting they made the loans, they own the loans and they were losing money as a result of non-payment by the borrowers and the other hand they are having their puppet players assert that they are the lenders who originated or acquired the loan. Which is it? ANSWER: NEITHER! The banks used the money of all investors from a commingled fund undifferentiated by any of the Trust acronyms, and then claimed whatever was convenient. And nobody is talking about this crime. The investors are the ONLY parties with an equitable claim for payment but are not protected by either the false note or false mortgage — both of which were converted to the apparent ownership of dozens of players who participated in this scheme. In the meanwhile the Banks and servicers are eating away at any semblance of recovery for the investors by asserting improper claims for fees, costs and advances.

If you sit down with pencil and paper you can understand that by hiding a 10% APR loan in a 5% APR portfolio they were able to “sell” the loan to the “trust” — on paper without any consideration — and book a false “trading profit” equal to the amount of the loan. Do the Math. The media is either ignoring the truth or don’t understand it.
Those trusts were never active, never got any money from the sale of their “mortgage backed securities”, never had a bank account and never had a financial statement, which on the reporting trusts would have been filed with the SEC. Instead they filed rule 15 forms saying they had nothing further to report.
They are hiding behind the cloak of another part of that rule that says reporting can stop when the number of investors falls below 300. But these trusts never had more than 300 investors at inception or any other time. They only filed on some of the trusts to give the appearance of propriety when in fact the BANKS were taking the entire proceeds of the sale of the mortgage backed securities issued BY THE TRUSTS and pocketing it. Then they used only as much of the Investor money as was necessary to give the appearance of a loan pool that was originated or acquired by the trust when no such transaction ever occurred. In short the were treating the offering of MBS issued by the Trust as though it was offering of the Bank. The “Trust’ was merely a 100% controlled entity of the Bank existing only on paper and not at law.

2. The same logic applies to the sale of the mortgage backed securities. The banks were not buying them, they were selling them. So the entire “loss” myth is merely a continuation of the fraud the Banks perpetrated on the investors and then the borrowers — violating the law and creating the illusion of a lender who was really not the lender.

That is important because it violates the federal law against the practice of table-funded loans. But more importantly, a party who does not loan money to a borrower has no right to be on the note and mortgage. And parties who make claims based upon the note and mortgage are really pursing their own interests and thus perpetrating a fraud upon the court, contrary to the interests of the investors whose money was procured by trick and deceit.

Lately some court have started allowing discovery to pursue this “theory” of the defense. The Banks are screaming. Enforcement of those discovery orders would reveal the true nature of the largest economic crime in human history. And the assumption expressed by many judges in open court that these are things that can be worked out by the parties later is belied by the fact that the Banks are continuing to steal what is left of the investments.

That “assumption” by the court is legislating from the bench and in direct conflict with Federal and State law regarding lending and property.

That assumption by the courts has opened a door to moral hazard that is wreaking havoc already on the West Coast and undoubtedly will soon be seen on the East Coast — total strangers discovering apparent debts owned by consumers in all sorts of loans, sending the “borrower” notices and then pressing for collection or even foreclosure. That is exactly what was revealed in the San Francisco, Osceola and dozens of other studies. Judges need to reconsider their positions. They need to make the choice between their false perception of a “free house” and a “get of jail free card.”

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments »

Reminder: President of DOCX Pled Guilty to Fabricating and Forging Documents

Posted on February 8, 2016 by Neil Garfield
WE HAVE REVAMPED OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS TO MEET THE REQUESTS OF LAWYERS AND HOMEOWNERS. This is not an offer for legal representation. In order to make it easier to serve you and get better results please take a moment to fill out our FREE registration form https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1453992450583 
Our services consist mainly of the following:
  1. 30 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  2. 60 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  3. Case review and analysis
  4. Rescission review and drafting of documents for notice and recording
  5. COMBO Title and Securitization Review
  6. Expert witness declarations and testimony
  7. Consultant to attorneys representing homeowners
  8. Books and Manuals authored by Neil Garfield are also available, plus video seminars on DVD.
For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. You also may fill out our Registration form which, upon submission, will automatically be sent to us. That form can be found at https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1452614114632. By filling out this form you will be allowing us to see your current status. If you call or email us at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com your question or request for service can then be answered more easily.
================================

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Article by Lynn Symoniak

On November 20, 2012, Lorraine O’Reilly Brown, the former president of mortgage-document mill, DocX, LLC, a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, pleaded guilty in federal court in Jacksonville, Florida to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud.  DocX produced over one million mortgage assignments.  These assignments were used in foreclosures across the country. Brown admitted that she knew that these assignments were being prepared to use in foreclosures.

In tens of thousands of cases, these fraudulent documents were used by mortgage-backed trusts to show that the trust acquired a mortgage.  The information on these assignments was false – the trusts did not acquire the mortgages on the date set forth on these DocX Assignments.

Signatures were forged, notarizations were wrongly added to create an appearance of authenticity.  Job titles were falsely claimed.

Which trusts used these phony DocX-prepared mortgage assignments?  The trusts that used these Mortgage Assignments to foreclose include those listed below, with the name of the trustee following the name of the trust.

ABFC TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

ABFC 2004-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2005-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2005-HE1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-HE1 (U.S. Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

ACE SECURITIES CORP. HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST & TRUSTEES

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-OP1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-NC1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-OP1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-OP2 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2007-HE5 (HSBC Bank)

 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE ASSETS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AHM Assets Trust, 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-3 (Citibank Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-4 (Citibank Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-5 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-6 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-4 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-5 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-6 (Deutsche Bank)

 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-3 (Citibank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-4 (Bank of NY)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-4 (U.S. Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-SD1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-5 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-8 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-AR1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R9 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R2 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R4 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R5 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R6 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R8 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R9 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R10 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R11 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust ARSI 2006-M3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R2 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

 

ARGENT SECURITIES INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Argent Securities, Inc. 2003-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2003-W6 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2004-W10 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2004-W11 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W4 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W5 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-M1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-M2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W4 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W5 (Deutsche Bank)

 

ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE5 (U.S. Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2005-HE6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE3 (U.S. Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE5 (U.S. Bank)

 

BANC OF AMERICA FUNDING CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Banc of America Funding Corp. Mort. PT Certs., 2008-1 (U.S. Bank)

 

BEAR STEARNS AB SECURITIES I TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Bear Stearns AB Securities I Trust 2006-AC3 (U.S. Bank)

 

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1 (Wells Fargo)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AMC1 (Deutsche Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE2 (U.S. Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-SHL1 (HSBC Bank)

 

DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES MORT. LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AR6 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2007-1(HSBC Bank)

 

DEUTSCHE ALT-B SECURITIES MORT. LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB2 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB3 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB4 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2007-AB1 (HSBC Bank)

 

GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST & TRUSTEES

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (U.S. Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-9 (U.S. Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-10 (Deutsche Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-11 (Deutsche Bank)

 

GSAMP TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

GSAMP 2004-OPT (Deutsche Bank)

 

GSR NORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1 (U.S. Bank)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-14 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5 (Deutsche Bank)

 

HSI ASSET SECURITIZATION CORP. “OPT” TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2005-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2007-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2007-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust, 2007-AR1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

IXIS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

JP MORGAN ACQUISITION CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT2 (U.S. Bank)

 

LUMINENT MORTGAGE TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-7 (HSBC Bank)

 

MASTR ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA1 (U.S. Bank)

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-1 (U.S. Bank)

 

MASTR ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2006-2 (Bank of New York)

 

MASTR ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT2 (Wells Fargo)

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2 (Wells Fargo)

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1 (Wells Fargo)

 

MERRILL LYNCH MORT. INVESTORS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Merrill Lynch Mort. Investors Trust, 2004-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Merrill Lynch Mort. Investors Trust, 2006-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

 

MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I, INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2004-OP1 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2005-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2005-HE2 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2007-NC3 (Deutsche Bank)

 

NOMURA HOME EQUITY TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Nomura Home Equity Loan 2005-HE1 (HSBC Bank)

 

NOVASTAR MORTGAGE FUNDING TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

 

OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-5 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-CP1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-FXD1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-FXD2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-HL1 (HSBC Bank)

 

QUEST TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Quest Trust 2006-X1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

SAXON ASSET TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank Americas)

 

SECURITIZED ASSET-BACKED RECEIVABLES, LLC TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2004-OP1 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2004-OP2 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2005-OP2 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2006-OP1 (Wells Fargo)

 

SECURITIZED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Securitized Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-4

 

SG MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT1 (HSBC Bank)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT2 (HSBC Bank)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-OPT2 (HSBC Bank)

 

SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN “OPT” TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT5 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT5 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC9 (Bank of America)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-11 (Bank of America)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-3 (U.S. Bank)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II , INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Mort. Investments II, Inc. 2006-AR5 (JP Morgan Chase)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2003-BC10 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2003-BC11 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2004-3 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-SC1 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-BC2 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-BC6 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , | 27 Comments »

Chase Found Guilty (AGAIN) for Fabricating and Uttering False Documentation: CA Appeals Award $250,000+ Attorney Fees

Posted on September 22, 2015 by Neil Garfield

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

This article is not a substitute for a legal opinion from an attorney licensed to practice in the jurisdiction in which your property is located. Get a lawyer.

===============================

see http://www.housingwire.com/articles/30540-chases-fraudulent-foreclosure-court-says-executive-falsified-documents

In January Patrick Giunta and I won a case against US Bank, Chase and SPS. The basis was simple. The Trust never acquired the loan. Thus US bank failed to establish standing. The Plaintiff was US Bank as trustee for the certificate holders, but the real player was Chase who then slipped in SPS as a “Successor” to the “Servicing” of the a loan in which there were no servicing duties. At trial they tried coming up with new fabricated documents and the Judge refused to admit them into evidence. Not only were the documents fabricated but also the “business records” showing a mixed bag of tricks with reversals of payments received and money going in and out of escrow that clearly could not be reconciled. The robo-witness could not come up with a default date nor could he reconcile the amount demanded for reinstatement with any terms of the loan.

Why was Chase operating behind the scenes creating these bogus claims? Also a simple answer. They wanted to stop making “servicer advance” payments, get the foreclosure and the sale and then eat up all the proceeds of sale with their false claims for fees, “recovery” of servicer advances and other claims.

In this case, reported by housing wire.com, there are many similarities:

JPMorgan Chase (JPM) created and recorded false documentation that showed the bank owned the mortgage of two California residents in order to foreclose on their home, the California Court of Appeals stated in a ruling Monday.

The Kalickis sued WaMu in 2009, alleging that the bank wrongfully foreclosed on their property in 2008. In 2010, Chase was granted a motion to intervene because it had purchased WaMu’s assets and held the interests in the loan.

The Kalickis amended their complaint to add Chase as a defendant and dismissed WaMu from the suit. In the complaint, the Kalickis alleged that Chase claimed ownership of their loan based on fraudulent documents.

In September 2012, a trial court in California ruled in favor of the Kalickis, stating that they owned the property and quieted the title in their favor.

The court also found that Chase had executed and recorded false documentation that showed that the ownership of the Kalickis’ mortgage was transferred to Chase. The court also ruled that a Chase executive created a document that “fraudulently represented that a prior assignment had been lost and that Chase owned the Kalickis’ mortgage.”

The lower court ruling voided all of the fraudulent documents and prohibited Chase from recording any false or misleading documents representing that it owned the Kalickis’ mortgage.

The court later found in the Kalickis’ favor and awarded them “reasonable” attorney fees in the amount of $255,135, stating the amount included feeds for reviewing and replying to Chase’s opposition briefs. Chase appealed that ruling, which led to the ruling Monday in the California Court of Appeals.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , | 9 Comments »

Alabama Appeals Court Slams U.S. Bank Down on “Magic” Fabricated Allonge

Posted on June 11, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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NY Trust Law — PSA Violation is FATAL

RE: Congress (yes that is really her name) versus U.S. Bank 2100934

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Editor’s Comment:

Yves Smith from Naked Capitalism has it right in the article below and you should not only read it but study it. The following are my comments in addition to the well written analysis on Naked Capitalism.

  1. Alabama is a very conservative state that has consistently disregarded issues regarding the rules of evidence and civil procedure until this decision from the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals was handed down on June 8, 2012. Happy Birthday, Brother! This court has finally recognized (a) that documents are fabricated shortly before hearings and (b) that it matters. They even understand WHY it matters.
  2. Judges talk to teach other both directly and indirectly. Sometimes it almost amounts to ex parte contact because they are actually discussing the merits of certain arguments as it would effect cases that are currently pending in front of them. I know of reports where Judges have stated in open Court in Arizona that they have spoken with other Judges and DECIDED that they are not going to give relief to deadbeat borrowers. So this decision in favor of the borrower, where a fabricated “Allonge” was used only a couple of days before the hearing is indicative that they are starting to change their thinking and that the deadbeats might just be the pretender lenders.
  3. But they missed the fact that an allonge is not an instrument that transfers anything. It is not a bill of sale, assignment or anything else like that. It is and always has been something added to a previously drafted instrument that adds, subtracts or changes terms. See my previous article last week on Allonges, Assignments and Endorsements.
  4. What they DID get is that under New York law, the manager or trustee of a so-called REMIC, SPV or “Trust” cannot do anything contrary to the instrument that appointed the manager or trustee to that position. This is of enormous importance. We have been saying on these pages and in my books that it is not possible for the trustee or manager of the “pool” to accept a loan into the pool if it violates the terms expressly stated in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. If the cut-off date was three years ago then it can’t be accepted. If the loan is in default already then it cannot be accepted. So not only is this allonge being rejected, but any actual attempt to assign the instrument into the “pool” is also rejected.
  5. What that means is that like any contract there are three basic elements — offer, consideration and acceptance. The offer is clear enough, even if it is from a party who doesn’t own the loan. The consideration is at best muddy because there are no records to show that the REMIC or the parties to the REMIC (investors) ever funded the loan through the REMIC. And the acceptance is absolutely fatal because no investor would agree or did agree to accept loans that were already in default.
  6. The other thing I agree with and would expand is the whole notion of the burden of proof. In this case we are still dealing with a burden of proof on the homeowner instead of the pretender lender. But the door is open now to start talking about the burden of proof. Here, the Court simply stated that the burden of proof imposed by the trial judge should have been by a preponderance (over 50%) of the evidence instead of clear and convincing (somewhere around 80%) of the evidence. So if it is more likely than not that the instrument was fabricated, the document will NOT be accepted into evidence. The next thing to work on is putting the burden of proof on the party seeking affirmative relief — i.e., the one seeking to take the home through foreclosure. If you align the parties properly, all of the other procedural problems disappear. That will leave questions regarding admissible evidence (another time).
  7. Keep in mind that this decision will have rumbling effects throughout Alabama and other states but it is only persuasive, not authoritative. So the fact that this appellate court made this decision does not mean you win in your case in Arizona.
  8. But it can be used to say “Judge, I know how the bench views these defenses and claims. But it is becoming increasingly apparent that the party seeking to foreclose is now and always was a pretender. And further, it is equally apparent that they are submitting fabricated and forged documents. 
  9. ‘More importantly, they are trying to get you to participate in a fraudulent scheme they pursued against the investors who advanced money without any proper documentation. This Alabama Appellate Court understands, now that they have read the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, that it simply is not possible for the investors to be forced into accepting a defaulted loan long after the cut-off date established in the PSA.
  10. ‘If you rule for the pretender creditor here you are doing two things: (1) you are providing these pretenders with the argument that there is a judicial ruling requiring the innocent investors to take the defaulted loan and suffer the losses when they never had any interest in the loan before and (2) you are allowing and encouraging a party who is not a creditor and never was a creditor to submit a credit bid at auction in lieu of cash thus stealing the property from both the homeowner and in violation of their agency or duty to the investors.
  11. ‘This Court and hundreds of others across the country are reading these documents now. And what they are finding is that pension funds and other regulated managed funds were tricked into buying non-existent assets through a bogus mortgage bond. The offer and promise made to these investors, upon whom millions of pensioners depend to make ends meet, was that these were industry standard loans in good standing. None of that was true and it certainly isn’t true now. Yet they want you to rule that you can force investors from another state or country to accept these loans even though they are either worthless or worth substantially less than the amount represented at the time of the transaction where the investment banker took the money from the investor and put it into a giant escrow fund without regard to the REMIC’s existence.

We don’t deny the existence of an obligation, but we do deny that this trickster should be given the proceeds of ill-gotten gains. The actual creditors should be given an opportunity to reject non-conforming loans that are submitted after the cut-off date and are therefore indispensable parties to this transaction.”

Alabama Appeals Court Reverses Decision on Chain of TitleCase, Ruling Hinges on Question of Bogus Allonges

In a unanimous decision, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed a lower court decision on a foreclosure case, U.S. Bank v. Congress and remanded the case to trial court.

We’d flagged this case as important because to our knowledge, it was the first to argue what we call the New York trust theory, namely, that the election to use New York law in the overwhelming majority of mortgage securitizations meant that the parties to the securitization could operate only as stipulated in the pooling and servicing agreement that created that particular deal. Over 100 years of precedents in New York have produced well settled case law that deems actions outside what the trustee is specifically authorized to do as “void acts” having no legal force. The rigidity of New York trust has serious implications for mortgage securitizations. The PSAs required that the notes (the borrower IOUs) be transferred to the trust in a very specific fashion (endorsed with wet ink signatures through a particular set of parties) before a cut-off date, which typically was no later than 90 days after the trust closing. The problem is, as we’ve described in numerous posts, that there appears to have been massive disregard in the securitization for complying with the contractual requirements that they established and appear to have complied with, at least in the early years of the securitization industry. It’s difficult to know when the breakdown occurred, but it appears that well before 2004-2005, many subprime originators quit bothering with the nerdy task of endorsing notes and completing assignments as the PSAs required; they seemed to take the position they could do that right before foreclosure. Indeed, that’s kosher if the note has not been securitized, but as indicated above, it is a no-go with a New York trust. There is no legal way to remedy the problem after the fact.

The solution in the Congress case appears to have been a practice that has since become troublingly become common: a fabricated allonge. An allonge is an attachment to a note that is so firmly affixed that it can’t travel separately. The fact that a note was submitted to the court in the Congress case and an allonge that fixed all the problems appeared magically, on the eve of trial, looked highly sus. The allonge also contained signatures that looked less than legitimate: they were digitized (remember, signatures as supposed to be wet ink) and some were shrunk to fit signature lines. These issues were raised at trial by Congress’s attorneys, but the fact that the magic allonge appeared the Thursday evening before Memorial Day weekend 2011 when the trial was set for Tuesday morning meant, among other things, that defense counsel was put on the back foot (for instance, how do you find and engage a signature expert on such short notice? Answer, you can’t).

The case was ruled in favor of the US Bank, in a narrow and strained opinion (which was touted as significant by reliable securitization industry booster Paul Jackson). It argued that the case was an ejectment action (the final step to get the borrower out after the foreclosure was final) so that, per securitization expert, Georgetown law professor Adam Levitin,

..the question of ownership of the note was not an issue of standing, but an affirmative defense for which the homeowner had the burden of proof…Crazy or not, however, this meant that the homeowner wasn’t actually challenging the trust’s standing. From there it was a small step for the court to say that the homeowner couldn’t invoke the terms of the PSA because she wasn’t a party to it…..

The case has been remanded back to trial court, and the judges put the issue of the allonge front and center.

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Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 31 Comments »

Az Sheriff Spends 2200 Hours on Birth Certificate — None on Foreclosure Docs

Posted on March 2, 2012 by Neil Garfield

I know this is a very hot political topic and that to some people it matters a great deal where Obama was born. I question the idiocy of an Arizona sheriff spending 2200 hours of cold case time on a birth certificate from Hawaii. The amazing revelation to me is that this sheriff has shown that he could take apart the “layering” on hundreds of thousands of recorded documents filed in support of fraudulent foreclosures.

So here we have a sheriff sitting on mountains of eviction papers, serving those papers, and even forcing homeowners out of their homes at gun point, knowing full well that the evictions are based upon false declarations of fact in fabricated documents. And he could prove it and charge the culprits. Instead he limits his inquiry into a Hawaiian birth certificate. What am I missing?

Filed under: bubble, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, Occupy Movement, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 68 Comments »

is it one of them or is it all of them? Mr. Cuomo, are you listening?

Posted on May 18, 2010 by Neil Garfield

According to two EMC analysts, they were encouraged to just make up data like FICO scores if the lenders they purchased loans in bulk from wouldn’t get back to them promptly

Editors’ Note: With Bear Stearns “underwater” it is difficult to come up with scenario where there won’t be criminal charges brought against the bankers and traders who worked there. They are low-hanging fruit, easily made the scape goat and easily subject to inquiry since nobody has any allegiance to them. They have no reason to stay silent except for self-incrimination. If some are offered immunity they will sing like birds in the meadow.

On the other hand Cuomo is aiming for the wrong target and could end up losing his cases unless he aims right. If this report is correct, then Cuomo is looking for the the real criminal culprit in the ratings fraud. What is wrong with that approach is that he is attempting to single out ONE defendant out of a group. They ALL knew, as the article goes on to say, what they were doing with ratings, just as they all knew what was going on with property appraisals just as they all knew that there was no underwriting of the loans.

Underwriting, which was the process of verifying the loan data from soup to nuts was abandoned because the party initiating the loan had no dog in the race. They were using investor dollars to fund the loan. Their income was based upon closing the loan without regard to risk. In fact, as has now been acknowledged after three years of me harping on the subject, the more likely it was that the loan would fail, the higher the profit and fees to everyone.

In the world of securities, underwriting was once the product of verifying the facts and risks of an investment through “due diligence”. Like the home loans there was no due diligence underwriting. The object was to sell something that LOOKED good even though they knew the loss was a sure thing — something the investment bankers needed and wanted.

They wanted the investments to fail because they were selling it (securitizing specific loans, parts of loan pools and entire loan pools) into multiple SPV packages, effectively selling the same loans over and over again.

They were taking the yield spread caused by the lower rate the investors were willing to accept because they perceived the investment as being little or no risk. The loan interest charged to borrowers was much higher, sometimes by multiples. This causes a SPREAD, which means that in order to give the investors the dollar income they we re expecting, they could promise, based upon exhibits that were fabricated in part, that the investor would get the desired revenue.  But the income was coming from loans to borrowers at much higher “nominal” rates. In plain language they were able to invest only a portion of the investors money into funding mortgages that were guaranteed to fail. The rest of the money they kept for themselves. Each time they re-sold the security as described above, the entire proceeds were kept by the ivnestment banking house. As long as the pools failed, nobody would demand an accounting.

The investors might make claims for the losses but they were stuck with being tagged as qualified investors who should have known better, even if they were some small credit union who had no person on staff capable of performing verification or due diligence on the investment in mortgage-backed securities.

But fund managers (especially those  who received bonuses due to the higher returns they reported) were highly unlikely candidates to demand an accounting since they either had no clue or cared less as to what was REALLY done with the proceeds of their investment. AND then of course there are the fund managers who may or may not have overlooked, through negligence of intentionally, the quality of these investments. They may have received some sort of perks or kickback for investing in these dog-eared securities. Since the manager is in charge, he or she would be required to ask for things that they really don’t want to hear about.

The ratings companies were put in the exact same position as the the appraisers of the homes subject to mortgage. Play or die. Here is what we assisted you in coming up with a human and computer algorithm to arrive at the value of this investment. In securities, the value was expressed as AAA down to BBB and below. Here are the securities which we reverse engineered to fit that algorithm. Now give us the triple ratings as we agreed, take our fees which are higher now for your cooperation and don’t ask any questions. If someone did ask questions or raised alarms at the ratings agency or appraisal companies they were blacklisted.

So you tell me — is it one of them or is it all of them? Mr. Cuomo, are you listening? Contrary to the report below, this is no grey area. It is really very simple. Just because you have a pile of documentation doesn’t make it theft. Look at the result to determine the intent. That’s what you are supposed to do in Court.

More Corruption: Bear Stearns Falsified Information as Raters Shrugged

MAY 14 2010, 2:25 PM ET |  Comment

Made up FICO scores? Twenty-minute speed ratings to AAA? If government prosecutors like New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo want answers to why the mortgage-backed securities market was so screwed up, they should talk to Matt Van Leeuwen from Bear Stearn’s servicing arm EMC.

Reports indicated on Thursday that Cuomo is pursuing a criminal investigation surrounding banks supplying bad information to rating agencies about the quality of the mortgages they signed off on. But so far he hasn’t been able to prove where in the chain of blame the due diligence for the ratings broke down.

What Cuomo needs to establish is: whose shoulders does it fall on to verify the information lenders were selling to investment banks about the quality of their loans? And who was ultimately responsible for the due diligence on the loans that created toxic mortgage securities that were at heart of our financial crisis?

False Information and the Grey Area

Employed during the go-go years of 2004-2006, and speaking in an interview taped by BlueChip Films for a documentary in final production called Confidence Game, Van Leeuwen sheds some light onto the shenanigans going on during the mortgage boom that might surprise even Cuomo. As a former mortgage analyst at Dallas-based EMC mortgage, which was wholly owned by Bear Stearns, he had first-hand experience working with Bear’s mortgage-backed securitization factory. EMC was the “third-party” firm Bear was using to vet the quality of loans that would purchase from banks like Countrywide and Wells Fargo.

Van Leeuwen says Bear traders pushed EMC analysts to get loan analysis done in only one to three days. That way, Bear could sell them off fast to eager investors and didn’t have carry the cost of holding these loans on their books.

According to two EMC analysts, they were encouraged to just make up data like FICO scores if the lenders they purchased loans in bulk from wouldn’t get back to them promptly. Every mortgage security Bear Stearns sold emanated out of EMC. The EMC analysts had the nitty-gritty loan-level data and knew better than anyone that the quality of loans began falling off a cliff in 2006. But as the cracks in lending standards were coming more evident the Bear traders in New York were pushing them to just get the data ready for the raters by any means necessary.

In another case, as more exotic loans were being created by lenders, the EMC analyst didn’t even know how to classify the documentation associated with the loan. This was a data point really important to the bonds ratings. When Bear would buy individual loans from lenders the EMC analyst said they couldn’t tell if it should be labeled a no-doc or full doc loan. Van Leeuwen explains, “I wasn’t allowed to make the decision for how to classify the documentation level of the loans. We’d call analysts in Bear’s New York office to get guidance.” Time was of the essence here. “So, a snap decision would be made up there (in NY) to code a documentation type without in-depth research of the lender’s documentation standards,” says Van Leeuwen.

Two EMC analysts said instead of spending time to go back to the lender and demand clarification, like if verification of income actually backed these loans, the executives at Bear would just make the loan type fit. Why? One EMC analyst explains, “from Bear’s perspective, we didn’t want to overpay for the loans, but we don’t want to waste the resources on deep investigation: that’s not how the company makes money. That’s not our competitive advantage — it eats into profits.”

Twenty Minutes for AAA

It’s easy to paint Bear as the only villain here — but what were the rating agencies thinking?

Susan Barnes of Standards and Poor’s testified before Congress last month saying banks like Bear were responsible for due diligence in the transactions described above: “For the system to function properly, the market must rely on participants to fulfill their roles and obligations to verify and validate information before they pass it on to others, including S&P.”

Yet, was it reasonable for agencies to stand behind ratings when due diligence was done by an affiliate of Bear? That’s like buying a car from a guy whose mechanic brother said it was great, and then finding out it was a lemon.

Equally amazing was how responsive the raters were even on the big deals. Van Leeuwen says, “The raters would provide a rating on a $1 billion security in 20-30 minutes.” Describing it as “a rubber stamp,” Van Leeuwen said that the ratings agencies slavish devotion to their computer models “was vital” because it allowed Bear to “cram mortgages through the process.”

The greatest asset Bear had in its quest to squeeze every ounce of profit from the mortgage-backed securities market was the methodology of the big ratings agencies. The bankers knew what kind of loan detail was needed to get that coveted AAA rating. After they prepped the rating agencies for what they ‘thought’ they loans would look like, they would buy loans in bulk, and then spend a day scrubbing them.

Bear’s decision to cut corners and to fail to take the time to make sure the raters got correct information about the quality of loans was big no-no. But rating bonds based on fast reactions, instead of thoughtful analysis and reliable due diligence, also might place some responsibility on the agencies’ shoulders.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 26 Comments »

Specialized Loan Services: “MISTAKE” Costs Elderly Couple Their Home

Posted on May 7, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Editor’s Note: Besides the obvious, there are a number of not-so-obvious things to keep in mind.

  • The reason why they made the “mistake” is probably related to errors in procedure because they receive information from multiple sources. It is possible but unlikely that this was a normal error in posting. In Motion Practice and Discovery you would want to exploit such weaknesses to s how that there are too many “stakeholders” in the pie and that the procedures used to keep track of payments and status are intentionally obtuse to create plausible deniability when something like this happens with such horrendous results.
  • Ask yourself: why are all these players in the marketplace supposedly servicing different aspects of the loan? One for payments from borrower, another for payments from third party credit enhancements, another for federal bailouts, another to “substitute” for the original nominal party named at closing as the lender, another”Substitute” for the trustee, another to handle the delinquency, another to handle the default, another to handle the foreclosure sale etc.
  • Pretender lenders want the courts to handle foreclosures like “business as usual.” But business isn’t usual. When business was usual the bank that loaned the money was the bank that foreclosed on the mortgage or otherwise enforced the note. They should not be allowed to proclaim “business as usual” or standard operating procedure, or business records and affidavits, when business is far from usual.
  • Fabricated documents executed by people with dubious titles and even more dubious authority are being used to foreclose on property. The reason is simple: they don’t own the loan and they are successfully using the courts to steal from both the investors who advanced the money, the taxpayers to covered the money and the homeowners who advanced their home as collateral — all for a debt or obligation that no longer exists in the same form as the one presented at the borrower’s closing.
  • From http://www.themortgageinsider.net we find:

Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS) is a mortgage servicer of residential mortgage loans primarily for other mortgage lenders. We uncovered three phone numbers, their website, and some pretty ugly customer complaints. We found an additional DBA name of The Terwin Group for SLS too.

Specialized Loan Servicing LLC Website and Phone Contacts

Specialized Loan Servicing LLC Website: https://www.sls.net/
Specialized Loan Servicing LLC Phone:
(800) 315-4757
(720) 241-7385
(720) 241-7364
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Specialized Loan Servicing LLC Review

Specialized Loan Servicing LLC services mortgage loans for other lenders and according to past customers, they have an ugly customer service track record.

When I search for complaints against Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, I found the worst complaints a mortgage service can get levied against them. Click here to see all the Specialized Loan Servicing LLC complaints listed in Google.

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Senior Couple Being Screwed Royally By Mortgage Servicer – Specialized Loan Servicers

H. Vincent and Theresa Price have lived in their home in Alameda for 32 years.  It’s where they raised their children.  They had always planned to leave it as their legacy.  They’ve NEVER been late on a mortgage payment… to this day! And they never wanted or asked for a loan modification.

Yes, everything was just fine at the Price home… until last September… when their mortgage servicer, Specialized Loan Services, made a mistake in their accounting department.  A simple mistake… they didn’t credit the Prices for having made their August and September mortgage payments, even though they most certainly did, just like they always had, and on time too.  Incredibly, less than five months later they had lost their home to foreclosure.

And today, although Mr. Price lies in a hospital bed with his wife at his side, they are scheduled to be LOCKED OUT by the Pasadena Sheriff’s Department pursuant to an order by the court.  If everything goes as planned by the mortgage servicer, when his doctors discharge him, the couple will be homeless.

How is such a thing possible?  Well, stay with me, because I promise you… this is not a story you’ve heard before.

According to the complaint filed in Los Angeles Superior Court, on August 1, 2008, Mrs. Price made the couple’s mortgage payment as she’s been doing for 32 years.  Certainly nothing remarkable about that.  A month later, when their September statement arrived showing that they owed their September payment, she made their mortgage payment again.  So far, so good, right?

It was right around September 29th that the Prices were notified that Specialized Loan Serivces had not received their August or September payments.  Mrs. Price assured the servicer’s representative that she had made the payments, and on time as always, thank you very much.

The servicer requested proof, so Mrs. Price sent in her bank statement showing that the payments had been made to Specialized Loan Services, and the amounts were deducted from her account on August 3rd and September 4th, respectively.  The Specialized representative called back to say they needed more proof, so she sent them a more detailed transaction report showing the payments having been made.  Still, not enough according to Specialized.  So, Mrs. Price went to her bank and had them print out her account’s record of the payment being made to Specialized and sent that document to the mortgage servicer.

The next call from Specialized came from a different representative of the servicer.  He informed Mrs. Price that they had not yet located her payments, but that her proof was acceptable and that they expected to soon. Meanwhile, he assured her, the servicer was placing a waiver on the October and November payments, a show of good faith, if you will, until the missing payments were found.  After a couple of weeks passed with no further word from Specialized, the Prices called to inquire as to the status of the situation.

They spoke with a woman who said her name was Lynette.  She told the Prices that their account was showing “CURRENT” for August, September, October and November, that they should make their next payment on the first of December, and that a new accounting statement would be sent out.

When no new statement had arrived two weeks later, the Prices called Specialized yet again.  It was November 23, 2008 and this time they spoke with another representative of the mortgage servicer, “Ben”.

They asked Ben about the new statement that was to have been sent out, but Ben had no idea what they were talking about.  He stated that he wasn’t aware of any sort of arrangement regarding the couple’s August and September payments, and further, now that they were four months late, if they did not make the delinquent payments and associated late charges within the next 24 HOURS… Specialized Loan Services WOULD FORECLOSE ON THE PROPERTY.

You can just imagine what happened next.  The Prices began calling the servicer asking to speak with the three representatives that had been speaking with over the last several months… the ones that had told them about the waiver and had been trying to find the missing payments.  They called… and called… and no one answered or returned their calls.  They then called the servicer’s Vice President of Customer Service… and… nothing.  No return call… nothing.

It was January when the Prices received their first piece of written communication from Specialized… it was a Notice of Default and Election to Sell.  Understandably, the couple was speechless.  How could this happen?  How was this possible?

The Prices were referred to a lawyer who said he was also a minister; a man identifying himself as a Mr. Reginald Jones.  Mr. Jones told the Prices that he was highly experienced in these matters and that he would file a lawsuit as soon as possible.  The couple would later learn that Mr. Jones was not an attorney.  What he had done was go into court, appearing as a plaintiff by claiming that he had an interest in the property, and file a frivolous lawsuit, which was later dismissed by the court…. as it might go without saying.

Now, having been defrauded by the so-called lawyer-minister, the Prices were forced to defend an unlawful detainer action in pro per, meaning without an attorney.  Unfortunately, they were not successful as they were told that they could not “litigate title in a summary proceeding,” which as I’m quite sure everyone would agree, they clearly should have known. They were advised that they should file an injunction, which they did, but unfortunately they mistakenly filed their injunction in the “wrong court,” and don’t we all hate it when that happens.

(I’m sorry for the sarcasm, but this is the most outrageous travesty of justice to which I’ve ever been exposed.)

The Prices searched and finally found an attorney they could trust, Zshonette Reed of the firm Lorden Reed in Chatsworth, California, but now it was only days before the Pasadena Sheriff would be locking the Prices out of their home potentially forever.  As quickly as was possible, Ms. Reed prepared the legal documents required for the filing of a Temporary Restraining Order, or TRO, and with her clients at her side, and confident that this horrendous injustice would not be allowed to prevail, she appeared in Superior Court yesterday, September 15, 2009.

The Price home is to be locked up by the Pasadena Sheriff today, although because that office is closed for a special training day today, the event has been moved to tomorrow.

Astonishingly, the judge denied her motion for a TRO, ruling that he had no jurisdiction over the judgment that had been entered against the Prices in the unlawful detainer court.  So, immediately she and her clients proceeded to the unlawful detainer court to ask that judge, in layman’s terms, to put a stop to the madness.

It may be hard for a reader to believe, but that judge also refused to provide the Prices any relief, because he said that the attorney could not litigate title in that court.  It was a classic Catch-22.  Ms. Reed couldn’t get relief from the Superior Court because that court said that it had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer court, and the unlawful detainer court wouldn’t provide relief because you can’t litigate title anywhere but in the Superior Court.  Ms. Reed begged the judge, explaining that her client’s home was to be locked up by the sheriff the very next day.  She needed time to prepare to present her client’s case to the appellate court.  The answer was still no.

Ms. Reed and her clients left the courthouse shocked and scared.  Mr. Price was clearly distressed as was his wife, and he was having a hard time breathing so he went to sit down on a stoop.  He went into cardiac arrest right there in front of the courthouse and was rushed to the hospital where he is today with his wife by his side.

Meanwhile, the Pasadena Sheriff is scheduled to lock the couple out of their home today, although that looks like it won’t be until tomorrow due to the department taking today off for special training.

Can you even imagine the horror?  After 32 years living in your home, raising your family, never being late on a mortgage payment… and then this?  It’s unthinkable.

And it cannot be allowed to happen to the Prices or anyone else.

The worst part is that, although this is certainly an extreme case, it is far from being the only example of mortgage servicers and banks disregarding the law, and abusing homeowners.  Why do they do it?  I don’t know… because they can, comes to mind.

How can a homeowner hope to go up against a bank or mortgage servicer?  They can’t.  It would seem that even the President of the United States and the United States Treasury is having trouble getting these companies to behave like human beings.

It’s time that the people of this country come to understand what’s happening here.  Past time.

Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 24 Comments »

The Narrative Has Shifted: Take Advantage of it

Posted on April 19, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Your allegations of intentional misdeeds, fabricated documents and forgeries have new life now that the SEC is hot on the trail of the wrongdoers in a very public way. As the news sinks in more and more Judges, lawyers and experts and forensic analysts will see their role more as a commitment to justice than just helping out a homeowner in distress.

It just didn’t make sense that anyone would loan money in a deal where they knew there would be no payback. My allegations rang hollow to many people, who felt that despite the many distractions and defects contained in the paperwork behind the foreclosure glut, it was the borrowers who made the financial crisis happen. Now we see more and more people taking another look.

For those of us who serve the judicial branch of government, it is no longer a dance to delay the inevitable. It is, as it has always been, a confrontation with giant corporations whose reach into the corridors of powers enabled them to suck the life out of an ailing economy.

No society has ever persisted without a vibrant growing middle class. It will be a very long time before we succeed in reversing the damage wreaked by Goldman Sachs and other investment banking houses who acted without any sense of conscience, morality or even compliance with laws that society passed to enable their existence. But now, we have a chance. Let’s not waste this opportunity. Don’t let the pretender lenders get control of the narrative again.

The reality is that many, perhaps most loans were created according to specifications set by Wall Street, not by industry underwriting standards. The reality is that people were hired to lie and cheat and deceive homeowners into investing their homes into this salacious scheme. The reality is that the appraisals were false, and were given greater credibility by the reasonable borrower assumption that no lender would lend money on a bad deal where the property value was intentionally overstated, and that lenders would and did strive to comply with the requirements of the Truth in Lending Law, where the responsibility for appraisal verification, income verification, quality, viability, and affordability are BY LAW the responsibility of the Lender. Little did these hapless homeowners know, TILA was a joke to these players.

So now reality sets in. securities that were rated investment grade were junk and are worth far less than their sale price. Homes that were rated as high value were really still the same value as the market had shown before the flood of money and bird dogs looking for signatures on documents, even if the signatures were forged and even if the borrower was dead.

The finance system depends upon confidence. Confidence is based upon belief in the market values and practices in the marketplace. There is only one correction that is viable now. It is the simple recognition that neither the securities nor the properties they were based upon, had any new “value added.” It is the simple recognition that we had to accept when the NASDAQ that flew near 5,000 is really worth only 2,000, long after the boom and bust of that era. Any attempt to saddle the homeowners, the taxpayers or the investors with anything other than the reality of fair market value will undermine our financial system, and ultimately our future and the future of generations to come.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments »

John Kennerty, Caryn A. Graham – MERS Assistant Secretary, VP of Documentation, VP of Communications, BofA, Countrywide, Wells Fargo

Posted on March 29, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Editor’s Note: Another example of attorney as MERS Assistant Secretary through access to password and user ID. She is an attorney with Marshall Watson and has appeared on numerous documents signing also as having limited power of attorney for Bank of America, Countrywide, Wells Fargo and probably others. Check your documents in Florida. If you see an assignment or any other document signed by her other than a pleading it is suspect, to say the least. You have the right to see the original, the basis for the “authorization,” and to conduct discovery — interrogatories, request to produce, request for admissions, depositions upon written questions and live deposition.

Caryn A. Graham – MERS Assistant Secretary

Caryn A. Graham – Attorney at Law at foreclosure mill Marshall Watson Fort Lauderdale, FL

Also listed on “Limited Power of Attorney” at Broward county records for BoA, Countrywide, and Wells Fargo.

JOHN KENNERTY-Signed for MERS as VP of Documentation on MERS assignments

JOHN KENNERTY-Signed as VP of Communications for America Servicing Company [owned by Wells Fargo] on other docs

JOHN KENNERTY-Signed as VP for Wells Fargo on other docs

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 40 Comments »

Marti Noriega Signor for MERS is Litton Employee

Posted on February 25, 2010 by Neil Garfield

You referenced ‘one Noriega’ on a post today. May I presume that to be the ‘Marti Noreiga’ who has already been ‘outed’ for her signatures as a MERS employee when her own Facebook and Linkedln pages declare she is a Litton or CBASS employee (CBASS being the corporation that owns Litton)?

Do we have any KNOWN valid signatures of Marti’s that can be used to validate that she did sign these documents? I know the MERS-employee documents with her signature are fraudulent. In my case Litton is the very company who is now in charge of servicing of my mortgage. Is Litton a target for legal action for the fraudulently signed docs bearing their employee’s name?

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

MERS AND COUNTRYWIDE V AGIN: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

Posted on November 29, 2009 by Neil Garfield

NOW AVAILABLE ON AMAZON KINDLE!

MERS and Countrywide v Agin Trustee D Ct Mass Aff’d B Ct on Avoidance Mtg 20091117

NOTE FROM EDITOR SEEKING HELP: Rumor has it San Diego has stopped all foreclosures. I need this corroborated or debunked quickly. Can I get a little help here?

The case in this POST comes out of Massachusetts where the cases are not quite stopped, but almost so — AND where property title insurance companies are NOT underwriting ANY policy that covers a home whose mortgage was securitized.

Many thanks to MAX GARDNER for this case and best wishes for his speedy recovery. He’s one of the titans of this movement. we want him around!

The primary point that needs emphasis here is that as you read this case you will see that if you give the Court something SOLID to hang its hat on, you can get the results you want.

The mistake being made repeatedly out there is simple: either the homeowner or the lawyer goes in with a legal argument addressing the conclusions of the case instead of directing the Judge’s attention to the beginning of the case — discovery, motions to compel, TRO etc. based upon discovery requirements.

The obvious requirement that you need to know in your mind what you are talking about it so you know the significance of the issue legally seems to  have escaped all but a few lawyers. Many lawyers are taking half baked “audits” going to court and making legal arguments about a report they have not read, do not understand and which does not contains all the elements needed anyway.

You must educate the Judge not lecture him. You must NOT rely on securitization in your preliminary arguments because it sounds like legal maneuvering to get out of a legitimate debt.

Unfortunately these mistakes are being made even by people who have attended our survey courses. So we are expanding our offering by adding DVDs, Boot Camps and home study.

Our own efforts at providing forensic review and expert support to lawyers has been challenged by the growing demand vs manpower limitations. Consequently, we will embark on efforts to increase the bandwith or resources in terms of people through educational programs. We will then start to refer cases to forensic analysts and lawyers.

We  are starting courses to train, and certify forensic analysts who pick up even the most minute flaw in a document — like a document you you know in your heart is fabricated and forged but feel intimidated by the process of proving it.

In conjunction with specific courses on training forensic analysts we will also offer addtional courses on how to be expert witnesses, how to prepare expert declarations and affidavits and how to defend your expert declarations in deposition or in an evidentiary hearing. The course is also for lawyers who feel they could use a little support on direct and cross examination of experts.


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 21 Comments »

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