Wells Fargo, Ocwen and Fake REMIC Trust Crash on Standing

What is surprising about this case is that there was any appeal. The trial court had no choice but to dismiss the foreclosure claim.

  1. A copy of the note without an indorsement was attached to the complaint. This leads to the presumption that the indorsement was attached after the complaint was filed. Standing must be proven to ex isa at the time the suit was filed.
  2. The robo-witness could have testified as to the date the indorsement was affixed but he said he didn’t know.
  3. The robo-witness was unable to testify that the default letter had been sent.
  4. It didn’t help that the foreclosure case had been brought before by two different parties and then dismissed.
  5. Attorneys attempted to admit into evidence an unsigned Pooling and Servicing Agreement that could not be authenticated and was merely “a copy of a printout obtained from the SEC website”. This is an example of how court’s are rejecting the SEC website as a government document subject to judicial notice or even introduction into evidence without competent testimony providing the foundation for introducing the PSA for a fake trust.
Let us analyze your case and give you ammunition for the court battle: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see Wells Fargo, as trustee v Madl

Note that the style of the case shows that Wells Fargo was never the Plaintiff. The purported or implied trust was the named Plaintiff. But as Wells Fargo explained in its own article, the Trust is not the Plaintiff and neither are the certificate holders the Plaintiff because their certificates most often expressly state that the holder of the certificate does NOT have any right, title or interest in the “underlying” loans.

In fact if you read it carefully you will see that no trust is actually named or mentioned. AND the failure of the “trust instrument” (the PSA) shows that the trust was never created and never existed. An unsigned, incomplete document downloaded from a site (SEC.gov) that anyone can access to upload documents is not evidence.

DEUTSCH BANK Memo Reveals Documents and Policies Ripe for Discovery

This completely corroborates what I have been saying for years along with a chorus of lawyers and pro se litigants across the county. It simply is not true that the attorney represents the trust or the trustee. 

This “Advisory” shows that there are documents that are rarely in the limelight and that clarify claims of securitization in practice. Note that the memorandum cited below comes from Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, as trustee and Deutsch Bank Trust Company Americas, as trustee.

These names are often NOT used when foreclosure actions are initiated where the name of the alleged REMIC Trustee is Deutsch Bank. It is important to note that neither of the two trust entities actually have been entrusted with any loans on behalf of any trust. Their name is used, for a fee, as windows dressing.

In this memo, Deutsch is attempting to limit its liability beyond the absence of any duties or trustee powers whose absence is revealed by reading the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) which is the alleged Trust instrument.

Let us help you plan your discovery requests: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Hat tip to Bill Paatalo

See Deutsche Bank Memorandum – July 2008

I have previously published and commented on parts of this memorandum. This is an expansion on my comments. This “advisory” obviously intends to bring alleged servicers back in line because it states in the introductory paragraph that the Trustee respectfully requests that all servicers review the First Servicing Memorandum and adhere to the practices it describes.”

None of this would have been necessary if the servicers were conforming to the directions and restrictions contained in the First Servicing Memorandum. We all know now that they were not conforming to anything or accepting instruction from anyone other than the alleged “Master Servicers” for NEITs (nonexistent  inactive trusts).

In discovery, one should ask for any servicer memoranda that exist including but not limited to the Memorandum to Securitization Loan Servicers dated August 30, 2007 a/k/a the First Servicer Memorandum, and all subsequent correspondence or written directions to servicers including but not limited to this “Advisory Concerning Servicing Issues Affecting Securitized Housing Assets.

Note also the oblique reference to the fact that the cut-off date actually means something.  It states that “typically” the REMICs (actually NEITs) take ownership of loans at the time the securitization trusts are formed. Thus discovery would include questions as to whether or not that occurred and if not, when did transfer of ownership occur and with what parties. Also one would ask for correspondence and agreements attendant to the alleged “transaction” in which the Trust allegedly purchased the loans with trust money that came from the proceeds of sales of certificates to investors. If the Trust did not pay value for the loans then it did not acquire the debt. It only acquired the paper instruments that are used as evidence of the debt.

Perhaps most importantly, the memo comes down hard on the use of powers of attorney, which are a favorite medium through which lawyers for the foreclosing parties typically try to patch obvious gaps in the chain of ownership or custody of the loan documents.

Then the memo provides foreclosure defense attorneys with the opportunity to attack the foundation laid for testimony and exhibits from robo-witnesses. It states that all parties must “Understand the mechanics of of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices in sufficient details to address such questions in a timely and accurate manner.” As any foreclosure defense lawyer will tell you, the robo-witness knows nothing about “the mechanics of of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices.” [The problem is that most borrowers and foreclosure defense lawyers don’t know either].

The inability of the robo-witness to describe the specific securitization practices in real life as it pertains to the subject loan gives rise to a cogent attack on the foundation for the rest of his testimony. With proper objections, perhaps motions in limine, and cross examination, this could lead to a defensive motion to strike the witnesses testimony and exhibits for lack of foundation. The following quote takes this out of the realm of theory and argument and into simple fact:

Servicers must ensure that loss mitigation personnel and professionals engaged by servicers, including legal counsel retained by servicers, understand the mechanics of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices in sufficient details to address such questions in a timely and accurate manner. In particular, servicing professionals [including “loss mitigation”] must become sufficiently familiar with the terms of the relevant securitization documents for each Trust for which they act to explain, and where necessary, prove those terms and resulting ownership interests to courts and government agencies.”

Note the assumption that lawyers are hired by servicers and not the Trustee or the Trust. Thus the servicers hire counsel and then order that foreclosure be brought in the name of the alleged trust. But if there is no trust or no acquisition of the debt, or authorization (remember powers of attorneys are not sufficient), the servicer is without legal authority to do anything, much less collect money from homeowners or bring foreclosure actions.

Paragraph (2) of the this “advisory” also gives guidance and foundation for what various people, especially attorneys, can say about who they represent and how.

“The Trustee believes that all persons retained by the servicer should specifically role or capacity in which they are acting. … One would be less accurate… if he or she claimed to be … attorney for the Trustee. A more accurate statement [attorney for servicer] acting for [Deutsch] as trustee of the Trust.”

This completely corroborates what I have been saying for years along with a chorus of lawyers and pro se litigants across the county. It simply is not true that the attorney represents the trust or the trustee.

 

Deutsch Bank: Going Down With the Details

It is getting increasingly obvious to the courts that there is something inherently wrong with foreclosures. The substitutions without leave of court and the repeated filing for foreclosure on the same default are coming back to bite the ‘securitization fail” scheme of the banks.

see http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202766695379/Deutsche-Bank-Trust-Co-Americas-v-Smith-20152381?kw=Deutsche%20Bank%20Trust%20Co.%20Americas%20v.%20Smith%2C%202015-2381&cn=20160907&pt=Daily%20Decisions&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=New%20York%20Law%20Journal&slreturn=20160807093854

If you start with the premise that the trusts were never funded and therefore never existed, everything starts to make sense. In ordinary circumstances with ordinary loans the pronouncement of every bank foreclosure attorney rings hollow: “Judge this is a standard foreclosure.” If that were true they wouldn’t be losing cases procedurally, allowing them to linger sometimes for a decade or more, and they wouldn’t be trying to slip in a “substitution of Plaintiff” without leave of court. And they probably would not be foreclosing on so many dead people.

This case, decided today, gives us an example of how things can go wrong for the banks, servicers and trustees. But first I would remind the reader that virtually all foreclosures over the past 10 years have been allowed without admissible evidence or pleading. They have succeeded in foreclosing based upon two elements: (1) fabricated paper and (2) getting a judge to apply legal presumptions that are contrary to the true facts. The banks have been helped by the judicial aversion to the “free house” myth, and the corollary myth that if the foreclosure is allowed to proceed, nobody is getting a free house. Neither myth is true.

So in this case there are two points made. First that New York like many states operates under the rule that if the case has been “discontinued” (i.e., dismissed twice) the third attempt should be dismissed because the two prior dismissals operate, as a matter of law, as an adjudication on the merits, meaning that res judicata applies. This is narrowly applied to those cases where the allegations are essentially the same as the two prior cases.

In prior decades I represented lenders and homeowner associations enforcing their liens by foreclosure. It was a rare occurrence that we ever had to go into court more than once to prove our case, and rarer still that we had our case dismissed because of inaction or refusal to answer discovery. Now it is practically the rule that the foreclosure cases are vetted on whether they are contested or not. Those cases that are contested are pushed to the back of the line because that is where the foreclosing parties, strangers to the transaction, are vulnerable to losing their spurious claims.

Since most foreclosures are uncontested, these banks, servicers and trustees are free to get their foreclosure judgments and forced sales without objection from anyone by a factor of roughly 25:1. So the banks are playing the odds. For every case that is contested it is best for banks to delay it while they get 25 others through without objection. But the Courts are catching up with this strategy and it won’t be long before some very strong orders are entered demanding explanations of what is really going on. The time is coming when we return to the days when judges scrutinized the foreclosures and asked pointed questions even in uncontested cases.

In prior times the lender or association would always show its records if it was demanded by the homeowner or property owner. Now despite a new Federal rule preventing blanket objections, banks routinely object to all or nearly all of the requests in discovery, frequently resulting in an order to compel discovery which is often ignored resulting in dismissal.

The other point raised by the Court was the practice of simply changing the style of the case by inserting a new or “corrected” name of the Plaintiff or foreclosing party. The principle is simple: if you want to substitute parties you need leave of court. In order to get permission you need to recite the facts under which the original lawsuit was correctly filed but now, as the result of intervening events, it needs to be prosecuted in favor of a new party. Often this requires an amendment to the complaint in a judicial state. This general rule is now universally rejected by the banks who have convinced judges to ignore the rules and allow the change in the name of the case — instead of demanding an explanation of the change.

The Banks don’t want to explain it because they have no reasonable explanation for changing the parties around. It is often done for strategic reasons rather than substantive reasons — neither of the Plaintiffs — old or new — having any interest in the loan, debt, note or mortgage.

Deutsch and other Banks Under Investigation by DOJ for Filing False Documents

see https://findsenlaw.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/department-of-justice-investigates-deutsche-bank-for-false-documents-presented-to-court-in-bankruptcy-foreclosure-case/

Beth Findsen, Esq. in Scottsdale, Az posted an article on her blog back in February revealing that after 10 years+ the Department of Justice is finally examining the validity of the papers filed by the banks in support of purported foreclosures on behalf of ghosts. Beth is a realist as well as an idealist. And her skills as an attorney are second to none.

While the DOJ is always slow, they frequently get to the bottom of things when they put their minds to it. The prosecution of individuals working for the Banks may just be around the corner. Apparently there has been a serious on-going investigation since 2014. If an indictment follows, it will shake the entire foreclosure process to its core. If there is a settlement, then it will probably stay business as usual.

This is not the first case where a US Trustee in Bankruptcy has questioned the authenticity and validity of documents supplied by the banks. But it seems to be a more serious issue now as they continue to piece together whether the claims filed by banks as Trustees, servicers or agents are real. If they are not they are committing fraud on US Bankruptcy court which is a federal crime for which plenty of people have gone to jail.

The importance in bankruptcy cannot be overstated. The size of the bankruptcy estate is affected. On the asset side you have the house and its fair market value at the time of filing or the time of appraisal. On the liability side you have a party who claims to be a creditor but isn’t a creditor. Then you have John Does whose money was used without their knowledge in connection with the origination or acquisition of the alleged loan. And finally you have a prospective liability that either is secured or is not secured. This could affect everything from motions to lift stay to adversary actions.

Interesting parts of the article include

Although the investigation involves the case of only one homeowner in Connecticut, a court document filed on Jan. 26 by the United States Trustee’s Office said it wants to elicit information about Deutsche Bank’s practices in general in foreclosure cases.

In recent months, the office has stepped up efforts around the United States to block banks and law firms from using false or fabricated documents in home foreclosure actions. The effort follows disclosures in October 2010 of large-scale “robo-signing”, the mass signing of foreclosure affidavits containing “facts” that had never been checked, and wide production of false mortgage assignments.

The Jan. 26 court motion stated that “The United States Trustee has reviewed the documents filed by Deutsche in this case and has concerns about the integrity of those documents and the process utilized by Deutsche in” filing to foreclose.”

From Reuters:

April Charney, a Florida legal aid attorney who represents homeowners in foreclosure cases and who is an expert on mortgage securitizations, said that aside from possible sanctions against Deutsche Bank in this foreclosure case, the results could have significant effect on Deutsche Bank’s practices in general, and on its ability to foreclose on large numbers of homeowners in default.

Lawyers for homeowners in foreclosure have alleged similar practices by Deutsche Bank in cases around the country.

Ocwen: Investors and Borrowers Move toward Unity of Purpose!

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Please consult an attorney who is licensed in your jurisdiction before acting upon anything you read on this blog.

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Anyone following this blog knows that I have been saying that unity of investors and borrowers is the ultimate solution to the falsely dubbed “Foreclosure crisis” (a term that avoids Wall Street corruption). Many have asked what i have based that on and the answer was my own analysis and interviews with Wall Street insiders who have insisted on remaining anonymous. But it was only a matter of time where the creditors (investors who bought mortgage backed securities) came to realize that nobody acting in the capacity of underwriter, servicer or Master Servicer was acting in the best interests of the investors or the borrowers.

The only thing they have tentatively held back on is an outright allegation that their money was NOT used by the Trustee for the Trust and their money never made it into the Trust and that the loans never made it into the Trust. That too will come because when investors realize that homeowners are not going to walk away, investors as creditors will come to agreements to salvage far more of the debts created during the mortgage meltdown than the money salvaged by pushing cases to foreclosure instead of the centuries’ proven method of resolving troubled loans — workouts. Nearly all homeowners would execute a new clean mortgage and note in a heartbeat to give investors the benefits of a workout that reflects economic reality.

Practice hint: If you are dealing with Ocwen Discovery should include information about Altisource and Home Loan Servicing Solutions, investors, and borrowers as it relates to the subject loan.

Investors announced complaints against Ocwen for mishandling the initial money, the paperwork and the subsequent money and servicing on loans created and a acquired with their money. The investors, who are the actual creditors (albeit unsecured) are getting close to the point where they state outright what everyone already knows: there is no collateral for these loans and every disclosure statement involving nearly all the loans violated disclosure requirements under TILA, RESPA, and Federal and state regulations.
The fact that (1) the loan was not funded by the payee on the note and mortgagee on the mortgage and (2) that the money from creditors were never properly channeled through the REMIC trusts because the trusts never received the proceeds of sale of mortgage backed securities is getting closer and closer to the surface.
What was unthinkable and the subject of ridicule 8 years ago has become the REAL reality. The plain truth is that the Trust never owned the loans even as a pass through because they never had had the money to originate or acquire loans. That leaves an uncalculated unsecured debt that is being diminished every day that servicers continue to push foreclosure for the protection of the broker dealers who created worthless mortgage bonds which have been purchased by the Federal reserve under the guise of propping up the banks’ balance sheets.

“HOUSTON, January 23, 2015 – Today, the Holders of 25% Voting Rights in 119 Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Trusts (RMBS) with an original balance of more than $82 billion issued a Notice of Non-Performance (Notice) to BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, US Bank, and Wells Fargo, as Trustees, Securities Administrators, and/or Master Servicers, regarding the material failures of Ocwen Financial Corporation (Ocwen) as Servicer and/or Master Servicer, to comply with its covenants and agreements under governing Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs).”
  • Use of Trust funds to “pay” Ocwen’s required “borrower relief” obligations under a regulatory settlement, through implementation of modifications on Trust- owned mortgages that have shifted the costs of the settlement to the Trusts and enriched Ocwen unjustly;
  • Employing conflicted servicing practices that enriched Ocwen’s corporate affiliates, including Altisource and Home Loan Servicing Solutions, to the detriment of the Trusts, investors, and borrowers;
  • Engaging in imprudent and wholly improper loan modification, advancing, and advance recovery practices;
  • Failure to maintain adequate records,  communicate effectively with borrowers, or comply with applicable laws, including consumer protection and foreclosure laws; and,

 

  • Failure to account for and remit accurately to the Trusts cash flows from, and amounts realized on, Trust-owned mortgages.

As a result of the imprudent and improper servicing practices alleged in the Notice, the Holders further allege that their experts’ analyses demonstrate that Trusts serviced by Ocwen have performed materially worse than Trusts serviced by other servicers.  The Holders further allege that these claimed defaults and deficiencies in Ocwen’s performance have materially affected the rights of the Holders and constitute an ongoing Event of Default under the applicable PSAs.  The Holders intend to take further action to recover these losses and protect the Trusts’ assets and mortgages.

The Notice was issued on behalf of Holders in the following Ocwen-serviced RMBS: see link The fact that the investors — who by all accounts are the real parties in interest disavow the actions of Ocwen gives rise to an issue of fact as to whether Ocwen was or is operating under the scope of services supposedly to be performed by the servicer or Master Servicer.
I would argue that the fact that the apparent real creditors are stating that Ocwen is misbehaving with respect to adequate records means that they are not entitled to the presumption of a business records exception under the hearsay rule.
The fact that the creditors are saying that servicing practices damaged not only the investors but also borrowers gives rise to a factual issue which denies Ocwen the presumption of validity on any record including the original loan documents that have been shown in many cases to have been mechanically reproduced.
The fact that the creditors are alleging imprudent and wholly improper loan modification practices, servicer advances (which are not properly credited to the account of either the creditor or the borrower), and the recovery of advances means that the creditors are saying that Ocwen was acting on its own behalf instead of the creditors. This puts Ocwen in the position of being either outside the scope of its authority or more likely simply an interloper claiming to be a servicer for trusts that were never actually used to acquire or originate loans, this negating the effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.  Hence the “servicer” for the trust is NOT the servicer for the subject loan because the loan never arrived in the trust portfolio.
The fact that the creditors admit against interest that Ocwen was pursuing practices and goals that violate laws and proper procedure means that no foreclosure can be supported by “clean hands.” The underlying theme here being that contrary to centuries of practice, instead of producing workouts in which the loan is saved and thus the investment of the creditors, Ocwen pursued foreclosure which was in its interest and not the creditors. The creditors are saying they don’t want the foreclosures but Ocwen did them anyway.
The fact that the creditors are saying they didn’t get the money that was supposed to go to them means that the money received from lost sharing with FDIC, guarantees, insurance, credit default swaps that should have paid off the creditors were not paid to them and would have reduced the damage to the creditors. By reducing the amount of damages to the creditors the borrower would have owed less, making the principal amounts claimed in foreclosures all wrong. The parties who paid such amounts either have or do not have separate unsecured actions against the borrower. In most cases they have no such claim because they explicitly waived it.
This is the first time investors have even partially aligned themselves with Borrowers. I hope it will lead to a stampede, because the salvation of investors and borrowers alike requires a pincer like attack on the intermediaries who have been pretending to be the principal parties in interest but who lacked the authority from the start and violated every fiduciary duty and contractual duty in dealing with creditors and borrowers. Peal the onion: the reason that their initial money is at stake is that these servicers are either acting as Master Servicers who are actually the underwriters and sellers of the mortgage backed securities,
I would argue that the fact that the apparent real creditors are stating the Ocwen is misbehaving with respect to adequate records means that they are not entitled to the presumption of a business records exception under the hearsay rule.
The fact that the creditors are saying that servicing practices damaged not only the investors but also borrowers gives rise to a factual issue which denies Ocwen the presumption of validity on any record including the original loan documents that have been shown in many cases to have been mechanically reproduced.
The fact that the creditors are alleging imprudent and wholly improper loan modification practices, servicer advances (which are not properly credited to the account of either the creditor or the borrower), and the recovery of advances means that the creditors are saying that Ocwen was acting on tis own behalf instead of the creditors. This puts Ocwen in the position of being either outside the scope of its authority or more likely simply an interloper claiming to be a servicer for trusts that were never actually used to acquire or originate loans, this negating the effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
The fact that the creditors admit against interest that Ocwen was pursuing practices and goals that violate laws and proper procedure means that no foreclosure can be supported by “clean hands.” The underlying theme here being that contrary to centuries of practice, instead of producing workouts in which the loan is saved and thus the investment of the creditors, Ocwen pursued foreclosure which was in its interest and not the creditors. The creditors are saying they don’t want the foreclosures but Ocwen did them anyway.
The fact that the creditors are saying they didn’t get the money that was supposed to go to them means that the money received from lost sharing with FDIC, guarantees, insurance, credit default swaps that should have paid off the creditors were not paid to them and would have reduced the damage to the creditors. By reducing the amount of damages to the creditors the borrower would have owed less, making the principals claimed in foreclosures all wrong. The parties who paid such amounts either have or do not have separate unsecured actions against eh borrower. In most cases they have no such claim because they explicitly waived it.
This is the first time investors have even partially aligned themselves with Borrowers. I hope it will lead to a stampede, because the salvation of investors and borrowers alike requires a pincer like attack on the intermediaries who have been pretending to be the principal parties in interest but who lacked the authority from the start and violated every fiduciary duty and contractual duty in dealing with creditors and borrowers.

Appellate Court Wrestling with Inconsistent Facts in Foreclosure Cases

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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IT ISN’T BOTCHED PAPERWORK. IT’S FAKE PAPERWORK

It should come as no surprise that Judges have been confused since the dawning of the mortgage crisis launched by Wall Street. Wall Street was counting on it. And the problem they are having is that most courts, including appellate courts, are presuming the loans existed in the first place. You can’t blame for that because nearly everyone still makes that presumption. How could it not be true? What do you mean the loan came from someone else? Then why didn’t that third person  make sure they were made the payee on the note and the mortgagee on the mortgage? The real lenders didn’t know about the loan and would never have approved it? Preposterous!

Yes, I concede it all sounds like nonsense. But here is something that does NOT sound like nonsense. If the loan actually existed (between the named payee on the note and the named mortgagee or beneficiary on the mortgage) there is no circumstances under which a lawyer for the “lender” or “investor” would withhold proof of that transaction to the borrower, the Court or anyone else that was entitled to that information. If they had proof of payment on the loan they would rush to show it. If they had proof of payment on the alleged purchase of the loan, they would rush to show it — because that would make them a holder in due course (where the borrower has virtually no defenses).

The problem is that with the shell game of plaintiffs, servicers and trustees, Judges are getting distracted as they start picking at the foreclosure actions and entering some judgments in favor of the homeowners but failing to even consider the possibility that the entire scheme is fraudulent. Instead we see articles like the one below where the paperwork is considered “botched.” It isn’t botched. It is part of a fraudulent scheme. Look for any case where the underlying monetary transaction has been shown or proven. It isn’t there. 6-7 million foreclosures and still no money changing hands. What lender would endorse a note and assign a mortgage without receiving payment for it? (Unless of course they didn’t pay anything either at the loan closing table).

And why would anyone endorse a note or assign a mortgage without a sale of the loan and without receiving payment for it? The answer is very clear. They wouldn’t.

But the Courts are starting with the premise that the loan, and the transfer of the loan is presumptively legal and valid. And part of that presumption starts with the wrong question in the minds of judges — why would anyone file a foreclosure action if they were not the injured party whose legitimate interests were abridged when the borrower stopped paying? That slippery slope leads them to ratify unsigned, robo-signed, fabricated, forged paperwork in the belief that it really doesn’t matter how much is wrong with the paperwork.

Judges still assume that the underlying transactions must be real; hence judgment for the homeowner is necessary to avoid a windfall. It is circular reasoning to assume that the claim must be true if it was filed — that is what our constitution is all about preventing.

see The Fate of Foreclosure Cases

Will botched paperwork affect the outcome of foreclosure appeals? It depends on the judges.

The decisions in three cases came down to paperwork and procedure Wednesday before the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

For BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, botched documentation at the height of the robo-signing scandal cost it a foreclosure judgment when the court ruled the lender failed to prove standing to sue homeowner Rosanie Joseph.

The appeals court reversed a foreclosure judgment issued by Palm Beach Circuit Judge Diana Lewis since there was no evidence to show Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. owned the mortgage when filing to foreclose on Joseph in July 2009.

The 2008 mortgage issued by Key Mortgage Associates was attached to the lawsuit, but no note or assignments accompanied the filing by Ocala-based Taylor Bean, a leading wholesale mortgage lender. The company reported the note was lost or stolen.

Taylor Bean, one of the spectacular bankruptcies of the housing crash, later assigned the note to BAC, which picked up the foreclosure ball.

In trial, BAC produced the original note and mortgage. The note offered two endorsements by the same person, Erica Carter-Shaw as a Key Mortgage attorney and Taylor Bean “E.V.P.” Neither endorsement was dated.

“A party must establish its standing to bring a mortgage foreclosure complaint by establishing an assignment or equitable transfer of the note and mortgage prior to instituting the complaint,” Judge Martha Warner wrote for the unanimous panel. Judges Carole Taylor and Mark Klingensmith concurred.

No File Review

A different panel split in similar litigation: Gafoor Jaffer and Nina Jaffer v. Chase Home Finance.

The homeowners claimed Chase attached a mortgage note payable to a third party without any proof of transfer and used an amended foreclosure complaint that failed to state a cause of action. However, the Jaffers waived the question of Chase’s standing by failing to respond to the lawsuit before default was entered.

Chase conceded some of its employees signed affidavits about the loan documents without first reviewing the loan file.

But the Fourth DCA upheld summary judgment issued by Broward Circuit Judge Sandra Perlman.

In the 2-1 unsigned decision, Judges Spencer Levine and Klingensmith concurred. Judge Burton Conner dissented, citing Chase’s failure to file an accurate copy of the mortgage note.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. wasn’t as lucky when it moved to overturn Broward Circuit Judge Kathleen Ireland’s ruling in favor of homeowner Theresa Boglioli.

Attorneys say the decisions may further complicate already-lengthy and expensive foreclosure litigation.

“Normally you see discrepancies of this nature within different circuits. But what we’re seeing in the Fourth is discrepancies among themselves,” said foreclosure defense attorney Roy Oppenheim of Weston. “It just makes this more complex. When there is cloudiness, it just creates more ambiguity and delays the conclusion of the foreclosure mess. In the end it doesn’t help anybody when you have inconsistent rules.”

“The judges themselves are coming up with different rationale based on the same facts, which makes for wildly different outcomes.”

Articles of Deception: PSA and Reynaldo Reyes Affidavit for Deutsch Bank as Trustee

WITHOUT CONFUSION AND OBFUSCATION, COMBINED WITH STONEWALLING, THERE WOULD BE NO FORECLOSURE OF ANY DEBT SUBJECT TO CLAIMS OF SECURITIZATION —- NEIL GARFIELD, WWW.LIVINGLIES.ME

For further information please call 954-495-9867 and 520-405-1688

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Hat tip to Carol Molloy who sent me the affidavit

See Reynaldo Reyes Affidavit New Jersey Union County 2010 CCF11162014

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Reynaldo Reyes, AVP of Deutsch Bank said to a borrower, in a taped interview, that the whole scheme was “counter-intuitive.” In plain language that means that nothing is what it appears to be. And THAT in turn means that disclosures” were deceptive or “counter-intuitive.” And THAT means that the disclosures at closing were also “counter-intuitive” or deceptive. Reyes in a sworn affidavit drafted many times and edited by various top level attorneys for the banks has submitted an affidavit on behalf of Deutsch Bank but which will be used by Banks to try to legitimize their deceptive tactics. Again, to put it simply, they were lying to everyone — investors, borrowers, regulators, law enforcement, Congress, and the President.

Witness the following paragraph from Reyes’ affidavit. Here he says in the affidavit in Paragraph 1, that the Trustees serve the Trust. But then he takes it all back by saying that the Servicers perform all the functions of administering the loans — not on behalf of the Trustee, but rather on behalf of the Trust. THAT can only mean that the named Trustee, is not the Trustee. It means that the power of administering the Trust assets is with the servicers. Does that mean the servicers should be sued for wrongful foreclosures? Then why is the Trust named or the Trustee named?

So the beginning of the PSA, which designates a Trustee, is merely window dressing to give the impression that Deutsch Bank is the Trustee with all the powers of a Trustee, when in fact, the servicer is the one who performs most or all of the functions of a Trustee. But they do so giving the impression that they must go back to the Trustee or the “investor” when in fact they assert the power to do everything. In their circular reasoning, they could say to the court that they must get approval from the investor and then leave the court room. Then they speak for the investors, according to the servicers. So now they come back to the homeowner or homeowner’s counsel and say the application for modification or settlement has been declined. Whether that assertion turns out to be true after analysis in court is another story.

This is contrary to the position taken by U.S. Bank and Deutsch Bank and BONY Mellon in foreclosure cases where they sue for foreclosure in their own name as Trustee for the REMIC Trust. It also accounts for why they sometimes sue as Trustees for the certificate holders, and sometimes even get away with saying they are trustees only for the certificates delivered to the investors. This of course makes no sense, since they are neither holding nor asserting ownership over the certificates.

Paragraph 7: No entity services loans on behalf of the trustees. The trustees and the loan services that are appointed by the the PSA’s each perform their designated functions on behalf of the trusts. In other words, loan servicers to service mortgage loans that have been pooled and sold into a securitization trust are performing services on behalf of the trusts, not on behalf of the trustees.

Then we get to Paragraph 10 which admits that the Trustee has neither any accounts nor any information or business records of its own. According to this paragraph 10, the Trustee receives loan level data from the servicers “to facilitate certain payments to bondholders.” But wait here comes the language that takes all THAT away: “However, for a number of trusts” [unspecified, but probably all of them] “a party other than the Trustee handles those payments responsibilities.” And then the rest is taken away by his statement that “With respect to the Trusts for which the Trustees serve as a Trustee but not as securities administrators, the Trustee do not receive loan level data.”

Get it? Just like the PSA, Reyes’ affidavit says one thing and then takes it all away in the next breath. The fact is that in virtually no case is the Trustee the securities administrator. And that, Reyes, says means that the Trustee neither gets loan level data, nor does it make payments to the bondholders. “Other parties” perform those functions. Who? The servicer who is according to Reyes the party with the actual powers of the Trustee. So why is Deutsch claiming to be a Trustee.

The answer is very simple — MONEY. The sellers of mortgage bonds pay Deutsch to rent their name to underwriters to make it appear as though an independent fiduciary is handling the money, the purchase or origination of loans, and the enforcement or modification of loans. This is meant to deceive the investors into a false sense of complacency. The same is true for borrowers, although at this point “complacency” would hardly be the word.

Everyone believed the wording at the beginning of the PSA and practically nobody read the PSA from end to end to see that the beginning was sales material and the end was a hodgepodge of obfuscation to make it difficult if not impossible to determine the identity of the players or what they were doing. This analysis can certainly NOT be done without reference to the underlying transaction in which we see who actually sent money to originate the loans, from whom they received the money etc.

The fact is that that while most people think the Trusts acquired the loans by sale of the loans into the trust, the evidence shows that practically none of them were sold to the Trust. The only logical conclusion from the facts at hand is that the investors’ money was pooled in an entirely different scheme while hiding behind claims of securitization.

The investors money was used directly, without their knowledge or consent, to fund origination of loans like the toxic Pick a Pay, reverse amortization, payment increase cap (usually 7.5%) that results in what appears to be affordable payments, but also results in uncontrolled liability.

A $139,000 loan that I recently analyzed, indicates the eventual liability could be nearly $4 million — all at the end of 30 years of payments, resulting in an undisclosed hidden balloon payment in the 13th payment and every payment thereafter which thanks to the miracles of compounding interest and an adjustable rate that could go as high as over 12% APR process an obligation that looks affordable but is infinitely not affordable. The interest alone on the new principal (original balance + deferred interest on negative amortization loan) could exceed $24,000 per month on a $139,000 loan.

Then you get to paragraph 11: Here the affidavit produces more obfuscation by referring to the Master Servicer who might (or might not) be responsible for performing any duties. But in the PSA you see the ultimate authority for virtually everything lies with the Master Servicer, who also turns out to be the the underwriter and seller of mortgage bonds. And since we now know that the Trustee had neither trust accounts nor any control or responsibility for the accounts, THAT makes it impossible for the Trustee to have received any proceeds from the sale of bonds issued by the Trust.

Since a Trust cannot operate except through the Trustee by law (see New York law and the law of your state for more information) it is an inevitable conclusion that there were no accounts established for the Trust in the manner expected by the investors who bought the mortgage bonds. And since there was no money in the Trust, the Trust could not have originate or purchased any loan documents, regardless of whether or not there was in fact an underlying loan transaction at the base of the chain relied upon by these parties when they foreclose.

Then Reyes gets to the meat of why he submitted the affidavit. BONY Mellon did the same thing by a lawsuit and so have hundreds of investors, insurers, guarantors, holders of loss mitigation hedge contracts, whose cases have been quietly settled. Reyes states that “the Trustee would not be in the best position to address further inquiries by the Court concerning any possible ‘irregularity in the handling of foreclosure proceedings.’” So to put it simply, Reyes is disclaiming any role in foreclosures and trying to distance Deutsch bank from wrongful foreclosures [i.e. most or nearly all of them] despite its APPARENT AUTHORITY.

Examination of the PSA reveals deep within its pages, prohibitions and restrictions against either the Trustee or the bond purchasers (“trust beneficiaries”) from knowing or even inquiring about anything involving the business of the trust, which we already know never existed because the trust never received its IPO (bond sale) money. This is why servicers assert control over the settlement and modification process. This is why they say the investor declined the modification or settlement because they never contacted the investor or the trust or the Trustee.

The truth is that the servicers assert, in the final analysis, the right to speak for the investors even thought they have a patent CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING FROM SERVICER ADVANCES. A true servicer would be required to mitigate the damages and minimize the losses. Servicers have no interest in doing that because they can make a ton of money for having advanced the principal and interest payment to the creditors from an account that contained the investors money and that would count, as stated in the PSA, as payment in full to the creditor — so the creditor could not declare a default against the servicer.

And THAT is why these foreclosures are pushed through, among other reasons, [avoiding workouts, modifications and settlements] to wit: the foreclosures proceed even though the creditors (investors) are being paid right through the date of foreclosure. The reason is the banks want to “recover” those “advances” (paid from money stolen from the investors) not from the borrower and not from the creditors, who have already been paid, but through a claim against the final liquidation of the property to a third party “innocent” purchaser. BY controlling the foreclosure process, the servicer gets paid a lot of money and protects the banks against claims for refunds and damages arising out of the improper loan practices, loan processing by the servicer, and wrongful foreclosures.

So far the servicers have fooled the courts into thinking that their claim to recover servicer advances is somehow secured. It isn’t. In order to do that the court would be required to issue a declaratory judgment specifying the breakup of the mortgage lien on a continual basis for each servicer advance or find that the total advanced by the servicer from the underwriter’s controlled slush fund, is subject to an equitable mortgage lien. Equitable liens are not accepted in virtually any court because ti would require the buyer of property to make exhaustive investigation into matters that a re not contained on the face of the note or mortgage.

PRACTICE NOTE FOR LAWYERS:

You might want to get the court to take judicial notice of the affidavit and just to be on the safe side get a certified copy of it. You might want to file a motion for involuntary dismissal based upon the affidavit of Reyes who was THE person in charge of the trustee “program.” Think also about a subpoena for Reyes to appear at trial, if there is one.

Reyes is saying that only the servicer can enforce. And he is saying that when the servicer acts, it does so for trust NOT THE TRUSTEE. So the Trustee, according to him is not a proper party to bring the action. The inference corroborates what I have been saying all along. It is that the investors are the real parties in interest and the servicer is acting in a representative capacity — IF IT IS THE TRUSTEE NAMED IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT (THE PSA).

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Editor’s Analysis: Reynaldo Reyes, the asset manager for Deutsch that pretends to be a trustee of non existent unfunded trusts said it best: “it’s all very counter-intuitive.” In reality he was giving a clue. It isn’t that we haven’t yet unravelled the tangled web of deceit and exotic financial instruments and absurd risk taking. It all boils down to one thing: it doesn’t make sense, it was illegal from the start and it will never make sense. The reason it is counter intuitive is that there is no explanation except lying, cheating, stealing and cover-ups.

Whether you start from the top down, the bottom up or even start in the middle and spread out to the top and bottom, there is no connection between the money trail, the promises and representations made, and the document trail which proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that theft, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, theft and cover-up were at the heart of what Wall Street called a securitization plan but which in practice was not securitization of credit but rather a PONZI s scheme completely dependent upon more investors buying bogus mortgage bonds. The crash didn’t happen because of mortgage de faults. It happened because investors stopped buying the bogus mortgage bonds. That is the red flag on all Ponzi Schemes. When people stop buying and start demanding their money back, the scheme collapses.

Under normal circumstances, the perpetrators — Madoff, Dreier, Stanford et al — go to jail, a receiver is appointed and the receiver does the best job possible of clawing back all the illicit gains, profits and accounts of the perpetrators. That is what should happen with he mortgage mess but that would mean admitting that the judicial system let millions of foreclosures go through the system because of bad lawyering, bad representation by pro se litigants and bad practices by the bench which failed to see the correct chain of title and then failed to inquire why not. —-

YES that IS the way it was. When I represented banks and HOA foreclosing on their liens, if I didn’t have my paperwork in order, the Judge sent me back to do it right — even if the other side didn’t show up. Why? Because the Judge understood that bad paperwork means bad title and that dozens of others could be effectively defrauded by allowing a bad foreclosure to proceed to sale, allowing an unproven creditor to submit a credit bid, and allowing a homeowner who legally still owned the home after the foreclosure to be evicted.

Back in those days certain presumptions applied — legal or informal — that the debt was real, the note was valid, and the mortgage was perfected. it was further correctly assumed that the borrower was in default.

The problem is that the old presumptions and assumptions remain while the facts are wildly different than the old-style foreclosures. Instead of the Judge being able to peruse the documents behind the mortgage, he must either accept the proffer of the facts from the lawyers for the foreclosing entity or have an evidentiary hearing, which he certainly doesn’t want on his calendar because all his other cases would pile up in a bottle neck. Thus lying in court became an acceptable substitute for having the right verifiable paperwork.

People ask me — how do I prove this? Lawyers ask me the same question. My answer is spend the daily rate for Lexus-nexus and get cases on point in your jurisdiction. They will say that where the facts and documents are uniquely within the knowledge and custody of the the defendant, the appropriate remedy is discovery and that the respondent to discovery has a higher duty to provide clear, concise and  extensive answers. In short, the burden of persuasion changes to the the foreclosing party — whether you are in a judicial or non-judicial venue.

Any other approach would have the Judge making findings in the absence of real evidence and actual facts, which is exactly the problem in the current judicial climate, although the tide is definitely turning in many states.

A quick look at the reality of the Ponzi scheme reveals the true nature of the illegality that the regulators and law enforcement faced, understaffed and underfunded against a well staffed and over-funded banking sector.

Let’s start in this article from the top. There the investment banking firm forms what appears to be a REMIC trust and they create a selling entity to put some distance between the investment banking firm and the actual sale. The sale takes place, to wit: the investors gives the investment banking money and the investor gets either a certificate (rarely) or some acknowledgment ina statement that the investor is now the proud owner of an interest in a REMIC trust governed by the REMIC provisions of the internal Revenue Code, which allows the REMIC trust to be a tax-exempt entity meaning the flow of funds from investments by the REMIC will only be taxed once even though it is coming through another entity. If that were true, there would be no problem. The problem is that it is not true and for the most never was true and never was the intent of the banks.

So to recap thus far, the money went from the bank account of the investors to the bank account of the investment bank or to an entity wholly controlled by the investment bank. Where it did NOT go was into a trust account wherein the Trustee for the REMIC pool would collect and disburse all funds, receipts and disbursements as set forth in the investor prospectus and pooling and service agreement.

If you look at the Taylor Bean and Whitaker setup, you’ll see, as Dan Edstrom has pointed out, that the money was instead put into a vast commingled account which they called a custodial account, but they never state for whom they are the custodian. And that is because they were skimming the money in a tier 2 yield spread premium and other “proprietary trading” also known as three pocket Monty — you take the money out of one pocket to transfer it to another pocket but on the way a few dollars drops into a secret third pocket. This vast Superfund was used as a TBW piggy bank as well as the source of funding for mortgages.

Without getting into the farce of “proprietary trading” being the cover for outright theft of investors money, let’s look at what happened next with the money.

People with the right connections were told to create mortgage origination companies. These companies would act as the payee on the note and the secured party on the mortgage or deed of trust, but they would never ever be allowed to touch the actual funding of the mortgage nor would they have the right to make a loan that would fall under the provisions of the assignment and assumption agreement signed with the aggregator (Countrywide, for example). SO XYZ company is created and they have a bank account and all that but the funding of the mortgage never touches the bank account of XYZ or any person associated with XYZ. The simple reason is that Wall Street being composed largely of thieves, understood that when the balances became high enough in the originators accounts, many if them would abscond with the money. So the wire transfer was made directly from the Superfund account (euphemistically referred to as a warehouse credit facility set up solely at the discretion of the aggregation (e.g. Countrywide.).

It was the coincidence of timing that convinced the closing agent and the borrower that the money had come from the “lender” identified on the disclosure paperwork and in the note and mortgage, when in fact, the originator was a mere nominee working for a fee. The originator could not under generally accepted accounting rules, book the transaction as a loan receivable because there was no offsetting entry debiting a cash account or other account over which the originator had control. The originator had control over nothing — the underwriting, funding, approval of the loan was left to the undisclosed aggregator using a computer system designed explicitly for this purpose. Without approval from Countrywide, the originator was not permitted to communicate approval of the loan.

The real lender were the investors whose money had been diverted from the REMIC trust into the Superfund. This created a common law partnership instead of a REMIC trust. This partnership with no name was the lender but the banks made sure that the true lender in an obviously illegal table-funded transaction was never disclosed. As far as the closing agent and borrower were concerned the coincidence of having the money there at the same time as the closing with the originator was proof of enough about what was going on. After all, who would send money for a mortgage transaction unless they thought they were getting a valid enforceable note and a mortgage or deed of trust securing the provisions of that note, which was valid evidence of the debt.

Unfortunately for the investors, the banks had other ideas than using the money the way they promised in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement, and they had other plans than protecting the investors enforceable rights under a valid promissory note, and they had a different idea about securing a note payable to the investors with the investors having a perfected mortgage lien against the property.

Bottom Line: The wire transfer receipt shows a loan emanating from the Superfund and that the money from the Superfund was advanced by the investors, but other than the wire transfer receipts there was not a shred of documentary evidence showing that the investors were going to be repaid under the terms of the mortgage-backed bonds in the REMIC because the mortgage bonds never made into the REMIC and their money never  made it into the largely or completely unfunded REMIC trust.

On the contrary, the documents produced by the originator under direction of the aggregator who was functioning under the thumb of the investment banks, all tell a wildly different story. According to the documents, the originator made the loan and assigned or sold it to the aggregator who sold it to the REMIC, which presumably protected the investors in a round about way even if it was a lie. The main problem with the bank’s version of the story is that XYZ never got paid for the loan or mortgage in a transfer or assignment transaction. And the aggregator never got paid by the REMIC trust for the loans either. The lack of consideration is not merely a technicality but rather part of a larger plot to steal from investors and homeowners.

The trust reposed in the banks by investors and homeowners alike basically was like putting red meat in front of a lion. The reason for the subterfuge was that the banks wanted to and did in fact get away with borrowing the loss of the investors by pretending to be the owner of the loans for a temporary period of time. By doing that they had what appeared to be ownership, proof of loss, albeit without any proof of payment. Now the insurers and credit default swap parties are hip to this trick and suing the investment banks.

The net result is that the actual financial transaction is largely undocumented, unsecured, and unenforceable in terms of method of repayment. The debt to investors (not the REMIC trusts) exists — less the insurance, CDS and bailouts received by the agents of the investors — but it is not documented. Conversely, the documented transaction lacks consideration of any kind, thus describing a financial transaction that never actually occurred. Any assignment therefore was pure lies and hype, since the reference was to originating documents that were procured by misrepresentation or fraud, without consideration, and obviously no perfected lien, which is not subject to nullification of instrument.

The banks and regulators and law enforcement don’t like my explanation because it would require them to do their work, and the people in charge of the banks to go to jail, costing a could of hundred millioin dollars to prove the case against the right people. Whether they like it or not, the regulators and law enforcement needs to do their job or face recriminations from the public once the true nature of this scheme is fully revealed. And make no mistake about it. I am not the only one who knows. The truth is coming out and that is why Judges are turning.

Arizona Supreme Court Hogan Case Holds that Note is Not required to Start Foreclosure

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the trustee owes the trustor a fiduciary duty, and may be held liable for conducting a trustee’s sale when the trustor is not in default. See Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 476, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (1978).” Hogan Court

Editor’s Comment: Here is another example of lawyers arguing out of a lack of understanding of the securitization process and trying to compress an elephant into a rabbit hole. They lost, unsurprisingly.

If you loaned money to someone, you want the money repaid. You DON’T want to be told that because you don’t have the note you can never enforce the loan repayment. You CAN start enforcement and you must prove why you don’t have the note in a credible way so that the court has footprints leading right up to the point that you don’t have the note. But the point is that you can start without the note. 

The Supreme Court apparently understood this very well and they didn’t address the real issue because nobody brought it up. The issue before them was whether someone without the note could initiate the foreclosure process. Nobody mentioned whether the same party could submit a credit bid at the auction which is what I have been pounding upon for months on end now.

Apparently, right or wrong, the feeling of the courts is that there is a very light burden on the right to initiate a foreclosure whether it is judicial or non-judicial. It is very close to the burden of the party moving to lift stay in a bankruptcy procedure. Practically any colorable right gives the party enough to get the stay — because the theory goes — whether it is a lift stay or starting the ball rolling on a foreclosure there is plenty the borrower can do to  oppose the enforcement procedure. I don’t agree with either standard or burden of proof in the case of securitized mortgages but it is about time we got real about what gets traction in the courtroom and what doesn’t.

In the Hogan case the Court makes a pretty big deal out of the fact that Hogan didn’t allege that WAMU and Deutsch were not entitled to enforce the note. From the court’s perspective, they were saying to the AG and the borrowers, “look, you are admitting the debt and admitting this is the creditor, what do you want from us, a free pass?”

This is why you need real people with real knowledge and real reports that back up and give credibility to deny the debt, deny the default, deny that WAMU and/or Deutsch are creditors, plead payment and force WAMU and Deutsch to come forward with pleadings and proof. Instead WAMU and Deutsch skated by AGAIN because nobody followed the money. They followed the document trail which led them down that rabbit hole I was referencing above.

In order to deny everything without be frivolous, you need to have concrete reasons why you think the debt does not exist, the debt does not exist between the borrower and these pretender lenders, the debt was paid in full, and deny that the loan was NOT secured (i.e. that the mortgage lien was NOT perfected when filed).

For anyone to do that without feeling foolish you must UNDERSTAND how the securitization model AS PRACTICED turned the entire lending model on its head. Then everything makes sense, which is why I wrote the second volume which you can get by pressing the appropriate links shown above. But it isn’t just the book that will get you there. You need to give rise to material, relevant issues of fact that are in dispute. For that you need a credible report from a credible expert with real credentials and real experience and training.

I follow the money. In fact the new book has a section called “Show Me the Money”. To “believe” is taken from an ancient  language that means “to be willing”. I want you to believe that the debt that the “enforcers” doesn’t exist and never did. I want you to believe that the declarations contained in the note, mortgage (deed of trust), substitution of trustee etc. are all lies. But you can’t believe that unless you are willing to consider the the idea it might be true. That I might be right.

At every “Securitized” closing table there were two deals taking place — one perfectly real and the other perfectly unreal, fake and totally obfuscated. The deal everyone is litigating is the second one,  starting with the documents at closing and moving up the chain of securitization. Do you really think that some court is going to declare that everyone gets a free house because some i wasn’t dotted or t crossed on the back of the wrong piece of paper when you admit the debt, the default and the amount due?

It is the first deal that is real because THAT is the one with the money exchanging hands. The declarations contained in the note, mortgage and other documents all refer to money exchanging hands between the named payee and secured party on one side and the borrower on the other. The deal in those documents never happened. The REAL DEAL was that money from investor lenders was poured down a pipe through which the loans were funded. The parties at the closing table with the borrower had nothing to do with funding; acquiring, transferring the receivable, the obligation, note or the mortgage or deed of trust.

Every time you chase them down the rabbit hole of the document trail you miss the point. The REAL DEAL had no documents and couldn’t possibly be secured. And if you read the wording from the Hogan decision below you can see how even they would have considered the matter differently if the simple allegation been made that the borrower denied that WAMU and Deutsch had any right to enforce the note either as principals or as agents. They were not the creditor. But Hogan and its ilk are not over — yet.

There is still a matter to be determined as to whether the party who initiated the foreclosure is in fact a creditor under the statute and can therefore submit a credit bid in lieu of cash. THAT is where the rubber meets the road — where the cash is supposed to exchange hands. And THAT is where nearly all the foreclosures across the country fail. The failure of consideration means the sale did not take place. If the borrower was there or someone for him was there and bid a token amount of money it could be argued in many states that the other bid being ineligible as a credit bid, the only winning bidder is the one who offered cash.

————————————————————

Hogan argues that a deed of trust, like a mortgage, “may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4(c) (1997); see Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 568-69, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (1938).

-6-
We agree. (e.s.) But Hogan has not alleged that WaMu and Deutsche Bank are not entitled to enforce the underlying note; rather, he alleges that they have the burden of demonstrating their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure may proceed. Nothing in the non-judicial foreclosure statutes, however, imposes such an obligation. See Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citing A.R.S. § 33-807 and observing that “Arizona’s [non-]judicial foreclosure statutes . . . do not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings”); In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (stating that non-judicial foreclosures may be conducted under Arizona’s deed of trust statutes without presentation of the original note).

———————AND SPEAKING OF  DEUTSCH BANK: READ THIS AS GRIST FOR THE ABOVE ANALYSIS——-

Disavowal by-DEUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY-AS-TRUSTEE-NOTICE-TO-CERTIFICATE-HOLDERSForeclosure-Practice-Notice-10-25[1]

Pandemic Lying Admission: Deutsch Bank Up and Down the Fake Securitization Chain

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Editor’s Comment:

One problem with securitization in practice even under the academic model is the effect on potential enforcement of the obligation, even assuming that the “lender” is properly identified in the closing documents with the buyer of the loan product and the closing papers of the buyer of the mortgage bonds (and we’ll assume that the mortgage bonds are real and valid, as well as having been issued by a fully funded REMIC in which loans were properly assigned and transferred —- an assumption, as we have seen that is not true in the real world). Take this quote from the glossary at the back of this book and which in turn was taken from established authoritative sources used by bankers, securities firms and accountants:

cross guarantees and credit default swaps, synthetic collateralized asset obligations and other exotic equity and debt instruments, each of which promises the holder an incomplete interest in the original security instrument and the revenue flow starting with the alleged borrower and ending with various parties who receive said revenue, including but not limited to parties who are obligated to make payments for shortfalls of revenues.

Real Property Lawyers spot the problem immediately.

First question is when do these cross guarantees, CDS, Insurance, and other exotic instruments arise. If they are in existence at the time of the closing with the borrower homeowner then the note and mortgage are not properly drafted as to terms of repayment nor identity of the lender/creditor. This renders the note either unenforceable or requiring the admission of parole evidence in any action to either enforce against the borrower or enforce the cross obligations of the new cross creditors who supposedly are receiving not just rights to the receivable but to the actual note and the actual mortgage.

Hence even a truthful statement that the “Trustee” beings this foreclosure on behalf of the “trust” as creditor (assuming a Trust existed by law and that the Trustee, and beneficiaries and terms were clear) would be insufficient if any of these “credit enhancements” and other synthetic or exotic vehicles were in place. The Trustee on the Deed of Sale would be required to get an accounting from each of the entities that are parties or counterparties whose interest is effected by the foreclosure and who would be entitled to part of the receivable generated either by the foreclosure itself or the payment by counterparties who “bet wrong” on the mortgage pool.

The second question is whether some or any or all of these instruments came into existence or were actualized by a required transaction AFTER the closing with the homeowner borrower. It would seem that while the original note and mortgage (or Deed of Trust) might not be affected directly by these instruments, the enforcement mechanism would still be subject to the same issues as raised above when they were fully actualized and in existence at the time of the closing with the homeowner borrower.

Deutsch Bank was a central player in most of the securitized mortgages in a variety of ways including the exotic instruments referred to above. If there was any doubt about whether there existed pandemic lying and cheating, it was removed when the U.S. Attorney Civil Frauds Unit obtained admissions and a judgment for Deutsch to pay over $200 million resulting from intentional misrepresentations contained in various documents used with numerous entities and people up and down the fictitious securitization chain. Similar claims are brought against Citi (which settled so far for $215 million in February, 2012) Flagstar Bank FSB (which settled so far for $133 million in February 2012, and Allied Home Mortgage Corp, which is still pending. Even the most casual reader can see that the entire securitization model was distorted by fraud from one end (the investor lender) to the other (the homeowner borrower) and back again (the parties and counterparties in insurance, bailouts, credit default swaps, cross guarantees that violated the terms of every promissory note etc.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Recovers $202.3 Million From Deutsche Bank And Mortgageit In Civil Fraud Case Alleging Reckless Mortgage Lending Practices And False Certifications To HUD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                  Thursday May 10, 2012

Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Stuart F. Delery, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, Helen Kanovsky, General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and David A. Montoya, Inspector General of HUD, announced today that the United States has settled a civil fraud lawsuit against DEUTSCHE BANK AG, DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS, INC., DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES, INC. (collectively “DEUTSCHE BANK” or the “DEUTSCHE BANK defendants”) and MORTGAGEIT, INC. (“MORTGAGEIT”). The Government’s lawsuit, filed May 3, 2011, sought damages and civil penalties under the False Claims Act for repeated false certifications to HUD in connection with the residential mortgage origination practices of MORTGAGEIT, a wholly-owned subsidiary of DEUTSCHE BANK AG since 2007. The suit alleges approximately a decade of misconduct in connection with MORTGAGEIT’s participation in the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA’s”) Direct Endorsement Lender Program (“DEL program”), which delegates authority to participating private lenders to endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. Among other things, the suit accused the defendants of having submitted false certifications to HUD, including false certifications that MORTGAGEIT was originating mortgages in compliance with HUD rules when in fact it was not. In the settlement announced today, MORTGAGEIT and DEUTSCHE BANK admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged in the Complaint, including that, contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations. MORTGAGEIT also admitted that it submitted certifications to HUD stating that certain loans were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance when in fact they were not; that FHA insured certain loans endorsed by MORTGAGEIT that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance; and that HUD consequently incurred losses when some of those MORTGAGEIT loans defaulted. The defendants also agreed to pay $202.3 million to the United States to resolve the Government’s claims for damages and penalties under the False Claims Act. The settlement was approved today by United States District Judge Lewis Kaplan.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara stated: “MORTGAGEIT and DEUTSCHE BANK treated FHA insurance as free Government money to backstop lending practices that did not follow the rules. Participation in the Direct Endorsement Lender program comes with requirements that are not mere technicalities to be circumvented through subterfuge as these defendants did repeatedly over the course of a decade. Their failure to meet these requirements caused substantial losses to the Government – losses that could have and should have been avoided. In addition to their admissions of responsibility, Deutsche Bank and MortgageIT have agreed to pay damages in an amount that will significantly compensate HUD for the losses it incurred as a result of the defendants’ actions.”

Acting Assistant Attorney General Stuart F. Delery stated: “This is an important settlement for the United States, both in terms of obtaining substantial reimbursement for the FHA insurance fund for wrongfully incurred claims, and in obtaining the defendants’ acceptance of their role in the losses they caused to the taxpayers.”

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www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/may12/deutschebankmortgageitsettlement.html                  1/45/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

HUD General Counsel Helen Kanovsky stated: “This case demonstrates that HUD has the ability to identify fraud patterns and work with our partners at the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to pursue appropriate remedies. HUD would like to commend the work of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York in achieving this settlement, which is a substantial recovery for the FHA mortgage insurance fund. We look forward to continuing our joint efforts with the Department of Justice and the SDNY to combat mortgage fraud. The mortgage industry should take notice that we will not sit silently by if we detect abuses in our programs.”

HUD Inspector General David A. Montoya stated: “We expect every Direct Endorsement Lender to adhere to the highest level of integrity and accountability. When the combined efforts and attention of the Department of Justice, HUD, and HUD OIG are focused upon those who fail to exercise such integrity in connection with HUD programs, the end result will be both unpleasant and costly to the offending party.”

The following allegations are based on the Complaint and Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) filed in Manhattan federal court by the Government in this case:

Between 1999 and 2009, MORTGAGEIT was a participant in the DEL program, a federal program administered by the FHA. As a Direct Endorsement Lender, MORTGAGEIT had the authority to originate, underwrite, and endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. If a Direct Endorsement Lender approves a mortgage loan for FHA insurance and the loan later defaults, the holder of the loan may submit an insurance claim to HUD for the costs associated with the defaulted loan, which HUD must then pay. Under the DEL program, neither the FHA nor HUD reviews a loan before it is endorsed for FHA insurance. Direct Endorsement Lenders are therefore required to follow program rules designed to ensure that they are properly underwriting and endorsing mortgages for FHA insurance and maintaining a quality control program that can prevent and correct any deficiencies in their underwriting. These requirements include maintaining a quality control program, pursuant to which the lender must fully review all loans that go into default within the first six payments, known as “early payment defaults.” Early payment defaults may be signs of problems in the underwriting process, and by reviewing early payment defaults, Direct Endorsement Lenders are able to monitor those problems, correct them, and report them to HUD. MORTGAGEIT failed to comply with these basic requirements.

As the Complaint further alleges, MORTGAGEIT was also required to execute certifications for every mortgage loan that it endorsed for FHA insurance. Since 1999, MORTGAGEIT has endorsed more than 39,000 mortgages for FHA insurance, and FHA paid insurance claims on more than 3,200 mortgages, totaling more than $368 million, for mortgages endorsed for FHA insurance by MORTGAGEIT, including more than $58 million resulting from loans that defaulted after DEUTSCHE BANK AG acquired MORTGAGEIT in 2007.

As alleged in the Complaint, a portion of those losses was caused by the false statements that the defendants made to HUD to obtain FHA insurance on individual loans. Although MORTGAGEIT had certified that each of these loans was eligible for FHA insurance, it repeatedly submitted certifications that were knowingly or recklessly false. MORTGAGEIT failed to perform basic due diligence and repeatedly endorsed mortgage loans that were not eligible for FHA insurance.

The Complaint also alleges that MORTGAGEIT separately certified to HUD, on an annual basis, that it was in compliance with the rules governing its eligibility in the DEL program, including that it conduct a full review of all early payment defaults, as early payment defaults are indicators of mortgage fraud. Contrary to its certifications to HUD, MORTGAGEIT failed to implement a compliant quality control program, and failed to review all early payment defaults as required. In addition, the Complaint alleges that, after DEUTSCHE BANK acquired MORTGAGEIT in January 2007, DEUTSCHE BANK managed the quality control functions of the Direct Endorsement Lender business, and had its employees sign and submit MORTGAGEIT’s Direct Endorsement Lender annual certifications to HUD. Furthermore, by the end of 2007, MORTGAGEIT was not reviewing any early payment defaults on closed FHA-insured loans. Between 1999 and 2009, the FHA paid more than $92 million in FHA insurance claims for loans that defaulted within the first six payments.

***

Pursuant to the settlement, MORTGAGEIT and the DEUTSCHE BANK defendants will pay the United States $202.3 million within 30 days of the settlement.

As part of the settlement, the defendants admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for certain misconduct. Specifically,

MORTGAGEIT admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for the following:

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5/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

MORTGAGEIT failed to conform fully to HUD-FHA rules requiring Direct Endorsement Lenders to maintain a compliant quality control program;

MORTGAGEIT failed to conduct a full review of all early payment defaults on loans endorsed for FHA insurance;

Contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations;

MORTGAGEIT endorsed for FHA mortgage insurance certain loans that did not meet all underwriting requirements contained in HUD’s handbooks and mortgagee letters, and therefore were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance under the DEL program; and;

MORTGAGEIT submitted to HUD-FHA certifications stating that certain loans were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance when in fact they were not; FHA insured certain loans endorsed by MORTGAGEIT that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance; and HUD consequently incurred losses when some of those MORTGAGEIT loans defaulted.

The DEUTSCHE BANK defendants admitted, acknowledged, and accepted responsibility for the fact that after MORTGAGEIT became a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of DB Structured Products, Inc and Deutsche Bank AG in January 2007:

The DEUTSCHE BANK defendants were in a position to know that the operations of MORTGAGEIT did not conform fully to all of HUD-FHA’s regulations, policies, and handbooks;

One or more of the annual certifications was signed by an individual who was also an officer of certain of the DEUTSCHE BANK defendants; and;

Contrary to the representations in MORTGAGEIT’s annual certifications, MORTGAGEIT did not conform to all applicable HUD-FHA regulations.

***

The case is being handled by the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit. Mr. Bharara established the Civil Frauds Unit in March 2010 to bring renewed focus and additional resources to combating financial fraud, including mortgage fraud.

To date, the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit has brought four civil fraud lawsuits against major lenders under the False Claims Act alleging reckless residential mortgage lending.

Three of the four cases have settled, and today’s settlement represents the third, and largest, settlement. On February 15, 2012, the Government settled its civil fraud lawsuit against CITIMORTGAGE, INC. for $158.3 million. On February 24, 2012, the Government settled its civil fraud suit against FLAGSTAR BANK, F.S.B. for $132.8 million. The Government’s lawsuit against ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE CORP. and two of its officers remains pending. With today’s settlement, the Government has achieved settlements totaling $493.4 million in the last three months. In each settlement, the defendants have admitted and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged in the Government’s Complaint.

The Office’s Civil Frauds Unit is handling all three cases as part of its continuing investigation of reckless lending practices.

The Civil Frauds Unit works in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, on which Mr. Bharara serves as a Co-Chair of the Securities and Commodities Fraud Working Group. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

Mr. Bharara thanked HUD and HUD-OIG for their extraordinary assistance in this case. He also expressed his appreciation for the support of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Division in Washington, D.C.

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5/16/12                  USDOJ: US Attorney’s Office – Southern District of New York

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Lara K. Eshkenazi, Pierre G. Armand, and Christopher B. Harwood are in charge of the case.

WHO OWNS THE MORTGAGE?

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John Kevin Kennedy was an engineer at Anheuser Busch for 30 years. Then came the sale to InBev, and the big downsizing at the brewery left Kennedy out on the street along with much of his department.

With no job, he asked his mortgage lender for a lower payment on his home in Barnhart.

What happened next set in motion a lawsuit challenging the way foreclosures are done in Missouri. By raising questions about which lender actually owns the mortgages, the suit claims certain foreclosures weren’t properly done and it asks the courts to give “hundreds, even thousands” of Missourians their foreclosed homes back.

Kennedy’s is part of a broader legal movement nationwide challenging the foreclosure process, which debtors say is slanted against them.

“We’ll put an end to this,” vowed lawyer Stanley Wallach of the Wallach Law Firm in Creve Coeur. “The capes-and-crusaders mode . . . is to put this back on a level playing field.

Kennedy says Bank of America agreed to reduce his mortgage payment to $624 from $823, and that he made the lower payments through 2009 and 2010. Such modifications are often done on a trial basis pending a permanent decision.

So, he was shocked when the sheriff arrived with a notice that the bank was starting the foreclosure process.

Kennedy called the bank. “I kept getting the runaround. I probably logged 100 to 150 hours on this cellphone,” he said.

In Missouri, lenders can foreclose without a judge’s order. Unless the homeowner files suit to stop it, the house can be sold at a foreclosure sale on the mortgage holder’s word alone. People who can’t pay their mortgages usually can’t afford lawyers, so foreclosures almost always go unchallenged. In Illinois, court approval is required before a foreclosure.

But Kennedy, 62, had something that most troubled homeowners don’t – money in a 401(k) retirement plan. He used it to hire lawyer Greg White, who specializes in fighting foreclosures.

White teamed up with three other law firms to file a lawsuit challenging the state’s foreclosure system. They hope to convert the case into a class-action suit.

A Bank of America spokeswoman said the bank hasn’t yet seen the suit and wouldn’t comment. An attorney at Kozeny & McCubbin, a creditors’ law firm also named a defendant, also declined to comment.

At the heart of the challenge is MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration System. It is the mortgage industry’s system for tracking ownership of perhaps 60 million mortgages.

These days, lenders that make mortgages sell them off to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or other large operators. There, many mortgages from many states are packaged into securities. Shares in those securities are sold to multiple investors. In the process, the ownership of a particular mortgage can change several times.

For example, Kennedy’s $86,500 mortgage was made by Quick Loans. But he ended up making payments to Bank of America.

Across the country, however, homeowners lawyers claim MERS muddies the legal ownership of loans.

As a result, the lawyers say, lenders trying to foreclose on homeowners often can’t prove that they own the mortgage in question.

“They were pretty sloppy on the way they did it,” said White, Kennedy’s lawyer. MERS is “an end run around the records requirements,” he says.

WHO OWNS THE MORTGAGE?

With millions of mortgages being mixed into thousands of securities, the industry faced a problem in keeping track of who owned what loan, who had the job of collecting payments, and who had the right to foreclose.

The industry’s solution was MERS, formed in 1995. Not only did it ease record keeping, but it was supposed to simplify legal requirements that changes in mortgage ownership be recorded at local courthouses.

The idea was that MERS would represent all its member lenders. The “deeds of trust,” mortgage ownership documents that let the holder foreclose, would all be recorded just once in MERS name, no matter how often the loans changed hands. As a result, MERS shows up in public records as the holder of claims on property, although it doesn’t really own the loans.

The system held up well, until the Great Recession brought on a landslide of foreclosures.

Wilson Freyermuth, law professor at the University of Missouri and an authority on real estate law, says the MERS system in theory seems compatible with the law.

“There’s not necessarily a legal problem with the structure of MERS,” says the professor, who is not involved in the case. “All MERS was originally intended to do was to serve as an agent for the actual owner of the loan.”

Lenders could trade mortgages among themselves without filing papers at the courthouse, as long as they were members of MERS. Or that was the idea.

But MERS produced a field day for homeowners’ lawyers around the country.

Challenges are underway in several states, and judges have gone both ways on the issue. For instance, the California Supreme Court upheld the MERS system, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review it. But last August, a judge in Massachusetts let a woman keep her home, after Deutsche Bank tried to foreclose. MERS, not Deutsche Bank, actually held the mortgage, he ruled.

The law on real estate ownership is quite technical, opening the door to technical challenges. In some Missouri suits, homeowners lawyers claim that legal paperwork needed to transfer loans was never actually done within the MERS system, so lenders claim to own loans they actually don’t.

The MERS system is also entangled in the so-called “robo-signing” scandal, in which employees of mortgage servicing operations and law firms swore to the accuracy of loan ownership records that they hadn’t checked.

Kennedy’s challenge claims that Bank of America can’t foreclose because MERS is recorded as the owner of the mortgage. The Kozeny & McCubbin law firm is a defendant because it handled the foreclosure.

Though the bank foreclosed on his home, Kennedy still lives at the house while the two sides face off in court.

“Hundreds, even thousands,” of Missouri families may have lost homes under similar circumstances, the suit says. The suit asks the court to give them the houses back. The law suit, filed in November, is in its beginning stages.

Read more: http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/suits-challenge-missouri-foreclosure-law/article_e2cb9724-4784-11e1-8c48-0019bb30f31a.html#ixzz1lBhK0V00

Briefs Submitted for Oral Argument in Arizona

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CV110091CQ Brief [Plaintiff Vasquez]

CV110091CQ Brief filed by Defendants

CERTIFIED QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW

AMICUS BRIEFS REPORTEDLY BEING FILED BY ARIZONA AG AND OTHERS

A lot of buzz being generated about this time in  Arizona Supreme Court. The Court has scheduled oral argument in an auditorium and it will be broadcast, from what I understand on September live on September 22, 2011.

The big question of course is whether we will take a step forward or a step backward. The certified questions are straightforward and the greater weight of the law clearly supports Vasquez. If the banks lose this one, as they have on appellate review, they will once again be forced backward on 5 million foreclosures, many of which were in Arizona. My position is simple: if the law is applied and substance is more important than a procedure (non-judicial foreclosure) that in the current environment is questionable at best, then the Court will issue a ruling and opinion that will require Judges to make inquiry as to the truth of the matters asserted by the banks. If it is true, they can foreclose, If it is false they can’t. The fact that the decision could have large ramifications should not stop the court from doing the right thing.

As for the large ramifications, they run both ways. A decision for the banks will mean that title will be forever corrupted and uncertainty will be introduced into the marketplace that was never permitted or even contemplated. A decision for the borrowers will put the borrowers back into the driver’s seat to reclaim their home, damages for wrongful foreclosure and it will create a huge opportunity for community banks and credit unions to pick up the pieces of what is left of the megabanks when their balance sheets are revealed as nothing more than the emperor’s new clothes. A decision for banks will continue to stifle the economy that is already choking on foreclosures, unemployment and lack of capital or income to fuel economic growth. A decision for the borrowers will inject capital back into the economic equation and allow homeowners to recover with some money in or wealth in their pockets that can fueled the stimulus needed for the economy, employment and increased tax revenue for the states and federal government.

AS FOR THE FREE HOUSE STORY: It’s true. Someone is going to get a free house. Will it be the disinterested non-creditor banks who misbehaved and lied in the process of lending and documenting the alleged loans, and withheld accounting from third party payments made without subrogation? Or will it be the homeowner who has down payments, monthly payments, maintenance, taxes and insurance, as well as furnishings and home improvements in the home? Will there be a windfall? Yes. Either to the banks who don’t have anything to lose except an opportunity to get a free house or to the homeowner who had more left on his obligation than the value of his claims against the bank for wrongful foreclosure, predatory lending, fraudulent lending etc.

 

WSJ: BANK STOCKS TUMBLING ON DOUBTS THAT MORTGAGES ARE ENFORCEABLE

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“The battle liens are drawn: either the pretender lenders with nothing at stake except satisfaction of greed or the homeowner -borrowers who were duped by fraudulent appraisals and other predatory and fraudulent lending practices are going to get a free house. The tide has turned in favor of the victim (homeowner-borrowers) and against the pretender lenders who simply have no skin in the game).” — Neil Garfield

FROM THE ARTICLE:

These “show me the paper” cases have been winding through the courts for several years. But in recent months, some judges have been siding with borrowers and stopping foreclosures after concluding that banks’ paperwork problems are more serious than previously thought and raise broader ethical questions.

This year, cases in California, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts and others have raised questions about whether banks properly demonstrated ownership.”

EDITOR’S COMMENT: When the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg start questioning the viability of the mortgages, they are questioning the viability of the mortgage bonds. Since the money was always intended for parties other than those disclosed at the closing with the homeowner-borrower, it is obvious that the mortgage lien was not only not perfected, it didn’t exist at all because the paperwork describes a transaction that never occurred. This in turn means that the megabanks are now at the point of the cliff where they can’t go back and if they go forward they cease to exist in their present form.

Investors and traders are starting to get the complexity of this but they are also simplifying it down to the essentials, “where’s the beef?” If there isn’t any substance to these transactions, and the investors who were the source of the funds are suing on exactly that premise then you have a confluence in which both creditor and debtor are saying the same thing: there is no debt, there is no lien.

That being the case, there is a magnificent trading opportunity in shorting the bank stocks, and it turns out that both puts and shorts are increasing. From my own experience, traders make their own reality and companies live or die based upon the conventional wisdom amongst those companies and investors who make their money in the liquidity portion of trading activity — day trades, speed trades by supercomputers etc. My opinion is that the bank stocks are i for a fall not unlike the GM and that they are headed for bankruptcy and resolution whether anyone likes the idea or not.

It is also apparent that the holy grail for homeowners is coming within reach. In 2010 there were 2.9 million households that received foreclosure papers. The Obama administration claims over 600,000 successful permanent modification (many of which went back into foreclosure). The parties to those modifications, just like the parties to the enforcement of the obligation, just like the parties to would-be foreclosures are the same parties as those whose claims to standing and real party in interest have essentially been repeatedly struck down by every court that looked at the documentation and simply applied basic rules of law and basic rules of evidence, which is also law.

Since neither the pretender lenders nor the actual creditors (investor-lenders) have taken any steps to reform the transactions (and for good reason, because their proof would be lacking) that leaves a void where there would ordinarily be a creditor claiming damages from the the failure or unwillingness of the homeowner to pay on a debt that was fraudulently stated, in a transaction that never occurred. In plain language, the millions of foreclosures numbering some 7 million households, are subject to and should be reversed restoring the homeowner to ownership of the home without the existing liens of record — i.e., by having the courts clear the existing liens off the title registry in a quiet title action.

The battle liens are drawn: either the pretender lenders with nothing at stake except satisfaction of greed or the homeowner -borrowers who were duped by fraudulent appraisals and other predatory and fraudulent lending practices are going to get a free house. The tide has turned in favor of the victim (homeowner-borrowers) and against the pretender lenders who simply have no skin in the game).

Banks Hit Hurdle to Foreclosures

By NICK TIMIRAOS

Banks trying to foreclose on homeowners are hitting another roadblock, as some delinquent borrowers are successfully arguing that their mortgage companies can’t prove they own the loans and therefore don’t have the right to foreclose.

These “show me the paper” cases have been winding through the courts for several years. But in recent months, some judges have been siding with borrowers and stopping foreclosures after concluding that banks’ paperwork problems are more serious than previously thought and raise broader ethical questions.

This year, cases in California, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts and others have raised questions about whether banks properly demonstrated ownership.

During the fall, banks temporarily suspended foreclosures to address so-called robo-signing problems, where employees were approving legal documents without properly reviewing them. They said that in weeks they could fix what they considered to be simple clerical errors. But borrowers are uncovering new types of document problems, further delaying banks’ efforts to get foreclosures back on track.

In some cases, borrowers are showing courts that banks failed to properly assign ownership of mortgages after they were pooled into mortgage-backed securities. In other cases, borrowers say that lenders backdated or fabricated documents to fix those errors.

“Flawed mortgage-banking processes have potentially infected millions of foreclosures, and the damages against these operations could be significant and take years to materialize,” said Sheila Bair, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., in testimony to a Senate committee last month .

Last month, the Maine Supreme Court reversed the foreclosure of Dana and Robin Murphy of Auburn, Me., after concluding that the mortgage company, a unit of HSBC Holdings PLC, filed “inherently untrustworthy” documents. An HSBC spokesman declined to comment.

The case began in 2008 when HSBC filed to foreclose on the Murphys, who hadn’t made a mortgage payment in two years. A trial judge initially rejected HSBC’s foreclosure because the bank couldn’t show it owned the promissory note—in effect, the borrower’s IOU. The court later granted the foreclosure after HSBC submitted new paperwork.

However, the Murphys found discrepancies and alleged that the documents were backdated. The court voided the foreclosure and sent the case back to the lower court to determine potential penalties.

Attorneys for borrowers reject the view that they are using arcane legal rules to secure free houses for clients who aren’t paying their bills. Efforts to gloss over incomplete or falsified evidence “can’t be tolerated by a free society,” says Thomas Ice, an attorney in Royal Palm Beach, Fla., who has a similar case before the Florida Supreme Court. “This is a huge assault on our legal system” that risks “turning us into a banana republic.”

Laurence E. Platt, a banking-industry lawyer at K&L Gates in Washington, concedes that banks may have been sloppy. But he says “the real assault on the legal system” are efforts by judges and local officials to strip lenders of their rightful ownership and make foreclosures impossible.

In March, an Alabama court said J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. couldn’t foreclose on Phyllis Horace, a delinquent homeowner in Phenix City, Ala., because her loan hadn’t been properly assigned to its owners—a trust that represents investors—when it was securitized by Bear Stearns Cos. The mortgage assignment showed that the loan hadn’t been transferred to the trust from the subprime lender that originated it.

Specific deal agreements required Bear Stearns to assign the loan within three months of the securitization. Because it failed to do so, Alabama Circuit Court Judge Albert Johnson determined, the trust didn’t own the mortgage. “The court is surprised to the point of astonishment that the defendant trust did not comply with the terms,” of the securitization agreement, he wrote.

The ruling is one of the first in the nation to strip a mortgage trust of an asset it thought it owned. A similar case earlier this year was decided in the bank’s favor when it held that the borrower wasn’t a party to the securitization agreement.

Nick Wooten, the lawyer for Ms. Horace, says the case won’t necessarily influence other decisions unless it is upheld by a higher court. But he says it is “another brick in the wall of trial-court-level cases that clearly show the wheels fell off the bus in the securitization industry during the bubble.”

J.P. Morgan Chase hasn’t appealed the case. A bank spokesman declined to comment.

Curing incomplete mortgage assignments can be tricky because many lenders that originated subprime loans are still listed as the owner but have gone out of business.

Bill Dallas, former chief executive of subprime lender Ownit Mortgage Solutions Inc., receives between 200 and 300 pieces of mail every month at his former company’s California headquarters from companies looking to correct ownership flaws. “Am I surprised? Absolutely not,” says Mr. Dallas, who founded and ran the subprime lender until its collapse in late 2006. “I knew this assignment problem was going to be an issue.”

Loans with botched assignments or no assignment are “really problematic” because “the person that originated the loan is gone, the person that funded it is gone, and your servicers are confused,” he says.

Write to Nick Timiraos at nick.timiraos@wsj.com

TAPE Recording Shows “Trustee” is NOT the party with Fiduciary Powers or Obligations

One of the interesting things about Arizona Law is that it is perfectly legal to tape record a telephone conversation without the knowledge or consent of the parties to that call.

I have a tape recording of a conversation between a borrower up in Scottsdale and an officer of Deutsch bank who is in charge of “Asset Acquisition.” His name might well be on the documents in your case. In that conversation he says that Deutsch is the “beneficiary”.. “for the “benefit of the investors”. He says that the whole arrangement is “counter-intuitive” (used that word more than once). Although the beneficiaries are the investors and Deutsch is named as Trustee, the Trustee has nothing to do. That is because the servicer (One West in the conversation) actually has complete discretion on all issues including modification. As to whether the loan was modifiable he explicitly deferred to the servicer.

Thus he is saying that notwithstanding appearances and what would be logical the ACTUAL arrangement is that the servicer has all power over the assets that have been conveyed to investors. He never mentioned the “Trust” (remember my contention is that there is no trust, that the SPV is merely a conduit vehicle for aggregating the assets and revenue streams from borrowers, insurers, counterparties on CDS etc.) He even refers to the servicer as having “fiduciary” obligations but shies away from any reference to Deutsch having fiduciary duties.

In my opinion, this tape both confirms my opinion and supplements it with a surprising detail, to wit: the servicer is the one with the power of a “Trustee” and not the named “Trustee” (in this case Deutsch). But the power of the real trustee (servicer) is limited to the provisions of the note, excludes third party payments from insurers, counterparties and federal bailouts, and is without reference to the encumbrance allegedly created by the Deed of Trust (Mortgage).

Boiling this down to its essential elements, the owner of the “asset” (the loan) is a group of investors who accepted certificated or non-certificated interests conveying to them a percentage interest in the flow of funds (principal and interest) and ownership of the note. The reference to a “Trust” is nominal (in name only) and the reference to a “Trustee” is both nominal and misleading. The beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, as seen by this representative of Deutsch is also the investor in that Deutsch is only named as a straw man for the investors as a convenience and with the result that the true beneficiaries are not disclosed.

Therefore, on its face, the beneficiary on the original Deed of Trust, the beneficiary named in the instruments used to securitize the loan, and the beneficiary in fact are all different. The original note also names a payee that is different from the payee under the assignments, which is different from the payee under the instruments of securitization and different from the actual party (the servicer) who receives those payments. In practice, according to this officer, the actual payee under the securitization documents (the investors) is different than the parties receiving payment and enforcing payment.

The effect of this “counterintuitive” arrangement is that the beneficiary and the party who represents themselves as the proper holder in due course or owner of the loan are different. All of this presumes that the loan was in fact properly, legally and successfully assigned and securitized — a question of fact since there are multiple conditions to acceptance of the assignment and multiple conditions subsequent (replacement of loan with another, buy back of the loan etc.), which are also questions of fact as to whether those conditions subsequent did or did not occur. In addition there are subsequent events (third party payments in accordance with insurance contracts, credit default swaps and other credit enhancements written into the securitization documents) that are also questions of fact.  And in either related or non-related context, there is the fact that many of these special purpose vehicles (“Trusts”) have been dissolved with the “assets” resecuritized into brand new securities sold to new investors.

Follow the Trail —Don’t get lost in the documents

I THOUGHT THIS COMMENT WAS WORTHY OF MAKING INTO A POST.

See for Deutsch bank references Prospectus offered all over the world: Anyone who had a Deed of Trust with: Indymac, Wells Fargo, Countrywide, GMAC, Ocwen, American Home, Residential Funding Company, Washington Mutual Bank, BofA, and many others you might want to check this link out. SHARPS%20CDO%20II_16.08.07_9347

Editor’s Note: The only thing I would add is that the obligation arose when the borrower executed a note, but the creditor got a securitized bond with different terms, deriving its value from your note and thousands of others. Once you realize that the obligation is NOT the same as the Note, which is only EVIDENCE of the obligation, and that the MORTGAGE is NOT the obligation, it is only incident to the note, THEN you will understand that following the money means following the obligation, not the note or the mortgage. And figuring out what effect there was on the obligation at each step that the note was transferred, bought or paid, is the key to understanding whether the note became a negotiable instrument, and if it did, if it retained that status as a negotiable instrument.

FROM Jan van Eck

to foreclosurefight:

What you are missing in your attempt to analyze this is that you are trying to follow the “mortgage,” not the Note. the reason you are doing this is that only the “mortgage,” as the Security Instrument, is being recorded on the land records – so it is all you get to see.

the reason your adversaries, whoever they really are, “withdrew” from the relief from Stay Motion in the BK Court is that they do not have the Note. Somebody else does. And you have no clue as to who that is.

You have to start by determining what has happened to the Note, and how the Indorsements on the Note flow. And you have not seen the Note, not in years, so the raw truth is that you have no clue.

the “mortgage” never went into any “Trust.” Mortgages do not go into trusts. Only the Note (“maybe”) went into a trust – and only if it had proper Indorsement. Since Deutsche is involved, you can safely bet that it did not. Deutsche is NOTORIOUS for perpetrating fraud on the Courts and by fabricating documents. You may assume that EVERYTHING that Deutsche shows up with is a fraud, and has been fraudulently fabricated, typically in their offices on Liberty Street in Downtown Manhattan NY.

What is missing in your convoluted chain of title is that there was a ton of other parties involved in setting up that “Trust”, including some Delaware sham entity known as the “Depositor,” and then another sham known as the “Seller,” and more. When you burrow through that Prospectus you will find those entities listed. Now you have to dig out the Note, and find if those entities are individually and sequentially listed on the Note by consecutive Indorsements. Since Deutsche had their sticky fingers in the pie, you already know that they did not.

What State are you in? Yes, you need new counsel. You should never have gotten into this with old counsel.

You can still defeat them, but you probably will have to go file in District (Federal ) Court. You will have to sue Deutsche. Think in terms of suing them in the USDC for the Sou.Distr. NY, in White Plains, NY. Now you are not tangled up in the State-Fed politics of your local judges.

You cannot ask for Quiet title as you are asking for that in the State Court. You have to go in with entirely new grounds or they will not hear your case. So you sue them for fraud in interstate commerce. Try the “Commerce Clause” in the US Constitution (Amendment 16? I forget), to try to get “jurisdiction.” You get “venue” easily as Deutsche Bank is in NY. You do not need to show up; you just file and do your papers by mail. If yo ask for enough money, e.g. 40 million, then DB has something to start worrying about.

Right now, DB has no downside. If they lose, all they lose is some paper on some worthless piece of property in some state that is flooded with empty foreclosed houses that nobody can sell. So what do they care? DB probably does not even know or care that your lawsuit is going on; you are just dealing with lawyers that are running up their tab with DB, and DB has so many tabs that they do not try to keep track of it all. So you have to expose them to some serious hurt. A gigantic lawsuit is a good place to start.

You may assume that everything DB and those attys produce is utterly fraudulent. I have seen documents produced where the entire Trust Agreement was fabricated, and notarized by a notary who did not even get his first commission until two years after he swore that the parties were standing in front of him. Welcome to Wall Street banks – the international predator banks.

Besides Deutsche, Credit Suisse is also notorious for this type of flagrant fraud upon our Courts.

Signors in Fabricated Documentation reported

This is an example of the information I am requesting that everyone send in so we can pool information. I am entering the names and parties in key words so you can search for them. My goal with HERS is to have an ever increasing database that will speed the research for forensic analysts and lawyers.

The following six orders by Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, of King, should be of interest:

American Brokers Conduit v ZAMALLOA, Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, Kings, Index No. 07206/2007 (11 Sep 2007)
In American Brokers Conduit v ZAMALLOA, on September 11, 2007, Judge SCHACK denied an application for a judgemnt of foreclosure and sale of a Kings County property without prejudice due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing.  The plaintiff American Brokers Conduit instituted suit on February 28, 2007, but did not receive an interest in the mortgage which is subject of the suit until a March 5, 2007 assignment (CFRN 2007000169450).  This case is a little bizarre in that American Brokers Conduit seems to have assigned the mortgage to ITSELF at a different address in Melville, New York.  The case does have a good discussion of the case authority requiring a plaintiff to have standing.
American Brokers Conduit v ZAMALLOA, Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, Kings, Index No. 07206/2007 (28 Jan 2008)
In American Brokers Conduit v ZAMALLOA, on January 28, 2008, Judge SCHACK denied an application for an order of reference due to the plaintiff’s failure to include an affidavit of merit by the party.  Rahter than having an officer of American Brokers Conduit execute the affidavit of merit, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of merit excuted by a Robert HARDMAN, who identified himself as Vice President of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS).
Aurora Loan Services, LLC v SATTAR, Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, Kings, Index No. 15208/2007 (09 Oct 2007)
In Aurora Loan Services, LLC v SATTAR, Judge SHACK denied an application for an order for service by publication and dismissed the complaint by Aurora Loan Services, LLC, due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing.  The plaintiff pled a promissory note and mortgage iin which the promissory note was in favor of First Magnus Financial Corporation and the mortgage was recorded in favor of MERS.  Judge SCHACK notes that there is no evidence whatsoever within the record that the mortgage was assigned in favor of the plaintiff and notes that no such mortgage assignemnt was either pled or recorded.  Judge SCHACK goes on to note that First Magnus Financial Corporation had gone out of business in AUgust 2007 and filed for bankruptcy on August 21, 2007.  The opinion then contains a thorough discussion of the case authority requiring a plaintiff to have demonstrable standing in order to be eligible to maintian a suit.  In addition to dismissing the suit, Judge SCHACK also cancelled the notice of pendency.  Judge SCHACK also found the original complaint and suit to be frivolous, but declined to impose sanctions upon the law firm filing the suit because it was the first instance that the Court had noted such conduct.
Bank of NY NA v OROSCO, Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, Kings, Index No. 32052/2007 (19 Nov 2007)
In Bank of NY NA v OROSCO, Judge SCHACK denied an application for an order of reference due to the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate ownership of the mortgage for the subject property.  The plaintiff pled an assignment from MERS to Bank of New York dated August 21, 2007, but Judge SCHACK noted that this assignment had never been recorded.  But Judge SCHACK went on to note that Bank of New York also pled an affidavit executed by a person who is identified as Keri SELMAN.  Judge SCHACK notes that while in her affidavit in the OROSCO case she identified herself as an Assistant Vice President for Bank of New York, in another case before Judge SCHACK Keri SELMAN had signed an affidavit identifying herself as a Vice President of “Countrywide Home Loans, Attorney in Fact for Bank of New York”.  Judge SCHACK ordered that Ms. Keri SCHACK furnish an affidavit describing her employment history for the previous three years. [In point of fact, this would seem to be Keri or Kerri L. SELMAN (b 26 Aug 1969 – Los Angeles, CA), formerly Keri Lynn ATWOOD, of McKinney, Texas.  She seems likely to be an employee of Countrywide, which has a large servicing facility near where Ms. SELMAN lives.]
Deutsche Bank v CASTELLANOS, Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, Kings, Index No. 22375/2006 (11 May 2007)
In Deutsche Bank v CASTELLANOS, on May 11, 2007, Judge SCHACK denied an application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing.  Judge SCHACK noted that the foreclosure was commenced in July 2006 by Deutsche Bank.  After obtaining an order of reference (November 16, 2006) and after preparing an affirmation of regularity (January 10, 2007) and during the pendency of the action, Deutsche Bank seems to have assigned the mortgage to MTGLQ Investors, L.P. on January 19, 2007 (recorded February 7, 2007). Judge SCHACK therefore denied the plaintiff’s application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale without prejudice expressly inviting the Plaintiff to amend its pleadings to appropriately to correct the identity of the plaintiff. Judge SCHACK cites Gretchen Morgenson’s April 6, 2007, New York Times article “Fair Game; Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker” in his opinion.
Deutsche Bank v CASTELLANOS, Judge Arthur M. SCHACK, Kings, Index No. 22375/2006 (14 Jan 2008)
In Deutsche Bank v CASTELLANOS, on May 11, 2007, Judge SCHACK denied a renewed application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing (see case above).  He noted that the defects identified within his May 11, 2007, order remained unaddressed.  In addition, he noted the presence of a affidavit of merit executed by a Mr. Jeff RIVAS, who was identified as Deutsche Bank’s “Vice President Default Timeline Management”.  He then notes the presence of mortgage assignment within the files executed the same date which identifies Mr. Jeff RIVAS as the “Vice President Default Timeline Management” for Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, the assignor of a the mortgage to Deutsche Bank.  Judge SCHACK points out that if Mr. RIVAS was acting as an officer of both the grantor and the grantee of the assignment that this would create a conflict rendering the conveyance VOID.  Judge SCHACK then directs that Mr. RIVAS’ employment history be clarified in any future application for a foreclosure order.  Judge SCHACK then goes on to note that Deutsche Bank and MTGLQ Investors, L.P. are also shown to share the same address at 1661 Worthington lioad, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, where suspicious transactions executed by one Scott ANDERSON seem to be occuring.  Judge SCHACK then also demands an explanation as to WHY so many corporations seem to be sharing the SAME suite in West Palm Beach.

Judge Arthur M. SCHACK is a Justice of the Supreme Court of New York for King County. [See http://www.nycourtsystem.com/Applications/JudicialDirectory/Bio.php?ID=7029077 ]

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant?

SEE ALSO BOE PAPER ON ABS DISCLOSURE condocmar10

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant? NOTE: BOE defines investors as note-holders.
information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.
Editor’s Note: As Gretchen Morgenstern points out in her NY Times article below, the Bank of England is paving the way to transparent disclosures in mortgage backed securities. This in turn is a guide to discovery in American litigation. It is also a guide for questions in a Qualified Written Request and the content of a forensic analysis.
What we are all dealing with here is asymmetry of information, which is another way of saying that one side has information and the other side doesn’t. The use of the phrase is generally confined to situations where the unequal access to information is intentional in order to force the party with less information to rely upon the party with greater information. The party with greater information is always the seller. The party with less information is the buyer. The phrase is most often used much like “moral hazard” is used as a substitute for lying and cheating.
Quoting from the Bank of England’s “consultative paper”: ” [NOTE THAT THE BANK OF ENGLAND ASSUMES ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION AND, SEE BELOW, THAT THE INVESTORS ARE CONSIDERED “NOTE-HOLDERS” WITHOUT ANY CAVEATS.] THE BANK IS SEEKING TO ENFORCE RULES THAT WOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
borrower details (unique loan identifiers); nominal loan amounts; accrued interest; loan maturity dates; loan interest rates; and other reporting line items that are relevant to the underlying loan portfolio (ie borrower location, loan to value ratios, payment rates, industry code). The initial loan portfolio information reporting requirements would be consistent with the ABS loan-level reporting requirements detailed in paragraph 42 in this consultative document. Data would need to be regularly updated, it is suggested on a weekly basis, given the possibility of unexpected loan repayments.
42 The Bank has considered the loan-level data fields which
it considers would be most relevant for residential mortgage- backed securities (RMBS) and covered bonds and sets out a high-level indication of some of those fields in the list below:
• Portfolio, subportfolio, loan and borrower unique identifiers.
• Loan information (remaining life, balance, prepayments).
• Property and collateral (current valuation, loan to value ratio
and type of valuation). Interest rate information (current reference rate, current rate/margin, reset interval).
• Performance information (performing/delinquent, number and value of payments in arrears, arrangement, litigation or
bankruptcy in process, default or foreclosure, date of default,
sale price, profit/loss on sale, total recoveries).
• Credit bureau score information (bankruptcy or IVA flags,
bureau scores and dates, other relevant indicators (eg in respect of fraudulent activity)).

The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility requirement that each issuer provides a summary of the key features of the transaction structure in a standardised format.
This summary would include:
• Clear diagrams of the deal structure.
Description of which classes of notes hold the voting rights and what proportion of noteholders are required to pass a resolution.
• Description of all the triggers in the transaction and the consequences of them being breached.
• What defines an event of default.
• Diagramatic cash-flow waterfalls, making clear the priority
of payments of principal and interest, including how these
can change in consequence to any trigger breaches.
52 The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility
requirement that cash-flow models be made available that
accurately reflect the legal structure of an asset-backed security.
The Bank believes that for each transaction a cash-flow model
verified by the issuer/arranger should be available publicly.
Currently, it can be unclear as to how a transaction would
behave in different scenarios, including events of default or
other trigger events. The availability of cash-flow models, that
accurately reflect the underlying legal structure of the
transaction, would enable accurate modelling and stress
testing of securities under various assumptions.

March 19, 2010, NY Times

Pools That Need Some Sun

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

LAST week, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sued a throng of Wall Street companies that sold the agency $5.4 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities during the height of the mortgage melee. The suit, filed March 15 in state court in California, seeks the return of the $5.4 billion as well as broader financial damages.

The case also provides interesting details on what the Federal Home Loan Bank said were misrepresentations made by those companies about the loans underlying the securities it bought.

It is not surprising, given the complexity of the instruments at the heart of this credit crisis, that it will require court battles for us to learn how so many of these loans could have gone so bad. The recent examiner’s report on the Lehman Brothers failure is a fine example of the in-depth investigation required to get to the bottom of this debacle.

The defendants in the Federal Home Loan Bank case were among the biggest sellers of mortgage-backed securities back in the day; among those named are Deutsche Bank; Bear Stearns; Countrywide Securities, a division of Countrywide Financial; Credit Suisse Securities; and Merrill Lynch. The securities at the heart of the lawsuit were sold from mid-2004 into 2008 — a period that certainly encompasses those giddy, anything-goes years in the home loan business.

None of the banks would comment on the litigation.

In the complaint, the Federal Home Loan Bank recites a list of what it calls untrue or misleading statements about the mortgages in 33 securitization trusts it bought. The alleged inaccuracies involve disclosures of the mortgages’ loan-to-value ratios (a measure of a loan’s size compared with the underlying property’s value), as well as the occupancy status of the properties securing the loans. Mortgages are considered less risky if they are written against primary residences; loans on second homes or investment properties are deemed to be more of a gamble.

Finally, the complaint said, the sellers of the securities made inaccurate claims about how closely the loan originators adhered to their underwriting guidelines. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank asserts that the companies selling these securities failed to disclose that the originators made frequent exceptions to their own lending standards.

DAVID J. GRAIS, a partner at Grais & Ellsworth, represents the plaintiff. He said the Federal Home Loan Bank is not alleging that the firms intended to mislead investors. Rather, the case is trying to determine if the firms conformed to state laws requiring accurate disclosure to investors.

“Did they or did they not correspond with the real world at the time of the sale of these securities? That is the question,” Mr. Grais said.

Time will tell which side will prevail in this suit. But in the meantime, the accusations illustrate a significant unsolved problem with securitization: a lack of transparency regarding the loans that are bundled into mortgage securities. Until sunlight shines on these loan pools, the securitization market, a hugely important financing mechanism that augments bank lending, will remain frozen and unworkable.

It goes without saying that after swallowing billions in losses in such securities, investors no longer trust what sellers say is inside them. Investors need detailed information about these loans, and that data needs to be publicly available and updated regularly.

“The goose that lays the golden eggs for Wall Street is in the information gaps created by financial innovation,” said Richard Field, managing director at TYI, which develops transparency, trading and risk management information systems. “Naturally, Wall Street opposes closing these gaps.”

But the elimination of such information gaps is necessary, Mr. Field said, if investors are to return to the securitization market and if global regulators can be expected to prevent future crises.

While United States policy makers have done little to resolve this problem, the Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, is forging ahead on it. In a “consultative paper” this month, the central bank argued for significantly increased disclosure in asset-backed securities, including mortgage pools.

The central bank is interested in this debate because it accepts such securities in exchange for providing liquidity to the banking system.

“It is the bank’s view that more comprehensive and consistent information, in a format which is easier to use, is required to allow the effective risk management of securities,” the report stated. One recommendation is to include far more data than available now.

Among the data on its wish list: information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.

The Bank of England recommended that investor reports be provided on “at least a monthly basis” and said it was considering making such reports an eligibility requirement for securities it accepts in its transactions.

The American Securitization Forum, the advocacy group for the securitization industry, has been working for two years on disclosure recommendations it sees as necessary to restart this market. But its ideas do not go as far as the Bank of England’s.

A group of United States mortgage investors is also agitating for increased disclosures. In a soon-to-be-published working paper, the Association of Mortgage Investors outlined ways to increase transparency in these instruments.

Among its suggestions: reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies by providing detailed data on loans well before a deal is brought to market, perhaps two weeks in advance. That would allow investors to analyze the loans thoroughly, then decide whether they want to buy in.

THE investors are also urging that loan-level data offered by issuers, underwriters or loan servicers be “accompanied by an auditor attestation” verifying it has been properly aggregated and calculated. In other words, trust but verify.

Confidence in the securitization market has been crushed by the credit mess. Only greater transparency will lure investors back into these securities pools. The sooner that happens, the better.

Bank Accuses Investment Houses of Lying About Mortgage Backed Bonds

“(T)he differences between the values ascribed to these properties and the prices at which the properties were sold in foreclosure are significantly greater than the declines in house prices in the same geographical areas over the same periods,”

Editor’s Comment: BINGO! Use this complaint for both discovery and as a pleading guide. Send me a copy of al pleadings when you get them. There a bank that gets it. They are manipulating the home values on the back end the same as they did on the front end. First they lied to borrower (debtor) and investor (creditor) about the value of the property when the loan was funded and then they lied about the value when the house was sold in foreclosure. Charles Koppa is close to publishing a study that shows that the price of most homes sold on the courthouse steps is dropped the morning of the sale to a price far below the fair market value of even the most distressed property.

‘About That $19 Billion …’

By DAVE TARTRE

SAN FRANCISCO (CN) – The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco demands $19 billion from major banks and investment houses it accuses of lying about the quality of the subprime mortgage-backed securities they created and sold. The FHLB sued Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, JPMorgan Stanley, UBS, Banc of America, Countrywide Financial and others in two Superior Court complaints.
The FHLB claims the lending giants, including now-defunct Bear Stearns, Greenwich Capital Markets, RBS Securities and others failed to disclose material facts about the mortgages, such as how much equity the borrowers had in their homes, and that the omissions and misrepresentation led to much greater rates of foreclosures than promised.
The firms used exaggerated property appraisals so the loan-to-value ratios of the mortgage loans in the securities’ collateral pools understated the risks, according to the complaint.
“(T)he differences between the values ascribed to these properties and the prices at which the properties were sold in foreclosure are significantly greater than the declines in house prices in the same geographical areas over the same periods,” the FHLB says.
In addition, the number of borrowers who actually lived in the houses was lower than the defendants represented, and the borrowers’ credit scores were lower too, the FHLB says.
The lending giants did not tell the FHLB that their loan “originators were making frequent … exceptions to underwriting guidelines when no compensating factor was present,” and the originators systematically failed to detect or prevent borrower fraud, according to the complaints.
According to one complaint, “the Defendants sold or issued to the Bank 98 certificates in 80 securitization trusts backed by residential mortgage loans. The Bank paid more than $13.7 billion for those certificates. When they offered and then sold these certificates to the Bank, the defendants made numerous statements to the bank about the certificates and the credit quality of the mortgage loans that backed them. On information and belief many of those statements were untrue. Moreover, on information and belief the defendants omitted to state many material facts that were necessary in order to make their statements not misleading.”
The other complaint states: “the defendants sold or issued to the bank 36 certificates in 33 securitization trusts backed by residential mortgage loans. The bank paid more than $5.4 billion for those certificates. When they offered and then sold these certificates to the bank, the defendants made numerous statements to the bank about the certificates and the credit quality of the mortgage loans that backed them. On information and belief, many of those statements were untrue.”
The FHLB would like its $19.1 billion back. Its lead counsel is Robert Goodin with Goodin, MacBride, Squeri, Day & Lamprey. 

Sample Interrogatories

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

CHANCERY DIVISION – ESSEX VICINAGE

——————————————————————X                Civil Action

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, As Trustee Of

Argent Securities, Inc. Asset Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2004-PW1

Docket Number: XXX

REQUEST FOR

INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

XXX; John Doe,

Husband Of XXX                                                                            XXX Avenue

Rosedale, NY 11422

Defendant(s)/Pro Se ——————————————————————X

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY: INTERROGATORIES

i). Defendant, XXX, serves these interrogatories on Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as authorized by Case Management Order dated September 30, 2009, and by the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company must serve an answer to each interrogatory separately and fully, in writing and under oath within 30 days after service to: XXX, XXX Ave., Rosedale, NY 11422.

INSTRUCTIONS

ii). These requests for interrogatories are directed toward all information known or available to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company – not its lawyer, Ralph F. Casale, Esq. – including information contained in the records and documents in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s custody or control or available to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company upon reasonable inquiry.

iii). Each request for interrogatory is to be deemed a continuing one. If, after serving an answer, you obtain or become aware of any further information pertaining to that request, you are requested to serve a supplemental answer setting forth such information.

iv). As to every request for interrogatory which an authorized officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company fails to answer in whole or in part, the subject matter of that request will be deemed confessed and stipulated as fact to the Court.

v). Kindly attach additional sheets as required identifying the Interrogatory being answered.  You have a continuing obligation to update the information in these Interrogatories as you acquire new information. If no such update is provided in a reasonable period of time that you acquired such information, it may be excluded at trial or hearing.

DEFINITIONS

vi). “You” and “your” include Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and any and all persons acting for or in concert with Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.

vii). “Document” is synonymous in meaning and equal in scope to the usage of this term in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a) and includes computer records in any format. A draft or non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of this term. The term “document” also includes any “tangible things” as that term is used in Rule 34(a).

viii). Parties. The term “plaintiff” or “defendant”, as well as a party’s full or abbreviated name or a pronoun referring to a party, means the party and, where applicable, (his/her/its) agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates.

ix). Identify (person). When referring to a person, “identify” means to give, to the extent known, the person’s full name, present or last known address, telephone number, and when referring to a natural person, the present or last known place of employment. Once a person has been identified in compliance with this paragraph, only the name of that person needs to be listed in response to later discovery requesting the identification of that person.

x). Identify (document). When referring to a document, “identify” means to give, to the extent known, the following information: (a) the type of document; (b) the general subject matter of the document; (c) the date of the document; (d) the authors, address, and recipients of the document; (e) the location of the document; (f) the identity of the person who has custody of the document; and (g) whether the document has been destroyed, and if so, (i) the date of its destruction, (ii) the reason for its destruction, and (iii) the identity of the person who destroyed it.

xi). Relating. The term “relating” means concerning, referring, describing, evidencing, or constituting, directly or indirectly.

xii). Any. The term “any” should be understood in either its most or its least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all reasons that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

REQUEST FOR INTERROGATORIES

1. Please identify each person who answer these interrogatories and each person (attach pages if necessary) who assisted, including attorneys, accountants, employees of third party entities, or any other person consulted, however briefly, on the content of any answer to these interrogatories.

ANSWER:

2. For each of the above persons please state whether they have personal knowledge regarding the subject loan transaction.

ANSWER:

3. Please state the date of the first contact between Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and the borrower in the subject loan transaction, the name, address and telephone number of the person(s) in your company who was/were involved in that contact.

ANSWER:

4. Please identify every potential party to this lawsuit.

ANSWER:

5. Please identify the person(s) involved in the underwriting of the subject loan. “Underwriting” refers to any person who made representations, evaluations or appraisals of value of the home, value of the security instruments, and ability of the borrower to pay.

ANSWER:

6. Please identify any person(s) who had any contact with any third party regarding the securitization, sale, transfer, assignment, hypothecation or any document or agreement, oral, written or otherwise, that would effect the funding, closing, or the receipt of money from a third party in a transaction that referred to the subject loan.

ANSWER:

7. Please identify any person(s) known or believed by anyone at Deutsche Bank National Trust Company who had received physical possession of the note and allonges, the mortgage, or any document (including but not limited to assignment, endorsement, allonges, Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Assignment and Assumption Agreement, Trust Agreement,  letters or email or faxes of transmittals  including attachments) that refers to or incorporates terms regarding the securitization, sale, transfer, assignment, hypothecation or any document or agreement, oral, written or otherwise, that would effect the funding, or the receipt of money from a third party in a transaction, and whether such money was allocated to principal, interest or other obligation related to the subject loan.

ANSWER:

8. Please identify all persons known or believed by anyone in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company or any affiliate to have participated in the securitization of the subject loan including but not limited to mortgage aggregators, mortgage brokers, financial institutions, Structured Investment Vehicles, Special Purpose Vehicles, Trustees, Managers of derivative securities, managers of the company that issued an Asset-backed security, Underwriters, Rating Agency, Credit Enhancement Provider.

ANSWER:

9. Please identify the person(s) or entities that are entitled, directly or indirectly to the stream of revenue from the borrower in the subject loan.

ANSWER:

10 Please identify the person(s) in custody of any document that identifies the loan servicer(s) in the subject loan transaction.

ANSWER:

11. Please identify any person(s) in custody of any document which refers to any instruction or authority to enforce the note or mortgage in the subject loan transaction.

ANSWER:

12. Other than people identified above, identify any and all persons who have or had personal knowledge of the subject loan transaction, underwriting of the subject loan transaction, securitization, sale, transfer, assignment or hypothecation of the subject loan transaction, or the decision to enforce the note or mortgage in the subject loan transaction.

ANSWER:

13. Please state address, phone number, and employment history for the past 3 years of Tamara Price, Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, “designated as the Assignor” of the mortgage loan to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Assignment of Mortgage recorded in Essex County Register’s Office on June 25, 2008).

ANSWER:

14. Please state the date on which Argent Mortgage Company, LLC (originator) sold the mortgage loan to Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Seller and Master Servicer).

ANSWER:

15. Please state the date on which Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Seller and Master Servicer) sold the mortgage loan to Argent Securities, Inc. (Depositor).

ANSWER:

16. Did Argent Mortgage Company, LLC (originator) or previous servicers of this account receive any compensation, fee, commission, payment, rebate or other financial considerations from Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Seller and Master Servicer) or any affiliate or from the trust funds, for handling, processing, originating or administering this loan?

ANSWER:

17. If yes, please describe and itemize each and every form of compensation, fee, commission, payment, rebate or other financial consideration paid to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, the originator or previous servicers of this account by Ameriquest or any affiliate, or from the trust fund.

ANSWER:

18. Please identify any party, person or entity known or suspected by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company or any of your officers, employees, independent contractors or other agents, or servants of your company who might possess or claim rights under the subject loan or mortgage and/or note.

ANSWER:

19. Please identify the custodian of the records that would show all entries regarding the flow of funds for the subject loan transaction prior to and after closing of the loan. (Flow of funds, means any record of money received, any record of money paid out and any bookkeeping or accounting entry, general ledger and accounting treatment of the subject loan transaction at your company or any affiliate including but not limited to whether the subject loan transaction was ever entered into any category on the balance sheet at any time or times, whether any reserve for default was ever entered on the balance sheet, and whether any entry, report or calculation was made regarding the effect of this loan transaction on the capital reserve requirements of your company or any affiliate.)

ANSWER:

20. Please identify the auditor and/or accountant of your financial statements or tax returns.

ANSWER:

21. Please identify any attorney with whom you consulted or who rendered an opinion regarding the subject loan transaction or any pattern of securitization that may have effected the subject loan transaction directly or indirectly.

ANSWER:

22. Please identify any person who served as an officer or director with Deutsche Bank National Company or Argent Mortgage Company LLC commencing with 6 months prior to closing of the subject loan transaction through the present. (This interrogatory is limited only to those people who had knowledge, responsibility, or otherwise made or received reports regarding information that included the subject loan transaction, and/or the process by which solicitation, underwriting and closing of residential mortgage loans, or the securitization, sale, transfer or assignment or hypothecation of residential mortgage loans to third parties.)

ANSWER:

23. Did any investor/certificate holder approve or authorize foreclosure proceedings on XXX’s property?

ANSWER:

24. Please identify the person(s) involved or having knowledge of any insurance policy or product, plan or instrument describing over-collateralization, cross-collateralization or guarantee or other instrument hedging the risk of default as to any person or entity acting as an issuer of any securities or certificates. (Such instrument(s) relate to the composition of a pool, tranche or other aggregation of assets that was created, included or referred to the subject loan and the pool or aggregation was transmitted, transferred, assigned, pledged or hypothecated to any entity or buyer. A person who “transmitted, transferred, assigned, pledged or hypothecated” refers to any person who suggested, approved, received or accepted the composition of the pool or aggregation made or confirmed representations, evaluations or appraisals of value of the home, value of the security instruments, ability of the borrower to pay.)

ANSWER:

25. Please identify the person(s) involved or having knowledge of any credit default swap or other instrument hedging the risk of default as to any person or entity acting as an issuer of any securities or certificates. (Such instrument(s) relate to the composition of a pool, tranche or other aggregation of assets that was created, included or referred to the subject loan.)

ANSWER:

Submitted by:  XXX

XXX  Ave

Rosedale, NY 11422

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, I, XXX certify that on this 29th day of the month of October, 2009.

1. A true copy of the 10-page Request for Interrogatories was served on The New Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division – Essex Vincinage, at 212 Wasington Street, Eighth Floor, Newark, New Jersey.

2. A copy of the foregoing was mailed on October 28, 2009 to

Dated: Queens New York

This _________ day of ___________ 2009    XXX

XXX Ave

Rosedale, NY 11422

Pot Calls Kettle Black: Deutsch V BOA

See DEUTSCHEBANKv BANKOFAMERICA

This is an action for (1) damages for breach of contract resulting from BOA’s
failure to secure and safeguard over $1.25 billion worth of cash and mortgage loans that it was contractually obligated to secure on behalf of DB and (2) contractual indemnity for the losses caused by BOA’s negligent performance of its duties to DB.

Ocala was established for the sole purpose of providing funding for mortgage
loans originated by Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“TBW”). Mortgages purchased by Ocala were required to conform to the requirements of, and were intended to be sold to, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), a government-sponsored entity that is implicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.

WET AND DRY MORTGAGES

One vital mechanism protecting DB against risk was the requirement that DB’s investment be at all times over-collateralized by a combination of cash and “dry” mortgages purchased by Ocala. “Dry” mortgages are mortgages that have been reviewed by the lender and are actually in the lender’s possession at the time the mortgage loan is acquired by the lender. By contrast, “wet” funding of mortgages is riskier from the lender’s perspective because financing is provided to a borrower before the mortgage note has been received and reviewed by the lender (i.e., when the ink on the mortgage note is still “wet”). The lender providing wet funding for TBW was Colonial Bank (“Colonial”). In making its investment in Ocala on June 30, 2008, DB insisted that its investment be used only for dry mortgages.

DB trusted that BOA, one of the nation’s largest and most well-known financial institutions, would perform the gatekeeper function reasonably and responsibly. DB’s confidence was echoed by Moody’s Investors Service, which, in assigning Ocala an investment grade rating, emphasized the importance of BOA’s role and stated that risk to DB and other noteholders was “mitigated by the resources, capability and credit strength of BOA as the trustee, collateral agent, depositary and custodian to provide critical program support services, including: certifying the borrowing base and checking the delinquency triggers before the issuance of Ocala’s ABCP; checking in the loan files and creating a collateral transmittal report; and managing the orderly wind-down of the program.” Moody’s ABCP Market Review (July 13, 2009). see Asset Backed Commercial Paper Review

As it turned out, the faith of DB and other investors was misplaced. In myriad ways, BOA failed to carry out its various duties designed to protect DB’s investment, and these failures substantially damaged Ocala and DB’s investment.


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