Obama: A Bold U.S. Plan to Help Struggling Homeowners

YOU DON’T NEED TO BE DELINQUENT TO SETTLE OR MODIFY. It might just be a good time to pick up the phone right now and call the servicer, trustee, or whoever is saying they have your loan (even though they don’t) and make a deal. Think about it first. Don’t be too generous to them and don’t be to greedy for yourself.  It’s true they don’t serve the home or the new mortgage, but if you can get the terms you need, and you get a court order confirming it, it won’t matter that the investors got ripped off in the deal. That’s not your problem.

Editor’s Note: Now that the plan is more fully described, hold the presses. It would seem that Obama got our message. This plan addresses all homeowners with securitized mortgages that were over appraised, and aims to keep them in their homes to avoid the obviously needless and lawless displacement that has been the rule up till now.
But don’t get lulled into complacency. The Banks are no more able or willing to give you that modification than they were before, with the possible exception of BofA. You still need legal weapons and ammunition, you most likely still need a lawyer, and you still need to get title quieted through a court order. It’s all possible if the settlement or “modification” agreement provides the right terms.
March 26, 2010

A Bold U.S. Plan to Help Struggling Homeowners

By DAVID STREITFELD

Will it work this time?

Once again, the federal government is adding to its arsenal of programs for troubled homeowners, seeking to help those who urgently need it while neither angering nor creating perverse incentives for those who do not.

The new measures, announced by financial policy makers at the White House on Friday, are among the boldest to date. They are aimed not only at the seven million households that are behind on their mortgages but, in a significant expansion of aid that proved immediately controversial, the 11 million that simply owe more on their homes than they are worth.

Some of these people, if the government plan works, will emerge with a house whose payments they can afford and whose new mortgage reflects its market value. Unlike many previous modification recipients, they would presumably be less likely to re-default, helping to stabilize a housing market that remains queasy.

“We’re walking that delicate balance to make sure these solutions are sustainable and not temporary,” said David H. Stevens, commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration.

It is a balancing act in numerous ways. If the plan falls short — and some experts were skeptical on Friday — the Obama administration could find itself having to start over yet again in six months or a year.

“The housing market is the Vietnam War of the American financial system,” said Howard Glaser, a housing consultant. “The federal government is in so deep, they have to keep ramping up to find a way out.”

The latest programs, together with foreclosure assistance efforts already in place, are aimed at helping as many as four million embattled owners keep their houses. But the measures, which will take as long as six months to put into practice, might easily fall victim to some of the conflicting interests that have bedeviled efforts to date. None of these programs have the force of law, and lenders have often seen no good reason to participate.

To lubricate its efforts, the government plans to spread taxpayers’ money around liberally. For instance, it had previously planned to give homeowners that sell their homes rather than let them go into foreclosure a “relocation assistance” payment of $1,500. The plan announced on Friday increases that amount to $3,000.

All told, the new measures are expected to cost about $50 billion. The White House was careful to stress that the money will come from funds already set aside for housing programs in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. There will be “no additional commitment of taxpayer dollars,” Michael S. Barr, an assistant secretary of the Treasury, said at the White House briefing.

Here is what the $50 billion is supposed to buy:

The simplest component of the plan involves assistance to unemployed homeowners. Mortgage companies will now be encouraged to reduce payments for at least three months and possibly six months while the homeowner pursues a new job.

To be eligible, borrowers must submit proof they are receiving unemployment insurance. The new payments will be 31 percent or less of their monthly income. The missing money will be tacked onto the loan’s principal.

A second and more complicated program is a requirement that mortgage servicers consider writing off a portion of a borrower’s loan to get it down to a more manageable level.

Borrowers in the government modification plan who owe more than 115 percent of the value of their home and are paying more than 31 percent of their monthly income toward the mortgage are eligible. The write-downs are to take three years, with the borrowers in essence being rewarded for making their payments on time.

The third major new program strays the farthest from the government’s previous approach. Borrowers who owe more on their homes than they are worth will get a chance to cut their debt — providing the investor or bank who owns the loan agrees.

Mr. Stevens of the F.H.A. said the program was “for responsible homeowners who through no fault of their own find themselves in a situation of negative equity.”

There is no official requirement that these homeowners be in distress, but it would probably make the investor more receptive to a deal. Whether homeowners will scheme to get into the program is one of the big uncertainties.

The investors will write down the loans to 97.75 percent of the appraised value of the property, at which point the F.H.A. will refinance them through new lenders. The F.H.A., which currently insures about six million homes, will insure the new loans as well.

If the homeowner has a second mortgage, as many do, the total value of the new mortgage can be as much as 115 percent of the value of the property. The F.H.A. will spend up to $14 billion to provide incentives to the banks that service the primary loan as well as the owners of the secondary loans. Some of the money will also provide additional insurance on the new loans.

Numerous parties will have to work together to make these deals fly. The primary loan might have been bundled into a pool and sold to investors during the housing boom. The investor must agree to cut the principal balance for a deal to work, and any bank holding a second mortgage on the property would have to go along, too.

The only incentive for the first lien holder is a quick exit from a loan that might ultimately default. Payments for second lien holders will be made on a sliding scale.

Early reaction to the refinance program among lending groups was less than enthusiastic.

“The magnitude of this program will likely be measured in the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands of borrowers,” said Tom Deutsch, executive director of the American Securitization Forum. Both banks and investors belong to the forum.

The Mortgage Bankers Association, which represents the banks that service the primary loans and own outright many of the secondary loans, warned that “each servicer will need to determine whether this is the best approach to help the individual borrower.”

The new proposals irked many people, who flooded online forums Friday. Some said those in trouble deserved their fate. Others asked why the government was propping up housing prices when many renters still could not afford to buy a house. And some wondered about the message these rescue plans were sending to those who resisted the housing bubble.

Dave Juliette, a software worker in Pittsburgh, is in the last group. He paid off his loan eight years ahead of schedule and now owns his house free and clear. “I’m a homeowner in a more genuine sense of the word than many of these people with mortgages,” Mr. Juliette said. “But I won’t be seeing a dime.”

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant?

SEE ALSO BOE PAPER ON ABS DISCLOSURE condocmar10

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant? NOTE: BOE defines investors as note-holders.
information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.
Editor’s Note: As Gretchen Morgenstern points out in her NY Times article below, the Bank of England is paving the way to transparent disclosures in mortgage backed securities. This in turn is a guide to discovery in American litigation. It is also a guide for questions in a Qualified Written Request and the content of a forensic analysis.
What we are all dealing with here is asymmetry of information, which is another way of saying that one side has information and the other side doesn’t. The use of the phrase is generally confined to situations where the unequal access to information is intentional in order to force the party with less information to rely upon the party with greater information. The party with greater information is always the seller. The party with less information is the buyer. The phrase is most often used much like “moral hazard” is used as a substitute for lying and cheating.
Quoting from the Bank of England’s “consultative paper”: ” [NOTE THAT THE BANK OF ENGLAND ASSUMES ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION AND, SEE BELOW, THAT THE INVESTORS ARE CONSIDERED “NOTE-HOLDERS” WITHOUT ANY CAVEATS.] THE BANK IS SEEKING TO ENFORCE RULES THAT WOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
borrower details (unique loan identifiers); nominal loan amounts; accrued interest; loan maturity dates; loan interest rates; and other reporting line items that are relevant to the underlying loan portfolio (ie borrower location, loan to value ratios, payment rates, industry code). The initial loan portfolio information reporting requirements would be consistent with the ABS loan-level reporting requirements detailed in paragraph 42 in this consultative document. Data would need to be regularly updated, it is suggested on a weekly basis, given the possibility of unexpected loan repayments.
42 The Bank has considered the loan-level data fields which
it considers would be most relevant for residential mortgage- backed securities (RMBS) and covered bonds and sets out a high-level indication of some of those fields in the list below:
• Portfolio, subportfolio, loan and borrower unique identifiers.
• Loan information (remaining life, balance, prepayments).
• Property and collateral (current valuation, loan to value ratio
and type of valuation). Interest rate information (current reference rate, current rate/margin, reset interval).
• Performance information (performing/delinquent, number and value of payments in arrears, arrangement, litigation or
bankruptcy in process, default or foreclosure, date of default,
sale price, profit/loss on sale, total recoveries).
• Credit bureau score information (bankruptcy or IVA flags,
bureau scores and dates, other relevant indicators (eg in respect of fraudulent activity)).

The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility requirement that each issuer provides a summary of the key features of the transaction structure in a standardised format.
This summary would include:
• Clear diagrams of the deal structure.
Description of which classes of notes hold the voting rights and what proportion of noteholders are required to pass a resolution.
• Description of all the triggers in the transaction and the consequences of them being breached.
• What defines an event of default.
• Diagramatic cash-flow waterfalls, making clear the priority
of payments of principal and interest, including how these
can change in consequence to any trigger breaches.
52 The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility
requirement that cash-flow models be made available that
accurately reflect the legal structure of an asset-backed security.
The Bank believes that for each transaction a cash-flow model
verified by the issuer/arranger should be available publicly.
Currently, it can be unclear as to how a transaction would
behave in different scenarios, including events of default or
other trigger events. The availability of cash-flow models, that
accurately reflect the underlying legal structure of the
transaction, would enable accurate modelling and stress
testing of securities under various assumptions.

March 19, 2010, NY Times

Pools That Need Some Sun

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

LAST week, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sued a throng of Wall Street companies that sold the agency $5.4 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities during the height of the mortgage melee. The suit, filed March 15 in state court in California, seeks the return of the $5.4 billion as well as broader financial damages.

The case also provides interesting details on what the Federal Home Loan Bank said were misrepresentations made by those companies about the loans underlying the securities it bought.

It is not surprising, given the complexity of the instruments at the heart of this credit crisis, that it will require court battles for us to learn how so many of these loans could have gone so bad. The recent examiner’s report on the Lehman Brothers failure is a fine example of the in-depth investigation required to get to the bottom of this debacle.

The defendants in the Federal Home Loan Bank case were among the biggest sellers of mortgage-backed securities back in the day; among those named are Deutsche Bank; Bear Stearns; Countrywide Securities, a division of Countrywide Financial; Credit Suisse Securities; and Merrill Lynch. The securities at the heart of the lawsuit were sold from mid-2004 into 2008 — a period that certainly encompasses those giddy, anything-goes years in the home loan business.

None of the banks would comment on the litigation.

In the complaint, the Federal Home Loan Bank recites a list of what it calls untrue or misleading statements about the mortgages in 33 securitization trusts it bought. The alleged inaccuracies involve disclosures of the mortgages’ loan-to-value ratios (a measure of a loan’s size compared with the underlying property’s value), as well as the occupancy status of the properties securing the loans. Mortgages are considered less risky if they are written against primary residences; loans on second homes or investment properties are deemed to be more of a gamble.

Finally, the complaint said, the sellers of the securities made inaccurate claims about how closely the loan originators adhered to their underwriting guidelines. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank asserts that the companies selling these securities failed to disclose that the originators made frequent exceptions to their own lending standards.

DAVID J. GRAIS, a partner at Grais & Ellsworth, represents the plaintiff. He said the Federal Home Loan Bank is not alleging that the firms intended to mislead investors. Rather, the case is trying to determine if the firms conformed to state laws requiring accurate disclosure to investors.

“Did they or did they not correspond with the real world at the time of the sale of these securities? That is the question,” Mr. Grais said.

Time will tell which side will prevail in this suit. But in the meantime, the accusations illustrate a significant unsolved problem with securitization: a lack of transparency regarding the loans that are bundled into mortgage securities. Until sunlight shines on these loan pools, the securitization market, a hugely important financing mechanism that augments bank lending, will remain frozen and unworkable.

It goes without saying that after swallowing billions in losses in such securities, investors no longer trust what sellers say is inside them. Investors need detailed information about these loans, and that data needs to be publicly available and updated regularly.

“The goose that lays the golden eggs for Wall Street is in the information gaps created by financial innovation,” said Richard Field, managing director at TYI, which develops transparency, trading and risk management information systems. “Naturally, Wall Street opposes closing these gaps.”

But the elimination of such information gaps is necessary, Mr. Field said, if investors are to return to the securitization market and if global regulators can be expected to prevent future crises.

While United States policy makers have done little to resolve this problem, the Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, is forging ahead on it. In a “consultative paper” this month, the central bank argued for significantly increased disclosure in asset-backed securities, including mortgage pools.

The central bank is interested in this debate because it accepts such securities in exchange for providing liquidity to the banking system.

“It is the bank’s view that more comprehensive and consistent information, in a format which is easier to use, is required to allow the effective risk management of securities,” the report stated. One recommendation is to include far more data than available now.

Among the data on its wish list: information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.

The Bank of England recommended that investor reports be provided on “at least a monthly basis” and said it was considering making such reports an eligibility requirement for securities it accepts in its transactions.

The American Securitization Forum, the advocacy group for the securitization industry, has been working for two years on disclosure recommendations it sees as necessary to restart this market. But its ideas do not go as far as the Bank of England’s.

A group of United States mortgage investors is also agitating for increased disclosures. In a soon-to-be-published working paper, the Association of Mortgage Investors outlined ways to increase transparency in these instruments.

Among its suggestions: reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies by providing detailed data on loans well before a deal is brought to market, perhaps two weeks in advance. That would allow investors to analyze the loans thoroughly, then decide whether they want to buy in.

THE investors are also urging that loan-level data offered by issuers, underwriters or loan servicers be “accompanied by an auditor attestation” verifying it has been properly aggregated and calculated. In other words, trust but verify.

Confidence in the securitization market has been crushed by the credit mess. Only greater transparency will lure investors back into these securities pools. The sooner that happens, the better.

%d bloggers like this: