Stop Referring to Defaults as Something Real

Referring to the default as real, but with an explanation of how it is subject to rationalization or argument, completely undermines your argument that they have no  right to be in court, to collect, to issue notices or initiate foreclosure. 

…when you refer to the default, you should refer to it as a false claim of default because at no time was Deutsch or any trust or any group of investors ever receiving payments from you as borrower. Nor did they have any contractual right to expect such payments from you as borrower. So Deutsch didn’t suffer any default and neither did the investors who own certificates that are not ownership interests in the debt, note or mortgage. And Deutsch won’t get any proceeds if the property is subjected to a foreclosure sale.

Questions to the servicer about how, when and where they made payments to Deutsch, or Deutsch as Trustee, or any trust, or any group of investors holding certificates will reveal their absence from the money trail. No such payments exist nor will they ever exist.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================
I take issue with the practice of referring to “the default.” When someone refuses or stops paying another person that does not automatically mean that a default exists. A default only exists if the the payment was due to a specifically identified party and they didn’t get it. Failure to pay a servicer is not a default. Failure to pay a servicer who is sending your payments to a creditor IS a default.
Since the fundamental defense for borrowers that wins cases is that the claimant has no right to be in court, it seems wrong to refer to”the default.” It should be “the claimed default.”
If your refusal to make payment was in fact a default as to Deutsch as Trustee of a real trust or as authorized representative of the certificate holders (they never make that clear), then all of your arguments come off as technical arguments to get out of a legitimate debt. You will lose.
On the other hand if your position (i.e., your denial and affirmative defenses) is that Deutsch is not a party on its own behalf and that it is being named by attorneys as being in a representative capacity for (a) a trust that does not exist or (b) for holder of certificates that do not convey title to the debt, note or mortgage and are specifically disclaimed, then you have a coherent narrative for your defense.
And if you further that argument by asserting that Deutsch has never received any payments and does not receive the proceeds of foreclosure on its own behalf nor as trustee for any trust or group of investors and will not receive those proceeds in this case then you push the knife in deeper.
So if Deutsch is not appearing on its own behalf and the parties that the lawyers say it is representing either don’t exist or are not identified, then the action is actually being filed in the name of Deutsch but for and on behalf of some other unidentified party who may or may not have any right to payment.
What is certain is that Deutsch is being represented as the owner of the loan when it is not.  The owner of a loan receives payments. Deutsch never receives payment from anyone and the investors never receive payment from the borrowers. If they did the servicer would have records of that. 
So when you refer to the default, you should refer to it as a false claim of default because at no time was Deutsch or any trust or any group of investors ever receiving payments from the homeowner as borrower. Nor did they have any contractual right to expect such payments from you as borrower. So Deutsch didn’t suffer any default and neither did the investors who own certificates that are not ownership interests in the debt, note or mortgage. And Deutsch won’t get any proceeds if the property is subjected to a foreclosure sale. 
If Deutsch didn’t suffer any default it could not legally declare one. If the declaration of default was void, then there is no default declared. In fact, there is no default until a  creditor steps forward and says I own the debt that I paid for and I suffered a default here. But there is no such party/creditor because the investment bank who funded the origination or acquisition of the loan has long since sold its interest in the loan multiple times.
Thus when lawyers or as servicer or both sent notices of delinquency or default they did so knowing that the party on whose behalf they said they were sending those notices had not suffered any delinquency or default.
When homeowners refer to the default as real, but with an explanation of how it is subject to rationalization or argument, they completely undermine their argument that they have no  right to be in court, to collect, to issue notices or initiate foreclosure. 
And remember that the sole reason for foreclosures in which REMIC claims are present is not repayment, because that has occurred already. The sole reason is to maintain the illusion of securitization which is the cover for a PONZI scheme. The banks are seeking to protect “profits” they already have collected not to obtain repayment. That is why a “Master Servicer” is allowed to collect the proceeds of a foreclosure sale rather than anyone owning the debt.
Also remember that while it might be that investors could be construed as beneficiaries of a trust, if it existed, they actually are merely holders of uncertificated certificates in which they disclaim any interest in the debt, note or mortgage.  Hence  they have no claim, direct or indirect, against any individual borrower. 

PRACTICE NOTE: Don’t assert anything you cannot prove. Leave the burden of proof on the lawyers who have named an alleged claimant who they say or imply possesses a claim. Deny everything and force them to prove everything. Discovery should be aimed at revealing the gaps not facts that will prove some assertion about securitization in general. Judges don’t want to hear that.
Appropriate questions to ask in one form or another are as follows:
  1. Who is the Claimant/Plaintiff/Beneficiary?
  2. Who will receive the proceeds of foreclosure sale?
  3. Before the default, who received the proceeds of payment from the subject borrower? [They will  fight this tooth and nail]
  4. Did the trustee ever receive payments from the borrower?
  5. Does the trustee in this alleged trust have any contractual right to receive borrower payments?
  6. Do holders of certificates receive payments from the borrower through a servicer?

Caliber and LSF9 Trust Example of Smoke and Mirrors

The lesson is keep your eye on the ball. The natural human reaction to an affidavit is to assume it is true. We assume that it would not be submitted if the lawyers knew it wasn’t true. And in most cases people don’t lie in affidavits. But they do mislead sometimes by leaving out context. And then there are affidavits and declarations fabricated, executed, filed and even recorded in  foreclosure cases which are mostly lies and virtually all misleading.

To reveal this you must take your time in reviewing the documents and affidavits submitted. They were created so that at a glance everything would seem in order. On closer reading you can see that they don’t actually say anything of value and therefore should not be considered facially valid documents conveying or certifying anything.

==============================
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
==========================

Bill Paatalo wrote the following in September 2018:

In 100% of the cases I’ve investigated regarding “U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust,” the servicer (most often “Caliber”) provides the exact same type of affidavit. This is all they ever produce, and here, the court says it doesn’t cut it.

“Moreover, Mr. Cantu is not an employee of Plaintiff or Wells Fargo and therefore can not attest to what is in the possession of the Plaintiff or Wells Fargo. As noted above, the copy of the Note and allonge does not contain any endorsement or date which would support that the Plaintiff had possession when the action was commenced. The affidavits of Caliber’s Default Service Officer did not give any factual details of a physical delivery and, thus, failed to establish that the plaintiff had physical possession of the note at the time the action was commenced, and as such Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment. (see Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Burke, 125 AD3d 765, 766 [2d Dept 2015]; US Bank N.A. v Faruque, 120 AD3d 575, 577 [2014]; Bank of NY Mellon v Gales, 116 AD3d 723 [2014]). Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is denied, and it is further”

So what foreclosure mill lawyers are doing is filing affidavits and declarations. That part of it is true. They are filed and sometimes recorded.

But what is in those affidavits and declarations is not supported by anything on the face of the instrument, or what is attached to it, nor even by reference within the instrument to a fact or document in the public domain. So it is wholly useless without resort to extrinsic evidence (testimony and exhibits), which means that it cannot be considered a facially valid document.

Putting this into practice is actually not hard. You simply need to break down the wording so that each phrase or statement is analyzed for the truth of the matter asserted.

The LSF9 Master Participation Trust is but one example. It is named but not described. So where normal custom and practice would dictate that it be named and described, the foreclosure mill lawyers are convincing judges to treat it as though it was described.

When the homeowner is described it is usually with a name, and place of residence or as title owner of certain property. When a Trust is described it is named without a place of residence and with no direct statement that it owns anything. In other civil pleadings, if the LSF9 Master Participation Trust was real, it would say that it was a common law (or statutory) trust organized and existing under the laws of the state of XXXXX with its principal place of business at YYYYYYYY in the City of ZZZZZ.

If you do a thorough search of all cases, you will not find a single instance in which a trust is named as Defendant except certain cases where the homeowners are suing the apparent trust under the misapprehension that it is an existing legal entity. On the finance side nobody refers to the trust much less sues it. There are a few cases in which banks claiming to be Trustees of a claimed REMIC Trust sued someone for delivering improperly underwritten loans, but no case in which the allegation is made that the Trust actually purchased those loans. All those cases settle long before trial.

Back to LSF9:

The lawyers submitted an affidavit that was probably forged. But assuming it wasn’t, the affidavit said nothing that could be accepted as evidence of anything because the knowledge of the alleged affiant, the employment of the alleged affiant and the authority of the alleged affiant were nonexistent.

But it gives the appearance of having facial validity even if there is none. It has a named affiant, a statement  and a notarized signature.

As the court found in New York, the affiant failed to state the basis for his knowledge which could NOT be implied from the affidavit since it did not recite that he was an employee of the Trust, the Bank or any other presumed party in interest.

Consider the following hypothetical extreme example which translates the affidavit:

My name is John Smith. I am an independent contractor for Caliber. I was hired to sign this affidavit. I have no knowledge of anything contained in this affidavit. I was not present in any capacity when any of the events or documents recited in this affidavit occurred or were created. I have never been an employee of any entity whose records are described in this affidavit nor did I have any role or knowledge of the events or the documents or records referred to herein. However I am familiar with the name Wells Fargo and I can see the name “LSF9 Master Participation Trust” on the affidavit prepared for me to sign.

Such affidavits are common place ONLY in one place, to wit: in the courtroom where a foreclosure is pending. And in all cases, except foreclosures, such affidavits are instantly rejected.

Trustee v Active Trustee US Bank Fails to show or even attempt to show it is an active trustee

CASE DISMISSED,WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. US BANK DECLINED TO AMEND. CASE DISMISSED.

Even where there is a clerk’s default “The burden is on the plaintiff to establish its entitlement to recovery.” Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

Here is an example of how lawyers purport to represent US Bank when in fact they are creating the illusion that they represent a trust and in reality they are representing a subservicer who is receiving orders from a master servicer of a nonexistent trust. As Trustee of the nonexistent trust USB had no active role in the nonexistent trust. As the inactive Trustee for a nonexistent Trust, no right, title or interest in the debts of homeowners were within any scope of authority of any servicer, subservicer or master servicer. Each foreclosure is a farce based upon assumptions and presumptions that are exactly opposite to the truth.

Given the opportunity to amend the complaint, lawyers for USB chose not to amend — because they could not plead nor prove the required elements of an active trustee. Because of that USB lacked standing to bring the action except as agent for an active trust or on behalf of the trust beneficiaries. But where the certificates show that the certificate holders do NOT have any interest in a mortgage or note (true in about 70% of all cases), then they too lack of standing. And if the Trust is not an active Trust owning the debt, note or mortgage then it too lacks standing.

Let us draft your motions and do the research necessary to draw the attention of the court to the fraud taking place under their noses. 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Bill Paatalo

see Memorandum and Order – USBank Trust NA as Trustee for LSF9 MPT v Monroe

See Judgment – USB Trust for LSF9 v Monroe –

While this case discusses diversity and other issues concerning US Bank “as trustee” the reasoning and ruling clearly expose the truth about pleading irregularities by attorneys who purport to represent US Bank or a REMIC Trust.

A debt is an asset to anyone who owns it. Industry practice requires that for transfer of ownership, there must be an agreement or other document providing warranty of title, confirmation of the existence and ownership of the debt and proof of authority of the person executing the document. Go into any bank and try to borrow money using a note as collateral. The bank will require, at a minimum, that the debt be confirmed (usually by the purported debtor) and that each party in the chain show proof of purchase.

Without consideration, the assignment of mortgage or endorsement of the note is just a piece of paper.

When there is an assertion of ownership of the loan, what the banks and so-called servicers are actually saying is that they own the paper (note and mortgage) not the debt. In the past this was a distinction without a difference. In the era of patently f false claims of securitization, the debt was split off from the paper. The owner of the debt were without knowledge that their money was not under Trust management nor that their money was being used to originate or acquire loans without their knowledge.

The securitization sting is accomplished because the owners of the debt (the investors who sourced the funds) are unaware of the fact that the certificate they are holding is merely a promise to pay from a nonexistent trust that never was utilized to acquire the debts and whose ownership of the paper is strictly temporary in order to foreclose.

The failure to make that distinction between the real debt and the fake paper is the principal reason why so many people lose their homes to interlopers who have no interest in the loan but who profit from the sale of the home because a judgment was entered in favor of them allowing them to conduct a foreclosure sale. 

This case also sets forth universally accepted legal doctrine even where there is a clerk’s default entered against the homeowner. The Judge cannot enter a judgment for an alleged debt without proving the debt — even if the homeowner doesn’t show up.

“When a default is entered, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the well- pleaded factual allegations in the complaint pertaining to liability.” Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Ninna, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). “While a default judgment constitutes an admission of liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof unless the amount is liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation.” Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, e.g., Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 190. “[E]ven upon default, a court may not rubber-stamp the non-defaulting party’s damages calculation, but rather must ensure that there is a basis for the damages that are sought.” United States v. Hill, No. 12-CV-1413, 2013 WL 474535, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013)

“The burden is on the plaintiff to establish its entitlement to recovery.” Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

 

2d DCA Adds Insult to Injury on Statute of Limitations

Message to homeowners: Heads I win, tails you lose. Between Bartram and Desylvester the recurrent theme emerges as doctrine: If the homeowner wins a case the skids are greased for the bank to win the next round. The winner is treated as the party who SHOULD have lost and the loser is treated as the party who SHOULD have won. This fight is far from over.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
“Following the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bartram v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 41 Fla. L. Weekly S493, 2016 WL 6538647 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2016), courts were left to interpret how Bartram would affect lenders’ reliance on breach letters issued more than five years prior to a foreclosure proceeding initiated after the dismissal of a prior action. Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal answered this very question in its opinion in Desylvester v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al., which indicates that lenders need not send a new breach letter in subsequent foreclosure actions filed after the dismissal of a prior foreclosure if the borrower has failed to cure the initial default.
 *
In Desylvester, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the entry of final judgment of foreclosure in favor where the bank initiated a successive mortgage foreclosure action premised on the same date of default alleged in a prior foreclosure action, including “all subsequent payments due thereafter.” Consistent with the Bartram decision, the Court’s opinion confirms that, following the dismissal of a prior foreclosure action, a mortgagee is not barred from filing a subsequent action premised on a “separate and distinct” date of default––including a borrower’s continuing state of default––under the same note and mortgage.”
 *
An ounce of truth and a lot of craziness. I think Bartram stands for the proposition that the statute of limitations does bar actions for payments due before the beginning of the current statutory period. As I suspected we have the Florida Supreme Court thinking they fixed a problem by legislating from the bench — returning the parties back to their original positions except for payments barred by the statute of limitations.
 *
The second DCA has muddied the waters further in Desylvester v Bank of New York Mellon. The courts are continuing to search and twist looking for a hook on which they can hang their preconceived notion of how the case should turn out — i.e., for the banks. Dozens of SCOTUS decisions say these courts (not just in Florida) are getting it wrong and overstepping constitutional boundaries resulting in unfair consequences. This fight is not over.
 *
The 2d DCA here stretches the problematic view of the Florida Supreme Court in Bartram v US Bank. A default letter was sent for an alleged default that is now barred by the SOL. I suppose it might be logical to say that the creditor could still file a foreclosure action for the payments that are not barred by the SOL. But this court goes further and says that the original default letter can still be used as the basis of the new foreclosure action.
 *
The court is skipping over obvious ramifications of the Bartram decision whether you think that decision was right or wrong. If the parties are returned to their original position except for the payments barred by SOL, then the homeowner still has a right to a default letter that spells out the real number, as amended by application of the SOL, that is required to reinstate, and the disclosure of how that number was computed. Removing that requirement is removing (1) a basic element of the alleged “contract” (i.e., the mortgage instrument, paragraph 22 in most such instruments) and (2) the application of statutory laws governing the conditions precedent to filing foreclosure.
 *
The 2d DCA opinion is plainly wrong and wrongful. Again pushing aside the notions that foreclosure is an action in equity that should only be used as a last resort, the Court has essentially stripped the homeowner of basic protections provided by statute and provided by law. The Bartram decision was bad enough. The 2d DCA decision is basically reloading the gun for what is at best a questionable party to foreclose, placing the homeowner on his/her knees and cocking the gun for the bank or servicer — neither of whom have any right to even be in court.. Under Desylvester the losing party in the first foreclosure is treated as the winner and the winning party is treated as the loser.
*
All of which prompts the the larger essential question: With the courts undermining due process at every turn in ruling for the banks under a political theory that the fall of the big banks will bring down the world order, how is anyone left going to trust in our institutions? And assuming the current polls and trends continue, what will be left of our society that will be worth saving?

The difference between paper instruments and real money

There is a difference between the note contract and the mortgage contract. They each have different terms. And there is a difference between those two contracts and the “loan contract,” which is made up of the note, mortgage and required disclosures.Yet both lawyers and judges overlook those differences and come up with bad decisions or arguments that are not quite clever.

There is a difference between what a paper document says and the truth. To bridge that difference federal and state statutes simply define terms to be used in the resolution of any controversy in which a paper instrument is involved. These statutes, which are quite clear, specifically define various terms as they must be used in a court of law.

The history of the law of “Bills and Notes” or “Negotiable Instruments” is rather easy to follow as centuries of common law experience developed an understanding of the problems and solutions.

The terms have been defined and they are the law not only statewide, but throughout the country, with the governing elements clearly set forth in each state’s adoption of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) as the template for laws passed in their state.

The problem now is that most judges and lawyers are using those terms that have their own legal meaning without differentiating them; thus the meaning of those “terms of art” are being used interchangeably. This reverses centuries of common law and statutory laws designed to prevent conflicting results. Those laws constrain a judge to follow them, not re-write them. Ignoring the true meaning of those terms results in an effective policy of straying further and further from the truth.

Listen to the Last Neil Garfield Show at http://tobtr.com/s/9673161

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
So an interesting case came up in which it is obvious that neither the judge nor the bank attorneys are paying any attention to the law and instead devoting their attention to making sure the bank wins — even at the cost of overturning hundreds of years of precedent.
 *
The case involves a husband who “signed the note,” and a wife who didn’t sign the note. However the wife signed the mortgage. The Husband died and a probate estate was opened and closed, in which the Wife received full title to the property from the estate of her Husband in addition to her own title on the deed as Husband and Wife (tenancy by the entireties).
 *
Under state law claims against the estate are barred when the probate case ends; however state law also provides that the lien (from a mortgage or otherwise) survives the probate. That means there is no claim to receive money in existence. Neither the debt nor the note can be enforced. The aim of being a nation of laws is to create a path toward finality, whether the result be just or unjust.
 *

There is an interesting point here. Husband owed the money and Wife did not and still doesn’t. If foreclosure of the mortgage lien is triggered by nonpayment on the note, it would appear that the mortgage lien is presently unenforceable by foreclosure except as to OTHER duties to maintain, pay taxes, insurance etc. (as stated in the mortgage).

*

The “bank” could have entered the probate action as a claimant or it could have opened up the estate on their own and preserved their right to claim damages on the debt or the note (assuming they could allege AND prove legal standing). Notice my use of the terms “Debt” (which arises without any documentation) and “note,” which is a document that makes several statements that may or may not be true. The debt is one thing. The note is quite a different animal.
 *
It does not seem logical to sue the Wife for a default on an obligation she never had (i.e., the debt or the note). This is the quintessential circumstance where the Plaintiff has no standing because the Plaintiff has no claim against the Wife. She has no obligation on the promissory note because she never signed it.
 *
She might have a liability for the debt (not the obligation stated on the promissory note which is now barred by (a) she never signed it and (b) the closing of probate. The relief, if available, would probably come from causes of action lying in equity rather than “at law.” In any event she did not get the “loan” money and she was already vested with title ownership to the house, which is why demand was made for her signature on the mortgage.
 *

She should neither be sued for a nonexistent default on a nonexistent obligation nor should she logically be subject to losing money or property based upon such a suit. But the lien survives. What does that mean? The lien is one thing whereas the right to foreclose is another. The right to foreclose for nonpayment of the debt or the note has vanished.

*

Since title is now entirely vested in the Wife by the deed and by operation of law in Probate it would seem logical that the “bank” should have either sued the Husband’s estate on the note or brought claims within the Probate action. If they wanted to sue for foreclosure then they should have done so when the estate was open and claims were not barred, which leads me to the next thought.

*

The law and concurrent rules plainly state that claims are barred but perfected liens survive the Probate action. In this case they left off the legal description which means they never perfected their lien. The probate action does not eliminate the lien. But the claims for enforcement of the lien are effected, if the enforcement is based upon default in payment alone. The action on the note became barred with the closing of probate, but that left the lien intact, by operation of law.

*

Hence when the house is sold and someone wants clear title for the sale or refinance of the home the “creditor” can demand payment of anything they want — probably up to the amount of the “loan ” plus contractual or statutory interest plus fees and costs (if there was an actual loan contract). The only catch is that whoever is making the claim must actually be either the “person” entitled to enforce the mortgage, to wit: the creditor who could prove payment for either the origination or purchase of the loan.
 *

The “free house” mythology has polluted judicial thinking. The mortgage remains as a valid encumbrance upon the land.

*

This is akin to an IRS income tax lien on property that is protected by homestead. They can’t foreclose on the lien because it is homestead, BUT they do have a valid lien.

*

In this case the mortgage remains a valid lien BUT the Wife cannot be sued for a default UNLESS she defaults in one or more of the terms of the mortgage (not the note and not the debt). She did not become a co-borrower when she signed the mortgage. But she did sign the mortgage and so SOME of the terms of the mortgage contract, other than payment of the loan contract, are enforceable by foreclosure.

*

So if she fails to comply with zoning, or fails to maintain the property, or fails to comply with the provisions requiring her to pay property taxes and insurance, THEN they could foreclose on the mortgage against her. The promissory note contained no such provisions for those extra duties. The only obligation under the note was a clear statement as to the amounts due and when they were due.  There are no duties imposed by the Note other than payment of the debt. And THAT duty does not apply to the Wife.

The thing that most judges and most lawyers screw up is that there is a difference between each legal term, and those differences are important or they would not be used. Looking back at AMJUR (I still have the book award on Bills and Notes) the following rules are true in every state:

  1. The debt arises from the circumstances — e.g., a loan of money from A to B.
  2. The liability to pay the debt arises as a matter of law. So the debt becomes, by operation of law, a demand obligation. No documentation is necessary.
  3. The note is not the debt. Execution of the note creates an independent obligation. Thus a borrower may have two liabilities based upon (a) the loan of money in real life and (b) the execution of ANY promissory note.
  4. MERGER DOCTRINE: Under state law, if the borrower executes a promissory note to the party who gave him the loan then the debt becomes merged into the note and the note is evidence of the obligation. This shuts off the possibility that a borrower could be successfully attacked both for payment of the loan of money in real life AND for the independent obligation under the promissory note.
  5. Two liabilities, both of which can be enforced for the same loan. If the borrower executes a note to a third person who was not the party who loaned him/her money, then it is possible for the same borrower to be required, under law, to pay twice. First on the original obligation arising from the loan, (which can be defended with a valid defense such as that the obligation was paid) and second in the event that a third party purchased the note while it was not in default, in good faith and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. The borrower cannot defend against the latter because the state statute says that a holder in due course can enforce the note even if the borrower has valid defenses against the original parties who arranged the loan. In the first case (obligation arising from an actual loan of money) a failure to defend will result in a judgment and in the second case the defenses cannot be raised and a judgment will issue. Bottom Line: Signing a promissory note does not mean the maker actual received value or a loan of money, but if that note gets into the hands of a holder in due course, the maker is liable even if there was no actual transaction in real life.
  6. The obligor under the note (i.e., the maker) is not necessarily the same as the debtor. It depends upon who signed the note as the “maker” of the instrument. An obligor would include a guarantor who merely signed either the note or a separate instrument guaranteeing payment.
  7. The obligee under the note (i.e., the payee) is not necessarily the lender. It depends upon who made the loan.
  8. The note is evidence of the debt  — but that doesn’t “foreclose” the issue of whether someone might also sue on the debt — if the Payee on the note is different from the party who loaned the money, if any.
  9. In most instances with nearly all loans over the past 20 years, the payee on the note is not the same as the lender who originated the actual loan.

In no foreclosure case ever reviewed (2004-present era) by my office has anyone ever claimed that they were a holder in due course — thus corroborating the suspicion that they neither paid for the loan origination nor did they pay for the purchase of the loan.

If they had paid for it they would have asserted they were either the “lender” (i.e., the party who loaned money to the party from whom they are seeking collection) or the holder in due course i.e., a  third party who purchased the original note and mortgage for good value, in good faith and without any knowledge of the maker’s defenses). Notice I didn’t use the word “borrower” for that. The maker is liable to a party with HDC status regardless fo whether or not the maker was or was not a borrower.

“Banks” don’t claim to be the lender because that would entitle the “borrower” to raise defenses. They don’t claim HDC status because they would need to prove payment for the purchase of the paper instrument (i.e., the note). But the banks have succeeded in getting most courts to ERRONEOUSLY treat the “banks” as having HDC status, thus blocking the borrower’s defenses entirely. Thus the maker is left liable to non-creditors even if the same person as borrower also remains liable to whoever actually gave him/her the loan of money. And in the course of those actions most homeowners lose their home to imposters.

All of this is true, as I said, in every state including Florida. It is true not because I say it is true or even that it is entirely logical. It is true because of current state statutes in which the UCC was used as a template. And it is true because of centuries of common law in which the current law was refined and molded for an efficient marketplace. But what is also true is that law judges are the product of law school, in which they either skipped or slept through the class on Bills and Notes.

Bank Media Blitz: End of Foreclosure Era: FALSE

The false pronouncements that the mortgage crisis is over have led many attorneys and homeowners to give up on winning cases.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

For years the banks having been gradually ramping up a PR campaign that carries the message: the foreclosure crisis is over. “Institutions” like Black Knight (formerly known as the infamous Lender Processing Services —LPS) have been issuing statements that foreclosures are essentially over. The newest round of these false pronouncements is that foreclosures  have sunk to a 9 year low.

The truth is more nuanced and “counter-intuitive” as Reynaldo Reyes, VP of Deutsch Bank “asset management” said many years ago. What the banks have done (using LPS/Black Knight) is play Wackamo with the states and counties. They ramp up foreclosures to an all time high and then switch to another county. Then the report is that the county with the all time high is now declining — because the banks have moved on to another county or state.

After the decline, they come back again and ramp it back up, sometimes stopping short of another all time high.

The facts are that there have been some 9 million foreclosures since the mortgage crisis began and there will be at least another 6 million foreclosures under cover of what is being reported as a crisis that is over. There are hundreds of thousands of foreclosures that were put on hold in cases where the homeowner put up a fight. Some of them are over ten years old — and courts, rather than dismissing them for lack of prosecution or adequate prosecution have (a) let them continue and (b) blamed the homeowner for the delays. Those cases are also coming to a head now and the banks are starting to show losses in court that were never reported before because they were only pursuing cases that were uncontested.

The truth is that the banks were playing the odds. The number of homeowners who put up a fight is only around 4-6%. By putting the contested foreclosures on hold, the banks were able to get millions of fraudulent foreclosures completed at a rate of 100%. Out of the contested ones, they still have the advantage much there record of success is much lower and getting lower every day as courts wake up to the fact that the banks are not being truthful in court nor with borrowers.

The soft underbelly is that the banks were not truthful with investors, from whom they essentially stole the money that was advanced for the purchase of mortgage backed securities that were issued by empty trusts.

PRACTICE HINT: There are three basic classifications of foreclosures into which every foreclosure falls.

  1. Foreclosures without “issues.”
  2. Foreclosures with factual issues
  3. Foreclosures with procedural issues.

The first two can be won and should be won 100% of the time (speaking of loans in which multiple “transfers” and claims of securitization were made).  The third one can be more challenging because either the pro se litigant or an attorney made admissions or already missed deadlines or otherwise failed to raise and press appropriate defenses.

The result of winning is an involuntary or voluntary dismissal when you win, but then you have the statute of limitations to deal with when they come back and sue again on more fraudulent paperwork. Attorney fees are generally awarded as long as you included the demand in the filings for the homeowner.

By foreclosures without issues I mean an apparent “default:” that the homeowner did stop making payments before the delinquency or default letter. These cases can only be won by good trial practice: timely proper objections, watching what evidence comes in and well-planned cross examination (which means good trial preparation). If you do the work your chances of winning at trial level or appeal, if necessary are very good.

By foreclosures with factual issues I mean situations in which the “servicer” created the illusion of a default by negligently or intentionally posting payments to the wrong ledger. This includes lump sum payments for reinstatement, insurance and other matters. The “borrower” never defaulted even if the note and mortgage were valid and even if the assignments were valid. The result is dismissal usually without prejudice. But if you also show that they were lying about the transfer to the trust or other foreclosing party, the case could be dismissed with prejudice and even with sanctions.

By foreclosures with procedural issues I mean situations in which procedural errors are present that require leniency of the court to correct them in order to properly defend. This usually occurs when pro se (aka pro per) litigants attempt to represent themselves because they think they have found some magic bullet. 95% of such cases are lost thus skewing the overall percentage of wins and losses for homeowners who put up a fight.

No case falls 100% into any specific category but each case can be generally categorized using the above analysis.

In all cases the homeowners’ attorney should make every effort to destroy the case asserted by the foreclosing party through vigorous and timely objections and brutal cross examination. Depending upon the rulings on objections and motions to strike testimony or documentary evidence, the defense should rest if there are no factual issues to present. This is especially true in cases without issues. If you don’t have the defense of payment or that the demand for reinstatement was inaccurate, there is nothing to present by the homeowner except for attempts at prejudicial comments about the lawyers and the servicers etc.

In a recent (August, 2016) case I had “without issues”, Patrick Giunta and I surprised the opposition by resting at the conclusion of the bank’s case. In nonjudicial states this is not so easy to do procedurally although it is possible in isolated instances. By resting at the conclusion of the bank’s case in a judicial foreclosure, the judge is forced to consider whether the evidence on the record supports a judgment for the plaintiff. Some judges will rule for the bank by the seat of their pants.

But by using objections vigorously, we had preserved multiple issues on appeal — namely we had excluded many pieces of evidence that were vital to the Plaintiff’s case. We were fortunate to have a judge that was serious about his job of being a judge. Like a jury would do, the judge took the case, the filings and the evidence into Chambers and read every page. He concluded that there were fatally defective elements and missing elements in the Plaintiff’s case and announced judgment for the homeowner.

In the final analysis the issue is always tacitly or explicitly legal and procedural standing. And one thing to keep in mind is that trial judges are not entirely persuaded by legal argument. But they ARE persuaded by facts admitted into evidence and facts excluded from evidence.

On a final note, I want remind practitioners that the admission of an objectionable document into evidence does two things: (1) it raises an issue for appeal and (2) it opens the door to challenge the probity of the evidence admitted. Once a document is admitted into evidence, it is in — in its entirety and for all purposes and for all parties.

For example when the PSA is admitted into evidence, make sure you have examined it and raise issues on cross examination as to whether it was signed, whether the exhibits were complete etc. Of course the main exhibit is the Mortgage Loan Schedule (MLS) which never contained real loans even where the PSA was complete and in many cases has no actual MLS exhibit, thus defeating the assertion that the Trust ever acquired any loan much less the loan of your client.

SERVICER ADVANCES: The Big Modification—> Foreclosure Scam by Wells Fargo and Others — “Better be 90 days behind”

See West Coast Workshop Northern California

For further information or services please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

This is not a legal opinion on any specific case. Get a lawyer.

======================================

see http://www.occupy.com/article/how-wells-fargo-fraudulently-foreclosed-florida-homeowner

The Big Question:

How can there be a declaration of default

when the creditor is showing no default and no loss on its books?

I have been through the ringer myself, as the homeowner in the article linked above said about himself. We have a steady policy of the banks luring homeowners into default or luring them into deeper defaults. The reason is clear. They want the foreclosure — not the house and definitely not the money owed. As one BOA manager said “we are in the foreclosure business not the modification business.” The facts are always the same: the homeowner is faced with two choices based upon the information that comes from the only source he or she knows about — the party claiming to own the loan or claiming the authority to service the loan. In nearly all cases neither representation is true.

The two choices are to find another way to get help from friends and relatives (i.e., forget about modification) or go into a default. The message is perfectly clear that the “customer representative” is inviting them to go into default. But they have a script that carefully avoids the direct words of “I am telling you to go into default.” And so nearly all judges say that this is not illegal legal advice and not fraudulent misrepresentation, even though the homeowner is told that there is nobody else they can talk to about their loan.

Millions of homeowners were looking for modification rather than a free house — mostly on loans that had reset to unaffordable monthly payments that were not properly disclosed at closing and which should never have been approved by any legitimate underwriting process. In fact, such loans were never approved prior to the era of the illusion of securitization in the secondary markets where mortgage loans are bought and sold. Industry practices, rules and regulations preventing banks from approving loans in which it was obvious that some or all of the terms would be breached based upon current information. So if a borrower is approved for a mortgage with a teaser payment of $500 per month in a household that grosses $50,000 per year, it is obvious what will happen when the payment resets to $5,000 per month ($60,000 per year) — $10,000 more than their entire income.

The ONLY reason why such loans were approved is that the banks were not putting the bank at risk in such loans and were making money hand over fist in the “secondary” markets that were completely under the control of the same banks. They sold that loan as though the $5,000 per month would be paid — and even had ratings and insurance indicating that the loan was “low risk” when the bank knew for sure that default was imminent due to the reset  of the amount of payments. And in fact, payments were made to the investor creditors just as expected —> but paid by the investment bank as “Servicer advances.”

But were they really paying the certificate holders in REMIC Trusts? Yes, but they were paying investors out of their own money which was hijacked into a commingled slush fund. But since they were called “servicer advances” that are now being bundled as derivatives and sold to the same investors as securitized debt, it is the SERVICER who has a claim for the advanced money even though it wasn’t their money that funded the “advances” which were really refunds out of the money paid by the investors themselves.

The banks created this scheme so that investors would remain ignorant that anything was wrong with the portfolio despite mountains of delinquencies that were DECLARED BY THE SERVICER to be “defaults.” And so the investors would buy more “mortgage backed” securities they were neither mortgage backed nor securities because the Trust never saw a penny of the offering of mortgage backed bonds and never operated nor purchased nor received ownership of the loans.

Those “advances” or refunds or whatever you want to call them can be “recovered” (I would say stolen) by the investment banks masquerading as the Master Servicer of a REMIC Trust that existed only on paper and not in the real world. But they can only “recover” those advances (that they are quickly selling to investors through new securitization schemes) if the property goes into foreclosure. If the property is foreclosed then the servicer no longer needs to make advances although in many cases it continues to do so in order to keep the investors in the dark. But more importantly it is ONLY when the property is sold that the “Master Servicer” can “recover” those servicer advances.

It’s complicated. But if you stop for a moment and put pencil to paper suddenly the reason for those long delays in prosecuting foreclosures becomes crystal clear. The investment bank is using the investor money to make “advances” to the investor to make good on the expectations of the investor in receiving income from their “investment.” Since the investment bank is not actually making the advances, the “receivable” due to the investment bank under this convoluted scheme increases with each passing month (without any corresponding liability or expense). So the investment bank that controls the slush fund where investor money is kept, makes payments to the investor for the amounts due regardless of whether the borrowers are paying.

In the example above, they want to keep that time running as long as possible. By making advances of $5,000 per month, that is $60,000 per year and over an 8 year period, for example, the receivable is now $480,000 without the bank having to spend one dime and in fact, actually collecting fees during the entire time at a premium rate for those loans that are distressed. So they have a $480,000 asset waiting. But there is a catch. They can only get the $480,000 if the property is foreclosed and the property is sold. It is only out of the sale proceeds that the bank as “master Servicer” can lay claim for its $480,000. Of course in the end the investors get screwed because that $480,000 was their money and THEY should have received it. But they didn’t and they don’t. Just read the prospectuses on the bundling of “servicer advances.”

So Wells Fargo and other banks adopted strategies that lure homeowners into default and get them believing and hoping they will get a modification when in fact they don’t give the modifications at all. In truth they are neither authorized to collect the money nor enforce the obligation because their so-called authority comes from the PSA for a REMIC Trust that was never used, never funded, never in operation. And they do it in a variety of ways—

Here are some excerpts from the article in the above link from about a year ago:

Occupy.com Article

Wells Fargo put them “through the ringer”. “We were happy living in a rural-suburban area. Time went by quickly. One thing that we always did was pay our bills on time. We took pride in our credit score, which were 760 each. We were so proud when we needed a new car we could just “walk” off the lot with it. [I’m] not sure what happened, where everything went wrong. I actually believe it was President Obama telling Americans to apply for a Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) loan. When job loss occurred in our family, I was aware that we would qualify for that loan and I called Wells Fargo to inquire. They put us through the ringer. That is what started our tumble down the credit hole. Wells Fargo approved a forbearance agreement, while we submitted a HAMP application in 2009.” – See more at: http://www.occupy.com/article/how-wells-fargo-fraudulently-foreclosed-florida-homeowner#sthash.iIM39zPY.dpuf

[HAMP had been introduced by the Obama administration as a tool to help homeowners keep their homes. It turned out that the yellow brick road led many into foreclosure disasters – a prolonged disaster that kept homeowners’ hope alive while chipping away their savings, their equity, and ruining their credit scores. Americans were watching in disbelief while the servicers and banks didn’t comply with the HAMP requirements, continued with dual tracking (processing modifications and foreclosing at the same time), pushing homeowners towards in-house modifications even when they qualified for HAMP, and many other irregularities.] – See more at: http://www.occupy.com/article/how-wells-fargo-fraudulently-foreclosed-florida-homeowner#sthash.iIM39zPY.dpuf

This is when the games began,” continued J.S. “The forbearance ruined my credit score. Every fax I sent to Wells Fargo has not been received – that’s what their representatives claimed. Week after week, always [with] a two-week lag. Always something missing. Then I started my Internet research on “lost paper work” and I found Living Lies website, which led to Foreclosure Hamlet, and now Facebook. My search for answers brought many wonderful people in my life together with the answers and they helped me through the darkest moments of my life. [Editor’s note: Ruining the credit score of the homeowner is key to insuring a foreclosure. If their credit score remained high they would be able to refinance and the investment bank as Master Servicer would have no claim for “servicer advances.”]

“In 2009 I was informed by a Wells Fargo representative that I may not be approved because someone moved my application out of the review folder from her computer! Their incompetence was limitless. Eventually I was approved for a modification, but it was more than my original mortgage. However, I wanted to save my house at all costs. At this time I had a good job. [But] after the BP oil spill my salary was cut in half and I re-applied for the HAMP loan in 2010. – [Editor’s Note: I have personal knowledge and tape recordings of Wells Fargo employees speaking without realizing they were being recorded by their own system. In those recordings they acknowledged that images and data from one borrower was mixed in with another. They agree that they shouldn’t admit that to the borrower. Then Wells Fargo blames the borrower for not having sent the required documentation which they have had all along or destroyed. Evidence in a case involving BOA and other banks shows that on a periodic basis the banks simply destroy all applications and submissions by borrowers.]

“I was told by Wells Fargo that we had to be 90 days late before they would consider my HAMP loan application. At that time, I still had a great credit score, and now they were telling me to actually STOP PAYING MY MORTGAGE. I think that I literally freaked out then. I didn’t want to lose my home.” [This is the big one. And up till now it has been foolproof. Most homeowners are unaware of the news or history of other borrowers. So when they are told about the “90 day” requirement, they think they don’t qualify for relief unless they withhold payments for 90 days. But that isn’t true for two reasons — the bank is only telling them about the policy of Wells Fargo, not the investors (sometimes Fannie or Freddie).  The bank is creating the impression that they are a reliable source of information when in fact they are lying to the borrower in order to get them into default, foreclosure, sell the property and then claim “Servicer advances.”]

One of the biggest traps by the servicers during the HAMP modification process was pushing homeowners into default without telling them that they would be reported by those same servicers to the credit agencies, thus ruining their credit.] – See more at: http://www.occupy.com/article/how-wells-fargo-fraudulently-foreclosed-florida-homeowner#sthash.iIM39zPY.dpuf

“After reluctantly not paying my mortgage for 90 days, I was able to apply for a HAMP loan. Again every fax I sent was lost. I didn’t know what to do anymore. My frustration reached its limits and I realized that next time I will FedEx my documents, so they can’t lose it, since there will be a tracking number as a proof of delivery. The new HAMP application letter stated that paper work was due on or before Feb. 14, 2011. I gathered everything and sent on Feb. 3, 2011. It was received on Feb. 4, 2011, and signed via FedEx tracking. On Feb. 16, 2014, I received a letter from Wells Fargo that my documents were not received. WHAT? I called them right away. They say they never received my package. After I cried over the phone, their representative sounded very upset and finally told me, ‘We have some of your documents, but things are missing.’ – See more at: http://www.occupy.com/article/how-wells-fargo-fraudulently-foreclosed-florida-homeowner#sthash.iIM39zPY.dpuf

“I called FedEx and spoke to the supervisor of the delivery person and she tried to call Wells Fargo but I was told no one would answer the phone and she never contacted me again. I had no choice but to wait for foreclosure proceedings. They obviously wanted to give me the run around. I was served Dec. 27, 2011. I was ready. – See more at: http://www.occupy.com/article/how-wells-fargo-fraudulently-foreclosed-florida-homeowner#sthash.iIM39zPY.dpuf

Mystery Solved! It’s the Servicers Who want the Foreclosure NOT the Certificate Holders or the “Trust”

See http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/servicing/mortgage-servicers-resume-securitizing-repayment-rights-1060096-1.html

So here is absolute proof that the real party in interest in the foreclosures are the unsecured servicers and also proof that the “default” never occurred. Notice how Freddie Mac figures in. Despite all denials and lies in court it is obvious that the servicers are, through one means or another, advancing payments to the certificate holders regardless of the payment status of the borrowers. And there are other people paying the creditors (certificate holders) as well. That means the secured creditors of the homeowner got paid, which means there is no default and they never declared one.

And THAT is why you rarely see US Bank as Trustee for the blah blah Pass through Certificates Trust hereby declares a default in your obligation; they don’t say that because neither the Trust nor the certificate holders have been short-changed, even as the servicer declares a default and moves toward foreclosure. This also explains why they don;t modify nearly as much as they should — they don’t collect their servicer advances that way. They only collect when there is a foreclosure and the property is sold. Why do they make those payments? Simple: They pay the certificate holders (1) so the certificate holders (investors) are kept in the dark about the real quality of the loan pool and (2) to lull the investors into a false sense of security such that they buy more of these worthless mortgage bonds.

The new “creditor” is the servicer who made the advances BUT they are unsecured. The only reason for the push for foreclosure is to make money selling new certificates of new securitization vehicles based upon the repayment rights of the servicer NOT the payments of the borrower. That means that the only party interested in the foreclosure is the servicer who (a) wants to stop making payments and (b) wants to collect on the unsecured volunteer payments the servicer made to creditors of the homeowner.

The story is that the servicers need to borrow the money in order to pay the certificate holders, but that isn’t true. They would never take that risk when the whole model is based upon the absence of risk. A close look at any REMIC prospectus, reveals a provision that says that some of the money of investors will be deposited into a pool that can be used to pay the investors their expected return on investment — i.e., their own money. Yes it’s a Ponzi scheme, but it is disclosed (not that anyone read it). AND the truth is that ALL of the invested money was pooled into accounts that had nothing to do with the REMIC trust.

And THAT is why the banks cannot connect the dots between the alleged loan closing, at which investor money was being used, and the paperwork which shows payees on the note and mortgagees on the mortgage as parties who have no relationship with the investors whose money was used to fund the loan. Bottom Line: The Banks are stealing from both ends.

Excerpts from the article:

There are some new features that issuers have to build into servicer advance trusts under the new rating criteria but “it’s been workable and issuers are finding ways to get deals done that work,” said Tom Hiner, a partner at law firm Hunton & Williams who has advised on a number of such transactions.

New Residential Investment Corp. is currently in the market with a $1.5 billion deal dubbed NRZ Advance Receivables Trust 2015-ON1. The real estate investment trust recently acquired the assets of Home Loan Servicing Solutions from Ocwen Financial; this deal refinances two existing securitizations, HLSS Servicer Advance Receivables Trust and HLSS Servicer Advance Receivables Trust.

The advance facility is backed by reimbursement rights to private-label mortgage-backed securities.

In June, Ocwen completed $450 million servicer advance refinancing of its Freddie Mac financing facility (formerly OFSART). The transaction securitizes the reimbursement rights to funds advanced on mortgages insured by the government-sponsored enterprise. S&P’s ratings on the notes issued by the deal, Ocwen Freddie Advance Funding LLC’s series 2015-T1, 2015-T2 and 2015-VF1, ranged from AAA to BBB and pay a weighted average interest rate of 2.225%.

In a July conference call discussing second-quarter earnings, Ocwen executives said the deal was positively received; it was upsized by $50 million and the advance rate on the notes was 8 percentage points higher than the facility it refinanced.

Hiner expects much of the market activity in the next two quarters to come from refinancing portions of the often unrated variable funding note commitments extended by bank lenders during the S&P moratorium on rating deals with term ABS.

This trend could result in a total of 10 to 12 term ABS deals by the end of the third quarter, according to Hiner.

The new deals have new features to address S&P’s recalibrated rating methodology, which takes into account the potential for extended timelines for reimbursements, the liquidity risk of the notes under stressed conditions, and the servicer’s ability to continue advancing based on its credit quality.

Timelines are further adjusted based on the actual recent experience of the servicer in recouping advances. The criteria establish “standard” reimbursement curves along with “above standard” and “below standard” ones for different advance types and rating scenarios.

The new methodology also includes a more stringent liquidity reserve fund requirements; this requirement varies according to the geographic diversification of receivables in the master trust.

“In a high-stress scenario, you could have potential issues where you didn’t receive cash from the receivables because you may not be liquidating properties as quickly,” said Jeremy Schneider, the agency’s director of RMBS ratings.

Hiner also expects to see more additional deals backed by repayments rights to advances on agency mortgages, similar to Ocwen’s. While servicing mortgages guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie is not as capital intensive as servicing nonagency mortgage securitizations, Hiner thinks that more participants with agency servicing portfolios will look to the ABS market for funding.

S&P’s older criteria for rating servicer advance receivables securitizations was not tailored for agency RMBS, simply because it had not seen many deals backed by IOUs from Fannie and Freddie. “But now there is more of an appetite,” said Waqas Shaikh, S&P’s managing director for RMBS ratings. The new criteria takes this into account.

Nationstar is the only other issuer to previously place agency notes under its Nationstar Agency Advance Funding Trust in January 2013.

There might not be any more deals from New Residential, however. The REIT said during its second-quarter earnings call that it has $3.5 billion of additional financing to fund increased balances of servicer advance receivables and upcoming maturities. The company acquired $5.1 billion of reimbursement rights through its purchase of HLSS; its portfolio now totals $8.5 billion.

And Ocwen, which has so far sold $66 billion of agency MSRs, is in the process of selling another $25 billion, according to its second-quarter earnings report. However, the issuer intends to remain in the agency space. On the company’s April 30 conference call to discuss operating results for the first quarter, CEO Ron Faris said Ocwen did not intend to sell any of its Ginnie Mae MSRs and would not completely exit GSEs or servicing or lending. The issuer still has $34 billion in GSE servicing rights and approximately $8 billion of GSE subservicing, and plans to continue to originate and service new Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and FHA loans.

However, Ocwen executives said that they remain “optimistic” that the company will eventually be able to resume purchasing mortgage servicing rights based on discussions with the New York Department of Financial Services and the California Department of Business Oversight. The servicer’s ability to acquire new MSRs is currently restricted as part of last year’s settlements with the two regulators over its practices.”

Dan Edstrom senior forensic analyst for livinglies, says –This article lists many of the major servicers – some of whom have outright denied making payment advances in response to discovery from homeowners …
  • So homeowner is obligated to make payments
  • The note references others obligated also (guaranty / surety)
  • The PSA references the obligation and requirement to make advances of principal and interest
  • The PSA references the ability to make use of an “advance facility” to fund advances
  • Investors purchase securities (providing funding through the advance facility)
  • The funds from the advance facility investors are funneled through the trust to certificateholder investors to cover all payments that were required but were not made on the pool of loans in the trust
  • The servicer skims off their fees from the funds, which means they were paid their servicing fee even though the homeowner may not have made any payment
And of course the advance facility is a securitization, so there are other fees that are now spread across each of the “loans” that have missed payments, adding to the costs and fees charged to the homeowner and most likely ultimately paid by the original trust investors (it costs them money for the process where by they are paid even though the loan payments are not performing, and then the payments are pulled back from them later when the property is “liquidated” by foreclosure, shortsale or whatever).
The entire process is a scam. The investors would make more money of loan workouts were done instead of forcing homeowners into foreclosure.
Thx,
Office: 916.207.6706

Rockwell P. Ludden, Esq. — A Lawyer who gets it on Securitization and Mortgages

see FORECLOSURE, SECURITIZATION DON’T MIX ROCKY&#39S+ARTICLE+in+the+CAPE+COD+TIMES+February+21,+2015

As I write this, I have no recall of Mr. Ludden before today. BUT his article in of all places, the Cape Cod Times, struck me as astonishing in its concise description of the illegal foreclosures that are skimming past Judges desks with hardly a look much less the usually required judicial scrutiny. He says

No one should have the legal right to take your home merely by winking and nodding their way around a significant flaw in the securitization model and whatever burrs it may leave on the industry’s saddle. …

Is there anyone with a present contractual connection to you or the loan who has actually suffered a default? If not, any… foreclosure begins to bear an uncanny resemblance to double dipping.

It is time for Judges to dust off the principle of fundamental fairness that lies at the heart of our legal system, demand a level playing field, and stand behind alternatives to foreclosure that serve the legitimate interests of homeowner and industry alike.

His article is both insightful and concise, which is more than I can say for some of the things that I have written at length. And I guess if you are in the Cape Cod area it probably would be a good idea to contact him at rpl@luddenkramerlaw.com. He pierces through layers upon layers of subterfuge by the financial industry and comes up with the right conclusion — separation not just of note and mortgage — but more importantly the separation between the note and the ultimate certificate that spells out the rights of a creditor to repayment and the rights of anonymous individuals and entities to foreclose. In securitization practice the note ceases to exist.

He correctly concludes that the assignments (and I would add endorsements and powers of attorney) are a sham, designed to conceal basic flaws in the entire securitization model. The only thing I would add is something that has not quite made it to the surface of these chaotic waters — that the money from the investors never made it into the trust — something that is perfectly consistent with ignoring the securitization model and the securitization documents.

The ‘assignment’ creates the appearance of [the] missing connection. But it is all hogwash, the only discernible purpose of which is to grease the skids for an illegal foreclosure. It is done long after the Trust has closed its doors. [referring to both the cutoff date and the fact that the trust actually does not ever get to own the debt, loan, note or mortgage]

The banks kept the money and assigned the losses to the investors. Then they bet on the losses and kept the profits from their intentionally watered down underwriting practices. Then they stole the identity of the borrowers and the investors and bought insurance that covered “losses” that were never incurred by the named insured — the Banks. The family resemblance to Ponzi scheme seems closer than mere double dipping in an infinite scheme of dipping into the funds of thousands of institutional investors and into the lives of millions of homeowners.

see also A 21st Century Trust Indenture Act?

posted by Adam Levitin

Why Is the PSA Relevant?

Many judges in foreclosure actions continue to rule that the securitization documents are irrelevant. This would be a correct ruling in the event that there were no securitization documents. Otherwise, the securitization documents are nothing but relevant.

There are three scenarios in which the securitization documents are relevant:

  1.  The party claiming to be a trustee of a trust is claiming to have the rights of collection and foreclosure.
  2.  The party claiming to be the servicer  for a trust is claiming to have the rights of collection and foreclosure.
  3.  The party claiming to be the holder with rights to enforce is claiming to have rights of collection and foreclosure. If the party claims to be a holder in due course, the inquiry ends there and the borrower is stuck with bringing claims against the intermediaries, being stripped of his right to raise defenses he/she could otherwise have made against the originator, aggregator or other parties.

The securitization scheme can be summarized as follows:

  1.  Assignment and Assumption agreement:  This governs procedures for the closing. This is an agreement between the apparent originator of the loan and an undisclosed third-party aggregator. This agreement exists before the first application for loan is received by the originator, and before the alleged “closing.” It governs the behavior of the originator as well as the rights and obligations of the originator. Specifically it states that the originator has no rights to the whatsoever. The aggregator is used as a conduit for the delivery of funds to the closing table at which the borrower is deceived into thinking that he received a loan from the originator when in fact the funds were wired by the aggregator on behalf of an unknown fourth party. The unknown fourth party is a broker-dealer acting as a conduit for the actual lenders. The actual lenders are investors who believe that they were buying mortgage bonds issued by a REMIC trust, which in turn would be using the money raised from the offering of the bonds for the purpose of originating or acquiring residential loans. Hence the assignment and assumption agreement is highly relevant because it dictates the manner in which the closing takes place. And it demonstrates that the loan was a table funded loan in a pattern of conduct that is indisputably “predatory per se.” It also demonstrates the fact that there was no consideration between originator and the borrower. And it demonstrates that there was no privity between the aggregator and the borrower. As the closing agent procured the signature of the borrower on false pretenses. Interviews with document processors for both originators closing agents now show that they would not participate in such a closing where the identity of the actual lender was intentionally withheld.
  2.  The pooling and servicing agreement: This governs the procedures for collection, disbursement and enforcement. This is the document that specifies the authority of the trustee, the servicer, the sub servicers, the documents that should be held by the servicer, the servicer advance payments, and the formulas under which the lenders would be paid. Without this document, none of the parties currently bring foreclosure actions would have any right to be in court. Without this document trustee cannot show its authority to represent the trust or the trust beneficiaries. Without this document servicer cannot show that it performed in accordance with the requirements of a contract, or that it was in privity with the actual lenders,  or that it had any right of enforcement, or that it computed correctly the amount of payment required from the borrower and the amount of payment required to be made to the lenders. It also specifies the types of third party payments that are made from insurance, swaps and other guarantors or co-obligors.
  3. Of specific importance is the common provision for servicer advances, in which the creditors are receiving payments in full despite the declaration of default by the servicer.  In fact, the declaration of default by the servicer is actually an attempt to recover money that was voluntarily paid to the creditor. It is not correctly seen as a declaration of default nor any right to demand reinstatement nor any right to accelerate because the creditor is not showing any default. It is a disguised attempt to assert a claim for unjust enrichment because the servicer made payments on behalf of the borrower, voluntarily, to the creditor that are not recoverable from the creditor. Usually they make this payment by the 25th of each month. Hence any prior delinquency is cured each month and eliminates the possibility of a default with respect to the creditor on the residential loan.

It is argued by the banks and accepted by many judges that mere possession of the note sufficient to enforce it in the amount demanded by the servicer. This is wrong. The amount demanded by the servicer and does not take into account the actual payments received by the actual creditor. Accordingly the computation of interest and principal is incorrect. This can only be shown by reference to the securitization documents, including the assignment and assumption agreement, the pooling and servicing agreement, the prospectus and supplements to the PSA and Prospectus.

For more information please call 520-405-1688 or 954-495-9867.

Use of Factual Findings of Servicer Advances

It is important that the content of the report dealing withservicer advances be argued strenuously.Servicer advances have been received by the creditor, thus reducing the amount the creditor is expecting to be paid. Hence there should be reduction in the amount that is due from the borrower — to the extent thatactual payments have been received by that creditor on this account whether the borrower was the source of those payments or not.The servicer has agreed to make the payments to the creditor regardless of whether the Borrower paid or not and has continued to make payments apparently right up through the present. The Title and Securitization report says that.

Hence there could have been no default. The acceleration was a breach of contract, the amount due for reinstatement was wrong, the amount due in the Notice of Default was wrong, and the amount due as claimed in the lawsuit is wrong. simply stated, there is no basis for a foreclosure lawsuit or even a suit on the note.

The servicer is trying to convert a hypothetical claim against the borrower fro advancing payments into a claim by the creditor. It is masking the fact that the creditor has been paid and that the servicer wants to recover the amounts advanced in lieu of payments from the borrower.

That would, at best, be an action for unjust enrichment, if they were able to prove the elements and it would not be secured by the mortgage.

The mortgage only secures indebtedness on the note — not to a claim outside of the note where a third party either as volunteer or intermeddler made the payments. The note is evidence of a debt owed by borrower (debtor) to the creditor. The creditor is the Trust according to their own pleadings.

Hence the creditor is not alleged to have a default on its books and records because it has been paid. The mortgage only secures THAT debt to THAT creditor. If it were otherwise, off record transactions would cloud the title on  virtually every mortgage loan creating uncertainty in the marketplace where no lender would make loans because they could never be sure whether some off record activity had occurred and that the payoff of the previous “lender” had included the money due to the secured party. Such a subsequent lender might inadvertently be placing itself in a  position of liability to the borrower for an overpayment to the creditor.

I provide litigation assistance and expert witnesses with real credentials who will corroborate this in expert declarations, affidavits and live testimony, if the facts match what is stated above. call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

 

Mortgage Lenders Network and Wells Fargo Battled over Servicer Advances

It is this undisclosed yield spread premium that produces the pool from which I believe the servicer advances are actually being paid. Intense investigation and discovery will probably reveal the actual agreements that show exactly that. In the meanwhile I encourage attorneys to look carefully at the issue of “servicer advances” as a means to defeat the foreclosure in its entirety.

As usual, the best decisions come from cases where the parties involved in “securitization” are fighting with each other. When a borrower brings up the same issues, the court is inclined to disregard the borrower’s defense as merely an attempt to get out of  a legitimate debt. In the Case of Mortgage Lenders  versus Wells Fargo (395 B.K. 871 (2008)), it is apparent that servicer advances are a central issue. For one thing, it demonstrates the incentive of servicers to foreclose even though the foreclosure will result in a greater loss to the investor then if a workout or modification had been used to save the loan.

See MLN V Wells Fargo

It also shows that the servicers were very much aware of the issue and therefore very much aware that between the borrower and the lender (investor or creditor) there was no default, and on a continuing basis any theoretical default was being cured on a monthly basis. And as usual, the parties and the court failed to grasp the real economics. Based on information that I have received from people were active in the bundling and sale of mortgage bonds and an analysis of the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements, I think it is obvious that the actual money came from the broker dealer even though it is called a “servicer advance.” Assuming my analysis is correct, this would further complicate the legal issues surrounding servicer advances.

This case also demonstrates that it is in bankruptcy court that a judge is most likely to understand the real issues. State court judges generally do not possess the background, experience, training or time to grasp the incredible complexity created by Wall Street. In this case Wells Fargo moves for relief from the automatic stay (in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by MLN) so that it could terminate the rights of MLN as a servicer, replacing MLN with Wells Fargo. The dispute arose over several issues, servicer advances being one of them. MLN filed suit against Wells Fargo alleging breach of contract and then sought to amend based on the doctrine of “unjust enrichment.” This was based upon the servicer advances allegedly paid by MLN that would be prospectively recovered by Wells Fargo.

The take away from this case is that there is no specific remedy for the servicer to recover advances made under the category of “servicer advances” but that one thing is clear —  the money paid to trust beneficiaries as “servicer advances” is not recoverable from the trust beneficiaries. The other thing that is obvious to Judge Walsh in his discussion of the facts is that it is in the servicing agreements between the parties that there may be a remedy to recover the advances; OR, if there is no contractual basis for recovering advances under the category of  “servicer advances” then there might be a basis to recover under the theory of unjust enrichment. As always, there is a complete absence in the documentation and in the discussion of this case as to the logistics of exactly how a servicer could recover those payments.

One thing that is perfectly clear however is that nobody seems to expect the trust beneficiaries to repay the money out of the funds that they had received. Hence the “servicer advance” is not a loan that needs to be repaid by the trust or trust beneficiaries. Logically it follows that if it is not a loan to the trust beneficiaries who received the payment, then it must be a payment that is due to the creditor; and if the creditor has received the payment and accepted it, the corresponding liability for the payment must be reduced.

Dan Edstrom, senior securitization analyst for the livinglies website, pointed this out years ago. Bill Paatalo, another forensic analyst of high repute, has been submitting the same reports showing the distribution reports indicating that the creditor is being paid on an ongoing basis. Both of them are asking the same question, to wit:  “if the creditor is being paid, where is the default?”

One attorney for US bank lamely argues that the trustee is entitled to both the servicer advances and turnover of rents if the property is an investment property. The argument is that there is no reason why the parties should not earn extra profit. That may be true and it may be possible. But what is impossible is that the creditor who receives a payment can nonetheless claim it as a payment still due and unpaid. If the servicer has some legal or equitable claim for recovery of the “servicer advances” then it can only be against the borrower, on whose behalf the payment was made. This means that a new transaction occurs each time such a payment is made to the trust beneficiaries. In that new transaction the servicer can claim “contribution” or “unjust enrichment” against the borrower. Theoretically that might bootstrap into a claim against the proceeds of the ultimate liquidation of the property, which appears to be the basis upon which the servicer “believes” that the money paid to the trust beneficiaries will be recoverable. Obviously the loose language in the pooling and servicing agreement about the servicer’s “belief” can lead to numerous interpretations.

What is not subject to interpretation is the language of the prospectus which clearly states that the investor who is purchasing one of these bogus mortgage bonds agrees that the money advanced for the purchase of the bond can be pooled by the broker-dealer; it is expressly stated that the investor can be paid out of this pool, which is to say that the investor can be paid with his own money for payments of interest and principal. This corroborates my many prior articles on the tier 2 yield spread premium. There is no discussion in the securitization documents as to what happens to that pool of money in the care custody and control of the broker-dealer (investment bank). And this corroborates my prior articles on the excess profits that have yet to be reported. And it explains why they are doing it again.

It doesn’t take a financial analyst to question why anyone would think it was a great business model to spend hundreds of millions of dollars advertising for loan customers where the return is less than 5%. The truth in lending act passed by the federal government requires the participants who were involved in the processing of the loan to be identified and to disclose their actual compensation arising from the origination of the loan — even if the compensation results from defrauding someone. Despite the fact that most loans were subject to claims of securitization from 2001 to the present, none of them appear to have such disclosure. That means that under Reg Z the loans are “predatory per se.”

To say that these were table funded loans is an understatement. What was really occurring was fraudulent underwriting of the mortgage bonds and fraudulent underwriting of the underlying loans. The higher the nominal interest rate on the loans (which means that the risk of default is correspondingly higher) the less the broker-dealer needed to advance for origination or acquisition of the loan; and this is because the investor was led to believe that the loans would be low risk and therefore lower interest rates. The difference between the interest payment due to the investor and the interest payment allegedly due from the borrower allowed the broker-dealers to advance much less money for the origination or acquisition of loans than the amount of money they had received from the investors. That is a yield spread premium which is not been reported and probably has not been taxed.

It is this undisclosed yield spread premium that produces the pool from which I believe the servicer advances are actually being paid. Intense investigation and discovery will probably reveal the actual agreements that show exactly that. In the meanwhile I encourage attorneys to look carefully at the issue of “servicer advances” as a means to defeat the foreclosure in its entirety.

I caution that when enough cases have been lost as a result of servicer advances, the opposition will probably change tactics. While you can win the foreclosure case, it is not clear what the consequences of that might be. If it results in a final judgment for the homeowner then it might be curtains for anyone to claim any amount of money from the loan. But that is by no means assured. If it results in a dismissal, even with prejudice, it might enable the servicer to stop making advances and then declare a default if the borrower fails to make payments after the servicer has stopped making the payments. Assuming that a notice of acceleration of the debt has been declared, the borrower can argue that the foreclosing party has elected its own defective remedy and should pay the price. If past experience is any indication of future rulings, it seems unlikely that the courts will be very friendly towards that last argument.

Attorneys who wish to consult with me on this issue can book 1 hour consults by calling 520-405-1688.

Challenging Deeds Issued After Auction (Sale) of Property

One of the rewarding aspects of what I do is to see more and more people not only hopping on board, understanding securitization, but adding to the body of knowledge I have amassed. In the following article Bill Paatalo, who has done the loan level accounting for many of our readers, expands upon a topic that I have introduced (and of course Dan Edstrom) but not explained nearly as well as Bill does: see http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/time-to-challange-those-trustees-deeds/

EDITOR’S NOTE: I would add that where servicer advances are paid to the creditor (or who we think is the creditor), then there is often an overpayment, which might account for why the “credit bid” is lower than the total amount demanded by the servicer for redemption or reinstatement. This anomaly could void the notice of default and notice of sale and create a problem on the amount required for redemption after the so-called sale.

The legal issue presented by Bill is whether the party who submitted the bid satisfies the state’s legal definition of a creditor who is allowed to submit a credit bid at closing in lieu of cash. This issue is fairly easily analyzed before any order or judgment is entered by a court.

But afterwards, because of the rubber stamping, the judgments mostly state something along the lines that $XXXX.XX is owed by the borrower to the opposing party in litigation. The judgment is final until overturned by appeal or a motion to vacate.

That Judgment makes them a possible creditor and even raises the presumption that they are a creditor when in fact there was no evidence to support that finding in the order or judgment. And ordinarily the courts require that the motion or other attack be verified by a sworn statement from the homeowner. That gets tricky because without having an actual forensic report in your hands, how would the borrower even know about such things?

The judgment can be attacked for fraud because the opposing party had never entered into a transaction wherein it paid value (see Article 9 of UCC) to originate or acquire the loan. Procedural rules vary from state to state on  how this is done and the time limit fro such challenges. In fact, none of the people in the cloud of “securitization” paid anything for the loan, with the exception of the servicer who is credited with having paid servicer advances to the creditor when in fact it appears as though the servicer advances were paid by the investment bank who reserved money out of the pool of money advanced by investors to pay the investors out of their own money. Hence, we see the reason for calling the scheme a PONZI scheme. This is why the issue of STANDING keep bouncing back front and center.

Without an attack on the Judgment I doubt if your state law will allow you to challenge the sale or the sale price. Obviously, before you act on anything on this blog, you need to consult with an attorney who is licensed and experienced in such matters and who practices in the jurisdiction in which your property is located.

For those who are good with computer graphics, here are two drawings I recently made to describe the process of securitization as it played out. The bottom line is that the investment bank diverted the money from the trust and diverted the documentation that was due to the investors to its own strawmen, trading on that documentation and making a ton of money while the investor/lenders and homeowner/borrowers lost either everything or a substantial amount of their wealth that ended up in the pocket of the banks. Anyone who is good with graphics is invited to donate their time to this website and make my hand drawn sketches easier to read and perhaps animated. Neil Garfield Securitization Diagrams 12-20-13

Posted by BPIA on December 18, 2013 bi Bill Paatalo:

For the past couple of years, I have been providing clients with the internal loan level accounting data, which reveals in most instances of private securitization, that all payments “due” on the notes have been paid regularly by undisclosed “co-obligors.” Thus there becomes an issue of fact as to whether or not the “note” is actually in “default.” Word through the grapevine is that this particular argument is gaining some momentum in certain jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Well now it’s time to use the same internal accounting data to attack those dubious “Trustee’s Deeds.” In non-judicial foreclosure states, a ”Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” or Trustee’s Deed” is recorded after the foreclosure sale. Often, the property is sold back to the supposed creditor into what is called “REO” status. In cases where the subject loans were alleged to have been securitized, the Trustee’s Deed will typically state that the Trustee for “XYZ Mortgage-Backed Trust” was the “highest bidder” at the sale and paid cash in the amount of $………..(whatever dollar figure.) There are many reasons to question the validity of these documents; such as the actual parties submitting the “credit bids,” and whether or not any actual cash exchanged hands as attested to under notary acknowledgment. However, there is a way to provide evidence and proof that no such payment ever exchanged hands.

The following language was extracted from a typical Trustee’s Deed:

Trustees Deed language snip

In this particular case, the alleged amount owed in the “Notice of Default” was roughly $314,000.00. A check of the internal accounting for this particular loan (6-months after the sale) shows the loan in “REO” status with no such payment having ever been applied. In fact, the certificateholders (investors) are still receiving their monthly payments of P&I with the trust showing “zero” losses.

This is good hard evidence that the sale and subsequent Trustee’s Deed filed in this case was a “sham” transaction.

If your loan was alleged to have been securitized by a private mbs trust, and your home sold in similar fashion with a recorded Trustee’s Deed, contact me today (bill.bpia@gmail.com) to see if your Trustee’s Deed matches up with the internal accounting data.

Living lies now offers Expert Affidavits showing what was stated in the Trustee’s Deed as opposed to what has actually occurred behind the curtains. See www.livingliesstore.com. Most people ask for consults with me and/or the expert, like Bill, so their lawyer understands what to do with this information.

Are Servicer Advances Deductible Expenses for Homeowners?

Many homeowners get tax statements from entities claiming the right to file them, with an EIN that is problematic. We are having trouble linking the EIN with the name of the entity that sends the tax statement. More importantly or perhaps of equal importance is the question raised by individual homeowners and investors who have purchased multiple residential units and operate them as a business, renting them out as landlords.

Despite my degree and experience in taxation, my knowledge is out of date on this subject. Nobody should take any action based upon this article without consulting a qualified tax professional. This article is for information purposes only. However, I pose the issue for those who do know, to comment on the following scenarios:

First in the homeowner who owns his single family residence but who has stopped paying the monthly amount demanded by the Servicer. In those cases where there are Servicer or similar advances, the creditor keeps getting paid the interest due under the bond agreement even though the Servicer is not receiving the interest allegedly due from the alleged borrower under the alleged note. The interesting issue here is whether the homeowner still owes the money to the creditor under the original note and mortgage agreement. As I have previously outlined in recent days the answer is no, the homeowner does not owe that money to the creditor claiming rights under the original borrower loan agreement. That would seem to be a gain. But the party who made such payments appears to have a new claim against the homeowner for contribution or unjust enrichment even though THAT claim is not secured. Thus, it is asserted, the payments were made on behalf of the homeowner in exchange for a claim to recoup the amounts advanced. Hence the conclusion that since the payments were made, the homeowner may deduct the Servicer advances from his income before paying taxes.

Second is the company or person that bought multiple properties and created a business out of them. The same logic applies. They didn’t make payments to the Servicer but the payments of interest were obviously received by the trust beneficiaries like the scenario above. And like the homeowner they are subject to a claim to recoup the money advanced on their behalf producing a new debt, like the above, that is unsecured. That being the case, they ought to be able to deduct the Servicer advances as business expense deductions from the business (rental) income.

If the entities in the alleged securitization chain or cloud oppose this and want the deduction themselves, then they must pick up the other end of the stick — I.e, that the payments they made as Servicer advances are not collectible from the borrower. Hence all such payments would reduce the original debt due the creditor and would not create a new debt due to the party who funded the Servicer advances. That party might be the Servicer as the name implies or it might be actually paid by the broker dealer who sold the mortgage bonds. Either way the creditor would appear to have received the interest income it was expecting under its deal, as presented by the broker dealer. Hence the trust beneficiary would be getting a statement from SOMEBODY stating that they had received the income for tax reporting purposes.

An interesting litigation question is whether the creditors did receive such statements from one of the securitization parties, and whether it can be discovered which party sent the statement and what EIN they used. An interesting tax and discovery question is whether one of the securitization parties took the deduction after paying the creditor and must now have that deduction disallowed — especially if the Servicer advances were taken out of a pool of money supplied by the creditor, which is most probably the case. It seems unlikely that the Servicer would actually be making such advances in such large volumes (where would they get the money?) and it seems equally unlikely that any other party would be digging into their own pockets to make a payment for which they get a dubious claim against a defaulting homeowner.

Perhaps the most interesting point here is that if the party who actually paid the “servicer advances” contests, they are admitting that the creditor received the payments and if they don’t contest it, they might still be admitting to the receipt of payments by the creditor during the pendency of the foreclosure action. The failure to disclose this in the accounting rendered to the court could be argued as fraud and grounds to overturn the foreclosure action, giving rise to an action for damages for wrongful foreclosure. The argument would be along the lines of no default and the ultimate defense of payment.

The Mystery of Servicer Non Stop Advances

Since I entered the fray as the actual attorney for clients, we are getting down to the nitty gritty. Judges are surprised to learn that the foreclosure case in front of them was filed despite the payments actually received by the alleged creditor through third parties. In other words the case in front of them does not actually present a default from the creditor’s point of view even tough the borrower stopped paying.

The primary payment we are focusing on today is servicer advances which come in different flavors — non-stop, limited and none. Most loans (96%) are subject to claims of securitization regardless of what the current servicer or trustee is telling you. And most of those (my guess is around 75%-90%) come with third party obligors, which is why there is so much confusion. Besides servicer advances, the agents for the trust beneficiaries at the investment bank who sold them the bonds received on behalf of the bond holders, insurance payments and other funds from other contracts designed to limit the risk associated with the terms of the bond repayment of interest and principal.

When you do the math, you can easily see how the “lender” could be overpaid by a multiple that averages 3-5 times, even while the borrower is being pursued for yet another payment or else losing a home. The dirty little secret, the mystery behind these payments is that under common law and statutory law there are potential causes of action against the borrower for such payments, but the actual creditor on the loan has been fully satisfied.

Worse yet, those third parties have waived subrogation or any right of action against the borrower to prevent multiple parties from suing the same defendant on the same debt. The insurers are mad as hell. But the servicers are curiously silent — possibly because they are not really paying the servicer advances which are instead coming from the pool of funds held by the investment banker from the original investment of the trust beneficiaries and the receipt of insurance, credit default swaps, guarantors and even sales to the Federal Reserve.

The lender (Trust beneficiaries) have agreed to lend money on the basis of interest only payments at a particular rate that rarely coincides with any of the loans alleged to be in the pool. Since they were sold the bonds first before the loan was made (see “selling forward”), you can assume fairly safely that the actual lender is the trust or trust beneficiaries, regardless of what was put on the loan documents — which is why I say that none of the loan documents are valid enforceable documents and why the investors have sued the real culprits (investment banks) stating the exact same thing.

In one case I have currently pending in Dade County, Florida, US Bank is putting itself through a ringer because servicer advances have been paid in full to the creditor that they acknowledge is the creditor. The Judge instantly recognized that this defeats the allegation of default, if the creditor has received and accepted payment. The attorney for US Bank allegedly as trustee for the trust beneficiaries is pursuing a strategy of getting the assignment of rents enforced. The statutory requirement is that there be a written demand for rents, which nobody ever made. And it turns out that the Trustee was unwilling to go on record demanding assignment of rents because the beneficiaries were paid in full exactly as set forth in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement. A call to the servicer confirmed they were not interested in the rents, but curiously, despite PSA restrictions to the contrary, the new “Trustee” US BANK is pursuing the foreclosure.

The Judge, who wants more proof of the advances which we are only too happy to provide, instantly recognized that if the trust beneficiaries were receiving their expected payment, then there can be no default on the principal, which is prerequisite to BOTH foreclosure and the assignment of rents. In this case there were 52 payments received and accepted by the trust beneficiaries after the alleged borrower default. We were able to get this information through drilling down to loan level accounting in our title and securitization reports. If there is money owed it is not owed to the plaintiff in foreclosure and it is not secured by a mortgage. see www.livingliesstore.com

We have since done the reports on other properties owned by the same client and found out that the same pattern holds true. In the one case we have already argued, more than $70,000 has been received by the trust beneficiaries from servicer non stop advances. Payment is the ultimate defense for an action to recover money. The fun part comes when the Judge starts asking why these payments were not disclosed by the attorney or his client.

There are other sources of third party payments from co-obligors at the inception of the loan. The mystery comes from the fact that the homeowner who signs loan papers has no idea, because it was never disclosed to him/her/them that the lender is not the payee on the note, not the mortgagee on the mortgage, not the beneficiary on the trust deed, but rather the trust beneficiaries who own bonds issued from the REMIC trust (which as I have already reported was never actually funded and never actually received title to the loan).

In other words, the lender has agreed to one set of terms that were never disclosed to the borrower in violation of the truth in lending act, and the borrower has agreed to an entirely different deal — which means that there is no “meeting of the minds.” Both the lender and borrower wanted a completed contract that would be enforceable and where title was clear, but neither of them got it. The solution is to get rid of the servicer and get rid of the investment banker, get an accounting of all funds, repay the investors and work out a reasonable deal with borrowers, most of whom would be willing to sign a mortgage that was enforceable based upon economic reality.

Why Do Subservicers Continue to Pay Investors After Borrower Stops Paying?

It is now common knowledge that subservicers are continuing to pay investors and reporting the loan as “performing” after they have sent a default and right to reinstate notice as required by the mortgage (usually paragraph 22) and by the uniform debt collection laws. The first problem about this is that the actual creditor does not show a default whereas the bookkeeper Servicer is declaring the default. With the investor receiving his regular payments, how can a default exist? This appears to apply to securitized student loans as well.

Bottom line is that the subservicer is reporting to the borrower that the loan is in default but reporting to the investor (the creditor) that it isn’t in default. These payments have gone on for as long as 18 months that I have seen. Which brings us back to the first articles ever written on this blog.

The borrower is only required to make payments that are DUE. The payment isn’t due if it is already been made and there is nothing to reinstate if the creditor has already received his expected payment. The payments are NOT DUE TO THE SERVICER. They are due to the creditor. If the creditor received the payment on that loan as shown in the distribution report to the creditor, then the conditions necessary to declare that the loan is in default are not present. Remember that the presence of a table funded loan, an aggregator, the securitization, the trust was withheld from the borrower. The banks could have covered themselves by adding to the mortgage and note that third party payments to the creditor will not reduce the payments, principal or interest. But if they had done that, they would have required to answer so e uncomfortable questions.

The second issue is the constant question “Why would they continue making payments to the ‘creditor’ when they are not receiving payments from the borrower?” And “Where are they getting the money to pay the creditor?”

After talking with sources from deep inside the industry the answer to why they are paying is primarily to sell more bonds and hide the default issues. The secondary reason is to make the investor complacent about the accounting for what was really received on account of the loans and from whom. That inquiry could lead to a demand from the investor for payment in full and if the REMIC doesn’t pay, then the investors sue the investment banker who was the one playing with OPM (other people’s money).

The answer to the second question is that the money comes from the investment banker. Whether the investment banker is merely using the investor’s money (allowed under prospectus) or using insurance proceeds or payments on CDS (credit default swaps) or even sale proceeds to the Federal Reserve varies. Either way it is an effort to keep money that should go to the investor and reduce the amount payable to the investor and which would reduce or eliminate the debt owed by the homeowner to the investor. It is fraud, theft and probably a bunch of other things.

Fannie and Freddie Ignore Homeowners in Detroit

LAW FIRM OFFERS CONTINGENCY ON SOME CASES
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our South Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. In Northern Florida and the Panhandle call 850-765-1236. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.

SEE ALSO: http://WWW.LIVINGLIES-STORE.COM

The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

————————————-

In the upside down world of the foreclosure of mortgages that are neither in default nor owned by the parties initiating foreclosure, and where applications for modification are submitted that clearly exceed federal standards for approval (and are denied)  and should come as no surprise that the government sponsored entities, Fannie and Freddie, canceled their appearance at a Metro Detroit foreclosure hearing which they had scheduled.

These are essentially federal agencies. Their first duty is to serve the country and its citizens. But they canceled their appearance because of pending litigation against them. Here was an opportunity for them to understand the impact of foreclosure on families, businesses, investors and the government. Here was an opportunity for them to utilize information provided to them by people on the ground to fashion remedies that are appropriate and legal.

This is all part of state and federal government policy to sweep the mortgage tragedies under the rug. Despite the fact that we know that most of the foreclosures that have already been deemed completed were in fact illegal, we have had millions of “auction sales” in which strangers to the transaction were awarded title to the house without ever having made a single payment of any amount of money to originate or acquire the loan that was allegedly in default but which was fatally defective and certainly not in default  despite the illusions created by Wall Street banks.

I am leading the charge on this one. It is my intention to file suit against the Wall Street banks who have accepted monthly payments, short sale payments, and full payments on loans that were subject to claims of securitization. In fact, my law firm is offering to represent homeowners who lost or sold their homes on a contingency fee, as long as only economic damages are sought. It is my goal to show payments to the sub servicer or anyone else in the false securitization chain should never have been made and were never due. It is my opinion that these payments are owed back to the homeowner in all events, together with interest, costs of the court action, and attorney fees where those are provided by statute or contract.  Each case will be evaluated as to viability utilizing this strategy.

If Bank of America or any other bank responds to an estoppel letter for payoff or short sale without knowing or showing that they have paid for the origination or acquisition of the loan, then they have no business providing the estoppel information or approving or denying a request for a short sale. Their acceptance of the money at closing and their execution of a satisfaction of mortgage or release and reconveyance is a sham. In the absence of any other creditor demanding payment and showing that they are in fact a true creditor (having paid actual money for the origination or acquisition of the loan), proceeds of all such closings should, in my opinion, go to the homeowner. If the bank got the money, it is my opinion that the bank should be sued for recovery of the entire proceeds of the closing.

Each of those closings described above represents a gift to the banks and a horror show for the homeowner and many attorneys for homeowners. The spin machine for the banks has created the illusion that homeowners are seeking a free home when in fact it is the banks that are seeking and getting free money and free homes. In auction sales where the banks are submitting a credit bid, they do not qualify as a creditor who can submit a credit bid. But the credit bid is accepted anyway and the bank gets the house for free despite the fact that the bank has no status as a creditor or even the authorized representative of a creditor.

Fannie and Freddie are colluding with the banks and the federal reserve  to maintain the illusion that the notes and mortgages are in proper form, were properly executed, and contain true representations concerning the real parties in interest. Many theories have been advanced as to why the Federal Reserve and other agencies are colluding with the banks. I think the reason is because many layers of policies are based upon the false assumption that the origination of the loans complied with existing laws, rules and regulations. The federal reserve and other federal agencies would look pretty stupid if they had paid or advanced trillions of dollars for worthless notes and mortgages and worthless mortgage bonds.

It is highly probable that the reason why the real lenders (investors) have not pursued loss mitigation with homeowners directly is that they know the note and mortgage is unenforceable and they have said so in their lawsuits against the investment banks that sold them the bogus mortgage bonds. What they don’t fully appreciate is the fact that most homeowners would willingly give them a valid mortgage and note based upon the reality of the current market. But the intermediaries (servicers) are doing everything possible to prevent modification or successful mediation of claims; which of course results from those intermediaries falsely claiming to be owners of loans that were funded by investors and falsely claiming losses on those loans that were paid by insurance and credit defaults swaps. Those intermediaries are the leading Wall Street banks in this mortgage mess. As long as we include them in the process of resolving the mortgage meltdown, the problems will be compounded rather than cured.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/18/detroit-foreclosure-hearing-fannie-mae-freddie-mac_n_3293854.html

Fed Pours Huge Sums Into Foreign Bank Coffers
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/05/fed-pours-huge-sums-into-foreign-bank-coffers/

Nearly half of all US homeowners with a mortgage still ‘underwater’ in Q1
http://www.inman.com/2013/05/22/nearly-half-of-all-us-homeowners-with-a-mortgage-still-underwater-in-q1/

Foreclosure Victims Protesting Wall Street Impunity Outside DOJ Arrested, Tasered
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/16527-victims-of-foreclosure-arrested-tasered-protesting-wall-street-impunity-outside-doj

Foreclosure Fraud Failures Come To A Head In Justice Dept. Protest
http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2013/05/foreclosure-fraud-failures-come-to-a-head-in-justice-dept-protest.html

Bank of America Zombie Foreclosure Protest (VIDEO)
http://4closurefraud.org/2013/05/22/bank-of-america-zombie-foreclosure-protest-video/

This is what it looks like when foreclosure fighters demand Wall Street criminals be prosecuted
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvwaFJdr13Q

Chasing The Shadow Of Money
http://zerohedge.blogspot.ca/2009/05/chasing-shadow-of-money.html

OCC: 13 Questions to Answer Before Foreclosure and Eviction

13 Questions Before You Can Foreclose

foreclosure_standards_42013 — this one works for sure

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our South Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. In Northern Florida and the Panhandle call 850-765-1236. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.

SEE ALSO: http://WWW.LIVINGLIES-STORE.COM

The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Note: Some banks are slowing foreclosures and evictions. The reason is that the OCC issued a directive or letter of guidance that lays out in brief simplistic language what a party must do before they can foreclose. There can be little doubt that none of the banks are in compliance with this directive although Bank of America is clearly taking the position that they are in compliance or that it doesn’t matter whether they are in compliance or not.

In April the OCC, responding to pressure from virtually everyone, issued a guidance letter to financial institutions who are part of the foreclosure process. While not a rule a regulation, it is an interpretation of the Agency’s own rules and regulation and therefore, in my opinion, is both persuasive and authoritative.

These 13 questions published by OCC should be used defensively if you suspect violation and they are rightfully the subject of discovery. Use the wording from the letter rather than your own — since the attorneys for the banks will pounce on any nuance that appears to be different than this guidance issued to the banks.

The first question relates to whether there is a real default and what steps the foreclosing party has taken to assure itself and the court that the default is real. Remember that the fact that the borrower stopped paying is not a default if no payment was due. And there is no default if it is cured by payment from ANYONE after the declaration of default. Thus when the subservicer continues making payments to the “Creditor” the borrower’s default is cured although a new liability could arise (unsecured) as a result of the sub servicer making those payments without receiving payment from the borrower.

The point here is the money. Either there is a balance or there is not. Either the balance is as stated by the forecloser or it is not. Either there is money due from the borrower to the servicer and the real creditor or there is not. This takes an accounting that goes much further than merely a printout of the borrower’s payment history.

It takes an in depth accounting to determine where the money came from continue the payments when the borrower was not making payments. It takes an in depth accounting to determine if the creditor still exists or whether there is an successor. And it takes an in depth accounting to determine how much money was received from insurance and credit default swaps that should have been applied properly thus reducing both the loan receivable and loan payable.

This means getting all the information from the “trustee” of the REMIC, copies of the trust account and distribution reports, copies of canceled checks and wire transfer receipts to determine payment, risk of loss and the reality of whether there was a loss.

It also means getting the same information from the investment banker who did the underwriting of the bogus mortgage bonds, the Master Servicer, and anyone else in the securitization chain that might have disbursed or received funds in connection with the subject loan or the asset pool claiming an interest in the subject loan, or the owners of mortgage bonds issued by that asset pool.

If the OCC wants it then you should want it for your clients. Get the answers and don’t assume that because the borrower stopped making payments that any default occurred or that it wasn’t cured. Then go on to the other questions with the same careful analysis.

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-17/wells-fargo-postpones-some-foreclosure-sales-after-occ-guidance

/http://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/foreclosure-prevention/correcting-foreclosure-practices.html

Hawaii Federal District Court Applies Rules of Evidence: BONY/Mellon, US Bank, JP Morgan Chase Failed to Prove Sale of Note

This quiet title claim against U.S. Bank and BONY (collectively, “Defendants”) is based on the assertion that Defendants have no interest in the Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan, yet have nonetheless sought to foreclose on the subject property.

Currently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ quiet title claim fails because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs’ loan was sold into a public security managed by BONY, and Plaintiffs cannot tender the loan proceeds. Based on the following, the court finds that because Defendants have not established that the mortgage loans were sold into a public security involving Defendants, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Editor’s Note: We will be commenting on this case for the rest of the week in addition to bringing you other news. Suffice it to say that the Court corroborates the essential premises of this blog, to wit:

  1. Quiet title claims should not be dismissed. They should be heard and decided based upon the facts admitted into evidence.
  2. Presumptions are not to be used in lieu of evidence where the opposing party has denied the underlying facts and the conclusion expressed in the presumption. In other words, a presumption cannot be used to lead to a result that is contrary to the facts.
  3. Being a “holder” is a a conclusion of law created by certain presumptions. It is not a plain statement of ultimate facts. If a party wishes to assert holder or holder in due course status they must plead and prove the facts supporting that legal conclusion.
  4. A sale of the note does not occur without proof under simple contract doctrine. There must be an offer, acceptance and consideration. Without the consideration there is no sale and any presumption arising out of the allegation that a party is a holder or that the loan was sold fails on its face.
  5. Self serving letters announcing authority to represent investors are insufficient in establishing a foundation for testimony or other proof that the actor was indeed authorized. A competent witness must provide the factual testimony to provide a foundation for introduction of a binding legal document showing authority and even then the opposing party may challenge the execution or creation of such instruments.
  6. [Tactical conclusion: opposing motion for summary judgment should be filed with an affidavit alleging the necessary facts when the pretender lender files its motion for summary judgment. If the pretender’s affidavit is struck down and/or their motion for summary judgment is denied, they have probably created a procedural void where the Judge has no choice but to grant summary judgment to homeowner.]
  7. “When considering the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences on behalf of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.” See case below
  8. “a plaintiff asserting a quiet title claim must establish his superior title by showing the strength of his title as opposed to merely attacking the title of the defendant.” {Tactical: by admitting the note, mortgage. debt and default, and then attacking the title chain of the foreclosing party you have NOT established the elements for quiet title. THAT is why we have been pounding on the strategy that makes sense: DENY and DISCOVER: Lawyers take note. Just because you think you know what is going on doesn’t mean you do. Advice given under the presumption that the debt is genuine when that is in fact a mistake of the homeowner which you are compounding with your advice. Why assume the debt, note , mortgage and default are genuine when you really don’t know? Why would you admit that?}
  9. It is both wise and necessary to deny the debt, note, mortgage, and default as to the party attempting to foreclose. Don’t try to prove your case in your pleading. Each additional “explanatory” allegation paints you into a corner. Pleading requires a short plain statement of ultimate facts upon which relief could be legally granted.
  10. A denial of signature on a document that is indisputably signed will be considered frivolous. [However an allegation that the document is not an original and/or that the signature was procured by fraud or mistake is not frivolous. Coupled with allegation that the named lender did not loan the money at all and that in fact the homeowner never received any money from the lender named on the note, you establish that the deal was sign the note and we’ll give you money. You signed the note, but they didn’t give you the money. Therefore those documents may not be used against you. ]

MELVIN KEAKAKU AMINA and DONNA MAE AMINA, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs,
v.
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK; U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR J.P. MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST 2006-WMC2, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-WMC2 Defendants.
Civil No. 11-00714 JMS/BMK.

United States District Court, D. Hawaii.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK AND U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR J.P. MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST 2006-WMC2, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-WMC2’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION

This is Plaintiffs Melvin Keakaku Amina and Donna Mae Amina’s (“Plaintiffs”) second action filed in this court concerning a mortgage transaction and alleged subsequent threatened foreclosure of real property located at 2304 Metcalf Street #2, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 (the “subject property”). Late in Plaintiffs’ first action, Amina et al. v. WMC Mortgage Corp. et al., Civ. No. 10-00165 JMS-KSC (“Plaintiffs’ First Action”), Plaintiffs sought to substitute The Bank of New York Mellon, FKA the Bank of New York (“BONY”) on the basis that one of the defendants’ counsel asserted that BONY owned the mortgage loans. After the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to substitute, Plaintiffs brought this action alleging a single claim to quiet title against BONY. Plaintiffs have since filed a Verified Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), adding as a Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WMC2, Asset Backed Pass-through Certificates, Series 2006-WMC2 (“U.S. Bank”). This quiet title claim against U.S. Bank and BONY (collectively, “Defendants”) is based on the assertion that Defendants have no interest in the Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan, yet have nonetheless sought to foreclose on the subject property.

Currently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ quiet title claim fails because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs’ loan was sold into a public security managed by BONY, and Plaintiffs cannot tender the loan proceeds. Based on the following, the court finds that because Defendants have not established that the mortgage loans were sold into a public security involving Defendants, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs own the subject property. See Doc. No. 60, SAC ¶ 17. On February 24, 2006, Plaintiffs obtained two mortgage loans from WMC Mortgage Corp. (“WMC”) — one for $880,000, and another for $220,000, both secured by the subject property.See Doc. Nos. 68-6-68-8, Defs.’ Exs. E-G.[1]

In Plaintiffs’ First Action, it was undisputed that WMC no longer held the mortgage loans. Defendants assert that the mortgage loans were sold into a public security managed by BONY, and that Chase is the servicer of the loan and is authorized by the security to handle any concerns on BONY’s behalf. See Doc. No. 68, Defs.’ Concise Statement of Facts (“CSF”) ¶ 7. Defendants further assert that the Pooling and Service Agreement (“PSA”) dated June 1, 2006 (of which Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan is allegedly a part) grants Chase the authority to institute foreclosure proceedings. Id. ¶ 8.

In a February 3, 2010 letter, Chase informed Plaintiffs that they are in default on their mortgage and that failure to cure default will result in Chase commencing foreclosure proceedings. Doc. No. 68-13, Defs.’ Ex. L. Plaintiffs also received a March 2, 2011 letter from Chase stating that the mortgage loan “was sold to a public security managed by [BONY] and may include a number of investors. As the servicer of your loan, Chase is authorized by the security to handle any related concerns on their behalf.” Doc. No. 68-11, Defs.’ Ex. J.

On October 19, 2012, Derek Wong of RCO Hawaii, L.L.L.C., attorney for U.S. Bank, submitted a proof of claim in case number 12-00079 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Hawaii, involving Melvin Amina. Doc. No. 68-14, Defs.’ Ex. M.

Plaintiffs stopped making payments on the mortgage loans in late 2008 or 2009, have not paid off the loans, and cannot tender all of the amounts due under the mortgage loans. See Doc. No. 68-5, Defs.’ Ex. D at 48, 49, 55-60; Doc. No. 68-6, Defs.’ Ex. E at 29-32.

>B. Procedural Background
>Plaintiffs filed this action against BONY on November 28, 2011, filed their First Amended Complaint on June 5, 2012, and filed their SAC adding U.S. Bank as a Defendant on October 19, 2012.

On December 13, 2012, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition on February 28, 2013, and Defendants filed a Reply on March 4, 2013. A hearing was held on March 4, 2013.
At the March 4, 2013 hearing, the court raised the fact that Defendants failed to present any evidence establishing ownership of the mortgage loan. Upon Defendants’ request, the court granted Defendants additional time to file a supplemental brief.[2] On April 1, 2013, Defendants filed their supplemental brief, stating that they were unable to gather evidence establishing ownership of the mortgage loan within the time allotted. Doc. No. 93.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden initially lies with the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts [and] come forwards with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citation and internal quotation signals omitted).

An issue is `genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is `material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” In re Barboza,545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When considering the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences on behalf of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.

IV. DISCUSSION

As the court previously explained in its August 9, 2012 Order Denying BONY’s Motion to Dismiss Verified Amended Complaint, see Amina v. Bank of New York Mellon,2012 WL 3283513 (D. Haw. Aug. 9, 2012), a plaintiff asserting a quiet title claim must establish his superior title by showing the strength of his title as opposed to merely attacking the title of the defendant. This axiom applies in the numerous cases in which this court has dismissed quiet title claims that are based on allegations that a mortgagee cannot foreclose where it has not established that it holds the note, or because securitization of the mortgage loan was defective. In such cases, this court has held that to maintain a quiet title claim against a mortgagee, a borrower must establish his superior title by alleging an ability to tender the loan proceeds.[3]

This action differs from these other quiet title actions brought by mortgagors seeking to stave off foreclosure by the mortgagee. As alleged in Plaintiffs’ pleadings, this is not a case where Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ mortgagee status is invalid (for example, because the mortgage loan was securitized, Defendants do not hold the note, or MERS lacked authority to assign the mortgage loans). See id. at *5. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are not mortgagees whatsoever and that there is no record evidence of any assignment of the mortgage loan to Defendants.[4] See Doc. No. 58, SAC ¶¶ 1-4, 6, 13-1 — 13-3.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan was sold into a public security which is managed by BONY and which U.S. Bank is the trustee. To establish this fact, Defendants cite to the March 2, 2011 letter from Chase to Plaintiffs asserting that “[y]our loan was sold to a public security managed by The Bank of New York and may include a number of investors. As the servicer of your loan, Chase is authorized to handle any related concerns on their behalf.” See Doc. No. 68-11, Defs.’ Ex. J. Defendants also present the PSA naming U.S. Bank as trustee. See Doc. No. 68-12, Defs.’ Ex. J. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the letter does not establish that Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan was sold into a public security, much less a public security managed by BONY and for which U.S. Bank is the trustee. Nor does the PSA establish that it governs Plaintiffs’ mortgage loans. As a result, Defendants have failed to carry their initial burden on summary judgment of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants may foreclose on the subject property. Indeed, Defendants admit as much in their Supplemental Brief — they concede that they were unable to present evidence that Defendants have an interest in the mortgage loans by the supplemental briefing deadline. See Doc. No. 93.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claim fails as to BONY because BONY never claimed an interest in the subject property on its own behalf. Rather, the March 2, 2011 letter provides that BONY is only managing the security. See Doc. No. 67-1, Defs.’ Mot. at 21. At this time, the court rejects this argument — the March 2, 2011 letter does not identify who owns the public security into which the mortgage loan was allegedly sold, and BONY is the only entity identified as responsible for the public security. As a result, Plaintiffs’ quiet title claim against BONY is not unsubstantiated.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] In their Opposition, Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ exhibits on the basis that the sponsoring declarant lacks and/or fails to establish the basis of personal knowledge of the exhibits. See Doc. No. 80, Pls.’ Opp’n at 3-4. Because Defendants have failed to carry their burden on summary judgment regardless of the admissibility of their exhibits, the court need not resolve these objections.

Plaintiffs also apparently dispute whether they signed the mortgage loans. See Doc. No. 80, Pls.’ Opp’n at 7-8. This objection appears to be wholly frivolous — Plaintiffs have previously admitted that they took out the mortgage loans. The court need not, however, engage Plaintiffs’ new assertions to determine the Motion for Summary Judgment.

[2] On March 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an “Objection to [87] Order Allowing Defendants to File Supplemental Brief for their Motion for Summary Judgment.” Doc. No. 90. In light of Defendants’ Supplemental Brief stating that they were unable to provide evidence at this time and this Order, the court DEEMS MOOT this Objection.

[3] See, e.g., Fed Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Kamakau, 2012 WL 622169, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2012);Lindsey v. Meridias Cap., Inc., 2012 WL 488282, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 14, 2012)Menashe v. Bank of N.Y., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 397437, at *19 (D. Haw. Feb. 6, 2012)Teaupa v. U.S. Nat’l Bank N.A., 836 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1103 (D. Haw. 2011)Abubo v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2011 WL 6011787, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov. 30, 2011)Long v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 2011 WL 5079586, at *11 (D. Haw. Oct. 24, 2011).

[4] Although the SAC also includes some allegations asserting that the mortgage loan could not be part of the PSA given its closing date, Doc. No. 60, SAC ¶ 13-4, and that MERS could not legally assign the mortgage loans, id. ¶ 13-9, the overall thrust of Plaintiffs’ claims appears to be that Defendants are not the mortgagees (as opposed to that Defendants’ mortgagee status is defective). Indeed, Plaintiffs agreed with the court’s characterization of their claim that they are asserting that Defendants “have no more interest in this mortgage than some guy off the street does.” See Doc. No. 88, Tr. at 9-10. Because Defendants fail to establish a basis for their right to foreclose, the court does not address the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims if and when Defendants establish mortgagee status.

Winning Cases Against the Mega Banks

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s  Comment: It is hard to interpret what people mean when they say they are winning cases. In the example below the case is oversimplified. Wells Fargo, as usual, wanted to foreclose on the home of an 80-year-old woman regardless of whether she was in default or not. Her main defense was simply that she was never in default. Wells Fargo took the position that the payments they accepted could be allocated towards expenses of the foreclosure, which never should’ve happened in the first place.

It was quite clear that the homeowner had made all of her payments. It was quite clear that Wells Fargo had not applied the payments properly. And after three years of litigation, during which most people would have folded, judgment was entered in favor of the borrower and against Wells Fargo.

No big surprise except for the persistence of the homeowner in fighting off a big bad bank despite dwindling resources and a gaggle of people who were treating her as a leper because she was a deadbeat who didn’t pay her bills and was trying to get out of a legitimate debt.

Of course as it turns out, she was neither a deadbeat nor was she trying to get out of the debt even though it probably is not a legitimate debt and Wells Fargo is most probably not a legitimate creditor in relation to this homeowner.

I am happy that this woman got what she wanted. But some questions that linger on include why Wells Fargo failed to do the proper accounting to bring her loan account up-to-date? Why did Wells Fargo want that foreclosure regardless of whether she was in default or not? And what other payments received from third parties in the form of insurance or credit default swaps were not applied to the appropriate receivable account on the books of the real creditor?

My opinion is that in all probability there is still plenty of meat left on the bone. This homeowner  probably has several causes of action for slander of title, breach of contract, probably fraud, and abuse of process,  just to name a few.

And another thought comes to mind: would the result  or the timing have been different if the roles were  reversed? This particular case is so obvious as to whether or not money was actually paid and received that it is difficult to comprehend how it could possibly have stretched out to three years.

The only way I can think of is that the judge had a preconception of the relationship of the parties and assumed that the debt was real and was in default instead of forcing Wells Fargo to immediately prove lack of payment and their status as the real creditor. For those who complain that the courts are jammed up with foreclosure lawsuits, this case is instructive as to why that is happening.

If judges would simply take each case on its own merits and require each party to actually prove their position rather than rely on dubious and rebuttable presumptions, most of the foreclosures wouldn’t be filed and those that ended up in litigation would be over in just a few months.

 The bottleneck in the court systems across the country is not caused by volume. It is caused by bias. Judges assume that a big-name bank with 150 year old reputation on the line would never make a claim they couldn’t back up. If judges would stop making that assumption and require the backup at the beginning of the litigation the bottleneck would vanish.

Oregon Woman Wins 3-Year Fight Against Wells Fargo Foreclosure
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2013/04/oregon-woman-wins-3-year-fight-against-wells-fargo-foreclosure/

 

%d bloggers like this: