Short Explanation of TILA RESCISSION vs Common Law Rescission

Quiet title is a lawsuit not a motion. It must be worded correctly to fulfill the elements required for the court to consider the demand for quiet title. Otherwise it will be dismissed.

For quiet title to apply the mortgage must be void not just unenforceable. TILA Rescission is a statutory remedy that is different from common law rescission. Sending of TILA rescission notice by U.S. Mail means that delivery is presumed. If delivery occurred or is presumed the TILA Rescission is effective. Just the opposite in common law rescission based upon fraud. At common law, sending a notice of rescission based upon fraud is only the first step in a long litigation process.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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One must be careful NOT to file a lawsuit or motion seeking to have the court declare it is effective. Either the notice was delivered or it wasn’t delivered. If U.S. Mail is used d delivery is presumed. If it was delivered it is effective. That is what the statute says and that it was SCOTUS said about the statute. The matter should be closed, but judges are resisting following the directive of the highest court in the land from which there is no appeal. (See Jesinoski v Countrywide).

If the notice of rescission is sent within three years of apparent consummation then there is no doubt that it is effective. If it is sent more than 3 years after the note and mortgage were executed then there is a split of opinion. I believe it is still effective until the rescission is vacated by a court order. In either case — before and after the three years — courts are reluctant to apply it.

The appropriate lawsuit could be framed in allegations that the defendants should be stopped from attempting to enforce the void loan documents or stopped from harassing the borrower using the void note and void mortgage. Both are rendered void by virtue of the notice of rescission.

If the lawsuit is filed within 1 year of the date of the notice of rescission it could also include allegations that the defendants (if they are lenders) failed to comply with the three statutory duties in the TILA rescission statute. Or, if they are not lenders nor representatives of the lender that they committed multiple violations of TILA, RESPA and FDCPA as well as fraud and negligence and of course uttering false instruments and recording instruments that are false or fraudulent.

TILA RESCISSION is an statutory event not a claim. No lawsuit is proper to declare an already legally effective instrument to be effective. It happened on the day of mailing. Best to use U.S. Postal Service for the notice.

Common law rescission is a claim not an event. In that sense they are procedural the opposite of one another. A lawsuit is required and the pleader must prove the allegations which ordinarily means that they must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

We can help evaluate your options!
Get a LendingLies Consult and a LendingLies Chain of Title Analysis! 202-838-6345 or info@lendinglies.com.
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave a message or make payments.
OR fill out our registration form FREE and we will contact you!
https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1502204714426
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Banks Traded on Inside Information on Mortgages

Despite the pronouncements by Eric Holder, the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, and the obvious reticence of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the vast majority of securities attorneys believe that the banks were (a) trading on inside information and (b) committing securities fraud when they funded and then traded on mortgages that were too toxic to ever succeed.

The first, trading on inside information, is regularly prosecuted by the justice department and the SEC. It is why Martha Stewart went to jail in rather flimsy evidence. The catch, justice and the SEC say is that this only applies to securities and the 1998 act signed into law by Clinton makes mortgage bonds and hedges on mortgage bonds NOT securities. It also makes the insurance paid on the mortgage bonds NOT insurance. This is despite the fact that the instruments meet every definition of securities and both the insurance contracts and credit default swaps appear to meet every definition of insurance. But the law passed by Congress in 1998 says otherwise, so how can we prosecute?

The second, securities fraud meets the same obstacle they say because they can’t accuse anyone of committing fraud in the issuance or trading of securities when the law says there were no securities.

So goes the spin coming from Wall Street and as long as law enforcement in each state and the DOJ keeps listening to Wall Street and their lawyers, they will keep arriving at the same mistaken conclusion.

If Wall Street had in fact followed the plan of securitization set forth in their prospectuses and pooling and servicing agreements, assignment and assumption agreements and various other instruments that were created to build the infrastructure of securitization of debt — including but not limited to mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, student loans etc. — then Wall Street would be right and the justice department and the SEC might be stuck in the mud created by the 1998 law. But that isn’t what happened and therefore the premise behind the apparent immunity of Wall Street Banks and bankers is actually an illusion.

Starting with the issuance of the mortgage bonds, most of them were issued before any mortgage was originated or acquired by anyone. In fact, the list attached to the prospectus for the mortgage bonds said so — stating that the spreadsheet or list attached was by example only, that these mortgages do not exist but would be soon be replaced with real mortgages acquired pursuant to the enabling documents for the creation of the REMIC “trust.” But that is not what happened either.

In no way did the Banks follow the terms of the prospectus, PSA, assignment and assumption agreements or anything else. Instead what they really did was create the illusion of a securitization scheme that covered up the reality of a PONZI scheme, the hallmark of which is that it collapses when investors stop buying the bogus securities and more investors want their money out than those wishing to put money into the scheme. There was no reason for the entire system to collapse other than the fact that Wall Street planned and bet on the collapse, thus making money coming and going and draining the lifeblood of capital worldwide out of economies and marketplaces that depended upon the continued flow of capital.

The creation of the REMIC “trust” was a sham. It was never formalized, never funded and never acquired any mortgages. hence any “exempt” securities issued by it were not the kind intended by the Act signed into law in 1998. It was not a mortgage-backed security, or credit backed security, it was an illusion designed to defraud anyone who invested in them. The purpose of issuing the mortgage bonds was not to fund and acquire mortgages but rather to steal as much money out of the flow as possible while covering their tracks with some of the money ending up on the closing table for newly originated or previously originated bundles of mortgages that were to be acquired. That isn’t what happened either.

Wall Street bankers put the money from investors into their own private piggy bank and then funded and acquired mortgages with only part of the money while they made false “proprietary trades” in the “mortgage bonds” that made it look like they were trading geniuses making money hand over fist while the rest of the world saw their wealth decline by as much as 60%-70%. The funding for debt came not from the unfunded REMIC “trusts” but from the investment banker who was merely an intermediary depository institution which unlawfully was playing with investor money. The actual instruments upon which Wall Street relies to justify its actions is the prospectus, the PSA, and the Master Servicing agreement — each of which was used to sell the investors on letting go of their money in exchange for the promises and conditions contained in the exotic agreements containing numerous conflicting clauses.

Thus the conclusion is that since the mortgage bonds were issued by an unfunded and probably nonexistent entity, the investors had “bought” an interest in an incoherent series of agreements that together constituted a security or, in the alternative, that there was no security and the investors were simply duped into parting with their money which is fraud, pure and simple.

I would say that investors acquired certain passive rights to the instruments used, with the exception of the bogus mortgage bonds that were usually worthless pieces of paper or entries on a log. In my opinion the issuance of the prospectus was the issuance of a security. The issuance of the PSA was the issuance of a security, And the issuance of the other agreements in the illusory securitization chain may also have been the issuance of a security. If cows can be securities, then written instruments that were used to secure passive investments are certainly securities. The exemption for mortgage bonds doesn’t apply because neither the mortgage bond nor the REMIC “trust” were ever funded or used — except in furtherance of their fraud when they claimed losses due to mortgage defaults and obtained federal bailouts, insurance and proceeds of credit default swaps.

The loan closings, like the funding of the “investments” was similarly diverted away from the investor and toward the intermediaries so that they could trade on the appearance of ownership of the loans in the form of selling bundles of loans that were not even close to being properly described in the paperwork — although the paperwork often looked as though it was all proper.

The trading, hedging and insuring of investments that were not only destined by actually planned to fail was trading on inside information. The Banks knew very well that the triple A rating of the mortgage bonds was a sham because the mortgage bonds were worthless. What they were really trading in was the ownership of the loans which they knew were falsely represented on the note and mortgage. They thus converted the issuance of the promissory note signed by the borrower into a security under flase pretenses because the payee on the note and the secured party on the mortgage never completed the transaction, to wit: they never funded the loan and they made sure that the terms of repayment on the promissory note did not match up with the terms of repayment set forth in the prospectus, which was the real security.

Knowing from the start that they had the power (through the powers conferred on the Master Servicer) to pull the rug out from under the “investments” they traded with a vengeance hedging and selling as many times as they could based upon the same alleged loans that were in fact funded directly by and therefor owned by the investors directly (because the REMIC was ignored and so was the source of funding at the alleged loan closing).

Being the sole source of the real information on the legality, quality and quantity of these nonexistent investments in mortgage bonds, the Wall Street banks, their management, and their affiliates were committing both violation of the insider trading rule and the securities fraud rule ( as well as various other common law and statutory prohibitions and crimes relating to deceptive practices in the sale of securities). By definition and applying the facts rather than the spin, the Banks a have committed numerous crimes and the bankers should be held accountable. Let’s not forget that by this time in the S&L scandal more than 800 people were sent to jail despite various attempts to mitigate the severity of their trespass and trampling on the rights of investors and depositors.

Failure to prosecute, while the statute of limitations is running out, is taking the rule of law and turning it on its head. The Obama administration has an obligation to hold these people accountable not only because violations of law should be prosecuted but to provide some deterrence from a recurrence or even escalation of the illegal practices foisted upon institutions, taxpayers and consumers around the world. Ample evidence exists that the Banks, emboldened by the lack of prosecutions, have re-started their engines and are indeed in the process of doing it again.

Think about it, where would a company get the money to have a multimedia advertising campaign blanketing areas of the the Country when the return on investment, according to them is only 2.5%? Between marketing, advertising, processing, and administrative costs, pus a reserve for defaults, they are either running a going out of business strategy or there is something else at work.

And if the transactions were legitimate why do the numbers of foreclosures drop like stones in those states that require proof of payment, proof of loss, and proof of ownership? why have we not seen a single canceled check or wire transfer receipt that corroborates the spin from Wall Street? Where is the real money in this scheme?

James Surowiecki: Why Is Insider Trading on the Rise?
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/06/10/130610ta_talk_surowiecki

FROM OTHER MEDIA SOURCES —-

Foreclosure Victims Protesting Wall Street Impunity Outside DOJ Arrested, Tasered
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/16527-victims-of-foreclosure-arrested-tasered-protesting-wall-street-impunity-outside-doj

Watch out. The mortgage securities market is at it again.
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/23/news/economy/mortgage-backed-securities.pr.fortune/

Wall Street Lobbyists Literally Writing Bills In Congress
http://news.firedoglake.com/2013/05/27/wall-street-lobbyists-literally-writing-bills-in-congress/

Time to Put the Heat on the Fed and FDIC to Fix Lousy Governance at TBTF Banks
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/05/so-if-shareholders-wont-rein-in-jamie-dimon-time-to-put-the-heat-on-the-fed-and-fdic.html

West Sacramento homeowner uses new state law to stop foreclosure
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/05/23/5441875/west-sacramento-homeowner-uses.html

The Foreclosure Fraud Prevention Act: A.G. Schneiderman Commends Assembly for Passing Foreclosure Relief Bills
http://4closurefraud.org/2013/05/23/the-foreclosure-fraud-prevention-act-a-g-schneiderman-commends-assembly-for-passing-foreclosure-relief-bills/

Where did the California foreclosures go? Level of foreclosures sales dramatically down. Foreclosure legislation and bank processing. Subsidizing investor purchases via HAFA.
http://www.doctorhousingbubble.com/california-foreclosure-process-hafa-program-subsidize-investor-purchases/

Wasted wealth – The ongoing foreclosure crisis that never had to happen – The Hill’s Congress Blog
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/301415-wasted-wealth–the-ongoing-foreclosure-crisis-that-never-had-to-happen

Oregon Foreclosure Avoidance Program gets tuneup
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/05/oregon_foreclosure_avoidance_p.html

Appraisal Fraud and Facts: Essential to Securitization Scam

The REMICS are mirror images of the NINJA loans — no income, no assets, no job

the borrower did not realize that the false appraisal and other deficiencies in underwriting had shifted the risk of loss to the homeowner and the investors

Editor’s Notes: Our economy and the economic structure in other countries is stuck because of the false appraisal reports that supported funding of at least $13 trillion (U.S. only) of loans that were so complex that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan didn’t understand them nor his staff of more than 100 PhDs. They were intentionally opaque because complexity is the way you get the other side of the “deal” (the buyer) to accept your explanation of the transaction. It also is designed to avoid criminal penalties even when the scheme unravels. Getting a Judge or Jury to understand what really happened is a challenge that has been insurmountable in both civil and criminal cases and investigations.

As stated in the 2005 petition to Congress from 8,000 appraisers who did not want to “play ball” with the banks, the appraisers were faced with a choice: either they submit appraisal reports $20,000 higher than contract and earn more money for each appraisal and earn  more money through volume, OR they won’t work at all.

Developers, mortgage brokers, and the “originators” (sales organization that pretended to be the lender), sellers and homeowners needing cash in an economy where there wages and earnings were not keeping up with the cost of living —- all reacted with glee when this system went into action. As “prices” rose by leaps and bounds — fed by a flood of money and demands for more mortgages — everyone except the banks ended up crashing when the money stopped flowing. That is how we know that it was the money that made prices rise, rather than demand.

So most appraisers were both stuck and pleasantly enjoying incomes 4-10 times what they had previously received, and obediently submitted appraisal reports that were in fact unsupportable by industry standards or any other standards that a reasonable and rational lender would use — if they were lending their own money. By lending money from investors the risk of loss was entirely removed. The originators got paid regardless of whether the mortgage was paid, or went underwater or caused the homeowner to execute a strategic default.

By using the originators as surrogates at the closing, the appraisal report was accepted without the required due diligence and confirmation that would be present if you went to the old style community bank loan department. The fact is that there was NO UNDERWRITING involved as we knew it before the securitization scam. The “extra” interest charged to No DOC loans (usually 3/4%-1.5%) and the premium interest charged on NINJA (No income, no assets, no job) loans was sold to borrowers on the premise that the “lender” was taking a higher risk. But the truth is they didn’t do any due diligence or underwriting of the loans regardless of whether or not the borrower was submitting information that confirmed their income, assets and ability to pay.  Thus the premium for the “extra risk” was based upon a false premise (like all the other premises of the securitization PONZI scheme).

The normal way of judging the price of a loan (the interest rate) was the perceived risk composed of two elements: ability to repay the loan, and the value of the property if the loan is not repaid. The banks that foisted the securitization scam upon the world got rid of both: they did nothing to confirm the ability to repay because they didn’t care if the borrower could repay. And they intentionally hyped the “value” of the property far above any supportable level as is easily shown in the Case Schiller index.

This is where PRICE and VALUE became entirely different concepts. By confusing the homeowner and hoodwinking the investors with false appraisals, they were able to move more money into the PONZI Scheme, as long as investors were buying the bogus mortgage bonds issued by fictitious entities that had no assets, no income and no prospects of either one. The REMICS are a mirror image of NINJA loans.

The value of the property was not the same as the prices supported by the false appraisal reports. The prices were going up because of the sales efforts of the banks to get homeowners giddy over the the numbers, making them feel, for a few moments as though they were more wealthy than they were in reality. But median income was flat or declining, which means that the value was flat or declining.

Thus prices went up while values of the homes were going down not only because of the median income factor but because of the oversold crash that was coming. Thus the PONZI scheme left the homeowner with property that would most likely be valued at less than any value that was known during the time the homeowner owned the property, while the contract price and appraisal report “valued” the property at 2-4 times the actual value.

The outcome was obvious: when all was said and done, the banks would be holding all the money and property while the investors, taxpayers, and homeowners were all dispensable pawns whose losses came under the category of “tough luck.”

While this might seem complex, the proof of appraisal fraud is not nearly as difficult as the explanation of why the banks wanted false appraisals. In the civil actions for wrongful lending or wrongful foreclosure, the homeowner need only show that the lender intentionally deceived the borrower as to the value of the property.

And the lack of actual underwriting committees and confirmations is essentially the proof, but you would be wise to have an appraiser who can testify as an expert as to what standards apply in issuing an appraisal report, to whom the appraisal report is addressed (i.e., the “originator”). Then using the foundation for the standards apply it to the property at hand at the time the original appraisal report was issued. It might also help if you catch the “originator” getting a part of the appraisal fee (like Cornerstone Appraisals, owned by Quicken Loans).

The borrower testifies that they were relying upon the “lender” representation that the loan had been carefully reviewed, underwritten, confirmed and approved based upon market conditions, ability of the borrower to repay and the value of the property. After all it was the “lender” who was taking the risk.

Thus the borrower did not realize that the false appraisal and other deficiencies in underwriting had shifted the risk of loss to the homeowner and the investors whose money was used to fund the loan — albeit not in the way it was presented in the prospectus where the REMIC was the supposed vehicle for the funding of the loans or the purchase of the loans.

Everyone in the securitization PONZI Scheme got paid. When you look at it from the perspective described above then you probably arrive at the same conclusion I did — all that money that was made and paid and not disclosed to the borrower changes the dynamics of the deal and the undisclosed compensation and profits should be paid to the borrower who was the party with the real risk of loss.

And in fact, if you look at the Truth in Lending Act, THAT is exactly what it says — all undisclosed compensation (which is broadly defined by the Act) is refundable with treble damages. Why lawyers have not taken action on this highly lucrative and relatively easy case to prosecute is a mystery to me.

Because of the statute of limitations applied in TILA cases, the TILA cause of action might not survive, especially in today’s climate, although more and more  judges are starting to see just how badly the banks acted. I therefore recommend to attorneys to use alternative pleading and add counts under other federal statutes (RICO, etc) and state statutes of deceptive lending, and common law fraud. The action for common law fraud, is the easiest to prosecute as I see it.

The interesting aspect of this that will lead to early settlement is that the pleading is simple as to the elements of the cause of action and can easily survive a motion to dismiss, the facts are clearly going to be in dispute which makes survival on a motion for summary judgment a much higher probability, and in discovery you have a nuclear option: since your cause of action is for return or sharing of the unlawful booty that was paid, plus treble, punitive or exemplary damages, discovery into all the different parties who made money in the chain is far easier to argue than the usual defensive foreclosure case.

The other thing you have is the possibility of stating a cause of action to force the retention of the property, to protect the homeowner in the collection of damages rendered by the final verdict. A lis pendens might be appropriate, and the bond need not be much more than nominal because unless the bank or servicer has a BFP to buy the property, you can easily show that your client is already posting bond every month they pay the utilities and maintain the property.

The compensatory damages would be a measure of the difference between the actual value of the deal and the deal that was offered to the homeowner. In simple terms, it could be that the appraisal report was $250,000 higher than the actual value of the property. As a result, the damages include the $250,000 plus the interest paid on that $250,000 and where appropriate, the loss of the house in foreclosure, plus interest from the date of the fraud (i.e. the closing), attorney fees, and costs of the action.

This action might also have special applications in commercial property cases where the appraisals are known to have come in much higher than the owner or buyer had ever expected. In some cases the “appraisal” actually changed the terms of the contract on the assumption that the property was worth much more than the original offer.

Foreclosure Defense: Rescission Letter, Demand Letter

events-coming-up-for-garfield-continuum-and-garfield-handbooks

New comment on your post #214 “Glossary: Mortgage Meltdown and Foreclosure”

Comment: A question on TILA and Non-judicial Foreclosure for anyone who knows the answer; Does a rescission letter that is timely and certifiably mailed to all appropriate parties (lender, assignee, servicer, trustee) prevent/nullify a pending non-judicial foreclosure sale? Would appreciate any information that may help find that answer.

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Complicated answer: technically speaking the purchase money first mortgage is exempted from TILA rescission but is still available under little FTC and common law fraud. This exemption was carved out after exhaustive lobbying by lenders.

The actual answer to your question is MAYBE. It depends upon the auctioneer’s assessment, but if you let everyone know at the auction that they are buying into a lawsuit our experience shows that generally speaking nobody bids — not even the lender.

Now if you accompany your letetr with the TILA audit and an attorney’s demand letter, you are in a stronger position.

The TILA/Mortgage audit is the key and most people don’t know how to do it even though they are advertising otherwise on fancy websites etc. We have two on our site that we are currently referring to and we are looking for others that are actually competent and not fly by night take your money and run places.

And if you are willing to file suit against the lender, there are a number of ways to prevent the sale and turn the tables on the lender. There are even strategies that are outlined in this blog that show how in certain cases the borrower walked away with the house free and clear of the mortgage and note.

Here is some verbiage that has been used, but frankly without an attorney to deal with the lender, your position is not going to be taken as seriously as it would with a competent attorney who understands the complex issues:

Dear Sir or Madam: Please accept this letter on behalf of the above-named property owner and borrower. While this letter is written in part for purposes of settlement and compromise it is already a demand letter which can and will be used as necessary. It is therefore not a confidential communication protected under the rules of settlement disclosures and correspondence.

You have previously been presented with proper notices of deceptive lending practices in the closing on the above-referenced loans. Said notices were accompanied by Proposed Resolutions under the Federal Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

Notwithstanding the above, your agents have threatened foreclosure, sale and eviction of the homeowner/borrower, despite the facts that the borrower is not in default, the lender and trustee are ignorant of any facts to state affirmatively that the borrower is or is not in default, the lender is in default of its obligations under applicable Federal and State laws, the lender at the closing the servicing agent are not the real parties in interest (i.e., they lack standing to proceed to judicial or non-judicial sale), the trustee and lender lack authority to proceed but have intentionally and fraudulently filed papers and posted notices as though the authority was present.

WE HEREWITH DEMAND THE NAMES AND CONTACT INFORMATION ALONG WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE SECURITY SOLD, THE ASSIGNMENT MADE, AGREEMENTS SIGNED, BETWEEN ALL OF THE MORTGAGE BROKERS, REAL ESTATE BROKERS, DEVELOPERS, APPRAISERS, MORTGAGE AGGREGATORS, INVESTMENT BANKERS, RETAIL OR OTHER SELLER OF SECURITIES AND THE INVESTORS WHO PURCHASED THE SECURITIES.

Based upon information received from the experts in this case and based upon our own factual and legal investigation there appear to be claims in addition to the claims stated in prior correspondence, which claims based upon the following summary, are in most cases not exclusive and therefore the demands stated in this letter and prior correspondence you have received, which is incorporated herein as specifically as if set forth at length hereat, should all be considered cumulative.

Usury: As a result of the artificially inflated “fair market values” utilized by LENDER et al, its agents, servants and/or employees, to induce the borrower to sign the mortgage documents and purchase the property, the effective yield now vastly exceeds the legal lending limit in the State of Florida, if the borrower pays in accordance with the mortgage and note indentures. A quick review of the usury law in Florida will reveal that while it has been relaxed somewhat to accommodate predatory lending through credit cards and payday loans, it remains somewhat stringent in connection with other loans and allows the borrower to to cancel the loan and collect damages. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus attorney fees and costs of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

Security Violation: The subject mortgage was part of a purchase transaction in which the property was sold with promises and assurances that the value would go up, the rental value would assure a return on investment, and that the investor need not perform any work, since the maintenance and other factors would be done by third parties — the Condominium Association, the real estate broker, the management office etc. This constitutes, despite the appearance of other “uses” the sale of a security under the Securities Act of 1933 and other applicable Federal and state Securities laws. The sale of this security was improper, lacking disclosure, rights to rescind under the securities laws, and lacking in disclosure as to the true nature of the transaction and the true position of the parties, including but not limited to the fact that the “lender” was in actuality acting as a conduit, removing the essential aspect of risk-sharing in the normal lender-borrower relationship, that the risk of loss was not only real but unavoidable because of the artificially inflated values, and that the Buyer should consider the purchase to be a high-risk investment with the possibility of total loss. Since the sale of THIS security was part of larger plan to sell securities to “qualified” investors using false ratings and false assurances of insurance, together with a promised rate of return in excess of the revenue produced by the underlying efforts, the sale of THIS security was part of larger Ponzi scheme wherein securities were sold at both ends of the spectrum of the supplier of capital (the investor) and the consumer of the capital (the borrower and the seller of the property). Since compensation arising from the transaction with this borrower was not disclosed to the borrower, the transaction lacked proper disclosure and is subject to rescission, compensatory and punitive damages. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus attorney fees of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

Common Law Fraud in the Inducement and Fraud in the execution of the closing documents including but not limited to the settlement statement, the mortgage and note. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus punitive and/or exemplary damages plus attorney fees of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

Little FTC Act (Florida): while the transaction clearly involves interstate commerce, Florida law provides for much the same remedies as described above for unfair and deceptive lending or business practices. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus punitive and/or exemplary damages plus attorney fees of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

TILA claims have been summarized in prior correspondence. Because the transaction is not a pure first mortgage residential transaction, the TILA exception for rescission does not apply and we therefore demand rescission in addition to the above-stated claims. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus punitive and/or exemplary damages plus attorney fees of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

RESPA: You have failed to properly respond to the claims under the act are are currently in violation. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus punitive and/or exemplary damages plus attorney fees of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

RICO: As stated above there were multiple parties in multiple states in a scheme spanning virtually all continents in which false, misleading and non-conforming statements were made to investors and borrowers alike, wherein LENDER et al acted in concert with other ”lenders” and investment bankers to artificially create the appearance of higher market values for property and the false appearance of trends that did not in actuality exist, but for the “free money” (secured under false pretenses) pumped into a financial system and real estate market consisting of false and deceptive high pressure sales tactics whose objectives were to get the borrower’s signature without regard for the consequences to either the borrower or the investor. Hence, just for the record, in the unlikely event we do not settle this case, demand is herewith made for full satisfaction of the mortgage and note plus three times the value of the note in damages, plus punitive and/or exemplary damages plus attorney fees of 10% of the value of the of the claim which is the principal of the note plus three times the principal of the note.

Under Federal Law, you are a provider of financial services and/or products to a borrower whom you or your agents, predecessors, or successors intentionally deceived at the closing of the loan, conspired to misrepresent the proper appraised value of the property, and have now ignored your basic responsibilities of presenting a response to the notices and correspondence already on file with you and regulatory agencies, who have been informed of your illegal and improper conduct.

Notwithstanding the above, the borrowers are now faced with the apparent prospect of losing their house, their credit rating, and have been required to seek the services of legal counsel to forestall the loss, for which services demand is herewith made under the terms of the mortgage and all applicable Federal (TILA, RESPA, RICO) and State Law..

YOUR CONDUCT, IF YOU PROCEED, CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL THEFT AND CIVIL THEFT OF THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE MORTGAGE, NOTE AND PROCEEDINGS YOU HAVE POSTED AND FILED. Accordingly your position, in the absence of any authority to do so under law is invalid and illegal. ON BEHALF OF THE BORROWER/HOMEOWNER DEMAND IS HEREWITH MADE THAT ALL EFFORTS AT SALE, EVICTION OR FORECLOSURE BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY AS THE PROPERTY IS SCHEDULED FOR EVICTION/SALE WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

Any further attempts at collection will result in further action taken on behalf of the borrowers for all remedies available in law and equity in both administrative proceedings, and judicial forums possessing competent jurisdiction, which will seek damages for unfair trade trade practices, treble damages under applicable law for RICO, FTC and little FTC violations, consequential damages and refunds, attorney fees, court costs, and all other available remedies in law or equity.

PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY!!!

respa_request_-_mike1-rev-1-neil

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