David Dayen via The Intercept: Stealth Attack on Wall Street Bank Reform foams the runway for the next Financial Crisis

Editor’s Note:  S.2155 is known in Washington as the Crapo bill.  A fitting name.  Even Georgetown Law professor and former CFPB adviser Adam Levitin in a blog post warns the dangers of further bank deregulation.  This bill functionally exempts 85% of US banks and credit unions from fair lending laws in the mortgage market

By David Dayen/The Intercept

https://theintercept.com/2018/03/02/crapo-instead-of-taking-on-gun-control-democrats-are-teaming-with-republicans-for-a-stealth-attack-on-wall-street-reform/

In mid-January, Citigroup executives held a conference call with reporters about the bank’s fourth-quarter 2017 earnings. The discussion turned to an obscure congressional bill, S.2155, pitched by its bipartisan supporters mainly as a vehicle to deliver regulatory relief to community banks and, 10 years after the financial crisis, to make needed technical fixes to the landmark Wall Street reform law, Dodd-Frank.

But Citi’s Chief Financial Officer John Gerspach told the trade reporters he thought that some bigger banks — like, say, Citigroup — should get taken care of in the bill as well. He wanted Congress to loosen rules around how the bank could go about lending and investing. The specific mechanism to do that was to fiddle with what’s known as the supplementary leverage ratio, or SLR, a key capital requirement for the nation’s largest banks. This simple ratio sets how much equity banks must carry compared to total assets like loans.

S.2155 did, at the time, weaken the leverage ratio, but only for so-called custodial banks, which do not primarily make loans but instead safeguard assets for rich individuals and companies like mutual funds. As written, the measure would have assisted just two U.S. banks, State Street and Bank of New York Mellon. This offended Gerspach. “We obviously don’t think that is fair, so we would like to see that be altered,” he told reporters.

Republicans and Democrats who pushed S.2155 through the Senate Banking Committee must have heard Citi’s call. (They changed the definition of a custodial bank in a subsequent version of the bill. It used to stipulate that only a bank with a high level of custodial assets would qualify, but now it defines a custodial bank as “any depository institution or holding company predominantly engaged in custody, safekeeping, and asset servicing activities.”) The change could allow virtually any big bank to take advantage of the new rule.

Multiple bank lobbyists told The Intercept that Citi has been pressing lawmakers to loosen the language even further, ensuring that they can take advantage of reduced leverage and ramp up risk. “Citi is making a very aggressive effort,” said one bank lobbyist who asked not to be named because he’s working on the bill. “It’s a game changer and that’s why they’re pushing hard.” A Citigroup spokesperson declined to comment.

A bill that began as a well-intentioned effort to satisfy some perhaps legitimate community bank grievances has instead mushroomed, sparking fears that Washington is paving the way for the next financial meltdown. Congress is unlikely to pass much significant legislation in 2018, so lobbyists have rushed to stuff the trunk of the vehicle full. “There are many different interests in financial services that are looking at this and saying, ‘Oh my God, there’s finally going to be reform to Dodd-Frank that may move, let me throw in this issue and this issue,’” said Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., in an interview. “There are a dozen different players who decided this is the last bus out of town.”

And Coons is a co-sponsor of the bill.

A hopeful nation — and the president himself — expected that the Senate would begin debate on major gun policy reform next week, but instead a confounding scenario has emerged: In the typically gridlocked Congress, with the Trump legislative agenda mostly stalled, members of both parties will come together to roll back financial rules, during the 10th anniversary of the biggest banking crisis in nearly a century. And it’s happening with virtually no media attention whatsoever.

Aside from the gifts to Citigroup and other big banks, the bill undermines fair lending rules that work to counter racial discrimination and rolls back regulation and oversight on large regional banks that aren’t big enough to be global names, but have enough cash to get a stadium named after themselves. In the name of mild relief for community banks, these institutions — which have been christened “stadium banks” by congressional staff opposing the legislation — are punching a gaping hole through Wall Street reform. Twenty-five of the 38 biggest domestic banks in the country, and globally significant foreign banks that have engaged in rampant misconduct, would get freed from enhanced supervision. There are even goodies for dominant financial services firms, such as Promontory and a division of Warren Buffett’s conglomerate Berkshire Hathaway. The bill goes so far as to punish buyers of mobile homes, among the most vulnerable people in the country, whose oft-stated economic anxiety drives so much of the discourse in American politics (just not when there might be something to do about it).

“Community banks are the human shields for the giant banks to get the deregulation they want,” said Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., who is waging a last-minute, uphill fight to stop the bill. “The Citigroup carve-out is one more example of how in Washington, money talks and Congress listens.”

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Royal Bank of Scotland Trained Employees on How to Forge Signatures

Fraud for the first time in history has been institutionalized into law.

It is foolishness to believe that the banking industry is trustworthy and that they have the right to claim legal presumptions that their fabricated documents, and the forged documents are valid, leaving consumers, borrowers and in particular, homeowners to formulate a defense where the banks are holding all the information necessary to show that the current foreclosing parties are anything but sham conduits.

Here we have confirmation of a practice that is customary in the banking industry today — fabricating and forging instruments that sometimes irreparably damage consumers and borrowers in particular. Wells Fargo Bank did not accidentally create millions of “new accounts” to fictitiously report income from those accounts and growth in their customer base.

Let us help you plan your narrative : 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Video available now for Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Across the pond the signs all point to the fact that the custom and practice of the financial industry is to practice fraud. In fact, with the courts rubber stamping the fraudulent representations made by attorneys and robo-witnesses, fraud for the first time in history has been institutionalized into law.

RBS here is shown in one case to have forged a customer’s signature to a financial product she said she didn’t want —not because of some rogue branch manager but because of a sustained institutionalized business plan based solidly on forgery and fabrication in which employees were literally trained to execute the forgeries.

The information is in the public domain — fabrication, robo-signing and robo-winesses testifying in court — and yet government and the courts not only look the other way, but are complicit in the pandemic fraud that has overtaken our financial industries.

Here are notable quotes from an article written by J. Guggenheim.

Once upon a time, in a land far, far away- forgery, fabrication of monetary instruments, and creating fake securities were crimes that would land you in prison.  If you forged the name of your spouse on a check it was a punishable crime.  The Big Banks now forge signatures and fabricate financial instruments on a routine basis to foreclose on homes they can’t prove they own, open accounts in unsuspecting customer’s names, and sign them up for services they don’t want.  If this isn’t the definition of a criminal racketeering enterprise- what is?

RBS, following the Wells Fargo Forgery model, conceded that a fake signature had been used on an official document, which means a customer was signed up to a financial product she did not want.  RBS’s confession comes only two weeks after whistle-blowers came forward claiming that bank staff had been trained to forge customer signatures. [e.s.]

The confession comes only two weeks after The Scottish Mail on Sunday published claims by whistle-blowers that bank staff had been trained to forge signatures.

At first, RBS strenuously denied the allegations, but was forced to publicly acknowledge this was likely a widespread practice. [e.s.]  The bank was forced to apologize publicly after retired teacher Jean Mackay came forward with paperwork that clearly showed her signature was faked on a bank document.  The great-grandmother was charged for payment protection insurance (PPI) back in 2008 even though she had declined to sign up for the optional product.

At first the bank refunded her fees but refused to admit the document was forged.  [e.s.]A forensic graphologist confirmed the signatures were ‘not a match’, forcing the bank to concede and offered her a mere £500 in compensation for their fraudulent act.

Forensic Graphologist Emma Bache, who has almost 30 years’ experience as a handwriting expert, examined the document and said the fundamental handwriting characteristics do not match.

The Banks in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, along with the United States include forgery and fabrication in their business models to increase profits.  Why shouldn’t they?  There is NO THREAT because they know they will not be held accountable by law enforcement or the courts- so they continue to fleece, defraud, and steal from their customers.

Homeowners must force an urgent investigation into claims of illegal practices by the banks.  Wells Fargo is not doing anything that CitiBank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and others aren’t doing.  To remain competitive in an unethical marketplace, you almost have to resort to the same fraudulent tactics.[e.s.]

However, whistle-blowers have now revealed that managers were coached on how to fake names on key papers.  Whistle-blowers said that staff members had received ‘guidance’ on how to download genuine signatures from the bank’s online system, trace them on to new documents then photocopy the altered paperwork to prevent detection.  When in fact the bank taught its employees how to engage in criminal conduct.

Although clearly against the law, the whistle-blowers claim it was “commonly done to speed up administration and complete files.”  Just like American banks forge notes and assignments to ‘speed up foreclosures and complete files.’  They claim the technique was also used to sign account opening forms – and even loan documents. [e.s.]

Forgery

According to Justia.com, the “criminal offense of forgery consists of creating or changing something with the intent of passing it off as genuine, usually for financial gain or to gain something else of value.” This often involves creation of false financial instruments, such as mortgage notes, assignments, checks, or official documents. It can also include signing another person’s name to a document without his or her consent or faking the individual’s handwriting.  Forgery often occurs in connection with one or more fraud offenses. 

The Mains Event: Demand that Attorney Generals Nationwide comply with LPS/Black Knight Consent Judgement

 

Please listen to the West Coast Foreclosure Show.  Attorney Charles Marshall interviews former FDIC team leader Eric Mains about his foreclosure battle and FOIA strategy.

By K.K. MacKinstry

Anyone who knows former FDIC Team Leader Eric Mains knows he is one tenacious ex-banker.  In eight years of litigation, every court he has approached for relief has stonewalled his efforts to discover who owns his mortgage loan.  Mains is still in his home despite Chase’s most recent Motion to Dismiss that was granted by the United States District Court based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine that shouldn’t have applied due to the fact neither the parties or subject matter of his federal complaint was covered in his State foreclosure action.

It is astonishing that Mains has not prevailed in his lawsuit against CitiBank and Chase.  In his lawsuits, he has variously provided evidence of the following:

– His Note was “endorsed” in blank and undated with stamp of one Cynthia Riley, a former WAMU employee laid off from her job at WAMU before his note was endorsed, and whose FL deposition in 2013 revealed she never worked at the SC facility his loan documents were sent to, never personally endorsed any notes herself, and her stamps were not located at the SC facility.

-Whistleblower Lynn Syzmoniak’s qui tam lawsuit revealed that one Jodi Sobotta (alleged “attorney in fact” for Chase who signed another of his Note assignments) was in fact a LPS employee in MN who alleged in the qui tam suit to have been involved in unauthorized robosigning and forgery at that facility. Christine Sauerer, notary on the assignment, filed an official notary card with MN which contains her signature, but it does not match her alleged signature on his assignment. Even more damningly, she supposedly notarized the assignment over 1 year before it was recorded in the county recorder’s office. This is an amazing feat as the assignment, ANY loan assignment, would have been sent to the local recorder’s office for recordation directly after execution as a normal course of business to ensure timely recording and priority- as any competent attorney could attest. This is direct evidence the assignment had been back dated as well as forged.

-While the above is incredible enough, it doesn’t end there. The above assignment was one of the assignments that was the subject of a $125 million 2013 multi-state consent judgment with LPS. LPS and its agents, which would have included the attorneys it contracted and retained to instigate the very foreclosures its forged assignments were used in, was required by the CJ to have reached out to consumers affected by their forgeries and remediated their forged assignments executed from 2008-2010, of which Mains was one. Mains foreclosure judgment occurred months after the signing of the CJ, and the foreclosure mill law firm in that case, Nelson & Frankenberger, never disclosed LPS as a material party in discovery, and never disclosed to the court the forgery activity it was aware of.  To this day, they have still proceeded to try multiple times to move forward with sheriffs sales on Mains property using the same forged documents, in violation of the CJ, and while the Indiana AG’s office remains mute.

Mains has appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States his 2017 federal appellate court ruling that their jurisdiction to hear his complaint was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Meanwhile, Mains has continued to seek information in his case, notably through a Freedom of Information Act request, in which he demanded that the Indiana Attorney General’s office provide information regarding the 2013 consent judgement with LPS/Black Knight, and their stated compliance with its terms, which is required to be documented in quarterly reports to the AG’s of all 50 states who were signatories to the settlement.

He requested copies of all the information relevant to the consent judgement, and he specifically requested copies of the all compliance reports the AG’s office held and was to have received from LPS/Black Knight. Mains wanted to know what LPS/Black Knight was doing to comply with the consent judgement to stop its stipulated to unauthorized signing of loan documents, the use of those documents, and most basically what their compliance activities consisted of. This is just common sense, as any Indiana consumer, homeowner, legislator, or attorney would expect to be apprised of the what, where, when, and how of LPS/Black Knight’s compliance with the CJ…. especially after paying the IN AG’s office $1.6 million to settle it violations!

After Mains sent his FOIA to the AG’s office he received a pathetically anemic response.  The AG ignored most of his request and were only willing to disclose 19 pages of documents. The 7 page CJ itself, and 12 supposed cover letters to the compliance reports and the original complaint.  That is it!!!!  Mains has indicated his suspicion that the compliance reports either don’t exist, or they fail to address the requirements of the consent judgements.

The IN AG has generally claimed that everything in relation to the settlement and information related to it is attorney work product or is somehow privileged/confidential.  This is patently ridiculous and violates the Indiana Public Records Act.  The various state AG’s offices are required to follow up on the consent judgement until January of 2018.  Mains wants to know what the state AG’s have done to protect consumers and ensure the compliance with the terms of the 2013 CJ, especially after taking millions of dollars of LPS money for that privilege. He encourages consumers and the media to do the same in each of their respective states given the danger that state AG’s are still knowingly and negligently allowing these fraudulent documents to be used in foreclosures in their states despite the 2013 CJ specifically prohibiting this conduct.

Look for Part II on Monday regarding how you can benefit from your own FOIAs, what you can do to help others, and why it matters.

Citi continues moving away from mortgages as originations plummet

By Ben Lane at Housingwire

Citigroup continues moving away from mortgages as originations plummet

Nearly finished with exit from mortgage servicing

Citigroup first-quarter earnings show that the bank is continuing to move further and further away from mortgages and into other lines of business (The bigger question is why is Citi moving away from originating and servicing consumer mortgages).

According to information released Thursday by the bank, Citi’s residential first mortgage originations plummeted in the first quarter, dropping from $5.6 billion in the fourth quarter of 2016 to $3.8 billion in the first quarter of 2017.

That’s a drop of 32% in one quarter, and a drop of 31% from the same time period last year, when Citi originated $5.5 billion in first mortgages.

Citi’s mortgage servicing rights portfolio is also dwindling, as the bank continues to shed mortgage servicing rights (Citi is vulnerable to litigation for foreclosing on homes it didn’t own, revoking loan modifications and other servicing improprieties).

Earlier this year, CitiMortgage announced that it agreed to a massive mortgage servicing rights deal with New Residential Investment and Nationstar Mortgage that will transfer the servicing rights for approximately 780,000 mortgages away from CitiMortgage.

That deal is part of a larger play for Citi to get out of the servicing business altogether.

In addition to selling the mortgage servicing rights on approximately $97 billion in unpaid principal balance to New Residential, Citi also earlier this year that it entered into a separate subservicing agreement with Cenlar that will effectively end Citi’s mortgage servicing business.

And Citi’s latest earnings show just how close Citi already is to exiting the servicing business.

According to Citi’s report, the bank claims $567 million in mortgage servicing rights as assets in the first quarter. That’s down a whopping 64% from the fourth quarter of 2016, when the bank claimed $1.564 billion in MSR assets.

So in just one quarter, Citi sold off nearly $1 billion in mortgage servicing rights.

While the bank’s mortgage portfolio is clearly down, the bank’s overall earnings didn’t take a hit.

The bank said Thursday that its net income for the first quarter of 2017 was $4.1 billion, or $1.35 per diluted share, on revenues of $18.1 billion. That’s up from the same time period last year, when the bank reported net income of $3.5 billion or $1.10 per diluted share, on revenues of $17.6 billion.

The bank said that its revenues increased 3% from the prior year period, “driven by growth in both the Institutional Clients Group and Global Consumer Banking, partially offset by lower revenues in Corporate/Other primarily due to the continued wind down of legacy assets.”

The bank also said that its net income of $4.1 billion increased 17%, “driven by the higher revenues and lower cost of credit.”

The lower revenue in the “Corporate/Other” segment of Citi’s business is partially mortgage related.

Here’s how Citi breaks it down (emphasis added by HousingWire):

Corporate/Other revenues of $1.2 billion decreased 40% from the prior year period, driven by legacy asset runoff and divestiture activity, as well as lower revenue from treasury-related hedging activity. The current quarter revenue included approximately $750 million of gains on asset sales which more than offset a roughly $300 million charge related to the previously announced exit of Citigroup’s U.S. mortgage servicing operations. As of the end of the first quarter 2017, Corporate/Other assets were $96 billion, 23% below the prior year period and 7% below the prior quarter, primarily reflecting the continued wind down of legacy assets.

Corporate/Other net income was $92 million, compared to $450 million in the prior year period, reflecting the lower revenue, partially offset by lower operating expenses and lower cost of credit. Corporate/Other operating expenses declined 11% to $1.1 billion, primarily driven by the wind-down of legacy assets, partially offset by approximately $100 million of episodic expenses related to the exit of Citigroup’s U.S. mortgage servicing operations.

Corporate/Other cost of credit was $52 million compared to $170 million in the prior year period. Net credit losses declined 43% to $81 million, reflecting the impact of ongoing divestiture activity as well as continued improvement in the North America mortgage portfolio, and the provision for benefits and claims declined by $59 million to $1 million reflecting lower insurance-related assets. The net loan loss reserve release was largely unchanged.

While the mortgage revenue is down, Citi’s revenue in other areas is up.

Here’s how Citi breaks that down (emphasis again added by HousingWire):

North America Global Consumer Banking revenues of $4.9 billion increased 2%, with higher revenues in Citi-branded cards partially offset by declines in retail services and retail banking. Citi-branded cards revenues of $2.1 billion increased 13%, reflecting the addition of the Costco portfolio and modest organic growth, offset by the impact of day count. Citi retail services revenues of $1.6 billion were down 5% driven by the absence of gains on the sales of two portfolios sold in first quarter 2016. Retail banking revenues declined 3% mainly due to lower mortgage revenues partially offset by growth in average loans, deposits and assets under management.

“The momentum we saw across many of our businesses towards the end of last year carried into the first quarter, resulting in significantly better overall performance than a year ago,” Citi CEO Michael Corbat said.

“Revenues increased in both our consumer and institutional lines of business, most notably in areas where we have been investing such as Equities, U.S. Cards and Mexico,” Corbat continued.

“We grew loans and deposits and achieved an efficiency ratio of just under 58%, an ROA of 91bps and a ROTCE ex-DTA of over 10%, showing good progress towards achieving our near-term financial targets,” Corbat added.

“Through our earnings and the utilization of $800 million in Deferred Tax Assets, we generated $5.5 billion of total regulatory capital before returning $2.2 billion to our shareholders,” Corbat concluded. “Our CET 1 Capital ratio rose to 12.8% and we could not be more committed to continuing to increase the capital we return to our shareholders.”

Breaking News: Mains v. Citibank N.A is Dismissed despite new findings of Fraud

Editor’s Note:  Please look for follow up article on this tragic and unlawful Indiana court decision by Neil Garfield.  Rooker-Feldman doctrine was applied despite the fact that Mains raised new issues and findings of fraud that were not present in his original complaint.

http://www.theindianalawyer.com/th-circuit-affirms-dismissal-of-foreclosure-fraud-case/PARAMS/article/43243

An Indiana man’s various federal claims against his former mortgage holders cannot proceed because federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to vacate state court decisions, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Wednesday.

In Eric Mains v. Citibank, N.A., et al., 16-1985, Eric Mains executed a mortgage on his home with Washington Mutual in December 2006 and made payments for two years. When Washington Mutual failed in 2008, Chase Bank purchasing Main’s mortgage and note, then assigned the mortgage and note to Citibank in 2010.

Mains began falling behind on his mortgage payments and discontinued them in March 2009, prompting Nelson & Frankenberger P.C. to send him a default and acceleration notice. In 2010, Citibank filed a foreclosure action against Mains in Clark Circuit Court.

The state court eventually granted summary judgment to Citibank in May 2013, and after failing to get a decision in his favor in the Indiana appellate courts, Mains filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in March 2015. In his federal complaint, Mains alleged that he had discovered new evidence of fraud that could not have been presented to the state court and included alleged violations of state and federal law.

The district court dismissed Mains’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that his claims would nullify the state court judgment if resolved in his favor. Mains then appealed to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, but the appellate court affirmed, though with a modification to a dismissal without prejudice.

In his appeal, Mains argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claim on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” But Chief Judge Diane Wood wrote in the appellate court’s Wednesday opinion that federal claims not raised in state court can trigger Rooker-Feldman if they are closely enough related a state-court judgment.

“Reading through the verbiage of Mains’ filings, we are left with the impression that the foundation of the present suit is his allegation that the state court’s foreclosure judgment was in error because it rested on a fraud perpetrated by the defendants,” Wood wrote. “Mains wants the federal courts to redress that wrong. That is precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits, however.”

Instead, Wood said Indiana law allows a party to file for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence or based on fraud or misrepresentation under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).

Mains further claimed that Chase and Citibank violated the Truth in Lending Act by misrepresenting payments due and his related obligations, and by failing to respond to his rescission, but Wood said that issue is also barred by Rooker-Feldman because it would require the 7th Circuit to vacate the state court decision on the issue.

Mains made additional claims, including injuries in the form of attorney fees, a RICO conspiracy and further violations of federal law, but Wood wrote each issue was either barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or by issue preclusion.

Finally, Mains attempted to bring a federal fraud claim against Cynthia Riley in her former capacity as vice president of Washington Mutual. But Woods wrote the proper party to sue would have been Washington Mutual itself, and such a suit would have been blocked by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.

Download opinion here: 2017 03 29 Mains v CitiBank United States Court of Appeals

Ocwen: Investors and Borrowers Move toward Unity of Purpose!

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Please consult an attorney who is licensed in your jurisdiction before acting upon anything you read on this blog.

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Anyone following this blog knows that I have been saying that unity of investors and borrowers is the ultimate solution to the falsely dubbed “Foreclosure crisis” (a term that avoids Wall Street corruption). Many have asked what i have based that on and the answer was my own analysis and interviews with Wall Street insiders who have insisted on remaining anonymous. But it was only a matter of time where the creditors (investors who bought mortgage backed securities) came to realize that nobody acting in the capacity of underwriter, servicer or Master Servicer was acting in the best interests of the investors or the borrowers.

The only thing they have tentatively held back on is an outright allegation that their money was NOT used by the Trustee for the Trust and their money never made it into the Trust and that the loans never made it into the Trust. That too will come because when investors realize that homeowners are not going to walk away, investors as creditors will come to agreements to salvage far more of the debts created during the mortgage meltdown than the money salvaged by pushing cases to foreclosure instead of the centuries’ proven method of resolving troubled loans — workouts. Nearly all homeowners would execute a new clean mortgage and note in a heartbeat to give investors the benefits of a workout that reflects economic reality.

Practice hint: If you are dealing with Ocwen Discovery should include information about Altisource and Home Loan Servicing Solutions, investors, and borrowers as it relates to the subject loan.

Investors announced complaints against Ocwen for mishandling the initial money, the paperwork and the subsequent money and servicing on loans created and a acquired with their money. The investors, who are the actual creditors (albeit unsecured) are getting close to the point where they state outright what everyone already knows: there is no collateral for these loans and every disclosure statement involving nearly all the loans violated disclosure requirements under TILA, RESPA, and Federal and state regulations.
The fact that (1) the loan was not funded by the payee on the note and mortgagee on the mortgage and (2) that the money from creditors were never properly channeled through the REMIC trusts because the trusts never received the proceeds of sale of mortgage backed securities is getting closer and closer to the surface.
What was unthinkable and the subject of ridicule 8 years ago has become the REAL reality. The plain truth is that the Trust never owned the loans even as a pass through because they never had had the money to originate or acquire loans. That leaves an uncalculated unsecured debt that is being diminished every day that servicers continue to push foreclosure for the protection of the broker dealers who created worthless mortgage bonds which have been purchased by the Federal reserve under the guise of propping up the banks’ balance sheets.

“HOUSTON, January 23, 2015 – Today, the Holders of 25% Voting Rights in 119 Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Trusts (RMBS) with an original balance of more than $82 billion issued a Notice of Non-Performance (Notice) to BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, US Bank, and Wells Fargo, as Trustees, Securities Administrators, and/or Master Servicers, regarding the material failures of Ocwen Financial Corporation (Ocwen) as Servicer and/or Master Servicer, to comply with its covenants and agreements under governing Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs).”
  • Use of Trust funds to “pay” Ocwen’s required “borrower relief” obligations under a regulatory settlement, through implementation of modifications on Trust- owned mortgages that have shifted the costs of the settlement to the Trusts and enriched Ocwen unjustly;
  • Employing conflicted servicing practices that enriched Ocwen’s corporate affiliates, including Altisource and Home Loan Servicing Solutions, to the detriment of the Trusts, investors, and borrowers;
  • Engaging in imprudent and wholly improper loan modification, advancing, and advance recovery practices;
  • Failure to maintain adequate records,  communicate effectively with borrowers, or comply with applicable laws, including consumer protection and foreclosure laws; and,

 

  • Failure to account for and remit accurately to the Trusts cash flows from, and amounts realized on, Trust-owned mortgages.

As a result of the imprudent and improper servicing practices alleged in the Notice, the Holders further allege that their experts’ analyses demonstrate that Trusts serviced by Ocwen have performed materially worse than Trusts serviced by other servicers.  The Holders further allege that these claimed defaults and deficiencies in Ocwen’s performance have materially affected the rights of the Holders and constitute an ongoing Event of Default under the applicable PSAs.  The Holders intend to take further action to recover these losses and protect the Trusts’ assets and mortgages.

The Notice was issued on behalf of Holders in the following Ocwen-serviced RMBS: see link The fact that the investors — who by all accounts are the real parties in interest disavow the actions of Ocwen gives rise to an issue of fact as to whether Ocwen was or is operating under the scope of services supposedly to be performed by the servicer or Master Servicer.
I would argue that the fact that the apparent real creditors are stating that Ocwen is misbehaving with respect to adequate records means that they are not entitled to the presumption of a business records exception under the hearsay rule.
The fact that the creditors are saying that servicing practices damaged not only the investors but also borrowers gives rise to a factual issue which denies Ocwen the presumption of validity on any record including the original loan documents that have been shown in many cases to have been mechanically reproduced.
The fact that the creditors are alleging imprudent and wholly improper loan modification practices, servicer advances (which are not properly credited to the account of either the creditor or the borrower), and the recovery of advances means that the creditors are saying that Ocwen was acting on its own behalf instead of the creditors. This puts Ocwen in the position of being either outside the scope of its authority or more likely simply an interloper claiming to be a servicer for trusts that were never actually used to acquire or originate loans, this negating the effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.  Hence the “servicer” for the trust is NOT the servicer for the subject loan because the loan never arrived in the trust portfolio.
The fact that the creditors admit against interest that Ocwen was pursuing practices and goals that violate laws and proper procedure means that no foreclosure can be supported by “clean hands.” The underlying theme here being that contrary to centuries of practice, instead of producing workouts in which the loan is saved and thus the investment of the creditors, Ocwen pursued foreclosure which was in its interest and not the creditors. The creditors are saying they don’t want the foreclosures but Ocwen did them anyway.
The fact that the creditors are saying they didn’t get the money that was supposed to go to them means that the money received from lost sharing with FDIC, guarantees, insurance, credit default swaps that should have paid off the creditors were not paid to them and would have reduced the damage to the creditors. By reducing the amount of damages to the creditors the borrower would have owed less, making the principal amounts claimed in foreclosures all wrong. The parties who paid such amounts either have or do not have separate unsecured actions against the borrower. In most cases they have no such claim because they explicitly waived it.
This is the first time investors have even partially aligned themselves with Borrowers. I hope it will lead to a stampede, because the salvation of investors and borrowers alike requires a pincer like attack on the intermediaries who have been pretending to be the principal parties in interest but who lacked the authority from the start and violated every fiduciary duty and contractual duty in dealing with creditors and borrowers. Peal the onion: the reason that their initial money is at stake is that these servicers are either acting as Master Servicers who are actually the underwriters and sellers of the mortgage backed securities,
I would argue that the fact that the apparent real creditors are stating the Ocwen is misbehaving with respect to adequate records means that they are not entitled to the presumption of a business records exception under the hearsay rule.
The fact that the creditors are saying that servicing practices damaged not only the investors but also borrowers gives rise to a factual issue which denies Ocwen the presumption of validity on any record including the original loan documents that have been shown in many cases to have been mechanically reproduced.
The fact that the creditors are alleging imprudent and wholly improper loan modification practices, servicer advances (which are not properly credited to the account of either the creditor or the borrower), and the recovery of advances means that the creditors are saying that Ocwen was acting on tis own behalf instead of the creditors. This puts Ocwen in the position of being either outside the scope of its authority or more likely simply an interloper claiming to be a servicer for trusts that were never actually used to acquire or originate loans, this negating the effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
The fact that the creditors admit against interest that Ocwen was pursuing practices and goals that violate laws and proper procedure means that no foreclosure can be supported by “clean hands.” The underlying theme here being that contrary to centuries of practice, instead of producing workouts in which the loan is saved and thus the investment of the creditors, Ocwen pursued foreclosure which was in its interest and not the creditors. The creditors are saying they don’t want the foreclosures but Ocwen did them anyway.
The fact that the creditors are saying they didn’t get the money that was supposed to go to them means that the money received from lost sharing with FDIC, guarantees, insurance, credit default swaps that should have paid off the creditors were not paid to them and would have reduced the damage to the creditors. By reducing the amount of damages to the creditors the borrower would have owed less, making the principals claimed in foreclosures all wrong. The parties who paid such amounts either have or do not have separate unsecured actions against eh borrower. In most cases they have no such claim because they explicitly waived it.
This is the first time investors have even partially aligned themselves with Borrowers. I hope it will lead to a stampede, because the salvation of investors and borrowers alike requires a pincer like attack on the intermediaries who have been pretending to be the principal parties in interest but who lacked the authority from the start and violated every fiduciary duty and contractual duty in dealing with creditors and borrowers.

Recording and Auctions: AZ Maricopa County Recorder Meets with Homeowners

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Phoenix, May 23, 2012: Last night we had the pleasure of meeting with Helen Purcell, Maricopa County Recorder, after having met with Tom Horne, AZ Attorney General and Ken Bennett, the AZ Secretary of State on issues relating to mortgages, robo-signing, notary fraud, etc.  Many thanks again to Darrell Blomberg whose persistence and gentle demeanor produced these people at a meeting downtown. See upcoming events for Darrell on the Events tab above.

The meeting was video recorded and plenty of people were taking notes. Purcell described the administrative process of challenging documents. By submitting a complaint apparently in any form, if you identify the offending document with particularity and state your grounds, again with particularity, the Recorder’s office is duty bound to review it and make a determination as to whether the document should be “corrected” by an instrument prepared by her office that is attached to the document.

If your complaint refers to deficiencies on the face of the document, the recorder’s office ought to take action. One of the problems here is that the office handles electronic recording via contracts who sign a Memorandum of Understanding with her office and become “trusted submitters.” Title companies, law offices, and banks are among the trusted sources. It appears to me that the mere submission of these documents in electronic form gives rise to the presumption that they are valid even if the notarization is plainly wrong and defective.

If the recording office refuses to review the document, a lawsuit in mandamus would apply to force the recorder to do their job. If they refer matters to the County Attorney’s office, the County Attorney should NOT be permitted to claim attorney client privilege to block the right of the person submitting the document or objection from know the basis of the denial. You have 10 years to challenge a document in terms of notary acknowledgement which means that you can go back to May 24, 2002, as of today.

One thing that readers should keep in mind is that invalidating the notarization does not, in itself, invalidate the documents. Arizona is a race-notice state though which means the first one to the courthouse wins the race. So if you successfully invalidate the notarization then that effectively removes the offending document as a recorded document to be considered in the chain of title. Any OTHER document recorded that was based upon the recording of the offending document would therefore NOT be appropriately received and recorded by the recording office.

So a Substitution of Trustee that was both robo-signed and improperly notarized could theoretically be corrected and then recorded. But between the time that the recorder’s correction is filed (indicating that the document did not meet the standards for recording) and the time of the new amended or corrected document, properly signed and notarized is recorded, there could be OTHER instruments recorded that would make things difficult for a would-be foreclosure by a pretender lender.

The interesting “ringer” here is that the person who signed the original document may no longer be able to sign it because they are unavailable, unemployed, or unwilling to again participate in robosigning. And the notary is going to be very careful about the attestation, making sure they are only attesting to the validity of the signature and not to the power of the person signing it.

It seems that there is an unwritten policy (we are trying to get the Manual through Darrell’s efforts) whereby filings from homeowners who can never file electronically, are reviewed for content. If they in any way interfere with the ability of the pretender lender to foreclose they are sent up to the the County Attorney’s office who invariably states that this is a non-consensual lien even if the word lien doesn’t appear on the document. I asked Ms. Purcell how many documents were rejected if they were filed by trusted submitters. I stated that I doubted if even one in the last month could be cited and that the same answer would apply going back years.

So the county recorder’s office is rejecting submissions by homeowners but not rejecting submissions from banks and certain large law firms and title companies (which she said reduced in number from hundreds to a handful).

What the pretenders are worried about of course, is that anything in the title chain that impairs the quality of title conveyed or to be covered by title insurance would be severely compromised by anything that appears in the title record BEFORE they took any action.

If a document upon which they were relying, through lying, is then discounted by the recording office to be NOT regarded as recorded then any correction after the document filed by the homeowner or anyone else might force them into court to get rid of the impediment. That would essentially convert the non-judicial foreclosure to a judicial foreclosure in which the pretenders would need to plead and prove facts that they neither know or have any evidence to support, most witnesses now being long since fired in downsizing.

The other major thing that Ms Purcell stated was that as to MERS, she was against it from the beginning, she thought there was no need for it, and that it would lead to breaks in the chain of title which in her opinion did happen. When asked she said she had no idea how these breaks could be corrected. She did state that she thought that many “mistakes” occurred in the MERS system, implying that such mistakes would not have occurred if the parties had used the normal public recording system for assignments etc.

And of course you know that this piece of video, while it supports the position taken on this blog for the last 5 years, avoids the subject of why the MERS system was created in the first place. We don’t need to speculate on that anymore.

We know that the MERS system was used as a cloak for multiple sales and assignments of the same loan. The party picked as a “designated hitter” was inserted by persons with access to the system through a virtually non-existence security system in which an individual appointed themselves as the authorized signor for MERS or some member of MERS. We know that these people had no authorized written  instructions from any person in MERS nor in the members organization to execute documents and that if they wanted to, they could just as easily designated any member or any person or any business entity to be the “holder” or “investor.”

The purpose of MERS was to put a grand glaze over the fact that the monetary transactions were actually off the grid of the claimed securitization. The single transaction was between the investor lenders whose money was kept in a trust-like account and then sued to fund mortgages with the homeowner borrower. At not time was that money ever in the chain of securitization.

The monetary transaction is both undocumented and unsecured. At no time was any transaction, including the original note and mortgage (or deed of trust) reciting true facts relating to the loan by the payee of the note or the secured party under the mortgage or deed of trust. And at no time was the payee or secured holder under the mortgage or deed of trust ever expecting to receive any money (other than fees for pretending to be the “bank”) nor did they ever receive any money. At no time did MERS or any of its members handle, disburse or otherwise act even as a conduit for the funding of the loan.

Hence the mortgage or deed of trust secured an obligation to the payee on the note who was not expecting to receive any money nor did they receive any money. The immediate substitution of servicer for the originator to receive money shows that in nearly every securitization case. Any checks or money accidentally sent to the originator under the borrower’s mistaken impression that the originator was the lender (because of fraudulent misrepresentations) were immediately turned over to another party.

The actual party who made the loan was a large group of institutional investors (pension funds etc.) whose money had been illegally pooled into a PONZI scheme and covered over by an entirely fake and fraudulent securitization chain. In my opinion putting the burden of proof on the borrower to defend against a case that has not been alleged, but which should be (or dismissed) is unfair and a denial of due process.

In my opinion you stand a much greater chance of attacking the mortgage rather than the obligation, whether or not it is stated on the note. Admitting the liability is not the same as admitting the note represents the deal that the borrower agreed to. Counsel should object immediately, when the pretender lender through counsel states that the note is or contains a representation of the deal reached by the borrower and the lender. Counsel should state that borrower denies the recitations in the note but admits the existence of an obligation to a lender whose identity was and remains concealed by the pretender in the foreclosure action. The matter is and should be put at issue. If the Judge rules against you, after you deny the validity of the note and the enforceability and validity of the note and mortgage, then he or she is committing reversible error even if the borrower would or probably would lose in the end as the Judge would seem to predict.

Trial is the only way to find out. If the pretenders really can prove the money is owed to them, let them prove it. If that money is theirs, let them prove it. If there is nobody else who would receive that money as the real creditor, let the pretender be subject to discovery. And they MUST prove it because the statute ONLY allows the actual creditor to submit a “credit bid” at auction in lieu of cash. Any auction in which both the identity of the creditor and the amount due was not established was and remains in my opinion subject to attack with a motion to strike the deed on foreclosure (probably on many grounds) based upon failure of consideration, and anyone who bids on the property with actual cash, should be considered the winner of the auction.

DON’T Leave Your Money on the Table

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Editor’s Comment:

The number of people passing up the administrative review process is appallingly low, considering the fact that many if not most homeowners are leaving money on the table — money that should rightfully be paid to them from wrongful foreclosure activity (from robo-signing to outright fraud by having non-creditors take title and possession).

The reason is simple: nobody understands the process including lawyers who have been notoriously deficient in their knowledge of administrative procedures, preferring to stick with the more common judicial context of the courtroom in which many lawyers have demonstrated an appalling lack of skill and preparation, resulting in huge losses to their clients.

The fact is, administrative procedures are easier than court procedures especially where you have mandates like this one. The forms of complaints and evidence are much more informal. It is much harder for the offending party to escape on a procedural technicality without the cause having been heard on the merits. 

The banks were betting on two thngs when they agreed to this review process — that people wouldn’t use it and that even if they used it they would fail to state the obvious: that the money wasn’t due or in default, that it was paid and that only a complete accounting from all parties in the securitization chain could determine whether the original debt was (a) ever secured and (b) still existence. They knew and understood that most people would assume the claim was valid because they knew that the loan was funded and that they had executed papers that called for payments that were not made by the borrower.

But what if the claim isn’t valid? What if the loan was funded entirely outside the papers they signed at closing? What if the payments were not due? What if the payments were not due to this creditor? And what if the payments actually were made on the account and the supposed creditor doesn’t exist any more? Why are you assuming that the paperwork at closing was any more real than the fraudulent paperwork they submitted during foreclosure?

People tend to think that if money exchanged hands that the new creditor would simply slip on the shoes of a secured creditor. Not so. If the secured debt is paid and not purchased then the new debt is unsecured even if the old was secured. But I repeat here that in my opinion the original debt was probably not secured which is to say there was no valid mortgage, note and could be no valid foreclosure without a valid mortgage and default.

Wrongful foreclosure activity includes by definition wrongful auctions and results. Here are some probable pointers about that part of the foreclosure process that were wrongful:

1. Use the fraudulent, forged robosigned documents as corroboration to your case, not the point of the case itself.

2. Deny that the debt was due, that there was any default, that the party iniating the foreclosure was the creditor, that the party iniating the foreclosure had no right to represent the creditor and didn’t represnet the creditor, etc.

3. State that the subsitution of trustee was an unauthorized document if you are in a nonjudicial state.

4. State that the substituted trustee, even if the substitution of trustee was deemed properly executed, named trustees that were not qualified to serve in that they were controlled or owned entities of the new stranger showing up on the scene as a purported “creditor.”

5. State that even if the state deemed that the right to intiate a foreclosure existed with obscure rights to enforce, the pretender lender failed to establish that it was either the lender or the creditor when it submitted the credit bid.

6. State that the credit bid was unsupported by consideration.

7. State that you still own the property legally.

8. State that if the only bid was a credit bid and the credit bid was invalid, accepted perhaps because the auctioneer was a controlled or paid or owned party of the pretender lender, then there was no bid and the house is still yours with full rights of possession.

9. The deed issued from the sale is a nullity known by both the auctioneer and the party submitting the “credit bid.”

10. Demand to see all proof submitted by the other side and all demands for proof by the agency, and whether the agency independently investigated the allegations you made. 

 If you lose, appeal to the lowest possible court with jurisdiction.

Many Eligible Borrowers Passing up Foreclosure Reviews

By Julie Schmit

Months after the first invitations were mailed, only a small percentage of eligible borrowers have accepted a chance to have their foreclosure cases checked for errors and maybe win restitution.

By April 30, fewer than 165,000 people had applied to have their foreclosures checked for mistakes — about 4% of the 4.1 million who received letters about the free reviews late last year, according to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The reviews were agreed to by 14 major mortgage servicers and federal banking regulators in a settlement last year over alleged foreclosure abuses.

So few people have responded that another mailing to almost 4 million households will go out in early June, reminding them of the July 31 deadline to request a review, OCC spokesman Bryan Hubbard says.

If errors occurred, restitution could run from several hundred dollars to more than $100,000.

The reviews are separate from the $25 billion mortgage-servicing settlement that state and federal officials reached this year.

Anyone who requests a review will get one if they meet certain criteria. Mortgages had to be in the foreclosure process in 2009 or 2010, on a primary residence, and serviced by one of the 14 servicers or their affiliates, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citibank and Wells Fargo.

More information is at independentforeclosurereview.com.

Even though letters went to more than 4 million households, consumer advocates say follow-up advertising has been ineffective, leading to the low response rate.

Many consumers have also grown wary of foreclosure scams and government foreclosure programs, says Deborah Goldberg of the National Fair Housing Alliance.

“The effort is being made” to reach people, says Paul Leonard, the mortgage servicers’ representative at the Financial Services Roundtable, a trade group. “It’s hard to say why people aren’t responding.”

With this settlement, foreclosure cases will be reviewed one by one by consultants hired by the servicers but monitored by regulators.

With the $25 billion mortgage settlement, borrowers who lost homes to foreclosure will be eligible for payouts from a $1.5 billion fund.

That could mean 750,000 borrowers getting about $2,000 each, federal officials have said.

For more information on that, go to nationalmortgagesettlement.com.

OCC Issuing Alert to Consumers About Independent Foreclosure Reviews

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The OCC is rolling out its first public service announcements to alert consumers about the Independent Foreclosure Review announced by it, the Fed, and the OTS in early November.  The campaign follows the distribution of over 4 million letters to potentially eligible borrowers which include forms for submitting requests and instructions on how to use them.

The public service materials include a feature story and two 30-second radio spots in English and Spanish.  These will be distributed to 7,000 small newspapers and 6,500 radio stations throughout the U.S. The announcements inform consumers of the specifics of the program which lets borrowers who faced foreclosure during 2009 or 2010 request reviews of their cases if they believe errors in the procedures used by servicers pursuing foreclosure actions caused them to suffer financial loss. 

The parameters for determining eligibility are explained and borrowers are directed to a starting point for their requests.  Over 20 of the largest servicing companies are mandated to offer and process the reviews:  America’s Servicing Company, Aurora Loan Services, Bank of America, Beneficial, Chase, Citibank, CitiFinancial, Citi Mortgage, Country-Wide, EMC, EverBank/Everhome, Freedom Financial, GMAC Mortgage, HFC, HSBC, IndyMac Mortgage Ser vices, MetLife Bank, National City, PNC, Sovereign Bank, Sun-Trust Mortgage, U.S. Bank, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo.

U.S. TREASURY IS THE CREDITOR AND CO-CONSPIRATOR

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary SEE LIVINGLIES LITIGATION SUPPORT AT LUMINAQ.COM

GOVERNMENT IS PAID TO LOOK THE OTHER WAY

EDITOR’S COMMENT: The U.S. Treasury is reported to own $4.6 TRILLION in mortgage bonds, which would make it the creditor in millions of homes that (a) have already been “foreclosed” (b) are in “foreclosure” or (c) going to be foreclosed. Yet not once in any court action is the U.S. Treasury named as the creditor or having any interest in any mortgage. They paid 100 cents on the dollar  to save the big powers on Wall Street (ignoring the smaller players who had played fair and square) and now they are going to test the market by starting to sell these mortgage bonds back into the marketplace.

[PRACTICE SUGGESTION: UNDER FREEDOM OF INFORMATION OR SUBPOENA, GET THE DETAILS AND DOCUMENTATION OF THE DEALS IN WHICH THE U.S. TREASURY ACQUIRED THOSE “ASSETS”]

So if you want to know why the government’s programs have been so anemic in confronting the fraudulent, illicit and  immoral behavior of Wall Street and the pretender lenders out there foreclosing on homes they never financed, you don’t have to look any further than the $4.6 TRILLION that the government says it is holding in mortgage-backed bonds that are backed by fatally defective and fraudulent mortgages and notes.

If the government were to tell the truth the way Elizabeth Warren says should be done, then the government would have to admit that (a) under the best case scenario they spent 100 cents when the speculative value was only 2-3 cents and (b) there is something fundamentally wrong with the mortgage backed bonds and the underlying fatally defective, fraudulent mortgages and notes. THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO ADMISSION THAT THE TAXPAYERS GIFTED $4.6 TRILLION TO WALL STREET.

To put this into perspective: 7 million homes have been fraudulently sold at auction on credit bids submitted by non-creditors. Not one penny was paid at these auctions nor any money before that because the bidder never lent any money nor did they purchase the receivable. The bidder was paid as a stand-in for the undisclosed and potentially unknowable creditor just like the “loan originator” was paid to stand in as the lender.

Applying the $4.6 TRILLION from the U.S. Treasury to cover losses to investors and homeowners caused by fraudulent appraisals, fraudulent ratings, and deceptive lending practices, (instead of giving the money to Wall Street) would have allowed an average of $657,142 to be applied on each so-called mortgage transaction providing more than enough to provide substantial relief to investors, and correcting the bogus loans to fair market value levels, thus leaving the investors where they intended to be and the homeowners where they intended to be. Oops!

Instead, the U.S. Treasury maintains the illusion of authenticity of the mortgage bonds and the mortgages, obscures the identity of creditors in foreclosures, and continues to indirectly prop up balance sheets of mega institutions on Wall Street. The true value of the Citi group is not $129 Billion as reported but more like a negative figure. Let it fall, and do what is right for investors and homeowners and the economy is largely fixed. Continue with current policy and our credibility in world markets will continue to erode. I’m not the only one who figured this out. Central Bankers and world economists understand this perfectly well.

It’s not too late. Don’t sell the bonds. Use them to make things right with investors and homeowners and go after the assets of the mega banks including the off-shore money that management took in the tier 2 yield spread premium that nobody wants to talk about. There management cheated not only investors and borrowers, but stockholders as well.

BBC: US Treasury to sell $142bn of mortgage assets

US house for sale The US housing market is still fragile

The US Treasury has said it will start selling off $142bn (£87bn) worth of mortgage-backed securities that it bought during the financial crisis.

It said it would look to sell up to $10bn worth every month and expected to generate a profit of between $15bn and $20bn from the sales.

The money will help to reduce the government’s high budget deficit.

The Treasury bought the securities in 2008 and 2009 as part of its attempts to combat the financial crisis.

“We’re continuing to wind down the emergency programmes that were put in place in 2008 and 2009 to help restore market stability, and the sale of these securities is consistent with that effort,” said assistant treasury secretary for financial markets Mary Miller.

“We will exit this investment at a gradual and orderly pace to maximise the recovery of taxpayer dollars and help protect the process of repair of the housing market.”

The government stepped in to buy the mortgage-backed securities when investors began lose confidence in the instruments when the housing market slumped during the financial crisis.

The housing market is still fragile in the US, with figures released on Monday showing a fall in existing home sales in February of 9.6% compared with the previous month.

JUDGE SCHACK| Dismisses Case With Prejudice Against Citibank Due To Counsel Failure To Comply

JUDGE SCHACK| Dismisses Case With Prejudice Against Citibank Due To Counsel Failure To Comply – 2011-01-11 11:33:03-05
Citibank, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES TRUST 2007-SD3, ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-SD3, Plaintiff, against Santiago Murillo, et. al., Defendants 16214/08 Plaintiff: Megan B. Szeliga, Esq. and Jenneifer M. MCann, Esq., Steven J. Baum, P.C., Amherst, NY Defendant: Paul E. Kerson, Esq., Leavitt, Kerson and Duane, Forest Hills, NY Arthur M. Schack, […]

Categorized | STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD

JUDGE SCHACK| Dismisses Case With Prejudice Against Citibank Due To Counsel Failure To Comply

JUDGE SCHACK| Dismisses Case With Prejudice Against Citibank Due To Counsel Failure To Comply

Citibank, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES TRUST 2007-SD3, ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-SD3, Plaintiff,

against

Santiago Murillo, et. al., Defendants

16214/08

Plaintiff: Megan B. Szeliga, Esq. and Jenneifer M. MCann, Esq., Steven J. Baum, P.C., Amherst, NY

Defendant: Paul E. Kerson, Esq., Leavitt, Kerson and Duane, Forest Hills, NY

Arthur M. Schack, J.

Excerpts:

The failure of plaintiff’s counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.C., to comply with two court orders, my November 4, 2010 order and Chief Administrative Judge Pfau’s October 20, 2010 order, demonstrates delinquent conduct by Steven J. Baum, P.C. This mandates the dismissal with prejudice of the instant action. Failure to comply with court-ordered time frames must be taken seriously. It cannot be ignored. There are consequences for ignoring court orders. Recently, on December 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in Gibbs v St. Barnabas Hosp. (___NY3d ___, 2010 NY Slip Op 09198), instructed, at *5:

<SNIP>

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 16214/08, is dismissed with

prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency in this action, filed with the Kings

County Clerk on June 5, 2008, by plaintiff, CITIBANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR

CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES TRUST 2007-SD3, ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-SD3 to foreclose on a mortgage for real property located at 41 Hill Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4165, Lot 40, County of Kings), is cancelled and discharged.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

ENTER

________________________________
HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK
J. S. C.

Student Loans Non-Dischargeable? — NOT SO FAST

If the government guarantee was waived in whole or in part, which I am sure is the case, then the rationale for non-dischargeability disappears. So I am suggesting that the assumption that the student loan is non-dischargeable should be challenged based upon the individual facts of your student loan. If it was securitized and it most likely was, then the party seeking to enforce the debt must prove that the government guarantee still applies. Otherwise it should be treated like any other unsecured debt.

—————————-

Editor’s comment: Fact: Nearly all finance was securitized and still is. Ron Lieber talks below about efforts to change the law so student loans could be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Good idea. But I’m not so sure it is necessary to change the law.

The entire student loan structure, as President Obama has pointed out, is just plain wrong. Somehow loans that were provided by government anyway became guaranteed by government and then actually “funded” by banks. The banks could charge whatever interest they wanted, which frequently rose to usurious levels and if the student didn’t pay, then the government did, which is the way it was before they let private banks into the mix.

The effect was to burden students with loans that were impossible to pay off given the economic context of unemployment, underemployment and stagnant median income. So the prospective students frequently put off the education or avoided it entirely because the economics did not make sense. Those that did take the plunge are “underwater” just like U.S. Homeowners all because of financial chicanery.

To top things off they made student loans —- private student loans — non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. The theory was that since the government was doing students the favor of providing a guarantee of the loans, the loans would be more available, thus increasing liquidity in the student loan market. Since the net effect was a gusher of money pouring into private banks from the pockets of students, marketing efforts (including payoffs in student adviser facilities on campus) did in fact  lure students into these ridiculous arrangements.

Enter securitization: Since the private bank was guaranteed against loss, this provided the rationale for this lock-up system enslaving students before their careers even begin. But virtually ALL private banks were simply paid a fee for fronting the marketing of the loan which was funded with investor money because the loans were securitized before they were ever granted and thus the money and the risk was already resolved before the “underwriting” of the loan.

Like the mortgage loans, underwriting standards were dropped completely in favor of parameters set by Wall Street. The appearance of underwriting was preserved, but like mortgages, not very well. Like the mortgages, credit enhancements were added to the mix adding co-obligors right in the pooling and servicing agreements and assignments and assumption agreements, including insurance, credit default swaps etc.

Thus the “lender” that originating the Loan was what? A pretender lender whoa advanced no funds or capital of their own. Since the originating lender made the election of laying off the risk into slices and pieces and credit enhancements, they, in my opinion, waived the government guarantee.

If the government guarantee was waived in whole or in part, which I am sure is the case, then the rationale for non-dischargeability disappears. So I am suggesting that the assumption that the student loan is non-dischargeable should be challenged based upon the individual facts of your student loan. If it was securitized and it most likely was, then the party seeking to enforce the debt must prove that the government guarantee still applies. Otherwise it should be treated like any other unsecured debt.

————————————————

June 4, 2010

Student Debt and a Push for Fairness

By RON LIEBER

If you run up big credit card bills buying a new home theater system and can’t pay it off after a few years, bankruptcy judges can get rid of the debt. They may even erase loans from a casino.

But if you borrow money to get an education and can’t afford the loan payments after a few years of underemployment, that’s another matter entirely. It’s nearly impossible to get rid of the debt in bankruptcy court, even if it’s a private loan from for-profit lenders like Citibank or the student loan specialist Sallie Mae.

This part of the bankruptcy law is little known outside education circles, but ever since it went into effect in 2005, it’s inspired shock and often rage among young adults who got in over their heads. Today, they find themselves in the same category as people who can’t discharge child support payments or criminal fines.

Now, even Sallie Mae, tired of being a punching bag for consumer advocates and hoping to avoid changes that would hurt its business too severely, has agreed that the law needs alteration. Bills in the Senate and House of Representatives would make the rules for private loans less strict, now that Congress has finished the job of getting banks out of the business of originating federal student loans.

With this latest initiative, however, lawmakers face a question that’s less about banking than it is about social policy or political calculation. At a time when voters are furious at their neighbors for getting themselves into mortgage trouble, do legislators really want to change the bankruptcy laws so that even more people can walk away from their debts?

There are two main types of student loans. Under the proposed changes, borrowers would remain on the hook for federal loans, like Stafford and Perkins loans, as they have been for many years. To most people, this seems fair because the federal government (and ultimately taxpayers) stand behind these loans. There are also many payment plans and even forgiveness programs for some borrowers.

In 2005, however, Congress made the bankruptcy rules the same for the second kind of debt, private loans underwritten by profit-making banks. These have no government guarantees and come with fewer repayment options. Undergraduates can also borrow much more than they can with federal loans, making trouble more likely.

Destitute borrowers can still discharge student loan debt if they experience “undue hardship.” But that condition is nearly impossible to prove, absent a severe disability.

Meanwhile, the volume of private loans, which are most popular among students attending profit-making schools, has grown rapidly in the last two decades as students have tried to close the gap between the rising price of tuition and what they can afford. In the 2007-8 school year, the latest period for which good data is available, about one third of all recipients of bachelor’s degrees had used a private loan at some point before they graduated, according to College Board research.

Tightening credit caused total private loan volume to fall by about half to roughly $11 billion in the 2008-9 school year, according to the College Board. Tim Ranzetta, founder of Student Lending Analytics, figures it fell an additional 24 percent this last academic year, though his estimate doesn’t include some state-based nonprofit lenders.

There is no strong evidence that young adults would line up at bankruptcy court in the event of a change. That gives Democrats and university groups hope that Congress could succeed in making the laws less strict.

In Congressional hearings on the efforts to change the rule, last year and then in April, no lender was present to make the case for the status quo. Instead, it fell to lawyers and financiers who work for them. They made the following points.

BANKRUPTCIES WOULD RISE At the April hearing, John Hupalo, managing director for student loans at Samuel A. Ramirez and Company, made the most obvious case against any change. “With no assets to lose, an education in hand, why not discharge the loan without ever making a payment to the lender?” he said.

Once you set aside this questionable presumption of mendacity among the young, there are actually plenty of practical reasons why not. “People don’t like to go through bankruptcy,” said Representative Steve Cohen, Democrat of Tennessee, who introduced the House bill that would change the rules. “It’s not like going to get a milkshake.”

Andy Winchell, a bankruptcy lawyer in Summit, N.J., likens student loan debt to tattoos: They’re easy to get, people tend to get them when they’re young, and they’re awfully hard to get rid of.

And he would remind clients of a couple of things. First, you generally can’t make another bankruptcy filing and discharge more debt for many years. So if you, in essence, cry wolf with a filing to erase your student loans, you’ll be in a real bind if you then face crushing medical debt two years later.

Then there’s the damage to your credit report. While it doesn’t remain there forever, the blemish can have an enormous impact on young people trying to establish themselves with an employer or buy a home.

Finally, you’re going to have to persuade a lawyer to take your case. And if it seems that you’re simply shirking your obligations, many lawyers will kick you out of their offices. “It’s not easy to find a dishonest bankruptcy attorney who is going to risk their license to practice law on a case they don’t believe in,” Mr. Winchell said.

Sallie Mae can live with a change, so long as there’s a waiting period before anyone can try to discharge the debts. “Sallie Mae continues to support reform that would allow federal and private student loans to be dischargeable in bankruptcy for those who have made a good-faith effort to repay their student loans over a five-to-seven-year period and still experience financial difficulty,” the company said in a prepared statement.

While there is no waiting period in either of the current bills, Mr. Cohen said he could live with one if that’s what it took to get a bill through Congress. “Philosophy and policy can get you on the Rachel Maddow show, but what you want to do is pass legislation and affect people’s lives,” he said, referring to the host of an MSNBC news program.

BANKS WOULDN’T LEND ANYMORE Private student loans are an unusual line of business, given that lenders hand over money to students who might not finish their studies and have uncertain earning prospects even if they do get a degree. “Borrowers are not creditworthy to begin with, almost by definition,” Mr. Hupalo said in an interview this week.

But banks that have stayed in the business (and others, like credit unions, that have entered recently) have made adjustments that will probably protect them far more than any alteration in the bankruptcy laws will hurt. For instance, it’s become much harder to get many private loans without a co-signer. That means lenders have two adults on the hook for repayment instead of just one.

BORROWING COSTS WOULD RISE They probably would rise a bit, at least at first as lenders assume the worst (especially if Congress applies any change to outstanding loans instead of limiting it to future ones). But this might not be such a bad thing.

Private loans exist because the cost of college is often so much higher than what undergraduates can borrow through federal loans, which have annual limits. Some lenders may be predatory and many borrowers are irresponsible, but this debate would be much less loud if tuition were not rising so quickly.

So if loans cost more and lenders underwrite fewer of them, people will have less money to spend on their education. Some fly-by-night profit-making schools might cease to exist, and all but the most popular private nonprofit universities might finally be forced to reckon with their costs and course offerings.

Prices might come down. And young adults just getting started in life might be less likely to face a nasty choice between decades of oppressive debt payments and visiting a bankruptcy judge before starting an entry-level job.

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