Agenda for Member Only Teleconference Tonight

  1. OCC Consent Decrees
  2. OCC Guidance — 13 Questions
  3. Discovery
  4. Pleading
  5. GGKW
  6. Chris Hayes
  7. Rachel Maddow
  8. Jon Stewart
  9. Bill Maher reversal
  10. Occupy and demonstrations, violence
  11. IT’S ABOUT THE MONEY! Tracking the money trails before you look to the documents.
  12. Lawsuits to recover economic damages on wrongfully foreclosed homes

Chris Hayes: “ALL IN” Keeps the Mortgage Scandal in the Public Eye

Death by foreclosure: This week’s real scandal. See Chris’ report on Death by Foreclosure and then his interview with group in Boston that is coming up with creative solutions: — you can just wait through the commercials to see the interview or click the link below:

See Chris Hayes on ALL IN: Death by Foreclosure

There are only two suggestions I would make to Chris and those who are seeking to provide creative remedies like the Boston Group he interviewed:

1. Do not assume that Wells Fargo owned the loan of the man who died in the courtroom. The odds are, especially since it was a high risk “pick-a-payment” loan, it was securitized — or more correctly stated subject to false claims of securitization, wherein Wells Fargo never had the risk of loss on the loan, because they were using the money of pension funds and other investors. Wells has a history of denying securitization and then admitting it later on in litigation — something which has led to them being cited for contempt of court.

2. The group that is buying the homes through short sales and then selling them back to the homeowner at fair market value is doing a good thing with a good business model. But I would suggest that they get more aggressive with their efforts and demand proof of payment and proof of loss before they make a payment to a bank or other entity that is more than willing to accept the money and execute a satisfaction or release, but who doesn’t have any money in the deal, thus leaving the actual creditor out in the cold in an undisclosed transaction.

I would suggest going into select cases that are in court with financing plans like the hedge fund I am organizing, and disclose that you are willing to refinance 100% of the mortgage with the party seeking foreclosure IF they can come up with a canceled check, wire transfer receipt etc. showing that they are indeed the creditor and that the chain of money  leads and ends to and with them.

If you select your cases properly, the outcome will be that they can’t do it even if the Judge orders them to do it. They will then try to salvage the situation  by making offers which you should refuse because they are in no position to offer anything. This in turn will hopefully lead the Judge to dismiss the foreclosure with prejudice and enter an order declaring the rights of the stakeholders (quiet title).

Under prior agreement with the homeowner, the fund actually loans some money to the homeowner for payment of attorney fees and other expenses and the homeowner executes a mortgage in favor of the fund for an amount that is 75% of fair market value, fixed interest, 30 years, self amortizing — in another words a traditional mortgage.

The mortgage received by the fund is quite a bit more than the amount of the loan funded but pays off the fees and other expenses and risk undertaken by the fund. It also leaves the homeowner with a completely affordable mortgage with equity restored in his home. And it provides the fund with capital to do it again and again, using either the existing plan of short-sales or calling the bluff of the foreclosing party who at least 80% of the time is just playing games aiming for a free house.

The reaction of the party foreclosing is going to be interesting, because the goal is the foreclosure sale and not necessarily getting the house — as they often abandon the home after the foreclosure sale let it get bull-dozed.

They will be forced into the position of arguing against getting paid and demanding that the foreclosure proceed! Why, because the backlash from their previous actions is going to bite them very hard — they might owe the insurers and credit default swap counterparties a truckload of money if those homes don’t go into foreclosure as assumed, and the value is pegged as low as possible — thus maximizing their apparent loss and justifying the maximum recovery of insurance and credit default swap proceeds.

CBO: principal reduction best for economy

Three cheers for Chris Hayes on MSNBC. In his new show, ALL IN, last night he reported and editorialized on the mistakes of giving banks relief and “screwing” homeowners since 2008. On his show he had Elliot Spitzer who took the administration to task for not doing something before this time. And to top it off DeMarco, the head of the former government sponsored entities (GSE), who has single-handedly blocked principal reduction is being removed and his replacement is an ardent consumer advocate currently a Representative from North Carolina. Things are changing.

The Congressional Budget Office is accepted as a non-partisan agency which has torpedoed both Democratic and Republican proposals on the economy. Upon request from Congress, the CBO studied the mortgage and foreclosure market and concluded that principal reduction should be the keystone of policy for Fannie and Freddie because it is a win-win that will return money to the taxpayers, spur the economy with an fiscal stimulus with a program that costs nothing, increasing GDP and employment. The CBO unequivocably recommended immediate implementation of large-scale reductions in mortgage principal.

The momentum is growing for the reduction of household debt just as this blog, numerous economists and financial experts have been virtually demanding. Iceland has proved the point. We have there a live experiment. Iceland has adopted a policy of continual reduction of household debt. The result was a healthier economy growing at a higher pace than any other country hit by the world- wide recession because consumer wealth, confidence and earnings increased allowing for consumption of goods and services that are in sharp decline in the U.S. and Europe. And the banks in Iceland are healthier and better regulated than at any time before the crash.

It is clearly a win- win situation for all stake holders. All this is providing fuel for the policy of principal reduction in household debt, including mortgages, forcing the banks to eat the difference. Of course Iceland also jailed the bankers who created the conditions that caused the Iceland economy to crash n 2008. Now you wouldn’t know it ever happened — but only if live in Iceland. Policy experts here and the CBO that measures past, present and future effects of economic policies are now moving away from the disastrous European experiment in reduced spending (“austerity”) which kicked the Euro economy when it was already down.

This means that homeowners will fight even harder to stay alive while the new policies go into effect and the right thing is done for consumers and homeowners in particular, that will provide trillions in fiscal stimulus for the economy with little negative impact on the banks who were using other people’s money to fund the mortgages, suffered no loss in mortgage defaults and only reported losses on bogus mortgage bonds backed by mortgage loans, which in turn were guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie 90% of the time. Those GSE entities under a single Federal Agency now guarantee or own more than 90% of all U.S. mortgages.

The remaining correction in describing the mortgages that were supposedly filed on record is that the mortgages were for the most part unenforceable, as is consistently alleged by investor lawsuits against investment banks that created and sold the bogus mortgage bonds AND that the “reduction” is really CORRECTION to adjust for fraudulent appraisals on which homeowners, the government and investors relied.

For the first time the reception of homeowners has changed from deadbeat to the ultimate resource to restore economic growth and who were screwed worse than anyone in the criminal enterprise that Wall Street called “securitization.” There was no securitization. Wall Street banks put the money in their own pockets instead of funding the so-called asset pools, “trusts” and other special purpose vehicles that the investors belied was receiving their money. The paperwork is all a sham from origination, where the “lender” never loaned a penny through assignments that conveyed nothing and were completely unsupported by value or consideration.


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