Florida Standard Jury Instructions as a Guide for Bench Trials

Danielle Kelley, esq., my law partner frequently says she likes to start with the jury instructions because that is where everything is boiled down to their simplest components. I think it is wise to make references to the standard jury instructions (plus the fact that they were introduced as an amendment to the Florida rules of Civil Procedure — thus overriding anything the Judge thought he knew).

For example, on evidence for use in motions and at trial —

SC12-1931 Opinion

301.5 EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE

The (describe item of evidence) has now been received into evidence. It has been admitted only [for the purpose of (describe purpose)] [as to (name party)]. You may consider it only [for that purpose] [as it might affect (name party)]. You may not consider that evidence [for any other purpose] [as to [any other party] [(name other party(s)].

That admonishment is not just for jurors — its also for jurists. There is not one set of laws that apply to juries and an entirely different set of substantive law if the case is heard by the Judge. Of course the recent case decided by Judge William Zloch in Fort Lauderdale Federal Court might make these jury instructions directly relevant.

Another example, this time on third party beneficiaries — careful that this double edged sword does not swing back at you and the need for consideration for there to be an enforceable contract—

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416.2 THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY

(Claimant) is not a party to the contract. However, (claimant) may be entitled to damages for breach of the contract if [he] [she] [it] proves that (insert names of the contracting parties) intended that (claimant) benefit from their contract.

It is not necessary for (claimant) to have been named in the contract. In deciding what (insert names of the contracting parties) intended, you should consider the contract as a whole, the circumstances under which it was made, and the apparent purpose the parties were trying to accomplish.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES FOR 416.2

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981):

[A] beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and … the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.

While the Supreme Court has not commented directly on the applicability of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981) (but note Justice Shaw’s partial concurrence in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 280-81 (Fla. 1985)), all five district courts of appeal have cited the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981). Civix Sunrise, GC, LLC v. Sunrise Road Maintenance Assn., Inc., 997 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Technicable Video Systems, Inc. v. Americable of Greater Miami, Ltd., 479 So.2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Cigna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 645 So.2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry Center, Inc., 548 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Cheesbro Roofing, Inc., 502 So.2d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). See also A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973), and Carvel v. Godley, 939 So.2d 204, 207-208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“The question of whether a contract was intended for the benefit of a third person is generally regarded as one of construction of the contract. The intention of the parties in this respect is determined by the terms of the contract as a whole, construed in the light of the circumstances under which it was made and the apparent purpose that the parties are trying to accomplish.”).

Thus servicer advances, FDIC loss mitigation payments, and insurance payments actually received by the creditor (presumed usually to be the trust beneficiaries in a REMIC New York Trust) decrease the amount due TO the creditor — which therefore means that the amount due FROM the borrower must be reduced by the same amount. The fact that out of all the parties to the contract requiring or providing for those payments to the creditor, directly or indirectly, none of them was thinking about a benefit to the homeowner borrowers does not mean it doesn’t count. The bank might not have thought about or even known you had an Aunt Tilly. But when she pays off your mortgage, it doesn’t matter where the money came from.

And as for the contract for loan that is sometimes referred to as a quasi contract, assuming the homeowner has defended by denying the existence of an enforceable contract, here we are —

SC12-1931 Opinion

416.3 CONTRACT FORMATION — ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS (Claimant) claims that the parties entered into a contract. To prove that a contract was

created, (claimant) must prove all of the following:
1. The essential contract terms were clear enough that the parties could understand

what each was required to do;

2. The parties agreed to give each other something of value. [A promise to do something or not to do something may have value]; and

3. The parties agreed to the essential terms of the contract. When you examine whether the parties agreed to the essential terms of the contract, ask yourself if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude, from the words and conduct of each party, that there was an agreement. The making of a contract depends only on what the parties said or did. You may not consider the parties’ thoughts or unspoken intentions.

Note: If neither offer nor acceptance is contested, then element #3 should not be given. If (Claimant) did not prove all of the above, then a contract was not created.

NOTE ON USE FOR 416.3

This instruction should be given only when the existence of a contract is contested. If both parties agree that they had a contract, then the instructions relating to whether a contract was actually formed would not need to be given. At other times, the parties may be contesting only a limited number of contract formation issues. Also, some of these issues may be decided by the judge as a matter of law. Users should omit elements in this instruction that are not contested so that the jury can focus on the contested issues. Read the bracketed language only if it is an issue in the case.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES FOR 416.3

1. The general rule of contract formation was enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court in St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So.2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004) (“An oral contract … is subject to the basic requirements of contract law such as offer, acceptance, consideration and sufficient specification of essential terms.”).

2. The first element of the instruction refers to the definiteness of essential terms of the contract. “The definition of ‘essential term’ varies widely according to the nature and complexity of each transaction and is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.Lanza v. Damian Carpentry, Inc., 6 So.3d 674, 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). See also Leesburg Community Cancer Center v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center, 972 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“We start with the basic premise that no person or entity is bound by a contract absent the essential elements of offer and acceptance (its agreement to be bound to the contract terms), supported by consideration.”).

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3. The second element of the instruction requires giving something of value. In Florida, to constitute valid consideration there must be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. Mangus v. Present, 135 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1961). The detriment necessary for consideration need not be an actual loss to the promisee, but it is sufficient if the promisee does something that he or she is not legally bound to do. Id.

4. The final element of this instruction requires an objective test. “[A]n objective test is used to determine whether a contract is enforceable.” Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So.2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985). The intention as expressed controls rather than the intention in the minds of the parties. “The making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs-not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.” Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957).

And as to whether the Plaintiff must prove they have been damaged by the defendant’s breach of contract —

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416.4 BREACH OF CONTRACT – ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS

To recover damages from (defendant) for breach of contract, (claimant) must prove all of the following:

  1. (Claimant) and (defendant) entered into a contract;
  2. (Claimant) did all, or substantially all, of the essential things which the contract

required [him] [her] [it] to do [or that [he] [she] [it] was excused from doing those things];

3. [All conditions required by the contract for (defendant’s) performance had occurred;]

4. [(Defendant) failed to do something essential which the contract required [him] [her] [it] to do] [(Defendant) did something which the contract prohibited [him] [her] [it] from doing and that prohibition was essential to the contract]; and

Note: If the allegation is that the defendant breached the contract by doing something that the contract prohibited, use the second option.

5. (Claimant) was harmed by that failure.

SC12-1931 Opinion

NOTE ON USE FOR 416.4

In many cases, some of the above elements may not be contested. In those cases, users should delete the elements that are not contested so that the jury can focus on the contested issues.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES FOR 416.4

1. An adequately pled breach of contract action requires three elements: (1) a valid contract; (2) a material breach; and (3) damages. Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 985 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). This general rule was enunciated by various Florida district courts of appeal. See Murciano v. Garcia, 958 So.2d 423, 423-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital, 765 So.2d 737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Mettler, Inc. v. Ellen Tracy, Inc., 648 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Knowles v. C.I.T. Corp., 346 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

2. To maintain an action for breach of contract, a claimant must first establish performance on the claimant’s part of the contractual obligations imposed by the contract. Marshall Construction, Ltd. v. Coastal Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc., 569 So.2d 845, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). A claimant is excused from establishing performance if the defendant anticipatorily repudiated the contract. Hosp. Mortg. Grp. v. First Prudential Dev. Corp., 411 So.2d 181, 182- 83 (Fla. 1982). Repudiation constituting a prospective breach of contract may be evidenced by words or voluntary acts but refusal must be distinct, unequivocal and absolute. Mori v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 380 So.2d 461, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

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3. “Substantial performance is performance ‘nearly equivalent to what was bargained for.’” Strategic Resources Grp., Inc. v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 870 So.2d 846, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). “Substantial performance is that performance of a contract which, while not full performance, is so nearly equivalent to what was bargained for that it would be unreasonable to deny the promisee the full contract price subject to the promisor’s right to recover whatever damages may have been occasioned him by the promisee’s failure to render full performance.” Ocean Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Quality Plastering, Inc., 247 So.2d 72, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).

4. The doctrine of substantial performance applies when the variance from the contract specifications is inadvertent or unintentional and unimportant so that the work actually performed is substantially what was called for in the contract. Lockhart v. Worsham, 508 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). “In the context of contracts for construction, the doctrine of substantial performance is applicable only where the contractor has not willfully or materially breached the terms of his contract or has not intentionally failed to comply with the specifications.” National Constructors, Inc. v. Ellenberg, 681 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

5. “There is almost always no such thing as ‘substantial performance’ of payment between commercial parties when the duty is simply the general one to pay.” Hufcor/Gulfstream, Inc. v. Homestead Concrete & Drainage, Inc., 831 So.2d 767, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

 

So if you look at both the pleading and the proof from the pretender lenders, they never actually say they paid for anything and they never actually say they were harmed and therefore, the Judge surmises incorrectly, that they don’t have to prove financial injury because it is somehow presumed. That is wrong. And since these jury instructions are published by the Florida Supreme Court, I don’t think the Judge has very much discretion to go outside these instructions when he or she is making the decision himself or herself — without (as the instructions from the Supreme Court say) unequivocally stating the grounds upon which the Judge deviated from the standard jury instruction.
And as for the origination of the loan, which definitely starts as an oral contract —

SC12-1931 Opinion

416.5 ORAL OR WRITTEN CONTRACT TERMS [Contracts may be written or oral.]

[Contracts may be partly written and partly oral.] Oral contracts are just as valid as written contracts.

NOTE ON USE FOR 416.5

Give the bracketed alternative that is most applicable to the facts of the case. If the complete agreement is in writing, this instruction should not be given.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES FOR 416.5

1. An “agreement, partly written and partly oral, must be regarded as an oral contract, the liability arising under which is not founded upon an instrument of writing.” Johnson v. Harrison Hardware Furniture Co., 160 So. 878, 879 (Fla. 1935).

2. An oral contract is subject to the basic requirements of contract law such as offer, acceptance, consideration, and sufficient specification of essential terms. St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So.2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004).

3. “The complaint alleged the execution of an oral contract, the obligation thereby assumed, and a breach. It therefore set forth sufficient facts which taken as true, would state a cause of action for breach of contract.” Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

4. As long as an essential ingredient is not missing from an agreement, courts have been reluctant to hold contracts unenforceable on grounds of uncertainty, especially where one party has benefited from the other’s reliance. Gulf Solar, Inc. v. Westfall, 447 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Community Design Corp. v. Antonell, 459 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). When the existence of a contract is clear, the jury may properly determine the exact terms of an oral contract. Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

5. “To state a cause of action for breach of an oral contract, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that, if taken as true, demonstrate that the parties mutually assented to ‘a certain and definite proposition’ and left no essential terms open.” W.R. Townsend Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Construction, Inc., 728 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Carole Korn Interiors, Inc. v. Goudie, 573 So.2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (company which provided interior design services sufficiently alleged cause of action for breach of oral contract, when company alleged that: it had entered into oral contract with defendants for interior design services; company had provided agreed services; defendants breached contract by refusing to remit payment; and company suffered damages); Rubenstein v. Primedica Healthcare, Inc., 755 So.2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“In this case, appellant sufficiently pled that Primedica, upon acquiring Shapiros’ assets, which included their oral agreement with appellant, mutually

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assented to appellant’s continued employment under the same terms and conditions as with Shapiro. Further, he alleged that he suffered damages as a result of his termination.”).

So if the offer  to loan money came from a party who did not loan the money then there is no contract, oral or written, and no documents that could be used as evidence of an enforceable contract because the basic elements of contract are absent. The same would hold true for assignments. Thus the pile of “transfer documents” are all meaningless and worthless unless there was an original enforceable contract.

As for the duty to disclose all intermediary parties and their compensation and the rise of an implied contract —-
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416.6 CONTRACT IMPLIED IN FACT

Contracts can be created by the conduct of the parties, without spoken or written words. Contracts created by conduct are just as valid as contracts formed with words.

Conduct will create a contract if the conduct of both parties is intentional and each knows, or under the circumstances should know, that the other party will understand the conduct as creating a contract.

In deciding whether a contract was created, you should consider the conduct and relationship of the parties as well as all of the circumstances.

NOTE ON USE FOR 416.6

Use this instruction where there is no express contract, oral or written, between the parties, and the jury is being asked to infer the existence of a contract from the facts and circumstances of the case.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES FOR 416.6

1. “[A]n implied contract is one in which some or all of the terms are inferred from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case, though not expressed in words.” 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 12 (2009).

2. “In a contract implied in fact the assent of the parties is derived from other circumstances, including their course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.” Rabon v. Inn of Lake City, Inc., 693 So.2d 1126, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); McMillan v. Shively, 23 So.3d 830, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

3. In Commerce Partnership 8098 Limited Partnership v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the Fourth District held:

A contract implied in fact is one form of an enforceable contract; it is based on a tacit promise, one that is inferred in whole or in part from the parties’ conduct, not solely from their words.” 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 3 (1964); Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1.18-1.20 (Joseph M. Perillo ed. 1993). When an agreement is arrived at by words, oral or written, the contract is said to be “express.” 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 3. A contract implied in fact is not put into promissory words with sufficient clarity, so a fact finder must examine and interpret the parties’ conduct to give definition to their unspoken agreement. Id.; CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562 (1960). It is to this process of defining an enforceable agreement that Florida courts have referred when they have indicated that contracts implied in fact “rest upon the assent of the parties.” Policastro v. Myers, 420 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Co., 281 So.2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1973). The supreme court described the mechanics of this process in Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1950):

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[A] [c]ourt should determine and give to the alleged implied contract “the effect which the parties, as fair and reasonable men, presumably would have agreed upon if, having in mind the possibility of the situation which has arisen, they had contracted expressly thereto.” 12 AM. JUR. 2d 766.

See Mecier v. Broadfoot, 584 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Common examples of contracts implied in fact are when a person performs services at another’s request, or “where services are rendered by one person for another without his expressed request, but with his knowledge, and under circumstances” fairly raising the presumption that the parties understood and intended that compensation was to be paid. Lewis v. Meginniss, 12 So. 19, 21 (Fla. 1892); Tipper, 281 So.2d at 13. In these circumstances, the law implies the promise to pay a reasonable amount for the services. Lewis, 12 So. at 21; Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 59 So.2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1951); A.J. v. State, 677 So.2d 935, 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Dean v. Blank, 267 So.2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Solutec Corp. v. Young & Lawrence Associates, Inc., 243 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).

….

For example, a common form of contract implied in fact is where one party has performed services at the request of another without discussion of compensation. These circumstances justify the inference of a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the service. The enforceability of this obligation turns on the implied promise, not on whether the defendant has received something of value. A contract implied in fact can be enforced even where a defendant has received nothing of value.

I think I made my point. Lawyers, follow Ms. Kelley’s suggestion. You might find your job in court a lot easier.

 

 

 

Prima Facie Case and Burden of Proof

In Court, a prima facie case is, in plain English, the completion of a party’s burden of proof. That means if you are seeking AFFIRMATIVE relief from the Court, then you have the burden of proving your case. In order to prove your case you must present evidence. Your evidence must conform to the legal requirements or elements of your lawsuit. So for example if you want to prove a case for damages, you must prove a duty, breach of duty and damages related to the breach of that duty. If you want to prove a case for breach of contract, then you must prove up the contract, the breach of the contract and the damages from that breach. If you are seeking to have the court make the other party do something, like pay you damages, then you are seeking affirmative relief.

In judicial states, there is no issue of who has the burden of establishing a prima facie case. In non-judicial states the issue is muddled because the borrower is required to file a lawsuit even  though it is the “lender” or “creditor” who is seeking affirmative relief. For reasons expressed below, it is my opinion that the prima facie burden in ALL states lies with the the party presuming to be the “lender” or “creditor.” So in all situations in all courts, federal or state, bankruptcy or civil, the burden is on the party seeking to enforce the note or foreclose on the property because when all is said and done, the party actually seeking affirmative relief is the party seeking to recover money or property or both.

Legally, tactically and strategically, it is a mistake and perhaps malpractice to ignore this point because it is at the threshold of the courtroom that the case might be won or lost. If you ignore the point or lose the argument, you are stuck with going beyond the simple position of the homeowner — denial of the claim of the opposing party. Even the petition for temporary restraining order should be translated as the homeowner’s denial of the claim of of the “creditor” and a demand that the creditor prove up its claim.

In other words, once a homeowner denies the claim, the case automatically becomes judicial simply because the parties are in court. At that point the court must adjust the orientation of the parties such that the party claiming affirmative relief becomes the plaintiff and the homeowner becomes the defendant notwithstanding the initial pleading that brought them into court.

The essential legal question is first, what is the prima facie case, and who has the burden of proof? The party seeking affirmative relief is the party seeking to enforce the note and deed of trust (mortgage). That would be the beneficiary under the deed of trust and the party to whom the note is payable. The note is payable legally and equitably to the investors if the securitization of the note was successful. The beneficiary is also the investors, making the same presumption. The party seeking negative relief (i.e., seeking to avoid the enforcement) is the homeowner who may or may not be considered a “borrower” or “debtor” depending upon the outcome of a presentation of facts that include an accounting of ALL receipts and disbursements related to or allocable to the specific loan in question.

It is obvious that in plain language, the party initiating a non-judicial sale is seeking affirmative relief and that in cases where there is an adversary judicial proceeding, the homeowner wishes to deny the claim of the creditor. In non-judicial states where the sale is essentially a private sale NOT based upon judicial proceedings, the mistake made by judges and lawyers alike is that they become confused by the fact that homeowner brought the suit to stop the sale.

That homeowner lawsuit is actually in substance no more than a denial of the claim by the alleged beneficiary under the deed of trust. In practice, the error is compounded by making the homeowner prove a “case” based upon the homeowner’s denial. In effect, this practice presumes the existence of a prima facie case by the alleged creditor or beneficiary, which is a denial of due process. Due process means that first you make a claim, second you prove it and ONLY AFTER the claim and the proof does the opposing party have ANY obligation to offer ANY proof.

Further compounding this error in process, many such states have rules that prevent the homeowner from contesting an eviction (unlawful detainer, writ of possession) even though that is the FIRST TIME the case has been in court. In effect, the Court is making the presumption that legal process has been completed, and giving the Private Sale the status of a judicial order — and then inappropriately and without realizing it, applying the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel in a case where there was no other proceeding, order, adversary hearing or any hearing on law or fact.

Therefore, in my opinion, the party who must establish a prima facie case is the party assuming the position of “creditor” or substitute lender, notwithstanding the apparent orientation of parties in the pleadings. Or, the prima facie case of the homeowner would consist of a denial that the opposing party is a creditor or that any money is due or that a default has occurred. Thus the burden would shift to the party actually seeking affirmative relief anyway. The prima facie case for the party seeking affirmative relief would require the following elements:

  • Establishment of the originating transaction
  • Establishment of chain of title as to homeowner
  • Establishment of chain of title as to obligation
  • Establishment of chain of title as to note
  • Establishment of chain of title as to deed of trust or mortgage
  • Establishment of chain of securitization documents
  • Establishment of acceptance of subject loan into each successive loan pool
  • Establishment of true party in interest and standing
  • Establishment of 1st party payments
  • Chain of 1st party payments step by step to the true party in interest
  • Chain of 3rd party payments step by step to the true party in interest
  • Establishment of allocation of 3rd party payments and receipts to subject loan
  • Accounting for all receipts and disbursements from all sources
  • Establishment of default date
  • Establishment of current status of the loan
  • Establishment of balance due
  • Establishment of encumbrance and status
  • Allocation of encumbrance to the property (if encumbrance covers future payments other than principal and interest — like taxes and insurance payable to 3rd parties, then the court must allocate a monetary value to the encumbrance for the benefit of the beneficiary)

The above elements would only be satisfied by the Court’s acceptance of testimony and documents with adequate foundation to be admitted into evidence. It would require actual persons with actual knowledge based upon personal observation, participation or experience with whatever aspect of the transaction is within the scope of their direct examination proffered by the party seeking affirmative relief. By virtue of the confusing panoply of documents, events and facts applicable to a securitized loan, it is my opinion that no legal presumptions would apply with respect to the obligation, note, encumbrance or default.

Hence, non-payment by the payor shown on the note would not give rise to the presumption of a default because of the explicit reference to third party payments, insurance and credit enhancements in the securitization documents. The party seeking affirmative relief would be required to proffer the testimony of a competent witness (probably someone from the investment banker that created the securitization chain and/or someone from the trading desk of the investment bank) that would provide a record and status of third party payments, receipts and disbursements allocable to the loan pool in which the subject loan was securitized. Failure to do so would lead to the conclusion of a failure of proof, or, in the court’s discretion, requiring the homeowner to cross examine each witness offered by the party seeking affirmative relief with the following question: “So you don’t know whether any third party made payments that would offset losses or principal in the loan pool, is that right?”

Verifying that the ‘Substitute Trustee’ is indeed a TRUST

BTW, I ask about verifying that the ‘Substitute Trustee’ is indeed a TRUST since I saw a post that made a point that any named ‘TRUSTEE’ must really be a TRUST.

Quality Loan Servicing was nominated by Litton Loan Service’s employee (via MERS) as the Substitute Trustee in place of ReconTrust.

I may have a case where BofA was in too many of the ‘roles’. The servicing was transferred on the very day the modified payments were to start per a signed and notarized mortgage modification agreement. The transfer was an attempt to justify the ‘mod’ not ‘happening’. RESPA does not agree with that. They ignored me. They never contacted me about any reason the mod was not occurring. I had been assured it was ‘my mod’. The BofA employees have stated that ‘all AG Mods’ were canceled. Well, they think that is the word. Actually the correct term is ‘BREACHED’.

So now I have some funny-looking documents being filed and what appears to be a bogus attempt to foreclose. Who knows who really has the note. Litton has filed documents saying that the ‘investor’ is CWABS with BoNY-MELLON as the trustee. Strangely BofA claims to be the beneficiary in more-recently filed documents in my court case. If BofA is ACTING for the investor, what the hell is Litton doing? The beneficiary LITTON should be ‘working for’ would seem to be the CWABS trustee. Certainly, I question whether BofA would have bought the mortgage back from the pooling (CWABS) once it was in litigation without advising the court at least. I do not understand how I can have BofA make the claim that they ARE the ’successor beneficiary’ when CWABS was otherwise identified as the ‘investor’.

Also, how would they deal with the original ‘Lender’ being a fictitious business name and the only beneficiary named is MERS as ‘nominal beneficiary’? Will I have more fictitious assignments to be looking for?

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