Mortgage-Transfer Systems are another layer of Illusion

By T. Anderson

Abstract – US Residential-Mortgage Transfer Systems – A Data Management Crisis

Investigator Bill Paatalo won’t stop digging until he unearths the entire skeleton of the fraudulent securitization scheme.  He recently stumbled upon a golden nugget contained in a white paper on residential mortgage transfers.  Confirming what Paatalo has already discerned from his decade of research, ““The loans are literally impossible to track, have no verifiable accounting, AND the master servicers and trustees manipulate and expunge data with no oversight.”

In a May 16, 2012 white-paper entitled U.S. Residential-Mortgage Transfer Systems: A Data Management Crisis by John Hunty, et al., the paper examines the current state of residential-mortgage data structures and transfers from origination through the securitization supply chain and concludes that it is impossible to trace an individual mortgage loan.

“The data in mortgage loan securitizations was a mortgage-risk management disaster, lacking transparency, consistency and accountability- thus opening the door for wide-scale fraud and masked by plausible deniability.    The securitization system, by design, was engineered with the purpose of facilitating the largest financial hoist the world has never seen.

Current data-management practices make it impossible for homeowners, lenders, investors, government regulators, and law enforcement to perform any oversight, analysis or even access individual loan data to determine the status of the loan (balances, write-down, insurance payoffs, transfers, ownership).  Thus, the servicers create the information as they go along to create the appearance that they have access to this information, and that the information exists.

Any sense of order was shattered in the process, allowing data to be resold, repackaged and recreated with a keystroke.  With this being true, a proper boarding of a loan from servicer to servicer is impossible, and investors in mortgage-backed securities are buying only ink, paper and data backed by nothing.”

      On page 7 of the white paper, under section 2.2 Origination Data, the paper reveals that there is “no permanent, unique, and verifiable loan identifier attached to the loan at origination,” and “instead, loan identification numbers are re-created by the different owners and managers (such as servicers and pool trustees).” If a loan identification number is changed there is no way to trace the prior history back to the securitized pool.  From page 7:

“Mortgage-origination data comprise the set of static information related to the mortgage at the time of the loan origination. As shown at the top of Table 3, the loan record is identified by an internal loan identification number. Currently, in the U.S. there is no permanent, unique, and verifiable loan identifier (like the CUSIP number in the bond market) attached to each loan at origination. Instead, loan identification numbers are re-created by the different owners and managers (such as servicers and pool trustees) of the loan origination and performance data sets. Nearly always, the loan IDs are changed as the loans travel though the mortgage supply chain (which will be described in subsequent sections of this Chapter), making it all but impossible to track a unique loan through the supply chain from its originators, via its servicers, to its securitized pool.”

      To add further insult, the servicers and trustees are attempting to track loans by “common loan elements” like zip code, loan amount and contract features.

“Without unique and permanent identifiers, the only way to track loans is through complicated, and often erroneous, computer matching schemes that link the information by common loan elements such as zip code, loan amount, and contract features.”

     The paper states the data is available to the loan originator, but originators typically aren’t very concerned about contractual details like properly transferring the note by assignment, or maintaining payment details.  An originator is focused on collecting their FEE to fund the loan, not in the quality of data or file transfer.

The paper claims that the data is “fully available internally to the….GSEs and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA)” but there is no way that is true and there is no way that the authors were permitted to audit the GSE or FHFA data.

The Federal Reserve receives incomplete “subsets of the data” that is available through private data vendors.  But according to the private data providers, the “trustees expunge nearly ALL of the borrower and co-borrower identification information.”  The data received by the Federal Reserve is deficient and inaccurate, as well.

When a loan goes into foreclosure, the servicer must create the illusion that the loan file exists- by fabricating a note, assignments, and the appearance of a legitimate loan file when none exists.  The servicer’s game plan in court is to defeat the homeowner by deceiving the courts with fabricated documents, filing a plethora of motions meant to exhaust and deplete the homeowner’s limited resources, and ensure the loan-level data never sees the light of day with the assistance of a biased court.

“The data reported in Table 3 are fully available internally to the analysts of the loan originator, the loan servicer, the GSEs, and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA). However, only subsets of the data are available through the private data vendors who represent the primary data source to investors and analysts in the securitized mortgage bond market and to the regulatory institutions, such as the Federal Reserve. The private data providers and all of the trustees expunge nearly all of the borrower and co-borrower identification information reported in Table 3

        In section 3.2.2 REMIC Data Reporting, the paper states that prior to the financial crisis and in 2012 when the paper was written that there was no loan-level information for mortgage backed assets in the REMIC-SPVs at the “date of the issuance of the prospectus supplement or the date of the initial offering of the certificates.” Thus, the individual loan characteristics including payment of principal and interest are NOT available!  The investors and certificate holders were forced to rely on “summary statistics” of the sub-pool.  The investors and certificate holders are not aware that they bought shares of a “mortgage-data” smoothie where no individual loans could be identified.”

3.2.2 REMIC Data Reporting

“As previously discussed, both prior to the crisis and currently, there is no loan-level information available for the mortgage collateral held as assets in the REMIC-SPVs at the date of the issuance of the prospectus supplement or the date of the initial offering of the certificates.

Because many of the REMIC-SPVs were composed of more than one distinct pool of mortgages, often the summary statistics would be provided for each of the sub-pools rather than for the collateral aggregates. Of course, mortgage analytics based solely on this information would be challenging, because the full distributional effects of the loan characteristics on the payments of principal and interest could not be specified.”

        The servicers, who are the bottom-feeders of this entire fraudulent scheme, are tasked with being the ‘data providers’ that are supposed to comply with the pooling and servicing agreements but typically have no idea what the original loan number was or balance, let alone what PSA is controlling of a particular loan pool.  This is an unmitigated disaster the banks can’t fix and the government doesn’t want to touch.

Shockingly, the prospectus supplements don’t require monthly payment remittance statistics, loan balances, delinquencies, prepayment status or audits to the investors.  There is literally no oversight or accountability for trillions of dollars of mortgage backed securities.

“During the run-up to the crisis, the only data that were available to analyze the loan origination and loan performance data for securitized mortgages were the data generated as the result of the PSA data management and reporting requirements stipulated in the prospectus supplement. These activities were carried out by the servicers and trustees of the REMIC SPVs.

Interestingly, the prospectus supplements never require that the monthly remittance statistics for the principal and interest payouts on the loans, the loan balances, and current loan delinquency or prepayment status be subject to external verification by accountants.

Access to the remittance data are available through subscriptions to private vendors such as ABSNet Lewtan and Bloomberg, the servicers, such as LPS and LoanPerformance (now Corelogic), and the trustees, such as CTSlink. Since the vendors source their data differently, the data that they maintain and sell is in part unique from, and in part overlaps, data available from other sources. Because there was, and is, no unique loan identifier, and because only some of the sources include data on the securitization status of the loans, it was and remains nearly impossible to obtain a consistent aggregate of securitized-loan characteristics and performance in the U.S.

This is consistent with the CA Case that was unsealed in 2016 – United States v. Discovery Sales, Inc. – The originating lenders who made loans to purchase DSI properties, including Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan Chase, generally would not keep the mortgages and thus did not end up losing money as a result of the DSI fraud scheme. Instead, they would sell the mortgages to other banks who would package them in securities that were sold to other investors. These securities failed when the underlying mortgages went into default. It was impossible to trace the majority of the mortgage loans on the over 300 homes sold by DSI that were the subject of the FBI investigation; it would have been harder yet to identify individual victims of the fraud given that the mortgages were securitized and traded.  (Emphasis added.)”

     Below is the information that is allegedly contained in the loan files at the GSEs.  The GSEs must be audited to determine if such files exist:

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The West Coast Foreclosure Show with Charles Marshall: Table Funded Loans, Consummation and the Courts

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The West Coast Foreclosure Show

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

Attorney Charles Marshall and Investigator Bill Paatalo will discuss the issues resulting  from table funding today on the West Coast Foreclosure Show.
Table Funding is a legal theory of liability Charles Marshall is applying in several of his California cases.   The theory has only received limited traction so far. Some judges are starting to accept that many loans were table funded and thus concealed the true lender, while other judges continue to reject the theory in fear that over a decade of table-funded loans would open up the floodgates.
Courts that have considered the argument that when “a borrower’s mortgage loan documents allegedly fails to identify the borrower’s ‘true lender’ that the mortgage loan was never consummated”— and have unanimously rejected it. (Marquez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2017, No. 16-CV-03012-EMC) 2017WL 1019820,  citing Sotanski v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) No. 15-CV-01489-LHK, 2015WL 4760506, at *6; Mohanna v. Bank of Am., N.A. (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016, No. 16-CV-01033-HSG) 2016WL 1729996, Ramos v. U.S. Bank (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012,No. 12-CV-1820-IEG) 2012 WL 4062499, (holding that where “a lender was plainly identified … the loan was consummated regardless of how or by whom the lender was ultimately funded”)).

Table funded loans, according to Reg Z of the Federal Reserve, are predatory loans  per se especially if it was part of a pattern of conduct by the originator.

“Table Funding” now comes in many flavors:

1. The one addressed by TILA and required disclosures of the identity of the lender (giving the consumer choice over who he/she decides to do business with) has some basics to it. You have a real lender with real money making a real loan. But the disclosures say that the originator is the lender and do not disclose thee existence or identity of the real lender. Regulators have often treated a pattern of table funded loans as “predatory per se.” Back in the 60’s the banks were changing things at closing giving the borrower no option but to close with a “lender” who was different from the entity identified as lender in the original documents (application) and disclosures (GFE etc).

2. So the banks set up what they called warehouse lending in which the originator was borrowing money from the real lender and therefore really was the lender.

3. But in the customary purchase and assumption agreement with the “warehouse lender” it is clear that the so-called “warehouse lender” is the real lender, since it asserted ownership of the loan starting before the closing of the new loan.

4. In the era of claims of securitization, most such claims were completely false. But it created a vehicle in which sham conduits could be used to such an extent that it was virtually impossible to identify ANY real lender. This was done to cover-up theft of investor funds who thought they were buying certificates in a viable REMIC Trust that turned out not to exist and whose name was never used in the purchase of loans although it was used in foreclosures — only after the banks swore up and down that the trusts didn’t exist back in 2006-2009.

5. It was those stolen funds that funded “trading profits” from sham transactions including paying fees to originators who would have the borrower execute the note and mortgage in favor of the originator, who in turn transferred the paper to the various sham conduits. The actual debt never changed hands in any transaction because the owner of the debts, whether secured or not, was the investors whose money was illegal used to fund the whole venture.

This can demonstrated by using glasses of water. You have the investors pour some of their water (money) into a glass whose name is the underwriter of a so-called REMIC trust. The investor water is controlled by the underwriter who created a fictional entity (REMIC Trust) to issue bogus certificates that were entirely worthless. The water is owned by the investors. It never goes into the trust. It stays under the control of the underwriters. Just this week there was another multi-billion dollar settlement with investors who sued not for beach of contract (Bad loan underwriting) but for fraud.

So at all times the water is controlled, every drop of it, by the underwriter and the only movement of the water is when it is poured into separate pockets of the underwriter whose name does not appear on any of the so-called loan documents that are based upon a transaction that never happened — a loan of money by and from the originator to the borrower.

The underwriter used SOME of the money from investors to create the illusion of a loan transaction with the originator. So neither the originator nor the warehouse lender has any money in the deal (i.e., water). But endorsements and assignments are fabricated to create the illusion that someone purchased the loan. The only way that could have happened is if someone paid the investors. So the transaction didn’t happen but the paper did happen. All smoke and mirrors.

 

Please refer to page 24 of the attached brief (this was the appellate case Charles Marshall orally argued by phone this morning) for a negative spin on why table funding as a viable legal theory.
Charles Marshall, Esq.
Law Office of Charles T. Marshall
415 Laurel St., #405
San Diego, CA 92101
Investigator Bill Paatalo
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075

The Phantoms of Foreclosure: Phantom Creditors, Trusts and Debt

by Jay Guggenheim

Hurry!  Sign up for the ‘Death of a Salesman’ seminar on Monday at 4pm Eastern here.

 

Neil Garfield, attorney Charles Marshall and investigator Bill Paatalo discuss how mortgage servicers are collecting phantom debt on behalf of phantom creditors by creating fabricated and forged documents on the Neil Garfield show.  Servicers counterfeit mortgage notes and pursue collection of this ‘debt’- but who do they send the proceeds they collect to, if there is no true creditor or funded trust that can be identified, or can accept payments from the servicer?

It is now known that:

  • The banks funded themselves instead of the trusts which never really existed (phantom trusts).
  • The banks covered up their theft of investor money by originating or buying loans with investor money and not trust money.
  • The theft has been the subject of settlements in which the owner of the debt — the investors — is paid off with cash and “resecuritization” in which actual loans were “sold” into a new trust (Like Zuni) by a party who STILL didn’t own them (phantom sales).
  • The proceeds of judicial and nonjudicial sales do not go to investors but back to the “underwriters” of nonexistent worthless certificates issued by nonexistent trusts that are registered nowhere and unfunded (phantom trusts).
  • The underwriter acts as “Master Servicer” for the phantom trust and collects “servicer advances” that were neither advances nor from the servicer, but rather a return of investor capital even if it was OTHER investors.
  • The “Trustee” of the Trust is not a Trustee either in writing nor in practice (phantom trustees).
  • We know the banks are acting on their own behalf and not on behalf of the investors or the trusts.

What we still don’t know- is where do the proceeds collected by the servicers from homeowners go- if there is no Trustee or Trust? 

The servicers are trying a ‘hide in plain site’ strategy by deliberately adding new players to the chain of title and switching servicers so another opaque level is created.

  1. Servicers are often changed the moment a homeowner goes into default.  Therefore, if litigation ensues, the servicer won’t have to reveal who payments are being forwarded to because no payments are being made, and
  2.  Servicers often change immediately after a foreclosure sale occurs so it isn’t disclosed where the sale proceeds went to.

Therefore, Neil Garfield suggests that homeowners and attorneys subpoena, not demand in discovery, who receives/received payments from the servicer, and name not only the current servicer in litigation, but former servicers as well.   Charles Marshall points out that he sees this servicer-switch particularly with homeowners who prove difficult or litigious, and to create an additional layer to conceal the truth.  The servicer transfers are an attempt to launder the papertrail.  He also says that this strategy makes it more difficult to discover who the true lender at origination was.

 

Neil Garfield says this plan is standard operating procedure now and that he can “imagine a room full of lawyers trying to plan out a strategy to confuse the homeowners, attorneys and courts- first they must make the money and ownership transfers difficult to understand, and then they must devise a system that makes it difficult for pro se litigants to get the information they need to create a defense.”

Back in 2007 and 2008 Garfield said he was sending out QWRs on behalf of homeowners who were not in default and saw an interesting pattern.  The homeowners who were current, and not in foreclosure, would receive letters providing a payoff amount, but no copies of note or assignments; but homeowners in foreclosure would receive payoff amounts including endorsed notes and assignments, to establish a credible chain-of-title.  Thus, those in foreclosure received a full QWR response including fabricated and robosigned documents that created the appearance of legitimacy.

Neil Garfield says that the banks and servicers have created an Industry of Fraud where people can create an entity, purchase lists of old debt that may or may not be valid, and attempt to collect.  Most people will tell the debt-collector to prove it or go to hell, but there is a percentage of poor, disadvantaged or unsophisticated people who will pay up.  Mortgage servicers and REMIC trustees are following the same business model by attempting to collect on debt they can’t prove they own without resorting to fabricated and forged documents.

Investigator Bill Paatalo says that in all of the years of investigating the trusts he has not yet seen any evidence that the trusts were funded or the entity foreclosing on the home purchased the debt legitimately.  In litigation, he never sees a credit or certificate holder identified and the banks rely on smoke and mirrors to collect on the phantom debt.  He said that he recently had a client that was not in default but was curious about who owned his loan.  Bill’s client received a response from Aurora emphatically stating that the note had never been transferred and would never be transferred unless there was a default.  Aurora was perplexed why a homeowner that was not in default was concerned about the ownership of his loan.  Paatalo claims he has called the GSEs and Hud who refuse to return his phone calls so he can verify a Power of Attorney.  He says it is clear that the Power of Attorneys are being substituted for the missing assignment of mortgages- because Power of Attorneys are typically not recorded in the county records.

Phantom debt is being collected on behalf of phantom creditors and the nonexistent party is being papered over by pledging the loan to a trust that doesn’t exist, as agents of agents of agents, and false Power of Attorneys and Attorneys in Fact.  The scheme creates such a convoluted ‘fact’ pattern so that homeowners and their attorneys must try to untangle the ownership knot thus requiring hours and  hours of work.  Garfield points out that this layering, or laddering as Goldman Sachs calls it, id a deliberate attempt by the banks, to confuse whoever is bothering them.

For example, there may be a signature and the name of a corporation on a document, below  it will show Bank of America as successor to Lasalle Bank as Trustee, as Trustee for XYZ trust, as Attorney In Fact, for x entity.  This deliberate obfuscation should be brought to the attention of the court and is a strategy to push out time and space- to buy time and also for attorneys to create additional billing hours.

Neil Garfield calls this strategy of the major investment banks, the “real thiefs in interest” because they do not posses a party who can be identified as the “true party in interest” as required to declare a default or foreclose.  The investment banks create puppet attorneys who do their dirty work, and because of this risk, the lawfirms facilitating this crime are paid handsomely.

Bill Paatalo recently who is an expert on the ‘hide, conceal, and cover’ strategies by the banks, recently obtained a copy of a itemized settlement statement from a lawfirm defending a USBank/Chase foreclosure.  The bank had paid over $450k and over 1,224 billable hours to defend against a simple foreclosure action, to buy a Cynthia Riley issue and hide the fact there was no certificate holders.  Paatalo points out that the head attorney was paid $628 an hour for four months of full 40-hour work weeks.   It is likely the mortgage wasn’t a fraction of this amount, but it shows that the banks are afraid. He points out that it is unlikely that any investors would authorize that type of expenditure if they existed- but would look for an equitable solution.

Garfield says to take the billing expense issue one step further, and states that attorney fees are deliberately ran up by law firms defending the banks due to the risk of the work being done.   Attorneys submitting forged and fabricated documents are putting their careers on the line, therefore they build in a profit for undertaking that much risk.

Additionally, the lawfirms have software that can recreate the record, cover up bonuses, move numbers around and create legitimate billing hours that were never done.  This ‘bonus’ is overlooked by the bank as compensation for risk taking.    Listen to the audio recording above to listen to investigator Bill Paatalo discuss a recent tax settlement where the certificate holders state that they have no right to recover from the homeowner, and no right to enforce the mortgage or note.

And lastly, Neil Garfield educates homeowners that the chances of proving in court ‘what really happened’ will likely not happen for sometime, if ever, and the goal of the homeowner and his or her attorney should be to reveal the GAPS in what is being assumed as the foreclosure path.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Investigator Bill Paatalo: Nationstar Conducts “Bulk Note Sales” Without The “Notes?”

In 2013, investors in six “RALI Series” Trusts filed a complaint in New York against their Master Servicer (Nationstar Mortgage, LLC) for conducting “Bulk Note Sales” of non-performing loans owned by the trusts for its own benefit; specifically to recoup upwards of a billion-dollars worth of servicing advance receivables. The Plaintiff / Investors accused Nationstar of conducting these “Bulk Note Sales” without having any ownership or requisite authority to do so. (See: KIRP LLC V Nationstar Mortgage LLC).

Per the complaint:

“INTRODUCTION
1. KIRP is a significant investor in certificates issued by six residential mortgage backed security trusts sponsored by Residential Accredit Loans, Inc. (the “RALI Trusts”).  KIRP brings this action against Nationstar, the Master Servicer for the RALI Trusts, for its liquidating loans owned by the trusts through on-line auctions at fire sale prices without authorization and in  blatant abdication of its servicing duties under the governing contracts.
2. As the Master Servicer, the RALI Trusts pay Nationstar to “service” the mortgage loans owned by the trusts in the best interests of the trusts and their certificateholders.  This includes working to maximize the recoveries on each of the mortgage loans through enumerated actions detailed in Pooling and Servicing Agreements (the “Servicing Agreements”), which set forth the Master Servicer’s duties.  However, rather than fulfilling its responsibilities to maximize recoveries, Nationstar has recently embarked on a campaign to benefit its own interests at the expense of the RALI Trusts and their certificateholders, through auctioning off the trusts’ mortgage loans in bulk (“Bulk Note Sales”) for amounts that are a fraction of the loans’ unpaid balances or the value of the properties securing the loans.  While these Bulk Note Sales injure KIRP and the RALI Trusts’ other certificateholders by dissipating the assets of the RALI Trusts, they provide multiple benefits to Nationstar, including through allowing them to more quickly recoup certain advances they made on the mortgage loans as part of their servicing duties.  KIRP seeks to enjoin Nationstar from engaging in any further Bulk Note Sales in breach of its duties and to recover damages for the Bulk Note Sales that have already occurred.”
      When I read this complaint, a couple questions immediately jumped out at me regarding the so-called “notes” being auctioned off by a party that doesn’t own said notes. What did Nationstar disclose to the “purchasers” at auction as to their rights to sell the notes? And, were the “original notes” actually delivered to the bulk-sale purchasers by Nationstar as a non-owner of the notes?
 I went to the SEC and located the 424(B)(5) Prospectus filing for one of the named trusts in the lawsuit (RALI 2006-QO1). (See: http://www.secinfo.com/dsvRa.vC1.htm#7fll).
Here’s what the Trust disclosed as to the custody of the loan files on P.S-108:

Custodial Arrangements                                                          

      The trustee will appoint Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A., to 
serve as custodian of the mortgage  loans.  The  custodian is 
not an affiliate of the  depositor,  the master servicer or the 
sponsor. No servicer will have custodial  responsibility for 
the mortgage loans.  The custodian  will maintain mortgage 
loan files that contain  originals of the notes,  mortgages,  
assignments and allonges in vaults located at the sponsor's 
premises in Minnesota. Only the custodian has access to these 
vaults. A shelving and filing system segregates the files 
relating to the mortgage loans from other assets serviced 
by the master servicer.

 

 

      If Nationstar had no authority per the trust instruments to sell, liquidate, and convert the notes for its own personal gain, it’s hard to believe that Wells Fargo would release the “original” notes in bulk to Nationstar for these purposes. The likely scenario is that the bulk purchasers were delivered copies of the notes from Nationstar’s servicing system that were pawned off as “originals.”
     This goes to the heart of what I have suspected for years now in regards to these “bulk non-performing loan purchases” by debt buyers. The “Sellers” often have no rights to sell these loans, and the “Buyers” are purchasing bogus collateral files with no “original notes” and no verifiable chains of title.
 Judge Mosman Quote - Re-Default and Authentic Note
Contact Investigator Bill Paatalo at www.bpinvestigationagency.com
Private Investigator
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
bill.bpia@gmail.com

Nardolillo V. Chase – Northern District of California: Motion to Dismiss Denied

By J. Guggenheim/www.lendinglies.com

Note: Our ongoing gratitude to Investigator Bill Paatalo of BP Investigative Agency for keeping us updated with significant developments in nationwide foreclosure defense cases.  Paatalo is the preeminent investigator regarding WaMu/JPMorgan Chase “merger” issues.

See Nordolillo v. JPMorgan Chase Nardolillo v. Chase

Analysis by Neil Garfield:  Although Nardolillo’s case has merit, unfortunately he may lose because he already alleged that the loan was sold to a specific securitized trust.  We already know the loans weren’t transferred to the trusts, so Nardolillo has already compromised his own case by making erroneous presumptions.

Without an amendment to his pleadings, he will be forced to prove the trust bought the loan which is impossible because the trust didn’t buy the loan and therefore there is no evidence to support the allegation.

The flip-side is that if Nordolillo had not identified who the loan was sold to, the court would have likely gone the other way on the motion to dismiss.

If he amends to not be specific on the “sale” of the loan, there is a risk that the court will dismiss the action.  The real problem really is that not only did the trust NOT buy the loan, but NOBODY did.

That is because the only movement of money that actually occurred in the real world was to fund loans originated by WAMU. Thus he is right that WAMU didn’t own it but he is citing the wrong reason. WAMU never owned the loan in the first place. Thus there could be no sale.

Chase relies on the complexity of its scheme to confuse and overwhelm the bench. This is the principal reason that I have been hammering at the idea of using a CPA as an expert witness because the numbers don’t lie. Banks lie, servicers lie, and lawyers lie; but in the end, the numbers on the general ledger as audited by one of the big auditing firms tell the real story. You will likely never find a single one of these loans on the balance sheet of any of the players pretending to foreclose.

___________________________________________________________

Nardolillo v. JPMorgan Chase is scheduled for trial in April in California’s liberal North District Court.  This case includes illegal substitutions of trustees by Chase, if they were not the beneficiary per the Purchase and Assumption Agreement (PAA).  Nardolillo alleges wrongful foreclosure, violations of the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, and dual-tracking violations in regards to a pending loan modification.  Nardolillo is not the first to allege that JPMorgan Chase is playing an ownership shell-game (see Fox).

WaMu was taken under receivership by the FDIC in 2008 when it became insolvent.  JPMorgan Chase then entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (PAA) with the FDIC to acquire “certain” WaMu assets.  Plaintiff Gary Nardolillo alleges his Note and Deed of Trust were not among the assets Chase acquired through the PAA and that they were “possibly” sold or securitized years earlier.

This is business as usual for JPMorgan Chase who typically has no note or assignment demonstrating ownership in regards to the WaMu loans it claimed to have acquired.  Therefore, without resorting to manufacturing the documents or having a ‘bank representative’ file a sworn affidavit they have personal knowledge of the loan (when they don’t), JPMorgan Chase simply relies on a substitute trustee to compensate for Chain of Assignment deficiencies.

On March 14, 2011, Chase claimed to be the beneficiary of the DOT and directed the California Reconveyance Corporation (CRC), as trustee, to record a Notice of Default against the subject property.  CRC recorded a Notice of Default, stating the amount due as of March 11, 2011, was $36,304.16.

On October 20, 2014, in a recorded “Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust,” Chase purported to act as “attorney in fact” for the FDIC and transferred all beneficial interest in Nardolillo’s DOT to itself.   Nardolillo alleges this was a void assignment because: (1) Nardolillo’s DOT was never among the assets received by the FDIC from WaMu and transferred to Chase; and (2) Chase was not authorized to serve as the attorney in fact for the FDIC at the time it executed and recorded the Corporate Assignment.

Chase then began its usual game of what Investigator Paatalo refers to “whack-a-mole” and on April 17, 2015, it recorded a Substitution of Trustee, substituting former-defendant Trustee Corps in place of CRC as trustee under the DOT. Nardolillo alleges that this substitution is also void.

Chase directed Trustee Corps to record a Notice of Trustee’s Sale against the Subject Property on July 7, 2016. Around July 22, 2016, Nardolillo submitted his first loan modification application to Chase, but the defendants have continued to notice trustee’s sale dates on the Property.  He claims that chase violated California Civil Code when it conducted the July 2016 Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded, as Chase had no right to foreclose because Chase never acquired rights to the DOT and Note from WaMu.

Assuming these allegations are true, the Notice of Trustee’s Sale would not be “accurate and complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.” Cal. City Code§ 2924.17/a).   Chase argues Nardolillo’s argument isn’t sufficiently supported by facts, but only by insufficient bare conclusions.  Nardolillo is at the mercy of Chase who likely doesn’t have the necessary proof but relies on the complicity of the bank to get away with fraud.  The relevant allegations in the Complaint are:

—Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that WaMu sold Plaintiff’s DOT and Note to a mortgage – backed securitized trust.
—Plaintiff’s securitization audit indicated Plaintiff ‘ s loan was possibly sold to the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR12 trust – a real estate mortgage investment conduit (“REMIC”) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
—Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that his Note and DOT were not among the assets acquired by Chase through the PAA, having been sold and securitized to a trust pool a few years prior.

Chase relies on the PAA, that claims Chase acquired WaMu’s “assets” from the FDIC in 2008, as well as the recorded “Corporate Assignment,” showing that plaintiff’s DOT and Note were transferred to Chase by Chase (as the attorney in fact for the FDIC as receiver for WaMu).  Relying on JPMorgan Chase’s word is like believing Kevin Hart is a committed family man- despite the Vegas photos.

Chase claims these judicially noticeable documents and the absence of notices recorded by any other entity with respect to the Property establish that Chase “is of record with respect to the Property.”  Plaintiff has correctly objected to any attempt to take judicial notice of the facts contained in these public records as true. He argues that the “truth” of whether Chase was entitled to sign the Corporate Assignment and whether plaintiff’s Note and DOT were included with the scope of the PAA are contested and cannot be established through a request f0r judicial notice.  Neil Garfield writes about the perils of not objecting to judicial notice here.

Chase’s arguments are not well-taken on a motion to dismiss.  The PAA does not expressly cover plaintiff’s Note and DOT.  Chase fails to point to any portion of the PAA that demonstrates that WaMu-funded REMICs (like the one Nardolillo contends owns his Note and DOT) were “WaMu assets” transferred to Chase for servicing or for any other purpose.  The court noted that although Chase has been an entity causing notices to be recorded with respect to the Property, is significant, it does not by itself establish as an incontrovertible fact that Chase is “of interest” or otherwise entitled to enforce rights to the Note and DOT.

Investigator Bill Paatalo has proof that JPMorgan Chase did not purchase $615 billion in WaMu loans.  See article here:

http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/why-jpmorgan-chase-did-not-purchase-ownership-of-615b-worth-of-wamu-loans-in-three-simple-steps/

Paatalo has long discussed the questionable use of using “Substitution of Trustees” in order to create the illusion of ownership and to further complicate the ownership issue in a court of law.  Paatalo discovered that WaMu entities have never been dissolved and still exist.  The loans did not go through the FDIC, therefore Chase executes assignments from the FDIC in order to substitute trustees.  Paatalo demonstrates that JPMorgan Chase did not purchase ownership of $615 billion in Washington Mutal loans in three simple steps.

Paatalo presents a “3-step Analysis” to show that “ownership” of at least $615,000,000,000.00 (over half a TRILLION Dollars!) of WaMu loans were not purchased by JPMorgan Chase from the FDIC.

STEP 1:

The U.S. Senate Sub-Committee (Levin – Coburn Report) reveals in its findings of fact that WaMu sold and securitized at least $615B of residential mortgage loans through its subsidiaries “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation” and “Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation” who acted as “Depositors” in the securitization transactions.

See:

https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-the-financial-crisis

 

Pg. 116 –

From 2000 to 2007, Washington Mutual and Long Beach securitized at least $77 billion in subprime and home equity loans. WaMu also sold or securitized at least $115 billion in Option ARM loans. Between 2000 and 2008, Washington Mutual sold over $500 billion in loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, accounting for more than a quarter of every dollar in loans WaMu originated.

 

Pg. 119 –

“WaMu Capital Corp. acted as an underwriter of securitization transactions generally involving Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. or WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. Generally, one of the two entities would sell loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by the loans in question, and WaMu Capital Corp. would then underwrite the securities consistent with industry standards.

STEP 2:

See: Page 2. – PAA – (click here: FDIC-Chase – PAA)

“Assets” means all assets of the Failed Bank purchased pursuant to Section 3.1. Assets owned by Subsidiaries of the Failed Bank are not “Assets” within the meaning of this definition.”

STEP 3:

In the case of Fox v. JPMorgan Chase, a specific REMIC Trust is named in the action. To prevail on its argument that the loan was sold and transferred to the Trust, JPMorgan Chase and U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee, both admitted / “stipulated” that the loan contained both investor codes “AO1″ and “369” in the loan transfer history, which means the loan was sold by Washington Mutual Bank to the subsidiaries prior to those subsidiaries transferring the loan into the Trust. AND, it was stipulated that the loan was NOT PURCHASED FROM THE FDIC.

(Click here: Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC)

Stipulated Facts:

“8. Investor Code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.”

“9. Investor Code 369 in the Loan Transfer History File represents Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation.”

“10.  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not purchase the loan from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”

In the Fox case, “JPMorgan Chase” and “U.S. Bank as Trustee,” have taken a position that universally applies to all $615B of these securitized loans.

Each one of these loan transactions will show either the investor code “AO1,” “369,” or both somewhere in the “Loan Transfer History” screenshots within the servicing system, and as such, the loans were not purchased from the FDIC.

To date, Chase has relied upon presumptions in order to maintain its position in thousands of foreclosure proceedings that: (1) it acquired the loans through the PAA, and (2) the assignments of beneficial-ownership interests to the loans unto itself is valid.

Please visit Bill Paatalos’s informative blog at http://www.bpinvestigativeagency.com.  Paatalo has investigated and exposed the fraudulent WaMu/FDIC/JPMorgan Chase fraud and is one of the most talented foreclosure fraud investigators in the country.

 

 

 

 

Investigator Bill Paatalo: Why JPMorgan Chase did not purchase $615 Billion of WaMu Loans

http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/why-jpmorgan-chase-did-not-purchase-ownership-of-615b-worth-of-wamu-loans-in-three-simple-steps/

Investigator Bill Paatalo questions the practice of using “Substitution of Trustees”.  Paatalo points out that WMAAC and WMMSC have never been dissolved and still exist.  Although the loans did not go through the FDIC, Chase executes assignments from the FDIC in order to substitute trustees.  In this article Paatalo demonstrates that JPMorgan Chase did not purchase ownership of $615 billion in Washington Mutal loans in three simple steps.

Please visit Bill Paatalos’s informative blog at www.bpinvestigativeagency.com.  Paatalo has investigated and exposed the fraudulent WaMu/FDIC/JPMorgan Chase fraud and is one of the most talented foreclosure fraud investigators in the country.

Here is a simple “3-step Analysis” to show that “ownership” of at least $615,000,000,000.00 (over half a TRILLION Dollars!) of WaMu loans were not purchased by JPMorgan Chase from the FDIC.

STEP 1:

The U.S. Senate Sub-Committee (Levin – Coburn Report) reveals in its findings of fact that WaMu sold and securitized at least $615B of residential mortgage loans through its subsidiaries “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation” and “Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation” who acted as “Depositors” in the securitization transactions.

See:

https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-the-financial-crisis

 

Pg. 116 –

From 2000 to 2007, Washington Mutual and Long Beach securitized at least $77 billion in subprime and home equity loans. WaMu also sold or securitized at least $115 billion in Option ARM loans. Between 2000 and 2008, Washington Mutual sold over $500 billion in loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, accounting for more than a quarter of every dollar in loans WaMu originated.

 

Pg. 119 –

“WaMu Capital Corp. acted as an underwriter of securitization transactions generally involving Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. or WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. Generally, one of the two entities would sell loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by the loans in question, and WaMu Capital Corp. would then underwrite the securities consistent with industry standards.

STEP 2:

See: Page 2. – PAA – (click here: FDIC-Chase – PAA)

“Assets” means all assets of the Failed Bank purchased pursuant to Section 3.1. Assets owned by Subsidiaries of the Failed Bank are not “Assets” within the meaning of this definition.”

STEP 3:

In the case of Fox v. JPMorgan Chase, a specific REMIC Trust is named in the action. To prevail on its argument that the loan was sold and transferred to the Trust, JPMorgan Chase and U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee, both admitted / “stipulated” that the loan contained both investor codes “AO1″ and “369” in the loan transfer history, which means the loan was sold by Washington Mutual Bank to the subsidiaries prior to those subsidiaries transferring the loan into the Trust. AND, it was stipulated that the loan was NOT PURCHASED FROM THE FDIC.

(Click here: Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC)

Stipulated Facts:

“8. Investor Code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.”

“9. Investor Code 369 in the Loan Transfer History File represents Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation.”

“10.  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not purchase the loan from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”

 

In the Fox case, “JPMorgan Chase” and “U.S. Bank as Trustee,” have taken a position that universally applies to all $615B of these securitized loans.

Each one of these loan transactions will show either the investor code “AO1,” “369,” or both somewhere in the “Loan Transfer History” screenshots within the servicing system, and as such, the loans were not purchased from the FDIC.

The presumptions that Chase has relied upon in order to maintain its position in thousands of foreclosure proceedings that (1) it acquired the loans through the PAA, and (2) the assignments of beneficial-ownership interests to the loans unto itself as “

US Bank v Mattos: Ocwen’s Witness unable to collaborate U.S. Bank’s Records

Thanks to Investigator Bill Paatalo of BP Investigative Agency for the heads up on this case.  Furthermore if you are suing U.S. Bank please note that THERE ARE NO RECORDS KEPT BY US BANK OF ANY KIND other than receipt of a monthly fee.  Bill Paatalo will be dropping a bombshell on these findings in the next month.

Please see ruling:  US Bank v Mattos – No Standing 06-06-17

The Supreme Court of Hawaii on certiorari to the Hawaii Court of Appeals reversed a prior summary judgment when it was determined that Ocwen’s witness was unable to speak for the validity of U.S. Bank’s records.   Hawaiian attorney Gary Dubin did an exemplary job demonstrating why the fraudulent assigments were void, not just voidable and that US Bank could not prove standing to foreclose.

The Defendants complained that the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact including two mortgage assignments that were robosigned by persons with insufficient authority or personal knowledge as to what they swore to.  There were also two assignments to the securitized trust in the chain of US Bank’s alleged ownership that were only supported by hearsay declarations inadmissible pursuant to Hawaii’s Civil Procedure Rule 56 and Evidence Rules.  Therefore, the court ruled that the Defendant’s loan violated the requirements of the securitized trust’s Pooling and Servicing agreement.

U.S. Bank’s declarants also had no idea how earlier business records had been compiled in regards to the two invalid mortgage assignments allegedly assigned to the securitized trust.

It was ruled that the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) incorrectly concluded that the declaration of Richard Work, the Contract Management Coordinator of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), rendered him a “qualified witness” for U.S. Bank’s records under the Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence Rule 803(b)(6)- hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity.  In addition, U.S. Bank failed to establish that it was a holder entitled to enforce the note at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed(see Bank of America, N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaii(2017)).

 

Unfortunately in regards to the first issue on certiorari, the court was unfamiliar with the term “robosigning” and ruled that since the legal effect of “robo-signing” was not necessary to  the determination of the case, the court sidestepped the issue and set aside the ICA’s holding that, “conclusory assertions that fail to offer factual allegations or a legal theory indicating how alleged “robo-signing” caused harm to a mortgagee” are insufficient to establish a defense in a foreclosure action.

 

Addressing the factual allegations underlying the “robo-signing” claim, however, the court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ocwen had the authority to sign the second assignment of mortgage to U.S. Bank. With respect to the second issue on certiorari, the court affirmed the ICA in part and followed the majority rule in U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Salvacion (Hawaii App. 2014) and held that, “a third party unrelated to a mortgage securitization pooling and servicing agreement lacks standing to enforce an alleged violation of its terms unless the violation renders the mortgage assignment void, rather than voidable.”  However the court limited the holding to the judicial foreclosure context not impacting non-judicial foreclosures.

 

The court issued a reversal and vacated the prior March 9, 2016 Judgment on Appeal, as well as the circuit court’s August 26, 2014 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against all defendants and remanded the case back to the circuit court.

It is unfortunate that the circuit court and Intermediate Court of Appeals were so obviously biased towards the homeowner that they refused to apply prior rulings of law that would have quickly resolved this case.  However, part of the MegaBank-Lower Court game is to exhaust the homeowner of financial resources, while abusing them with delay strategies, discovery deficits and the misapplication of established law.  When these unethical methods are employed and a homeowner is forced to return to the lower courts and start all over again, the banks and courts should immediately be held responsible for violations of due process and the deliberate use of legal abuse tactics. The homeowner should in time be compensated for the stress incurred, emotional trauma, any lost earnings, and any resulting physical and mental health degradation.  Only when there is a sufficient financial penalty will the banks and courts consider following the rule of law.

 

 

The Neil Garfield Radio Show at 6pm Eastern: JPMorgan Chase operates a Racketeering Enterprise according to Plaintiffs

The Neil Garfield Show LIVE today at 6 pm Eastern/3 pm Pacific.  Join us!

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

For a copy of the LIST OF LOANS involved in the RICO lawsuit Click the following link: First Fidelity loans purchased from Chase

For a copy of this case click here: RICO Complaint – Chase

JPMorgan Chase has been accused of creating a “racketeering enterprise” whose purpose was to evade legal duties owed to borrowers, regulators and Plaintiffs, among others, to appropriately service federally regulated mortgage loans.  Basically, JPMorgan Chase cannot provide the necessary documentation to the Plaintiff’s regarding the loans they purchased, while borrowers whose loans were sold to JPMorgan Chase cannot obtain proof regarding the ownership of their loans (likely because all documentation was intentionally destroyed). The loans are void without the proper documentation (notes, reconveyances and assignments).   It is noteworthy, that when JPMorgan Chase went to foreclose on the “loans” with no legitimate documentation,  they would use entities like Nationwide Title Clearing to create false title and paperwork necessary to foreclose or to attach to a proof of claim in bankruptcy.

This blockbuster lawsuit illuminates the fact that JPMorgan Chase was selling thousands of loans it didn’t own including loans it had previously sold to other MBS trusts!  It is alleged that Chase transferred these defective “loans” in order to avoid non-reimbursable advances and expenses.

S&A Capital Mortgage Partners, Mortgage Resolution Servicing and 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing are suing JPMorgan Chase in the Southern District of New York District court for failure to service loans in a manner consistent with its legal obligations under: RESPA, TILA, FTC violations, the FDCPA, The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act; and other applicable state and federal usury, consumer credit protection and privacy, predatory and abusive lending laws (collectively “the Acts”).  It is likely that this is not an isolated incident, but JPMorgan Chase’s normal operational standard.

The Plaintiffs complain that JPMC, rather than comply with the costly and time consuming legal obligations it faced under the Acts, the Defendants warehoused loans in a database of charged-off loans known as RCV1 and intentionally and recklessly sold these liabilities to unaware buyers such as the Plaintiffs.

To accomplish the transfer of these obligations Defendants prevented Plaintiff’s from conducting normal due diligence, failure to provide information, and changing terms of transactions after consummation; as well as failure to transfer mortgages to them. Because the Plaintiff’s did not receive the information about the loans purchased, the Defendants tortuously interfered with the Plantiff’s relationships with the borrowers including illegally sending borrowers debt forgiveness letters and releasing liens.   These actions not only resulted in specific damage to said lien’s value, but caused Plaintiffs reputational harm with borrowers, loan sellers, investors, lenders and regulators.

In reality both investors and borrowers should unite and sue JPMorgan Chase for Fraud and Fraudulent Inducement, Tortious Interference with Business Relations, conversion, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel and additional relief.

Highlights from the case include these bombshells accusing JPMorgan Chase of:

(iv) Knowingly breached every representation they made in the MLPA, including failing to legally transfer 3,529 closed-end 1st lien mortgages worth $156,324,399.24 to the Plaintiffs, and to provide Plaintiffs with the information required by both RESPA and the MMLSA so that Plaintiffs could legally service said loans.

(v) Took numerous actions post-facto that tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs’ relationships with borrowers including illegally sending borrowers debt forgiveness letters and releasing liens.

RCV1 Evades Regulatory Standards and Servicing Requirements

  1. Defendants routinely and illicitly sought to avoid costly and time-consuming servicing of federally related mortgage loans. Since 2000, Defendants maintained loans on various mortgage servicing Systems of Records (“SOR”) which are required to meet servicing standards and regulatory mandates. However, Defendants installed RCV1, an off-the-books system of records to conduct illicit practices outside the realm of regulation or auditing. Defendants’ scheme involves flagging defaulted and problem federally related loans on the legitimate SOR and installing a subsequent process to then identify and transfer the loan records from the legitimate SOR to RCV1. The process could be disguised as a reporting process within the legitimate SOR and the data then loaded to the RCV1 repository on an ongoing basis undetected by federal regulators.
  2. Defendants inactivated federally related mortgage loans from their various SORs such as from the Mortgage Servicing Platform (“MSP”) and Vendor Lending System (“VLS”).

 

  1. RCV1’s design and functionality does not meet any servicing standards or requirements under applicable federal, state, and local laws pertaining to mortgage servicing or consumer protection. Instead, the practices implemented by Defendants on the RCV1 population are focused on debt collection.

 

  1. Defendants seek to maximize revenue through a scheme of flagging, inactivating, and then illicitly housing charged-off problematic residential mortgage loans in the vacuum of RCV1, improperly converting these problematic residential mortgage loans into purely debt collection cases that are akin to bad credit card debt, and recklessly disregarding virtually all servicing obligations in the process. In order to maximize revenue, Defendants used unscrupulous collection methods on homeowners utilizing third-party collection agencies and deceptive sales tactics on unsuspecting note sale investors, all the while applying for governmental credits and feigning compliance with regulatory standards.

 

  1. In short, the RCV1 is where mortgage loans and associated borrowers are intentionally mishandled in such a manner that compliance with any regulatory requirements is impossible. In derogation of the RESPA, which requires mortgage servicers to correct account errors and disclose account information when a borrower sends a written request for information, the information for loans in RCV1 remains uncorrected and is sent as an inventory list from one collection agency to another, progressively resulting in further degradation of the loan information. In dereliction of various regulations related to loan servicing, loans once in RCV1 are not verified individually and the identity of the true owner of the note per the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is often concealed. Regulatory controls regarding grace periods, crediting funds properly, charging correct amounts are not followed.

 

  1. More specifically, a borrower sending a qualified written request under Section 6 of RESPA concerning the servicing of his/her loan or request for correction under 12 U.S.C. §2605(e), 12 CFR §1024.35 could not obtain resolution because RCV1 is a repository for housing debt rather than a platform for housing and servicing federally related loans. RCV1 contains no functionalities for accounting nor escrow management in contravention of §10 of RESPA, Regulation X, 12 CFR §1024.34.

 

In contravention of 12 CFR §1024.39, Chase failed to inform Borrowers whose loans were flagged, inactivated, and housed in RCV1, about the availability of loss mitigation options, and in contravention of 12 CFR §1024.40. Chase also failed to make available to each Borrower personnel assigned to him/her to apprise the Borrower of the actions the Borrower must take, status of any loss mitigation application, circumstances under which property would be referred to foreclosure, or applicable loss mitigation deadlines in careless disregard of any of the loss mitigation procedures under Reg X 12 CFR § 1024.41.

 

  1. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs and regulatory agencies, Chase has systematically used RCV1 to park flagged loans inactivated in the MSP, VLS, and other customary SORs to (1) eschew Regulatory requirements while publicly assuring compliance, (2) request credits and insurance on the charge-offs., (3) continue collection, and (4) sell-off these problematic loans to unsuspecting investors to maximize profit/side-step liability, all with the end of maximizing profit.

 

Specifics of Defendants’ RICO Scheme and Conduct:

  1. Since at least 2000, Defendants evaded their legal obligations and liabilities with respect to the proper servicing of federally related mortgages, causing Plaintiffs damage through Defendants’ misconduct from their scheme to violate:
  • The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA);
  • The Truth in Lending Act (TILA);
  • The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC);
  • The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);
  • The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank);
  • The Equal Credit Opportunity Act; and
  • The Fair Housing Act.
  1. After Plaintiffs acquired mortgage loans from Defendants, during the period 2011 through at least 2016, Defendants released thousands of liens related to RCV1 loans, including RCV1 loans Defendants no longer owned, to avoid detection of non-compliance with the Lender Settlements. These lien releases caused harm to the Plaintiffs and to numerous other note sale investors.

 

  1. Similarly, in September 2008, Chase Bank entered into an agreement with the FDIC as receiver for WAMU-Henderson. Chase Bank made a number of representations in its agreement with the FDIC, including that Chase Bank and its subsidiaries were in compliance with all applicable federal, state and local laws. However, at the time of execution and delivery of the agreement, Chase owned thousands of loans with respect to which, through its improper servicing and other misconduct relating to the RCV1, it was in violation of many federal and state laws. These circumstances created a further motive for Chase Bank to participate in the scheme to transfer thousands of noncompliant loans to Plaintiffs and others.

 

  1. Plaintiff MRS purchased loans from Chase pursuant to the MLPA that were actually Chase’s most problematic loans and mostly housed in the RCV1 repository. In March, 2009, bare notes and deeds, without the promised required loan files documenting servicing and borrower information, were simply shipped to Plaintiffs as the “loan files”. Plaintiffs also received loans for which no notes, deeds or loan files were provided at all. Nevertheless, Defendants kept promising that the complete loan files were forthcoming, with no intent of ever providing them. Without the necessary documentation, it was difficult or impossible for Plaintiffs to service and collect on the loans. And despite herculean efforts, most often Plaintiffs could not locate the necessary information to service and collect on the loans.

 

  1. Defendants’ plan to entice an existing and approved, but unsuspecting note sale buyer to purchase these toxic loans is in plain view in various recently produced email exchanges discussing Defendant’s fraudulent scheme to dump non-serviced loans with inadequate documentation on Plaintiffs from October 2008 through February 2009.

 

  1. As early as 2008, Defendants’ knew the public was becoming more aware of its the scope of its improper actions. Ultimately, in 2012, public pressure prompted the federal government and many states to bring a complaint against JPMorgan and Chase Bank, as well as other banks responsible for fraudulent and unfair mortgage practices that cost consumers, the federal government, and the states tens of billions of dollars. The complaint alleged that JPMorgan and Chase Bank, as well as other financial institutions, engaged in improper practices related to mortgage origination, mortgage servicing, and foreclosures, including, but not limited to, irresponsible and inadequate oversight of the banks’ quality control standards. Unfortunately, the complaint failed to note, and the government appeared unaware of, the Defendants’ deeper institutional directives designed to hide their improprieties (such as the establishment of the RCV1 and its true purpose).

 

  1. 48. At all applicable times, Defendants had been continuing to utilize its RCV1 database.

 

  1. However, as in 2008, the loans housed in the RCV1 repository presented a huge reputational risk and legal liability as the loans housed in RCV1 were not being treated as federally related mortgage loans, were not in compliance, were no longer being serviced as such, but were being collected upon.

 

  1. By 2012, the RCV1 database contained hundreds of thousands of federally related mortgage loans, which had been inactivated in regular systems of records and whose accounts were no longer tracked pursuant to regulatory requirements, including escrow accounting.

 

  1. Other knowing participants in the conspiracy include third party title clearing agencies, such as Nationwide Title Clearing Company (NTC), Pierson Patterson, and LCS Financial Services, who were directed by Defendants to prepare and then file fraudulent lien releases and other documents affecting interests in property. Either these entities were hired to verify liens and successively failed to properly validate the liens before creating documents and lien releases containing false information, or these entities were directed by Chase to create the documents with the information provided by Defendants. In either case, these title clearing agencies which recorded fraudulent releases of liens and related documents in the public record, had independent and separate duty from Defendants to file, under various state laws, all relevant documents only after a good faith proper validation of the liens. Instead these entities deliberately violated their duty of care by knowingly or recklessly filing false lien releases and false documents on properties not owned by Defendants.

 

  1. In many states, the act of creating these documents is considered the unauthorized practice of law. In Florida, where NTC is organized, there is a small exception for title companies who are only permitted to prepare documents and perform other necessary acts affecting the legal title of property where the property in question is to be insured, to fulfill a condition for issuance of a title policy or title insurance commitment by the Insurer or if a separate charge was made for such services apart from the insurance premium of the Insurer. Plaintiffs have not ascertained whether Nationwide Title or any other agencies created documents for Chase as a necessary incident to Chase’s purchase of title insurance in Florida.

 

  1. Chase used Real Time Resolutions, GC Services, and Five Lakes Agency, among other collection agencies, to maximize its own back door revenues on loans that were problematic and had been inactivated/“charged off” and thereby were invisible to regulatory agencies.

 

  1. At all times, Defendants directed the collection of revenue on problematic federal mortgage loans, placing them in succession at third party collection agencies. Those third party collection agencies included:

 

  1. The third-party collection agencies had a duty to verify whether the debts were owned by Chase, offer pre-foreclosure loss mitigation, offer Borrowers foreclosure alternatives, and comply with any of HUD’s quality control directives and knowingly or recklessly failed to do so. The third-party collectors knew that the debts they were collecting at Defendants’ directions were mortgage loans. They also knew they did not have the mechanisms to provide any regulatory servicing. Nonetheless, the third-party collection agencies continued collection on behalf of Chase for RCV1 loans. The collection agencies continued to collect without oversight or verification and did in fact continue collecting on debt on behalf of Defendants, despite the mortgage loans being owned by the Schneider entities. The ongoing collection gave Chase continued windfalls.

 

  1. A September 30, 2014 document shows that as late as September 30, 2014, Defendants had charged-off and ported 699,541 loans into RCV1.

 

  1. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Chase was selling non-compliant and thus no longer “federally related mortgage loans” to Plaintiff which Chase had ported and inactivated within their regulated systems of records but had copied over to a separate data repository solely for the purpose of collecting without servicing.

 

 

  1. Plaintiff MRS was not privy to Defendants’ internal communications of October 30, 2008, which clarify that Chase knew that the loans it was intending to off load onto the Plaintiff were not on the primary system of record and were being provided from the un-serviced repository called RCV1. The information in RCV1 was not complete because it was not a regulated system of record. As indicated by Chase’s communications, Chase purposefully cut and pasted select information where it could from other systems of records to the information in RCV1. Defendants’ emails discuss data from the FORTRACS application, the acronym for Foreclosure Tracking System, which is an automated, loan default tracking application that also handles the loss mitigation, foreclosure processing, bankruptcy monitoring, and whose data would have originally come from a primary system of record. Rather than a normal and customary data tape, Chase was providing a Frankenstein of a data tape, stitched together from a patchwork of questionable information.

 

  1. Despite its representation and warranty that Chase “is the owner of the Mortgage Loans and has full right to transfer the Mortgage Loans,” a significant portion of the loans listed on Exhibit A were not directly owned by Chase.

 

  1. Upon information and belief, some of the loans sold to MRS were RMBS trust loans which Chase was servicing. Chase had transferred these to MRS in order to avoid non-reimbursable advances and expenses. The unlawful transfer of these loans to MRS as part of the portfolio of loans sold under the MLPA aided the Defendants in concealing Regulatory non-compliance and fraud while increasing the liabilities of MRS.

 

  1. Chase committed, inter alia, the following violations of law with respect to the loans sold to MRS: a. Chase transferred the servicing of the mortgage loans to and from multiple unlicensed and unregulated debt collection agencies which lacked the mortgage servicing platforms to account for or service the borrowers’ loan with any accuracy or integrity.

Investigator Bill Paatalo of the BP Investigative Agency points out that allegations in this case support accusations in other lawsuits against JPMorgan Chase including that:

  1. Chase knowingly provided collection agencies with false and misleading information about the borrowers.
  2. Chase failed to provide proper record keeping for escrow accounts.
  3. Chase stripped loan files of most origination documentation, including federal disclosures and good faith estimates, thus putting MRS in a positionwhere it was unable to respond to borrower or regulatory inquiries.
  4. Chase failed to provide any accurate borrower payment histories for any of the loans in theMLPA.
  5. Chase knowingly executed assignments of mortgage to MRS for mortgage loans that Defendants knew had been foreclosed and sold to third parties.
  6. Chase circumvented its own operating procedures and written policies in connection with servicing federally-related mortgage loans by removing the loans from its primary record-keeping platform and creating an entry in its RCV1 repository. This had the effect of denying the borrowers their rights concerning federally related mortgages yet allowed Chase to retain the lien and the benefit of the security interest,
  7. Chase included on Exhibit A loans that it had previously sold to third parties and loans that it had never owned.
  8. Chase knowingly and deliberately changed the loan numbers of numerous valuable loans sold to MRS after the MLPA had been fully executed and in force. This allowed Chase to accept payments from borrowers whose loans had been sold to MRS without its own records disclosing the wrongful acceptance of such payments.
  9. Chase’s failure to provide the assignments of the notes and mortgages was not an act of negligence. As events unfolded, it became clear that Chase failed to provide the assignments of the notes and mortgages because it wanted, in selective instances, to continue to treat the sold loans as its own property.
  10. Chase converted payments from borrowers whose loans it had sold

At what point does the Federal Government take action against these fraudulent practices?  It is likely that ALL major banks are participating in the exact same racketeering enterprises so obvious at JPMorgan Chase.

Bill Paatalo, Private Investigator:
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075
Attorney Charles Marshall, Esq.
Law Office of Charles T. Marshall
415 Laurel St., #405
San Diego, CA 92101

 

 

Investigator Bill Paatalo: A Plea To These Conspirators – You Have The Power To End This Nightmare.

 http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/a-plea-to-these-conspirators-you-have-the-power-to-end-this-nightmare/

I received an email yesterday morning that starts out with this:

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 9:18 AM, the author wrote:

Please help save longtime Sandy Oregon resident Robynne Fauley’s life. She had major cancer surgery less than two weeks ago is getting chemo and is VERY ill. She will be evicted from her home on May 1st if we don’t help.  She has nowhere to go. The ordeal is very likely to kill he[r;].
I happen to have some knowledge about this case, as I was called in as an expert last year to assist an ABC News investigative journalist in Dallas, TX. Unfortunately, after all the time spent conducting interviews and laying out the evidence of fraud on a platter, corporate counsel for ABC News quashed the story. I’m sure this surprises no one. The reality is that the media will continue to plug its ears, while law enforcement will continue to view and categorize crimes of counterfeiting, forgery, tax evasion, and mail/wire fraud as “civil matters” in the context of foreclosures.
So with the clock ticking, I thought I’d throw up a “Hail Mary” plea in the direction of “Diane Meistad” and the rest of these conspirators. Diane, Michael, and the rest of you –  if you’re out there and see this, fix it!
The following email strand (2008 Internal Emails – MGC – RFC – Quality Loan Servicing – Fauley Case) is a rare glimpse of bank employees conspiring to forge, back-date, and fraudulently produce a chain of title.
July 11, 2008
From: Monica Hadley – MGC Mortgage
To: Chris Malapit – (Trustee) Quality Loan Service of Washington
Hadley: Chris, Does this loan have title issues? I was going through the original documents and the chain of title seems to be missing some assignments. It could have been that this was missed in the file and all is well. I want to make sure.
July 11. 2008
From: Chris Malapit
To: Monica Hadley
Subject: *12125 Se Laughing Water, Sandy, OR 97055* Robynne Fauley
The DOT was assigned to WAMU,FA as of 5/3/2007 by instrument#2007-038181. Once we are able to proceed we will then need an assignment from WAMU, FA in LNV Corporation.
July 14, 2008
From: Monica Hadley
To: Chris Malapit
Chris, That is what I see too. We received the loan from Residential Funding Company, LLC and have an AOM from RFC to LNV Corporation. Why did RFC assign the loan to WAMU? Do you have a contact at WAMU who will assign the file to LNV Corporation?
July 14, 2008
From: Chris Malapit
To: Monica Hadley
Doing more research I don’t think Residential Funding Co, LLC had the authority to transfer the interest as the last bene of record per our title report was Deutsche Bank Trust not Residential Funding Co.
July 16, 2008
From: Monica Hadley – MGC Mortgage
To: Chris Malapit – (Trustee) Quality Loan Service of Washington
Subject: Subject: *12125 Se Laughing Water, Sandy, OR 97055* Robynne Fauley
Here is a copy of the most recent title update from the attorney office and the email chain from our attorney.
[FAST FORWARD]
October 17, 2008
From: Michael Barnett (MGC Mortgage, Inc.)
To: Shanda Foreman (entity unknown)
Cc: Carissa Golden (entity unknown)
Subject: Intervening Assignments to Deutsche Bank
 
Shanda, I have 2 RFC loans that are needing assignments from Deutsche Bank to RFC. Please check to see if they are on the list you sent to RFC. See the loan numbers below.
 
17103058/Robynne Fauley, Oregon
17102692/Stuart Berg, New Jersey
 
 
October 24, 2008
From: Michael Barnett
To: ‘Meistad, Diane’ (entity unknown)
 
Diane, this loan was last assigned to Washington Mutual from RFC but, prior to this assignment was assigned from Washington Mutual to Deutsche Bank and recorded in Clackamas County, Oregon. We need an assignment from Deutsche Bank to RFC and from Washington Mutual to LNV Corp. I have templates for both assignments. We will be re-recording the assignment from RFC to Washington Mutual to correct the chain of title with both of these assignments. Also, please find Note Allonge from Deutsche Bank to RFC as well. Please forward these signed assignments back to me via our federal express account #252870180. Thanks Michael.
 
(Assignments & Allonge attached)
[Note: WAMU no longer existed on October 24, 2008. This is a huge problem! But this doesn’t stop MGC from creating the necessary “templates” to solve this problem. Furthermore, Diane Meistad is believed to have been employed by RFC. Yet, MGC creates an “Alonge” from Deutsche Bank to RFC seeking RFC’s execution, not Deutsche Bank.]
October 27, 2008
From: Diane Meistad
To: Michael Barnett
Subject: RE: Default Assignment Request loan #7889719/17103058 (Fauley, Robynne)
 
Michael, If the assignment was recorded from WAMU to DB and another assignment f/RFC to WAMU – technically the second assignment is ‘invalid’ because RFC was not in title to record the second assignment and it should not effect title.
 
Because of the assignment was invalid technically it didn’t transfer ownership.
 
October 27, 2008
From: Michael Barnett
To: Diane Meistad
 
Diane, since the assignment from RFC to WAMU is of record we have to correct the chain of title. At this point the county recorder’s office shows that WAMU is the assignee of record for this loan (which is wrong), right? RFC did assign this loan and shouldn’t have but, in order to fix this one the correct chain should be from Deutsche to RFC, then from RFC to WAMU, then WAMU to LNV Corp, which will correct the chain of title. Litton Loan Servicing LP prepared and recorded the assignment from RFC to WAMU, which should not have been recorded. We still need to get this loan from RFC to LNV to properly convey this property, since we purchased it from RFC. Please call me if you still concerns about the chain of assignments. Borrower loan #7889719/17103058 – Robynne Fauley. Thanks Michael.
 
[NOTE: This was a WAMU originated loan. WAMU sold this loan in a number of undocumented transactions that wound up in the hands of “Deutsche Bank as Trustee.” This means that the Fauley loan was securitized into some trust years prior, to which Deutsche Bank was acting as Trustee. MGC is claiming they purchased this loan when they clearly do not have clear title. They admit in this email that in order to correct the chain of title, they need the final transfer from WAMU to LNV Corp, which at this point in time is an impossibility. The next responsive email shows that Diane Meistad disagrees with MGC’s position / request.]
October 27, 2008
From: Diane Meistad
To: Michael Barnett
Subject: RE: Default Assignment Request loan (Fauley, Robynne)
 
I disagree since RFC was not in position (title position) to transfer the asset.
 
I will need to refer your request for this assignment to our Records Services team in Iowa to begin the process. Diane
[NOTE: Meistad, who is believed to work for RFC, does not believe RFC was in title position to transfer the Deed of Trust. The reference to the “Records Services team in Iowa” means it is likely that Wells Fargo was involved as a master servicer / custodian for the unidentified trust for which Deutsche Bank was Trustee.]
October 27, 2008
From: Michael Barnett
To: Diane Meistad
Subject: RE: Default Assignment Request loan (Fauley, Robynne)
 
Okay Diane, I had my manager look at this file with me and we have determined that we need the following assignments to correct the chain of assignments:
 
1) Corrective Assignment from WAMU TO Deutsche Bank (to correct the assignment from RFC to WAMU, which was recorded in error) & Note Allonge
2) Assignment from Deutsche Bank to RFC & Note Allonge
3) Assignment from RFC to LNV Corp (Note allonge in file already)
 
The assignment from RFC to WAMU was recorded in error so it is not needed. We also have 2 endorsements on the original Note WAMU to RFC to Deutsche Bank which should be cancelled, to correct the Endorsement chain on the Note. We will just need the okay from you via email to cancel these endorsements. Will this work for you? Thanks Michael.
[NOTE: MGC has decided what was done right and wrong in prior transactions for which it has no knowledge, and what now needs to be done in its own best interest to steal and harvest the home. The transfers to and from WAMU as described above would be fraud due to WAMU being defunct. Then there is the request to have RFC cancel out the endorsements and replace with allonges. The third request in the sequence states that an allonge is already in the file from RFC to LNV Corp even though there are no assignments, yet, to support that allonge. That allonge created by MGC is fraudulent, and represents yet another broken sequence in the chain of title.]
Four days after this last email on October 27, 2008, the following two attached assignments are recorded simultaneously in Clackamas County, Oregon (Recorded Assignments – October 31 2008 – Fauley). The first assignment (and I call it the “first” because of its fraudulently back-dated) is executed on “March 10, 2008″ and notarized as such by “Diane Meistad” – Notary Public – State of Minnesota.” The assignor is “Residential Funding Company, LLC fka Residential Funding Corporation” with no Assignee named. NO ASSIGNEE! However, the second assignment is executed on October 27, 2008 with the Assignor named as “Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (formerly known as Bankers Trust Company) and the Assignee – “Residential Funding Company, LLC.” This assignment is also notarized by “Diane Meistad.” As admitted by Meistad above, RFC was not in title position to transfer the asset as of October 27, 2008. Yet, she acquiesced to MGC’s fraudulent conspiracy to forge, fabricate, and alter documents.
So, Diane Meistad, Michael Barnett, and all the rest of you who where involved in this deceit, this one’s on you. You are the only ones who can put a stop to this injustice. Robynne Fauley, who is elderly and very sick, has suffered immensely from your actions. In six-days she is scheduled to be evicted from her home. Fix this!
Bill Paatalo
Private Investigator – OR PSID$ 49411
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
(406) 328-4075
bill.bpia@gmail.com

Case Involuntarily Dismissed: Caliber & U.S. Bank Trust for LSF9 Master Participation Trust Lose In Florida –

Please study the attached transcript for a road map regarding how a homeowner’s attorney should question a servicer’s witness.   See:  BOA-v-Asset-Acquisitions-Re-LSF9

Great job by Michelle Belmont, Esq.!

http://belmontesq.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/WON-Transrcipt-BOA-v-Asset-Acquisitions.pdf

Here’s a case we’ve seen a thousand times. Plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, is substituted in during the litigation. Caliber as the servicer sends in its witness minion to parrot what he/she has been told.
But this time things went south very quickly for Caliber. Though the note, mortgage, assignment, and most everything else were stipulated to prior to trial, attorney Michelle Belmont attacked the validity of the LPOA to which the court rejected and dismissed the case involuntarily. The Court clearly recognized that the witness could not reach first base without the Court allowing the LPOA into the record. The best part however, is the judge telegraphs what he perceives was the fatal strategy to bring in a witness from Caliber, when the Plaintiff became “U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.” He says, “Where’s the witness from U.S. Bank?” As everyone knows well, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., or U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee knows nothing!
This is a roadmap that should be used in every single case!

Bill Paatalo

Oregon Private Investigator – PSID#49411

BP Investigative Agency, LLCP.O. Box 838

Absarokee, MT 59001Office: (406) 328-4075

Ft. Myers Attorney Michelle Belmont
http://belmontesq.com
Phone: (239) 848-6552 |
Office: 8660 College Parkway, Suite 180, Fort Myers, Florida

Investigator Bill Paatalo: “Who Is Private Investor ‘AO1?” JPMorgan Chase Refuses To Reveal The Identity Of This Investor.”

Evidence-Puzzle-via-TouroLawReview

http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/washington-mutual-bank-sold-these-67529-toxic-loans-and-not-one-single-foreclosure-by-the-investors/

In relation to my previous article, let me continue a bit further. More and more cases continue to come across my desk showing that WaMu loans claimed to be owned by JPMorgan Chase, through the “Purchase & Assumption Agreement” with the FDIC, were in fact sold by WaMu to “Private Investor – AO1” prior to the FDIC’s Receivership. Here is an excerpt from a recent affidavit I produced:

———————————————————————

“Private investors own the subject loans, and their identity is being concealed.

Attached as Exhibit 5, p.1 is a servicing system screenshot titled, “3270 Explorer” which was provided to me by Plaintiff through discovery efforts. This screenshot is dated 03/02/2009 and refers to “Loan Number [“REDACTED”] which is associated with the [“REDACTED”] mortgage. This document shows an investor code “AO1” directly beneath the top line. The same investor code “AO1” is shown on the servicing screenshot for this loan on 12/31/2005 (Exhibit 5, p. 2). Exhibit 5. P.3 is the servicer screenshot for the [“REDACTED” mortgage (“Loan Number [REDACTED]”) dated 12/31/2005 which also shows the same investor code “AO1.”

From experience, I have seen and reviewed JPMC’s servicing records for WMB originated loans within JPMC’s “3270 Explorer” servicing platform. This system / platform contains a specific screenshot which shows the “loan transfer history” (Screen: “Explorer 3270 – LNTH”) for these loans.

From experience, I have seen complete LNTH screenshots for these WaMu loans provided by JPMC, but usually they are produced with great reluctance and through motions to compel. When produced, these LNTH screens tell an entirely different story about the loans; specifically, all the sales and transfers conducted prior to the FDIC’s receivership.

Attached as Exhibit 6 is a “3270 Explorer: Loan Loan Transfer History (LNTH)” screenshot provided by JPMC in a very similar case which I have been involved captioned Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., U.S. BK CT, ND CA, Adv. Case No. 10-05245. Like the [REDACTED]loans, the Kelley loan was also originated by Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. Exhibit 6 shows the entire LNTH from origination through the FDIC receivership. The beginning “Investor Code” at the inception of the loan is “030” on 08/07/07. The loan is then sold and transferred to a “New/Inv” (new investor) on 09/01/07 with the “Investor Code – AO1”: the same code for both [REDACTED] loans on 12/31/2005. It can be logically deduced from this evidence that the same originator code of “030” should also exist on the [REDACTED] loans if WMBFA was the originator.

A deposition of JPMC employee “Crystal Davis” occurred in the Kelley case on August 13, 2014. A copy of the Davis Deposition Transcript was filed in the PACER System and a copy is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 3. Exhibit 4 is a glossary of codes exhibit provided by JPMC in that deposition. Crystal Davis explains the investor codes on p.42 as follows:

(In reference to Exhibit 4).

Q. Now if you look to the right of that, it states that the claim – the investor IDs begin with an A through V; is that correct?

A. In the current MSP platform, yes, indicates private investor loans.

Q. And what would X,Y,Z indicate?

A. Those would indicate bank-owned assets.

It is very likely that the complete LNTH screenshots for both subject loans, if ever produced, will show similar sales transactions from WMB to “New/Inv – AO1.” The identity of investor “AO1” has not been disclosed and is being concealed from the Court and the Plaintiff. I believe this is intentional.”

————————————————–

What also appears to be intentional is the fact that when JPMC is now pressured to produce these “LNTH” screenshots per my findings and recommendations to counsel, JPMC or the servicer comes back with incomplete LNTH histories for the loans; the LNTH screens begin AFTER September 25, 2008. What this means is, not only was no schedule of assets ever produced in association with “Schedule 3.1” of the PAA, but now in some of my current cases, JPMC takes the added position that it owns these WaMu loans to which there is also no record of the sales and transfer histories of the loans within their servicing platform.  So, my opinion that WaMu sold and securitized the loan(s) prior to September 25, 2008 becomes a bit more difficult to rebut.  The question to ask any Chase representative in a deposition is this, “If no schedule or inventory of WaMu loans has ever been produced, and there are no servicing records in existence from WaMu showing whether or not the loan was ever sold or securitized, could it be possible the loan(s) were sold by WaMu prior to September 25, 2008?” (As a reminder, few if any Chase witnesses have any personal knowledge of WaMu’s business practices.)

Bottom line – Chase’s own witness testified that “Ao1” is a private investor, and this code does not mean “bank owned.” With the LNTH screenshots now appearing with no pre-receivership sales and transfer activities entered by WaMu, it is almost too much to believe that one of the largest banking institutions in the world, would not have tracked the loans it originated and sold into the secondary market within its servicing systems.

C’mon Chase, who is “Private Investor AO1?”

 

Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID#49411

Bill.bpia@gmail.com

(406) 328-4075

http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/who-is-private-investor-ao1-jpmorgan-chase-refuses-to-reveal-the-identity-of-this-investor/

 

 

Fake Agreements Between Sham Conduits Try to Preempt Courts from Ruling on Evidence

the parties are creating the illusion that they are essentially entering into an agreement to purchase paper from the seller where there is no original paperwork and no indication that the purchase ever actually took place.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Bill Paatalo, a private investigator who has concentrated his efforts on the fraud committed by banks for the past 15 years, has alerted me to a factor that ties in closely with my article yesterday on evidence. He gives a link for an example of an agreement that is designed to pull the wool over the eyes of judges, lawyers and their clients.

Note that the agreement says it is a “Correspondent” Purchase and Sale Agreement. No such thing exists. Either the Seller is a Correspondent in which case the loan “Closing” they originated was for the benefit of the superior bank or the originator was the source of funds, in which case the paperwork is at a minimum defective because it names the wrong party as lender. He writes:

Along these lines, you might find this interesting. I found the following SEC filing by WaMu, FA and one of its correspondent lenders. I can only guess there are hundreds more of these types of agreements.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/883476/000119312503037807/dex105.htm

CORRESPONDENT PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT

This is a Correspondent Purchase and Sale Agreement (“Agreement”), dated as of March 5, 2003 by, and between WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (“Purchaser”), and Crescent Mortgage Services, Inc., a Georgia Corporation (“Seller”).

Section 8.11 Reproduction of Documents. This Agreement and all documents relating thereto, including, without limitation, (a) consents, waivers and modifications which may hereafter be executed, (b) documents received by any party at the closing, and (c) financial statements, certificates and other information previously or hereafter furnished, may be reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic or other similar process. The parties agree that any such reproduction shall be admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding, whether or not the original is in existence and whether or not such reproduction was made by a party in the regular course of business, and that any enlargement, facsimile or further reproduction of such reproduction shall likewise be admissible in evidence.

Apparently these parties don’t feel that a judge decides what is admissible evidence, they themselves do.

Bill Paatalo

This is indeed interesting. It is easy to over look as boilerplate language that nobody reads.

Might be good to discuss on the radio show. Like the Purchase and Assumption Agreement (see below) between the “originator” and the sham conduit for the Underwriter of bogus mortgage bonds, this is an agreement that anticipates violation of law. It might conceivably be binding on the parties to the agreement, but it essentially preempts the court from ruling on the admissibility of evidence.

The other interesting aspect is that it anticipates that the original will not be found anywhere. This also is like the P&A. Thus the parties are creating the illusion that they are essentially entering into an agreement to purchase paper from the seller where there is no original paperwork and no indication that the purchase ever actually took place.

In all probability the “seller” never had ownership of the DEBT. It only had “ownership” of the paper. The fact that the paperwork was at best worthless and most probably is some evidence of fraud or fraudulent intent, does not diminish the “ownership” interest claimed by the “purchaser.”

They skirt the law by saying that the paper is being sold even though the debt is obviously not being sold because the seller doesn’t own it. But ti creates the illusion and for many judges the presumption that this is facially valid paper even though it violates the best evidence rule. The entire document is thus designed to skirt the best evidence rule and substitute copies of documents that can be changed at any time, since they are copies. As copies, it would be impossible to tell from the face of the “document” how many times the parties or terms had been changed.

This is the sleight of hand pattern that runs through all the “loans” that are subject to false claims of securitization. The illegal and wrongful acts, starting with the “origination” and moving forward through void transfers, assignments and endorsements are buried under what appears to be valid documentation. But like every lawyer knows — if you want copies to be treated as originals, they must all be the same and executed at least by initials and distributed to all parties to the alleged agreement.


The Purchase and Assumption Agreement was first noticed back in 2006. It was the document that gave me the first notion of how the mortgage loan documents were not merely defective, but rather nonexistent in relation to the actual debt. This is an agreement dated before the first loan is originated by the “originator.” It spells out how the consumer should not and will not know the identity of their lender in direct contravention of the entire intent and provisions of the Federal Truth in lending Act. As outlined above, this too is an agreement between two sham conduits. It’s facially validity and the laziness of lawyers and judges who don’t read it leads to the false conclusion that the banks and servicers have dotted their i’s and crossed their t’s. In truth it is just part of the mountain of false paperwork and false claims presented to courts, lawyers and their clients.

Bill Paatalo Investigations: Washington Mutual Bank Sold These 67,529 Toxic Loans, And Not One Single Foreclosure By The Investors?

http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/washington-mutual-bank-sold-these-67529-toxic-loans-and-not-one-single-foreclosure-by-the-investors/

 Having investigated the WaMu/FDIC/Chase fact pattern for nearly seven-years now, and having investigated hundreds of foreclosure cases where JPMorgan Chase claims sole ownership of specific Washington Mutual Bank loans by virtue of the “Purchase & Assumption Agreement” (PAA) with the FDIC, one fact is now well established – no schedule or inventory of assets listing any specific WMB mortgage loan acquired by JPMC exists, or has ever been produced or disclosed. The reason for this fact is that the vast majority of residential mortgage loans were securitized through WaMu’s “Off-Balance Sheet Activities,” meaning WMB sold their loans prior to the FDIC Receivership. Many of these prior sales transactions by WMB to private investors went undocumented, and were kept outside the prevue of regulators, the borrowers, and the general public. For roughly the past 8-years, Chase has been foreclosing on thousands of these previously sold WMB loans in its own name as mortgagee and beneficiary of the security instruments, when by Chase’s own admissions to numerous borrowers, the loans were sold to private investors.

Chase Admits, Then Denies

In cases I have reviewed all across the country, borrowers have made and continue to make, inquiries to their servicer “Chase” for the identity of the beneficial owners / investor(s) of their WaMu loan(s) only to be told,

“Your loan was sold into a public security managed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and may include a number of investors. As the servicer of your loan, Chase is authorized by the security to handle any related concerns on their behalf” (See:   Chase Private Investor Letters ).

In both cases involving these two disclosure letters, after having made these admissions to the borrowers, JPMorgan Chase reversed itself in court by taking the position that it was the sole owner of the loans by virtue of the PAA, and there were no investors associated with these loans because “WaMu never sold or securitized the loans.”

But now Chase has tripped itself by disclosing an actual investor in complete contradiction of its publicly recorded assignment. (See:   Chase Discloses Investor WaMu 2007-FLX1 but assigns deed to itself in 2012.)

Here, Chase executes this self-serving assignment to itself from the FDIC declaring beneficial rights to the deed of trust even though they disclosed to the borrower that the owner of the loan is “Deutsche Bank Nat Trust Co as Trustee for WAMU 2007-FLEX1.” This particular investor trust was the subject of litigation within the Washington Mutual, Inc. bankruptcy proceeding (See:  WaMu Inc Investor Complaint 2010.)

According to the complaint, the WAMU 2007-FLEX1 was a part of three asset trusts set up by Washington Mutual Preferred Funding, LLC (WMPF), who purchased the assets from WMB in 2006 and 2007. The following asset trusts were labeled “Preferred Trust Securities”:

ASSET TRUST I, ASSET TRUST II, & ASSET TRUST III

(Washington Mutual Home Equity Trust I)

(WaMu 2006-OA1)

(WaMu 2007-FLEX1)

 

Per the Complaint:

16. On September 26, 2008, as a result of the FDIC’s takeover of Washington Mutual Bank and the bankruptcy of Washington Mutual, Inc., Plaintiffs’ investments in the Preferred Trust Securities automatically converted into preferred stock of Washington Mutual, Inc., and thereby rendered worthless.  

260. Upon seizing WaMu, the FDIC immediately sold off WaMu’s assets and bank deposits to the highest bidder. (WaMu’s debt and preferred equity securities obligations, such as those owned by Plaintiff, were not part of the transaction.)

Very little information is available regarding these “Preferred Trust Securities” outside of this “Confidential Offering Circular.” (See:  Asset Trusts Offering Circular.)

However, one thing is crystal clear. WMB sold “67,529” of these toxic loans totaling “$10,947,602,313.00” to WMPF, and was reimbursed for the sale of these assets. WMPF then sold all assets backing these “67,529” loans to investors in these securities. (See: “Appendix E” of Offering Circular.)

Combined Asset Trust Data 67529 loans

These loans were some of the worst, fraud-laced loans originated by WMB, yet my initial investigation has yet to find a single foreclosure action (judicially or non-judicially) in the name of any of these investor trusts. How can this be, you ask? Simple, because JPMorgan Chase has decided to claim ownership of these loans, and continues to foreclose and harvest these assets in its own name by concealing these facts, and denying in Courtrooms that WMB ever sold or securitized these loans. This fraud story, which Chase and its attorneys continue to stick to, is no longer believable or sustainable based on the cumulative evidence compiled in the public domain. I can pretty much assure that all 67,529 of these loans have a non-existent and fatally defective chains of title.

But here’s something even more dubious and suspicious. In “JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s” 10-K filings with the SEC for fiscal years 2009-2013, “Washington Mutual Home Equity Trust I,” “WaMu 2006-OA1,” and “WaMu 2007-FLEX1” are all listed as subsidiaries of the company, but vanished as subsidiaries beginning in 2014. What I suspect is that these 67,529 loans, or whatever is left of them, were sold by Chase in hedge fund debt purchases in 2014, along with the non-existent chains of title. I’ll save that for another article.

These trusts were set-up as Delaware Statutory Trusts with REMIC status. In virtually all PSA agreements for DST’s that are visible, to which the DST’s are irrevocable and elect REMIC status, they are required to maintain complete separateness from any other person or entity. Chase’s naming of these trusts as subsidiaries certainly smells “fishy.” At best, Chase acquired servicing rights to these loans, but even this should not be assumed. How a servicer can take control of a REMIC Trust and claim it as a subsidiary on its 10-K is beyond me, but I’d sure like to see the documentation granting this authority.

In the meantime, someone explain to me how tens of thousands of foreclosures have been conducted in the names of private MBS REMIC trusts since the crash in 2008, and not one foreclosure appears to have occurred within this toxic group of 67,529 loans in the name of Deutsche Bank as Trustee for these trusts. The odds are virtually impossible.

 

Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID# 49411

Bill.bpia@gmail.com

 

 

 

Mortgage Lenders Network and Wells Fargo Battled over Servicer Advances

It is this undisclosed yield spread premium that produces the pool from which I believe the servicer advances are actually being paid. Intense investigation and discovery will probably reveal the actual agreements that show exactly that. In the meanwhile I encourage attorneys to look carefully at the issue of “servicer advances” as a means to defeat the foreclosure in its entirety.

As usual, the best decisions come from cases where the parties involved in “securitization” are fighting with each other. When a borrower brings up the same issues, the court is inclined to disregard the borrower’s defense as merely an attempt to get out of  a legitimate debt. In the Case of Mortgage Lenders  versus Wells Fargo (395 B.K. 871 (2008)), it is apparent that servicer advances are a central issue. For one thing, it demonstrates the incentive of servicers to foreclose even though the foreclosure will result in a greater loss to the investor then if a workout or modification had been used to save the loan.

See MLN V Wells Fargo

It also shows that the servicers were very much aware of the issue and therefore very much aware that between the borrower and the lender (investor or creditor) there was no default, and on a continuing basis any theoretical default was being cured on a monthly basis. And as usual, the parties and the court failed to grasp the real economics. Based on information that I have received from people were active in the bundling and sale of mortgage bonds and an analysis of the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements, I think it is obvious that the actual money came from the broker dealer even though it is called a “servicer advance.” Assuming my analysis is correct, this would further complicate the legal issues surrounding servicer advances.

This case also demonstrates that it is in bankruptcy court that a judge is most likely to understand the real issues. State court judges generally do not possess the background, experience, training or time to grasp the incredible complexity created by Wall Street. In this case Wells Fargo moves for relief from the automatic stay (in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by MLN) so that it could terminate the rights of MLN as a servicer, replacing MLN with Wells Fargo. The dispute arose over several issues, servicer advances being one of them. MLN filed suit against Wells Fargo alleging breach of contract and then sought to amend based on the doctrine of “unjust enrichment.” This was based upon the servicer advances allegedly paid by MLN that would be prospectively recovered by Wells Fargo.

The take away from this case is that there is no specific remedy for the servicer to recover advances made under the category of “servicer advances” but that one thing is clear —  the money paid to trust beneficiaries as “servicer advances” is not recoverable from the trust beneficiaries. The other thing that is obvious to Judge Walsh in his discussion of the facts is that it is in the servicing agreements between the parties that there may be a remedy to recover the advances; OR, if there is no contractual basis for recovering advances under the category of  “servicer advances” then there might be a basis to recover under the theory of unjust enrichment. As always, there is a complete absence in the documentation and in the discussion of this case as to the logistics of exactly how a servicer could recover those payments.

One thing that is perfectly clear however is that nobody seems to expect the trust beneficiaries to repay the money out of the funds that they had received. Hence the “servicer advance” is not a loan that needs to be repaid by the trust or trust beneficiaries. Logically it follows that if it is not a loan to the trust beneficiaries who received the payment, then it must be a payment that is due to the creditor; and if the creditor has received the payment and accepted it, the corresponding liability for the payment must be reduced.

Dan Edstrom, senior securitization analyst for the livinglies website, pointed this out years ago. Bill Paatalo, another forensic analyst of high repute, has been submitting the same reports showing the distribution reports indicating that the creditor is being paid on an ongoing basis. Both of them are asking the same question, to wit:  “if the creditor is being paid, where is the default?”

One attorney for US bank lamely argues that the trustee is entitled to both the servicer advances and turnover of rents if the property is an investment property. The argument is that there is no reason why the parties should not earn extra profit. That may be true and it may be possible. But what is impossible is that the creditor who receives a payment can nonetheless claim it as a payment still due and unpaid. If the servicer has some legal or equitable claim for recovery of the “servicer advances” then it can only be against the borrower, on whose behalf the payment was made. This means that a new transaction occurs each time such a payment is made to the trust beneficiaries. In that new transaction the servicer can claim “contribution” or “unjust enrichment” against the borrower. Theoretically that might bootstrap into a claim against the proceeds of the ultimate liquidation of the property, which appears to be the basis upon which the servicer “believes” that the money paid to the trust beneficiaries will be recoverable. Obviously the loose language in the pooling and servicing agreement about the servicer’s “belief” can lead to numerous interpretations.

What is not subject to interpretation is the language of the prospectus which clearly states that the investor who is purchasing one of these bogus mortgage bonds agrees that the money advanced for the purchase of the bond can be pooled by the broker-dealer; it is expressly stated that the investor can be paid out of this pool, which is to say that the investor can be paid with his own money for payments of interest and principal. This corroborates my many prior articles on the tier 2 yield spread premium. There is no discussion in the securitization documents as to what happens to that pool of money in the care custody and control of the broker-dealer (investment bank). And this corroborates my prior articles on the excess profits that have yet to be reported. And it explains why they are doing it again.

It doesn’t take a financial analyst to question why anyone would think it was a great business model to spend hundreds of millions of dollars advertising for loan customers where the return is less than 5%. The truth in lending act passed by the federal government requires the participants who were involved in the processing of the loan to be identified and to disclose their actual compensation arising from the origination of the loan — even if the compensation results from defrauding someone. Despite the fact that most loans were subject to claims of securitization from 2001 to the present, none of them appear to have such disclosure. That means that under Reg Z the loans are “predatory per se.”

To say that these were table funded loans is an understatement. What was really occurring was fraudulent underwriting of the mortgage bonds and fraudulent underwriting of the underlying loans. The higher the nominal interest rate on the loans (which means that the risk of default is correspondingly higher) the less the broker-dealer needed to advance for origination or acquisition of the loan; and this is because the investor was led to believe that the loans would be low risk and therefore lower interest rates. The difference between the interest payment due to the investor and the interest payment allegedly due from the borrower allowed the broker-dealers to advance much less money for the origination or acquisition of loans than the amount of money they had received from the investors. That is a yield spread premium which is not been reported and probably has not been taxed.

It is this undisclosed yield spread premium that produces the pool from which I believe the servicer advances are actually being paid. Intense investigation and discovery will probably reveal the actual agreements that show exactly that. In the meanwhile I encourage attorneys to look carefully at the issue of “servicer advances” as a means to defeat the foreclosure in its entirety.

I caution that when enough cases have been lost as a result of servicer advances, the opposition will probably change tactics. While you can win the foreclosure case, it is not clear what the consequences of that might be. If it results in a final judgment for the homeowner then it might be curtains for anyone to claim any amount of money from the loan. But that is by no means assured. If it results in a dismissal, even with prejudice, it might enable the servicer to stop making advances and then declare a default if the borrower fails to make payments after the servicer has stopped making the payments. Assuming that a notice of acceleration of the debt has been declared, the borrower can argue that the foreclosing party has elected its own defective remedy and should pay the price. If past experience is any indication of future rulings, it seems unlikely that the courts will be very friendly towards that last argument.

Attorneys who wish to consult with me on this issue can book 1 hour consults by calling 520-405-1688.

Challenging Deeds Issued After Auction (Sale) of Property

One of the rewarding aspects of what I do is to see more and more people not only hopping on board, understanding securitization, but adding to the body of knowledge I have amassed. In the following article Bill Paatalo, who has done the loan level accounting for many of our readers, expands upon a topic that I have introduced (and of course Dan Edstrom) but not explained nearly as well as Bill does: see http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/time-to-challange-those-trustees-deeds/

EDITOR’S NOTE: I would add that where servicer advances are paid to the creditor (or who we think is the creditor), then there is often an overpayment, which might account for why the “credit bid” is lower than the total amount demanded by the servicer for redemption or reinstatement. This anomaly could void the notice of default and notice of sale and create a problem on the amount required for redemption after the so-called sale.

The legal issue presented by Bill is whether the party who submitted the bid satisfies the state’s legal definition of a creditor who is allowed to submit a credit bid at closing in lieu of cash. This issue is fairly easily analyzed before any order or judgment is entered by a court.

But afterwards, because of the rubber stamping, the judgments mostly state something along the lines that $XXXX.XX is owed by the borrower to the opposing party in litigation. The judgment is final until overturned by appeal or a motion to vacate.

That Judgment makes them a possible creditor and even raises the presumption that they are a creditor when in fact there was no evidence to support that finding in the order or judgment. And ordinarily the courts require that the motion or other attack be verified by a sworn statement from the homeowner. That gets tricky because without having an actual forensic report in your hands, how would the borrower even know about such things?

The judgment can be attacked for fraud because the opposing party had never entered into a transaction wherein it paid value (see Article 9 of UCC) to originate or acquire the loan. Procedural rules vary from state to state on  how this is done and the time limit fro such challenges. In fact, none of the people in the cloud of “securitization” paid anything for the loan, with the exception of the servicer who is credited with having paid servicer advances to the creditor when in fact it appears as though the servicer advances were paid by the investment bank who reserved money out of the pool of money advanced by investors to pay the investors out of their own money. Hence, we see the reason for calling the scheme a PONZI scheme. This is why the issue of STANDING keep bouncing back front and center.

Without an attack on the Judgment I doubt if your state law will allow you to challenge the sale or the sale price. Obviously, before you act on anything on this blog, you need to consult with an attorney who is licensed and experienced in such matters and who practices in the jurisdiction in which your property is located.

For those who are good with computer graphics, here are two drawings I recently made to describe the process of securitization as it played out. The bottom line is that the investment bank diverted the money from the trust and diverted the documentation that was due to the investors to its own strawmen, trading on that documentation and making a ton of money while the investor/lenders and homeowner/borrowers lost either everything or a substantial amount of their wealth that ended up in the pocket of the banks. Anyone who is good with graphics is invited to donate their time to this website and make my hand drawn sketches easier to read and perhaps animated. Neil Garfield Securitization Diagrams 12-20-13

Posted by BPIA on December 18, 2013 bi Bill Paatalo:

For the past couple of years, I have been providing clients with the internal loan level accounting data, which reveals in most instances of private securitization, that all payments “due” on the notes have been paid regularly by undisclosed “co-obligors.” Thus there becomes an issue of fact as to whether or not the “note” is actually in “default.” Word through the grapevine is that this particular argument is gaining some momentum in certain jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Well now it’s time to use the same internal accounting data to attack those dubious “Trustee’s Deeds.” In non-judicial foreclosure states, a ”Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” or Trustee’s Deed” is recorded after the foreclosure sale. Often, the property is sold back to the supposed creditor into what is called “REO” status. In cases where the subject loans were alleged to have been securitized, the Trustee’s Deed will typically state that the Trustee for “XYZ Mortgage-Backed Trust” was the “highest bidder” at the sale and paid cash in the amount of $………..(whatever dollar figure.) There are many reasons to question the validity of these documents; such as the actual parties submitting the “credit bids,” and whether or not any actual cash exchanged hands as attested to under notary acknowledgment. However, there is a way to provide evidence and proof that no such payment ever exchanged hands.

The following language was extracted from a typical Trustee’s Deed:

Trustees Deed language snip

In this particular case, the alleged amount owed in the “Notice of Default” was roughly $314,000.00. A check of the internal accounting for this particular loan (6-months after the sale) shows the loan in “REO” status with no such payment having ever been applied. In fact, the certificateholders (investors) are still receiving their monthly payments of P&I with the trust showing “zero” losses.

This is good hard evidence that the sale and subsequent Trustee’s Deed filed in this case was a “sham” transaction.

If your loan was alleged to have been securitized by a private mbs trust, and your home sold in similar fashion with a recorded Trustee’s Deed, contact me today (bill.bpia@gmail.com) to see if your Trustee’s Deed matches up with the internal accounting data.

Living lies now offers Expert Affidavits showing what was stated in the Trustee’s Deed as opposed to what has actually occurred behind the curtains. See www.livingliesstore.com. Most people ask for consults with me and/or the expert, like Bill, so their lawyer understands what to do with this information.

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