National Honesty Day? America’s Book of Lies

Posted on April 30, 2014 by Neil Garfield

Today is National Honesty Day. While it should be a celebration of how honest we have been the other 364 days of the year, it is rather a day of reflection on how dishonest we have been. Perhaps today could be a day in which we say we will at least be honest today about everything we say or do. But that isn’t likely. Today I focus on the economy and the housing crisis. Yes despite the corruption of financial journalism in which we are told of improvements, our economy — led by the housing markets — is still sputtering. It will continue to do so until we confront the truth about housing, and in particular foreclosures. Tennessee, Virginia and other states continue to lead the way in a downward spiral leading to the lowest rate of home ownership since the 1990’s with no bottom in sight.

Here are a few of the many articles pointing out the reality of our situation contrasted with the absence of articles in financial journalism directed at outright corruption on Wall Street where the players continue to pursue illicit, fraudulent and harmful schemes against our society performing acts that can and do get jail time for anyone else who plays that game.

It isn’t just that they escaping jail time. The jailing of bankers would take a couple of thousand people off the street that would otherwise be doing harm to us.

The main point is that we know they are doing the wrong thing in foreclosing on property they don’t own using “balances” the borrower doesn’t owe; we know they effectively stole the money from the investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds, we know they effectively stole the title protection and documents that should have been executed in favor of the real source of funds, we know they received multiple payments from third parties and we know they are getting twin benefits from foreclosures that (a) should not be legally allowed and (b) only compound the damages to investors and homeowners.

The bottom line: Until we address wrongful foreclosures, the housing market, which has always led the economy, will continue to sputter, flatline or crash again. Transferring wealth from the middle class to the banks is a recipe for disaster whether it is legal or illegal. In this case it plainly illegal in most cases.

And despite the planted articles paid for by the banks, we still have over 700,000 foreclosures to go in the next year and over 9,000,000 homeowners who are so deep underwater that their situation is a clear and present danger of “strategic default” on claims that are both untrue and unfair.

Here is a sampling of corroborative evidence for my conclusions:

Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Candid Take on the Foreclosure Crisis

There it was: The Treasury foreclosure program was intended to foam the runway to protect against a crash landing by the banks. Millions of people were getting tossed out on the street, but the secretary of the Treasury believed the government’s most important job was to provide a soft landing for the tender fannies of the banks.”

Lynn Symoniak is Thwarted by Government as She Pursues Other Banks for the Same Thing She Proved Before

Government prosecutors who relied on a Florida whistleblower’s evidence to win foreclosure fraud settlements with major banks two years ago are declining to help her pursue identical claims against a second set of large financial institutions.

Lynn Szymoniak first found proof that millions of American foreclosures were based on faulty and falsified documents while fighting her own foreclosure. Her three-year legal fight helped uncover the fact that banks were “robosigning” documents — hiring people to forge signatures and backdate legal paperwork the firms needed in order to foreclose on people’s homes — as a routine practice. Court papers that were unsealed last summer show that the fraudulent practices Szymoniak discovered affect trillions of dollars worth of mortgages.

More than 700,000 Foreclosures Expected Over Next Year

How Bank Watchdogs Killed Our Last Chance At Justice For Foreclosure Victims

The results are in. The award for the sorriest chapter of the great American foreclosure crisis goes to the Independent Foreclosure Review, a billion-dollar sinkhole that produced nothing but heartache for aggrieved homeowners, and a big black eye for regulators.

The foreclosure review was supposed to uncover abuses in how the mortgage industry coped with the epic wave of foreclosures that swept the U.S. in the aftermath of the housing crash. In a deal with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, more than a dozen companies, including major banks, agreed to hire independent auditors to comb through loan files, identify errors and award just compensation to people who’d been abused in the foreclosure process.

But in January 2013, amid mounting evidence that the entire process was compromised by bank interference and government mismanagement, regulators abruptly shut the program down. They replaced it with a nearly $10 billion legal settlement that satisfied almost no one. Borrowers received paltry payouts, with sums determined by the very banks they accused of making their lives hell.

Investigation Stalled and Diverted as to Bank Fraud Against Investors and Homeowners

The Government Accountability Office released the results of its study of the Independent Foreclosure Review, conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve in 2011 and 2012, and the results show that the foreclosure process is lacking in oversight and transparency.

According to the GAO review, which can be read in full here, the OCC and Fed signed consent orders with 16 mortgage servicers in 2011 and 2012 that required the servicers to hire consultants to review foreclosure files for efforts and remediate harm to borrowers.

In 2013, regulators amended the consent orders for all but one servicer, ending the file reviews and requiring servicers to provide $3.9 billion in cash payments to about 4.4 million borrowers and $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions, such as loan modifications. The list of impacted mortgage servicers can be found here, as well as any updates. It should be noted that the entire process faced controversy before, as critics called the IFR cumbersome and costly.

Banks Profit from Suicides of Their Officers and Employees

After a recent rash of mysterious apparent suicides shook the financial world, researchers are scrambling to find answers about what really is the reason behind these multiple deaths. Some observers have now come to a rather shocking conclusion.

Wall Street on Parade bloggers Pam and Russ Martens wrote this week that something seems awry regarding the bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) policies held by JPMorgan Chase.

Four of the biggest banks on Wall Street combined hold over $680 billion in BOLI policies, the bloggers reported, but JPMorgan held around $17.9 billion in BOLI assets at the end of last year to Citigroup’s comparably meager $8.8 billion.

Government Cover-Up to Protect the Banks and Screw Homeowners and Investors

A new government report suggests that errors made by banks and their agents during foreclosures might have been significantly higher than was previously believed when regulators halted a national review of the banks’ mortgage servicing operations.

When banking regulators decided to end the independent foreclosure review last year, most banks had not completed the examinations of their mortgage modification and foreclosure practices.

At the time, the regulators — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve — found that lengthy reviews by bank-hired consultants were delaying compensation getting to borrowers who had suffered through improper modifications and other problems.

But the decision to cut short the review left regulators with limited information about actual harm to borrowers when they negotiated a $10 billion settlement as part of agreements with 15 banks, according to a draft of a report by the Government Accountability Office reviewed by The New York Times.

The report shows, for example, that an unidentified bank had an error rate of about 24 percent. This bank had completed far more reviews of borrowers’ files than a group of 11 banks involved the deal, suggesting that if other banks had looked over more of their records, additional errors might have been discovered.

Wrongful Foreclosure Rate at least 24%: Wrongful or Fraudulent?

The report shows, for example, that an unidentified bank had an error rate of about 24 percent. This bank had completed far more reviews of borrowers’ files than a group of 11 banks involved the deal, suggesting that if other banks had looked over more of their records, additional errors might have been discovered.

http://www.marketpulse.com/20140430/u-s-housing-recovery-struggles/

http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0429/Home-buying-loses-allure-ownership-rate-lowest-since-1995

http://www.opednews.com/articles/It-s-Good–no–Great-to-by-William-K-Black–Bank-Failure_Bank-Failures_Bankers_Banking-140430-322.html

[DISHONEST EUPHEMISMS: The context of this WSJ story is the broader series of betrayals of homeowners by the regulators and prosecutors led initially by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and his infamous “foam the runways” comment in which he admitted and urged that programs “sold” as benefitting distressed homeowners be used instead to aid the banks (more precisely, the bank CEOs) whose frauds caused the crisis. The WSJ article deals with one of the several settlements with the banks that “service” home mortgages and foreclose on them. Private attorneys first obtained the evidence that the servicers were engaged in massive foreclosure fraud involving knowingly filing hundreds of thousands of false affidavits under (non) penalty of perjury. As a senior former AUSA said publicly at the INET conference a few weeks ago about these cases — they were slam dunk prosecutions. But you know what happened; no senior banker or bank was prosecuted. No banker was sued civilly by the government. No banker had to pay back his bonus that he “earned” through fraud.

Filed under: AMGAR, CASES, CORRUPTION, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, investment banking, Investor, MBS TRUSTEE, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, TRUST BENEFICIARIES, trustee | Tagged: appraisal fraud, auction fraud, Bank of America, bankruptcy, borrower, countrywide, disclosure, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, modification, predatory lending, securitization, Wells Fargo | 10 Comments »

Reuters: Mortgage Bonds Were “Rotten from the Start.”

Posted on August 12, 2013 by Neil Garfield

We have come a long way in six years. Back in 2007 almost everyone thought that the mortgage bonds were valid instruments issued by a valid entity that owned valid mortgages.

Now we have Reuters news service reporting that “home loans underlying securities were rotten from the start.” Thus we are crossing that line where the critical mass of thinking is changing the assumptions and presumptions about whether the mortgage bonds were real and about whether the mortgage loans were real. It is becoming increasingly apparent that neither the mortgage bonds nor the mortgage loans had any basis in reality.

Paperwork was all fabricated for the purpose of allowing the banks to pretend ownership over the bonds and the underlying loans plus justifying the purchase of insurance and other hedge products and justifying the claim of a loss on investments the banks never made. The government rescued the banks from a loss they never incurred — basically money that should have been refunded to the investors and lowering or negating the balance due on any loans made to homeowners. Currently the banks are selling these nonexistent investments consisting of nonexistent mortgage bonds issued by nonexistent trusts with nonexistent assets based upon nonexistent loans.

The largest buyer of this crap is the Federal Reserve. This would be the same agency that declared that the collapse in the mortgage markets was “contained.” That was in 2007. The question could legitimately be asked whether the government officials were stupid or simply lying. And the same question could be asked now.

So we really have several issues that are now due to go in reverse despite the apparent drumbeat of foreclosures that continue to be rubberstamped by judges who don’t know or don’t care to know the truth about mortgage loans today. The two main issues are ownership of the alleged loan and the actual balance of the unpaid account receivable.

Regulators and officers of law enforcement are just on the cusp of understanding that the money that showed up at the time of the closing with the borrower/homeowner was stolen and that the theft was covered up under layers of paperwork. Alan Greenspan, who was chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time the banks were on a spree of highway robbery, admitted that neither he nor the 100 economists employed by the Federal Reserve understood one word of the so-called securitization instruments. It was his opinion that the “free market” would correct whatever was wrong. He now concedes that he was wrong to conclude that the market was “free” and he was wrong to conclude that any self correction mechanism could or would work.

As the stench rises from the mortgage bonds and the details are revealed as to how the banks handled the money one might be convinced that this awareness will “trickle down” to the homeowners and borrowers. Don’t hold your breath. Most people in the marketplace and most judges have somehow reached the conclusion that they can lift a stick that is burning on one end and still say “the stick is not burning” because they are holding the end that is not burning.

It may be years yet before there is general consensus that the entire mortgage process was rotten from top to bottom. Thus it is an absolute requirement to litigate, admit nothing, and seek discovery from each key point in the illusion that was called the “securitization chain.” On nearly all “self evident” points there is a lack of corroboration, evidence or truth despite all appearances to the contrary that were carefully constructed by the banks. This illusion is what keeps lawyers from feeling comfortable about denying the documents that were apparently signed, about the default on a loan that was apparently made, and consigning themselves and their clients to the inevitability of the foreclosure.

In the end, when the accounting is done in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, it will be understood that millions of people were forced out of homes they owned based upon loans with no balance due — documented by loan documents with no validity possessed by strawmen who were covering for the Wall Street banks as they diverted investor money from mortgages to insurance and from loans to credit default swaps. These strawmen were covering for the Wall Street banks as they diverted the loan documents from the investors to the banks themselves, enabling the banks to sell counterfeit bonds based on counterfeit mortgages securing counterfeit notes referencing counterfeit account receivables — all for 100 cents on the dollar and then another hundred cents on the dollar and then another hundred cents on the dollar.

With Wall Street banks sucking up all the money existence somebody had to lose a lot of money. The answer was of course the investors who were tricked and deceived into buying investments that the investment bank would never buy for its own account, based on loans that the investment bank would never have approved if they were using their own money. In fact, the investment bank would never have approved the loans even if they were not using their own money — but for the fact that they were making 100 cents on the dollar several times over on each loan regardless of whether it was a good loan or a bad loan.

And the investment banks knew for a fact that the fund managers of pension funds and other investors would not and indeed could not invest in high risk securities. So they it look like these were low risk securities exempt from securities regulation when in fact they were running a PONZI scheme that diverted the money from the investment vehicle to the pockets of the bankers.

In the end it is the little guy, the common man, who suffers the consequences. If he owns a house he’s going to lose it even though there is no balance due on the loan he received. If he manages to keep the house he’s going to pay a loan that does not exist to a creditor that never loaned him the money but who received payment on the fictitious loan several times over. It is not just the taxpayers who are getting hit and who are entitled to restitution from the financial services industry. It is everyone who lives and works (or who wants to work) who pays the price. It is a society based upon freedom and fair play that has turned into debt bondage and foul play.

ROTTEN FROM THE START: REUTERS

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-07/bofa-put-toxic-debt-in-bond-as-staff-resisted-u-s-says.html

AG: Lawyer e-mails indicate collusion to control foreclosure billing
http://www.denverpost.com/realestatenews/ci_23833815/ag-lawyer-e-mails-indicate-collusion-control-foreclosure

BANKS NOW OWNERS IN COMMODITIES BUSINESSES JUST LIKE THE OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY CHANGED

Federal Reserve Board Announces Additional Foreclosure Review Settlement
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-reserve-board-announces-addition-78136/

You Will Survive! How to Overcome the Emotional Trauma of Foreclosure
http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20130812_traumaofforeclosure.htm

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, Servicer | Tagged: account receivable, appraisal fraud, auction fraud, bailout, Bank of America, Bloomberg, Chase Bank, commodities, disclosure, Federal reserve, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, Reuters, securitization | 24 Comments »

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Posted on May 7, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

As I have reported on past occasions I have sources from the securities and more specifically the securitization industry that provide comments and information on the promise that I will keep their identities anonymous. This one in particular caught my attention. The source is from a Southeastern state who packaged and sold pools of loans of all types and qualities.

I believe regardless of whether the note and mortgage / deed of trust was assigned or not, it can be demonstrated they did not move as a unit, unless the price paid was the payoff value of the loan and/or value of property. [Editor’s Note: The importance of this fellow’s statement cannot be overstated. And his method for determining the true nature of an assignment, allonge or indorsement transaction is extremely helpful. While there are contrary arguments to his contention, they are a stretch to accept]

A different price (which I have hitting on this theme) would indicate the two are not a unit, because the value of the promissory note is not related to the actual security value. Also how the transaction was booked and valued on the bank’s accounts would reveal the same. I am guessing that they were valuing notes at a price much higher than the market value of the home. [Editor’s Note: Yes and as I have already been seen informed with documentation, the transactions were never booked as accounting transactions because from the standpoint of the assignor or assignee no transaction took place. These were assignments of convenience. They do not show on the balance sheet of the either the assignor or the assignee as a loan receivable. If they come to court claiming ownership or that someone else acquired ownership through them, they are doing so contrary to their own admissions in the own bookkeeping. THIS is where confidence and knowledge in motion practice and confidence and knowledge in discovery will put the homeowner in either extreme jeopardy or in a winning position — because the loan was never owned by ANY of the intermediaries who acted as conduits]

I believe the key is to assert the note as a ‘financial asset.’ That there is a market or exchange in which it trades. In fact on many of the bank’s annual reports, they speak that the primary business is originating loans for sale/securitization, i.e. a market exists. Along with pricing, this will be an easy case to make. [Editor’s Note: Read this carefully — it proves the point by reference to information in the public domain — and it is not subject to attack as being opinion or questionable fact or standing to raise the issue. What I believe he is telling me here is that even if there was ($10.00, or other valuable consideration), there are only three values that conceivably be used — the principal due on the note, the value of the collateral or the fair market value of the loan as determined by the freely traded secondary market. In nearly all cases the “traders” never even pretended that this was a real transaction and so there was no exchange of money at all. But if there was an exchange of money, this index could be used to prove that the transaction was a sham because it never met the elements of a reasonable business transaction. Judge Shack in New York asked the question himself — why and under what terms would anyone buy a loan that is in default? How could a loan declared in default be assigned into an investor pool where the investors were promised that they would at least initially receive performing loans. And how could they receive any loan after the 90 day cutoff period included in the PSA and the REMIC statute? The collateral question that Judge Shack might have asked is why anyone would pay a price different than the price set on the secondary market regardless of the principal stated on the note or the current fair market value?]

Here is the kicker: SECTION 36‑8‑406. Obligation to notify issuer of lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken security certificate.

If a security certificate has been lost, apparently destroyed, or wrongfully taken, and the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within a reasonable time after the owner has notice of it and the issuer registers a transfer of the security before receiving notification, the owner may not assert against the issuer a claim for registering the transfer under Section 36‑8‑404 (wrongful registration) or a claim to a new security certificate under Section 36‑8‑405 (replacement of a lost, destroyed or wrongfully taken security certificate).

I wonder out loud why I should not reregister my note. Imagine the bank now arguing all the points of having to present an actual note, etc in order to change ownership.

The next big thing I am digging into is whether an owner/purchaser of a security has any authority to electronically register and transfer ownership. I believe, but cannot find exact wording, that such is only limited to the issuer. On the entire face, MERs may not even be allowed because the issuer of the note, the homeowner, never authorized them to keep track.

Think of why there are laws that require lenders to notify borrowers when their mortgage is sold, it is because the issuer needs a record. Worse case is that the bank argues the issuer under Chapter 8 is the one who ‘becomes responsible for, or in place of, another person described as an issuer in this section.’ That is still not the bank, but the county registrar.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: accounting transactions, allonge, assignment, auction fraud, borrower, Chapter 8, county registrar, current fair market value, financial asset, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, fraud, indorsement, investor pool, Judge Shack, Mortgage, Obligation to notify issuer of lost destroyed or wrongfully taken security certificate, owner/purchaser of a security, predatory lending, PSA, REMIC, secondary market, Section 36-8-405, Section 36-8-406, securitization, securitization industry, security certificate, who would buy a loan in default? | 25 Comments »

People Have Answers, Will Anyone Listen?

Posted on May 3, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

Thanks to Home Preservation Network for alerting us to John Griffith’s Statement before the Congressional Progressive Caucus U.S. House of Representatives. See his statement below.

People who know the systemic flaws caused by Wall Street are getting closer to the microphone. The Banks are hoping it is too late — but I don’t think we are even close to the point where the blame shifts solidly to their illegal activities. The testimony is clear, well-balanced, and based on facts.

On the high costs of foreclosure John Griffith proves the point that there is an “invisible hand” pushing homes into foreclosure when they should be settled modified under HAMP. There can be no doubt nor any need for interpretation — even the smiliest analysis shows that investors would be better off accepting modification proposals to a huge degree. Yet most people, especially those that fail to add tacit procuration language in their proposal and who fail to include an economic analysis, submit proposals that provide proceeds to investors that are at least 50% higher than the projected return from foreclosure. And that is the most liberal estimate. Think about all those tens of thousands of homes being bull-dozed. What return did the investor get on those?

That is why we now include a HAMP analysis in support of proposals as part of our forensic analysis. We were given the idea by Martin Andelman (Mandelman Matters). When we performed the analysis the results were startling and clearly showed, as some judges around the country have pointed out, that the HAMP loan modification proposals were NOT considered. In those cases where the burden if proof was placed on the pretender lender, it was clear that they never had any intention other than foreclosure. Upon findings like that, the cases settled just like every case where the pretender loses the battle on discovery.

Despite clear predictions of increased strategic defaults based upon data that shows that strategic defaults are increasing at an exponential level, the Bank narrative is that if they let homeowners modify mortgages, it will hurt the Market and encourage more deadbeats to do the same. The risk of strategic defaults comes not from people delinquent in their payments but from businesspeople who look at the principal due, see no hope that the value of the home will rise substantially for decades, and see that the home is worth less than half the mortgage claimed. No reasonable business person would maintain the status quo.

The case for principal reductions (corrections) is made clear by the one simple fact that the homes are not worth and never were worth the value of the used in true loans. The failure of the financial industry to perform simple, long-standing underwriting duties — like verifying the value of the collateral created a risk for the “lenders” (whoever they are) that did not exist and was present without any input from the borrower who was relying on the same appraisals that the Banks intentionally cooked up so they could move the money and earn their fees.

Many people are suggesting paths forward. Those that are serious and not just positioning in an election year, recognize that the station becomes more muddled each day, the false foreclosures on fatally defective documents must stop, but that the buying and selling and refinancing of properties presents still more problems and risks. In the end the solution must hold the perpetrators to account and deliver relief to homeowners who have an opportunity to maintain possession and ownership of their homes and who may have the right to recapture fraudulently foreclosed homes with illegal evictions. The homes have been stolen. It is time to catch the thief, return the purse and seize the property of the thief to recapture ill-gotten gains.

Statement of John Griffith Policy Analyst Center for American Progress Action Fund

Before

The Congressional Progressive Caucus U.S. House of Representatives

Hearing On

Turning the Tide: Preventing More Foreclosures and Holding Wrong-Doers Accountable

Good afternoon Co-Chairman Grijalva, Co-Chairman Ellison, and members of the caucus. I am John Griffith, an Economic Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, where my work focuses on housing policy.

It is an honor to be here today to discuss ways to soften the blow of the ongoing foreclosure crisis. It’s clear that lenders, investors, and policymakers—particularly the government-controlled mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—must do all they can to avoid another wave of costly and economy-crushing foreclosures. Today I will discuss why principal reduction—lowering the amount the borrower actually owes on a loan in exchange for a higher likelihood of repayment—is a critical tool in that effort.

Specifically, I will discuss the following:

1      First, the high cost of foreclosure. Foreclosure is typically the worst outcome for every party involved, since it results in extraordinarily high costs to borrowers, lenders, and investors, not to mention the carry-on effects for the surrounding community.

2      Second, the economic case for principal reduction. Research shows that equity is an important predictor of default. Since principal reduction is the only way to permanently improve a struggling borrower’s equity position, it is often the most effective way to help a deeply underwater borrower avoid foreclosure.

3      Third, the business case for Fannie and Freddie to embrace principal reduction. By refusing to offer write-downs on the loans they own or guarantee, Fannie, Freddie, and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, or FHFA, are significantly lagging behind the private sector. And FHFA’s own analysis shows that it can be a money-saver: Principal reductions would save the enterprises about $10 billion compared to doing nothing, and $1.7 billion compared to alternative foreclosure mitigation tools, according to data released earlier this month.

4      Fourth, a possible path forward. In a recent report my former colleague Jordan Eizenga and I propose a principal-reduction pilot at Fannie and Freddie that focuses on deeply underwater borrowers facing long-term economic hardships. The pilot would include special rules to maximize returns to Fannie, Freddie, and the taxpayers supporting them without creating skewed incentives for borrowers.

Fifth, a bit of perspective. To adequately meet the challenge before us, any principal-reduction initiative must be part of a multipronged

To read John Griffith’s entire testimony go to: http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2012/04/pdf/griffith_testimony.pdf

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: appraisal fraud, auction fraud, bailout, bankruptcy, borrower, Center for American Progress Action Fund, Congressional Progressive Caucus U.S. House of Representatives, disclosure, Eviction, Fannie MAe, Federal reserve, FHFA, foreclosure, foreclosure crisis, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, fraud, Freddie Mac, Grijalva, HAMP, housing market, housing policy, housing prices, investors, John Griffith, Jordan Eizenga, Lender Liability, LOAN MODIFICATION, Martin Andelman, MERS, mortgage meltdown, mortgages, predatory lending, Preventing more foreclosures, principal reduction, rescission, RESPA, Robo-Signing, securitization, settlement, strategic default, TILA audit, trustee | 44 Comments »

HOAs Retaliate Against Banks Skipping Out on Paying Maintenance Expenses

Posted on May 2, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

Having had the experience of representing Condominium Associations, Cooperatives and Homeowners Associations in Florida on a large scale, I am acutely aware of the pain they feel when “neighbors” don’t pay their monthly fees. The rest of the homeowners must pick up the slack and in many cases there were special assessments against the owners to pay for the shortfall.

The Banks, always playing the game, would get their Judgement of Foreclosure and then postpone the actual sale indefinitely because they could and because they didn’t want the liability of association dues, association compliance etc. So Florida actually had to pass a law that required the bank to start paying maintenance after they received a Final Judgment of foreclosure. Apparently, judging from the article below, that law has been rescinded or eviscerated by the intensive bank lobbying going on in all 50 state legislatures and in Congress.

With the foreclosure crisis desiccating entire neighborhoods, it sometimes comes down to a handful of homeowners who are paying the tab for the maintenance of the entire complex. So those homeowners, who were now on the Board of directors of the association jumped in and are now getting the benefits of self-help through renting abandoned homes and condos as though they owned it. In some cases they are turning a profit, attracting new buyers in and getting a pretty good bang for their buck — if they do it right.

You might remember the uproar that occurred when I reported that a number of people were making this situation into a business model: by renting out at lower rates homes that were abandoned by both the homeowner and the “bank” or other pretender lender that put the home into default and foreclosure, these “entrepreneurs” are making money on assets that don’t belong to them.

That is a bad thing, right? Only if you are not a bank or pretender lender who are doing exactly the same thing. If a non-creditor took title to property by submitting a credit bid, then they don’t have real title. Whether they sell it or rent it out, they are making money off of an asset that was never owned by them and in which they never had any financial interest, risk or loss.

That of course is the problem with the corruption of our title system, and the failure of due process, especially in the non-judicial states where foreclosures are routinely processed on behalf of non-creditors who submit “credit bids” at auction. My answer as previously posted, is that the HOA and the homeowner should collude with each other the same way that the substituted trustees collude with the pretender lender. The homeowner falls behind in payments causing the association to sue for those payments and to foreclose on the lien. The lawsuit names the homeowner and all other lenders on record reciting in the pleading that the existing mortgage on record has been satisfied or abandoned.

We all know that in many cases the lender of record is a sham corporation that was created to front as straw-man for the real lenders (investors). So the court enters a default against the lender of record, and then awards judgment to the association along with a sale date during which period the homeowner redeems the property with a settlement agreement in which the court quiets title to the homeowner.

At that point, if any party wishes to foreclose, whether they are in a judicial state or otherwise, they must proceed judicially by pleading and proving that they were a real party in interest and that they should have received notice of the foreclosure by the Association. In many cases, where it is institution versus association or another institution the same arguments advanced by homeowners are advanced by the association or institution.

The difference is that the argument coming from a creditor is taken far more seriously by the courts —- all the way up to the Supreme Court of the state (like the Landmark case in Kansas). In all such cases I have reviewed, the court found and was affirmed in its finding that the foreclosure by the first creditor to get to the mat won the case. This is one of several reasons why I have given my permission to start a national law firm rolling out into all 50 states. In a word, “if you want something done right, you have to do it yourself.”

Canceled foreclosure sales saddle neighbors, HOAs with expenses

By Mark Puente

Kathy Lane envisioned a picturesque neighborhood with tree-lined streets when she moved to FishHawk Ranch in 2004.

These days, she stares at an eyesore.

Two doors away, the back yard of an abandoned home overflows with trash; rain pours in open windows; weeds have overgrown the lawn. The pool, filled with black muck, draws swarms of bugs.

“I was expecting well-kept yards,” Lane said. “I live two doors from a dump. If it goes up in flames and catches our house on fire, who is responsible?”

The foreclosure crisis has littered the region with thousands of abandoned homes. The houses sit idle as banks have been slow to seize them in the final stage of the foreclosure process, the public auction.

Although recent headlines proclaim the worst of the housing crisis is over, the decrepit homes are a constant reminder that cleaning up the foreclosure mess remains a work in progress.

The house on Lane’s street in Lithia went into foreclosure in 2008 and has been vacant for more than a year. Aurora Loan Services had set an auction for February but canceled it.

It’s an oft-repeated pattern.

In the last 12 months, lenders have canceled auctions on 4,204 properties in Pinellas and Hillsborough counties. Sales have been canceled two, three, even nine times on some homes.

In many cases, banks delay seizures to avoid having to pay maintenance bills or homeowner association fees. Meanwhile, neighbors fend off vandals and thieves and worry about property values falling because of the deteriorating houses.

The repeated cancellations burden the court system.

“These never seem to go away,” said Thomas McGrady, chief judge of the Pinellas-Pasco County Circuit. “It’s a nuisance.”

Taxpayers also pay for the delays.

Hillsborough Circuit Judge Herbert Baumann Jr. said the Clerk of Courts’ workers spend hours filing paperwork when banks repeatedly cancel auctions.

“It does create more work,” he said. “Clerks do expend a lot of resources on this.”

• • •

No neighborhood is immune.

Even the tony streets in Tampa’s Avila and St. Petersburg’s Snell Isle have “lost houses.”

While the homes sit in limbo, homeowners associations lose money when lenders delay taking titles. The associations may mow lawns and make minor repairs, but that forces other residents to shoulder higher assessments.

Associations have few options to force lenders to sell the homes.

HOAs can seize properties through foreclosure when owners stop paying monthly assessments. Some go a step further by renting out the seized properties to recoup lost dues. Still, those actions cost the associations thousands in legal fees.

Lane, the FishHawk Ranch resident, is baffled by the banks’ inaction.

“Every day you expect a poltergeist,” she said. “We have to live here.”

She isn’t alone.

Tampa-based Rizzetta & Co. manages more than 100 community associations with 32,000 homes in Florida, including most associations in FishHawk Ranch. The firm has been deluged in recent years with calls about the abandoned homes and delinquent assessments.

Pete Williams, a Rizzetta manager, attributes the canceled auctions to money.

“The banks never want to take ownership,” he said. “They have to pay the fees going forward. The costs are considerable.”

Even McGrady, the Pinellas-Pasco judge, believes money is behind the canceled sales.

“After a while, you begin to question their motives,” the judge said.

• • •

On the flip side, some experts contend that the banks’ slowness helps stabilize the real estate market. Putting thousands of homes for sale at once could depress prices. Letting them trickle to the market brings higher prices.

And some cancellations occur because lenders and homeowners agree to loan modifications or because homeowners and defense attorneys find errors in bank documents.

The cancellations are currently down in Hillsborough and Pinellas. But that’s because lenders halted foreclosures in late 2010 amid allegations they used robo-signers and false documentation to speed up the foreclosure process.

Still, the delays have allowed some owners to live free for years and dodge assessments.

In June 2009, a Pasco judge granted U.S. Bank a final judgment to seize a home in the Valencia Gardens subdivision in Land O’Lakes. U.S. Bank scheduled the auction for September 2009 but has canceled it eight times. The most recent cancellation occurred last month.

The homeowners have lived in the home but have not paid dues to the Valencia Gardens Homeowners Association. The association is objecting to the cancellations and has asked a judge to order the bank to sell the home. Thirty-eight delinquent homeowners owe the association $56,000.

The shortfall has forced the HOA to convert water fountains into flower beds and to scale back on other projects, said Gail Spector, the president.

The group began cracking down on delinquent residents last year by threatening foreclosure lawsuits against them. Spector knows residents have lost jobs but said other homeowners shouldn’t be burdened with the unpaid dues.

“You have to treat everybody the same,” Spector said. “We are fixing and paying for everything. That’s not fair.”

Leonard J. Mankin, a Clearwater-based law firm, represents hundreds of associations across Florida. Attorney Brandon Mullis has asked a judge to sanction U.S. Bank and to force the sale of the home in Valencia Gardens.

It is now common, he said, for banks to cancel auctions seven or eight times in many foreclosure cases.

Mullis questions why lenders file court documents saying they are “negotiating or reviewing for possible loss mitigation options” when the houses have been vacant a year or longer.

He is fighting another case in Palm Harbor. The Bank of New York Mellon has canceled seven auctions — even though the homeowner defaulted on the mortgage in 2008. The bank canceled the seventh auction in February because it wanted to exhaust options to prevent the foreclosure.

Mullis scoffed.

“This action leaves the burden to fall on those neighboring residents who are forced to pay higher assessments while the property next door further deteriorates,” he said.

The Florida Bankers Association disagrees.

Anthony DiMarco, executive vice president, said lenders are overwhelmed with thousands of foreclosures and aren’t cancelling sales to skirt maintenance and assessments.

“They are trying to move cases forward,” he said. “We’d rather keep people in homes.”

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: abandoned homes, Anthony DiMarco, auction fraud, Bank of New York Mellon, borrower, Brandon Mullis, canceled home auctions, canceled home sales, chain of title, credit bid, FishHawk Ranch, Florida bankers Association, foreclosure, foreclosures, Hillsborough county, HOA, Homeowner's Association, housing inventory, housing market, Judge Herbert Baumann Jr., Leonard J Mankin, Mortgage, mortgages, Palm Harbor, Pinellas county, Rizzetta & Co., Snell Island, Tampa's Avila, Thomas McGrady chief judge, title, US BANK, Valencia Gardens Homeowner's Association, Valencia Gardens subdivision | 31 Comments »

ANOTHER VICTORY IN OKLAHOMA

Posted on April 24, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

There is no doubt that the tide is turning and that Judges are increasingly uncomfortable with the presence of forged, fabricated documents containing fraudulent statements of fact on transactions that never actually occurred. As this article explains, in Oklahoma — a very conservative red state — they are beginning to realize that it isn’t the borrower seeking the free house it is the foreclosing party who has no financial stake in the outcome except a windfall if they get the house on a “credit bid.”

by Brian Mahany

We have been saying for several months that the tide is beginning to turn against big banks and mortgage lenders. Many courts are beginning to get fed up with the abusive practices of lenders. Recently several state supreme courts have been weighing in on a wide variety issues including missing paperwork, forged affidavits, questionable title and abusive foreclosure or loan modification practices.

When a state supreme court decides a case, the decision takes on considerable weight. As the highest court in the land, a state supreme court decision is generally binding on all trial courts in that state. We were happy to learn that the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided 7 cases this month in favor of homeowners.

The facts in each of the cases were similar. In each case, the court ruled that in order to bring a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must prove that it has the right to enforce the promissory note. No note means no standing to bring the complaint.

It’s in the details that the Oklahoma cases become important.

Many lenders have problems producing the note and mortgage. In recent years, most lenders sell the mortgage shortly after the closing. Banks rarely hold their own paper any more. The mortgages are often packaged, securitized and sold several times. In that process, paperworks frequently is lost. The lost or incomplete paperwork issue was addressed by the court.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion is helpful to homeowners in several ways.

First, the court reaffirmed that the plaintiff must prove it has the right to enforce the note. Courts shouldn’t simply rely on an affidavit from a lawyer saying the bank or servicer has the right to enforce the note. They must prove it.

Next, the court said that the foreclosing party needs to have the note. Just having an assignment of mortgage is not enough. (Often the servicing bank will draft an assignment of mortgage. That requires the lender’s signature. The note, obviously, contains the borrowers signature. If documents are missing it is much easier for a lender to forge a mortgage assignment than to forge a homeowners signature.)

FInally, the court said that the lack of standing (missing note) can be raised at any time. That can be extremely important in foreclosure cases. Often borrowers seek legal counsel after a judgment of foreclosure has issued. Many folks don’t seek legal help until well into the foreclosure process. By the time a lawyer gets the case, discovery periods have elapsed and often there is already a judgment of foreclosure. The Oklahoma court said as long as the case isn’t closed, its not too late to challenge jurisdiction.

Postscript- There are tens of millions of homeowners under water. Many are facing foreclosure. Unfortunately, there are few lawyers that truly understand how to fight big lenders and even fewer actually willing to do so. If you are facing foreclosure, seek professional assistance as soon as possible. Don’t settle for a bankruptcy lawyer or a fly by night foreclosure “rescue” consultant. Foreclosures can be won but it’s not easy.

The average cost for a lawyer to file an answer and defend a foreclosure action is between $2500 and $5000. While there are some highly qualified lawyers that do this work, we think the only thing big banks understand is a counterclaim and aggressive lawyer.

Everyday we receive calls from homeowners across the U.S. Although we write about foreclosure defense, we rarely take such cases. Our primary purpose in writing is to provide general information and offer hope. The cases we do take are lawsuits against banks and lenders for illegal lending, loan modification and foreclosure practices. If you sufered a particularly bad experience, we certainly want to listen.

Our mortgage fraud team is currently co-counsel in the largest federal false claims act case in the nation, the $2.4 billion action on behalf of HUD against Allied Home Mortgage. Large or small, suing banks and getting justice for victims of predatory lending and foreclosure practices is what we enjoy.

Mahany & Ertl, America’s Fraud Lawyers. Offices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Detroit, Michigan; Portland, Maine & Minneapolis, Minnesota. Services available in many jurisdictions.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: Allied Home Mortgage, appraisal fraud, auction fraud, borrower, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, fraud, homeowner, housing market, HUD, Lender Liability, Mortgage, mortgage assignment, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Oklahoma Supreme Court, predatory lending | 55 Comments »

Current Bank Plan Is Same as $10 million Interest Free Loan for Every American

Posted on April 24, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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“I wonder how many audience members know that Bair’s plan is more or less exactly the revenue model for all of America’s biggest banks. You go to the Fed, get a buttload of free money, lend it out at interest (perversely enough, including loans right back to the U.S. government), then pocket the profit.” Matt Taibbi

From Rolling Stone’s Matt Taibbi on Sheila Bair’s Sarcastic Piece

I hope everyone saw ex-Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation chief Sheila Bair’s editorial in the Washington Post, entitled, “Fix Income Inequality with $10 million Loans for Everyone!” The piece might have set a world record for public bitter sarcasm by a former top regulatory official.

In it, Bair points out that since we’ve been giving zero-interest loans to all of the big banks, why don’t we do the same thing for actual people, to solve the income inequality program? If the Fed handed out $10 million to every person, and then got each of those people to invest, say, in foreign debt, we could all be back on our feet in no time:

Under my plan, each American household could borrow $10 million from the Fed at zero interest. The more conservative among us can take that money and buy 10-year Treasury bonds. At the current 2 percent annual interest rate, we can pocket a nice $200,000 a year to live on. The more adventuresome can buy 10-year Greek debt at 21 percent, for an annual income of $2.1 million. Or if Greece is a little too risky for you, go with Portugal, at about 12 percent, or $1.2 million dollars a year. (No sense in getting greedy.)

Every time I watch a Republican debate, and hear these supposedly anti-welfare crowds booing the idea of stiffer regulation of Wall Street, I wonder how many audience members know that Bair’s plan is more or less exactly the revenue model for all of America’s biggest banks. You go to the Fed, get a buttload of free money, lend it out at interest (perversely enough, including loans right back to the U.S. government), then pocket the profit.

Considering that we now know that the Fed gave out something like $16 trillion in secret emergency loans to big banks on top of the bailouts we actually knew about, you might ask yourself: How are these guys in financial trouble? How can they not be making mountains of money, risk-free? But they are in financial trouble:

• We’re about to see yet another big blow to all of the usual suspects – Goldman, Citi, Bank of America, and especially Morgan Stanley, all of whom face potential downgrades by Moody’s in the near future.

We’ve known this was coming for some time, but the news this week is that the giant money-managing firm BlackRock is talking about moving its business elsewhere. Laurence Fink, BlackRock’s CEO, told the New York Times: “If Moody’s does indeed downgrade these institutions, we may have a need to move some business around to higher-rated institutions.”

It’s one thing when Zero Hedge, William Black, myself, or some rogue Fed officers in Dallas decide to point fingers at the big banks. But when big money players stop trading with those firms, that’s when the death spirals begin.

Morgan Stanley in particular should be sweating. They’re apparently going to be downgraded three notches, where they’ll be joining Citi and Bank of America at a level just above junk. But no worries: Bank CFO Ruth Porat announced that a three-level downgrade was “manageable” and that only losers rely totally on agencies like Moody’s to judge creditworthiness. “A lot of clients are doing their own credit work,” she said.

• Meanwhile, Bank of America reported its first-quarter results yesterday. Despite that massive ongoing support from the Fed, it earned just $653 million in the first quarter, but astonishingly the results were hailed by most of the financial media as good news. Its home-turf paper, the San Francisco Chronicle, crowed that BOA “Posts Higher Profits As Trading Results Rebound.” Bloomberg, meanwhile, summed up results this way: “Bank of America Beats Analyst Estimates As Trading Jumps.”

But the New York Times noted that BOA’s first-quarter profit of $653 million was down from $2 billion a year ago, and paled compared to results of more successful banks like Chase and Wells Fargo.

Zero Hedge, meanwhile, posted an amusing commentary on BOA’s results, pointing out that the bank quietly reclassified nearly two billion dollars’ worth of real estate loans. This is from BOA’s report:

During 1Q12, the bank regulatory agencies jointly issued interagency supervisory guidance on nonaccrual policies for junior-lien consumer real estate loans. In accordance with this new guidance, beginning in 1Q12, we classify junior-lien home equity loans as nonperforming when the first-lien loan becomes 90 days past due even if the junior-lien loan is performing. As a result of this change, we reclassified $1.85B of performing home equity loans to nonperforming.

In other words, Bank of America described nearly two billion dollars of crap on their books as performing loans, until the government this year forced them to admit it was crap.

ZH and others also noted that BOA wildly underestimated its exposure to litigation, but that’s nothing new. Anyway, despite the inconsistencies in its report, and despite the fact that it’s about to be downgraded – again – Bank of America’s shares are up again, pushing $9 today.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Bank of America, big banks, BlackRock's CEO, Business News, Child Poverty, Children, Children In Recession, Chris Koster, Citi, credit bids, FDIC, Foreclosure Children, foreclosure crisis, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, Goldman, housing market, housing prices, investors, Kids In Recession, Laurence Fink, Matt Taibbi, Moody's, Morgan Stanley, mortgage fruad, mortgage settlement, mortgages, Poverty, Robo-Signing, settlement, Sheila Bair, strategic default, the Fed, Wells Fargo, Zero Hedge | 4 Comments »

Bringing in the Clowns Through Breach of Fiduciary Duties

Posted on April 23, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment: In my many conversations with both attorneys and pro se litigants they frequently express intense frustration about those invisible relationships and entities that permeate the entire mortgage model starting in the 1990’s and continuing to the present day, every day court is in session.

I think they are right. This article takes it as given, whether the courts wish to recognize it or not, that the parties at the closing table with the homeowner were all fiduciaries and included all those who were getting fees paid out of the closing proceeds — in other words paid out either the homeowner’s hapless down payment (worthless the moment it was tendered) or the proceeds of a loan (undocumented as to the source of the loan and documented falsely as to the creditor and the terms of repayment.

This article also takes it as a given, whether the courts are ready to recognize it or not, that the parties at the closing table with the investors who were the source of funds pooled or not were all fiduciaries and included all those who were getting fees paid out of the closing proceeds — in other words paid out either the hopeless plunge into an abyss with no loans purchased or funded until long after the money was in “escrow” with the investment banker in exchange for a completely worthless mortgage backed security without any mortgages backing the security.

But the interesting fact is that while some of the parties were known to the investor, and some of the parties were known to the homeowners, the investor did not know the parties at the closing table with the homeowner; and the borrower did not know the parties at the closing table with the investor.

In point of fact, the borrower did not even know there was a table or an investor or a table funded loan until long after closing, if ever. Remember that for years MERS, the servicers and others brought foreclosures that are still final (but subject to challenge) while they vigorously denied the very existence of a pool or any investors.

While this is interesting from the perspective of Reg Z that states that a pattern of table-funded loans is to be regarded as “predatory” per se, which the courts have refused to enforce or even recognize, I have a larger target — all the participants in the securitization chain, each of whom actually claims to have been some sort of escrow agent giving rise to a fiduciary relationship per se — meaning that the cause of action is simple and cannot be barred by the economic loss rule because they had no contract with the homeowners and probably had no contracts with the investors.

Again, I warn about the magic bullet. there isn’t one. But this one comes close because by including these fiduciaries by name from your combo title and securitization report and by description where the fake securitization was dubbed “private label” they are all brought into the courtroom and they are all subject to a simple action for accounting which can be amended later to allege damages, or if you think you have enough information already, state your damages.

Based upon my research of the fiduciary relationship there are no limits anywhere if the action is not based upon a direct contract, and some states and culled that down to a “no limit’ doctrine (see Florida cases) except in product liability or similar cases.

The allegation is simply that the homeowner bought a loan product that was known to be defective, poorly documented, if at all, and subject to a shell game (MERS) in which the homeowner would never know the identity of the chosen creditor until the homeowner was maneuvered into foreclosure. There are several potential channels of damages that can be alleged.

Lawyers are encouraged to do about 30 minutes of research into fiduciary liability in your state and match up the elements of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty with the securitization documents that either has already been admitted or that has been discovered.

Go through the PSA and look at it from the point of view of assumed agency and escrowing or holding documents, receivables, notes, money and mortgages. Each one of those is low hanging fruit for a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit.

And of course any party specifically named as a “trustee” whether a trust exists or not raises the issue of trust duties which are fiduciary as well, whether it is the trustee of a “pool” or the trustee on the deed of trust (or more likely the alleged substitution trustee on the DOT).

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, closing table, DocX Indictment, fiduciary duty, fiduciary relationship, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, MERS, mortgage fruad, mortgages, PSA, Reg Z, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Substitution of Trustee, trustee | 85 Comments »

FireDogLake: How the Corruption of the Land Title System is NOT Being Fixed

Posted on April 21, 2012 by Neil Garfield

The Real Foreclosure Fraud Story: Corruption of the Land Title System

By: David Dayen

George Zornick carries a rebuttal from Eric Schneiderman’s team on yesterday’s damaging expose of the securitization fraud working group. Here’s what it has to say:

• There are 50 staffers “across the country” working on the RMBS working group (the official title).
• DoJ has asked for $55 million for additional staffing.
• The five co-chairs of the working group meet formally weekly, and talk daily.
• There are no headquarters for the working group, but that’s because it’s spread across the country.
• There is no executive director.
• Activists still think the staffing level is too low.

If any of this looks familiar, it’s because it’s EXACTLY what Reuters and I reported a week ago. In other words, it was unnecessary. And it doesn’t contradict what the New York Daily News op-ed said yesterday, either. Like that op-ed, this confirms that there is no executive director and no headquarters for the working group, which sounds more like a central processing space for investigations that could have happened independently, at least at this point.

Meanwhile, if you want actual news, you can go to this very good story at MSNBC, revealing the truth that nobody wants to talk about: the inconvenient detail that the land title and property rights system that has served this country well for over 300 years has been irreparably broken by this gang of thieves at the leading banks.

In a quiet office in downtown Charlotte, N.C., dozens of Wells Fargo’s foreclosure foot soldiers sit in cubicles cranking out documents the bank relies on to seize its share of the thousands of homes lost to foreclosure every week […]

The Wells Fargo worker, who first contacted msnbc.com via email in late January, told of a wide range of concerns about the foreclosure documents she processes. Some families apparently were denied loan modifications after only cursory interviews, she said. Other borrowers applying for help sent comprehensive personal financial documents to a fax machine that she discovered had been unattended for weeks. Others landed in foreclosure after owing interest payments of as little as $1.18 a day, according to documents she said she reviewed.

“There was one file where they weren’t even past due and they were in foreclosure status,” the loan processor said. “They’re pushing these files and pushing these files….”

Five years into the worst housing collapse since the Great Depression, the foreclosure pipeline that is removing tens of thousands of families from their homes every month rests on a legal process that has been badly compromised by errors, misrepresentation and outright fraud, according to consumer attorneys, state attorneys general, federal investigators and state and federal judges.

I must confess that I don’t throw this in everyone’s face nearly enough. What is being described in this article is the product of a completely broken system. The low-level grunts are being forced to sign off on a quota of loan files every day, and push the paper through the pipeline. Veracity, or even knowledge of the underlying data in the files, is irrelevant. This is precisely what got us into this mess in the first place, and it’s still happening. And these grunts, making $30,000 a year, are given titles like “Vice President of Loan Documentation” to sign off on affidavits attesting to the loan files. That’s basically robo-signing. It’s still happening.

Check out this part about LPS:

Like many mortgage servicers, Wells Fargo relies on a company called Lender Processing Services to assemble some of the information used to foreclose on properties.

With each file they prepare, the bank’s document processors must swear “personal knowledge” the information in each affidavit was properly collected and is accurate and complete.

But they have no way of making good on that promise because they are not able to check whether LPS properly collected and processed the data, according to the document processor.

“We’re basically copying and pasting” information from the LPS system, she said. “It’s data entry. We just input (on the affidavit) what’s on that system. And that’s it. We don’t go back through system and look.”

You’re talking about massive, massive fraud. And this is what the state Attorneys General and the federal regulators gave up, in exchange for their non-investigatory investigation.

This story is familiar here, but not necessarily to the MSNBC.com audience. I applaud them for putting this long piece together that synthesizes a lot of the information that’s been out there for years. This is the real scandal here, a corrupted residential housing market that actually cannot be put back together.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, AHMSI, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chris Koster, credit bids, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 115 Comments »

Citi’s Parsons Blames Glass-Steagall Repeal for Crisis

Posted on April 20, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment: So here we have one of the guys that was part of the team that overturned Glass-Steagal saying that their success led to the failure of our financial system. But then he says it is too late to change what we have done. It is not too late and if we are ever going to correct the financial system and hence the economy, we need to fix what we have done — separate the banks back into investment banks that take risks and commercial banks that are supposed to minimize risks. Instead we have a system where there is a virtually unlimited supply of other people’s money in the form of deposits and taxpayer bailouts that is the engine for leading what is left of the financial system into another ditch, this one deeper and worse.

Think about it. The banks are reporting record profits while the rest of us are experiencing record problems. That means that the banks are reporting gargantuan profits trading paper based upon economies that are in a nose-dive. How is that possible. We have less commerce (buying and selling) and more money being made by banks trading paper to each other. Or is this simply money laundering — bringing back and repatriating the money they stole in the mortgage meltdown and paying little or no tax?

Parsons Blames Glass-Steagall Repeal for Crisis

By Kim Chipman and Christine Harper

Richard Parsons, speaking two days after ending his 16-year tenure on the board of Citigroup Inc. (C) and a predecessor, said the financial crisis was partly caused by a regulatory change that permitted the company’s creation.

The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall law that separated banks from investment banks and insurers made the business more complicated, Parsons said yesterday at a Rockefeller Foundation event in Washington. He served as chairman of Citigroup, the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets, from 2009 until handing off the role to Michael O’Neill at the April 17 annual meeting.

Enlarge image Citigroup Inc.

A Citigroup Inc. Citibank. Photographer: Dado Galdieri/Bloomberg

Parsons Says End of Glass-Steagall Led to Crisis

Play Video

April 20 (Bloomberg) — Bloomberg’s Erik Schatzker and Stephanie Ruhle report that Richard Parsons, speaking two days after ending his 16-year tenure on the board of Citigroup Inc. and a predecessor, said the financial crisis was partly caused by a regulatory change that permitted the company’s creation. They speak on Bloomberg Television’s “Inside Track.” (Source: Bloomberg)

“To some extent what we saw in the 2007, 2008 crash was the result of the throwing off of Glass-Steagall,” Parsons, 64, said during a question-and-answer session. “Have we gotten our arms around it yet? I don’t think so because the financial- services sector moves so fast.”

The 1998 merger of Citicorp and Sanford I. Weill’s Travelers Group Inc. depended on the U.S. government overturning the portion of the Depression-era act that required banks to be separate from capital-markets businesses like Travelers’ Salomon Smith Barney Holdings Inc. Parsons, who was president of Time Warner Inc. (TWX) at the time, had been a member of the Citicorp board before joining the board of the newly created Citigroup.

“Why didn’t he do something about it when he had a chance to?” Mike Mayo, an analyst at CLSA in New York who rates Citigroup shares “underperform,” said in a phone interview. “He’s a couple days out the door and he’s publicly criticizing the ability to manage the company.”

‘Dynamic World’

Unlike John S. Reed, the former Citicorp CEO who said in 2009 that he regretted working to overturn Glass-Steagall, Parsons said he didn’t think that the barriers can be rebuilt.

“We are going to have to figure out how to manage in this new and dynamic world because there are good and sufficient business reasons for putting these things together,” Parsons said. “It’s just that the ability to manage what we have built isn’t up to our capacity to do it yet.”

Parsons didn’t refer to Citigroup specifically during his comments and Shannon Bell, a spokeswoman for the bank in New York, declined to comment. Mayo said Parsons’ comments show he views the New York-based bank as “too big to manage.”

“This gives more support to the new chairman to take more radical action,” said Mayo, whose book “Exile on Wall Street” was critical of Parsons and the management of banks including Citigroup. “Citigroup needs to be reduced in size whether that’s breaking up or additional asset sales or whatever it takes.”

‘Separate Houses’

Parsons said in a phone interview after the event that it was difficult to find executives who could run retail banks and investment banks in the U.S. because the two businesses had been separated by Glass-Steagall for about 60 years.

“One of the things we faced when we tried to find new leadership for Citi, there wasn’t anybody who had deep employment experience in both sides of what theretofore had been separate houses,” he said. Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit is trying to change that, Parsons said. “I think if you ask Vikram he’d say probably his biggest challenge long-term is developing the management.”

Banks are growing because corporations and other clients want them to, and management must meet the challenge, he said.

U.S. Bailout

“People have a sort of a notion that ‘well, we can decide that’s too big to manage,’” he said. “But it got that way because there was a market need and institutions find and follow the needs of the marketplace. So what we have to do is we have to learn how to improve our ability to manage it and manage it more effectively.”

Citigroup, which took the most government aid of any U.S. bank during the financial crisis, has lost 86 percent of its value in the past four years, twice as much as the 24-company KBW Bank Index. (BKX) Most shareholders voted this week against the bank’s compensation plan, which awarded Pandit about $15 million in total pay for 2011, when the shares fell 44 percent.

Shareholders’ views shouldn’t be “given the same level of weight” as those of the board and management, Parsons said. Companies “shouldn’t make the mistake of putting them in the driver’s seat.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Kim Chipman in Washington at kchipman@bloomberg.net; Christine Harper in New York at charper@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Colleen McElroy at cmcelroy@bloomberg.net; David Scheer at dscheer@bloomberg.net.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, AHMSI, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chris Koster, credit bids, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, Glass-Steagal, housing market, housing prices, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Parsons, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 32 Comments »

OCC Review Getting Few Takers

Posted on April 20, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Demand an Administrative Hearing

Very few people have asked for a review of their wrongful foreclosures. Maybe it is because we are all war-weary from this constant barrage of illegal activity from the banks. But there are avenues to travel, whether your foreclosure is past, present or even future. While the OCC review process has some restrictions announced, it nonetheless allies to all foreclosures whether they like it or not. They are the regulatory agency for certain types of banks and servicers, just like OTS, and the Federal Reserve. If one of their chartered and regulated members commits an atrocity, the agency is required by law to do something about it.

And one more thing. The OCC should be setting up review panels and administrative hearing processes because you can be sure that homeowners are not going to agree with the “review” that is conducted by the bank that is accused of committing the error, which is what the “review process” is all about. Why not ask a rapist to investigate whether he did it or if she was just asking for it?

This stuff is not just made up out of my head. It comes from the Administrative Procedures Act and its likeness in the federal, state and even local systems where any government agency is involved.

So if you are alleging wrongdoing in ANY foreclosure — past, present or future — you should be making your allegations. What do you allege? That is where the COMBO product linked next to my picture comes in and there are other people who do similar work although it is true that the title companies are trying their best to obscure the searches for title information. Getting a loan specific title analysis and a loan specific securitization analysis should provide you with enough information to allege wrongful foreclosure. Getting a Forensic Analysis and loan level analysis might also be helpful in rounding out the allegations.

Here are just a few items to get you going:

The debt wasn’t due
The debt wasn’t due to the party who foreclosed
The party who foreclosed misrepresented itself as the owner of the debt
The debt was paid in full by insurance, credit default swaps or federal bailouts
The monthly payment was paid by the servicer to the creditor (or the party they claim is the creditor) at the same time that the servicer was declaring a default to the borrower. If the creditor was getting paid, where is the default?
The credit bid was submitted by a party who was not a creditor and therefore should have paid cash at the auction
The auction was conducted by an employee or agent of the party seeking to foreclose
Payments were improperly applied or were not applied
Charges were illegal and unfair and were the reason for the foreclosure
You were tricked into foreclosure by the pretender lender’s agent telling you had to skip payments before you could be considered for modification. (known in the industry as dual tracking)
The “lender” failed to comply with Reg Z on rescission
The loan violated TILA, RESPA
The “lender” failed to comply with RESPA

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, administrative hearings, AHMSI, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chris Koster, credit bids, DocX Indictment, Federal reserve, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, OCC, OTS, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 59 Comments »

Hoping Canadians are Stupid, Stewart Title Skips Warranties of Title

Posted on April 19, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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I’ve been telling Canadians that there is considerable doubt as to whether the investment properties they are buying in the context of foreclosure are going to work out for them because of title defects. Some of them are listening and most see the deals as too good to be true. They are right — it is too good to be true, which means it isn’t true that the prices and title are just find, eh?

Here is the new disclaimer (see below). If you can find anything that protects anyone other than the title company then you are able to drill down further than we can. This disclaimer shows what we have been saying — the very use of the term “virtual” title tells us that there is no basis upon which the title agent or carrier will be held accountable or will pay anything if you buy property and take a policy from any of the major carriers.

Up until now it was standard practice in the industry that lawyers and lay people would rely upon the title report issued by the title company. Now they say it is for general information and you can’t rely on it. This means that virtually every buyer should have an attorney who is competent and has the resources to obtain and independent title report and is able to advise people holding or intending to hold title, mortgage or anything else. This gives them a license to insert or delete almost anything. The only way you can really know your chain of title is to go down to the county recorder’s office and examine the chain, one instrument at a time and to check for cross references where a parcel number or name might have been transposed.

What this also means is that anyone seeking to foreclose now must go through the same process and prove to the judge with a certified copy of the title registry that the mortgage is on there and that no satisfaction or other impediments to foreclosure are present. This is a new development and it therefore calls for new tactics and strategies.

Virtual Underwriter® is an underwriting tool. Stewart Title Guaranty Company and its affiliated underwriters (collectively “Stewart”) does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or completeness of any content of Virtual Underwriter®, and you may not rely upon any such content. Only Stewart Issuing Offices may rely on Virtual Underwriter and only to issue Stewart insurance forms. Stewart makes no express or implied warranties with regard to Virtual Underwriter® and shall have no liability for any errors or omissions or for the results of the use of such material. You should not assume that Virtual Underwriter® is error-free or that it will be suitable for the particular purpose that you have in mind. Any material, forms, documents, policies, endorsements, annotations, notations, interpretations, or constructions included in Virtual Underwriter® are made available as a convenience only and should not be considered as altering or modifying the text of any matter to which they relate. Virtual Underwriter® should not be relied upon as a basis for interpreting the forms contained herein. Virtual Underwriter® is made available with the understanding that Stewart is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional advice or services. If legal advice or services or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. The material contained in Virtual Underwriter® is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney or other professional person. Preparation/facilitation of documents other than by an attorney may constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

see vubulletins.jsp?displaykey=BL133368894600000002

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, affidavits • attesting • Daniel Edstrom • DTC-Systems • fabricating • false information • false sworn documents • foreclose • illicit business practices • improper statements • imp, AHMSI, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chris Koster, credit bids, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 20 Comments »

Banks Slammed for Misrepresenting Themselves as Owners of the Loan

Posted on April 19, 2012 by Neil Garfield

2008 Legal Memo at BKR Conference

Cautions Banks and Lawyers Against Lying About Ownership

A legal compendium of cases published by the American Bankruptcy Institute establishes a pattern of conduct by Ameriquest, Wells Fargo and Chase dating back before 2008 in which these and other banks have intentionally misrepresented themselves to the court as owners of the note, entitled to foreclose and seeking to lift the automatic stay in bankruptcy court under “color of title” arguments. The link to the entire article is below.

What I see is not just wrongful conduct in court but a continuous pattern of lying, fabricating, forging and cheating that has left millions of homeowners without possession of their rightful homes. The ONLY REMEDY in my opinion is to restore these homes to the bankruptcy estate and that the debtor’s be allowed to assert claims attacking the supposed mortgage liens that were based upon false identification of the lender, false and predatory figures used in borrowing and servicing and a large shroud thrown over the entire fictitious securitization process as a place to hide an illegal scheme to issue multiple securities in which the borrower was the issuer of the promissory note under false pretenses and the REMIC was carefully constructed to issue bogus mortgage bonds.

In both cases, the issuer and the investor were dealing with participants in the securitization chain who had no intention of allowing them to keep or recover their investment. In both cases, the instrument was a security that did NOT fall under the exemptions previously used to protect the banks. The borrower as issuer was induced to enter into a securities transaction in which he purchased a loan product under the false assumption created and promoted by the Banks that the real estate market never went down and would always go up, thus allaying the borrowers’ fear that the loan was not affordable. In fact that loan was not affordable and would violate the affordability guidelines in TILA and RESPA if it was classified as a residential mortgage loan. The REMIC that issued the bonds did so without any assets, and even though the disclosure was in the prospectus buried in parts where one would not be looking for that risk, that fact alone removes the REMIC issuance as a REMIC under the Internal Revenue Code, and removes the issuance of the mortgage bond from the cover of exemption under the 1998 Act.

We have all seen Wells Fargo, BOA, Chase, US Bank, Ameriquest and others banged repeatedly fro misrepresenting themselves in court as the owner of the loan when in fact they were not the owner of the loan, never loaned the money to begin with and never purchased the loan obligation from anyone because no money exchanged hands. Even if they tried, the only party who could sell or release claims to the receivable from the “borrower” (issuer) would have been the partnership or individuals or as a group pooled their money into leaky, fictitious entities created for the express purpose of deceiving the pension funds and other investors.

The bottom line is that when it suits them (when they want the property, in addition to the unearned insurance payments, proceeds of credit default swaps and proceeds from other credit enhancements and federal bailouts) these banks assert falsely that they are the creditor, claiming the losses that trigger payments to them rather than the investor. When it does not suit them, like when they abandon the property, or are subject to imposition of fees, sanctions or fines or attorney fees, then they finally fess up and state that they are not the owner of the loan in order to avoid paying appropriate costs, fines, fees, penalties and fees.

Here are some of the notable quotes from the piece written by Catherine V Eastwood, Esq., of Partridge, Snow and Hahn, LLP. At some point the lawyers must be subjected to the same sanctions knowing in the public domain that these practices exist as a pattern of conduct. see Consumer_Sept_2008_NE08_Messing_Mortgages_Cases

QUOTES FROM ARTICLE:

Make Sure Your Pleading Contains Accurate Information Regarding The Identity Of The Real Party In Interest
[AMERIQUEST FINED $250,000, LAW FIRM FINED $25,000, WELLS FARGO FINED $250,000 FOR A TOTAL OF $525,000] On April 25, 2008, Judge Rosenthal issued an memorandum of decision regarding an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed in the matter of Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1251 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008). Ameriquest had maintained throughout a prior adversary proceeding and bankruptcy case that it was the “holder” of the note and mortgage. When the debtor filed a second adversary proceeding requesting trustee process from two Chapter 13 Trustees to collect payment on the judgment issued in the prior case, Ameriquest argued that it was merely the servicer of the loans and that it was not the owner of the funds sought to be collected. The court noted that Ameriquest and its attorneys had made misrepresentations to the court throughout the prior proceedings regarding its status as noteholder. Wells Fargo, NA as Trustee for Amresco Residential Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 1998-2 was the real holder of the note. The Court issued a Notice to Show Cause why sanctions should not be imposed

Make Sure Your Pleading Contains Accurate Financial Information or Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 May Be Imposed: Judge Bohm asked counsel why a motion from relief from stay was being withdrawn. The lawyer’s answer resulted in the judge issuing two show cause orders in In re Parsley, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 593 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 2008). The real answer should have been that the motion for relief was filed in error on account of an erroneous payment history. Unfortunately, counsel misrepresented to the court that it was a “good motion” and that set off an explosion, leading to evidence of other misrepresentations…. Testimony also revealed that the payment histories were prepared by paralegals and were not reviewed by any attorneys. Countrywide did not review the loan histories either. No one was catching the errors under this system. Judge Bohm wrote “what kind of culture condones its lawyers lying to the court and then retreating to the office hoping that the Court will forget about the whole matter.”

[$75,000 Sanction against Law Firm] In an earlier matter, also in the Southern District of Texas, the Court sanctioned a law firm in the amount of $75,000 for filing an objection to plan and subsequent withdrawal of the objection that was deemed to be “gibberish.” In re Allen, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2063 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 2007). It was clear to the Court that the pleadings were not being reviewed by an attorney after being generated by a computer as the objection listed reasons that were completely unrelated or blatantly opposite of the contents of the Chapter 13 plan filed by the debtor.

[Chase required to pay legal fees of debtor] On April 10, 2008, Judge Morris, a bankruptcy court judge for the Southern District of New York, issued a decision in the case of In re Schuessler, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1000 (Bankr. S.D. NY. 2008) regarding an order to show cause why Chase Home Finance, LLC should not be sanctioned for submitting pleadings that were misleading and that had no factual support.

Standing Challenges: Make Sure The Company Bringing The Action Has The Legal Right To Do So

[RELIEF FROM STAY DENIED RETROACTIVELY ON DEBTOR’S MOTION] In re Schwartz, 366 BR 265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) that parties who do not hold the note or mortgage and who do not service the mortgage do not have standing to pursue motions for relief or other actions arising out of the mortgage obligation. In Schwartz the creditor was seeking relief to pursue an eviction action following a foreclosure sale. The assignment of mortgage into the foreclosing mortgagee was executed four days after the foreclosure sale took place. The Court stated that while the term “mortgagee”, as used in M.G.L. c. 244 §1, “has been defined to include assignees of a mortgage, there is nothing to suggest that one who expects to receive the mortgage by assignment may undertake any foreclosure activity.” Id. at 269. The motion for relief was denied.

While not a bankruptcy court case, a United States District Court case worthy of inclusion in this section is In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio 2007). The District Court issued an order covering numerous foreclosure cases that were pending in the state. The creditor was ordered by the Court to produce evidence that the named plaintiff was the holder and owner of the note and mortgage as of the date the foreclosure complaint was filed. The court dismissed the foreclosure complaints when the lenders were unable to produce the assignments.

How Many Times Can A Lender Continue a Foreclosure Sale?

In re Soderman, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008). In Soderman the court recited the “one-time” postponement blessing in order to seek relief from stay but that repeated continuances may be a violation of the automatic stay. The repeated continuances will be deemed a violation of the stay if the postponements are made in order to harass the debtor, gain an advantage for the creditor or renew the financial strain that led the debtor to file for bankruptcy protection. Id. One month after the decision in Soderman was released, Judge Hillman also ruled that repeated continuances of a foreclosure sale was a violation of the automatic stay. In re Lynn-Weaver, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1101 (Bankr. D. Mass 2008).

Challenging the Assessment of Mortgage Fees to a Loan and the United States Trustee’s Office’s Investigation of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

In an unprecedented move, Judge Agresti of the Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court, in April 2008, approved the Justice Department’s further investigation of Countrywide due to widespread allegations that the lender is filing false or inaccurate claims, misapplying funds, assessing unreasonable fees to borrowers’ accounts or ignoring the discharge injunction and other court orders. Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc. f/k/a Countrywide Funding Corp., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1023 (Bankr. W.D. PA. 2008).
This matter was precipitated by a Standing Chapter 13 Trustee in Pennsylvania originally filing for sanctions against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. due to her experience with the lender

The Pennsylvania matters have led the United States Trustee’s Office to file similar suits in Georgia1 and Ohio2 seeking to investigate the servicing practices of Countrywide. Various subpoenas have also been served by the United States Trustee’s office upon Countrywide in Florida regarding the assessment of fees on borrower’s accounts.

1 The United States Trustee’s Office filed a complaint on February 28, 2008 styled as Walton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,08-06092-mhm in the Northern District of Georgia. The related bankruptcy case is In re Atchley, 05- 79232-mhm. In Atchley, the homeowners eventually sold their home to avoid foreclosure but believe the payoff amount cited by Countrywide contained excessive fees and that Countrywide continued to accept trustee payments after the loan paid off.
2 The United States Trustee’s Office filed a complaint on February 28, 2008 styled as Fokkena v. Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc., 08-05031-mss in the Northern District of Ohio. The related bankruptcy case is In re O’Neal, 07- 51027. In O’Neal, Countrywide filed a proof of claim and objection to plan when it had already accepted a short sale on the property prior to the bankruptcy filing.

ALL LENDERS ARE FAIR GAME

[Forensic Audits Suggested — $10,000 damages, $12,350 Legal Fees, Wells Fargo sanctioned $5000] in the matter of In re Dorothy Stewart Chase, Docket 07-11113, Chapter 13 (Bankr. E.D. LA 2008), Judge Magner issued a 49 page decision on April 10, 2008 which ordered Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it filed in the district since April 13, 2007 and to provide a complete loan history on every account. If the audits reveal additional concerns, the judge reserved the right to appoint experts to do forensic accountings at the expense of Wells Fargo. She also ruled that Wells Fargo was negligent in the loan servicing of Ms. Chase’s loan and assessed damages of $10,000, legal fees of $12,350 and sanctioned Wells Fargo $5,000 for filing a consent order that did not reflect the agreement of the parties and for filing erroneous proofs of claim.

[Wells sanctioned $67,202.45] The decision in Chase was on the heels of Judge Magner’s earlier decision in In re Jones, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2984 (Bankr. E.D. LA. 2007). In Jones, Judge Magner sanctioned Wells Fargo $67,202.45 for violating the order of confirmation and the automatic stay by improperly assessing the debtor’s loan with fees in the amount of $16,852.01 and diverting payments made by the Chapter 13 trustee and the Debtor to satisfy fees that had not been authorized by the Court. The judge stated that the Jones case would provide guidance in the post-petition administration of home mortgage loans to a degree that, until this decision issued, had been lacking in the industry.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, affidavits • attesting • Daniel Edstrom • DTC-Systems • fabricating • false information • false sworn documents • foreclose • illicit business practices • improper statements • imp, AHMSI, Ameriquest, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chase, Chris Koster, countrywide, credit bids, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 26 Comments »

Moynihan Must Testify in Fraud Suit Brought by Bond Insurer

Posted on April 18, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment; The fact they he is being forced to testify is a major breakthrough the wall silence used by the banks and servicers. BY this article I am asking for people to review the court file, get the pleadings and memorandums and send them to me at neilFgarfield@hotmail.com. Everyone should be paying attention to this case, and everyone should be reading everything. The insurer is making the case for the borrowers at the the same time as they are making the case for recovery of money paid by them under false pretenses to the wrong parties, screwing both the investors and the borrowers.

www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/13/us-bofa-moynihan-testify-idUSBRE83C03F20120413

NEW YORK | Thu Apr 12, 2012 10:00pm EDT

(Reuters) – A New York judge has ruled that Bank of America (BAC.N) CEO Brian Moynihan must testify in a lawsuit brought by bond insurer MBIA Inc.(MBI.N) which claims the bank fraudulently induced it to insure risky mortgage-backed securities.

The judge said Moynihan could provide relevant testimony in the case due to his position as CEO, former president of investment banking and the fact that he oversaw the process of integrating Countrywide into Bank of America.

Bank of America acquired mortgage lender Countrywide in July 2008. MBIA filed a Countrywide later that year. In 2009, MBIA claimed Bank of America was liable for Countrywide’s conduct.

Bank of America, the second-largest U.S. bank by assets, is fighting several legal cases following the global financial crisis and had sought to block MBIA efforts for Moynihan to give evidence.

MBIA was once the largest U.S. municipal bond insurer. It announced a restructuring in 2009 after incurring large losses insuring mortgage debt.

Bank of America had asked New York Supreme Court Justice Eileen Bransten to rule that Moynihan did not need to testify, arguing that MBIA was seeking his deposition only to harass the bank and that Moynihan had no unique knowledge about the case.

But the judge on Wednesday denied the request, according to court papers made public on Thursday.

“The knowledge Moynihan gained as part of the (Countrywide) Steering Committee is unique, and it is material and necessary to MBIA’s successor liability claim,” the judge said.

Moynihan was involved in “high-level decisions regarding the Countrywide transaction” and his testimony will not duplicate that of lower-level employees, she said.

MBIA declined to comment and Bank of America did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The cases is MBIA Insurance Corp v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc et al, New York State Supreme Court, New York County, No. 602825/2008.

State and Federal Agencies Should Brace for Demands for Administrative Hearings

Posted on April 18, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment: We had an interesting exchange in a civil, almost charming meeting with the Arizona Secretary of State last night at Darrell Blomberg’s Tuesday night meeting. He has the AZ AG coming in a couple of weeks.

One thing that came out is that the oath of the notary is missing in many cases and there were some people who thought this might be the magic bullet that would bring down the entire foreclosure process. I don’t know how this got started but the responses from the Secretary and his manager of business affairs were mostly correct — although they point to serious deficiencies in the system and training of the people.

The oath and the bond are usually on the same page. That it is not recorded anywhere is flimsy at best and even if correct would be a source of annoyance to a judge rather than convincing him that the mortgage origination was defective and the foreclosure wrongful.Proving the notary to have been incorrectly affixed might accomplish a right to have the mortgage or deed of trust removed from the title records — but it does NOT invalidate the document itself. There is no magic bullet.

I again say: there is no magic bullet, and there is no paper defect that will discharge a debt. Debts are discharged by payment or waiver of payment (and waived could be involuntary, like in bankruptcy). By concentrating upon the possibility of a defect in the process of record-keeping on the oath of office of a judge or notary, you are essentially admitting the debt, the default and the right to collect and even foreclose, although your intent is otherwise.

The attestation by the notary has nothing to do with the validity of the contents of the document. It serves only to say that a person appeared before the notary and fulfilled the statutory requirements by identifying themselves. The notary is merely attesting to the fact that this is what happened. Someone appeared, gave a drivers license etc., and signed in front of the notary. That is the fullest extent of the attestation of the notary and the power of the notary.

In Arizona, any attestation by the notary that includes corroboration that the person whose signature is being notarized is in fact that person or has a particular relationship with a particular company is void to the extent that the attestation of the notary includes assurance of the signor’s official position or representative powers.

California has a similar provision but allows notaries — if they actually know — to attest to the official capacity of the signor. But California law has an important caveat. Any attestation as to the powers, rights and obligations of the signor cannot be used and is of no effect if it is being used outside the state. So if you are in Arizona and the notary was in California and included an attestation that the signor was vice president of MERS, the part about the signor being a VP of MERS counts for nothing.

The secretary stepped in immediately when his manager tried to say that any decision by the office of the secretary of state is final and cannot be reviewed. However, as he pointed out, the finding of an administrative agency is presumptively true unless you can prove otherwise. That is why the OCC decrees etc. should be viewed as valuable to homeowners because there have already been admissions and findings that the foreclosures were wrongful, and in some studies (San Francisco). Those findings after investigations are also entitled to a presumption of validity and throws the burden of proof onto the the pretender lender IF you show that the bad practices cited by the agencies show up in your particular case.

It is disturbing that (a) a state official second only to the secretary of state himself actually believed that she had supreme authority that was never subject to review. And (b) although the secretary affirmed his believe that his office was a record keeper and not an enforcement arm of the executive branch, I think that is a contradiction in terms. The purpose of the executive branch of government is to enforce the law. If a filing is required with the Secretary of State providing information about the activities of a limited partnership along with the fees payable to the State of Arizona, it is a mistake, in my opinion, to believe that such an agency lacks the right to prosecute those who fail to register, do business in the state and don’t pay their fees.

After decades of practice in administrative law all over the country, I believe I have discovered a mistaken impression that is often found amongst state departments, both as to their powers and their obligations to enforce those powers. I think a lawsuit in mandamus against the office of Secretary of State requiring them to use the Administrative Procedures Act and participate in hearings conducted by administrative hearings judges who are objective and unbiased, may well be necessary unless the Secretary rethinks his position and does so on his own.

This might be particularly important to the State of Arizona and other states since the REMIC pools appear to be either general or limited partnerships and not Trusts as they are described in the PSA and prospectus. This ought to be at least tested.

But whether the restrictive power of the secretary of state extends only to limited partnerships and not corporations and other business entities ( division that is peculiar at best) the major point is still the same. A foreign entity or person holding money in their hands, solicited applicants for loans and then closed transactions for those loans within the state of Arizona and with respect to an interest or potential interest in real property located strictly within the state of Arizona, violated state law and must suffer the consequences.

If they want to say that these leads to an unfair or inequitable result, they must allege and prove that they will lose money by applying the law and that means proving that they funded the loan, bought it or otherwise advanced real money where money exchanged hands. At this point everyone who knows the logistics here knows that there is not one party, group or person that can prove that case, which is why the rejection of modifications is so ridiculous and born of pure arrogance.

The real lender or creditor is now admitted to be an out of state group or entity of some kind that never registered in the state, never paid the fees, and never gave any required information about the group or entity. Perhaps the Secretary of state should be more intrigued when he realizes that hundreds of thousands of such transactions occurred in the State of Arizona over the last 12 years and they continue to be conducting business activity and legal activity in the state all without the required registration. The exemptions from registration do not apply.

Under normal rules of engagement, the party failing to properly register is subject to fees, fines and penalties for doing business without registration and may neither bring any legal claim or defend against one in the absence of the proper registration. So whether it is the office of the Secretary of State or some other department that somehow does not fall under the authority of the secretary of state (a peculiar circumstance at best) the State is (a) missing out on hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from out-of-state carpet baggers and (b) missing its chance to stop the foreclosures and even return the wrongfully foreclosed homes to their rightful owners.

So my question to the Secretary of State is this: As the putative lieutenant governor of the State who might be seeking higher office (the governor’s mansion), which would you rather do — run with the backing of back s tabbing bankers who have already shown their willingness and desire to lie, forge documents and otherwise cheat the state’s citizens out of the right to possession of their own homes AFTER payment has been received in full — or would you rather ride the crest of anti-bank sentiment that can be found lurking in almost every voter regardless of the status of the ir mortgage or living arrangements? My bet is that the politician who seeks higher office or to maintain incumbency, would best be served by leading a populist revolt against the major out of state banks and a movement toward local in-state banks that had nothing to do with the mortgage mess created by false claims of securitization.

My second piece of advice is that the head of any agency having anything to do with regulation of business entities , banking and lending had best brush off their old copy of the Administrative Procedure Act because in my view there is right to bring a complaint against the agency that cannot be denied. And without having procedures and facilities for administrative hearings, complainants cannot fulfill the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. That allegation alone in state or federal court could bring a mountain of constitutional issues crashing upon the shoulders of agency heads who thought they were immune from some issues.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: administrative hearings, Administrative Procedures Act, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, credit bids, discharge of debt, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, Ken Bennett AZ Secretary of State, kenneth Bennett AZ Secretary of State, linda green, LPS, mortgage fruad, mortgages, notary, notary attestation, notary fraud, notary power, OCC decree, partnership, Prospectus, PSA, REMIC pools, Robo-Signing, secretary of state, settlement, strategic default | 35 Comments »

Occupy Homes Protest Forces Delay of Sheriff Sale

Posted on April 17, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Occupy Homes Protest Forces Delay of Sheriff Sale
By Ty Moore

US Bank buckles under pressure, delaying sale of veteran John Vinje’s home until May 29th

After a week of escalating pressure demanding US Bank postpone the sheriff’s sale of John and Lucinda Vinje’s home, Occupy Homes won another 11th hour victory today. John Vinje led a contingent of 50 Occupy Homes MN supporters into the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Civil Division where the sale was to take place at 11:00am this morning.

Speeches, chants, and song filled the marbled hallways in the ground floor of city hall. No potential buyers were seen entering the courtroom the entire time, and just after 11:30am it was announced that US Bank had delayed the sale to May 29th. Following the victory, John said: “This shows that the power is now with the people, and not with large, monolithic corporations, like US Bank.

Homeowners throughout Minnesota facing foreclosure, facing sheriff’s sales, should get together with their community and demand a postponement and renegotiation. They should get connected with Occupy Homes because we can save homes throughout the state of Minnesota when we all work together.” Today’s action followed a week of escalating pressure on US Bank, including a national call-in campaign aimed to VP Tom Joyce, and a march on US Bank CEO Richard Davis’ mansion on April 7th. Ty Moore, an organizer with Occupy Homes explained: “We’ve got the banks scrambling already, but this fight is just beginning. John’s victory, following Monique and Bobby’s victories, is sending a message. Minnesota homeowners aren’t going to leave their homes quietly and in shame anymore. It’s the banks and CEOs like Richard Davis who should be ashamed!”

Occupy Homes MN achieved national media attention after winning Bobby Hull’s foreclosed home back after US Bank bought his property at a sheriff sale, and repeatedly delaying the eviction of Monique White, who also received her original mortgage through US Bank. John and Lucinda Vinje are among a growing number of homeowners joining together through Occupy Homes to fight back against the unjust and illegal banking practices behind the foreclosure crisis. John and Lucinda Vinje bought their home in 2008, the first house either of them had ever owned. John is an Air Force veteran now working as a security guard, and Lucinda has worked a government job for ten years.

But when financial difficulties caused them to fall behind on payments by just two months, US Bank refused their request to repay their arrears in installments and immediately began foreclosure proceedings. Meanwhile, Lucinda has been forced into “medical retirement” due to a chronic condition, adding financial strain on the family. If US Bank would renegotiate their mortgage to current market value as the Vinje’s request, they could afford the payments. After six months of delays, in March US Bank offered them a measly $97 less on their monthly payments. Both John and Lucinda have worked their entire lives, but now stand to lose the only home they have ever owned.

Home Prices Still Spiralling down

Posted on April 17, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: As this article demonstrates in sampling some counties in the Northeast, there is no indication that the prices of homes are stabilizing nor that there is any prospect of anything but further reductions in prices of homes. The reason is simple. Price is not the same as value. The value of the homes are still at least 15% lower than the current prices. Thus it is not difficult to recognize that when the market catches up with the current reality, the prices will come down to meet the actual values.

That is exactly how in 2007 I was able to call with precision, the collapse of the housing market, the collapse of the stock market and the freezing of the credit markets — and the resulting effect on some brokerage houses who neither loaned any money nor bought any of the bogus mortgage bonds they were selling, but rather created fictitious losses that were carefully manipulated to extract taxpayer money for toxic assets that could have been protected and improved but for the narrative created and controlled by the banks and servicers.

Brad Keiser deserves some credit here for predicting the actual order and timing of the crash of each investment house. All he did was put pen to paper and figure out how many time each investment firm was leveraged on the same bond pools. He was exactly right. You can see it on the DVD package we offer that describes securitization.

The more pernicious part of this process is that the capital sucked out of the economy by the banks (who are now reporting “profits” of high magnitude) this money was tucked away and NOT used to finance start-ups, expansion or even maintenance of existing business. Just as the clear policy of the banks and service is to foreclose on residential property, they have followed the path of starving new and existing capital for the sole purpose of favoring competition and financing the purchase of what is left after these companies die, laying off hundreds of thousands of workers.

As for the workers, they are still out there or giving up on finding a job that will pay anything for their household expenses after deductions of work-related expenses. Hence median income has no current prospect of stabilizing or increasing under the current circumstances. In fact median income continues to decline. A decline in median income means that there will be further decline in home values which in turns means further decline in home prices.

Add to this deadly cycle the fact that title to the “foreclosed” properties is very much in doubt, at best, and probably fatally defective at worst, and you have a very slow moving, downward market in residential home sales and financing for at least the next ten years. My projection is that overall, there will be at least another 30% drop in prices over the next 10 years. This will be offset by inflation averaging at least 3% per year under the best of circumstances. We have now more than tripled our currency volume and we still can’t get out of this mess. Follow the example of Iceland and watch what happens — huge fiscal stimulus to the economy, the banks taking the hit for their own misdeeds, the each household getting enough relief that they can start purchasing things besides food.

Follow the examples of our own common law history and the homes that were the subject of wrongful foreclosure are re turned to their rightful owners and if someone wants to make a claim for collection or even foreclosure they still can — if they can prove each and every essential element of their case.

And it seems clear that nothing can stop this drag on the entire U.S. economy except the application of law. BUT the application law goes both ways. Having truth on your side makes no difference at all if you don’t present in the right way, at the right time and prove it. And THAT is the reason for the many negative positions taken by Judges. If you go in and concede that you know owe the money, you agree you failed (not refused) to make scheduled payments, and that you defaulted on the loan, the Judge really has very little choice except granting whatever motions the banks and servicers present. You have conceded your case away.

This is why you need title, securitization and forensic reporting from reliable third parties whose credentials are indisputable in court. Take these issues to your accountants and see what they think. You may come up with some surprising answers.

The point you need to know and believe is that the money went down one path and the documents went down an entirely different path so the banks could oversell the loans and the bets on those loans. This leaves the banks and servicers in a vulnerable position but it is a complex set of facts. You have about 30 seconds to get the Judge’s attention and 5 minutes to make your point. After that, expect nothing.

But the single-most important ingredient in the recovery is the resistance and fear of the borrowers who feel like deadbeats, and do not appreciate how they were used as pawns in getting tons of money from investors that far exceeded the amount of their loans. There is a new diagnosis created by the authors of the book, Legal Abuse Syndrome. You all ought to look it up, and order it. They hit the nail on the head. Without the outrage shown in Iceland, our country’s finances will never be fixed.

www.businessinsider.com/home-prices-across-the-northeast-are-still-declining-2012-4

The Truth About The ‘Housing Bottom’: Home Prices Across The Northeast Are In Total Freefall

Keith Jurow | Apr. 16, 2012, 9:00 AM
For nearly two years, I have been warning in my articles posted on BUSINESS INSIDER that there is no housing bottom in sight. I’ve been correct.

Yet one analyst after another has been proclaiming that the housing bottom is finally here. This is nonsense!

Many of these “experts” have skin in the game and hope to lure you back into the market. They base their assumptions on the fact that housing prices seem to be falling more slowly. They’re not. Take a look at these shocking numbers I uncovered in the last two weeks:

SINGLE-FAMILY HOME PRICES IN THE NORTHEAST
February 2012

Location	Avg. Price Per Sq. Ft	Change from Feb. 2011

Connecticut
Fairfield County	$260	down 16.6%
City of Bridgeport	$86	down 17.3%
City of New Haven	$88	down 31.2%
City of Hartford	$72	down 10.1%
Westport	$311	down 30.3%
Greenwich	$481	down 34.8%
Darien	$354	down 19.3%
New Canaan	$371	down 10.1%
Branford	$126	down 41.4%
Glastonbury	$161	down 19.1%
Simsbury	$129	down 13.2%

Massachusetts
Framingham	$157	down 9.2%
Newton	$313	down 13.5%
Scituate	$215	down 16.5%

Rhode Island
Providence	$101	down 5.5%
Warwick	$120	down 12.2%
Pawtucket	$91	down 18.3%

New York State
Westchester County	$276	down 10.1%

Source: Wm. Raveis & Co. – raveis.com

These are real, raw numbers, not an index like Case-Shiller. They come from the largest family-owned brokerage firm in the northeast — Raveis and Co. whose reputation is impeccable. I spent several days reviewing the terrific raveis.com search tool and found similar price declines in more than 150 towns and cities.

Sales volume was way down in most towns in the northeast. To my surprise, inventories are up substantially from a year earlier. All that talk last fall about shrinking MLS inventories is history. Listings are soaring in most towns.

Some people I speak with are skeptical about these numbers. Check them for yourself if you think I’m making them up. Go to the raveis.com homepage and the drop-down menu for “Housing Data.” Then hit the link to “View local housing data” and this will take you to their search page where you can see the latest sales and price statistics for towns in seven northeast states. You’ll be as shocked as I was.

Here is my warning: Prices are crumbling and homeowners have perhaps six months to decide what to do. I strongly suspect that a year from now will be too late.

Iceland Forgives Household Debt and Now leads the Way to Economic Recovery

Posted on April 16, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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“Since the end of 2008, the island’s banks have forgiven loans equivalent to 13 percent of gross domestic product, easing the debt burdens of more than a quarter of the population, according to a report published this month by the Icelandic Financial Services Association.”

It’s Not a Theory

When it was Wrong from the Beginning:

The Highest Form of Economic Stimulus is to

Correct Debt Balances

Editor’s Comment: Iceland has taken the obvious common sense approach — fueled by an outraged population — and ended up creating the largest fiscal stimulus of any developed country without spending one cent of taxpayer money and without printing any “quantitative easing” currency debasing their currency. By the way more than 90 bankers there are headed for jail. Sounds like magic? That is what U.S. Banks would have you believe. But it is true as you can see from the Bloomberg article below.

The problem has been that the populations cannot pay the interest or the principal on debts that were so exotic in their construction that Alan Greenspan confesses he never understood them, let alone the borrowers. Borrowers were forced to rely on misrepresentations by the Banks and their agents as to the value of the loan, the value of the collateral and the viability of the transaction.

People in Iceland rioted in the streets throwing rocks at politicians and government buildings — not because they owed the money but because they knew that (a) they were victims of bank fraud and (b) the banks owed them money, not the other way around.

Under pressure from the government, the banks have decreased household debt by around 25% so far. The banks have not collapsed, financial system is in good shape and Iceland leads the developed world in economic recovery. The risk fell back on the Banks, the perpetrators of this mess.

The relief was and is being shared by two victims — the households tricked into buying these debt packages and the investors who pooled their money to fund the exotic debt structures. The claims of bank losses have been ignored as being not (and never were) economically real.

That’s what happens when the populations rises up and says “NO!” Similar programs here even on a small scale have corroborated the Iceland experience. And yet we continue to support the banks whom we believe are too big to fail. Following the Iceland example — now in its 3rd year — would provide many trillions of dollars in fiscal stimulus to our economy, launch the economy into a full recovery and clear up the budget deficits of local, state and federal government agencies.

It’s a choice. What do you choose?

Icelandic Anger Brings Debt Forgiveness in Best Recovery Story

By Omar R. Valdimarsson

Icelanders who pelted parliament with rocks in 2009 demanding their leaders and bankers answer for the country’s economic and financial collapse are reaping the benefits of their anger.

Since the end of 2008, the island’s banks have forgiven loans equivalent to 13 percent of gross domestic product, easing the debt burdens of more than a quarter of the population, according to a report published this month by the Icelandic Financial Services Association.

Enlarge image Icelandic Anger Brings Debt Forgiveness

Icelandic Anger Brings Debt Forgiveness

Paul Taggart/Bloomberg

A cyclist passes an Icelandic national flag hanging in a popular shopping street in Reykjavik, Iceland.

A cyclist passes an Icelandic national flag hanging in a popular shopping street in Reykjavik, Iceland. Photographer: Paul Taggart/Bloomberg

“You could safely say that Iceland holds the world record in household debt relief,” said Lars Christensen, chief emerging markets economist at Danske Bank A/S in Copenhagen. “Iceland followed the textbook example of what is required in a crisis. Any economist would agree with that.”

The island’s steps to resurrect itself since 2008, when its banks defaulted on $85 billion, are proving effective. Iceland’s economy will this year outgrow the euro area and the developed world on average, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates. It costs about the same to insure against an Icelandic default as it does to guard against a credit event in Belgium. Most polls now show Icelanders don’t want to join the European Union, where the debt crisis is in its third year.

The island’s households were helped by an agreement between the government and the banks, which are still partly controlled by the state, to forgive debt exceeding 110 percent of home values. On top of that, a Supreme Court ruling in June 2010 found loans indexed to foreign currencies were illegal, meaning households no longer need to cover krona losses.

Crisis Lessons

“The lesson to be learned from Iceland’s crisis is that if other countries think it’s necessary to write down debts, they should look at how successful the 110 percent agreement was here,” said Thorolfur Matthiasson, an economics professor at the University of Iceland in Reykjavik, in an interview. “It’s the broadest agreement that’s been undertaken.”

Without the relief, homeowners would have buckled under the weight of their loans after the ratio of debt to incomes surged to 240 percent in 2008, Matthiasson said.

Iceland’s $13 billion economy, which shrank 6.7 percent in 2009, grew 2.9 percent last year and will expand 2.4 percent this year and next, the Paris-based OECD estimates. The euro area will grow 0.2 percent this year and the OECD area will expand 1.6 percent, according to November estimates.

Housing, measured as a subcomponent in the consumer price index, is now only about 3 percent below values in September 2008, just before the collapse. Fitch Ratings last week raised Iceland to investment grade, with a stable outlook, and said the island’s “unorthodox crisis policy response has succeeded.”

People Vs Markets

Iceland’s approach to dealing with the meltdown has put the needs of its population ahead of the markets at every turn.

Once it became clear back in October 2008 that the island’s banks were beyond saving, the government stepped in, ring-fenced the domestic accounts, and left international creditors in the lurch. The central bank imposed capital controls to halt the ensuing sell-off of the krona and new state-controlled banks were created from the remnants of the lenders that failed.

Activists say the banks should go even further in their debt relief. Andrea J. Olafsdottir, chairman of the Icelandic Homes Coalition, said she doubts the numbers provided by the banks are reliable.

“There are indications that some of the financial institutions in question haven’t lost a penny with the measures that they’ve undertaken,” she said.

Fresh Demands

According to Kristjan Kristjansson, a spokesman for Landsbankinn hf, the amount written off by the banks is probably larger than the 196.4 billion kronur ($1.6 billion) that the Financial Services Association estimates, since that figure only includes debt relief required by the courts or the government.

“There are still a lot of people facing difficulties; at the same time there are a lot of people doing fine,” Kristjansson said. “It’s nearly impossible to say when enough is enough; alongside every measure that is taken, there are fresh demands for further action.”

As a precursor to the global Occupy Wall Street movement and austerity protests across Europe, Icelanders took to the streets after the economic collapse in 2008. Protests escalated in early 2009, forcing police to use teargas to disperse crowds throwing rocks at parliament and the offices of then Prime Minister Geir Haarde. Parliament is still deciding whether to press ahead with an indictment that was brought against him in September 2009 for his role in the crisis.

A new coalition, led by Social Democrat Prime Minister Johanna Sigurdardottir, was voted into office in early 2009. The authorities are now investigating most of the main protagonists of the banking meltdown.

Legal Aftermath

Iceland’s special prosecutor has said it may indict as many as 90 people, while more than 200, including the former chief executives at the three biggest banks, face criminal charges.

Larus Welding, the former CEO of Glitnir Bank hf, once Iceland’s second biggest, was indicted in December for granting illegal loans and is now waiting to stand trial. The former CEO of Landsbanki Islands hf, Sigurjon Arnason, has endured stints of solitary confinement as his criminal investigation continues.

That compares with the U.S., where no top bank executives have faced criminal prosecution for their roles in the subprime mortgage meltdown. The Securities and Exchange Commission said last year it had sanctioned 39 senior officers for conduct related to the housing market meltdown.

The U.S. subprime crisis sent home prices plunging 33 percent from a 2006 peak. While households there don’t face the same degree of debt relief as that pushed through in Iceland, President Barack Obama this month proposed plans to expand loan modifications, including some principal reductions.

According to Christensen at Danske Bank, “the bottom line is that if households are insolvent, then the banks just have to go along with it, regardless of the interests of the banks.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Omar R. Valdimarsson in Reykjavik valdimarsson@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Jonas Bergman at jbergman@bloomberg.net

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, AHMSI, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chris Koster, credit bids, debt forgiveness, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, ICELAND, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 36 Comments »

Why the Banks Are Paying You to Sign the Deed in a Shortsale

Posted on April 13, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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“The bottom line is that the value of a homeowner’s signature is going up and might be the best investment in existence. The walls are closing in on trillions of dollars in real estate that could be the subject of summary proceedings repatriating the property to their rightful owners using the most basic principles of property law.” — Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me

It isn’t just hype. Law firms like the one shown below are realizing that there really is money in servicing homeowners who are underwater. But lawyers should also beware of this offer. Think about it. What economic reason would there be to pay a distressed homeowner to enter into a short-sale? If they really thought they had the right to foreclose and/or collect on the promissory note they are using, the last thing they would do is pay a person who is already delinquent in their payments.

The banks have realized that in a short sale they don’t sign the deed — that job goes to the homeowner who is usually giving a warranty that title is all fine and dandy. The pretender lender is not doing the lying; they are getting the homeowner to do their lying. All that is fine if there was only one owner of the property or one prior mortgagee who is joining in the transaction and registering the appropriate releases, satisfactions and warranties.

If a third party or prior owner makes a claim against title, the pretender lender has succeeded in placing another layer between them and claimants who want title vested or re-vested as a result of wrongful, illegal foreclosures — or wrongful or illegal satisfactions (release and reconveyance). They now have a stronger argument about why the “chain of title” while imperfect, should not be disturbed because of the transactions that were in the public records and notice to the world.

If you are buying one of these short-sales or other REO property, take a good long look at the title policy they are offering and make sure you get advice of competent legal counsel — because most of the new “replacement” policies have language that excludes risks associated with the chain of title being mangled by securitization or claims arising out of securitization. So if you buy, you are getting naked paperwork that may or may not be ratified later — or could be the target of a wave a repatriating property to their rightful owners because the foreclosures are and were wrongful. With no title insurance proceeds you could be out of a lot of money and still have a liability if you financed the purchase.

I’ve heard some talk of the statute of limitations being applied against claims of repatriating property. I don’t know of any statute of limitations on defects in the title chain but there might be some on theft, fraud and adverse possession that could provide some cover for the older mortgages. That alone could be an interesting question. Imagine representing the bank and arguing “yes your honor, we admit that we stole this property and illegally evicted the owner. However, under the statute of limitations I have shown you, the homeowner has no cause of action because it is barred by the expiration of time.”

THAT is where civil rights violations should be alleged in Federal courts. If the states failed to safeguard the rights of homeowners in their procedures for foreclosures then the civil rights of the homeowners may well be the last and only claim the homeowner can make even after it is admitted that the foreclosures are wrongful and illegal.

The lesson here is stop waiting to see what happens. Get on your horse and have your bags packed with as much proof as you can and start your actions now. At this point, you need to show that the general policies resulted in wrongful, illegal foreclosures with “strangers” taking title to property on which they loaned no money and never financed or purchased the property; and then show that those policies that have been the subject so many studies, orders, decrees, fines, penalties, settlements etc. are the same same policies that were used in your case.

Remember, the burden of proof shifts when you cross the line of establishing a prima facie case. At that point the pretender is dead in the water unless they still have more rabbits in that hat.

BANKS PAYING HOMEOWNERS TO AVOID FORECLOSURES

by Harold Shepley & Associates, LLC, see http://www.jdsra.com

Banks, anxious to move troubled mortgages off their books, have started offering cash incentives to homeowners to sell their properties for less than what they owe – typically called a “short sale.”

In the past, banks have balked or dragged their feet at short sales. However, lately, they have decided that short sales are more advantageous than foreclosures, which can take a year or more to process. Additionally, banks take about 15% less of a loss on a short sale than they do on a foreclosure.

Some banks are now offering cash incentives to homeowners to have them sell their homes at a loss—sometimes up to $35,000. Experts believe that banks just want to get rid of bad loans. They can often afford to forgive the debt and offer incentives yet still make a profit, because they usually purchase the loan from another bank at a discount.

For a bank, approving a short sale can cut a year or more off the process of unloading a home and its accompanying loan. A short sale takes about 123 days on average. On the other hand, it takes nearly a year to foreclose on a home and then another 175 days to re-sell the property.

Allowing your home to go into foreclosure is may not be your only option. Every situation is different. For a in depth look at your situation you should contact a full service debt relief law firm like Harold Shepley & Associates that can answer any questions you may have about debt relief, mortgage modification, and short sales.

From the OCC, The Path to Discovery in Litigation

Posted on April 11, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Appendix J: Underwriter Interview Guide

Bank Name: Examiner: Exam Date: Product:

As necessary, ask follow-up questions until it is clear how requirements or procedures apply to the files to be examined and until the rationales for unusual policies are understood. Items in bold are apparent violations if not carried out as prescribed in Regulation B. Examiners may conduct a second interview to discuss inconsistencies found during file reviews.

If the bank’s standards are unclear or if loan files lack data on applicants’ qualifications:

• Ask what specific problems were the basis for the reasons for denying applicants cited on the notices of adverse action.

• Using specific approved applicants, ask how the bank determined that they differed from the denied applicants.

• Use file comments (if any) that characterize qualifications as “good,” “adequate,” “weak,” etc., as points of reference.

GENERAL

1. Obtain from the chief underwriter an overview of the underwriting procedures and standards. Review written policies, procedures, standards, etc.

2. Do underwriting policies differ across the different loan products within the loan purpose categories of the focal points for this exam? If yes, how?

3. Do underwriting policies differ by lien status, occupancy, property type, loan purpose, or documentation type?

4. Does your bank apply different standards in any of the geographical areas within the proposed scope of the examination? If so, why?

5. Does your bank apply different standards based on the size of the loan or the value of the property securing the loan requested?

6. Does your bank apply different standards based on the amount of the applicant’s income?

7. Are there any factors we have not addressed that might make it inappropriate to compare some transactions within the proposed scope to others?

Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance 123 Fair Lending

8. Please provide all policy manuals and underwriting guidelines for the products included in the focal points for this examination.

9. Were there any policy changes during the period under review? If yes, are there changes that would preclude combining the data for the entire time period (i.e., prevent comparison over the entire time period)? Please provide a summary of all policy changes.

10. Are there any other reasons why any two applications in the focal point could not be compared?

11. If the focal point covers home improvement loans, are home improvement loans underwritten differently from home equity loans?

12. Are any of the 2nd lien Home Purchase or Refinance loans piggyback loans? If so, how are underwriting policies different if it is a piggyback loan vs. a stand-alone 2nd lien loan?

13. What creditworthiness factors does the bank consider when making underwriting decisions for these products?

14. How are creditworthiness factors used – for example, do you use ranges of values for the FICO score, or LTV and apply different underwriting policies based on tiers that applicants fall into? Or, do you use an absolute cutoff for values of the credit score, LTV, or DTI?

15. Obtain any exception reports maintained on loans approved despite failing to meet requirements. Learn who approves exceptions.

16. How does the bank ensure that all information related to an application for credit is retained for 25 months after notifying the applicant of action taken, pursuant to Section 202.12(b) of Regulation B?

17. Find out if a credit-scoring system is used. If so, obtain information and follow guidance as called for in appendix B, “Considering Automated Underwriting and Credit Scoring Risk Factors.”

18. Obtain copies of any consumer guidance on the loan process (such as: how to develop a viable application).

19. Obtain copies of any checklists, log sheets, or other loan-processing aids used by bank personnel.

BANK STRUCTURE

1. Could you explain the bank’s organization in terms of prime, subprime or near-prime units; or subsidiaries? Are there any differences in underwriting/pricing across units/subsidiaries?

Fair Lending 124 Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance

2. Could you explain the bank’s organization in terms of channels ‒ wholesale, retail, Internet,

correspondent banking, etc.? Are there any differences in underwriting/pricing across channels?

3. What are the bank’s primary markets or geographic areas of operation?

4. Where are the service centers for each business unit and/or channel?

5. Could you explain how an applicant gets channeled to a particular business unit?

6. Could you explain the relationship the bank has with brokers? (Correspondent vs. broker lending) What kind of discretion do brokers have in underwriting/pricing?

7. Please provide a list of the specific products and programs within the loan purpose category of the focal point for this examination?

APPLICATION PROCESS

1. Could you walk us through the application process for each of the relevant products in each channel and/or business unit?

2. Where are applications accepted? Who handles them?

3. Which bank or subsidiary staff meets face-to- face with applicants?

4. Which bank staff review or have access to the applications with completed monitoring information?

5. For a home purchase or refinance loan, how is government monitoring information obtained to comply with section 202.13 of Regulation B?

6. For other loans, how are staff directed not to obtain prohibited information?

7. If the product is covered by HMDA, when and how are data entered on the LAR?

8. What applicant information verifications are obtained? When and how?

9. What happens if there is a problem obtaining verifications or if they are inconsistent with the application data?

10. Is the applicant asked if assistance or explanation is needed?

11. Is there a “conditional approval” stage in the process?

12. Do files document conditions and attempts to resolve them?

13. How long are terms locked in by a written or oral agreement?

14. Under what circumstances are lock-ins extended?

15. How does the bank determine whether married applicants intend to apply jointly or

Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance 125 Fair Lending

individually?

16. Do you discuss with applicants all loan products they qualify for, or only the product requested by the applicants?

17. What is the extent of automation in underwriting?

i. How is the risk level of an applicant

determined?

ii. Are the products being analyzed here eligible

for automated underwriting?

iii. Do you use the Desktop Underwriter, Loan

Prospector or some customized system?

iv. If applications are auto-decisioned, would the loan officer only be involved to verify information? If information cannot be verified what is the next step?

v. Who has discretion during the underwriting process?

vi. What controls are in place to monitor this discretion?

vii. What percent of applications are automatically “approved” or automatically “denied” – without additional manual review?

viii. If there are no automatic approvals or denials, what percent of applications that are on the path to approval after risk level determination are eventually denied, and what percent of applications on the path to denial are eventually approved?

ix. If there are no automatic approvals or denials, what is the nature of the manual review? Is it primarily verification of information?

x. Are there second reviews for denials? Are there any second reviews for approvals? Please explain what factors are considered during these second reviews.

18. Are there any other aspects to the application process that we should keep in mind during our analysis?

19. If an applicant is denied a loan for the product he or she was applying for, does the lender make an effort to offer other loan products more suitable? Please explain this process.

20. Which loans are sold in the secondary market? Are different underwriting guidelines used for these loans?

21. Is there a certain time limit to receiving required documentation? After the time limit has elapsed would the application be denied automatically?

Fair Lending 126 Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance

22. Is there guidance given to the applicant when there is documentation outstanding? If the loan officer follows up with the borrower, how many contacts would be made?

CREDIT HISTORY

1. Which credit report is used?

2. When multiple credit scores are obtained, which score is used – lowest or middle?

3. Do you use any custom score – own or vendor product? Could you describe the elements used if it is a custom score?

4. Is the credit score of both primary applicant and co-applicant used in the credit decision? If yes, how?

5. Review with the underwriter a copy of each type of credit report used. Obtain copies of any code sheets or other guidance on using the credit report(s).

6. At what stage of the transaction is a credit report obtained?

7. Does the bureau send a copy of the report (or abstract) to consumers? Obtain a copy of the transmittal letter.

8. Do you look at details in the credit report – if so, for all or only marginal applicants? Could you give examples?

9. Do you consider compensating factors if creditworthiness factors are not satisfactory? Can you provide some examples?

10. Does the bank require that corrected information come from the bureau, or will it accept corrected information directly from the customer?

11. What constitutes a sufficient credit history on which to make a decision?

12. Is a minimum number of accounts reported required?

13. Is a minimum length of reported credit history required?

14. Has the bank made loans to persons who did not meet these standards?

15. In such a case, what evidence of creditworthiness substituted for the bureau report?

16. How does the bank evaluate additional information when an applicant seeks to correct or explain credit information from another source?

17. How does the bank evaluate joint spousal accounts when a married person applies for individual credit?

18. How does the bank treat unmarried joint applicants in terms of evaluating their creditworthiness?

Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance 127 Fair Lending

19. How does the bank evaluate accounts held jointly with a former spouse that an applicant for individual credit asks to be considered to show his or her own creditworthiness?

20. What credit history deficiencies would cause denial?

21. Does a mortgage payment defect negate otherwise good credit? Does a good mortgage payment record offset other credit defects?

22. How far into the past is derogatory information relevant?

23. Does it matter if the debt has been paid?

24. Is minor derogatory information ignored? What kinds?

25. Does the bank solicit explanations? In what circumstances? Obtain the form letter to the applicant, if one exists. If the mode of contact is by phone rather than letter, are these noted in the file?

26. What constitutes a “good” explanation?

27. Is the failure to disclose serious derogatory information on the application fatal?

28. Is derogatory information associated with a medical problem in the applicant’s household treated differently than other derogatory information?

29. How does the bank view judgments, repossessions, and collections?

30. Under what circumstances would the bank lend to a customer with a bankruptcy in his or her record?

31. How does the bank view inquiries? Would the bank ever deny a loan solely on the basis of inquiries?

FUNDS TO CLOSE

1. What items must be covered by funds for closing?

2. How many months of cash reserves are needed?

3. When are funds from undocumented sources acceptable?

4. Are applicants with inadequate or marginal cash to close advised on how gift funds may be applied?

5. Are grants acceptable as gifts? From what sources?

6. How does the bank assure that applicants are advised uniformly regarding the use of grants?

7. May family or household cash be pooled for closing?

Fair Lending 128 Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance

8. How are funds to close documented by the applicant?

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

1. How many years on the job are required for income to be deemed stable? How many years in the line of work?

2. What length of gap or frequency of changes in employment is regarded as negative? Are explanations routinely requested for employment negatives?

3. How is stable income defined?

4. Do loan originators routinely ask for verifiable unstable sources of income, such as overtime and seasonal work?

5. Is rent paid by household members counted as income?

6. Do loan originators routinely ask about rent paid by household members?

7. Is any or all nontaxable income to be “grossed up”?

8. Are applicants routinely asked whether they expect their income to rise? What type of documentation is needed to establish a projected increase?

9. How is part-time income handled?

10. How is annuity, pension, or retirement income handled?

11. How is income from alimony, child support, and separate maintenance handled? How is income from public assistance handled?

PROJECTED HOUSING COSTS AND DEBTS

1. What types of debts are included or excluded from ratio calculations?

2. Are certain types of accounts viewed more negatively than others, for example, revolving debt?

3. Under what circumstances would an applicant be advised to pay down debts?

4. Would the bank specify which debts should be paid off?

DEBT RATIOS

1. What maximum housing debt and total debt ratios are used?

2. What is the source or rationale for them?

3. What would justify approving an application with a ratio higher than the requirement?

4. Are applicants with qualifying ratios ever refused because of debt considerations?

COLLATERAL/APPRAISALS

1. Are applicants advised of their right to obtain

Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance 129 Fair Lending

a copy of the appraisal report on their property? Is a copy routinely provided? If the FHFA Code5 applies, are applicants provided a copy of the appraisal upon completion or at least three days before closing unless they waive the right?

2. Does the bank employ its own appraisers? If the FHFA Code applies, does the bank take appropriate steps to prevent the improper influencing of such in-house appraisers and affiliated appraisers, appraisal company, or appraisal management companies?

3. Review the guidance the bank provides appraisers, whether employed or independent.

4. What rules govern adjustments to initial appraised values? If the FHFA Code applies, ensure any such adjustments are consistent with the appraiser independence safeguard standards.

5. Who reviews appraisals? If the FHFA Code applies, does the bank quality control test a randomly selected 10 percent of appraisals?

6. When is PMI required?

7. What does the bank do if a PMI company refuses to insure the loan?

8. On adverse action notices and HMDA-LAR “reasons for denial,” does the bank report PMI denials as “denied for PMI,” or does it merely repeat the substantive reason that the PMI company cited?

9. Under what circumstances would a lender order a second appraisal?

10. If the FHFA Code applies, does the bank prohibit reliance on appraisals completed by mortgage brokers or other third parties?

11. What steps does the bank take to ensure appraiser independence and that the appraiser is not coerced or influenced?

GUARANTORS, ETC.

1. Under what circumstances would a guarantor materially increase an applicant’s likelihood of approval (e.g., if the applicant had bad ratios, poor credit history)?

2. Are applicants with such weak qualifications routinely told that a guarantor would increase the likelihood of approval?

DENIALS

1. Obtain a list of the reasons for denial and review it with the interviewee.

5 The FHFA Code will apply to all conventional, single-family loans originated on or after May 1, 2009, that are sold to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).

Fair Lending 130 Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance

2. How is the adverse action notice prepared? Review it with the interviewee.

3. How does the bank document the timely provision of adverse action notices?

4. Are all denied applicants given a second review? Describe the review process.

FATAL FLAWS AND DEROGATORIES

1. Are there any “fatal” values for factors that would result in an automatic decline? Is there any written guidance for the same?

2. Would a bankruptcy in the last six months be fatal – if not, what would be a compensating factor? Are there any other fatal flaws – e.g., LTV >125 or DTI >100, etc.?

3. What is the time frame considered for derogatory factors? Is the magnitude of delinquencies considered as well? (e.g., x number of 30-day delinquencies compared to y number of 90-day delinquencies?) Also, within the time frame considered, would newer derogatories get more weight than older ones (e.g., if the time frame for bankruptcies is six months, would a bankruptcy which is one month old get more weight than a five- month-old bankruptcy?)

4. Are there any compensating factors that can make up for derogatory information – can you provide some examples?

SECONDARY MARKET CONSIDERATIONS

1. To whom does the bank principally sell loans?

2. Arrange to have copies of the loan purchasers’ guidance available during file review.

3. In what ways are bank standards different from those loan purchasers require?

4. What have been the lender’s experiences in attempting to persuade loan purchasers to reconsider refusals to purchase?

PORTFOLIO LENDING

1. Does the bank lend for its own portfolio?

2. How do the requirements for this differ from those for loans to be sold?

3. Does the bank hold loans to “season” them until sale? What features would cause a loan to be handled this way?

4. Does the bank purchase loans?

EXCEPTIONS/OVERRIDES

1. Are there any exceptions to the bank’s stated requirements? Can you provide examples? When would they be made?

2. Does the bank produce (for its management’s use) an “exceptions” report that lists all residential loans made that do not meet the bank’s stated requirements? Obtain any such report for the period being examined in the fair lending review.

Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance 131 Fair Lending

3. At what level in the bank can loans be approved that fail to meet requirements?

4. Are there any overrides? Do you generate a report or list of overrides or flag them?

5. Is there written guidance on exceptions and overrides? If so, please provide.

6. Who authorizes exceptions and/or overrides?

7. Is any special consideration given based on customer relationship with the bank? If so, please explain.

COMPENSATING/OFFSETTING FACTORS

1. Do strong qualifications in certain areas overcome an applicant’s failure to meet requirements in others?

2. Describe specific factors that operate to overcome particular deficiencies (e.g., projected income compensates for excessive total debt ratio)?

3. Are compensating factors formal or informal? (Obtain any written guidance.)

4. What constitutes a “good customer relationship?”

LOAN TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. How are prices set? Is there a range?

2. Why would prices differ? Which aspects of pricing are fixed and which are discretionary?

3. How are loan terms set? Why would loan terms vary?

4. How is the down payment set? Why would requirements vary?

5. How are collateral requirements set? Why would requirements vary?

6. How are escrow amounts set? Why would they vary?

7. What fees are imposed for the product? Why would they vary?

8. Please provide a copy of each of the rate sheets you use? If rates change often, a set of rate sheets for one or a small number of dates would be sufficient.

9. Please provide all policy manuals and pricing guidelines for the products included in the focal points for this exam.

10. Does pricing policy differ across the different loan products within the loan purpose categories identified in the focal points? If yes, how?

11. Does pricing vary across channels and/or geography? If yes, how? Could you provide a list of all of the areas that have their own rate sheets?

12. Were there any policy changes in pricing during the period under review? If yes, would

Fair Lending 132 Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance

these changes preclude combining the data for the time period covered by this exam? Also, please provide a summary of these changes.

13. Were there any special promotions during the period under analysis? If yes, please explain.

14. Could you walk us through the pricing process for each of the relevant products in each channel and/or business unit? How do brokers price loans? Do they have different rate sheets? Are any rate sheets broker-specific?

15. What are the reasons why interest rates would be lower than or greater than what appears on the pricing sheets?

16. Please expand on the discretionary reasons for price differences?

i. Can you provide some examples of these reasons?

ii. How is pricing influenced by loan officers? iii. Is loan officer compensation tied to pricing? If

so, please explain. iv. How is pricing influenced by brokers?

v. How are brokers compensated? vi. Are there caps for broker compensation?

vii. Who else has discretion during the pricing process?

viii. What controls are in place to monitor discretion in pricing?

ix. Explain to what degree potential loan customers are allowed to negotiate a better interest rate/loan fees. Are loan officers or brokers allowed to deviate from the pricing sheets? If yes, to what degree, what are the criteria considered, and how are the pricing exceptions/pricing discretion documented?

17. What fees are charged? When and why would charged fees differ? Is there any discretion in charging fees?

18. Are there maximum and minimum fees? Any exceptions?

19. Do any fees vary by state due to state-specific laws?

20. Which fees affect the APR?

21. Are loan customers allowed to buy down the interest rates by paying more in discount points? If yes, explain the criteria and provide written guidance regarding this practice.

22. How are origination points, discount points, and YSP determined? Are there caps on each or caps on totals?

23. If any of the 2nd lien loans are piggyback loans,

i. How are pricing policies different if a product is a piggyback loan vs. a stand-alone second lien loan?

Comptroller’s Handbook for Compliance 133 Fair Lending

ii. How are pricing policies different if the corresponding first lien is held with another bank?

iii. Are first and second lien loans as part of a combo loan priced independently?

FILE DOCUMENTATION

1. How are contacts with the customer documented?

2. How are in-bank conferences (or other face-to- face encounters) with the applicant documented?

3. What work sheets should be found in the typical file?

ELECTRONIC DATA

1. Can automatic approvals and denials be identified in the electronic data? That is, are there identifiers for automated approvals and/or denials; or identifiers for the output from an automated system (such as DU/LP)?

2. Can “document type” be identified in the electronic data?

3. Is product name available in the electronic data?

4. Are applicant names and addresses available in the electronic data?

5. Can piggyback loans be identified in the electronic data? If yes, can one also identify if the 1st lien is from this bank or from another bank?

6. Can individual brokers be identified in the data?

7. Is there electronic information on any of the following: number of trade lines; number of 30- 60- 90-day “lates” and the time period in which those “lates” occurred; incidence of bankruptcy and/or foreclosure; combined loan to value; combined debt to income; years in job; years in occupation; loan term; identifier for whether applicant uses ACH; override codes; collateral value; customer relationship; employment type (salaried or self-employed); any measure of “stable income”; indicator for first-time home buyer?

8. Is there electronic information on any additional pricing variables that can be incorporated into the dataset – overages; underages; broker fees; total broker compensation; YSP; any other points and fees; rate lock date or period (15-30-45-60 days, etc.)?

9. Could you also provide explanations for the variables provided in the electronic dataset?

10. If you update DTI, LTV, or other credit variables during the underwriting process, does the updated information appear in the data?

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: 60 minutes, appraisal fraud, attorney general, auction fraud, Chris Koster, credit bids, DocX Indictment, foreclosure fraud, FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT, foreclosures, forgery, housing market, housing prices, investors, linda green, LPS, Missouri, mortgage fruad, mortgages, Robo-Signing, settlement, strategic default, Wells Fargo | 8 Comments »

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