What is the difference between the note and the debt? What difference does it make?

Posted on May 13, 2019 by Neil Garfield

NOTE: This case reads like  law review article. It is well worth reading and studying, piece by piece. Judge Marx has taken a lot of time to research, analyze the documents, and write a very clear opinion on the truth about the documents that were used in this case, and by extension the documents that are used in most foreclosure cases.

Simple answer: if you had a debt to pay would you pay it to the owner of the debt or someone else who says that you should pay them instead? It’s obvious.

Second question: if the owner of the debt is really different than the party claiming to collect it, why hasn’t the owner shown up? This answer is not so obvious nor is it simple. The short version is that the owners of the risk of loss have contracted away their right to collect on the debt, note or mortgage.

Third question: why are the technical requirements of an indorsement, allonge etc so important? This is also simple: it is the only way to provide assurance that the holder of the note is the owner of the note. This is important if the note is going to be treated as evidence of ownership of the debt.

NY Slip Opinion: Judge Paul I Marx carefully analyzed the facts and the law and found that there was a failure to firmly affix the alleged allonge which means that the note possessor must prove, rather than presume, that the possessor is a holder with rights to enforce. U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee v Cannella April 15, 2019.

Now the lawyers who claim U.S. Bank, N.A. is their client must prove something that doesn’t exist in the real world. This a problem because U.S. Bank won’t and can’t cooperate and the investment bank won’t and can’t allow their name to be used in foreclosures.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Words actually matter — in the world of of American Justice, under law, without words, nothing matters.
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So it is especially important to presume nothing and actually read words without making any assumptions. Much of what we see in the language of what is presented as a conveyance is essentially the same as a quitclaim deed in which there is no warranty of title and which simply grants any interest that the grantor MIGHT have. It is this type of wording that the banks use to weaponize the justice system against homeowners.
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There is no warranty of title and there is no specific grant of ownership in an assignment of mortgage that merely says the assignor/grantor conveys “all beneficial interest under a certain mortgage.” Banks want courts to assume that means the note and the debt as well. But that specific wording is double-speak.
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It says it is granting rights to the mortgage; but the rest of wording  is making reference only to what is stated in the mortgage, which is not the note, the debt or any other rights. So in effect it is saying it is granting title to the mortgage and then saying the same thing again, without adding anything. That is the essence of double speak.
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In the Cannela Case Judge Marx saw the attempt to mislead the court and dealt with it:

The language in RPAPL § 258, which this Court emphasized—”together with the bond or obligation described in said mortgage“—stands in sharp contrast to the language used here in the Assignment—”all beneficial interest under a certain Mortgage”. If such language is mere surplusage, as Plaintiff seems to believe, the drafters of RPAPL § 258 would not have included it in a statutory form promulgated for general use as best practice.

So here is the real problem. The whole discussion in Canella is about the note, the indorsement and the allonge. But notice the language in the opinion — “The Assignment did not go on to state that the referenced debt “…. So the Judge let it slip (pardon the pun) that when he refers to the note he means the debt.

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The courts are using “the debt” and “the note” as being interchangeable words meaning the same thing. I would admit that before the era of false claims of securitization I used the words, debt, note and mortgage interchangeably because while there were technical  difference in the legal meaning of those terms, they all DID mean the same thing to me and everyone else.
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While a note SHOULD be evidence of the debt and the possession of a note SHOULD be evidence of being a legal note holder and that SHOULD mean that the note holder probably has rights to enforce, and therefore that note “holder” should be the the owner of a debt claiming foreclosure rights under a duly assigned mortgage for which value was paid, none of that is true if the debt actually moved in one or more different directions — different that is from the paper trail fabricated by remote parties with no interest in the loan other than to collect their fees.
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The precise issue is raised because the courts have almost uniformly assumed that the burden shifts to the homeowner to show that the debt moved differently than the paper. This case shows that might not be true. But it will be true if not properly presented and argued. In effect what we are dealing with here is that there is a presumption to use the presumption.
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If Person A buys the debt (for real) for value (money) he is the owner of the debt. But that is only true if he bought it from Person B who also paid value for the debt (funded the origination or acquisition of the loan). If not, the debt obviously could not possibly have moved from B to A.
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It is not legally possible to move the debt without payment of value. It IS possible to appoint agents to enforce it. But for those agents seeking to enforce it the debtor has a right to know why he should pay a stranger without proof that his debt is being collected for his creditor.
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The precise issue identified by the investment banks back in 1983 (when securitization started) is that even debts are made up of component parts. The investment banks saw they could enter into “private contracts” in which the risk of loss and other bets could be made totalling far more than the loan itself. This converted the profit potential on loans from being a few points to several thousand percent of each loan.
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The banks knew that only people with a strong background in accounting and investment banking would realize that the investment bank was a creditor for 30 days or less and that after that it was at most a servicer who was collecting “fees’ in addition to “trading profits” at the expense of everyone involved.
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And by creating contracts in which the investors disclaimed any direct right, title or interest in the collection of the loan, even though the investor assumed the entire risk of loss, the investment banks could claim and did claim that they had not sold off the debt. Any accountant will tell you that selling the entire risk of loss means that you sold off the entire debt.
*
* Thus monthly payments, prepayments and foreclosure proceeds are absorbed by the investment bank and its affiliates under various guises but it never goes to reduce a debt owned by the people who have paid value for the debt. In this case, and all similar cases, U.S. Bank, N.A. as trustee (or any trustee) never received nor expected to receive any money from monthly payments, prepayments or foreclosure proceeds; but that didn’t stop the investment banks from naming the claimant as U.S. Bank, N.A. as trustee.
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**So then the note might be sold but the alleged transfer of a mortgage is a nullity because there was no actual transfer of the debt. Transfer of the debt ONLY occurs where value is paid. Transfer of notes occurs regardless of whether value was paid.
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US laws in all 50 states all require that the enforcer of a mortgage be the same party who owns the debt or an agent who is actually authorized  by the owner of the debt to conduct the foreclosure. For that to be properly alleged and proven the identity of the owner of the debt must be disclosed.
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That duty to disclose might need to be enforced in discovery, a QWR, a DVL or a subpoena for deposition, but in all events if the borrower asks there is no legal choice for not answering, notwithstanding arguments that the information is private or proprietary.
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The only way that does not happen is if the borrower does not enforce the duty to disclose the principal. If the borrower does enforce but the court declines that is fertile grounds for appeal, as this case shows. Standing was denied to U.S. Bank, as Trustee, because it failed to prove it was the holder of the note prior to initiating foreclosure.
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It failed because the fabricated allonge was not shown to be have been firmly attached so as to become part of the note itself.
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Thus the facts behind the negotiation of the note came into doubt and the presumptions sought by attorneys for the named claimant were thrown out. Now they must prove through evidence of transactions in the real world that the debt moved, instead of presuming the movement from the movement of the note.
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But if B then executes an indorsement to Person C you have a problem. Person A owns the debt but Person C owns the note. Both are true statements. Unless the indorsement occurred at the instruction of Person B, it creates an entirely new and separate liability under the UCC, since the note no longer serves as title to the debt but rather serves as presumptive liability of a maker under the UCC with its own set of rules.
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And notwithstanding the terms of the mortgage to the contrary, the mortgage no longer secures the note, which is no longer evidence of the debt; hence the mortgage can only be enforced by the person who owns the debt, if at all. The note which can only be enforced pursuant to rules governing the enforcement of negotiable instruments, if that applies, is no longer secured by the mortgage because the law requires the mortgage to secure a debt and not just a promissory note. See UCC Article 9-203.
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This is what the doctrine of merger is intended to avoid — double liability. But merger does not happen when the debt owner and the Payee are different parties and neither one is the acknowledged agent of a common principal.
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Now if Person B never owned the debt to begin with but was still the payee on the note and the mortgagee on the mortgage you have yet another problem. The note and debt were split at closing. In law cases this is referred to as splitting the note and mortgage which is presumed not to occur unless there is a showing of intent to do so. In this case there was intent to do so. The source of lending did not get a note and mortgage and the broker did get a note and mortgage.
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Normally that would be fine if there was an agency contract between the originator and the investment bank who funded the loan. But the investment bank doesn’t want to admit such agency as it would be liable for lending and disclosure violations at closing, and for servicing violations after closing.
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***So when the paperwork is created that creates the illusion of transfer of the mortgage without any real transaction between the remote parties because it is the investment bank who is all times holding all the cards. No real transactions can occur without the investment bank. The mortgage and the note being transferred creates two separate legal events or consequences.
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Transfer of the note even without the debt creates a potential asset to the transferee whether they paid for it or not. If they paid for it they might even be a holder in due course with more rights than the actual owner of the debt. See UCC Article 3, holder in due course.
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Transfer of the note without the debt (i.e. transfer without payment of value) would simply transfer rights under the UCC and that would be independent of the debt and therefore the mortgage which, under existing law, can only be enforced by the owner of the debt notwithstanding language in the mortgage that refers to the note. The assignment of mortgage was not enough.
Some quotables from the Slip Opinion:

A plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mortgage “[g]enerally establishes its prima facie case through the production of the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default”. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v Sabloff, 153 AD3d 879, 880 [2nd Dept 2017] (citing Plaza Equities, LLC v Lamberti, 118 AD3d 688, 689; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Brewton, 142 AD3d 683, 684). However, where a defendant has affirmatively pleaded standing in the Answer,[6] the plaintiff must prove standing in order to prevail. Bank of New York Mellon v Gordon, 2019 NY Slip Op. 02306, 2019 WL 1372075, at *3 [2nd Dept March 27, 2019] (citing HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Roumiantseva, 130 AD3d 983, 983-984; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Calderon, 115 AD3d 708, 709; Bank of NY v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 279).

A plaintiff establishes its standing in a mortgage foreclosure action by showing that it was the holder of the underlying note at the time the action was commenced. Sabloff, supra at 880 (citing Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 NY3d 355, 361; U.S. Bank N.A. v Handler, 140 AD3d 948, 949). Where a plaintiff is not the original lender, it must show that the obligation was transferred to it either by a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note. Id. Because the mortgage automatically passes with the debt as an inseparable incident, a plaintiff must generally prove its standing to foreclose on the mortgage through either of these means, rather than by assignment of the mortgage. Id. (citing U.S. Bank, N.A. v Zwisler, 147 AD3d 804, 805; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 754).

Turning to the substantive issue involving UCC § 3-202(2), Defendant contends that the provision requires that an allonge must be “permanently” affixed to the underlying note for the note to be negotiated by delivery. UCC § 3-202(1) states, in pertinent part, that if, as is the case here, “the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement”. UCC § 3-202(1) (emphasis added). The pertinent language of UCC § 3-202(2) provides that when an indorsement is written on a separate piece of paper from a note, the paper must be “so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” UCC § 3-202(2) (emphasis added); Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Kelly, 166 AD3d 843 [2nd Dept 2018]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Roumiantseva, supra at 985; see also One Westbank FSB v Rodriguez, 161 AD3d 715, 716 [1st Dept 2018]; Slutsky v Blooming Grove Inn, 147 AD2d 208, 212 [2nd Dept 1989] (“The note secured by the mortgage is a negotiable instrument (see, UCC 3-104) which requires indorsement on the instrument itself `or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof’ (UCC 3-202[2]) in order to effectuate a valid `assignment’ of the entire instrument (cf., UCC 3-202 [3], [4])”).

[Editor’s note: if it were any other way the free spinning allonge would become a tradable commodity in its own right. ]

The Assignment did not go on to state that the referenced debt was simultaneously being assigned to Plaintiff.

 

Filed under: burden of persuasion, burden of pleading, BURDEN OF PROOF, CORRUPTION, discovery, Discovery -Subpoena, Fabrication of documents, foreclosure, foreclosure defenses, foreclosure mill, forensic investigation, investment banking, Investor, jurisdiction, legal standing, MBS TRUSTEE, originator, Pleading, prima facie case, Servicer, sham transactions, standing, STATUTES | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments »

Unrhetorical Questions — Money, Lies and Accounting Records: Gander and Goose

Posted on June 7, 2013 by Neil Garfield

Why are our courts routinely accepting allegations and documents from foreclosing banks that they would summarily throw out if the same allegations and documents came from borrowers?

 How can possession of an ALLONGE construed as ownership

of the debt without any other evidence being presented?

Why is the standard definition of “Allonge” ignored?

IF THE COURT IS USING THE TERMS OF “ALLONGE”, “ASSIGNMENT”AND “ENDORSEMENT” INTERCHANGEABLY, WHY DOES ALL THE LITERATURE ON LEGAL DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS SAY OTHERWISE? ARE WE MAKING A NEW UCC?

WHY ARE COURTS ALLOWING ENDORSEMENTS (SHOULD BE SPELLED “INDORSEMENT”) IN BLANK TO TRANSFER THE LOAN WHEN THE BASIS OF THE PROPONENT’S AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE IS A DOCUMENT THAT FORBIDS ACCEPTANCE OF  ENDORSEMENTS IN BLANK?

 I recently received a question from an old friend of mine who was a solicitor in Canada and who is frustrated with our court system that continues to assume the validity of loans that have already been thoroughly discredited. He has attempted on numerous occasions to get information through a qualified written request or a debt validation letter and has attempted to verify the authority of any party to whom he would address a request for modification of his loan in Florida. While chatting with him online I realized that this information might be of some value to attorneys and borrowers. The principal point of this article is the old expression “what is good for the goose is good for the gander.” For those of you who are unfamiliar with the old expression it means that there should be equality of treatment, all other things being equal. In mortgage litigation is apparent that when an allegation is made or a proffer is made through counsel rather than the introduction of evidence, the courts continue to function from both a misconception and  misapplication of the Rules of Court and the rules of evidence.

 When the case involves one institution against another, the same arguments that are summarily  rejected when they are advanced by a borrower are given considerable traction because the argument was advanced by a financial institution or financial player that identifies itself as a financial institution. In fact, a review of most cases reveals a much heavier burden on the party defending against the loss of their homestead than the party seeking to take it —  which is a complete reversal of the way our justice system is supposed to work.  The burden of proof in both judicial and nonjudicial states is constitutionally required to be on the party seeking affirmative relief and not on the party defending against it.

In the nonjudicial states, in my opinion, the courts are violating this basic constitutional requirement on a regular basis under circumstances where the party announcing a right to enforce a dubious deed of trust, collection on a dubious note, and therefore having the right to sell the property without judicial intervention despite the inability of the foreclosing entity to produce any evidence that it owns the debt, note, mortgage rights,  or even demonstrate a financial interest in the outcome of the foreclosure sale; to make matters worse the courts are allowing trustees on deeds of trust to be appointed or substituted even though they have a direct or indirect financial relationship with the alleged lender.

These trustees are accepting “credit bids” without any due diligence as to whether or not the party making the offer of the credit bid at auction is in fact the creditor who may submit such a credit bid according to the statutes governing involuntary auctions within that state.  In nonjudicial states the burden is put on the borrower to “make a case” and thus obtain a temporary restraining order preventing the sale of the property. This is absurd. These statutes governing nonjudicial sales were created at a time when the lender was easily identified, the borrower was easily identified, the chain of title was easily demonstrated, and the chain of money was also easily demonstrated. Today in the world of falsely securitized loans, the courts have maintain a ministerial attitude despite the fact that 96% of all loans are subject to competing claims by false creditors. The borrower is forced to defend against allegations that were never made but are presumed in a court of law. If anything is a violation of the due process requirements of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of most of the individual states of the union, this must be it.

 In the judicial states,  the problem is even more egregious because the same presumptions and assumptions are being used against borrowers as in the nonjudicial states. Thus in addition to being an unconstitutional application of an otherwise valid law, the judicial states are violating their own rules of civil procedure mandated by the Supreme Court of each such state (or to be more specific where the highest court is not called the Supreme Court, we could say the highest court in the state).  This is why I have strongly suggested for years that an action in mandamus be brought directly to the highest court in each state alleging that the laws and rules, as applied, violate constitutional standards and any natural sense of fairness.

 Here is the question posed by my Canadian friend:

(1)  The documents are phony documents (copies) produced by Ben Ezra Katz. It will cost me several thousand dollars to have a document expert evaluate the documents and then testify if they find them to be copies. At the beginning of this case, The Plaintiff’s attorney (Ben Ezra Katz associate) told the court (I do have a transcript) that they has found the ORIGINAL documents (note, mortgage, etc.) and that they had couriered the ORIGINAL documents to the clerk of Court. They did a Notice of Filing which on its’ face states ORIGINAL documents. I can not afford a document expert, however the AG in S. Florida has an open investigation into this case. Would I be out of line in requesting that they include this case per-se as part of their investigation and accordingly make a determination as to if or if not the subject documents which are on file with the clerk of court are originals or copies ??
(2)  The only nexus that Wells Fargo produces to establish themselves as a real party in interest is a hand filled out allonge (copy attached). Please note that the signer only signs as “assistant secretary” without further specifics. On the basis of what they provide it is virtually impossible to depose this person to determine if she actually did or did not sign this document, and if so what is her authority to do so.  I want to launch some sort of discovery that seeks to discover what else the Plaintiff has which would support the alleged allonge. Things such as any contracts, copies of any consideration, what was the consideration, who authorized the transaction, etc.  Do you have any suggestions in this regard. I bounced this off my attorney and I am not sure that we are on the same page. He wants to go to trial and have the proven phony documents as the main thrust. I agree with that, however I also would feel far better if we were able to cut them off at the knees as to standing such as the alleged allonge is part of the phony documents, and there are no documents that the Plaintiff can produce to support not only its’ authenticity, but its’ legitimate legal function. I do not like to have all of my eggs in one basket.

 And here is my response:

 You are most probably correct in your assessment of the situation. If they lied to the court and filed phony documents you should file motion for contempt. You should also file a motion for involuntary dismissal based on the fact that they have had plenty of time to either come up with the original documents or alleged facts to establish lost documents. The affidavit that must accompany the allegation of lost documents must be very specific as to the content of the documents and the path of the documents and it must the identify the person or records from which the allegations of fact are drawn. They must be able to state with certainty when they last had the original documents if they ever did have the original documents. If they didn’t ever have the original documents then an affidavit from them is meaningless. They have to establish the last party had physical custody of the original documents and establish the reason why they are missing. If they can’t do those things then their foreclosure should be dismissed. The more vague they are in explaining what happened to the original documentation the more likely it is that somebody else has the original documentation and may sue you again for recovery. So whatever it is that they allege should result in your motion to strike and motion to dismiss with prejudice. As far as the attorney general’s office you are correct that they ought to cooperate with you fully but probably incorrect in your assumption that they will do so.

I think you should make a point about the allonge being filled out by hand as being an obviously late in the game maneuver. You can also make a point about the “assistant Sec.” since that is not a real position in a corporation. Something as valuable as a note would be reviewed by a real official of the Corporation who would be able to answer questions as to how the note came into the possession of the bank (through interrogatories or requests for admission) and  what was paid and to whom for the possession and rights to the note, when that occurred and where the records are that show the payment and how Wells Fargo actually came into possession of the note or the rights to collect on the note. As you are probably aware the predecessor that is alleged to have originated the note or alleged to have had possession of the note must account for whether they provided the consideration for the note and what they did with it after the closing. If they say they provided consideration than they should have records showing a payment to the closing agent and if they received consideration from Wells Fargo they should have those records as well.

But the likelihood is that neither Option One nor Wells Fargo ever funded this mortgage which means that the note and mortgage lack consideration and neither one of them has any right to collect or foreclose.   In fact, since they are taking the position that the loan was not securitized and therefore that no securitization documents are relevant,  neither of them can take the position that they are representing the real party in interest as an authorized agent for the real lender.  And the reason you are seeing lawsuits especially by Wells Fargo in which it names itself as the foreclosing party is that the bank knows that Iit ignored and routinely violated essential and material provisions of the securitization documents including the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement upon which investors relied when they gave money to an investment banker.

In that case, since you seek to modify the loan transaction and determine whether or not it is now or is potentially subject to  a valid mortgage, you should seek to enforce a request for information concerning the exact path of the money that was used to fund the mortgage. And you should request any documentation or records showing any guarantee, payment, right to payment, or anything else that would establish a loan to you where actual money exchanged hands between the declared lender and yourself. The likelihood is that the money was in a co-mingled account somewhere —  possibly Wells Fargo —  which came from investors whose names should have been on the closing and the closing documents.  Those investors are the actual creditors. Or at least they were the actual creditors at the time that the loan money showed up at the alleged “loan closing.” Since then, hundreds of settlements and lawsuits were resolved based upon the bank tacitly acknowledging that it took the money and used it for different purposes than those disclosed in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement. These settlements avoid the embarrassing proof problems of any institution since they not only ignored the securitization documents, more importantly, they chose to ignore all of the basic industry standards for the underwriting of a real estate loan because the parties who appeared to be underwriting the loan and funding the loan had absolutely no risk of loss and only had the incentive to close deals in exchange for sharing pornographic amounts of money that were identified as proprietary trading profits or fees.

And the reason why this is so important is that the mortgage lien could never be perfected in the absence of the legitimate creditor who had advanced actual money to the borrower or on behalf of the borrower. This basic truth undermines the industry and government claims about the $13 trillion in loans that still are alleged to exist (despite multiple payments from third parties in multiple resales, insurance contracts and contracts for credit default swaps). The abundant evidence in the public domain as well as the specific factual evidence in each case negates any allegation of ultimate facts upon which relief could be granted, to wit: the money came from third-party investors who are the only real creditors. The fact that the money went through intermediaries is no more important or relevant than the fact that you are a depository bank is intended to honor checks drawn on your account provided you have the funds available. The inescapable conclusion is that the investors were tricked into making unsecured loans to homeowners and that the entire foreclosure scandal that has consumed our nation for years is based on completely false premises.

Your attorney could pose the question to the court in a way that would make it difficult for the court to rule against you. If the lender had agreed to make a loan provided you put up the property being financed PLUS additional collateral in the form of ownership of a valid mortgage on another piece of property,  would the court accept a handwritten allonge from you as the only evidence of ownership or the right to enforce the other mortgage? I think it is clear that neither the banks nor the court would accept the hand written instrument as sufficient evidence of ownership and right to collect payment if you presented the same instruments that they are presenting to the court.

PRACTICE HINT: In fact, you could ask the bank for their policy in connection with accepting its mortgages on other property as collateral for a business loan or for a loan on existing property or the closing on a new piece of property being acquired by the borrower. You could drill down on that policy by asking for the identification of the individual or committee that would decide whether or not a handwritten allonge would be sufficient or would satisfy them that they had  adequate collateral in the form of a mortgage on the first property and the pledge of a mortgage on a second piece of property.

The answer is self-evident. No bank or other lending institution or lending entity would loan money on the basis of a dubious self-serving allonge.  There would be no deal. If you sued them for not making the loan after the bank issued a letter of commitment (which by the way you should ask for both in relation to your own case and in relation to the template used by the bank in connection with the issuance of a letter of commitment), the bank would clearly prevail on the basis that you provided insufficient documentation to establish the additional collateral (your interest in the mortgage on another piece of property).

The bank’s position that it would not loan money on such a flimsy assertion of additional collateral would be both correct from the point of view of banking practice and sustained by any court has lacking sufficient documentation to establish ownership and the right to enforce. Your question to the court should be “if justice is blind, what difference does it make which side is using an unsupportable position?”

HSBC Hit with Foreclosure Suit; FHA’s $115 Billion Loss Scenario; Return of the Synthetic CDO?
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/hsbc-hit-with-foreclosure-suit-fhas-115-billion-dollar-loss-scenario-1059622-1.html
HSBC Foreclosure Law Violations
http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/hsbc-foreclosure-law-violations/4356
Trouble Looms For Bank Of America, AIG’s Objections Have Merit
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/06/05/trouble-looms-for-bank-of-america-aigs-objections-have-merit/
Massachusetts foreclosures decline 79% as local laws stall the process
http://www.housingwire.com/news/2013/06/05/massachusetts-foreclosures-decline-79-local-laws-stall-process
———————————————–
Money from thin air? If the bank does not create currency or money then where does the money come from? Answer investor deposits into what they thought was an account for a REMIC trust. And if the money came from investors then the banks were intermediaries whether they took money on deposit, or they were the underwriter and seller of mortgage bonds issued from non existent entities, backed by non existent loans. And any money received by the banks should have been for benefit of the investors or the REMIC trust if the DID deposit the money into a trust or fiduciary account.Dan Kervick: Do Banks Create Money from Thin Air?
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/06/dan-kervick-do-banks-create-money-from-thin-air.html

Supreme Court foreclosure ruling tilts toward banks
http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/real-estate-daily/2013/06/foreclosure-ruling-tilts-toward-banks.html
Your student loan isn’t really a loan!
http://www.salon.com/2013/06/05/let_college_students_go_bankrupt/

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 295 Comments »

An Allonge is Not an Assignment: Do the research!

Posted on May 8, 2013 by Neil Garfield

by Danielle Kelley, Esq., Senior Partner, Garfield, Gwaltney, Kelley and White:

I moved to dismiss two cases on several grounds – one that the allonge was not “firmly affixed”.  This will become an issue as the banks scramble to file pleadings under HB87 that show they have the Note.  The 1st DCA has now admitted there is a lack of caselaw in Florida on this issue – I’m hoping that one of these Judges (the one in Marianna who has already dismissed twice on one case) will issue an order agreeing.

1.                  The allonge attached to the Complaint does not meet the legal definition of what an allonge is:  a firmly attached document to the Note, when there is no space on the bottom of the Note for endorsements.  “An allonge is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Black’s Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed.1990). Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code does not specifically mention an allonge, but notes that “[f]or the purpose of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is part of the instrument.” § 673.2041(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). See Booker vs. Sarasota, 707 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(footnote 1).  See also Isaac v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 74 So. 3d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)(“An “allonge” is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself; such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.”). 

2.                  There is no Florida case on point which provides guidance as to how an allonge must be physically attached to an instrument in order for it to become “firmly affixed” to same.  Recently the First District Court of Appeal took notice of such in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bohatka, 1D11-3356, 2013 WL 1715439 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), stating that “A body of caselaw has developed, primarily in other states and under the UCC, regarding the validity of an allonge and how it must be “affixed” to a note.4”).  In footnote Four to that statement, the First District Court of Appeal wrote:

 “See, e.g., Douglas J. Whaley, Mortgage Foreclosures, Promissory Notes, the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 W. St. U.L.Rev. 313, 318–19 (2012) (noting the “many new cases” that deal with allonges and the meaning of “affixed”). Professor Whaley continues, “It is not enough that there is a separate piece of paper which documents the transfer unless that piece of paper is “affixed” to the note. What does “affixed” mean? The common law required gluing. Would a paper clip do the trick? A staple?” Id. at 319 (footnotes omitted). To our knowledge, no Florida court has explored what type of affixation or annexation of an allonge is legally sufficient, nor has any court addressed the possibility of electronic attachment of allonges. See Patricia Brumfield Fry, James A. Newell, & Michael R. Gordon, Coming To A Screen Near You—“Emortgages”—Starring Good Laws And Prudent Standards—Rated “XML”, 62 Bus. Law. 295, 311 (Nov.2006) (noting that Freddie Mac addressed the possibility “that an electronic allonge be added to all eNotes that contains language addressing both the recourse and transfer warranty issues”).”

 

3.                  Thus, with this issue to date still uncertain, the Court can rely on the plain meaning of the words, “firmly affixed” and the Court may look to decisions of courts in other states for persuasive authority.  To begin, two reasons have been cited for the “firmly affixed” rule:  (1) to prevent fraud; and (2) to preserve a traceable chain of title.  See Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc., 853 F. 2d. 163, 167 (3rd Cir. 1988).  A draft of the 1951 version of the UCC Article 3 included the comment that “[t]he indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or an allonge, which, as defined in Section___, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the instrument as to become part of it.”  ALI, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1-Article III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311, 424 (1984).  More recently, however, courts have held that “stapling is the modern equivalent of gluing or pasting.”  See Lamson v. Commercial Cred. Corp., 187 Colo. 382 (Colo. 1975).  See also Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W. 2d 262 (Texas 1997)(holding that an allonge stabled to the back of a promissory note is valid so long as there is no room on the note for endorsement but affixed does not include paperclips.).  Regardless of the exact method of affixation, numerous cases have rejected indorsements made on a separate sheet of paper loosely inserted into a folder with the instrument and not physically attached in any way.  See Town of Freeport v. Ring, 1999 Me. 48 (Maine 1999); Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc., 853 F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988); Big Builders, Inc. v. Israel, 709 A. 2d 74 (D.C. 1988).  

Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GARFIELD GWALTNEY KELLEY AND WHITE, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , | 143 Comments »

Forgery! Now You’ve Got Them, Or Do You?

Posted on February 5, 2013 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Analysis: First of all hats off to April Charney, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com and Yves Smith for the article on Forgery (see link below) James M. Kelley as a forensic document examiner — outstanding work!

This is one of the places where the rubber meets the road, but before you start celebrating take a deep breath: proof of forgery will NOT necessarily stop delay or alter the foreclosure. That is why I start with questioning the monetary transactions before I introduce the document deficiencies, fabrications and forgeries.

You have to put yourself in the Judge’s seat (or more properly, bench). A simple example will suffice to make my point. Suppose I loaned you $100 and you didn’t pay it back the way we agreed. Later I sue you and produce a promissory note you know you never signed but it looks like your signature, but you’ve admitted you owe the $100 and you admit you defaulted. Under those circumstances your evidence of forgery might be excluded from evidence –— because it is already established you owe the money and defaulted. In fact it should be excluded because it is no longer relevant to the proceedings. The debt is not the not — and vica versa.

The note is only evidence of the debt and taking that out of the equation still leaves the admissions, presumptions and witnesses by which the authenticity of the debt and default have already been taken as agreed and irrefutable. Some people look askance as Judges who apply the rules of evidence and accuse them of stupidity or dishonesty. But the truth is the forged fabricated note is at most corroborative evidence of something that is no longer a material issue of fact in dispute. The Judge has little choice but to rule in favor of the forecloser at that point. Hence, we keep pounding on DENY AND DISCOVER.

If you are filing the lawsuit you should, along with the initial summons and and complaint, file whatever discovery requests you have at the same time which all amount to “who are you, what are you doing here, why are you seeking collection of this debt, and by what authority.

Admitting the debt, note, mortgage etc can be either direct (“I admit that”) or indirect/tacit (“I understand what you are saying Judge but there is ample evidence of skullduggery here”). In most cases, either one is enough, especially with a Judge who is already assuming that the bank wouldn’t be there if there was no debt, note and mortgage and the presence of a default.

The borrower, who knows they did get money on loan, knows they did sign papers and knows they didn’t pay, naturally assumes that it is pointless to deny the basic elements of the foreclosure — the debt between the borrower and the forecloser, the note, which is evidence of the debt, and the mortgage, assignments and other instruments used by the banks to get you pointed in the wrong direction. AND THAT is where the defense goes off the deep end every time there is a “bad” decision.

The Judge is going to be looking for admissions by the borrower (not the forecloser) because of a very natural presumption that at one time was a perfectly reasonable assumption — that the bank would not waste time and money enforcing a debt that didn’t exist and a note that was never valid, nor a mortgage that was never perfected.

And the Judge is going to see any avoidance of enforcement on the basis of paperwork as a tacit admission that the debt is real, the default is real, and the note and mortgage were properly executed under proper circumstances —- because that is what banks do! Maybe it isn’t “fair” but it is perfectly understandable why we encountered a mindset that treated borrowers as lunatics when they first came up with the notion that the paperwork was missing, lost, fabricated, forged, robo-signed etc.

The study by Katherine Ann Porter, the San Francisco study and the studies in Massachusetts and Maryland and Massachusetts all point to a credit bid being submitted at foreclosure auction by a party who wasn’t a creditor at all. The San Francisco study said 65% of the credit bidders were strangers to the transaction and strange is the word to use in court. Did it change anything? No!

So where does that leave you? In order to be able to show the relevance of the forgery or fabrication you must attack the debt itself. Where would I be if I sued you on the $100 loan, produced a fabricated, forged note and you DIDN’T admit the debt or the default. The burden falls back on me to prove I gave you the $100.

What if I didn’t give you the $100 but I know someone else did. That doesn’t give me standing to sue you because I am not injured party. Can any of you state with certainty that the loan money you received came from the originator disclosed on the TILA, settlement and closing documents? Probably not because the ONLY way you would know that is if you had seen the actual wire transfer receipt and the wire transfer instructions.

Thus if you don’t know that to be true — that the originator in your mortgage loan was funded by the originator and was not a table-funded loan (which accounts for about 95%-96% of all loans during the mortgage meltdown), why would you admit it, tacitly, directly or any other way?

As a defense posture the first rule is to deny that which you know is untrue and to deny based upon lack of information or deny based upon facts and theory that are contrary to the assertions of the forecloser. Deny the debt. THAT automatically means the note can’t be evidence of anything real, because the note refers to a loan between the originator and the borrower where the borrower unknowingly received the money from a third or fourth party (table funded loan, branded “predatory” by TILA and reg Z).

Your defense is simply “we don’t know these people and we don’t know the debt they are claiming. We were induced to sign papers that withheld vital information about the party with whom I was doing business and left me with corrupt title. The transaction referred to in the note, mortgage, assignments, allonges etc. was never completed. The fact that we received a loan from someone else does not empower this forecloser to enforce the debt of a third party with whom they have had no contact or privity.”

THEN HAMMER THEM WITH THE FORGERY BUT USE SOMEONE AS GOOD AS KELLEY TO DO IT. WATCH OUT FOR CHARLATANS WHO CAN CONVINCE YOU BUT NOT THE COURT. THUS THE DEFICIENT DOCUMENTS CORROBORATE YOUR MAIN DEFENSE RATHER THAN SERVE AS THE CORE OF IT.

Practice Pointer: At this point either opposing counsel or the Judge will ask some questions like who DID give the loan or what proof do you have. If you are at the stage of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, your answer should be, if you set up case correctly and you have outstanding discovery, that those are evidential questions that require production of witnesses, testimony, documents and cross examination. Since the present hearing is not a trial or evidential hearing and was not noticed as such you are unprepared to present the entire case.

The issues on a motion to dismiss are solely that of the pleadings. At a Motion for Summary Judgment, it is the pleadings plus an affidavit. Submit several affidavits and the Judge will have little choice but to deny the forecloser’s motion for summary judgment.

Attack their affidavit as not being on personal knowledge (voir dire) and if you are successful all that is left is YOUR motion for summary judgment and affidavits which leaves the Judge with little choice but to enter Summary Final Judgment in favor of the homeowner as to this forecloser.

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/02/expert-witnesses-starting-to-take-on-forgeries-in-foreclosures.html

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 63 Comments »

Alabama Appeals Court Slams U.S. Bank Down on “Magic” Fabricated Allonge

Posted on June 11, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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NY Trust Law — PSA Violation is FATAL

RE: Congress (yes that is really her name) versus U.S. Bank 2100934

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Editor’s Comment:

Yves Smith from Naked Capitalism has it right in the article below and you should not only read it but study it. The following are my comments in addition to the well written analysis on Naked Capitalism.

  1. Alabama is a very conservative state that has consistently disregarded issues regarding the rules of evidence and civil procedure until this decision from the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals was handed down on June 8, 2012. Happy Birthday, Brother! This court has finally recognized (a) that documents are fabricated shortly before hearings and (b) that it matters. They even understand WHY it matters.
  2. Judges talk to teach other both directly and indirectly. Sometimes it almost amounts to ex parte contact because they are actually discussing the merits of certain arguments as it would effect cases that are currently pending in front of them. I know of reports where Judges have stated in open Court in Arizona that they have spoken with other Judges and DECIDED that they are not going to give relief to deadbeat borrowers. So this decision in favor of the borrower, where a fabricated “Allonge” was used only a couple of days before the hearing is indicative that they are starting to change their thinking and that the deadbeats might just be the pretender lenders.
  3. But they missed the fact that an allonge is not an instrument that transfers anything. It is not a bill of sale, assignment or anything else like that. It is and always has been something added to a previously drafted instrument that adds, subtracts or changes terms. See my previous article last week on Allonges, Assignments and Endorsements.
  4. What they DID get is that under New York law, the manager or trustee of a so-called REMIC, SPV or “Trust” cannot do anything contrary to the instrument that appointed the manager or trustee to that position. This is of enormous importance. We have been saying on these pages and in my books that it is not possible for the trustee or manager of the “pool” to accept a loan into the pool if it violates the terms expressly stated in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. If the cut-off date was three years ago then it can’t be accepted. If the loan is in default already then it cannot be accepted. So not only is this allonge being rejected, but any actual attempt to assign the instrument into the “pool” is also rejected.
  5. What that means is that like any contract there are three basic elements — offer, consideration and acceptance. The offer is clear enough, even if it is from a party who doesn’t own the loan. The consideration is at best muddy because there are no records to show that the REMIC or the parties to the REMIC (investors) ever funded the loan through the REMIC. And the acceptance is absolutely fatal because no investor would agree or did agree to accept loans that were already in default.
  6. The other thing I agree with and would expand is the whole notion of the burden of proof. In this case we are still dealing with a burden of proof on the homeowner instead of the pretender lender. But the door is open now to start talking about the burden of proof. Here, the Court simply stated that the burden of proof imposed by the trial judge should have been by a preponderance (over 50%) of the evidence instead of clear and convincing (somewhere around 80%) of the evidence. So if it is more likely than not that the instrument was fabricated, the document will NOT be accepted into evidence. The next thing to work on is putting the burden of proof on the party seeking affirmative relief — i.e., the one seeking to take the home through foreclosure. If you align the parties properly, all of the other procedural problems disappear. That will leave questions regarding admissible evidence (another time).
  7. Keep in mind that this decision will have rumbling effects throughout Alabama and other states but it is only persuasive, not authoritative. So the fact that this appellate court made this decision does not mean you win in your case in Arizona.
  8. But it can be used to say “Judge, I know how the bench views these defenses and claims. But it is becoming increasingly apparent that the party seeking to foreclose is now and always was a pretender. And further, it is equally apparent that they are submitting fabricated and forged documents. 
  9. ‘More importantly, they are trying to get you to participate in a fraudulent scheme they pursued against the investors who advanced money without any proper documentation. This Alabama Appellate Court understands, now that they have read the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, that it simply is not possible for the investors to be forced into accepting a defaulted loan long after the cut-off date established in the PSA.
  10. ‘If you rule for the pretender creditor here you are doing two things: (1) you are providing these pretenders with the argument that there is a judicial ruling requiring the innocent investors to take the defaulted loan and suffer the losses when they never had any interest in the loan before and (2) you are allowing and encouraging a party who is not a creditor and never was a creditor to submit a credit bid at auction in lieu of cash thus stealing the property from both the homeowner and in violation of their agency or duty to the investors.
  11. ‘This Court and hundreds of others across the country are reading these documents now. And what they are finding is that pension funds and other regulated managed funds were tricked into buying non-existent assets through a bogus mortgage bond. The offer and promise made to these investors, upon whom millions of pensioners depend to make ends meet, was that these were industry standard loans in good standing. None of that was true and it certainly isn’t true now. Yet they want you to rule that you can force investors from another state or country to accept these loans even though they are either worthless or worth substantially less than the amount represented at the time of the transaction where the investment banker took the money from the investor and put it into a giant escrow fund without regard to the REMIC’s existence.

We don’t deny the existence of an obligation, but we do deny that this trickster should be given the proceeds of ill-gotten gains. The actual creditors should be given an opportunity to reject non-conforming loans that are submitted after the cut-off date and are therefore indispensable parties to this transaction.”

Alabama Appeals Court Reverses Decision on Chain of TitleCase, Ruling Hinges on Question of Bogus Allonges

In a unanimous decision, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed a lower court decision on a foreclosure case, U.S. Bank v. Congress and remanded the case to trial court.

We’d flagged this case as important because to our knowledge, it was the first to argue what we call the New York trust theory, namely, that the election to use New York law in the overwhelming majority of mortgage securitizations meant that the parties to the securitization could operate only as stipulated in the pooling and servicing agreement that created that particular deal. Over 100 years of precedents in New York have produced well settled case law that deems actions outside what the trustee is specifically authorized to do as “void acts” having no legal force. The rigidity of New York trust has serious implications for mortgage securitizations. The PSAs required that the notes (the borrower IOUs) be transferred to the trust in a very specific fashion (endorsed with wet ink signatures through a particular set of parties) before a cut-off date, which typically was no later than 90 days after the trust closing. The problem is, as we’ve described in numerous posts, that there appears to have been massive disregard in the securitization for complying with the contractual requirements that they established and appear to have complied with, at least in the early years of the securitization industry. It’s difficult to know when the breakdown occurred, but it appears that well before 2004-2005, many subprime originators quit bothering with the nerdy task of endorsing notes and completing assignments as the PSAs required; they seemed to take the position they could do that right before foreclosure. Indeed, that’s kosher if the note has not been securitized, but as indicated above, it is a no-go with a New York trust. There is no legal way to remedy the problem after the fact.

The solution in the Congress case appears to have been a practice that has since become troublingly become common: a fabricated allonge. An allonge is an attachment to a note that is so firmly affixed that it can’t travel separately. The fact that a note was submitted to the court in the Congress case and an allonge that fixed all the problems appeared magically, on the eve of trial, looked highly sus. The allonge also contained signatures that looked less than legitimate: they were digitized (remember, signatures as supposed to be wet ink) and some were shrunk to fit signature lines. These issues were raised at trial by Congress’s attorneys, but the fact that the magic allonge appeared the Thursday evening before Memorial Day weekend 2011 when the trial was set for Tuesday morning meant, among other things, that defense counsel was put on the back foot (for instance, how do you find and engage a signature expert on such short notice? Answer, you can’t).

The case was ruled in favor of the US Bank, in a narrow and strained opinion (which was touted as significant by reliable securitization industry booster Paul Jackson). It argued that the case was an ejectment action (the final step to get the borrower out after the foreclosure was final) so that, per securitization expert, Georgetown law professor Adam Levitin,

..the question of ownership of the note was not an issue of standing, but an affirmative defense for which the homeowner had the burden of proof…Crazy or not, however, this meant that the homeowner wasn’t actually challenging the trust’s standing. From there it was a small step for the court to say that the homeowner couldn’t invoke the terms of the PSA because she wasn’t a party to it…..

The case has been remanded back to trial court, and the judges put the issue of the allonge front and center.

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ALLONGES, ASSIGNMENTS AND ENDORSEMENTS: THE REAL DEAL

Posted on June 4, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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ALLONGES, ASSIGNMENTS AND INDORSEMENTS

Excerpt from 2nd Edition Attorney Workbook, Treatise and Practice Manual

AND Subject Matters to be Covered in July Workshop

ALLONGE: An allonge is variously defined by different courts and sources. But the one thing they all have in common is that it is a very specific type of writing whose validity is presumed to be invalid unless accompanied by proof that the allonge was executed by the Payor (not the Payee) at the time of or shortly after the execution of a negotiable instrument or a promissory note that is not a negotiable instrument. People add all sorts of writing to notes but the additions are often notes by the payee that are not binding on the Payor because that is not what the Payor signed. In the context of securitization, it is always something that a third party has done after the note was signed, sometimes years after the note was signed.

A Common Definition is “An allonge is generally an attachment to a legal document that can be used to insert language or signatures when the original document does not have sufficient space for the inserted material. It may be, for example, a piece of paper attached to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which endorsements can be written because there isn’t enough room on the instrument itself. The allonge must be firmly attached so as to become a part of the instrument.”

So the first thing to remember is that an allonge is not an assignment nor is it an indorsement (UCC spelling) or endorsement (common spelling). This distinction was relatively unimportant until claims of “securitization” were made asserting that loans were being transferred by way of an allonge. By definition that is impossible. An allonge is neither an amendment, nor an assignment nor an endorsement of a loan, note, mortgage or obligation. Lawyers who miss this point are conceding something that is basic to contract law, the UCC and property law in each state.

It is important to recognize the elements of an allonge:

  1. By definition it is on a separate piece of paper containing TERMS that could not fit on the instrument itself. Since the documents are prepared in advance of the “closing” with the borrower, I can conceive of no circumstances where the note or other instrument would be attached to an allonge when there was plenty of time to reprint the note with all the terms and conditions. The burden would then shift to the pretender lender to establish why it was necessary to put these “terms” on a separate piece of paper.
  2. The separate piece of paper must be affixed to the note in such a manner as to demonstrate that the allonge was always there and formed the basis of the agreement between all signatories intended to be bound by the instrument (note). The burden is on the pretender lender to prove that the allonge was always present — a burden that is particularly difficult without the signature or initials of the party sought to be bound by the “terms” expressed in the allonge.
  3. The attached paper must contain terms, conditions or provisions that are relevant to the duties and obligations of the parties to the original instrument — in this case the original instrument is a promissory note. The burden of proof in such cases might include foundation testimony from a live witness who can testify that the signor on the note knew the allonge existed and agreed to the terms.
  4. ERROR: An allonge is not just any piece of paper attached to the original instrument. If it is being offered as an allonge but it is actually meant to be used as an assignment or indorsement, then additional questions of fact arise, including but not limited to consideration. In the opinion of this writer, the reason transfers are often “documented” with instruments called an “allonge” is that by its appearance it gives the impression that (1) it was there since inception of the instrument and (2) that the borrower agreed to it. An additional reason is that the issue consideration for the transfer is avoided completely if the “allonge” is accepted as a document of transfer.
  5. As a practice pointer, if the document contains terms and conditions of the loan or repayment, then it is being offered as an allonge. But it is not a valid allonge unless the signor of the original instrument (the note) agreed to the contents expressed on the allonge, since the proponent of this evidence wishes the court to consider the allonge part of the note itself.
  6. If the instrument contains language of transfer then it is not an allonge in that it fails to meet the elements required for proffering evidence of the instrument as an allonge.

ASSIGNMENT: All contracts require an offer, acceptance and consideration to be enforced. An assignment is a contract. In the context of mortgage loans and litigation, an assignment is a document that recites the terms of a transaction in which the loan, note, obligation, mortgage or deed of trust is transferred and accepted by the assignee in exchange for consideration. Within the context of loans that are subject to securitization claims or claims of assignment the documents proffered by the pretender lender are missing two out of three components: consideration and acceptance. The assignment in this context is an offer that cannot and in fact must not be accepted without violating the authority of the manager or “trustee” of the SPV (REMIC) pool.

Like all contracts it must be supported by consideration. An assignment without consideration is probably void, almost certainly voidable and at the very least requires the proponent of this instrument as evidence to be admitted into the record to meet the burden of proof as to foundation.

The typical assignment offered in foreclosure litigation states that “for value received” the assignor, being the owner of the note described, hereby assigns, transfers and conveys all right, title and interest to the assignee. The problem is obvious — there was no value received if the loan was not funded by the assignee or was being purchased by the assignee at the time of the alleged transfer. A demand for records of the assignor and assignee would show how the parties actually treated the transaction from an accounting point of view.

In the same way as we look at the bookkeeping records of the “payee” on the original note to determine if the payee was in fact the “lender” as declared in the note and mortgage, we look to the books and records of the assignor and assignee to determine the treatment of the transaction on their own books and records.

The highest probability is that there will be no entry on either the balance sheet categories or the income statement categories because the parties were already paid a fee at the inception of the “loan” which was not disclosed to the borrower in violation of TILA. At most there might be the recording of an additional fee for “processing” the “assignment”. At no time will the assignor nor the assignee show the transaction as a loan receivable, the absence of which is powerful evidence that the assignor did not own the loan and therefore conveyed nothing, and that the assignee paid nothing in the assignment “transaction” because there was no transaction.

Any accountant (CPA) should be able to render a report on this limited aspect. Such an accountant could recite the same statements contained herein as the reason why you are in need of the discovery and what it will show. Such a statement should not say that the evidence will prove anything, but rather than this information will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as to whether the party whose records are being produced was acting in the capacity of servicer, nominee, lender, real party in interest, assignee or assignor.

The foundation for the assignment instrument must be by way of testimony (I doubt that “business records” could suffice) explaining the transaction and validating the assignment and the facts showing consideration, offer and acceptance. Acceptance is difficult in the context of securitization because the assignment is usually prepared (a) long after the close out date in the pooling and servicing agreement and (b) after the assignor or its agents have declared the loan to be in default. Both points violate virtually all pooling and servicing agreements that require performing loans to be pooled, ownership of the loan to be established by the assignor, the assignment executed in recordable form and many PSA’s require actual recording — a point missed by most analysts.

If we assume for the moment that the origination of the loan met the requirements for perfecting a mortgage lien on the subject property, the party managing the “pool” (REMIC, Trust etc.) would be committing an ultra vires act on its face if they accepted the loan, debt, obligation, note, mortgage or deed of trust into the pool years after the cut-off date and after the loan was declared in default. Acceptance of the assignment is a key component here that is missed by most judges and lawyers. The assumption is that if the assignment was offered, why wouldn’t the loan be accepted. And the answer is that by accepting the loan the manager would be committing the pool to an immediate loss of principal and income or even the opportunity for income.

Thus we are left with a Hobson’s choice: either the origination documents were void or the assignments of the origination documents were void. If the origination documents were void for lack of consideration and false declarations of facts, there could not be any conditions under which the elements of a perfected mortgage lien would be present. If the origination was valid, but the assignments were void, then the record owner of the loan is party who is admitted to have been paid in full, thus releasing the property from the encumbrance of the mortgage lien. Note that releasing the original lien neither releases any obligation to whoever paid it off nor does it bar a judgment lien against the homeowner — but that must be foreclosed by judicial means (non-judicial process does not apply to judgment liens under any state law I have reviewed).

INDORSEMENTS OR ENDORSEMENTS: The spelling varies depending upon the source. The common law spelling and the one often used in the UCC begins with the letter “I”. They both mean the same thing and are used interchangeably.

An indorsement transfers rights represented by the instruments to another individual other than the payee or holder. Indorsements can be open, qualified, conditional, bearer, with recourse, without recourse, requiring a subsequent indorsement, as a bailment (collection), or transferring all right title and interest. The types of indorsements vary as much as human imagination which is why an indorsement, alone, it frequently insufficient to establish the rights of the parties without another evidence, such as a contract of assignment.

The typical definition starts with an overall concept: “An indorsement on a negotiable instrument, such as a check or a promissory note, has the effect of transferring all the rights represented by the instrument to another individual. The ordinary manner in which an individual endorses a check is by placing his or her signature on the back of it, but it is valid even if the signature is placed somewhere else, such as on a separate paper, known as an allonge, which provides a space for a signature.” Another definition often appearing in cases and treatises is “ the act of the owner or payee signing his/her name to the back of a check, bill of exchange, or other negotiable instrument so as to make it payable to another or cashable by any person. An endorsement may be made after a specific direction (“pay to Dolly Madison” or “for deposit only”), called a qualified endorsement, or with no qualifying language, thereby making it payable to the holder, called a blank endorsement. There are also other forms of endorsement which may give credit or restrict the use of the check.”

Entire books have been written about indorsements and they have not exhausted all the possible interpretations of the act or the words used to describe the writing dubbed an “indorsement” or the words contained within the words described as an indorsement. As a result, courts are justifiably reluctant to accept an indorsed instrument on its face with parole evidence — unless the other party makes the mistake of failing to object to the foundation, and in the case of the mortgage meltdown practices of fabrication, forgery and fraud, by failing to deny the indorsement was ever made except for the purposes of litigation and has no relation to any legitimate business transaction.

Once the indorsement is put in issue as a material fact that is disputed, then the discovery must proceed to determine when the indorsement was created, where it was done, the parties involved in its creation and the parties involved in the execution of the indorsement, as well as the circumstantial evidence causing the indorsement to be made. A blank indorsement is no substitute for an assignment nor is it evidence that any transaction took place win which consideration (money) exchanged hands. Further blank indorsements might be yet another violation of the PSA, in which the indorsement must be with recourse and be unqualified naming the assignee.

A “trustee” of an alleged SPV (REMIC) who accepts such a document would no doubt be acting ultra vires (acting outside of the authority vested in the person purported to have acted) and it is doubtful that any evidence exists where the trustee was informed that the proposed indorsement or assignment involved a loan and a pool which was five years past the cutoff, already declared in default and which failed to meet the formal terms of assignment set forth in the PSA. A deposition upon written questions or oral deposition might clear the matter up by directing the right questions to the right person designated to be the person who represents the entity that claims to manage the SPV (REMIC) pool. In order to accomplish that, prior questions must be asked and answered as to the identity of such individuals and entities “with sufficient specificity such that they can be identified in subsequent demands for discovery or the issuance of a subpoena.”

Throughout this process, the defender in foreclosure must be ever vigilant in maintaining control of the narrative lest the other side wrest control and redirect the Judge to the allegation (without any evidence in the record) that the debt exists (or worse, has been admitted), the default occurred (or worse, has been admitted) and that the pretender is the lender (or worse, has been admitted as such).

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Posted on May 7, 2012 by Neil Garfield

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Editor’s Comment:

As I have reported on past occasions I have sources from the securities and more specifically the securitization industry that provide comments and information on the promise that I will keep their identities anonymous. This one in particular caught my attention. The source is from a Southeastern state who packaged and sold pools of loans of all types and qualities.

I believe regardless of whether the note and mortgage / deed of trust was assigned or not, it can be demonstrated they did not move as a unit, unless the price paid was the payoff value of the loan and/or value of property. [Editor’s Note: The importance of this fellow’s statement cannot be overstated. And his method for determining the true nature of an assignment, allonge or indorsement transaction is extremely helpful. While there are contrary arguments to his contention, they are a stretch to accept]

A different price (which I have hitting on this theme) would indicate the two are not a unit, because the value of the promissory note is not related to the actual security value.  Also how the transaction was booked and valued on the bank’s accounts would reveal the same.  I am guessing that they were valuing notes at a price much higher than the market value of the home. [Editor’s Note: Yes and as I have already been seen informed with documentation, the transactions were never booked as accounting transactions because from the standpoint of the assignor or assignee no transaction took place. These were assignments of convenience. They do not show on the balance sheet of the either the assignor or the assignee as a loan receivable. If they come to court claiming ownership or that someone else acquired ownership through them, they are doing so contrary to their own admissions in the own bookkeeping. THIS is where confidence and knowledge in motion practice and confidence and knowledge in discovery will put the homeowner in either extreme jeopardy or in a winning position — because the loan was never owned by ANY of the intermediaries who acted as conduits]

I believe the key is to assert the note as a ‘financial asset.’  That there is a market or exchange in which it trades.  In fact on many of the bank’s annual reports, they speak that the primary business is originating loans for sale/securitization, i.e. a market exists.  Along with pricing, this will be an easy case to make. [Editor’s Note: Read this carefully — it proves the point by reference to information in the public domain — and it is not subject to attack as being opinion or questionable fact or standing to raise the issue. What I believe he is telling me here is that even if there was ($10.00, or other valuable consideration), there are only three values that conceivably be used — the principal due on the note, the value of the collateral or the fair market value of the loan as determined by the freely traded secondary market. In nearly all cases the “traders” never even pretended that this was a real transaction and so there was no exchange of money at all. But if there was an exchange of money, this index could be used to prove that the transaction was a sham because it never met the elements of a reasonable business transaction. Judge Shack in New York asked the question himself — why and under what terms would anyone buy a loan that is in default? How could a loan declared in default be assigned into an investor pool where the investors were promised that they would at least initially receive performing loans. And how could they receive any loan after the 90 day cutoff period included in the PSA and the REMIC statute? The collateral  question that Judge Shack might have asked is why anyone would pay a price different than the price set on the secondary market regardless of the principal stated on the note or the current fair market value?]

Here is the kicker:  SECTION 36‑8‑406. Obligation to notify issuer of lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken security certificate.

     If a security certificate has been lost, apparently destroyed, or wrongfully taken, and the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within a reasonable time after the owner has notice of it and the issuer registers a transfer of the security before receiving notification, the owner may not assert against the issuer a claim for registering the transfer under Section 36‑8‑404 (wrongful registration) or a claim to a new security certificate under Section 36‑8‑405 (replacement of a lost, destroyed or wrongfully taken security certificate).

I wonder out loud why I should not reregister my note.   Imagine the bank now arguing all the points of having to present an actual note, etc in order to change ownership.

The next big thing I am digging into is whether an owner/purchaser of a security has any authority to electronically register and transfer ownership.  I believe, but cannot find exact wording, that such is only limited to the issuer.  On the entire face, MERs may not even be allowed because the issuer of the note, the homeowner, never authorized them to keep track.

Think of why there are laws that require lenders to notify borrowers when their mortgage is sold, it is because the issuer needs a record.  Worse case is that the bank argues the issuer under Chapter 8 is the one who ‘becomes responsible for, or in place of, another person described as an issuer in this section.’   That is still not the bank, but the county registrar.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 25 Comments »

J CURLEY AZ BKR CT: “No Docs To Show Ownership Of Loan Or Standing”

Posted on January 28, 2011 by Neil Garfield

ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD

COMBO ANALYSIS TITLE AND SECURITIZATION

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Judge Curley has been wrestling with these issues for more than 2 years. She has heard every argument, seen every memorandum, Expert Declaration (mine) and considered everything else possible. She was led to the inescapable conclusion that BOA’s position was a farce. She denied the Motion to Lift Stay, which effectively puts into question whether BAC or BOA is a creditor at all. In this well-reasoned and extremely well-written opinion, she outlines her analysis and reasoning. IN plain language, we are a nation of laws and civil procedure and not a nation of men and power. Not even the largest Bank on Earth can escape the requirements of our laws.

Arizona Bankruptcy Court Denies BAC “No Docs To Show Ownership Of Loan Or Standing” In re: ZITTA

Arizona Bankruptcy Court Denies BAC “No Docs To Show Ownership Of Loan Or Standing” In re: ZITTA

In re MIKE ZITTA AND IRENA ZITTA, Debtors.
BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP FKA COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS
SERVICING LP, its assignees and/or successors in interest, Movant,
v.
MIKE ZITTA AND IRENA ZITTA, Respondents.

No. 09-bk-19154-SSC

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DATED: January 21, 2011.

Not for Publication-Electronic Docketing ONLY

AMENDED1 MEMORANDUM DECISION

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Court recently received a Notice of Appeal filed by BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P.(“BAC”) on December 23, 2010. The Notice of Appeal concerns the Court’s denial of a Motion for Reconsideration filed by BAC relating to its Motion for Relief from Stay in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Mike and Irena Zitta (“Debtors”). Because BAC may have prematurely filed its Notice of Appeal, and because this Court had anticipated an opportunity to execute some sort of Order, with an appended memorandum decision on the issues presented, this Court will amplify its reasoning in denying the Motion for Reconsideration and clarify the record so that the Motion for Reconsideration may be heard on appeal.

BAC filed its Motion for Relief from Stay on August 30, 2010.2 Copies of the interest-only promissory note (“Note”), along with an allonge (“Allonge”), the recorded deed of trust (“Deed of Trust”), and the Broker’s price opinion were attached to the Motion.3 BAC also filed a declaration in support of the Motion.4 However, no assignment of the Deed of Trust from any entity to BAC was included. The Debtors filed a response/objection to the relief requested.5 The Court denied BAC’s Motion by Minute Entry Order issued on October 20, 2010 (the “Minute Entry Order”), because BAC had failed to provide a copy of an assignment of the Deed of Trust with its Motion.6 The October 20 Minute Entry Order was not executed by this Court.

On October 29, 2010, BAC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Entry Order, asserting that under Arizona law, an assignment of the Deed of Trust was not necessary to establish standing to move for relief from the automatic stay.7 The Court heard the Motion for Reconsideration on December 15, 2010, and denied the requested relief. BAC never submitted a form of order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and although a minute entry order was generated that same day outlining briefly the Court’s denial of the Motion, the minute entry order was never executed by this Court.8 Rather than wait for an appropriate form of order to be entered, BAC chose to file a Notice of Appeal on December 23, 2010.

In this Memorandum Decision, the Court has set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The issues addressed herein constitute a core proceeding over which this Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b) (West 2010).

II. FACTUAL DISCUSSION
In the Motion for Relief from Stay filed on August 30, 2010, BAC asserted that it was the “holder in due course” and that it was the “payee and a holder in due course under that certain Promissory Note dated March 20, 2007.”9 The Note attached to the Motion for Relief from Stay stated that GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., had provided the financing to the Debtors so that the Debtors could acquire the real property located at 5100 East Blue Jay Lane, Flagstaff, Arizona (“Property”).10 The Note further stated that anyone taking the Note “by transfer and who [was] entitled to receive payments under [the] Note [was] called the “Note Holder.”11 The Allonge, dated March 20, 2007, stated as follows: “Pay to the Order of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loan Servicing, LP without recourse.”12 GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. had executed the Allonge, although the signature is difficult to discern.13 The Deed of Trust attached to the Motion for Relief from Stay stated that GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. was the lender and that MERS was the nominee for the lender. Specifically, the Deed of Trust stated:

(E) “MERS” is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument.14

The Deed of Trust stated that the Debtors acknowledged or executed the document on March 21, 2007, although the Allonge and the Note had an execution date of March 20, 2007. Finally, the Declaration submitted in support of the Motion for Relief from Stay stated that “[it] is in the regular course and scope and business for BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP to prepare and maintain books and records relating to the status of the servicing of Movant’s Deed of Trust.”15 The Declaration also stated that “Movant is the payee under that certain Promissory Note dated March 20, 2007…. Further, Movant is the present holder and owner of that certain First Deed of Trust of same date…. securing said Note against Debtors’ property….”16 Thus, BAC’s Declaration creates an ambiguity as to whether BAC is the servicer of the loan or whether it is the Note Holder who is entitled to payments under the Debtors’ Note obligation. The documentation presented by BAC also includes a security agreement, granting BAC a security interest in the Note.17

A review of the Motion for Relief from Stay reflects the myriad problems that this and other Courts are facing in attempting to handle the tremendous volume of such motions that are filed in the numerous bankruptcy cases that are pending across the country. First, the Motion that was filed in this case appears to be a form that may have been imperfectly tailored to the facts of this case. For instance, the Motion for Relief from Stay alleges that GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. “was the original lender on the subject Note and Deed of Trust. Thereafter, GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. assigned all of its rights, title and interest in and to said [N]ote and Deed of Trust to BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. by way of an Allonge….”18 However, as noted previously, the Declaration seems to indicate that BAC was acting as a servicer. If BAC was simply the servicer, then for whom was BAC receiving payments under the Note? If BAC was holding the Note as the servicer, for whom was it acting? If BAC was the Note Holder, as defined in the Note, then why does the Declaration state that BAC operates as a servicer? Another way to state the problem is that the Motion for Relief from the Stay and the Declaration seem to reflect imperfectly the transfer of the various interests in the Note and Deed of Trust. Given the posture of the record presented to the Court, and the lack of clarity, the Court denied the Motion for Relief from Stay by Minute Entry Order on October 20, 2010. Rather than clarify the record by filing the appropriate assignment, a further declaration or affidavit, or some other documentation, BAC filed its Motion for Reconsideration. BAC chose to provide no further information to the Court from a factual standpoint.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
The Motion for Reconsideration

As outlined above, part of the problem with the issues to be decided is the context in which the matters have been presented to the Court. When a motion for relief from stay is filed, the Bankruptcy Code, the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Local Rules of this Court are immediately applicable or implicated.

11 U.S.C. §362 (d) states that the bankruptcy court may, for instance, terminate, modify, or condition the automatic stay (1) “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest,” or (2) “with respect to a stay of an act against
property under subsection (a) of this section if-(A) the debtor does not have an equity interest in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.”19 Section 362(g) states that the party requesting relief from the automatic stay has the burden of proof of whether the debtor has any equity in the property at issue.20 The Local Rules of the Arizona Bankruptcy Court further require that a party filing a motion for relief from the automatic stay be able to provide some support for the relief requested. For instance, if the party is stating that it is a secured creditor requesting relief from the automatic stay to pursue a trustee’s sale under Arizona law, the secured creditor should be able to provide support in the motion that it has a perfected security interest in property of the estate in which the debtor or debtor in possession also has an interest.21

In reviewing the sufficiency of any motion for relief from the automatic stay, the court must also consider under what provision of the Bankruptcy Code the debtor has filed. For instance, if the individual debtor has filed a chapter 7 petition, a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed that must collect and liquidate property of the estate, that has not been claimed exempt by the debtor, for distribution to the debtor’s creditors, according to the priorities set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.22 The trustee in bankruptcy may increase the amount of property of the estate available for distribution to creditors by exercising certain avoidance powers enumerated, inter alia, in Bankruptcy Code Sections 544, 547, and 548.23 An individual debtor may acquire the same duties and responsibilities of a trustee in bankruptcy by filing a chapter 11 petition, seeking to reorganize or to file a plan of liquidation.24 Because the debtor in possession is vested with the same powers of the trustee, the debtor in possession may pursue avoidance actions as well.25 In this case, the individual Debtors filed a chapter 11 petition seeking to reorganize, and no bankruptcy trustee has yet been appointed in this case. As a result, the Debtors exercise the rights of a bankruptcy trustee concerning the ability to avoid certain transfers or transactions.

Because of the avoidance powers of the bankruptcy trustee or the debtor in possession, this Court requires that if a party seeking relief from the automatic stay asserts a perfected security interest in any property of the estate, that moving party must be able to present at least a prima faciecase that it has such a perfected security interest under applicable law.26 The fact that the transaction is not avoidable between the parties to the underlying loan transaction is not dispositive of whether the transaction may be avoided by third parties that are, for instance, bona fidepurchasers.27

Turning to the standards of a motion for reconsideration, the moving party must show a manifest error of fact, a manifest error of law, or newly discovered evidence. School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County, OR v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Gurr, 194 B.R. 474 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996). A motion for reconsideration is not specifically contemplated by the Federal Rules. To the extent it is considered by the Court, it is under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend an order or judgment. In re Curry and Sorensen, Inc., 57 B.R. 824, 827 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986). Because BAC presented no new evidence to this Court and has not outlined any manifest error of fact, the sole basis for the BAC Motion for Reconsideration must be a manifest error of law by this Court. BAC has outlined several bases for what it believes is this Court’s manifest error of law.

 

(A) Is the Movant the Real Party in Interest?

A colleague in the Arizona Bankruptcy Court has stated that a party that brings a motion for relief from the automatic stay must first establish a “colorable claim.” “In order to establish [such a claim], a movant…. bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion.” In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 18 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (citing In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009)). In the Weisband decision, the Court states that the moving party may establish standing by showing that it is a “real party in interest.”28 The Weisband Court next states that a holder of a note is a “real party in interest” under FRCP 17 because, under the Arizona Revised Statute (“ARS”) § 47-3301, the note holder has the right to enforce it. Weisband at 18. Relying on a decision from a bankruptcy court in Vermont, the Weisband Court next opines that “[b]ecause there is no federal commercial law which defines who is a note holder, the court must look to Arizona law to determine whether [movant] is [such] a holder.” Id. (citing In re Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 73 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009)). Finally, the Weisband Court states that under Arizona law, a holder of a note is defined as, inter alia, “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” Id. (citing ARS § 47-1201(B)(21)(a)).

BAC’s citation to Weisband fails to address this Court’s concerns. In the Motion for Relief, BAC contends that it is the “payee and a holder in due course.” However, the Declaration that it filed appears to reflect that BAC is the servicer for some other party. Obviously there is a difference. A servicer acts pursuant to a separate agreement with the Note Holder and is paid a separate fee to determine what payments have been made, or not made, by a given borrower. However, the servicer would not normally list the loan on its balance sheet as one of its assets. The Note Holder, according to the definition in the Note, is the party that is entitled to receive the payments under the Note, because it has arguably paid some consideration for the transfer of the obligation to it, and has listed the obligation as an asset in its books and records.29 BAC has not provided any additional facts to clarify whether it is the servicer pursuant to an agreement with the Note Holder, or contrary to its Declaration, it actually acquired the loan and has placed the loan on its balance sheet as one of its assets.

From the documentation provided by BAC, it appears that GreenPoint provided the original funding for the loan to the Debtors so that they could acquire the Property. Yet, at the time of the closing, GreenPoint immediately assigned its interest in the Note to BAC. The Declaration submitted by BAC, however, seems to indicate that BAC is only in the business of servicing loans-perhaps for some other entity associated or related to BAC. If BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, is acting as the servicer of a Bank of America entity, for which entity is it acting? Conversely, if GreenPoint transferred the Debtors’ loan from its books and records to some other entity, was it BAC? If BAC alleges in its Motion for Relief from the Stay that it is the Note Holder, is it, in fact, the one legally entitled, because of the purchase of the Debtors’ obligation, to receive the Debtors’ payments?

As a part of its prima faciecase, BAC should have provided the Court with more factual information in support of its position. As a result, this Court may deny the Motion for Reconsideration, and the underlying Motion for Relief from the Stay, on the basis that BAC has failed to provide sufficient documentation to this Court so that the Court may ensure that BAC is the proper Note Holder, or servicer if appropriate, to pursue such a Motion for Relief from the Stay.

Thus, the focus of the BAC’s Motion for Reconsideration does not consider all of the factual and legal issues that it should. It does not address whether BAC, in this matter, has presented an appropriate factual and legal basis to proceed on this loan concerning the Debtors and their Property. BAC could have easily supplemented the record to provide the appropriate documentation to proceed, but chose not to do so.

(B) Has BAC Set Forth a Prima Facie Case That It Has
A Perfected Security Interest in the Property Given the Status
Of the Debtors As Debtors In Possession?

In its Motion for Reconsideration, BAC relies on ARS § 33-817, which states, “The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security for such contract or contracts.” ARS § 33-817. BAC further points out that the Supreme Court of Arizona has held that a mortgage is a “mere incident to the debt,” and its “transfer or assignment does not transfer or assign the debt or the note,” but “the mortgage automatically goes along with the assignment or transfer” of the note. Hill v. Favour, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (Ariz. 1938) (emphasis added). However, at the hearing on December 15, 2010, the Court expressly stated its concern about the ability of BAC to proceed given that it had not provided any information as to a recorded assignment of the Deed of Trust. The Court asked counsel how her analysis was appropriate given (1) the status of the Debtors as Debtors in Possession who had objected to the relief requested, and (2) ARS § 33-818 which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[A]ssignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed,… shall from the time of being recorded impart notice of the content to all persons, including subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value.
As outlined above, the Debtors, as Debtors in Possession, acquire the status of a bona fide purchaser and are able to set aside any real estate transaction, concerning their Property, for which the creditor has not taken appropriate steps under Arizona law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (West 2010). Arizona law requires that if a secured creditor with a lien on the Debtors’ Property wishes to ensure that said interest is not subject to the claims of a bona fide purchaser, that said secured creditor record an assignment of its interest with the Recorder in the County where the Debtors’ Property is located. If notice of the assignment has not been provided, through recordation, the secured creditor may have its interest avoided by a bona fide purchaser. See Rodney v. Arizona Bank, 836 P.2d 434, 172 Ariz. 221 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1992) (Unless and until the transferee of the beneficial interest in the deed of trust records an assignment of the deed of trust, the security interest in the real property remains unperfected.)

At the time of the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, BAC’s counsel agreed that although vis-a-vis the original parties to the transaction, no assignment of the Deed of Trust need be produced or recorded, because of the Debtors’ filing of a bankruptcy petition, ARS § 33-818 required that an assignment be prepared and properly recorded given the new status of the Debtors as Debtors in Possession.30 It is unclear why BAC has not simply supplemented the record to provide the assignment of the Deed of Trust.

The request that an assignment be recorded is not a burdensome requirement. MERS, through its registration system, keeps track of the transfers of the beneficial interests, under a deed of trust, from member to member in the system. When there is some type of default under the loan transaction, MERS generally prepares an assignment of the beneficial interest in the deed of trust for signature and then records the assignment with the appropriate state authority, which in Arizona would be the Recorder in the County where the real property that is subject to the secured creditor’s lien is located. This recordation of the assignment provides the requisite notice to third parties, as required under Arizona law.

Although BAC relies on the decision of Rodney v. Arizona Bank, 836 P.2d 434, 172 Ariz. 221 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1992), the decision actually supports this Court’s understanding of the importance of the recordation of the assignment of the deed of trust. In Rodney, the borrowers were the Vasquezes, who received purchase money financing from the initial lender, Hal Clonts (“Clonts”), to purchase real property (“Property”) located in Mohave County. The Vasquezes executed a promissory note and deed of trust in favor of Clonts to provide him with a lien on their Property to secure repayment of the note. It is important to keep in mind that the Vasquezes remained the borrowers throughout a series of subsequent transactions that only affected the lender or the party that had a security interest in the promissory note and deed of trust.

Clonts transferred his interest to the Fidlers through an assignment of the beneficial interest in the promissory note and deed of trust. Id. at 435. However, on April 11, 1985, the Fidlers entered into a separate loan transaction in which they borrowed money from a third party, State Bank, later called Security Pacific Bank Arizona (“Security Pacific”). The Fidlers provided security to Security Pacific for their loan transaction by pledging “all monies” received by the Fidlers in “Escrow # 85-02-9290.” Id. Security Pacific immediately notified the title company, for the subject escrow, as to Security Pacific’s interest in the escrow funds. In September 1986, the Fidlers again transferred their beneficial interest in the promissory note and deed of trust to Theron Rodney (“Rodney”). The Fidlers received $20,000 from Rodney for the transfer of their interest. The Fidlers executed an assignment of the beneficial interest under the deed of trust. Rodney recorded his interest in the deed of trust with the Mohave County Recorder’s Officer where the Property was located. Not surprisingly, Security Pacific and Rodney disagreed as to the priority of their respective security interests in the loan proceeds. Security Pacific argued that the interest in the loan proceeds could only be perfected pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code. Conversely, Rodney argued that the real property provisions of Arizona law were applicable. Id. at 436.

The sole issue to be addressed by the Appellate Court was whether Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code (as adopted in Arizona) applied to the creation and perfection of a security interest in a promissory note when the note itself was secured by a deed of trust in real property. Id. Before considering the analysis by the Court, let’s diagram the various loan transactions.

+——————————————————————————————————–+———————————————+
| The Vasquezes |                                                                                                                                                  Clonts |
| —- | |
+——————————————————————————————————–+———————————————+
| initial borrowers purchase money financing |                                                                                     initial lender |
+——————————————————————————————————–+——————————————————————+
| Vasquezes continue to pay on the original note and deed of trust to the title company, as escrow agent | (1) transfer of the interest in the note and deed of trust for consideration to the Fidlers |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | (2) separate loan to the Fidlers–security interest in the note and deed of trust given to Security Pacific-consideration given to Fidlers |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | (3) Fidlers again seek financing–security interest in the note and deed of trust given to Rodney |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | for $20,000. |
+——————————————————————————————————–+——————————————————————–+
| | |
+——————————————————————————————————–+——————————————————————–+

Thus, it is only the parties on one side of the initial loan transaction that are in disagreement as to the priority of their security interests. Noting that Security Pacific only wanted to obtain a perfected security interest in the promissory note proceeds, the Court stated “we find that Security Pacific received a corollary security interest in the real property evidenced by the deed of trust, along with its interest in the note, although the corollary interest remained unperfected.” Id. The Court then stated that Security Pacific need not have a perfected security interest in the real property, because Security Pacific’s interest was only in the note which was a security interest in personal property under ARS § 47-1201(37). Id. at 436-37. The Court concluded that “Arizona case law holds that a mortgage note and the debt evidenced thereby are personal property (citing to Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. at 571, 84 P.2d at 579). Article Nine of the UCC applies to security interests in personal property….” Id. at 437. However, Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to obtaining a lien on real property. In considering the somewhat murky area of “realty paper,” the Court relied on Commentators J White and R. Summers, who described “realty paper” as follows:

B mortgages his real estate to L. L gives B’s note and the real estate mortgage to Bank as security for a loan. Article Nine does not apply to the transaction between L and B, but does apply to that between L and Bank.

Id.31 Turning to the facts of this case, BAC is arguing that its security interest in the Note and Deed of Trust is perfected as to all others, rather than to just other mortgagees. It has forgotten the other side of the transaction, which is the “mortgagor” in the White and Summers analysis, or someone that may acquire an interest from the mortgagor, such as a bona fide purchaser. To perfect its interest as to the “mortgagor,” which would be the Zittas, or someone who may acquire an interest in the Property from the Zittas, BAC needed to record its assignment in the Deed of Trust, as required under real property law, such as ARS § 33-818 (West 2010). BAC has not shown this Court that any such assignment exists, so its Motion for Reconsideration must be denied as a matter of law.

BAC also relies on In re Smith, 366 B.R. 149 (Bank. D. Colo. 2007), which is inapposite. The debtor had been in a chapter 13 proceeding, but had converted his case to one under chapter 7. Id. at 150. Bank of New York, N.A. (“Bank of New York”) subsequently requested relief from the automatic stay as to the real property owned by the debtor. The debtor did not oppose the motion, and a foreclosure sale, pursuant to Colorado law, subsequently occurred. Bank of New York then recorded a deed upon sale as to the debtor’s real property. Without seeking any stay of the foreclosure proceedings, the debtor filed an adversary proceeding with the bankruptcy court. The debtor asserted that the Bank of New York was not the real party in interest, and therefore, it was unable to proceed with a foreclosure of his real property. The bankruptcy court reviewed the evidence presented and determined that Bank of New York was the holder of the promissory note at the time it commenced its foreclosure sale. The court stated that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., which had originally provided the financing to the debtor, had endorsed the promissory note in blank. Under Colorado law, such a blank endorsement allowed the promissory note to become “payable to bearer.” However, Bank of New York did submit a Certification of Owner and Holder of the Evidence Debt, which allowed the Colorado court to conclude that Bank of New York was the “holder of the original evidence of debt.” The court then reviewed the deed of trust, determining that it was recorded at approximately the same time as the loan closing between the debtor and Countrywide Home Loan, Inc. The bankruptcy court then concluded that the promissory note was assigned to the Bank of New York. As such, once the promissory note was assigned to the Bank of New York, MERS then functioned as the nominee for the Bank of New York. Id. at 151. Presumably, as a result of MERS nominee status, the bankruptcy court concluded, sub silentio, that no additional action needed to be taken by Bank of New York vis-a-vis the debtor.

This Court questions the analysis by the Smith court.32 Although the Smith court relies on a 2002 decision from the Colorado Supreme Court, the court does not analyze the concept of “realty paper” or discuss White and Summers. As noted by this Court supra, the lender in the original loan transaction or a party that may subsequently obtain a security interest in the promissory note, as a result of a separate loan transaction, may be protected, but this Court is viewing the transaction from a different viewpoint: that of the Debtors in Possession that acquire the status of bona fide purchasers. There is no discussion, in Smith, as to how Colorado law would treat such third parties. Moreover, it is unclear whether Colorado has a similar provision as Arizona’s ARS § 33-818 that focuses on the separate requirements of a creditor that may have a beneficial interest under a deed of trust assigned to it.

In considering the ability of the debtor to pursue a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 544, the Colorado court concludes that the debtor does not have the standing of the bankruptcy trustee. Smith at 152. Such an analysis is correct, since the debtor pursued his claim against the Bank of New York only after he had converted his case to one under chapter 7. The chapter 7 trustee also failed to join with the debtor in the adversary proceeding or to pursue the claim separately.33 However, as to the facts before this Court, the Debtors, as Debtor in Possession, in this chapter 11 proceeding do have the standing to pursue claims under Section 544.34 Thus, this Court must reject the analysis in the Smith case.

This Court concludes that given the summary nature of motions for relief from the automatic stay, 35 the general requirements in the case law and the Local Rules of this Court36 that a creditor alleging a security interest in certain property of the debtor and/or the bankruptcy estate at least set forth a prima facie case as to its perfected security interest, 37 BAC should have provided an assignment of the Deed of Trust. It failed to do so; however, the Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay was denied without prejudice. BAC still has the opportunity to refile the Motion with the appropriate documents as exhibits thereto.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP’s Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s Denial of the Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay. The Court

SARAH SHARER CURLEY, Bankruptcy Judge

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 24 Comments »

YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO CASH PAYMENT FOR WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE — Coming to a Billboard Near YOU

Posted on September 27, 2010 by Neil Garfield

SERVICES YOU NEED

EDITOR’S NOTE: Well it has finally happened. Three years ago I couldn’t get a single lawyer anywhere to consider this line of work. I predicted that this area of expertise in their practice would dwarf anything they were currently doing including personal injury and malpractice. I even tried to guarantee fees to lawyers and they wouldn’t take it. Now there are hundreds, if not thousands of lawyers who are either practicing in this field or are about to take the plunge. The early adopters who attended my workshops and read my materials, workbooks and bought the DVD’s are making some serious money and have positioned themselves perfectly ahead of the crowd.

Congratulations, everyone, it was the readers who made this happen. Without your support I would not have been able to reach the many thousands of homeowners and lawyers and government officials whoa re now turning the corner in their understanding of this mess and their willingness to do something about it.

The article below from Streitfeld sounds like it was written by me. No attribution though. No matter. The message is out. The foreclosures were and are wrongful, illegal, immoral and the opposite of any notion we have of justice. They were dressed up to look right and they got way with it for years because so many homeowners simply gave up convinced they had only to blame themselves for getting into a raw deal. Those homeowners who gave up were wrong and now they will find themselves approached by lawyers who will promise them return of the house they lost or damages for the wrongful foreclosure. When you left, you thought your loan had not been paid and that the notice you received was legitimate. You were wrong on both counts. The loan had been paid, there were other people who had signed up for liability along with you to justify the price on steroids that was sold to your lender (investor).

For those who are just catching up, here it is in a nutshell: Borrower signs a note to ABC Corp., which says it is the lender but isn’t. So you start right away with the wrong party named on the note and mortgage (deed of trust) PLUS the use of a meaningless nominee on the mortgage (deed of trust) which completely invalidates the documents and clouds the title. Meanwhile the lender gets a mortgage bond NOT SIGNED BY THE BORROWER. The bond says that this new “entity” (which usually they never bothered to actually form) will pay them from “receivables.” The receivables include but ARE NOT LIMITED TO the payments from the borrower who accepted funding of a loan. These other parties are there to justify the fact that the loan was sold at a huge premium to the lender without disclosure to either the borrower or the lender. (The tier 2 Yield Spread Premium that raises some really juicy causes of action under TILA, RESPA and the 10b-5 actions, including treble damages, attorney fees and restitution).

And and by the way for the more sophisticated lawyers, now would be the time to sharpen up your defense skills and your knowledge of administrative laws. Hundreds of thousands of disciplinary actions are going to filed against the professionally licensed people who attended the borrower’s “closing” and who attended the closing with the “lender.” With their livelihood at stake, their current arrogance will morph into abject fear. Here is your line when you quote them fees: “Remember that rainy day you were saving up for? Well, it’s raining!” Many lawyers and homeowners are going to realize that they have easy pickings when they bring administrative grievances in quasi criminal proceedings (don’t threaten it, that’s a crime, just do it) which results in restitution funded by the professional liability insurer. careful about the way you word the grievance. Don’t go overboard or else the insurance carrier will deny coverage based upon the allegation of an intentional act. You want to allege gross negligence.

EVERYBODY in the securitization structure gets paid premium money to keep their mouth shut and money changes hands faster than one of those street guys who moves shells or cards around on a table. Yes everyone gets paid — except the borrower who never got the benefit of his the bargain he signed up for — a home worth whatever they said it was worth at closing. It wasn’t worth that and it will never be worth that and everyone except the borrower knew it with the possible exception of some lenders who didn’t care because the other people who the borrower knew nothing about, had “guaranteed” the value of the lender’s investment and minimized the risk to the level of “cash equivalent” AAA-rated.

The securitization “partners” did not dot their “i’s” nor cross their “t’s.” And that is what the article below is about. But they failed to do that for a reason. They didn’t care about the documents because they never had any intention of using them anyway. It was all a scam cleverly disguised as a legitimate part of the home mortgage industry. It was instead a Ponzi scheme without any of the attributes of real appraisals, real underwriting reviews and committees and decisions. They bought the signature of the borrowers by promising the moon and they sold the apparent existence of signature (which in many cases) did not even exist) to Lenders by promising the stars.

And now, like it wasn’t news three years ago when we first brought it up, suddenly mainstream media is picking up the possibility that  the foreclosures were all fraudulent also. The pretender lenders were intentionally and knowingly misrepresenting themselves as lenders in order to grab property that didn’t belong to them and to which they had no rights — to the detriment of both the borrowers and the lenders. And some judges, government officials and even lawyers appear to be surprised by that, are you?

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GMAC’s Errors Leave Foreclosures in Question

By DAVID STREITFELD

The recent admission by a major mortgage lender that it had filed dubious foreclosure documents is likely to fuel a furor against hasty foreclosures, which have prompted complaints nationwide since housing prices collapsed.

Lawyers for distressed homeowners and law enforcement officials in several states on Friday seized on revelations by GMAC Mortgage, the country’s fourth-largest home loan lender, that it had violated legal rules in its rush to file many foreclosures as quickly as possible.

Attorneys general in Iowa and North Carolina said they were beginning separate investigations of the lender, and the attorney general in California directed the company to suspend all foreclosures in that state until it “proves that it’s following the letter of the law.”

The federal government, which became the majority owner of GMAC after supplying $17 billion to prevent the lender’s failure, said Friday that it had told the company to clean up its act.

Florida lawyers representing borrowers in default said they would start filing motions as early as next week to have hundreds of foreclosure actions dismissed.

While GMAC is the first big lender to publicly acknowledge that its practices might have been improper, defense lawyers and consumer advocates have long argued that numerous lenders have used inaccurate or incomplete documents to remove delinquent owners from their houses.

The issue has broad consequences for the millions of buyers of foreclosed homes, some of whom might not have clear title to their bargain property. And it may offer unforeseen opportunities for those who were evicted.

“You know those billboards that lawyers put up seeking divorcing or bankrupt clients?” asked Greg Clark, a Florida real estate lawyer. “It’s only a matter of time until they start putting up signs that say, ‘You might be entitled to cash payment for wrongful foreclosure.’ ”

The furor has already begun in Florida, which is one of the 23 states where foreclosures must be approved by courts. Nearly half a million foreclosures are in the Florida courts, overwhelming the system.

J. Thomas McGrady, chief judge in the foreclosure hotbed of St. Petersburg, said the problems went far beyond GMAC. Four major law firms doing foreclosures for lenders are under investigation by the Florida attorney general.

“Some of what the lenders are submitting in court is incompetent, some is just sloppy,” said Judge McGrady of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Clearwater, Fla. “And somewhere in there could be a fraudulent element.”

In many cases, the defaulting homeowners do not hire lawyers, making problems generated by the lenders hard to detect.

“Documents are submitted, and there’s no one to really contest whether it is accurate or not,” the judge said. “We have an affidavit that says it is, so we rely on that. But then later we may find out that someone lost their home when they shouldn’t have. We don’t like that.”

GMAC, which is based in Detroit and is now a subsidiary of Ally Financial, first put the spotlight on its procedures when it told real estate agents and brokers last week that it was immediately and indefinitely stopping all evictions and sales of foreclosed property in the states — generally on the East Coast and in the Midwest — where foreclosures must be approved by courts.

That was a highly unusual move. So was the lender’s simultaneous withdrawal of important affidavits in pending cases. The affidavits were sworn statements by GMAC officials that they had personal knowledge of the foreclosure documents.

The company played down its actions, saying the defects in its foreclosure filings were “technical.” It has declined to say how many cases might be affected.

A GMAC spokeswoman also declined to say Friday whether the company would stop foreclosures in California as the attorney general, Jerry Brown, demanded. Foreclosures in California are not judicial.

GMAC’s vague explanations have been little comfort to some states.

“We cannot allow companies to systematically flout the rules of civil procedure,” said one of Iowa’s assistant attorneys general, Patrick Madigan. “They’re either going to have to hire more people or the foreclosure process is going to have to slow down.”

GMAC began as the auto financing arm of General Motors. During the housing boom, it made a heavy bet on subprime borrowers, giving loans to many people who could not afford a house.

“We have discussed the current situation with GMAC and expect them to take prompt action to correct any errors,” said Mark Paustenbach, a spokesman for the Treasury Department.

GMAC appears to have been forced to reveal its problems in the wake of several depositions given by Jeffrey Stephan, the team leader of the document execution unit in the lender’s Fort Washington, Pa., offices.

Mr. Stephan, 41, said in one deposition that he signed as many as 10,000 affidavits and other foreclosure documents a month; in another he said it was 6,000 to 8,000.

The affidavits state that Mr. Stephan, in his capacity as limited signing officer for GMAC, had examined “all books, records and documents” involved in the foreclosure and that he had “personal knowledge” of the relevant facts.

In the depositions, Mr. Stephan said he did not do this.

In a June deposition, a lawyer representing a foreclosed household put it directly: “So other than the due date and the balances due, is it correct that you do not know whether any other part of the affidavit that you sign is true?”

“That could be correct,” Mr. Stephan replied.

Mr. Stephan also said in depositions that his signature had not been notarized when he wrote it, but only later, or even the next day.

GMAC said Mr. Stephan was not available for an interview. The lender said its “failures” did not “reflect any disrespect for our courts or the judicial processes.”

Margery Golant, a Boca Raton, Fla., foreclosure defense lawyer, said GMAC “has cracked open the door.”

“Judges used to look at us strangely when we tried to tell them all these major financial institutions are lying,” said Ms. Golant, a former associate general counsel for the lender Ocwen Financial.

Her assistants were reviewing all of the law firm’s cases Friday to see whether GMAC had been involved. “Lawyers all over Florida and I’m sure all over the country are drafting pleadings,” she said. “We’ll file motions for sanctions and motions to dismiss the case for fraud on the court.”

For homeowners in foreclosure, the admissions by GMAC are bringing hope for resolution.

One such homeowner is John Turner, a commercial airline pilot based near Detroit. Three years ago he bought a Florida condo, thinking he would move down there with a girlfriend. The relationship fizzled, his finances dwindled, and the place went into foreclosure.

GMAC called several times a week, seeking its $195,000. Mr. Turner says he tried to meet the lender halfway but failed. Last week it put his case in limbo by withdrawing the affidavit.

“We should be able to come to an agreement that’s beneficial to both of us,” Mr. Turner said. “I feel like I’m due something.”

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , | 62 Comments »

WEISBAND Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH. BKR Tucson Judge HOLLOWELL Denies MLS for Lack of Standing

Posted on May 6, 2010 by Neil Garfield

GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved.

IN RE WEISBAND

In re: BARRY WEISBAND, Chapter 13, Debtor.

Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Arizona.

March 29, 2010.

Barry Weisband, Tucson, AZ, Ronald Ryan, Ronald Ryan, P.C., Tucson, AZ, Attorney for Debtor.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The debtor, Barry Weisband (“Debtor”), has challenged the standing of creditor, GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor’s home loan, lacks standing to seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this decision.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Creation of Debtor’s Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers

On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GreenPoint”) an adjustable rate promissory note in the principal sum of $540,000 (“Note”) secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on real property located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 85718 (“Property”).

On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC (“Endorsement”). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13, 2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary of the DOT “solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns.”

Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10, 2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement (“FISA”) (Exhibit D)[ 1 ] with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Lehman”), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential, fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman. According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the FISA.

On November 1, 2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement (“MLSAA”) with Structured Asset Securities Corporation (“SASC”) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the transferred mortgages — GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust (“Trust”). The MLSAA also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust.

Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F) with Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”) as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1, 2006, GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement (“SSA”) (Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust. GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT.

Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1, 2006, the Note and DOT had been transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10, 2009, pp. 44, 47, 75.)

B. Bankruptcy Events

As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note. Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19, 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim (“POC”), which attached the Note and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC’s proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its interest in the DOT to GMAC (“MERS Assignment”). The MERS Assignment was recorded on July 16, 2009.

GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay (“Motion”) on May 29, 2009, on the grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate protection payments to protect GMAC’s alleged interest in the Property. GMAC attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion.

The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC’s standing to seek relief from stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009, to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT. (Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the “subject loan” to Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the “subject loan” to SASC under the MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the “subject loan,” and, that GMAC was the servicer of the “subject loan” under the SSA. According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had standing to bring the Motion.

On November 10, 2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing and admitted into evidence a copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the FISA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA, where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the words “Intentionally Omitted” on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word “None.” (Exhibit F, pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled “Mortgage Loan Schedule,” is blank. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee. The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000.

III. ISSUE

Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion?

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with “protection against hungry creditors” and to assure creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not “racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor’s assets.” In re Tippett,Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 2737-4 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits. 542 F.3d 684, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a “party in interest,” to grant relief from the stay, “such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection.” Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009); Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are limited in scope — the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, “[s]tay relief hearings do not involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim.” In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).

Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, a movant for relief from stay bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both “constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns whether the plaintiff’s personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to have a “case or controversy” to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).

Additionally, the “prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'” Pershing Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in stay relief motions by Rule 9014, “generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine.” In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398.

B. GMAC’s Standing

GMAC advances three different arguments in support of its claim to be a “party in interest” with standing to seek relief from stay. First, GMAC asserts it has standing because the Note was endorsed to GMAC and GMAC has physical possession of the Note. Second, GMAC asserts that by virtue of the MERS Assignment, it is a beneficiary of the DOT and entitled to enforce and foreclose the DOT under Arizona law. Third, GMAC asserts it has standing because it is the servicer of the Note. The court addresses each of GMAC’s claims in turn.

1. GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Holder Of The Note

If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the Debtor’s failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement. GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under ARIZ. REV. STAT. (“A.R.S.’) § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.[ 2 ] However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note.

Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” A.R.S. § 47-1201(B)(21)(a).[ 3 ] GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it must be on “a paper affixed to the instrument.” A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was not affixed to the Note.[ 4 ]

In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the defendant’s possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC’s fixation requirement. Id. at 168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. § 47-3204]: “An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Id. at 165. Since the endorsement page, indicating that the defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67. Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly affixed special endorsement.

While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention that the note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261.

In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it, such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be affixed to the instrument to be valid.

GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.[ 5 ] As a result, because GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note.

2. The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With Standing

GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS.[ 6 ] In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the “nominee” of GreenPoint, holding only “legal title” to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS “collect[s] no money from [d]ebtors under the [n]ote, nor will it realize the value of the [p]roperty through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [t]rust in the event the [n]ote is not paid.” 2009 WL 631355 at *4.

Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS’ assignee of the DOT, “stands in the shoes” of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, Trust No. 3496, 187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v. Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414, 417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS’ assignee, it cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing either.[ 7 ]

3. GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note

(a) Servicer’s Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages

Securitization of residential mortgages is “the process of aggregating a large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages.” Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to the funding entity. “This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool.” Id. at 538.

The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity, which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”,) whose sole role is to hold the pool of mortgages. Id. at 539. “The transfer to the special purpose trust must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash.” Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at 539.

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It “does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of trust are held by the SPV.” Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able to collect its servicing fees.[ 8 ]In re O’Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009) . In this case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that GMAC is the servicer of the Note.

(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman And Became Part Of The Trust

When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint, allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term “mortgage loans” is not defined in the FISA and GMAC’s documents regarding the securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be “true sales,” they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term, GMAC has failed “to connect the dots” to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust.

C. Debtor’s Other Arguments

1. Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a “Securitized” Mortgage

The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the funds for a borrower’s loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator, does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g., DCM Ltd. P’ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (2009).

Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280, cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor’s argument that the Note is unenforceable because the funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law.

2. Proof Of A Note’s Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay Relief

A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a colorable claim — not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every movant for relief from stay has to provide a complete chain of a note’s assignment to obtain relief.

Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale. Blau v. Am.’s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009); Mansour v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009); Diessner v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009). It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer instrument. See In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore, this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of a note’s entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so.

3. The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011

The Debtor argues that GMAC “violated Rule 7011” by presenting insufficient and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). As noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often conflicting, decisions on the issues of “real party in interest” and constitutional standing, and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions.

VI. CONCLUSION

GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing or is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay.

Accordingly, its motion is DENIED without prejudice.

Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 23 Comments »

Assignments to Non MERS Members Further Cloud Title

Posted on March 15, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Your case should first be summarized by your securitization expert who relies upon the expert opinions of others as to underwriting, appraisal, mortgage brokers etc. Then those other experts come in. After that, the forensic analyst and homeowner come in to fill in the facts upon which the experts relied.

But you build your case in reverse of the order of presentation, starting with the homeowner, then the forensic analyst, then the sub-experts, and finally the securitization expert.

From: Tony Brown

Editor’s Note: I have not bothered to edit the following comment because for those of you who are attending the forensic workshop I wanted you to see how information is often presented. Here is clear evidence of (a) why a forensic analyst is essential and (b) why you need a method of presentation that gives the Judge a clear picture of the true nature of a securitized transaction.

The other lesson to be gleaned is that forensic analysts should stick to facts and expert witnesses should stick to opinions. Lawyers should stick to argument. Any overlap will result in a brutal cross examination that will, quite rightfully, draw blood.

I’m planning a workshop whose working name is Motion Practice and Discovery for late in May. You see there is method to our madness here notwithstanding our critics.

Your case should first be summarized by your securitization expert who relies upon the expert opinions of others as to underwriting, appraisal, mortgage brokers etc. Then those other experts come in. After that, the forensic analyst and homeowner come in to fill in the facts upon which the experts relied.

But you build your case in reverse of the order of presentation, starting with the homeowner, then the forensic analyst, then the sub-experts, and finally the securitization expert.

Mers was named nominee on the mortgage and filed at the Register Of Deeds in Greenville SC, supposedly according to a lost note affidavit the original lender RBMG sold the note and according to MERS servicer ID the loan was transferred off of the MERS system and MIN# deactivated because of a sale to a non-mers member in 2002. NO ASSIGNMENT WAS RECORDED.Now the new owner EMC sold the loan to Bear Stearns which deposited into the Asset Backed Securities which did an assignment/sell to JP MORGAN CHASE as trustee. Now there has been a foreclosure started on the loan in March 2009 by The Bank OF New York Mellon as successor trustee for JP MORGAN CHASE who claims to be the real party in interest and hold the note. By way Of an assignment which was recorded at the ROD after the LIS-PENDENS and after the filing of complaint.Here is more fraud because the assignment was from MERS on behalf of the original lender RBMG which is defunct and has been since 2005 to the THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON. MERS has no authority to do an assignment because the loan was transferred from them in 2002 and Mers was Longer the mortgagee as nominee of record.Now are you with me( no chain of title) the BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON produced in discovery to me an allonge RBMG to EMC along with the lost note affidavit. EMC showed an allonge to JP MORGAN CHASE which skipped BEAR STEARNS. BEAR STEARNS was the depositor into the securities. First let start with the allonges: according to the UCC an allonge is only used when there is NO ROOM ON THE ORIGINAL NOTE FOR ENDORSEMENT and must be firmly attached as to become a part of the note. AN ALLONGE cannot be used to transfer interest and is invalid if there is room on the note for endorsements and is invalid it not attached. A lost note and two allonges that were not signed and not dated and even skipped BEAR STEARNS that deposited it into the securities is the purported chain of title , now let’s look at the prospectus:Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Inc · 424B5 · Bear Stearns Asset Backed Certificates Series 2003-2 · On 6/30/03 Document 1 of 1 · 424B5 · Prospectus . Assignment of the Mortgage Loans; Repurchase At the time of issuance of the certificates, the depositor will cause the mortgage loans, together with all principal and interest due with respect to such mortgage loans after the cut-off date to be sold to the trust. The mortgage loans in each of the mortgage loan groups will be identified in a schedule appearing as an exhibit to the pooling and servicing agreement with each mortgage loan group separately identified. Such schedule will include information as to the principal balance of each mortgage loan as of the cut-off date, as well as information including, among other things, the mortgage rate,the borrower’s monthly payment and the maturity date of each mortgage note. In addition, the depositor will deposit with Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, National Association, as custodian and agent for the trustee, the following documents with respect to each mortgage loan: (a) except with respect to a MOM loan, the original mortgage note, endorsed without recourse in the following form: “Pay to the order of JPMorgan Chase Bank, as S-40——————————————————————————– trustee for certificate-holders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2 without recourse,” with all intervening endorsements, to the extent available, showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the seller or, if the original mortgage note is unavailable to the depositor, a photocopy thereof, if available, together with a lost note affidavit; (b) the original recorded mortgage or a photocopy thereof, and if the related mortgage loan is a MOM loan, noting the applicable mortgage identification number for that mortgage loan; (c) except with respect to a mortgage loan that is registered on the MERS(R) System, a duly executed assignment of the mortgage to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, as trustee for certificate-holders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2, without recourse;” in recordable form, as described in the pooling and servicing agreement; (d) originals or duplicates of all interim recorded assignments of such mortgage, if any and if available to the depositor; (e) the original or duplicate original lender’s title policy or, in the event such original title policy has not been received from the insurer, such original or duplicate original lender’s title policy shall be delivered within one year of the closing date or, in the event such original lender’s title policy is unavailable, a photocopy of such title policy or, in lieu thereof, a current lien search on the related property; and (f) the original or a copy of all available assumption, modification or substitution agreements, if any. In general, assignments of the mortgage loans provided to the custodian on behalf of the trustee will not be recorded in the appropriate public office for real property records, based upon an opinion of counsel to the effect that such recording is not required to protect the trustee’s interests in the mortgage loan against the claim of any subsequent transferee or any successor to or creditor of the depositor or the seller, or as to which the rating agencies advise that the omission to record therein will not affect their ratings of the offered certificates. In connection with the assignment of any mortgage loan that is registered on the MERS(R) System, the depositor will cause the MERS(R) System to indicate that those mortgage loans have been assigned by EMC to the depositor and by the depositor to the trustee by including (or deleting, in the case of repurchased mortgage loans) in the computer files (a) the code in the field which identifies the trustee and (b) the code in the field “Pool Field” which identifies the series of certificates issued. Neither the depositor nor the master servicer will alter these codes (except in the case of a repurchased mortgage loan). A “MOM loan” is any mortgage loan as to which, at origination, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. acts as mortgagee, solely as nominee for the originator of that mortgage loan and its successors and assigns. S-41——————————————————————————– The custodian on behalf of the trustee will perform a limited review of the mortgage loan documents on or prior to the closing date or in the case of any document permitted to be delivered after the closing date, promptly after the custodian’s receipt of such documents and will hold such documents in trust for the benefit of the holders of the certificates. In addition, the seller will make representations and warranties in the pooling and servicing agreement as of the cut-off date in respect of the mortgage loans. The depositor will file the pooling and servicing agreement containing such representations and warranties with the Securities and Exchange Commission in a report on Form 8-K following the closing date. After the closing date, if any document is found to be missing or defective in any material respect, or if a representation or warranty with respect to any mortgage loan is breached and such breach materially and adversely affects the interests of the holders of the certificates in such mortgage loan, the custodian, on behalf of the trustee, is required to notify the seller in writing. If the seller cannot or does not cure such omission,defect or breach within 90 days of its receipt of notice from the custodian, the seller is required to repurchase the related mortgage loan from the trust fund at a price equal to 100% of the stated principal balance thereof as of the date of repurchase plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon at the mortgage rate to the first day of the month following the month of repurchase. In addition, if the obligation to repurchase the related mortgage loan results from a breach of the seller’s representations regarding predatory lending, the seller will be obligated to pay any resulting costs and damages incurred by the trust. Rather than repurchase the mortgage loan as provided above, the seller may remove such mortgage loan from the trust fund and substitute in its place another mortgage loan of like characteristics; however, such substitution is only permitted within two years after the closing date. With respect to any repurchase or substitution of a mortgage loan that is not in default or as to which a default is not imminent, the trustee must have received a satisfactory opinion of counsel that such repurchase or substitution will not cause the trust fund to lose the status of its REMIC.

I’m not a MOM loan the loan transferred off of MERS, Mers no longer tracked the assignments and let’s not forget I HAVE IN MY POSSESSION THE ORIGINAL NOTE STAMPED FULLY PAID AND SATISFIED NEGOTIATED TO ME FROM RBMG. The note is date stamped MARCH 2002 and has been in my possession since 2004 along with a letter from the RBMG stating the loan is fully paid and satisfied address to me which is the declaratory letter.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments »

Evidence: Produce the Witness

Posted on January 11, 2010 by Neil Garfield

In practice, this surfaces as a demand letter, affidavit or assignment or other document used by the pretender lender to establish its case. The path to defeat of the homeowner is paved when they fail to object to the introduction of these documents as anything other than an allegation that raises a question of fact. If you make the objection then you are conforming to the rules of evidence and enforcing your rights under the the U.S. Constitution. By directing the Judge’s attention to the question of fact, you then open the door to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Without that, the allegations of the pretender lender will be taken as true and you are just about done.
The 6th Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights, guarantees people the right to confront witnesses who are offering “evidence” against them. This basic right has often been eroded by bad decisions by Judges who do not understand the rules of evidence — but more often affidavits, reports and other documents are often admitted into evidence because of the failure of the opposing party to object. In a great many cases, “evidence” becomes what is allowed by the failure of the party to understand their right to cross examine a witness in live testimony.
RELEVANCE: Neither the computer generated reports nor the affidavits or correspondence of the pretender lender is evidence unless you fail to object to it for (a) lack of foundation and (b) violation of your right to confront the PERSON who entered the data or information written or the PERSON who prepared the document. The same holds true for your forensic report. You can use it to raise a question of fact, but when it comes down to actually proving your case the report is useless without the live testimony of the forensic analyst and the live testimony of an expert who explains what it means.

In practice, this surfaces as a demand letter, affidavit or assignment or other document used by the pretender lender to establish its case. The path to defeat of the homeowner is paved when they fail to object to the introduction of these documents as anything other than an allegation that raises a question of fact. If you make the objection then you are conforming to the rules of evidence and enforcing your rights under the the U.S. Constitution. By directing the Judge’s attention to the question of fact, you then open the door to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Without that, the allegations of the pretender lender will be taken as true and you are just about done.
There are exceptions to allowing a document in as evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted but they are limited exceptions and contain numerous conditions, mostly in the form of providing a foundation for the introduction of the document, the reason for the absence of the witness and whether the witness is actually available to testify and if not, why not.
The parallel tactic used by pretender lenders is to produce a witness that is a shill for the real thing. This comes down to the conventional definition of competency of a witness to testify. In nearly all cases, the witness the pretender lenders offers has no direct personal knowledge of anything contained in the written document, has been recently hired, is not in the department that would have any knowledge and/or is not the true custodian of records who could identify where the data came from, who provided it, when it was created, and the method by which the document is created. In nearly all cases, these documents are fabricated in “service mills” which might actually be in the office of the attorney for the pretender lender where an employee of the law firm or service mill executes the affidavit or document as “limited signing officer,” “assistant secretary,” etc. MERS documents are virtually always executed by people with no connection with MERS and where MERS has no knowledge of the existence of the person nor that they executed a document in the name of MERS.
A competent witness is ONLY a live person in court who has PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE and personally remembers the transaction(s) about which they are offering testimony. The pretender lenders merely grab someone and tell them what to say in court like “I am an authorized representative of Pretender Lender and I am familiar with the facts regarding this loan.” Your objection should be accompanied by a request to voir dire the witness. Who is your employer. what is your job? where do you work? When were you employed? Did you get information about this transaction from documents you were given or that you found? Did you get your information from another person?
Test them on conflicts of the numbers shown in different documents. Ask them if they have personal knowledge of the two documents. You probably will find that they have no personal knowledge of one of them. Ask them to explain the difference if they manage to qualify the witness, as it lessens their credibility to have conflicting demands from the same party.
Establish that the witness doesn’t really know anything on their own because they had nothing to do with the origination or servicing of the loan and nothing to do with the securitization of the loan.
On the securitization of the loan sometimes they will bring in a person who has some connection with the loan from the servicing company. Establish that the servicing company is a bookkeeper and conduit for payments and not the creditor (the obligation, as evidenced by the note is not owed to the witness or their employer).
After establishing that they otherwise do have personal knowledge not gleaned from someone else (hearsay), you ask them if they have any access to the the records of the other parties involved in the securitization of this loan.
Then you establish that therefore they only have the records of a specific period of time involving transactions between the borrower and a particular servicer and NOT the full record of all transactions that occurred as credit or debits to the obligation created when the loan was originated. So they don’t know whether the obligation was transferred or sold or paid by federal bailout or insurance. They don’t know the identity of the creditor.
As soon as they admit lack of knowledge you object to the witness as not having the required personal knowledge and personal recollection of the entire transaction or even parts of it. You therefore object to the the document or report or affidavit they are offering as lacking proper foudnation and as violating your right to cross examine witnesses offering to testify against you.
While the 6th Amendment is often cited just in criminal cases, it is the basis for the rules of evidence in every state in the union. The purpose is not some legal trick. It is to provide the court with some assurance that the information being offered to the court has the required amount of credibility to be useful in finding the facts of the case.
————————————
New York Times
January 11, 2010
Editorial

The Right to Confront Witnesses

Just last June, the Supreme Court decided that when prosecutors rely on lab reports they must call the experts who prepared them to testify. It was an important ruling, based on a defendant’s right to be confronted with witnesses against him, but the court is about to revisit it. The justices should reaffirm that the Sixth Amendment requires prosecutors to call the lab analysts whose work they rely on.

On Monday, the court hears arguments in Briscoe v. Virginia, in which a man was convicted on drug charges. The prosecutors relied on certificates prepared by forensic analysts to prove that the substance seized was cocaine. They did not call the analysts as witnesses.

The defendant should be able to get his conviction overturned based on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the ruling from last June, which held, by a 5-to-4 vote, that using lab reports without calling the analysts violates the Sixth Amendment.

The amendment’s confrontation clause guarantees defendants the right to see prosecution witnesses in person and to cross-examine them, unless they are truly unavailable. In cases that involve drugs, and many that do not, lab analysts’ work can be a critical part of the prosecution’s case. If the prosecutors want to use the reports, they should be required to call the analysts as witnesses.

Critics of the ruling last June argue that it imposes too great a burden and excessive costs on prosecutors. But in states where analysts have to testify, the burden is easily manageable. Ohio’s 14 forensic scientists appeared in 123 drug cases in 2008, less than one appearance each per month.

It is not clear why the Supreme Court is rushing to reconsider this issue. There are some differences in the rules on witnesses between Virginia and Massachusetts. But it may be that with Justice Sonia Sotomayor having replaced Justice David Souter, the dissenters believe they have a fifth vote to erode or undo last June’s ruling.

As a former assistant district attorney, some court analysts argue, she may be more sympathetic to the burden on prosecutors. As a circuit court judge, Justice Sotomayor did often rule for the government in criminal cases, but making predictions of this sort is perilous. Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the court’s most conservative members, wrote the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz.

If the court changes the rule, it would be a significant setback for civil liberties, and not just in cases involving lab evidence. Prosecutors might use the decision to justify offering all sorts of affidavits, videotaped statements and other evidence from absent witnesses.

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments »

How to Attack MERS and WIN!

Posted on December 8, 2009 by Neil Garfield

 

NOW AVAILABLE OF AMAZON/KINDLE!

EDITOR’S NOTE:MY WIFE WILL KILL ME IF SHE FINDS OUT I’VE BEEN WORKING. SHHHHHHHHH.

This news is irresistible. MERS is all but dead with this single decision (see below). Here are the salient points:

 

  1. MERS is not a beneficiary even if the mortgage deed or deed of trust states otherwise.
  2. MERS lacks standing in bankruptcy to seek relief from stay.
  3. MERS lacks ANY financial interest in
    1. the obligation
    2. the note
    3. the mortgage
    4. any assignment, allonge (often misidentified as an assignment, indorsement etc.
  4. MERS cannot acquire rights to foreclose unless it acquires a REAL financial interest
    1. In a non-judicial state
    2. In a judicial state
  5. MERS’ Appearance on ANY instrument in the securitization chain clouds the homeowner’s title by extension of the reasoning set forth in the case decision reported below.
    1. MERS’ appearance on the deed of trust renders the mortgage deed or deed of trust invalid
    2. MERS’ appearance on the deed of trust renders the mortgage deed or deed of trust VOID
      1. This means there is no security instrument even if the obligation is still outstanding
      2. This means there is no security instrument even if the note is still outstanding
      3. This means the obligation arising from the funding of the “loan” or”security” to or for the benefit of the homeowner is UNSECURED.
      4. This means that there is no legal procedure to take property — real or personal, tangible or intangible — by virtue of using non-judicial procedure or judicial procedure — unless the creditor (i.e. — the one who advanced actual cash for the funding of the obligation) gets a money judgment against the homeowner — a process which by definition requires the creditor to use exclusively judicial procedures in which they must
        1. A Lawsuit properly served
        2. Allegations that if taken as true would entitle the creditor to a money judgment (e.g. “I gave money for the benefit of this homeowner and I never got the money back from anyone”). By the way this debt, even if they get ajudgment, is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
        3. Attachments to the lawsuit of ALL documents that conform to the allegations
        4. Your Defenses, affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
        5. Discovery on both sides:
          1. Interrogatories — how they know, what they know, who they know, where did the person signing the interrogatories get their information — when were they hired, by whom, when did they work for MERS, how many paychecks did they get from MERS etc., what documents do they rely upon, what do THEY call those documents, where are those documents, who has them, what is the title of that person, by whom are they employed, what’s their telephone number address etc.
          2. Investigation: on any (AND ALL) signature follow the lead of one of our lead homeowners — find a mortgage or other document filed in the county recorders office and see if the signature matched the one in which they signed, notarized, or witnessed.
          3. Who prepared their website. Where is the source code? Who has the current source code, the prior source codes and any source codes or emails with meta data that will enable you to determine what parties were involved in the preparation of the website, where MERS, for example, advertises that you can use their name but they will never make a claim against the property or for the money.
          4. Request to produce using their answers to interrogatories
          5. Subpoena Third Parties for records with option to give you copies
          6. Request for admissions: VERY POWERFUL weapon when used properly
          7. Notice of deposition
          8. Request for access to their network servers and workstations for forensic examination
          9. Notice of deposition from the people identified in their answers to interrogatories
          10. Motions to compel
          11. Motions for Contempt
          12. Motions to Strike MERS pleadings
          13. Motions to Strike the pretender lender’s pleadings
          14. Motion to enter default after judge orders pleadings struck
          15. Motion to enter default final judgment
          16. Motion for Summary Judgment on your counterclaims including quiet title, money damages for violations of TILA, RESPA, SEC, etc.
          17. Recording final judgment in recorder’s office

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 24 Comments »

How to Search for the Trust or SPV Claiming Your Loan to Be Part of the SPV Pool

Posted on December 5, 2009 by Neil Garfield

Thank You ABBY!

This post is from Abby. You can catch her email in comments where she originally posted. Just one word of caution: Just because the Trustee or officer of the SPV pool claims to have your loan doesn’t mean they really do. In fact they may only have a spreadsheet with no documentation, no original notes, no copies of the note, no copy of the deed, deed of trust or mortgage deed. They may have something they called an allonge and are treating it as though it was an assignment. The attempted transfer will almost ALWAYS violate the terms of the the SPV mortgage backed bonds and almost certainly violate the terms of the pooling and service agreement which is the document governing the pools created by aggregators before they were “sold” to the SPV. For one thing these documents usually state that the execution of the transfer documentation must be in recordable form and some of them even say they should be recorded. There are many other terms as well that conflict with each other and conflict with the actions of the intermediary participants in the securitization chain.

This is why this research is so important — but you should not be doing it to prove your case. You should be doing it to make them justify their position.

By delving deep in discovery or seeking an order compelling them to answer the QWR or DVL, they will eventually anger the judge by their stonewalling. Judicial anger is behind some of the most favorable decisions on record so far. The Judge gets there by recognizing that he/she has been duped and now the truth is coming out that these foreclosing parties are illegiitimate: they are not creditors, they are not lenders, they are not beneficiaries. They are simply interlopers seeking a windfall leaving the homeowners and the investor who advanced the funds in the dark. Shine the light and they scatter like roaches in the middle of the night.

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WANT TO SEARCH FOR THE TRUST YOUR LOAN WENT INTO??

Some steps below to use the SEC website to locate your loan and the trust it is in (mortgage pool).

This example uses WAMU (Washington Mutual).
Typically, Chase had JPMAC (JP Morgan Acquisition Corp) as the name of trusts.

http://www.sec.gov/

1. click on above link
2. if you have not yet created a free account and it asks you for login info…create the account
3. click on ’search’ in upper right corner
4. in the blue area, type in WAMU in the ‘company name’ field
5. click find companies at bottom
6. this brings up all the WAMU filings
7. search around for one that is the year you got your WAMU refi
8. it will be tedious, but you have to click on each CIK number (in red) over on left, and that will take you to a whole big list of more filings for that particular trust
9. go through and click on any ‘fwp’….read/scan to see if it lists any loan numbers….some will….check to see if your loan number is in it.
10. when you click on an ‘fwp’, which means free writing prospectus, you will see even more files…try to avoid looking at the ones that have .txt ending (the other, usually an html file, will have any infor you may need.

Note: you may want to also search around in years just prior to or just after your loan was done.

Some of these deals were set up even prior to you getting your loan.

Again, another place you may find the trust name is on your recorded docs, in MERS or on a Power of Attorney filed at the county recorder by the Securities trustee in your local county (if required by law).

Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 20 Comments »

FROM FAQ: Allonge, assignments and moving the note and mortgage around

Posted on September 12, 2008 by Neil Garfield

QUESTION:

1.  A friend of mine let me see his papers he received from the Attorney’s office that’s the trustee for a bank that’s foreclosing on him.  One of the papers that sent was titled Allonge.  On the paper it says:

PAY TO THE ORDER OF

NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE COMPANY
_______________________________________
without recourse

Company Name:  ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING LLC

by:  Robert Gregory, Jr.  Vice President

Can you explain what that really means?

2.  Also, the paperwork says the original lender for this loan was Ace Funding Mortgage LLC.  The loan has now been assigned to US Bank National Association, as Trustee for Asset-Back Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NCS, and their mailing address is in care of America’s Servicing Company 3476 Stateview Blvd…..

Can you give me a brief explanation what all this means.

ANSWER: ALLONGE IS A FRENCH TERM (THEY ARE FOND OF THOSE ON WALL STREET), WHICH BASICALLY IS USED BECAUSE THERE IS NO PLACE TO WRITE ON THE FACE OF THE NOTE. THE INDORSEMENT (technically the correct spelling when used in connection with negotiable instruments)

This allonge says that ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING LLC, posing as the lender (FALSELY, AND RECEIVING A FEE FOR LENDING ITS LICENSE TO A NON-LICENSED OR CHARTERED ENTITY) in your transaction, assigned its interest in your note and mortgage to NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE COMPANY, which also was not the lender. You can liken this to getting a check from someone, and then signing it over to someone else. Whether the signatory on the allonge “Robert Gregory” was really the name of anyone who works there I do not know. It often is revealed that this is not the case. In fact it is often revealed that these assignments, Allonges etc. are created for your benefit long after the date of the allonge.

The date on the allonge is either before or after you closed on your loan transaction. If it is before, then they assigned an interest they did not yet have. If it was after it was probably within days of your loan closing. This would show that ACE was a stand-in for the real source of the funding, which you might think from these documents was New Century, but that would probably not be correct.

You say “The loan has now been assigned to US Bank National Association, as Trustee for Asset-Back Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NCS”. Whether it was actually assigned and if so, how, is not known by you and apparently not known at all. There is probably an assignment and assumption agreement around somewhere and a pooling and services agreement around somewhere that will identify the real purpose of these parties. But the “trustee” does not actually own the mortgage and note either sicne the it is the actual owners of mortgage backed securities to whom the mortgages and notes are pledged. Whether any assignment was recorded is also an open question. Usually they are not, which is illegal in most states. This creates an odd anomoly — the mortgage of record is in the name of ACE and the note is travelling at light speed toward parts unknown with each successive transfer, transmittal or assignment. The effect of this is that what was rare under the Uniform Commercial Code has become commonplace. Ordinarily the note follows the mortgage and mortgage follows the note. But for reasons too extensive to report here, the note is split off from the mortgage because the players have other plans for it, including changing its terms, and changing the allocation of payments on the note.

And then you say “and their mailing address is in care of America’s Servicing Company 3476 Stateview Blvd….” This means that US Bank is not really doing anything here except acting as conduit and that it too has no real interest in the note and mortgage because it too was not the source of funding. Generally the law follows the money. So whoever was the actual source of the funding is the one who should be repaid. This is called the holder in due course under ordinary circumstances but these are not ordinary circumstances. The note is being held by any number of people other than the source of funding who has received a certificate and prospectus stating the the entire beneficial interest on the notes and mortgages in the pool are pledged to him, but that the specific notes and mortgages could be different than the original list, probably will be different, and that substitutions will occur. In other words they are selling the certificates before they actually have loan closings based upon signatures that have not yet been executed in loan closings that have not yet occurred.

America’s Servicing Company is obviously serving as the mortgage loan servicer, which means they are appointed by someone, with or without authority to do so, to collect your mortgage payments. They were created as yet another layer for you to penetrate when you attempt to asert or claims and defenses against the people who were present at the original closing.

Filed under: CDO, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Mortgage | Tagged: , , | 9 Comments »

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