Interesting NY Decision on Acceleration: U.S. Bank N.A. v. Gordon, 176 A.D.3d 1006 (2d Dept. 2019)

 “failure to pay this delinquency, plus additional payments and fees that may become due, will result in the acceleration of your Mortgage Note. Once acceleration has occurred, a foreclosure action . . . may be initiated.”

the Notice of Default stated that “[t]o avoid the possibility of acceleration,” Defendants were required to make certain payments by a specific time, or ASC “will proceed to automatically accelerate your loan.” (Emphasis added).


So it seems that in New York a notice of intention to accelerate or any notice that says that the supposed “lender” will accelerate is not the same as an actual acceleration. Actually that makes sense because any other interpretation would defy the intent of the notice of default. the notice of default is for the purpose of giving the borrower notice that unless they bring their payments up to date, the entire loan will become due.

The inherent logical and legal problem with this decision is that it is inconsistent with Florida (see Bartram case) and other states who made decisions as to implied “deceleration” for purposes of evading the effects of the statute of limitation. In fact, this very decision uses such “logic” to arrive at the conclusion that the “lender” is not barred because there was no acceleration. There was only an expression of an intent to do so. therefore any claims arising from acceleration could not arise.

In short the courts are speaking out multiple sides of their mouths.

On the one hand they say that deceleration which has never been claimed or noticed occurs upon the rendition of an order dismissing a defective foreclosure action and that the statute of limitations does not run on the balance where the “lender” has  given “notice” that it is intending to accelerate. The courts have thus “interpreted” a legal fiction into practical existence contrary to the rules of law. The acceleration is rendered void upon losing in court. There are various possible criticisms of such doctrine but the best one I think is “nuts.”

On another hand (or mouth) they are approving of “interpretation” of a notice of default declaring an intent to accelerate as actual being the acceleration for purposes of foreclosure. This is also crazy. If the notice of intention to accelerate was the actual acceleration then the notice would be fatally defective pursuant to paragraph 22 — which requires notice of default and an opportunity to cure it without paying the whole balance. So “intent to accelerate” cannot be the same as declaring acceleration since it would violate both law and contact. yet there it is in most courts where the “intent” is sufficient (according to most judges) to be an actual declaration of acceleration.

And still on another hand (or mouth) they are saying that acceleration does not occur where the lender declares only an intent to accelerate. This again is insane in the context of the foregoing “doctrines” imposed by the courts.

And of course the declaration of intent is contained in a “notice of default” that is a complete legal nullity, to wit: it is declared on behalf of U.S. Bank and a trust neither of which have any interest in the loan.

In short, the courts are willing to bend every rule, break any logical flow, and divert every rule in order to rule in favor of nonentities just like this case. U.S. Bank had no right, title or interest in the loan, debt, note or mortgage and neither suffered any financial loss for nor was it exposed to any default  declared or otherwise. And neither did any entity supposedly or presumably represented by U.S. Bank.

Note that acceleration can be accomplished through filing of a lawsuit where acceleration is declared. But in nonjudicial states, this is not possible if nonjudicial foreclosure is pursued.

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