is it one of them or is it all of them? Mr. Cuomo, are you listening?

According to two EMC analysts, they were encouraged to just make up data like FICO scores if the lenders they purchased loans in bulk from wouldn’t get back to them promptly

Editors’ Note: With Bear Stearns “underwater” it is difficult to come up with scenario where there won’t be criminal charges brought against the bankers and traders who worked there. They are low-hanging fruit, easily made the scape goat and easily subject to inquiry since nobody has any allegiance to them. They have no reason to stay silent except for self-incrimination. If some are offered immunity they will sing like birds in the meadow.

On the other hand Cuomo is aiming for the wrong target and could end up losing his cases unless he aims right. If this report is correct, then Cuomo is looking for the the real criminal culprit in the ratings fraud. What is wrong with that approach is that he is attempting to single out ONE defendant out of a group. They ALL knew, as the article goes on to say, what they were doing with ratings, just as they all knew what was going on with property appraisals just as they all knew that there was no underwriting of the loans.

Underwriting, which was the process of verifying the loan data from soup to nuts was abandoned because the party initiating the loan had no dog in the race. They were using investor dollars to fund the loan. Their income was based upon closing the loan without regard to risk. In fact, as has now been acknowledged after three years of me harping on the subject, the more likely it was that the loan would fail, the higher the profit and fees to everyone.

In the world of securities, underwriting was once the product of verifying the facts and risks of an investment through “due diligence”. Like the home loans there was no due diligence underwriting. The object was to sell something that LOOKED good even though they knew the loss was a sure thing — something the investment bankers needed and wanted.

They wanted the investments to fail because they were selling it (securitizing specific loans, parts of loan pools and entire loan pools) into multiple SPV packages, effectively selling the same loans over and over again.

They were taking the yield spread caused by the lower rate the investors were willing to accept because they perceived the investment as being little or no risk. The loan interest charged to borrowers was much higher, sometimes by multiples. This causes a SPREAD, which means that in order to give the investors the dollar income they we re expecting, they could promise, based upon exhibits that were fabricated in part, that the investor would get the desired revenue.  But the income was coming from loans to borrowers at much higher “nominal” rates. In plain language they were able to invest only a portion of the investors money into funding mortgages that were guaranteed to fail. The rest of the money they kept for themselves. Each time they re-sold the security as described above, the entire proceeds were kept by the ivnestment banking house. As long as the pools failed, nobody would demand an accounting.

The investors might make claims for the losses but they were stuck with being tagged as qualified investors who should have known better, even if they were some small credit union who had no person on staff capable of performing verification or due diligence on the investment in mortgage-backed securities.

But fund managers (especially those  who received bonuses due to the higher returns they reported) were highly unlikely candidates to demand an accounting since they either had no clue or cared less as to what was REALLY done with the proceeds of their investment. AND then of course there are the fund managers who may or may not have overlooked, through negligence of intentionally, the quality of these investments. They may have received some sort of perks or kickback for investing in these dog-eared securities. Since the manager is in charge, he or she would be required to ask for things that they really don’t want to hear about.

The ratings companies were put in the exact same position as the the appraisers of the homes subject to mortgage. Play or die. Here is what we assisted you in coming up with a human and computer algorithm to arrive at the value of this investment. In securities, the value was expressed as AAA down to BBB and below. Here are the securities which we reverse engineered to fit that algorithm. Now give us the triple ratings as we agreed, take our fees which are higher now for your cooperation and don’t ask any questions. If someone did ask questions or raised alarms at the ratings agency or appraisal companies they were blacklisted.

So you tell me — is it one of them or is it all of them? Mr. Cuomo, are you listening? Contrary to the report below, this is no grey area. It is really very simple. Just because you have a pile of documentation doesn’t make it theft. Look at the result to determine the intent. That’s what you are supposed to do in Court.

More Corruption: Bear Stearns Falsified Information as Raters Shrugged

MAY 14 2010, 2:25 PM ET |  Comment

Made up FICO scores? Twenty-minute speed ratings to AAA? If government prosecutors like New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo want answers to why the mortgage-backed securities market was so screwed up, they should talk to Matt Van Leeuwen from Bear Stearn’s servicing arm EMC.

Reports indicated on Thursday that Cuomo is pursuing a criminal investigation surrounding banks supplying bad information to rating agencies about the quality of the mortgages they signed off on. But so far he hasn’t been able to prove where in the chain of blame the due diligence for the ratings broke down.

What Cuomo needs to establish is: whose shoulders does it fall on to verify the information lenders were selling to investment banks about the quality of their loans? And who was ultimately responsible for the due diligence on the loans that created toxic mortgage securities that were at heart of our financial crisis?

False Information and the Grey Area

Employed during the go-go years of 2004-2006, and speaking in an interview taped by BlueChip Films for a documentary in final production called Confidence Game, Van Leeuwen sheds some light onto the shenanigans going on during the mortgage boom that might surprise even Cuomo. As a former mortgage analyst at Dallas-based EMC mortgage, which was wholly owned by Bear Stearns, he had first-hand experience working with Bear’s mortgage-backed securitization factory. EMC was the “third-party” firm Bear was using to vet the quality of loans that would purchase from banks like Countrywide and Wells Fargo.

Van Leeuwen says Bear traders pushed EMC analysts to get loan analysis done in only one to three days. That way, Bear could sell them off fast to eager investors and didn’t have carry the cost of holding these loans on their books.

According to two EMC analysts, they were encouraged to just make up data like FICO scores if the lenders they purchased loans in bulk from wouldn’t get back to them promptly. Every mortgage security Bear Stearns sold emanated out of EMC. The EMC analysts had the nitty-gritty loan-level data and knew better than anyone that the quality of loans began falling off a cliff in 2006. But as the cracks in lending standards were coming more evident the Bear traders in New York were pushing them to just get the data ready for the raters by any means necessary.

In another case, as more exotic loans were being created by lenders, the EMC analyst didn’t even know how to classify the documentation associated with the loan. This was a data point really important to the bonds ratings. When Bear would buy individual loans from lenders the EMC analyst said they couldn’t tell if it should be labeled a no-doc or full doc loan. Van Leeuwen explains, “I wasn’t allowed to make the decision for how to classify the documentation level of the loans. We’d call analysts in Bear’s New York office to get guidance.” Time was of the essence here. “So, a snap decision would be made up there (in NY) to code a documentation type without in-depth research of the lender’s documentation standards,” says Van Leeuwen.

Two EMC analysts said instead of spending time to go back to the lender and demand clarification, like if verification of income actually backed these loans, the executives at Bear would just make the loan type fit. Why? One EMC analyst explains, “from Bear’s perspective, we didn’t want to overpay for the loans, but we don’t want to waste the resources on deep investigation: that’s not how the company makes money. That’s not our competitive advantage — it eats into profits.”

Twenty Minutes for AAA

It’s easy to paint Bear as the only villain here — but what were the rating agencies thinking?

Susan Barnes of Standards and Poor’s testified before Congress last month saying banks like Bear were responsible for due diligence in the transactions described above: “For the system to function properly, the market must rely on participants to fulfill their roles and obligations to verify and validate information before they pass it on to others, including S&P.”

Yet, was it reasonable for agencies to stand behind ratings when due diligence was done by an affiliate of Bear? That’s like buying a car from a guy whose mechanic brother said it was great, and then finding out it was a lemon.

Equally amazing was how responsive the raters were even on the big deals. Van Leeuwen says, “The raters would provide a rating on a $1 billion security in 20-30 minutes.” Describing it as “a rubber stamp,” Van Leeuwen said that the ratings agencies slavish devotion to their computer models “was vital” because it allowed Bear to “cram mortgages through the process.”

The greatest asset Bear had in its quest to squeeze every ounce of profit from the mortgage-backed securities market was the methodology of the big ratings agencies. The bankers knew what kind of loan detail was needed to get that coveted AAA rating. After they prepped the rating agencies for what they ‘thought’ they loans would look like, they would buy loans in bulk, and then spend a day scrubbing them.

Bear’s decision to cut corners and to fail to take the time to make sure the raters got correct information about the quality of loans was big no-no. But rating bonds based on fast reactions, instead of thoughtful analysis and reliable due diligence, also might place some responsibility on the agencies’ shoulders.

Ohio Sues Rating Firms for Losses in Funds: Fraud Catching Up with Swindlers

NOW AVAILABLE ON KINDLE/AMAZON
WHY THIS IS IMPORTANT TO FORECLOSURE DEFENSE AND OFFENSE: OK I know the last thing you want to hear is how complex this scheme was. But if you can get over the intimidation factor, you will see how the lawsuits filed by individual homeowners, attorney generals, and class actions are picking apart the whole scheme, coming up with the inconvenient answers that Wall Street is working to avoid and that many government officials are too lazy or paid off or whatever to get involved.
So here we focus on the rating agencies and you might be asking why do I care if I wasn’t an investor who bought those empty bonds that funded my loan? The reason is that others with far greater resources than you are doing your work for you.
The SINGLE transaction, starting with the sale of the bond to the investor and then to the sale of the financial loan product to the homeowner and then ending with the false foreclosures and unconscionable proceeds of credit default swaps could ONLY have been achieved with the active participation from the rating agencies.
By selling their reputation for objectivity to the highest bidder, by misusing their skill in assessing credit risk,  the rating agencies enabled those bonds to be sold under the pretense that they were AAA sound investments. But for that the mortgage meltdown would never have occurred. But for that, you would not be in the upside down position, or delinquency, default or foreclosure in which you find yourself.
But for the free flow of free money there would have been no pressure to get rid of it in order to make Wall Street’s unconscionable profits. And without that pressure, housing prices would have remained relatively stable instead of shooting up to unprecedented (by any measure) unsustainable levels that were not reflective of what the homeowner would get when Wall Street’s scheme was over.
Your home loan was rated by these rating agencies. They looked the other way and changed underwriting standards from common sense to common fraud. The ONLY way the bonds sold to investors could have been rated so high was by rating the underlying mortgages and notes. No REAL analysis would have done anything except raise red flags bringing the rating down to junk. Just starting with the appraisal” on the house which was also a form of rating, no reasonable person could possible look at the history of housing prices and believe that the 30% jump in 4 months was sustainable. Nobody using their own money would fund a deal based on that. It is only because the originating “lenders” (i.e, straw-men, conduits) were not using their own capital that these loans were made.
We were all duped by the appraisers and the rating agencies who sold their integrity to the highest bidder. And in the process of tragedy of astonishing severity is unfolding, getting worse and fooling the American public — until it reaches each and every one of us, which it will.
At some point the homeowners should be suing the rating agencies and appraisers for their part in all this. The counterclaim is both fraud in the inducement and fraud in the execution. Fraud in the execution because you thought you were just taking out a loan when in fact you were purchasing a financial loan product that was a security promising you passive returns whose value was intentionally misrepresented. Fraud in the inducement because had you known the true value of the property you would never have assumed that you could cover the loan terms, which were also illegal and predatory.
The game is on. If you reach the truth before Goldman et al are done, you can stop it, reverse it, and set the country back on the path of confidence in an economy that is based upon something other than $500 trillion in derivative vapor.
November 21, 2009

Ohio Sues Rating Firms for Losses in Funds

Already facing a spate of private lawsuits, the legal troubles of the country’s largest credit rating agencies deepened on Friday when the attorney general of Ohio sued Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, claiming that they had cost state retirement and pension funds some $457 million by approving high-risk Wall Street securities that went bust in the financial collapse.

The case could test whether the agencies’ ratings are constitutionally protected as a form of free speech.

The lawsuit asserts that Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch were in league with the banks and other issuers, helping to create an assortment of exotic financial instruments that led to a disastrous bubble in the housing market.

“We believe that the credit rating agencies, in exchange for fees, departed from their objective, neutral role as arbiters,” the attorney general, Richard Cordray, said at a news conference. “At minimum, they were aiding and abetting misconduct by issuers.”

He accused the companies of selling their integrity to the highest bidder.

Steven Weiss, a spokesman for McGraw-Hill, which owns S.& P., said that the lawsuit had no merit and that the company would vigorously defend itself.

“A recent Securities and Exchange Commission examination of our business practices found no evidence that decisions about rating methodologies or models were based on attracting market share,” he said.

Michael Adler, a spokesman for Moody’s, also disputed the claims. “It is unfortunate that the state attorney general, rather than engaging in an objective review and constructive dialogue regarding credit ratings, instead appears to be seeking new scapegoats for investment losses incurred during an unprecedented global market disruption,” he said.

A spokesman for Fitch said the company would not comment because it had not seen the lawsuit.

The litigation adds to a growing stack of lawsuits against the three largest credit rating agencies, which together command an 85 percent share of the market. Since the credit crisis began last year, dozens of investors have sought to recover billions of dollars from worthless or nearly worthless bonds on which the rating agencies had conferred their highest grades.

One of those groups is largest pension fund in the country, the California Public Employees Retirement System, which filed a lawsuit in state court in California in July, claiming that “wildly inaccurate ratings” had led to roughly $1 billion in losses.

And more litigation is likely. As part of a broader financial reform, Congress is considering provisions that make it easier for plaintiffs to sue rating agencies. And the Ohio attorney general’s action raises the possibility of similar filings from other states. California’s attorney general, Jerry Brown, said in September that his office was investigating the rating agencies, with an eye toward determining “how these agencies could get it so wrong and whether they violated California law in the process.”

As a group, the attorneys general have proved formidable opponents, most notably in the landmark litigation and multibillion-dollar settlement against tobacco makers in 1998.

To date, however, the rating agencies are undefeated in court, and aside from one modest settlement in a case 10 years ago, no one has forced them to hand over any money. Moody’s, S.& P. and Fitch have successfully argued that their ratings are essentially opinions about the future, and therefore subject to First Amendment protections identical to those of journalists.

But that was before billions of dollars in triple-A rated bonds went bad in the financial crisis that started last year, and before Congress extracted a number of internal e-mail messages from the companies, suggesting that employees were aware they were giving their blessing to bonds that were all but doomed. In one of those messages, an S.& P. analyst said that a deal “could be structured by cows and we’d rate it.”

Recent cases, like the suit filed Friday, are founded on the premise that the companies were aware that investments they said were sturdy were dangerously unsafe. And if analysts knew that they were overstating the quality of the products they rated, and did so because it was a path to profits, the ratings could forfeit First Amendment protections, legal experts say.

“If they hold themselves out to the marketplace as objective when in fact they are influenced by the fees they are receiving, then they are perpetrating a falsehood on the marketplace,” said Rodney A. Smolla, dean of the Washington and Lee University School of Law. “The First Amendment doesn’t extend to the deliberate manipulation of financial markets.”

The 73-page complaint, filed on behalf of Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and other groups, claims that in recent years the rating agencies abandoned their role as impartial referees as they began binging on fees from deals involving mortgage-backed securities.

At the root of the problem, according to the complaint, is the business model of rating agencies, which are paid by the issuers of the securities they are paid to appraise. The lawsuit, and many critics of the companies, have described that arrangement as a glaring conflict of interest.

“Given that the rating agencies did not receive their full fees for a deal unless the deal was completed and the requested rating was provided,” the attorney general’s suit maintains, “they had an acute financial incentive to relax their stated standards of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ to placate their clients.”

To complicate problems in the system of incentives, the lawsuit states, the methodologies used by the rating agencies were outdated and flawed. By the time those flaws were obvious, nearly half a billion dollars in pension and retirement funds had evaporated in Ohio, revealing the bonds to be “high-risk securities that both issuers and rating agencies knew to be little more than a house of cards,” the complaint states.

Housing Bubble: How We All Got Screwed

  • And now, because nobody stepped in before the flood began, a new industry is born — bigger than personal injury lawsuits — it the flood of claims under TILA, RESPA, RICO, Securities laws, common law fraud and state and federal laws concerning false and deceptive business practices. People will be rescinding or simply voiding their mortgage transaction through rescission remedies provided under statutory law and common law. They will be seeking and getting damages, treble damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages. Lawyers will be happy. Anyone who says the worst is behind us is, to say the least, overly optimistic.

The bottom line is pressure, greed, arrogance, power, and recklessness. In the excellent article that follows, you can pick out the trail of fraud and deception, self-deception and how “everyone” was on board with the mortgage meltdown and how everyone knew it would bust.

By false and deceptive representations, by improper relationships with rating “agencies” (actually private companies out to make a buck just like everyone else in the process) and by creation of complex instruments wherein the buyer relied on the integrity of the firms involved in the issuance of derivative securities, demand for these high yielding “no-risk” AAA rated securities was insatiable. Wall Street was awash in money and put the screws on everyone down the line including the borrower who would buy real estate that was as falsely appraised in value as the security that provided the the money to fund the loan.

What started as an innovative way to increase liquidity and disperse risk ended up being institutionalized theft. As the success of derivative securities (measured by sales and demand from investors) rose, so did the pressure on lenders to increase their “output” of loans, no matter how ridiculous. In fact, the more ridiculous, the better — because the the lower the grade of the borrower, the higher the interest rate.

By parsing and packaging loans together, mortgage aggregators were able to report that a loan which started out at 1%, negative amortization, adjustable rate, with resets every 3 months, was actually a 12% loan or more. This allowed the CDO manager to “secure” the top tranche in an SPV with “income” left over for the lower the tranches. It all looked so good on paper.

The pressure was on — lenders threw out all their underwriting standards, while they and mortgage brokers, appraisers, and others conspired to simply get that signature on the loan documents, the devil be damned if he/she paid anything on the loan.  Get rid of the escrow for taxes and insurance and “qualify” the borrower based upon the very first teaser rate and PRESTO! a guy with an income of $30,000 can get a mortgage loan of $1 million, with negative amortization and adjustments to his payments. Using the same tactics as the time-share sales people of times past, they assure the borrower that his lack of understanding of how he could get a mortgage so big is understandable, but that the world of finance, rising home prices that will continue to rise, and the integrity of the lender, the mortgage broker, the appraiser and underwriting department is something he can rely on. 

The more they ran out of people to make loans to the lower the standards for lending. Nobody cared because they knew they were just middlemen taking their cut out of the pie created by the investment of some money manager in asset backed securities that were neither backed nor had assets.  The fall would be taken by the investors in CDOs issued by SPVs, and holders of credit default swaps and synthetic derivatives that were too complicated for anyone to understand without the assistance of a computer powerful enough to run our defense department. 

Then the developer’s ran out of product, as prices skyrocketed and people were lining “free money” loans. So the lender’s threw construction loan money at the developers — and sent THOSE loans upstream to be securitized. Developer’s filed for hundreds of thousands of permits, completing the picture of a market that was in a permanent spiral upward. The illusion that there was not enough housing drowned out the little voices of older, wiser people, who asked “where is all this demand coming from and why had we not noticed it before?”

Cities, counties, states all revised their budgets based upon increased revenues and increased demands on their infrastructure. Now they are committed to projects, some of them started, without any prospect of being able to fund their completion. Local governments are looking to the Federal government to make up the shortfall — for good reason.

Those in the Federal government who had anything to do with legislating or regulating lending and securitization were receiving “perks” which sometimes were as simple as getting a mortgage loan under market and sometimes involved much more than that. Congress made sure they played their part with REMIC legislation ostensibly to prevent double taxation of “revenue” that was in actuality mostly smoke and mirrors. But in so doing, Congress institutionalized the process of fraud, deception and crisis.

And of course there was the Federal Reserve, which had opened its loan window to investment bankers, accepting as collateral the face value of virtually worthless securities. The window is not open to ordinary people who got screwed, or their cities, counties and states. It is only open to the people who caused the mess to begin with.

The fact that the foreclosure “race” was on and could only end in disaster was of little concern to the Federal Reserve in accepting those securities at face value. Only two outcomes were possible — either the house would be acquired by the lender (95% of the cases) and then left to rot, be vandalized and robbed of everything of value right down to windows, doors, wiring and plumbing — or the “inventory” of homes would be shifted from seller’s to “lenders” — with big question on who the “lender” actually is anymore. It certainly is not anyone who was present at closing.

In many cases the houses are subject to the first scenario as there are organized crime groups making a business out of stripping unoccupied dwellings. The COST of either demolishing the house or renovating the house back to salable condition with warranties exceeds the “value” of the land and any existing structure on it. Thus the value of this investment is either already less than zero or headed there. Thus the value of the securities accepted by the Fed at their window is negative. The holders of those securities are upside down just like the borrowers but the investment bankers and banks have the Fed. Everyone else has nothing. 

And now, because nobody stepped in before the flood began, a new industry is born — bigger than personal injury lawsuits — it the flood of claims under TILA, RESPA, RICO, Securities laws, common law fraud and state and federal laws concerning false and deceptive business practices. People will be rescinding or simply voiding their mortgage transaction through rescission remedies provided under statutory law and common law. They will be seeking and getting damages, treble damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages. Lawyers will be happy. Anyone who says the worst is behind us is, to say the least, overly optimistic.

PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP

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The housing bubble, in four chapters
How homeowners, speculators and Wall Street rode a wave of easy money
By Alec Klein and Zachary A. Goldfarb
The Washington Post
updated 2:10 a.m. MT, Sun., June. 15, 2008

The black-tie party at Washington’s swank Mayflower Hotel seemed a fitting celebration of the biggest American housing boom since the 1950s: filet mignon and lobster, a champagne room and hundreds of mortgage brokers, real estate agents and their customers gyrating to a Latin band.

On that winter night in 2005, the company hosting the gala honored itself with an ice sculpture of its logo. Pinnacle Financial had grown from a single office to a national behemoth generating $6.5 billion in mortgages that year. The $100,000-plus party celebrated the booming division that made loans largely to Hispanic immigrants with little savings. The company even booked rooms for those who imbibed too much.

Kevin Connelly, a loan officer who attended the affair, now marvels at those gilded times. At his Pinnacle office in Virginia, colleagues were filling the parking lot with BMWs and at least one Lotus sports car. In its hiring frenzy, the mortgage company turned a busboy into a loan officer whose income zoomed to six figures in a matter of months.

“It was the peak. It was the embodiment of business success,” Connelly said. “We underestimated the bubble, even though deep down, we knew it couldn’t last forever.”

Indeed, Pinnacle’s party would soon end, along with the nation’s housing euphoria. The company has all but disappeared, along with dozens of other mortgage firms, tens of thousands of jobs on Wall Street and the dreams of about 1 million proud new homeowners who lost their houses.

The aftershocks of the housing market’s collapse still rumble through the economy, with unemployment rising, companies struggling to obtain financing and the stock market more than 10 percent below its peak last fall. The Federal Reserve has taken unprecedented action to stave off a recession, slashing interest rates and intervening to save a storied Wall Street investment bank. Congress and federal agencies have launched investigations into what happened: wrongdoing by mortgage brokers, lax lending standards by banks, failures by watchdogs.

Seen in the best possible light, the housing bubble that began inflating in the mid-1990s was “a great national experiment,” as one prominent economist put it — a way to harness the inventiveness of the capitalist system to give low-income families, minorities and immigrants a chance to own their homes. But it also is a classic story of boom, excess and bust, of homeowners, speculators and Wall Street dealmakers happy to ride the wave of easy money even though many knew a crash was inevitable.

Chapter I: ‘A lot of potential’
For David E. Zimmer, the story of the bubble began in 1986 in a high-rise office overlooking Lake Erie.

An aggressive, clean-cut 25-year-old, armed with an MBA from the University of Notre Dame, Zimmer spent his hours attached to a phone at his small desk, one of a handful of young salesmen in the Cleveland office of the First Boston investment bank.

No one took lunch — lunch was for the weak, and the weak didn’t survive. Zimmer gabbed all day with his clients, mostly mid-size banks in the Midwest, persuading them to buy a new kind of financial product. Every once in a while, he’d hop a small plane or drive his Oldsmobile Omega out for a visit, armed with charts and reports. The products, investments based on bundles of residential mortgages, were so new he had to explain them carefully to the bankers.

“There was a lot of education going on,” Zimmer said. “I realized, as a lot of people did, this was a brand new segment of the market that had a lot of potential, but I had no idea how big this would get.”

Zimmer joined the business as enormous changes were taking hold in the mortgage industry. Since World War II, community banks, also called thrifts or savings and loans, had profited by taking savings deposits, paying their customers interest and then lending the money at a slightly higher rate for 30 years to people who wanted to buy homes. The system had increased homeownership from less than 45 percent of all U.S. households in 1940 to nearly 65 percent by the mid-’60s, helped by government programs such as G.I. loans.

In 1970, when demand for mortgage money threatened to outstrip supply, the government hit on a new idea for getting more money to borrowers: Buy the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages from the thrifts, guarantee them against defaults, and pool thousands of the mortgages to be sold as a bond to investors, who would get a stream of payments from the homeowners. In turn, the thrifts would get immediate cash to lend to more home buyers.

Wall Street, which would broker the deals and collect fees, saw the pools of mortgages as a new opportunity for profit. But the business did not get big until the 1980s. That was when the mortgage finance chief at the Salomon Brothers investment bank, Lewis Ranieri — a Brooklyn-born college dropout who started in the company’s mailroom — and his competitor, Laurence Fink of First Boston, came up with a new idea with a mouthful of a name: the collateralized mortgage obligation, or CMO. The CMO sliced a pool of mortgages into sections, called “tranches,” that would be sold separately to investors. Each tranche paid a different interest rate and had a different maturity date.

 

Investors flocked to the new, more flexible products. By the time Zimmer joined First Boston, $126 billion in CMOs and other mortgage-backed securities were being sold annually. “Growth is really poised to take off,” Zimmer thought.

After a few years at First Boston, Zimmer eventually ended up at Prudential Securities on the tip of Manhattan near the World Trade Center, selling increasingly exotic securities based not only on mortgages but also credit card payments and automobile loans.

As Wall Street’s securities grew more complex and lucrative, so did the mathematics behind them. Zimmer would walk over to Prudential’s huge “deal room.” The room was filled with quantitative researchers — “quants” — a motley crew of math wonks, computer scientists, PhDs and electrical engineers, many of them immigrants from China, Russia and India. The quants built new mathematical models to price the securities, determining, for example, what borrowers would do if interest rates moved a certain way.

The industry, which came to be known as structured finance, grew steadily. Zimmer grew with it. He got married, raised two kids and climbed to the level of senior vice president, a top salesman at Prudential.

Zimmer’s clients through the 1990s were mutual funds, pension funds and other big investors who dealt in big numbers: sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars. He’d get up at 4:30 a.m., be out of the house by 5, catch the 5:30 train from Princeton, N.J., be locked to his desk for 10 hours, devouring carbs — pizza, lasagna — and consumed by stress, but thinking nonetheless, “It was so much fun.”

 

Chapter II: ‘Extraordinary’ boom
April 14, 2000. A rough day on Wall Street. The technology-laden Nasdaq stock index, which had more than doubled from January 1999 to March 2000, falls 356 points. Within a few days, it will have dropped by a third.

Although the business of structured finance grew during the 1990s, Internet companies drew the sexiest action on the Street. When that bubble popped, average Americans who had invested in the high-flying stocks saw their savings evaporate. Consumer and business spending began to dry up.

Then came the 2001 terrorist attacks, which brought down the twin towers, shut down the stock market for four days and plunged the economy into recession.

The government’s efforts to counter the pain of that bust soon pumped air into the next bubble: housing. The Bush administration pushed two big tax cuts, and the Federal Reserve, led by Alan Greenspan, slashed interest rates to spur lending and spending.

Low rates kicked the housing market into high gear. Construction of new homes jumped 6 percent in 2002, and prices climbed. By that November, Greenspan noted the trend, telling a private meeting of Fed officials that “our extraordinary housing boom . . . financed by very large increases in mortgage debt, cannot continue indefinitely into the future,” according to a transcript.

The Fed nonetheless kept to its goal of encouraging lending and in June 2003 slashed its key rate to its lowest level ever — 1 percent — and let it sit there for a year. “Lower interest rates will stimulate demand for anything you want to borrow — housing included,” said Fed scholar John Taylor, an economics professor at Stanford University.

The average rate on a 30-year-fixed mortgage fell to 5.8 percent in 2003, the lowest since at least the 1960s. Greenspan boasted to Congress that “the Federal Reserve’s commitment to foster sustainable growth” was helping to fuel the economy, and he noted that homeownership was growing.

There was something very new about this particular housing boom. Much of it was driven by loans made to a new category of borrowers — those with little savings, modest income or checkered credit histories. Such people did not qualify for the best interest rates; the riskiest of these borrowers were known as “subprime.” With interest rates falling nationwide, most subprime loans gave borrowers a low “teaser” rate for the first two or three years, with the monthly payments ballooning after that.

Because subprime borrowers were assumed to be higher credit risks, lenders charged them higher interest rates. That meant that investors who bought securities based on pools of subprime mortgages would enjoy higher returns.

 

Credit-rating companies, which investors relied on to gauge the risk of default, gave many of the securities high grades. So Wall Street had no shortage of customers for subprime products, including pension funds and investors in places such as Asia and the Middle East, where wealth had blossomed over the past decade. Government-chartered mortgage companies Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac, encouraged by the Bush administration to expand homeownership, also bought more pools of subprime loans.

One member of the Fed watched the developments with increasing trepidation: Edward Gramlich, a former University of Michigan economist who had been nominated to the central bank by President Bill Clinton. Gramlich would later call subprime lending “a great national experiment” in expanding homeownership.

In 2003, Gramlich invited a Chicago housing advocate for a private lunch in his Washington office. Bruce Gottschall, a 30-year industry veteran, took the opportunity to pull out a map of Chicago, showing the Fed governor which communities had been exposed to large numbers of subprime loans. Homes were going into foreclosure. Gottschall said the Fed governor already “seemed to know some of the underlying problems.”

 

Chapter III: ‘Half-truths’ and lies
The young woman who walked into Pinnacle’s Vienna office in 2004 said her boyfriend wanted to buy a house near Annapolis. He hoped to get a special kind of loan for which he didn’t have to report his income, assets or employment. Mortgage broker Connelly handed the woman a pile of paperwork.

On the day of the settlement, she arrived alone. Her boyfriend was on a business trip, she said, but she had his power of attorney. Informed that for this kind of loan he would have to sign in person, she broke into tears: Her boyfriend actually had been serving a jail term.

Not a problem. Almost anyone could borrow hundreds of thousands of dollars for a house in those wild days. Connelly agreed to send the paperwork to the courthouse where the boyfriend had a hearing. As it happened, he was freed that day. Still, Connelly said, “that was one of mine that goes down in the annals of the strange.”

Strange was becoming increasingly common: loans that required no documentation of a borrower’s income. No proof of employment. No money down. “I was truly amazed that we were able to place these loans,” Connelly said.

It was a world removed from his start in the business, in 1979, when the University of Maryland graduate joined the Springfield office of a savings and loan. For most of his 25 years in the industry, home buyers provided reams of paperwork documenting their employment, savings and income. He’d fill out the forms and send away carbon copies for approval, which could take 60 days.

Connelly was now brokering loans for Orlando-based Pinnacle or for subprime specialists such as New Century Financial that went to borrowers with poor credit history or other financial limitations. Connelly said he secured many loans for restaurant workers, including one for $500,000 for a McDonald’s employee who earned about $35,000 a year.

Lenders saw subprime loans as a safe bet. Home prices were soaring. Borrowers didn’t have to worry about their payments ballooning — they could sell their homes at any time, often at a hefty profit. Jeffrey Vratanina, one of Pinnacle’s co-founders, said Wall Street wanted to buy more and more of the mortgages, regardless of their risk, to pool them and then sell them to investors. “Quite candidly, it all boils down to one word: greed,” he said.

In the Washington area, the housing boom coincided with a surge in the immigrant population, especially Latinos in places such as Prince William County. For many of them, subprime and other unconventional loans were the only way to attain the American dream of owning a home. Pinnacle’s customers included construction workers, house cleaners and World Bankemployees, who “saw an opportunity to get into a house without putting much money on the table — to save money to buy furniture to decorate the house,” said Mariano Claudio, who in his late 20s was helping run Pinnacle’s emerging-markets division, which was dedicated to immigrants.

Pinnacle ran ads on Spanish-language television and radio, set up booths at festivals and sponsored soccer matches at George Mason University. Brokers would hold raffles for gift cards or digital music players to collect names, addresses and phone numbers. It was “a great way to assemble a database of potential clients,” Connelly said.

He said his commission and fees depended on how much work he did on the loan, a common industry practice that often led to higher charges for subprime borrowers. Connelly said he carefully reviewed fees with his customers. “The way it’s justified morally and ethically is [that] the deal requires more work for a first-time home buyer or one with inferior financial history,” Connelly said. “It’s a balancing act of morals and ethics — and the need to make a living.”

Some brokers ignored the balance. Connelly began to hear about loan officers who charged low-income borrowers fees of as much as 5 percent of the loan or got a kickback by tacking extra percentage points to the interest rate on a mortgage. “Many borrowers are overwhelmed by the sheer volume of paperwork, disclosures, etc., and they’re just not equipped to fully understand,” he said. “There were half-truths and downright lies and severe omissions.”

A mortgage lender could hire practically anybody. “It’s not rocket science,” Connelly would tell new hires, such as the busboy who quickly traded in his Toyota Tercel (value: $1,000) for a Mazda Miata sports car (value: $25,000). Pinnacle was running out of office space, forcing some loan officers to work on window ledges or out of their cars.

Then came the party at the Mayflower at the end of 2005, a celebration hosted by the emerging-markets division. In June 2003, the division had originated $500,000 in loans. By the end of 2005, it was doing $500 million with hundreds of brokers across the country.

“It built to a head,” Connelly said of the times. “You could point to the Christmas party as the pinnacle.”

Chapter IV: Warning sign
Jan. 31, 2006. Greenspan, widely celebrated for steering the economy through multiple shocks for more than 18 years, steps down from his post as Fed chairman.

Greenspan puzzled over one piece of data a Fed employee showed him in his final weeks. A trade publication reported that subprime mortgages had ballooned to 20 percent of all loans, triple the level of a few years earlier.

“I looked at the numbers . . . and said, ‘Where did they get these numbers from?’ ” Greenspan recalled in a recent interview. He was skeptical that such loans had grown in a short period “to such gargantuan proportions.”

 

Greenspan said he did not recall whether he mentioned the dramatic growth in subprime loans to his successor, Ben S. Bernanke.

Bernanke, a reserved Princeton University economist unaccustomed to the national spotlight, came in to the job wanting to reduce the role of the Fed chairman as an outsized personality the way Greenspan had been. Two weeks into the job, Bernanke testified before Congress that it was a “positive” that the nation’s homeownership rate had reached nearly 70 percent, in part because of subprime loans.

“If the housing market does slow down,” Bernanke said, “we’ll want to see how strong the subprime mortgage market is and whether or not we’ll see any problems in that market.”

Staff writers David Cho and Neil Irwin and staff researchers Richard Drezen and Rena Kirsch contributed to this report.

 

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