Gieseke-The “Creditor” consists of the Investors not Servicer

 

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The Illusion of Creditor

Gieseke Remand Order 5 20 16 from 9th Circuit (3)

“As it stands, the “creditor” consists of all investors in all trusts created by each investment bank. But nobody is acting as if that is true.”

——–THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER——–

And for those who thought they could get away with lying and cheating forever, let me say this: anyone can get away with almost anything — at first. But eventually if you keep doing it you are going to pay the price. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals (Federal) has made it clear that it will routinely reverse any decision that involves the trial court accepting void assignments or in which the court rules that the borrower has no standing to raise the issue of ownership and standing based upon a void assignment on the grounds that the borrower was not a party to the transaction.
Just to be clear, that whole line of reasoning was flawed from the start. If you witness a murder, will your testimony be blocked because you were neither the murderer nor the victim? The very notion of due process means that all parties have an opportunity to pursue the truth and not be stuck with some legal presumption that is based upon a false statement of fact.

 

The importance of the Geiseke decision is that several states are involved and it likely to have strong persuasive impact on courts across the country. However, don’t think the party is over for the banks. They will continue to raise the standing issue (i.e., the borrower was not part of the assignment transaction) and judges will continue to say to borrowers until they absolutely cannot, that borrowers have no standing the raise the issue as to whether any of the implied transactions actually exist.

 

The same is true with the identity of the creditor, a closely related issue. It is black letter law, as they say, that every borrower should know the identity of his or her creditor. But like other issues, the courts are still asking “what difference does it make?”
But as to the standing issue on void assignments, here again we have a procedural due process issue. Isn’t it a finding of fact without any evidence for a court to say that the borrower was neither a third party beneficiary nor party to the transaction? How can that happen without evidence? Doesn’t that mean that the court must see the fictional transaction? This entire issue is about letting the banks steamroll over the borrowers and investors — where the bank or service takes the loan as its own, in direct conflict of interest to the actual creditors — the investors.

The banks don’t want this issue to surface because of a dirty little secret — in a legal sense there is no creditor that they can identify. And the borrower is completely faultless in that event. The borrower did not steal the investors’ money. The borrower did not create fictional trusts that were never active and the borrower did not create dark dynamic pools in which money was going in and out of the pool every second.

 

If the banks had obeyed the law those trusts would have been active for at least 90 days. But they were not active. But if they had been active there would be a definable group of creditors — the investors in that trust. As it stands, the “creditor” consists of all investors in all trusts created by each investment bank- not the loan servicer.

To Contact Attorney Charles Marshall:

Email: cmarshall@marshallestatelaw.com
Website: marshallesquire.com
Phone number: 619.807.2628, 619.755.7825
Original Order: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14840482884466427978&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

9th Circuit (Federal) Allows Quiet Title and Damages for Wrongful Filing of False Documents

Hat Tip to Beth Findsen who is a good friend and a great lawyer in Scottsdale, Az and who provided this case to me this morning. I always recommend her in Arizona because her writing is spectacular and her courtroom experience invaluable.

This case needs to be analyzed further. Robert Hager (CONGRATULATIONS TO HAGER IN RENO, NV) et al has succeeded in getting at least a partial and significant victory over the MERS system, and voiding robosigned documents as being forged per se. I disagree that a note and mortgage, once split, can be reunified by mere execution of an instrument. They are avoiding the issue just like the “lost note” issue. The rules of evidence and pleading have always required great factual specificity on the path of transactions leading up to the point where the note was lost or transferred. This Court dodged that bullet for now. Without evidence of the trail of ownership, the money trail and the document trail all the way through the system, such a finding leaves us in the dark. The case does show what I have been saying all along — the importance of pleading and admitting to NOTHING. By not specifically stating that there was no default, the court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to establish the elements of wrongful foreclosure and left open the entire question about whether such a cause of action even exists.

But the more basic issue us whether the homeowner can sue for quiet title and damages for slander of his title by the use and filing of patently false documentation in Court, in the County records etc. The answer is a resounding YES and will be sustained should the banks try to move this up the ladder to the U.S. Supreme Court. This opinion changes again my earlier comments. First I said you could quiet title, then I said you first needed to nullify title (the mortgage) before you could even file a quiet title action. Now I revert to my prior position based upon the holding and sound reasoning behind this court decision. One caveat: you must plead facts for nullification, cancellation of the instrument on the grounds that it is void before you can get to your cause of action on quiet title and damages for slander of the homeowner’s title. My conclusion is that they may be and perhaps should be in the same lawsuit. This decision makes clear the damage wrought by use of the MERS system. It is strong persuasive authority in other jurisdictions and now the law for all courts within the 9th Circuit’s jurisdiction.

Here are some of the significant quotes.

Writing in 2011, the MDL Court dismissed Count I on four grounds. None of these grounds provides an appropriate basis for dismissal. We recognize that at the time of its decision, the MDL Court had plausible arguments under Arizona law in support of three of these grounds. But decisions by Arizona courts after 2011 have made clear that the MDL Court was incorrect in relying on them.
First, the MDL Court concluded that § 33-420 does not apply to the specific documents that the CAC alleges to be false. However, in Stauffer v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 308 P.3d 1173, 1175 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a § 33-420(A) damages claim is available in a case in which plaintiffs alleged as false documents “a Notice of Trustee Sale, a Notice of Substitution of Trustee, and an Assignment of a Deed of Trust.” These are precisely the documents that the CAC alleges to be false.
[Statute of Limitations:] at least one case has suggested that a § 33-420(B) claim asserts a continuous wrong that is not subject to any statute of limitations as long as the cloud to title remains. State v. Mabery Ranch, Co., 165 P.3d 211, 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Third, the MDL Court held that appellants lacked standing to sue under § 33-420 on the ground that, even if the documents were false, appellants were still obligated to repay their loans. In the view of the MDL Court, because appellants were in default they suffered no concrete and particularized injury. However, on virtually identical allegations, the Arizona Court of Appeals held to the contrary in Stauffer. The plaintiffs in Stauffer were defaulting residential homeowners who brought suit for damages under § 33-420(A) and to clear title under § 33-420(B). One of the grounds on which the documents were alleged to be false was that “the same person executed the Notice of Trustee Sale and the Notice of Breach, but because the signatures did not look the same, the signature of the Notice of Trustee Sale was possibly forged.” Stauffer, 308 P.3d at 1175 n.2.
“Appellees argue that the Stauffers do not have standing because the Recorded Documents have not caused them any injury, they have not disputed their own default, and the Property has not been sold pursuant to the Recorded Documents. The purpose of A.R.S. § 33-420 is to “protect property owners from actions clouding title to their property.” We find that the recording of false or fraudulent documents that assert an interest in a property may cloud the property’s title; in this case, the Stauffers, as owners of the Property, have alleged that they have suffered a distinct and palpable injury as a result of those clouds on their Property’s title.” [Stauffer at 1179]
The Court of Appeals not only held that the Stauffers had standing based on their “distinct and palpable injury.” It also held that they had stated claims under §§ 33-420(A) and (B). The court held that because the “Recorded Documents assert[ed] an interest in the Property,” the trial court had improperly dismissed the Stauffers’ damages claim under § 33-420(A). Id. at 1178. It then held that because the Stauffers had properly brought an action for damages under § 33-420(A), they could join an action to clear title of the allegedly false documents under § 33-420(B). The court wrote:
“The third sentence in subsection B states that an owner “may bring a separate special action to clear title to the real property or join such action with an action for damages as described in this section.” A.R.S. § 33-420.B. Therefore, we find that an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under § 33-420.A.”
Fourth, the MDL Court held that appellants had not pleaded their robosigning claims with sufficient particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). We disagree. Section 33-420 characterizes as false, and therefore actionable, a document that is “forged, groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 33-420(A), (B) (emphasis added). The CAC alleges that the documents at issue are invalid because they are “robosigned (forged).” The CAC specifically identifies numerous allegedly forged documents. For example, the CAC alleges that notice of the trustee’s sale of the property of Thomas and Laurie Bilyea was “notarized in blank prior to being signed on behalf of Michael A. Bosco, and the party that is represented to have signed the document, Michael A. Bosco, did not sign the document, and the party that did sign the document had no personal knowledge of any of the facts set forth in the notice.” Further, the CAC alleges that the document substituting a trustee under the deed of trust for the property of Nicholas DeBaggis “was notarized in blank prior to being signed on behalf of U.S. Bank National Association, and the party that is represented to have signed the document, Mark S. Bosco, did not sign the document.” Still further, the CAC also alleges that Jim Montes, who purportedly signed the substitution of trustee for the property of Milan Stejic had, on the same day, “signed and recorded, with differing signatures, numerous Substitutions of Trustee in the Maricopa County Recorder’s Office . . . . Many of the signatures appear visibly different than one another.” These and similar allegations in the CAC “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009), and provide the defendants fair notice as to the nature of appellants’ claims against them, Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
We therefore reverse the MDL Court’s dismissal of Count I.
[Importance of Pleading NO DEFAULT:] The Nevada Supreme Court stated in Collins v. Union Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610 (Nev. 1983):
An action for the tort of wrongful foreclosure will lie if the trustor or mortgagor can establish that at the time the power of sale was exercised or the foreclosure occurred, no breach of condition or failure of performance existed on the mortgagor’s or trustor’s part which would have authorized the foreclosure or exercise of the power of sale. Therefore, the material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was exercised…. Because none of the appellants has shown a lack of default, tender, or an excuse from the tender requirement, appellants’ wrongful foreclosure claims cannot succeed. We therefore affirm the MDL Court’s of Count II.
[Questionable conclusion on “reunification of note and mortgage”:] the Nevada Supreme Court decided Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 2012). Edelstein makes clear that MERS does have the authority, for purposes of § 107.080, to make valid assignments of the deed of trust to a successor beneficiary in order to reunify the deed of trust and the note. The court wrote:
Designating MERS as the beneficiary does . . . effectively “split” the note and the deed of trust at inception because . . . an entity separate from the original note holder . . . is listed as the beneficiary (MERS). . . . However, this split at the inception of the loan is not irreparable or fatal. . . . [W]hile entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose, nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan. . . . MERS, as a valid beneficiary, may assign its beneficial interest in the deed of trust to the holder of the note, at which time the documents are reunified.
We therefore affirm the MDL Court’s dismissal of Count III.

Here is the full opinion:

Opinion on MDL

For further information or assistance, please call 520-405-1688 on the West Coast and 954-495-9867 on the East Coast.

The Rush to Foreclosure: Wells Fargo Loses the Argument on Trial Modifications

As Danielle Kelley, Esq. (Tallahassee) has repeatedly predicted, the trial modification practices of the big banks are getting them into hot water. Scenarios vary. But one typical scenario  is that the trial modification is “approved” (which under current law means that it has been through underwriting) and the borrower makes the trail payments. Then the bank says the “investor” (with whom they have most likely NOT been in contact) has denied the modification. After receiving the trial payments and assuring the borrowers that they were safe in their home, the bank then forecloses. Many homeowners, unaware that they in fact probably have a binding contract with the bank on the modification, walk away.

Kelley has won cases based upon the argument that the bank had no choice but to modify the loan according to the terms of the trial modifications — and to make any other adjustments necessary to make the numbers come out right. The important point being that the payments offered in the trial modification are the same payment they will have for the rest of the term of the loan. The Bank argued that they were under no obligation to make the trial modification permanent. The Judge was furious with the bank and its attorneys, reminding them that forfeiture of one’s home is an extreme remedy, not to be taken lightly.

Of course the game of the Banks has been, all along, that they want as many of the mortgage loans in foreclosure, because that is the only way out of potential liability for refunds and buybacks of loans that have now been “assigned” to REMIC trusts, most of which were never funded and thus lacked the capacity to originate or acquire any loans. The servicers are rushing to foreclosure sale because that is an opportunity for them to claim the proceeds of liquidation of the property to get back “servicer advances” paid while they claimed the homeowner was in default (but the creditors (investors) were being paid on time in the right amount — i.e., NO DEFAULT).

The investors are suing the broker dealers (investment banks) for fraud, mismanagement of funds, documents and title. The investors affirmatively allege that the loan documents are unenforceable but when it gets down to state court level in the foreclosure cases, those assertions by the creditors are not considered relevant by a standard that does not seem to have any support under the law but which is nonetheless applied.

In all probability no investor knows of any foreclosures nor do they get notice of how the Servicers and Trustees are forcing the cases into foreclosures where the investors do the worst, the borrowers do the worst, and the banks, trustees and servicers get to take all the spoils of the largest economic fraud in human history.  I know that sounds like hyperbole. But I will bet anything that the time will come when the real truth comes out in its entirety — and the shock and awe of the whole thing becomes apparent to everyone.

While most of the cases involving trial modifications result in confidential settlements that cannot be discussed here or I would be violating the confidentiality agreement, one case recently stands out as having been at least partially litigated now.

Borrowers Can Sue Wells Fargo Over Mortgage Modifications — Reuters

The 9th Circuit, which has been considered unfriendly to borrowers, changed course in this decision.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said Wells Fargo was required under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program [HAMP] to offer loan modifications to borrowers who demonstrated their eligibility during a trial period. … the appeals court rejected the argument that Wells Fargo became bound only upon sending borrowers signed modification agreements.

 

The court said this would create “unfettered discretion” for the San Francisco-based bank to reject modifications “for any reason whatsoever – interest rates went up, the economy soured, (or) it just didn’t like the borrower.”

While a federal appeals court in Chicago reached a similar conclusion last year, the 9th Circuit decision applies in several western U.S. states – among them California, Arizona and Nevada – that have been particularly hard-hit by foreclosures.

Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 11-16234.

 

This decision, like others coming out of Federal and State courts shows a growing anger and mistrust of the banks and their attorneys that most borrowers would say is long overdue.

For people familiar with determining the present value of a flow of funds, the analysis of the modification deals is easier. The average length of time a home is held by its owner is around 7 years, but many people stay in the home for life. Just to make things easier, here is a way of looking at certain modifications that don’t seem to offer anything of value on their face.

Assuming the original mortgage was $500,000 and now with default interest, attorneys fees etc. the total demanded is $600,000 the bank might offer a low interest rate (2%-5%) with amortization for forty years at a payment you can afford. But you don’t like the deal because you were the victim of appraisal fraud so you would be accepting a mortgage and waiving your defenses and ratifying the ownership of the loan in exchange for what?

The payment over 40 years changes the equation dramatically and does address the appraisal fraud if you stay in the house for a long time. In 40 years, with even low inflation, each dollar you are spending now is going to be worth around 20 cents. And even without any organic growth in prices from demand, your house might be worth $300,000 now, will be priced in 40 years at around $1,200,000. This assumes 2% rate of inflation. The risk factors are deflation and stagnation, which at this point most economists are not predicting.

For more information on trial modifications, litigation support, or other related information contact Danielle Kelley at 850-765-1236.

 

 

 

 

 

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