TILA RESCISSION: W.V. Federal District Court:”LENDER” MUST FILE SUIT, DAMAGES AWARDED TO BORROWER

Posted on October 2, 2018 by Neil Garfield

major hat-tip to Charles Cox in Nevada.

Federal Judge’s response to chicken little argument: [2] RMS argues that enforcing the statute as written would upend the mortgage industry. As noted, lending institutions faced with a notice of rescission have many options to protect their interests and ensure that the borrower is able to tender the loan proceeds. Most obviously, creditors may provide the required disclosures to limit the rescission period to three days, when parties are more likely to be able to easily return to the status quo. The Court is unconvinced that creditors will be unable to protect their financial interests if they are required to comply with § 1635 according to its terms.”(e.s.)

And that, my friends is the end of the free house myth and the sky is falling argument for making homeowners pay for bank malfeasance and negligence.

As I have said and predicted, the language of the TILA Rescission statute 15 USC §1635 is clear and unambiguous. This decision will eventually pull the plug on all claims of securitization whether true or false.

The problem for the financial industry is (a) they have no way of actually identifying the debt from the perspective a creditor and (b) therefore they have no creditor to identify. In order to file a claim to change or vacate the notice of rescission they must allege and prove standing without the void note and void mortgage. That requires a creditor.

However this case does not test the three year express limit on TILA rescission. I say that all rescissions are effective by operation of law when delivered (or mailed using USPS) regardless of whether or not the rescission is contested. I say that TILA Rescission creates a procedural hurdle that the banks have been dancing around for over a decade. The three year limitation could be an adequate defense and grounds to vacate the TILA rescission — but only if “someone” asks for it and that “someone” must be a party with standing that does not rely on the void note and void mortgage. This is an issue for another day.

Thre question in this case is whether there will be an appeal and if so, in whose name?

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

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PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see LAVIS v. REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS LLC Dist

For more discussion on TILA Rescission just use the search bar here on this blog “TILA RESCISSION.”

Without further comment ad nauseum but with at least one well-deserved “I told you so” here are some significant quotes from a West Virginia District Court Judge:

RMS conceded that it could not demonstrate that Ms. Lavis was provided notice of her right to rescind, which extended the time in which Ms. Lavis could exercise that right. Ms. Lavis cites the testimony from RMS’ corporate representative, confirming that it had a copy of her notice of rescission, with a receipt stamp dated May 17, 2016, and that RMS did not release the deeds of trust or file a civil action to maintain the lien within twenty days after that notice.

The Court further finds that RMS failed to preserve any right to tender from Ms. Lavis. Ms. Lavis took all appropriate steps required under the statute to rescind and to protect her rights. Despite its status as a sophisticated entity with access to the expertise of counsel, RMS did nothing in response to Ms. Lavis’ notice of rescission. It did not take steps to terminate her security interest. It did not request that she proffer regarding her ability to tender or submit a request for a specific amount in tender. It did not file suit to preserve its right to tender or to delay its obligation to terminate the security interest pending Ms. Lavis’ demonstration of an ability to tender the loan proceeds. After Ms. Lavis filed this action to enforce her rights, RMS did not file a counterclaim for return of the loan proceeds. It did not file a motion or other response requesting that the Court alter the procedures set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Instead, it continued to insist, even through the end of trial and in its briefings considered here, that it could simply ignore Ms. Lavis’ rescission of the loan.[2](e.s.)

 

The evidence related to rescission was not significantly in dispute, although the parties vigorously dispute the legal implications of the facts. RMS did not provide Ms. Lavis with required disclosures regarding the right to rescind at the loan closing, giving her three years to exercise her right to rescind. Ms. Lavis sent a letter, dated May 12, 2016, informing RMS that she was exercising her right to rescind. Although RMS does not dispute that Ms. Lavis retained the right to rescind, it did nothing in response to the letter. To date, RMS has taken no steps to effectuate rescission or to honor its statutory obligations triggered by Ms. Lavis’ letter.

15 U.S.C. § 1365(b) sets forth the procedures involved in rescission, using mandatory “shall” language. Within twenty days after an obligor exercises the right to rescind, “the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, down payment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (emphasis added.) This language is not permissive.

The Court has repeatedly held that the clear language of the statute, as well as the Supreme Court’s discussion of the issue in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., demonstrate that, absent a suit or motion to alter the procedures set forth in the statute and regulations, a creditor’s obligation to return funds and terminate the security interest precedes any obligation of the borrower to tender loan proceeds. 135 S.Ct. 790, 793 (2015).

The Court further finds that RMS failed to preserve any right to tender from Ms. Lavis. Ms. Lavis took all appropriate steps required under the statute to rescind and to protect her rights. Despite its status as a sophisticated entity with to the expertise of counsel, RMS did nothing in response to Ms. Lavis’ notice of rescission. It did not take steps to terminate her security interest. It did not request that she proffer regarding her ability to tender or submit a request for a specific amount in tender. It did not file suit to preserve its right to tender or to delay its obligation to terminate the security interest pending Ms. Lavis’ demonstration of an ability to tender the loan proceeds. After Ms. Lavis filed this action to enforce her rights, RMS did not file a counterclaim for return of the loan proceeds. It did not file a motion or other response requesting that the Court alter the procedures set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Instead, it continued to insist, even through the end of trial and in its briefings considered here, that it could simply ignore Ms. Lavis’ rescission of the loan.[2](e.s.)

A finding that RMS is entitled to tender, despite its disregard of its obligations over a period of years and its failure to take any measures to preserve its rights under the statute, would incentivize lending institutions to follow RMS’ poor example.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , | 9 Comments »

Statute of Limitations on TILA Rescission: How long does the debt survive after notice of TLA rescission?

Posted on August 23, 2018 by Neil Garfield

The simple answer is that the debt, or the claim on the debt, ends 20 days after notice of rescission. Otherwise the statute 15 U.S.C. §1635 and SCOTUS would have had no meaning when it says that the rescission is effective by operation of law at the time the notice is delivered. It provides a  very short window for “lender’s” compliance.

In reality, I have referred to a one year limitation because the courts are trying to mitigate the punitive intent of the TILA rescission statute. 15 U.S.C. §1640(e) basically leans toward a one year limitation for borrower’s claims against “lenders” based upon disclosure which is what TILA rescission is all about.

The borrower has every right to force compliance and get a court order requiring (a) return of canceled note (b) filing a release and satisfaction of the encumbrance and (c) payment of money to the borrower — but they have no such right after one year has expired starting with the date of the notice or date of delivery.

Employing analysis based upon the goose and the gander, it would follow that the one year limitation would also apply to “lenders” seeking payment from the borrower based upon the statutory requirement that the borrower pays the debt.

If this analysis was adopted as doctrine it would create a window of opportunity for a lender in violation of the three statutory duties under TILA rescission to cure the violation and bring the claim for repayment. This interpretation would be contrary to the wording and intent of the TILA rescission statute — as it would cloud the purpose of the statute — to enable borrowers to get out of the deal they are in and seek a new deal instead. Nobody would lend to the borrower if there was a risk that they might still owe money to a prior lender, even though the law makes the debt unsecured. Nonetheless it is entirely possible that the courts will invent such a doctrine. 

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key elements of a scam. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORMWITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Any borrower claim based upon a remedy in the TILA statutes has a one year limitation. In TILA rescission, the claim for the debt arises not from the note and mortgage which are void, but from 15 USC §1635. The statute replaces the contract. The “lender” has a claim to collect the debt under that statute. But they must first comply with their three statutory duties before they can demand and then enforce collection of the debt. The debt can be satisfied by tendering title to the home. But a part of the debt is easily satisfied by the payment to the borrower from the Lender.

The confusion arises from the fact that statutory rescission is different from common law rescission. Common law rescission puts tendering payment on the debt first, whereas statutory rescission puts payment of the debt last.
In TILA Rescission, while there is no express limitation provision as to the ability of the lender to collect on the debt, they can never collect the debt unless, within 20 days, they have complied with the three duties set forth in the statutory scheme for statutory rescission. After that they are barred from enforcing the debt. It is intended to be punitive to encourage “lenders” to comply with disclosure requirements.
Theoretically then, they can never collect the debt because they never comply with the three duties that are condition precedent to seeking payment on the debt. So academically speaking the “lender” is barred after 20 days. But realistically the language of the statute leans heavily to one year for claims arising from TILA and that includes rescission although the statute doesn’t say that expressly.
So I have taken the position that they are barred after 20 days from ever expressing a claim on the debt or, if one wants to “interpret” the statute (against the advice of SCOTUS in Jesinoski) the limitation would be one year from the date of rescission or from the last day that “lender” compliance was due. That interpretation would mean, though, that the “lender” had complied with its duties under statutory rescission 15 U.S.C. § 1635.
Lastly there is another academic thread that would state that there is no limitation on the right of the lender to collect the debt as long as they complied with the statute even if it was outside of the 20 day period. This conclusion seems unlikely as it would change the wording in 15 U.S.C. §1635 and render lender’s compliance practically irrelevant. It would insert language into the statute that would mean that the rescission was not effective when mailed and there was nothing the borrower could do about that.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

TILA Rescission Time Limits

Posted on August 6, 2018 by Neil Garfield

If you slow down and logically go through the statute and the Jesinoski decision it is easy to analyze the situation and come to a correct conclusion. This is not argument of law, it is the application of logic. SCOTUS and the statute state unequivocally that the rescission is effective WHEN it is mailed, by operation of law. Everything else happens afterwards.

Let us help you plan your TILA rescission strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK ORDERED BY YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS IS NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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The “three year” limitation is an affirmative defense that only arises AFTER rescission is effective by operation of law. It is only an affirmative act resulting in a court order that can revoke or vacate a TIILA rescission. To state it more bluntly, merely raising a dispute does not mean (a) you have the standing to do so nor (b) that the matter is at issue. The error here is that the parties are usually already in court.
As soon as the court is apprised of the rescission having been sent (whether 10 minutes ago or 10 years ago) the case changes, to wit: any action based upon the note and mortgage must be struck or dismissed.
  • Any party who was pursuing a claim based upon the note and mortgage is out — they no longer have legal standing and the Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over their claims or defenses.
  • Any party who is the actual creditor could, within 20 days from notice of rescission, either comply with the statute or file a lawsuit invoking and standing or any other basis upon which they dispute that the rescission was properly sent.
  • Any party failing to invoke the remedy of repayment or the duty of compliance within one year from date of mailing is barred from pursuing any statutory claim.
  • Title stays unchanged as of the date of mailing, to wit: fee simple absolute with no encumbrance of mortgage or deed of trust.
Once the statutory scheme is invoked, everything changes. The statutory scheme replaces the loan agreement just as the statutory scheme for nonjudicial foreclosure replaces the constitutional requirement of due process PROVIDED that the homeowner may still invoke the right to due process. If not, the statutory nonjudicial scheme is all that remains. The same analysis applies when looking at the nonjudicial cancelation of the loan agreement. If the “lender” fails to object with a lawsuit to vacate or revoke the rescission, then the statutory nonjudicial scheme is all that remains.
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Once TILA rescission is sent, the note and mortgage no longer exist, by operation of law. The courts may not simply apply a note (new or old), much less an encumbrance (new or old) on land by fiat as this deprives the homeowner of his right to due process before his clear title can be taken away from him. Such an act must be preceded by formal application to a court by a party who has legal standing, and a trial occurs producing the court order. That application must be filed within 20 days of notice of rescission.
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People are pointing to the reference in Jesinoski to the three year limitation. That is dicta — i.e., there is no ruling or opinion on when or whether that defense can be invoked. That defense does not arise by operation of law like the effectiveness of the rescission notice. But we do know by definition that such defenses can only arise after notice of rescission is sent. The argument that SCOTUS said that a notice sent outside the three year period is void is wrong. There is no place in the opinion where the court says that. And it isn’t likely they they will issue such an opinion.
*
The reason is that if SCOTUS were to say that rescission is NOT effective upon mailing if it was mailed beyond the three year limitation, then an added condition is being inserted into the statute. The option stands for exactly the opposite conclusion. No conditions may be added. Period. Any interpretation or ruling that adds a condition means that the rescission is not effective upon mailing by operation of law. Such a ruling inserts “unless….” into the wording of the statute and the ruling of SCOTUS.
*
Lastly, within the context of 15  USC §1635 and Jesinoski, the rescission and simultaneous destruction of the note and mortgage does NOT start a clock on any statute of limitations any more than a Deed starts a clock on a statute of limitations as to the title. But for the same reason it is true that SCOTUS is unlikely to say both a 2008 and 2017 rescission were effective. Once the first rescission was sent (and assuming there is no doubt about that) the loan agreement was canceled; hence, there was nothing to rescind in 2017.

Filed under: burden of pleading, BURDEN OF PROOF, foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

What is the effect of TILA Rescission on My title? Can I sue for damages?

Posted on August 6, 2018 by Neil Garfield

I have been getting the same questions from multiple attorneys and homeowners. One of them is preparing a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on rescission, but is wondering, as things stand whether she has any right to sue for damages. When our team prepares a complaint or other pleading for a lawyer or homeowner we concentrate on the elements of what needs to be present and the logic of what we are presenting. It must be very compelling or the judge will regard it as just another attempt to get out of justly due debt.

Let us help you plan your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS IS NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Combining fact patterns from multiple inquiries we start with a homeowner who actually sent two notices of rescission (2010 and 2017). Questions vary from who do I sue for damages to how do I get my title back?

Note that the biggest and most common error in rescission litigation is that the homeowner attempts to (a) have the court declare the rescission effective contrary to their own argument that it is already effective by operation of law, 15 USC §1635, and (b) seek to enforce the TILA rescission statutory duties beyond one year after rescission.

Whether you can sue for damages is one question. Whether the rescission had the effect of removing the jurisdiction, right or authority to dispossess you of title is another. And whether title ever changed is yet another. Yes you can sue for damages if not barred by a statute of limitations. Yes authority is vitiated by operation of law regardless of the status of litigation. And NO, title never changed and you probably own your house unless state law restricts your right to claim such ownership.

All three questions are related.
Taking the last question (did title actually change?) first, my opinion is that the rescission was effective when mailed. Therefore the note and mortgage were void. The failure of the alleged “lender” to comply with the rescission duties and then pursue repayment within one year from the date of rescission bars them from pursuing the debt. So at this point in time (equally applicable to the 2017 rescission notice) there is no note, mortgage or enforceable debt.
  • Hence any further activities to enforce the note and mortgage were legally void. And that means that any change of title wherein a party received title via any instrument executed by anyone other than you is equally legally void. In fact, that would be the very definition of a wild deed.
  • The grantor did not have any right, title or interest to convey even if it was a Sheriff, Clerk or Trustee in a deed of trust.
  • Any other interpretation offered by the banks would in substance boil down to arguments about why the rescission notice should not be effective upon mailing, like the statute says and like SCOTUS said 9-0 in Jesinoski.
  • CAUSES OF ACTION would definitely include
    • the equitable remedy of mandatory and prohibitive injunctions to prevent anyone from clouding your title or harassing you for an unenforceable debt would apply. But as we have seen, the trial courts and even the appellate courts refuse to concede that the rescission notice is effective upon mailing by operation of law, voiding the note and mortgage.
    • such a petition could also seek supplemental relief (i.e., monetary damages) and could be pursued as long as the statute of limitations does not bar your claim for damages. This is where it gets academically interesting. You are more likely to be barred if you use the 20010 rescission than you are if you use the 2016 rescission.
    • a lawsuit for misrepresentation (intentional and/or negligent) might also produce a verdict for damages — compensatory and punitive. It can be shown that bank lawyers were publishing all over the internet warning the banks to stop ignoring rescission. They knew. And they did it anyway. Add that to the fact that the foreclosing party was most often a nonexistent trust with no substance to its claim as administrator of the loan, and the case becomes stronger and potentially more lucrative.
    • CLASS ACTION: Mass joinder would probably be the better vehicle but the FTC and AG’s (and other agencies) have bowed to bank pressure and made mass joinder a dirty word. It is the one vehicle that cannot be stopped for failure to certify a class because there is not class — just a group of people who have the same cause fo action with varying damages. The rules for class actions have become increasingly restrictive but it certainly appears that technically the legal elements for certification fo the class are present. It is very expensive for the lawyers, often exceeding $1 million in costs and expenses other than fees.
    • Bottom line is that you legally still own your property but it may take a court to legally unwind all of the wrongful actions undertaken by previous courts at the behest of banks misrepresenting the facts. Legally title never changed, in my opinion.

Taking the second question (the right to dispossess your title) my answer would obviously be in the negative (i.e., NO). Since there was no right to even attempt changing title without the homeowner’s consent and signature, petitions to vacate such actions and for damages would most likely apply.

  • This question is added because the courts are almost certainly going to confuse (intentionally or not) the difference between unauthorized actions and void actions.
  • The proper analysis is obviously that the rescission is effective upon mailing by operation of law.
  • Being effective by operation of law means that the action constitutes an event that has already happened at the moment that the law says it is effective. If a court views this simply as “unauthorized” actions then it will most likely slip back into its original “sin”, to wit: treating rescission as a claim rather than an event that has already transpired.

And lastly the issue of claims for damages. There are different elements to each potential cause of action for damages or supplemental relief. I would group them as negligence, fraud, and breach of statutory duty.

  • As to the last you are barred from enforcing statutory duties in the TILA rescission statute if you are seeking such relief more than one year after rescission. But there are other statutes — RESPA, FDCPA and state statutes that are intended to provide for consumer protection or redress when the statutes are violated. There are statutory limits on the amount of damages that can be awarded to a consumer borrower.
  • Fraud requires specific allegations of misrepresentations — not just an argument that the position taken by the banks and servicers was wrong or even wrongful. It also requires knowledge and intent to deceive. It is harder to prove first because fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence which is close to beyond a reasonable doubt. Second it is harder to prove because you must go into “state of mind” of a business entity. The reward for proving fraud is that it might open the door to punitive damages and such awards have been in the millions of dollars.
  • Negligence is the easier to prove that it is more likely than not that the Defendant violated a statutory or common law duty — a duty of care. So the elements are simple — duty, breach of that duty, proximate cause of injury, and the actual injury. Negligent misrepresentation and negligent super vision and gross negligence are popular.

Filed under: CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, jurisdiction, legal standing, Motions, Servicer, standing, TILA rescission | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Tonight! Open Rebellion By Inferior Courts Threatens Authority of SCOTUS!

Posted on July 26, 2018 by Neil Garfield

Lecturing Courts on Their Duty to Comply with SCOTUS Decisions

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While the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)  unanimously (9-0) put to bed all of the arguments against the effectiveness of a notice of rescission under 15 U.S.C. §1635, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015), all inferior and lower courts have been ruling the other way. Any dispute raised by anyone, even if they have no legal standing to do so, is taken as an excuse for the lower courts to impose conditions not included in the TILA Rescission statute and banned or barred by SCOTUS.

Join me tonight as we discuss what to do about rebellious judges and how to preserve your interest in real property despite a negative ruling from a trial judge, even if it is affirmed by an appellate court other than SCOTUS, the highest court in the land.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: , , , , | 2 Comments »

Rescission Precision Goes to U.S. Supreme Court Petition for Mandamus

Posted on December 26, 2017 by Neil Garfield

10 years ago, seeing where the foreclosure wave was going and watching court cases, I said on these pages that the only solution to these foreclosures is Mandamus. First to stop judges from applying legal PRESUMPTIONS and second to stop judges from ignoring TILA rescission. Now someone has done it and others might follow suit, if you pardon the pun. Lawyers were not well versed in mandamus and pro se litigants had never heard of it. So for the most part everyone has been screaming and yelling about injustice, fabrication, forgery and perjury.

Ironically it is Dan Junk, pro se, who has done the best legal writing on the issue of TILA Rescission and has chosen, in my opinion, the best route to getting the Supreme Court to issue an order prohibiting judges from disregarding TILA Rescission and requiring judges to follow the law in 15 U.S.C. §1635. The irony is doubled because of Dan’s last name (Junk) and the fact that the securitization scheme arose partly out of the junk bond craze 30 years ago. Except of course that back then Wall Street pirates WERE sent to prison.

SCOTUS has the option of taking any case they want to review. They did take the Jesinoski v Countrywide case from which this Petition for Mandamus arises. And once they take it for review, they can still deny the writ leaving decisions on rescissions in limbo and creating case precedent where Judges have the option of disregarding the law as written in a statute in virtually any kind of case.

This one was filed, as I understand it, last Friday. It may or may not be considered timely. The reason I am publishing the Petition for the Writ of Mandamus is  that it attacks exactly on point what is happening in the courts — namely, “denying” the existence and effect of TILA rescission even after it has taken effect as a nonjudicial remedy.

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see

Junk SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Mandamus on TILA RESCISSION

Hiding in Plain Sight_ Jesinoski and the Consumer_s Right of Resc

Jesinoski decision

Dan Junk attended one of my first seminars back in the days when I was co-presenting with Brad Keiser. In litigation for around 9 years, he has followed this blog (and many others) and fought off the “inevitable” foreclosure as long as he could in Ohio. Besides clear evidence of substantive defenses Dan had sent a notice of rescission within the 3 years stated in the TILA Rescission statute.

Like thousands of judges across the country in State and Federal courts, the timely and effective rescission was ignored simply because the judges didn’t like the result. The ultimate decision was against him because the courts continue to allow legal presumptions to apply even though they create “alternate facts” in conflict with reality.

Blind justice supposedly requires courts to apply the law, as written by the Federal and State legislatures. The answer for Dan was not in some attempted appeal but rather to seek a sweeping ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States that specifically requires all judges, whoever situated, to follow the TILA Rescission law. There is adequate evidence to show that this is of great public importance inasmuch as virtually all judges are committing the same “error” to wit: not taking TILA rescission literally or seriously.

We’ll see what happens. But in the meanwhile do give a careful read of the Brief Dan filed. This could be a moment where everything changes.

Filed under: BURDEN OF PROOF, CASES, CORRUPTION, discovery, evidence, foreclosure, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, STATUTES, TILA, TILA rescission | Tagged: , , , , , | 11 Comments »

RESCISSION: It’s time for another slap on the wrist for state and federal judges.

Posted on February 2, 2017 by Neil Garfield

50 years ago Congress decided to slap punitive measures on lenders who ignore or attempt to go around (table-funded loans) existing laws on required disclosures — instead of creating a super agency that would review every loan closing before it could be consummated. So it made the punishment so severe that only the stupidest lenders would attempt to violate Federal law. That worked for a while — until the era of securitization fail. (Adam Levitin’s term for illusion under the cloak of false securitization).

Draconian consequences happen when the “lender” violates these laws. They lose the loan, the debt (or part of it), their paper is worthless and the disgorgement of all money ever paid by borrower or received by anyone arising out of the origination of the loan.

But Judges have resisted following the law, leaving the “lenders” with the bounty of ill-gotten gains and no punishment because judges refuse to do it —even after they received a slap on their wrists by the unanimous SCOTUS decision in Jesinoski. Now they will be getting another slap — and it might not be just on the wrists, considering the sarcasm with which Scalia penned the Jesinoski opinion.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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TILA rescission is mainly a procedural statute under 15 USC §1635. Like Scalia said in the Jesinoski case it specifically states WHEN things happen. It also makes clear, just as the unanimous court in Jesinoski made clear that no further action was required — especially the incorrect decisions in thousands of cases where the judge said that the rescission under TILA is NOT effective until the borrower files a lawsuit. What is clear from the statute and the regulations and the SCOTUS decision is that rescission is effective on the date of notice, which is the date of mailing if the borrower uses US Mail.

There are several defenses that might seem likely to succeed but those defenses (1) must be filed by a creditor (the note and mortgage are void instruments the moment that rescission notice is sent) (2) hence the grounds for objection are not “defenses” but rather potential grounds to vacate a lawful instrument that has already taken effect. Whether the right to have sent the notice had expired, or whether the right to rescind the putative loan is not well-grounded because of other restrictions (e.g. purchase money mortgage) are all POTENTIAL grounds to vacate the rescission — as long as the suit to vacate the rescission is brought by a party with legal standing.

A party does not have legal standing if their only claim to standing is that they once held a note and mortgage that are now void. {NOTE: No party has ever filed an action to vacate the rescission because (1) they have chosen to ignore the rescission for more than 20 days and thus subject to the defense of statute of limitations to their petition to vacate and (2) they would be required to state the rescission was effective in order to get relief and (3) there is a very high probability that there is no formal creditor that was secured by the mortgage encumbrance of record. The latter point about no formal creditor would also mean that the apparent challenge to the rescission based upon the “purchase money mortgage” “exception” would fail.}

The premise to this discussion is that the so-called originator was not the source of funds. This in my opinion means that there never was consummation — despite all appearances to the contrary.

The borrower was induced to sign a note and mortgage settlement statements and acknowledgement of disclosures and right to rescind under the false premise that the originator was the lender, as stated on the note and mortgage.

The resulting execution of documents thus produced the following results: (1) the putative borrower has signed the “closing documents” and (2) the originator neither signs those documents nor lends any money. This results in an executory contract without consideration which means an unenforceable partially completed documentary trail that creates the illusion of a normal residential loan closing.

TILA Rescission is effective at the time that the borrowers notify any one of the players who represent themselves as being servicer, lender, assignee or holder. The effect of rescission is to cancel the loan contract and that in turn makes the note and mortgage void, not voidable. That the note and mortgage become void is expressly set forth in the authorized regulations (Reg Z) promulgated by the Federal Reserve and now the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB). There is no lawsuit that is required or even possible for the putative borrower to file — i.e., there is no present controversy because the loan “contract” to the extent it exists has already been canceled and the note and mortgage have already been rendered void.

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TILA RESCISSION: Who Pays the Money?

Posted on January 30, 2017 by Neil Garfield

The menu of items that are due to the borrower as a condition precedent to making a claim for repayment is expansive and frankly in many cases is equivalent or nearly equivalent to the total amount of the principal claimed as loan repayment. 

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https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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While everyone is resisting the idea of enforcing rescission, some are asking the right questions. Here is the answer.

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The rescission is effective on the date of mailing. The lender must comply within 20 days from date of notification. Compliance means (1) return of cancelled note (2) release of the encumbrance on record in tech county records and (3) return of all money paid by the borrower, directly or indirectly with certain minor exceptions.

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The answer to the question of how much is due is that there needs to be an accounting because the statute 15 USC §1635 requires the return of all money paid by the “borrower”, directly or indirectly.

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The fact that the fee or compensation or “profit” was not disclosed to the borrower does not remove it from the list of the charges paid by or on behalf of the borrower nor the liability to pay it to the borrower once rescission is effective (i.e., upon notice — mailing).

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This leads to some interesting issues that will need to be dragged out of the “lender”, including all the other “lenders” going back to the original transaction. Most of the money received as compensation by third parties was not disclosed to the borrower, hence the need for an accounting. Many of the charges were slipped in to the loan without the borrower’s knowledge or consent. This brings in possible violations of the FDCPA, the FTCA and the “little FTC” acts passed by individual states.

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The menu of items that are due to the borrower as a condition precedent to making a claim for repayment is expansive and frankly in many cases is equivalent or nearly equivalent to the total amount of the principal claimed as loan repayment. 

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And that in turn brings up the most interesting question of all: who is liable to return those fees, compensation and finance charges? You can be sure that once the accounting is ordered by a court there will be scrambling amongst the players in the “Securitization” market. The whole point of masking their scheme was to avoid liability for this sort of thing. Hence the obfuscation of the actual creditor or lender. And this is one of many break points where the securitization players will start sniping at each other rather than the borrower.

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Nobody wants to hand all that money that was “earned” through the hard work of chicanery. And nobody wants to assert that they are the actual creditor since that would be an admission against interest that they had been misrepresenting the true creditor all along. And it would be waiving the 5th Amendment right against self incrimination for criminal charges.

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In any event, here are the REG Z rules on what constitutes a finance charge, which by the way, means that they should ALL have been been disclosed without exception.

§226.4   Finance charge.

(a) Definition. The finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount. It includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit. It does not include any charge of a type payable in a comparable cash transaction.

(1) Charges by third parties. The finance charge includes fees and amounts charged by someone other than the creditor, unless otherwise excluded under this section, if the creditor:

(i) Requires the use of a third party as a condition of or an incident to the extension of credit, even if the consumer can choose the third party; or

(ii) Retains a portion of the third-party charge, to the extent of the portion retained.

(2) Special rule; closing agent charges. Fees charged by a third party that conducts the loan closing (such as a settlement agent, attorney, or escrow or title company) are finance charges only if the creditor—

(i) Requires the particular services for which the consumer is charged;

(ii) Requires the imposition of the charge; or

(iii) Retains a portion of the third-party charge, to the extent of the portion retained.

(3) Special rule; mortgage broker fees. Fees charged by a mortgage broker (including fees paid by the consumer directly to the broker or to the creditor for delivery to the broker) are finance charges even if the creditor does not require the consumer to use a mortgage broker and even if the creditor does not retain any portion of the charge.

(b) Examples of finance charges. The finance charge includes the following types of charges, except for charges specifically excluded by paragraphs (c) through (e) of this section:

(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under an add-on or discount system of additional charges.

(2) Service, transaction, activity, and carrying charges, including any charge imposed on a checking or other transaction account to the extent that the charge exceeds the charge for a similar account without a credit feature.

(3) Points, loan fees, assumption fees, finder’s fees, and similar charges.

(4) Appraisal, investigation, and credit report fees.

(5) Premiums or other charges for any guarantee or insurance protecting the creditor against the consumer’s default or other credit loss.

(6) Charges imposed on a creditor by another person for purchasing or accepting a consumer’s obligation, if the consumer is required to pay the charges in cash, as an addition to the obligation, or as a deduction from the proceeds of the obligation.

(7) Premiums or other charges for credit life, accident, health, or loss-of-income insurance, written in connection with a credit transaction.

(8) Premiums or other charges for insurance against loss of or damage to property, or against liability arising out of the ownership or use of property, written in connection with a credit transaction.

(9) Discounts for the purpose of inducing payment by a means other than the use of credit.

(10) Charges or premiums paid for debt cancellation or debt suspension coverage written in connection with a credit transaction, whether or not the coverage is insurance under applicable law.

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Rescission is a Test of Persistence

Posted on December 14, 2016 by Neil Garfield
The “free house” mythology will have become reality. That is what happens when you break the laws governing deceptive and predatory lending.
… for those who don’t give up, the reward is substantial when TILA rescission is reluctantly recognized by the Courts as effective upon mailing.

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https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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The current judicial climate regarding TILA Rescission is that it doesn’t count — it means nothign, does nothing and cannot be sued to defeat foreclosure. But the signs are all there showing that the banks are bracing themselves for the real consequences of rescission in which borrowers receive the draconian remedy stated in the statute. For those borrowers who persist, there will ample reward despite the dark clouds that appear in the rear view window.
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On the horizon there are positive signs that the Congressional intent in the Truth in Lending Act will been enforced, to wit: “lenders” and “pretender lenders” will lose both their security interest in residential property and the right to collect any debt. The “free house” mythology will have become reality. That is what happens when you break the laws governing deceptive and predatory lending. And that is what happens when Congress decides what should happen to you when you break those laws.
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The current argument is that if the rescission was sent more than 3 years after consummation, it does not count as anything and the judges can ignore it.
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There is absolutely no doubt that judges want to adopt that  reasoning. But the three year limitation is not the only restriction. The same statute says that if the loan is a purchase money mortgage, TILA rescission is not an option. And there are other restrictions. The whole point of the Supreme Court decision was to say that the rescission WAS effective when it was mailed and not when a court ruled on whether it should have been sent in the first place. And there is a provision in the statute to allow an “injured party” (creditor?) to request a court to adjust the procedures that follow the mailing of the rescission.

So if the court was just saying that it was obvious that this was beyond the three year limitation. Or that it was obvious that this was a purchase money mortgage and that therefore the rescission was void or could be ignored, such a court would be reversing the Supreme Court decision — something no court in our country is empowered to do and is in fact prohibited from doing under the US Constitution. Obviously if the rescission was void there would be no limitation.

But the Supreme Court decision basically says that there is no such thing as a void rescission under the truth in lending act. Whether the borrower is wrong or right, it is effective when mailed and the “lender” (creditor) has 20 days to comply — or, to file an action to vacate the rescission because the borrower has unfairly canceled the loan transaction. The whole point was to make it easy on the borrower who felt that they have been the victim of deceptive or predatory lending. The wording of the statute was carefully crafted.

The obvious intention, which can be seen in many other cases that construe the statute, was to provide a mechanism by which a borrower could throw the burden to justify the practices leading up to the “loan” on to the “lenders.”

Both the statute and the Supreme Court decision make it clear that the borrower does not need any resources (except a pen, paper and a stamp) to trigger the procedures under the rescission statute in the truth in lending act.

The consequence of inaction by the “lenders” are very harsh and even draconian. The idea behind doing this was to force lenders into policing themselves, or upon failing to do that, suffer the loss of the security instrument and even the loss of the right to seek repayment. This legislation was a compromise. Some people wanted the creation of a new agency that would be the size of the Internal Revenue Service to review and police loan transactions. This distrust of the banks goes back to the 19060’s when the TILA legislation was initially enacted.

As I have posted on the blog, even lawyers who represent the banks agree in published articles that ignoring a notice of rescission could come a huge cost. Like me, they do not believe that the current environment will continue wherein Judges ignore the notice of rescission. If the bank lawyers agree with what I have been writing, it would seem that we should take this much more seriously in the expectation that the current climate will change with respect to the sending of a notice of rescission and the recording of that notice in the public records.

I agree that the current climate it is virtually entirely negative. And most people who have sent a notice of rescission and most people who have recorded a notice of rescission will probably never receive the remedy to which they are entitled. This may be because of lack of persistence, ignorance of the change in the judicial climate or because of limitations are upheld in going back in time to the moment of the sending of the notice of rescission. For those people who persist, I still believe that they will prevail in the end. And for those entities who who have identified themselves as creditors or lenders, they will be barred from enforcing the underlying debt for failure to respond to the notice of rescission.

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BOTTOM LINE: For those who persist on the issue of rescission, the ultimate remedy under TILA rescission is coming — mostly too late for those who have had their homes go through forced sales that were void because the loan transaction and the loan documents had been canceled. Many of them have “moved on” albeit hobbled by the bite of the banks in the era of false securitization and fictitious appraisals. But for those who don’t give up, the reward is substantial when TILA rescission is reluctantly recognized by the Courts as effective upon mailing.
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RESCISSION Revalidated in CA Decision

Posted on July 22, 2016 by Neil Garfield

1sT Appellate District US Bank v Naifeh: “… we conclude that a borrower may rescind the loan transaction under TILA without filing a lawsuit, but when the rescission is challenged in litigation, the court has authority to decide whether the rescission notice is timely and whether the the procedure set forth in the TILA (sic) should be modified in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.”

The jig was up when the Jesinoski decision was rendered — courts cannot re-write the statute, although they can consider minor changes in procedure whose purpose is to comply with the statute, not ignore. it.

HE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see US BANK VS NAIFEH

In a carefully worded opinion at least one appellate court seems to be moving closer to the view I have expressed here on these pages. But they still left some simple propositions unclear.

It remains my opinion that a recorded rescission forces those who would challenge it to file suit to remove the rescission from the title record. In that suit they would need to plead and prove standing — without using the note or mortgage to do it because rescission renders them void at the moment the letter of rescission is mailed..

  1. The decision clearly says that for the rescission to be effective (deriving its authority from 15 USC §1635 and the unanimous SCOTUS decision in Jesinoski v Countrywide), the borrower need NOT file suit. That means it is effective when mailed (NOT FILED) just as the statute says and just as the late Justice Scalia penned in the Jesinoski case.
  2. The decision anticipates a challenge to rescission — which in and of itself is recognition that the rescission IS effective and that something must be done about it.
  3. But the court does not clarify what is meant when it said “when the rescission is challenged in litigation.” Clearly the decision stands for the proposition that the rescission stands as effective unless challenged in litigation. The unanswered question is ‘what form of litigation?’
  4. If we apply ordinary rules of procedure, then the decision dovetails with my opinions, the statute and the US Supreme Court decision. The rescission is effective when mailed. So the “challenge” must be “in litigation.” But whether that means a lawsuit to vacate or a motion challenging the rescission is unclear. A “motion challenging the rescission” is problematic if it does not set forth the standing of the party making the challenge and if it does not set forth the plain facts that the rescission, under law, is already effective but should be vacated, then it is trying to get the court to arrive at the position that the rescission can be ignored even if it is recorded (a condition not addressed in the opinion).
  5. The claimant challenging the rescission must state a cause of action, if the rescission is recorded, that is in essence a quiet title claim that needs to be framed as an original complaint in a lawsuit. So far the banks have been successful in getting trial judges to IGNORE the rescission rather than remove it as an effective instrument, whether recorded or not. This only compounds title problems already present.
  6. The procedural oddity here is that in foreclosure litigation the court might conclude (erroneously in my opinion) that the beneficiary under the deed of trust had standing to substitute trustee, standing to to have the trustee record a notice of default, and standing to record a notice of sale.
  7. BUT once the rescission is effective, there is absolutely no foundation for a claim of standing based upon the void note, the void mortgage and the consequential void assignments, which even if they were not otherwise void, are void now because the assignment is purporting to transfer something that no longer exists.
  8. Standing vanishes if it is dependent upon presumptions applied from the assignment, endorsement and other attributes wherein false statements are made concerning purchase and sale of the note or mortgage. The note and mortgage are void the moment the rescission is mailed. No reliance on the mortgage, note or any transfer of same can constitute standing, since those documents, as a matter of law, no longer exist.
  9. Hence STANDING TO CHALLENGE RESCISSION must logically be dependent upon the ability of the challenger to affirmatively plead that they own the debt or obligation and to prove it at a hearing in which evidence is produced. This is the holy grail of foreclosure defense. We know that 99% of the foreclosers do NOT qualify as owners of the actual debt or obligation. They are traveling on legal presumptions as alleged “holders” etc. under the UCC. If the note and mortgage don’t exist then the status of holder is nonexistent and irrelevant.
  10. This court further leaves us in a gray area when it correctly reads that portion of the statute giving the court authority to consider the options, procedurally, but incorrectly states that one of those options is that a Federal Statute that preempts state law could be “modified in light of the facts and circumstances. This is NOT contained in either the statute or the Jesinoski decision. This court is putting far too much weight on the provision of the statute that allows for a petition to the court at which the court could change some of the procedural steps in complying with rescission, and possibly by implication allowing for a challenge to the rescission in order to vacate the legal effectiveness of the rescission.
  11. ANY DECISION ON “PROCEDURE” THAT NULLIFIES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESCISSION WHEN MAILED IS ERRONEOUS.  Any such decision would effectively be eviscerating the entire statute and the opinion of the US Supreme Court. The simple rule of thumb here (heuristic reasoning) is that the rescission is and always will have been effective when mailed. The parts of the statute that deal with procedure can only be related to a party who claims to be the creditor (owner of the debt or obligation) who intends to comply.
  12. Since tender is expressly excluded in the statute and the Jesinoski decision, the change can not require the borrower to tender money — especially when the statute says that no such demand need be considered by the borrower until there is full compliance with the rescission — return of canceled note, release of encumbrance and payment to the borrower of all money ever paid by the borrower for principal, interest, insurance, taxes, and fees.
  13. Hence the changes are limited perhaps granting additional time, or maybe even to credits against what might be due from the homeowner but even that looks like a stretch. The committee notes and subsequent decisions clearly state that the intent of Congress was to prevent any bank from stonewalling the effectiveness of a rescission, which is what judges have been doing despite the Jesinoski decision and the clear wording of the statute.
  14. And this is how we know that the challenge, if brought, must be within the 20 days available for the creditor, “lender” etc to comply with the rescission. Any other interpretation would mean that the rescission was NOT effective upon mailing and would also mean that the owner of the property cannot get a substitute mortgage to pay off any legitimate claim from a true creditor. Such interpretations, while apparently attractive to bank lawyers and judges, are directly contrary to the express wording of the statute and directly contrary tot he express wording of the Jesinoski decision, decided unanimously by SCOTUS. Hence ANY CHALLENGE outside the 20 days is barred by the statute. Just like any action to enforce the TILA duties against the “lender” must be brought within one year of the mailing and receipt of the rescission.
  15. The failure of either the “lender” to comply or the borrower to enforce simply means that after one year, the rescission is still effective (meaning the note and mortgage are void) the claim for enforcement of the duties of the lender is extinguished, and the financial claim of the lender is extinguished. Hence, the infamous free house — not caused by sneaky borrowers but caused instead of malfeasant banks who continue to use their influence to get judges to re-write the law.
  16. But regardless of how one looks at this decision, the Jesinoski decision or the statute one thing is perfectly clear — vacating the rescission is strictly dependent upon timely filing of a challenge in litigation and a hearing on evidence, because the legal presumptions used in determining standing are no longer available in the absence of the the note or mortgage, which were irretrievably rendered void upon mailing of the rescission.

The banks and servicers have so far been successful in pulling the wool over judges eyes, perhaps because judges have long disliked TILA and especially TILA rescission. The jig was up when the Jesinoski decision was rendered — courts cannot re-write the statute, although they can consider minor changes in procedure whose purpose is to comply with the statute, not ignore. it.

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