Dancing with ghosts. The banks have no shame in contradicting themselves

The bottom line is that foreclosures are all about collecting on unpaid debt. The only party who can initiate foreclosure proceedings that will force the sale of title to the home and then forcibly dispossess the homeowner is a party who owns the debt, is injured by nonpayment and who receives the proceeds of foreclosure as restitution for an unpaid debt.

In a pending case the attorneys for the “bank” argue that ownership of the debt is irrelevant.

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I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Article 9, §203 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by the statutes of the State of Hawaii simply says that a condition precedent to enforcement of as security instrument is payment for the debt. Opposing counsel has proposed a daring, inventive argument to avoid producing evidence of something that he should be anxious to demonstrate: this his client is an injured party seeking restitution. Instead opposing counsel has advanced argument intended to divert the court’s attention into Dickensian (see Bleak House, Charles Dickens, serially published March 1852-September 1853 ) meandering in which the point of the proceeding is totally lost on lawyers who no longer remember the reason the matter is in court.
The statute merely states as matter of law what is already axiomatic: in order to bring a case to court the claimant must be an injured party and present an actual controversy wherein some act of the accused has produced such injury. Opposing counsel doesn’t like that apparently because he does not represent an injured party and yet still seeks the remedy which thus will result in the generation of unaccountable revenue to a party simple because they asked for it.
In the case at bar the defendant has been sued in foreclosure, presumably for restitution of an unpaid debt. She asks in discovery whether the Plaintiff is actually the party who has suffered an injury by way of asking for evidence of who paid for the debt and when that occurred. In another decade counsel for the foreclosing party would have happily obliged, thus removing any likelihood of failure of the action. But here, counsel resists, saying that such a request is not warranted since the action is not dependent upon on ownership of the debt. It seems to be the argument that the mere possible existence of the debt is sufficient for anyone to enforce it.
Opposing counsel is essentially objecting as a substitute for filing a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. Despite the convoluted and erroneous arguments proposed by opposing counsel, the fact remains that discovery is allowed on any subject that could lead to the discovery (hence the name “discovery”) of admissible evidence. Since foreclosure is by definition a remedy for the recovery of debt, it is impossible to fathom an argument against requiring the suing party to answer questions about that debt. Yet that is exactly what opposing counsel seeks to do with smoke and mirrors. Defendant is entitled to an order requiring a good faith factual answer because there is no basis to deny her request or sustain any bojection of opposing counsel.
While it therefore is not necessary entertain the “merits” of the supercilious argument advanced by opposing counsel, the following is submitted in an abundance of caution.
Thus the first erroneous element of the argument of opposing counsel is that it ignores a simple fact, to wit: the note is one contract and the mortgage is another separate contract. Opposing counsel is seeking to mislead the court into ignoring the mortgage contract and laws concerning conditions precedent and standing to enforce the mortgage contract which is a security instrument, despite arguments to the contrary offered up by opposing counsel. If a mortgage is not a security instrument then it will come as unwelcome news to the holders of tens of millions of mortgages on real property.
In practice there are some presumptions that arise from possession and rights to enforce the promissory note in residential mortgage transactions; but those presumptions can be rebutted when, for example, the presumption of ownership of the loan is rebutted by evidence or inference or legal presumption — i.e., a showing that the claimant is neither the owner of the debt nor representing any owner of the debt who paid for it — or by undermining the use of the legal presumptions arising from their claims of possession, ownership or rights to enforce the promissory note. Those legal presumptions are those that allow a court tor reasonably conclude that the claimant is the owner of the debt and therefore would be receiving restitution for an unpaid debt to satisfy an unpaid debt due to the claimant.
Opposing counsel seeks to remove the very purpose of such legal presumptions, arguing instead that ownership of the debt is irrelevant and that anyone can initiate proceedings to forcibly divest title and peaceful possession from a homeowner merely by showing possession of the promissory note — thus wholly ignoring the conditions precedent to enforcement of the mortgage. The question of whether the proceeds of a foreclosure sale would go to pay anyone who had suffered actual economic loss from nonpayment is thus rendered irrelevant. Opposing counsel wishes this court to divert from current laws of enforcement of mortgages to new “interpretations” that only require certain conditions that allow for enforcement of the promissory note in residential mortgage transactions while ignoring any laws regarding the actual mortgage.
The fundamental flaw in their argument is that if they were right, then a few other things would also be true. The motive is clear — to provide a legal theory in which ownership of the debt is completely divorced from enforcement of the mortgage. This opens the door to moral hazard and outrage. Foreclosure, which is enforcement of a security instrument, is widely considered to be the most severe penalty under civil law — the equivalent of capital punishment in criminal law. It results in the loss of homestead property. Opposing counsel would have this court believe that no statutory law controls the conditions precedent to initiating a foreclosure proceeding. Such an offering is both absurd and dangerous.

First, the result of their intentionally misleading argument would be that there is no provision in the entire Uniform Commercial Code governing the conditions in which a mortgage could be enforced. This argument, wholly specious, produces the anomalous result of having no statutory authority setting forth standards for foreclosure and leaving it entirely to interpretation of contract law. If this were true, then foreclosure law would be entirely common law doctrine and would lead to wildly inconsistent results.
This is not the case. Foreclosure law is consistent in all U.S. jurisdictions precisely because the standards are the same, to wit: only the owner of the debt can authorize initiation of foreclosure proceedings because only the owner of the debt is an injured party arising from nonpayment. Opposing counsel is attempting to alter this paradigm and  enable virtually anyone with the right information to bring a foreclosure action, pocket the proceeds, and divest the homeowner of ownership and peaceful enjoyment of their home. Foreclosure is not and should not be an opportunity for entrepreneurs to generate revenue. Foreclosure is intended, by statute, to be strictly limited to a remedy (restitution) for an unpaid debt. Opposing counsel seeks to expand the remedy of foreclosure from restitution for an unpaid debt to the owner for the debt to a whole new concept — generation of revenue without regard to the owner of the debt.
Second, their argument is disingenuous. They are trying to get the court the court to assume that there is no UCC provision under Article 9 for enforcement of a security instrument against the owner of real property while at the same time they seek to use the UCC provisions under Article 3 to support legal presumptions that they are in fact owners of the debt and authorized to enforce not only the promissory note, which is governed by Article 3 but the mortgage which they say is not governed by anything. Thus they invoke the UCC for their purpose of invoking foreclosure procedure while at the same time they deny the application of the UCC to the actual enforcement of the mortgage.
Hence they seek to shift the focus from enforcement of the mortgage to enforcement of the note. In other words they want it both ways, to wit: they want the legal presumptions under Article 3 which removes any obligation to prove payment for the debt payment with evidence but they want to remove any possibility of rebutting those presumptions as being irrelevant, because now under their theory they don’t need to be or represent anyone who owns the debt by virtue of having paid for it.
Thus anyone who claims to possess the note and have the status of someone who could enforce it would also automatically be conclusively presumed to be able to enforce the mortgage. According to the argument proposed by opposing counsel, the note should be converted from being considered evidence of the debt to actually being the debt and the facts be damned. If someone else paid for the debt, they are automatically excluded from the foreclosure process — which means that the one party who actually might have suffered from nonpayment by the borrower gets none of the proceeds.
Hence the basic premise behind the argument of opposing counsel is to undermine existing law and replace it with a haphazard set of possible interpretations.
Next look at their convoluted attempt to state that Article 9 does not cover real estate transactions.
First, looking at the simple wording of Article 9, §203 UCC, if there was meant to be an exclusion or exemption, it would be there. No such exclusion or exemption exists. The argument of opposing counsel consists entirely of twisting other provisions of UCC, as adopted by the laws of the State of Hawaii, to mean that the law does not mean what it says when it relates to a residential mortgage. Without ambiguity, the court has no power to “interpret” the statute to mean something other than what is says. Yet opposing counsel seeks to have this court interpret the statute as being irrelevant thus rendering moot the entire concept of a present controversy, legal standing, and public policy.
The rest of opposing counsel’s arguments are rebuffed, rebutted and rejected by his own quotation from Article 9 §308 UCC which states as follows:
“(e) [Lien securing right to payment.]

Perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.”

In plain language, the statute defining perfection of as security instrument includes the word “mortgage,” which is defined in Article 9 § 102 as “(55) “Mortgage” means a consensual interest in real property, including fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation. “Security Instrument” is defined in Article 9 § 102 as “(74) “Security agreement” means an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest” and “secured Party is defined in Article 9 §102 as

“(73) “Secured party” means:

(A) a person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is outstanding;

(B) a person that holds an agricultural lien;

(C) a consignor;

(D) a person to which accountschattel paperpayment intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold;

(E) a trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other representative in whose favor a security interest or agricultural lien is created or provided for; or

(F) a person that holds a security interest arising under Section 2-4012-5052-711(3)2A-508(5), 4-210, or 5-118.”

Opposing counsel attempt to thread the needle by pointing to only one of six possible situations in which the rights arise of a “Secured Party.” A mortgage clearly qualifies as a security interest, as banks and attorneys for banks have argued for centuries. Their position on this issue has been constant and it has been codified into state law that is consistent throughout all U.S. jurisdictions. They have always been right, until they said they were not right.

For all of the above reasons the objections of plaintiff should be overruled, the Plaintiff should be directly ordered to answer the queries of the Defendant and failing that, the Defendant is entitled sanctions and the legal presumption that the Plaintiff is not an owner the debt, not a secured party, has not paid value for the debt, and this does not qualify as an injured party.

California Decision for Borrower Post Sale in Eviction Proceeding

BIG HAT TIP TO STEPHEN LOPEZ, ESQUIRE FOR THIS SAN DIEGO WIN!!

This is the latest of a string of decisions from trial judges who took the time to carefully analyze the law and then facts. In this case the issue was whether the Plaintiff in a lawsuit for Unlawful Detainer could be awarded Summary Judgment simply because the sale had been recorded.

This decision, following the law in all jurisdictions, says that recording the sale is interesting but not dispositive. If the actual sale was void because ti was conducted in favor of a party who was not a true beneficiary under the deed of trust, then the sale itself is void.

This judge quote approvingly from otheor case decisions words to the effect that any other decision would produce the absurd result of allowing completely disinterested parties to issue instructions to sell the property and then claim possession of homestead property.

Despite the long line of “bad results” published, this case shows that a case properly presented, properly argued and based upon sound legal reasoning has a good chance of gaining traction even after the foreclosure has been allowed to proceed. That means you need to prepare and be certain as to your facts and that you don’t ask the court to presume facts in your favor.

We don’t know how this case will  be decided at trial, if there is one. In all probability this case, like thousands of others like it, will most likely be buried by settlement with the homeowner and payment to the homeowner for executing a confidentiality agreement.

For those who bother to actually read the decision it looks like I wrote it. I didn’t. My point is that what I have provided in my articles is not theory. It is fact based upon established law and the real facts of most foreclosure cases. The assignments are void.

If the Plaintiff in this Unlawful Detainer case is unable to prove at trial that it is the owner of the debt it will lose because owning the debt is the key component or element of being a beneficiary under a deed of trust and a key component or element of a valid credit bid.

See 2019.07.15 – Minute order for MSJ

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Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 954-451-1230. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM 
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Key quotes from this decision:

“To establish that he is a proper plaintiff, one who has purchased property at a trustee’s sale and seeks to evict the occupant in possession must show that he acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter “duly perfected” his title.” ((Code Civ. Proc., § 1161 a, subdiv. 3.) (Id.))[California]”

“[W]here the plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action is the purchaser at a trustee’s sale, he or she ‘need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by the purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title.”‘ (Bank of New York Mellon v. Preciado, (2013) 224 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, citing, Old Nat’/ Fin. Servs. V. Seibert (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 460, 465, 239 Cal.Rptr. 728.) “The statute” with which a post-foreclosure plaintiff must prove compliance is Civ. Code, § 2924. (Bank of New York Mellon v. Preciado, supra, citing Seidell v. Anglo-California Trusts Co. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 920, 132 P.2d 12.)

The term ‘duly’ implies that all of those elements necessary to a valid sale exist, else there would not be a sale at all.” (Bank of New York Mellon v. Preciado, supra at 9-10, citing Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837, 841, 327 P .2d 241 [internal citations omitted].) This holding by the court in Preciado makes clear that in Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a post-foreclosure trustee sale cases, a focus on the sale itself (rather than simply the recorded title documentation) is part of the analysis of determining  whether the title was “duly perfected.”

subsequent buyer must also prove that the trustee sale was conducted in accordance with Civ. Code, § 2924 and that title has been duly perfected. (Stephens, Parlain & Cunningham v. Hollis, supra, at p. 242.)

[l]f the borrower defaults on the loan, only the current beneficiary may direct the trustee to undertake the nonjudicial foreclosure process. “[O]nly the ‘true owner’ or ‘beneficial holder’ of a Deed of Trust can bring to completion a nonjudicial foreclosure under California law.” (Barrioneuveo v Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal.2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, 972.” (Id. at pp. 927-928.) Where the nonjudicial post-foreclosure trustee sale is not property initiated, ” … a borrower may base a wrongful foreclosure claim on allegations that the foreclosing party acted without authority because the assignment by which it purportedly became beneficiary under the deed of trust was not merely voidable but void.” (Yvanonova, supra, at pp. 851-852.)

“A void contract is without legal effect. (Rest.2d Contracts,§ 7, com. A.) “It binds no one and is a mere nullity.” (Little v. CFS Service Corp. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1362, 233 Cal.Rptr. 923.) “Such a contract has no existence whatever. It has no legal entity for any purpose and neither action nor inaction of a party to it can validate it …. ” (Colby v. Title Ins. And Trust Co. (1911) 160 Cal. 632, 644, 117 P. 913.) “If a purported assignment necessary to the chain by which the foreclosing entity claims that power is absolutely void, meaning of no legal force or effect whatsoever, [internal citations omitted] the foreclosing entity has acted without legal authority by pursuing a trustee’s sale, and such an unauthorized sale constitutes a wrongful foreclosure. (Yvanonova, supra, at pp. 855-856; citing Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., at pp. 973-974.

it would be an “‘odd result indeed’ were a court to conclude a homeowner had no recourse where anyone, even a stranger to the debt, had declared a default and ordered a trustee’s sale.”

“[w]hen a non-debtholder forecloses, a homeowner is harmed because he or she has lost her home to an entity with no legal right to take it. If not for the void assignment, the incorrect entity would not have pursued a wrongful foreclosure. Therefore, the void assignment is the cause-in-fact of the homeowner’s injury and all he or she is required to allege on the element of prejudice.” (Id. at pp. 555-556.) “A contrary rule would lead to a legally untenable situation – i.e., that anyone can foreclose on a homeowner because someone has the right to foreclose. ‘And since lenders can avoid the court system entirely through nonjudicial foreclosures, there would be no court oversight whatsoever.”‘

McDonough v Smith: High Court Open Door on Fabrication of Evidence

This decision is extremely important for 2 reasons.

1st, it reaffirms a right under federal law to bring an action for damages for fabrication of evidence.

2nd, and equally important, it establishes that the time to bring such a claim does not start until the conclusion of litigation, whether successful or unsuccessful.

see Article on McDonough v Smith McDonough v. Smith, No. 18-485 (U.S. Jun. 20, 2019)

See U.S. Supreme Court mcdonough-v-smith-5

see 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

I am uncertain at the time of writing this as to whether or not any attorney has thought to bring an action for damages based upon this statute. but it certainly seems applicable to foreclosure actions in which assignments, endorsements, notices, correspondence, and even deeds are fabricated for the purposes of obtaining a judgment in court.

[Additional Comments: after analyzing the cases, it would appear that this federal statute provides the basis for a cause of action for money damages and injunction.

However, close analysis of the cases involved strongly indicates that a homeowner will be able to use this statute only if he prevails in the prior foreclosure action.

While many attorneys are bringing wrongful foreclosure claims, and claims based upon fraud, this federal statute is probably an important addition for 2 reasons: (1) the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the case and foreclosure is over and is probably tolled by active concealment; (2) it appears as though the burden of proof might be a mere preponderance of the evidence that fabricated instruments and fabricated testimony were used in the pursuit of a wrongful foreclosure.]

If I am right about the SOL, that eliminates a primary defense of the potential defendants. If I am right about the burden of proof, it makes it far easier to prove a case against the defendants than using a cause of action for fraud.

This statute could be used in conjunction with virtually all foreclosure defenses and which claims of securitization are made and documents are fabricated, robo-signed and forged.

At this point, as any foreclosure Defense Attorney and most pro se litigants can tell you, virtually all foreclosures are based upon some chain of title that includes various alleged transfers or apparent transfers of the subject debt, note or mortgage.

Nearly all such alleged transfers do not exist except for the paper on which a reference is made to an assignment, endorsement, power of attorney or some other document that may or may not exist, and in all probability has been fabricated, backdated, forged and/or robosigned. all such documents are only valid if they refer to an actual event in real life. In connection with loans, the only relevant events are transfers of money. And in real life, in nearly all cases, no transfer of money ever occurred in connection with the execution of documents that were fabricated for the sole purpose of obtaining a foreclosure sale.

if I am correct in my interpretation, the statute could be used to include multiple defendants that might otherwise escape liability for actions alleged in a complaint for damages related to the fabrication of evidence and the use of fabricated evidence in furtherance of the scheme to obtain a wrongful foreclosure.

Breaking it Down: What to Say and Do in an Unlawful Detainer or Eviction

Homeowners seem to have more options than they think in an unlawful detainer action based upon my analysis. It is the first time in a nonjudicial foreclosure where the foreclosing party is actually making assertions and representations against which the homeowner may defend. The deciding factor is what to do at trial. And the answer, as usual, is well-timed aggressive objections mostly based upon foundation and hearsay, together with a cross examination that really drills down.

Winning an unlawful detainer action in a nonjudicial foreclosure reveals the open sores contained within the false claims of securitization or transfer.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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HAT TIP TO DAN EDSTROM

Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiffs title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.” (Emphasis added.) (Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159-160.) My emphasis added

So we can assume that they are specifically preserving your right to sue for damages. But also, if they still have the property you can sue to get it back. If you do that and file a lis pendens they can’t sell it again. If a third party purchaser made the bid or otherwise has “bought” the property you probably can’t touch the third party — unless you can show that said purchaser did in fact know that the sale was defective. Actual knowledge defeats the presumptions of facially valid instruments and recorded instruments.

The principal point behind all this is that the entire nonjudicial scheme and structure becomes unconstitutional if in either the wording of the statutes or the way the statutes are applied deprive the homeowner of due process. Denial of due process includes putting a burden on the homeowner that would not be there if the case was brought as a judicial foreclosure. I’m not sure if any case says exactly that but I am sure it is true and would be upheld if challenged.


It is true that where the purchaser at a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale; but it is only to this limited extent, as provided by the statute, that the title may be litigated in such a proceeding. Hewitt v. Justice’ Court, 131 Cal.App. 439, 21 P.(2d) 641; Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diggs, 134 Cal.App. 278, 25 P.(2d) 522; Berkeley Guarantee Building & Loan Ass’n v. Cunnyngham, 218 Cal. 714, 24 P.(2d) 782. — [160] * * * In our opinion, the plaintiff need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title

So the direct elements are laid out here and other objections to title are preserved (see above):

  • The existence of a sale under nonjudicial statutes
  • Acquisition of title by purchase at the sale
  • Compliance with statutes
  • Compliance with deed of trust

The implied elements and issues are therefore as follows:

  • Was it a Trustee who conducted the sale? (i.e., was the substitution of Trustee valid?) If not, then the party who conducted the sale was not a trustee and the “sale” was not a trustee sale. If Substitution of Trustee occurred as the result of the intervention of a party who was not a beneficiary, then no substitution occurred. Thus no right of possession arises. The objection is to lack of foundation. The facial validity of the instrument raises only a rebuttable presumption.
  • Was the “acquisition” of title the result of a purchase — i.e., did someone pay cash or did someone submit a credit bid? If someone paid cash then a sale could only have occurred if the “seller” (i.e., the trustee) had title. This again goes to the issue of whether the substitution of trustee was a valid appointment. A credit bid could only have been submitted by a beneficiary under the deed of trust as defined by applicable statutes. If the party claiming to be a beneficiary was only an intervenor with no real interest in the debt, then the “bid” was neither backed by cash nor a debt owed by the homeowner to the intervenor. According there was no valid sale under the applicable statutes. Thus such a party would have no right to possession. The objection is to lack of foundation. The facial validity of the instrument raises only a rebuttable presumption.

The object is to prevent the burden of proof from falling onto the homeowner. By challenging the existence of a sale and the existence of a valid trustee, the burden stays on the Plaintiff. Thus you avoid the presumption of facial validity by well timed and well placed objections.

” `To establish that he is a proper plaintiff, one who has purchased property at a trustee’s sale and seeks to evict the occupant in possession must show that he acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter ‘duly perfected’ his title. [Citation.]’ (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251,255, 142 Cal.Rptr. 414,572 P.2d 28; see Cruce v. Stein (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 688,692,304 P.2d 118; Kelliherv. Kelliher(1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 226,232,225 P.2d 554; Higgins v. Coyne (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 69, 73, 170 P2d 25; [*953] Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diggs (1933) 134 Cal.App. 278, 288-289, 25 P2d 522.) One who subsequently purchases property from the party who bought it at a trustee’s sale may bring an action for unlawful detainer under subdivision (b)(3) of section 1161a. (Evans v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cai.App.3d 162, 169, 136 Cal.Rptr. 596.) However, the subsequent purchaser must prove that the statutory requirements have been satisfied, i.e., that the sale was conducted in accordance with section 2924 of the Civil Code and that title under such sale was duly perfected. {Ibid.) ‘Title is duly perfected when all steps have been taken to make it perfect, i.e. to convey to the purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt (Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co, (1951), 37 Cal.2d 644, 649 [234 P.2d 625,40 A.L.R.2d 1238] ), which includes good record title (Gwin v. Calegaris (1903), 139 Cal. 384 [73 P. 851] ), (Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837, 841, 327 P.2d 241.) ¶ To the limited extent provided by subdivision (b){3) of section 1161a, title to the property may be litigated in an unlawful detainer proceeding. (Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159, 69 P.2d 832.) While an equitable attack on title is not permitted (Cheney, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 160, 69 P.2d 832), issues of law affecting the validity of the foreclosure sale or of title are properly litigated. (Seidel) v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cai.App.2d 913, 922, 132 P.2d 12, approved in Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 256, 142 Cal.Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28.)’ ” (Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis (1987) 196 Cai.App.3d 948, 952-953.)
 
Here the court goes further in describing the elements. The assumption is that a trustee sale has occurred and that title has been perfected. If you let them prove that, they win.
  • acquisition of property
  • regularly conducted sale
  • duly perfecting title

The burden on the party seeking possession is to prove its case “beyond all reasonable doubt.” That is a high bar. If you raise real questions and issues in your objections, motion to strike testimony and exhibits etc. they would then be deemed to have failed to meet their burden of proof.

Don’t assume that those elements are present “but” you have a counterargument. The purpose of the law on this procedure to gain possession of property is to assure that anyone who follows the rules in a bona fide sale and acquisition will get POSSESSION. The rights of the homeowner to accuse the parties of fraud or anything else are eliminated in an action for possession. But you can challenge whether the sale actually occurred and whether the party who did it was in fact a trustee. 

There is also another factor which is whether the Trustee, if he is a Trustee, was acting in accordance with statutes and the general doctrine of acting in good faith. The alleged Trustee must be able to say that it was in fact the “new” beneficiary who executed the substitution of Trustee, or who gave instructions for issuing a Notice of Default and Notice of sale.

If the “successor” Trustee does not know whether the “successor” party is a beneficiary or not, then the foundation testimony and exhibits must come from someone who can establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the foreclosure proceeding emanated from a party who was in fact the owner of the debt and therefore the beneficiary under the deed of trust. 

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